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VOLUME I

**The Middle-Belt Movement in Nigerian Political Development:
A Study in Political Identity 1949-1967**

by

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**Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Politics
at the University of Keele, England**

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Dedication

The thesis is dedicated to:

**My parents - Dah Chunun and Ngo Zong, who encouraged me to
persue higher education; and to Garos and KGB-P to aspire
for higher education**

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Preface and Acknowledgements.

Academic interest to study the socio-economic and political issues that caused the organization of the Middle-Belt (M-Belt) movement and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region as a unit of the Nigerian Federation (1949-1967) were shaped by my study of British Politics and the history of Scottish nationalism at Strathclyde University in 1979. These developed from the explanations of Scottish Nationalism and the demands for federation within the United Kingdom to ensure "Scottish Home Rule". Subsequently there were demands for separation and constitution of Scotland into a Scottish-Nation as was the case in the political rhetoric of the Scottish National Party (SNP). The history of Scottish nationalism and the focus of its explanations on the causes for the activation of the Scottish identity for political purposes produced ideas which struck me as applicable to do research on the political and social nature of the problems of politics in the North and Nigeria which produced "the M-Belt identity".

My M.Sc. dissertation in Politics for Strathclyde University on some of the socio-economic and political issues that were raised by Scottish MPs in Parliament in the period between 1974 and 1978 and the relationships that were sought to be established on the Scottish identity as causes for its nationalism, culminating into the Referendum vote of May 1979, also provided me with an initial potential framework. Under the supervision of Mr. J. Dent, I subsequently refined my initially conceived "internal colonial" framework for the analysis of the M-Belt movement and the "sub-national-nationalism" which it exhibited and directed against a dominant Islamic society in the political unit of the North.

The very controvertial academic research of Michael Hechter on the politics of Bristish National Development, in which he used variables from the theory of internal colonialism and the similar, though independent variables, I derived from the empirical study of M. J. Dent on 'The UMBC -

A Minority Party' in Nigerian Politics, refined and encouraged my conceptions of examining the M-Belt groups as internal colonies and the political organizations of the M-Belt movement as a reaction in the ways they were variously affected by the thrust of domination by Islamic groups in the North. Among others, I acknowledge the influence of these two academic studies in shaping my interests on the research topic. My personal prejudices of having origins in one of the M-Belt groups are, however, independent of the analysis in this study.

In acknowledgement of other individual and institutional influences that enabled me to undertake and complete this research, I am grateful to Plateau State Government of Nigeria which initially gave me a scholarship to do post-graduate study in Scotland and England. The University of Jos, subsequently took over sponsorship of my studies in 1981, with a generous award of Training Leave to complete the thesis as part of their Academic Staff Development.

I am grateful to my Supervisor, Mr M. J. Dent, in the very nature of his character, for his generosity of time, academic rigour and patience, with understanding of my changing circumstances while supervising the research; even when I was unable to meet datelines. I am particularly thankful, not only for his altruistic human concern for my welfare with generous financial support while in England, but also for his direct inducement to complete the thesis, to which I am forever grateful. I also benefitted from his wide and indepth knowledge and studies of Nigerian Politics. His personal experiences and understanding of the M-Belt Movement, having been "on-the-spot" in Tiv-land, Bauchi and Kano as DO during Colonial Service was indispensable to some of my analysis.

Furthermore, while directing and supervising this research, Mr. M. J. Dent introduced me to many of his friends in England, who were ex-British ^{officers of the} Colonial and post-Colonial period and his friends in Nigeria who were directly involved in the organization of the M-Belt movement. They were

useful sources to me because they shared experiences and political views of the M-Belt movement and conceptions of its political identity. In that connection, I am grateful to friends in England such as John Smith, Professor A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Sir T. H. Marshall, Professor D. M. Muffet; and in Nigeria, Ajiva Aji, Isaac Shaahu, Jonah Assadugu, Isaac Kpum, Moses Nyam Rwang, Azi Nyako, Patrict Dokotri, Pastor David Lot and Professor Armstrong of Ibadan University. They granted me interviews and discussed the M-Belt movement "as they saw it" in the period between 1950 and 1965. I am also grateful to Mr. David Williams and Averill McGarvey, of West Africa Magazine and editor of Nigeria Newsletter in London, respectively, for discussions of various topics on Nigerian Politics, before and after independence in 1960. It was by relating the experiences and views of all these friends to my research work that my ideas were refined from the array of facts and initial prejudices, with which I surrounded the M-Belt problem in the North and in Nigerian Politics.

Many of my friends in Keele University encouraged and assisted my efforts in many different ways to complete the thesis. To them I owe gratitudes, particularly to Mrs Grace Osman and her husband Mike. I must also acknowledge the warmth and kindness of Miss Young and the Politics Department as well as of the Academic Community in Keele, which created a conducive atmosphere for research and thus reduced the "temperature".

Lastly, but not the least, I am grateful to Mrs Denis Tyson, who typed some of my final drafts and to Linda and Dawn of Keele University, who demonstrated an enviable harmony between human, machine and paper, in typing the remaining final drafts of the thesis.

Paul Chunun Logams.

30th January, 1985.

Abstract.

The study examines causes of the Middle-Belt movement and its identity in Northern Nigeria. It relates this identity to Nigerian Politics and Federation. The study suggests that internal colonialism of the Islamic society on the M-Belt groups were contributive to activating minorities identities and the organization of the M-Belt movement. The roots of internal colonial relationships were from a colonial system which the British incorporated with the M-Belt groups in 1900. In the processes of incorporation before 1940, British administration subordinated many M-Belt groups to Islamic leadership.

The M-Belt movement was a reaction to colonial relationships and domination by culturally different groups. The reaction took the form of activating tribal support for creation of a M-Belt Region. This was meant to separate the M-Belt and the Islamic society into different units of the Federation. Tribal identities developed from chieftancy institutions among some of the M-Belt groups were reinforced by modernization, with European Missionaries dominating the processes and produced Christian political leadership. The tribal identities, were complemented by a trans-tribal Christian religious identity, to produce cohesion and collective political demands. Variation in processes of modernization between the Islamic society and M-Belt groups in a North, under Islamic leadership, conditioned support of non-Islamic groups for the M-Belt movement. The combination of these factors and with the North as an outsized unit, produced conceptions of regionalism. The thesis studies the furtherance of their cause in the development of Middle-Belt political parties and the UMBC party under the leadership of J. S. Tarka.

While the causes for the regionalism resulted into re-structuring of Nigeria in 1967 in which Benue-Plateau State emerged and enclosed prominent minorities in the M-Belt Movement, sub-regionalism produced localism.

Although localism in the political identity of M-Belt groups, destroyed conceptions of the M-Belt, its religious identity remains powerful in Nigerian Politics.

Outline of the thesis

The thesis has two parts: Part I with Chapters 1 and 2 provide the historical background to the problems of the M-Belt groups and the M-Belt movement; and Part II with Chapters 3, 4, 5 and an Epilogue, together produce an account of the M-Belt movement from its social foundations in Christianity and political origins in the tribal union movements among the M-Belt groups, to the present shape and nature of the M-Belt political identity on the contemporary Nigerian political arena. Part I also has an introduction, which explains the theoretical framework in the analysis of the research evidence, produces a review of previous research on the M-Belt movement and explains some of the methodological problems and data base in the research.

Chapter 1 traces the nature of the historical roots of the M-Belt problem and places this, in the establishment of an indigenous Islamic system. The socio-economic and political relationship of the society established by dan Fodio was not successful in politically and religiously incorporating all of the non-Islamic groups by conquest in the M-Belt areas. It left a history of socio-economic and political exploitation and depopulation by slave raids which affected all of the M-Belt groups in varying degrees in the period between 1804 and 1900. Chapter 2 examines socio-political and economic transformation, the groups in the territories that became the North experienced, upon impact with British conquest and influences. The British created a political unit of the North, which enclosed the Islamic society established by dan Fodio, the Islamic Kingdom of Borno and the non-Islamic groups of the M-Belt areas. The non-Islamic groups were victims of slave-raids from both Borno and the Sokoto based Islamic society. While there was an end to exploitative slave raids by the Islamic societies on the M-Belt groups, upon impact with British influences, the British preferred to establish authority within the existing

framework of the structures of control and leadership of the Islamic Society over most of the North. These subordinated the M-Belt groups to Fulani and Islamic leadership and increased their cultural influences over the M-Belt areas, a process that was characterized by the systematic destruction of the disparate cultures of the M-Belt groups. The cultures of the M-Belt groups were seen to be underdeveloped and backward. The Fulani and the Islamic identity became symbols of unity and developed to underline the ethos in the political identity of the North.

Chapter 3 traces the social foundations and political origins of the M-Belt movement in the tribal unions as political organizations that were direct reactions to subordination and processes of modernization in the M-Belt areas. Modernization by Christian Missionary activities transformed the traditional world views of groups in the M-Belt areas and created Christian consciousness with an explicit social identity which became used for political purposes. While the Christian religion produced a social movement, Christian social and welfare institutions produced an educated elite which activated tribal identities to complement the focus of tribal unity on the Chieftaincies institutions. The tribal union movements became the instruments which articulated the socio-economic and political grievances of government in the midst of rapid modernization processes. Many of the M-Belt groups shared similar socio-economic and political problems which were independently articulated by the tribal unions.

Chapter 4 traces and examines the political growth and development of the M-Belt movement from the non-Muslim League (NML) of Northern Nigeria to the all embracing political organization, the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) which stood as the ostensible political party to form a government in a M-Belt Region, under the leadership of Joseph Tarka. The Chapter also examines the conditions under which the support for the movement and leadership shifted its base from the Plateau, where it was began among the Birom, to Southern Zaria, Southern Bauchi and Adamawa and then southwardly

to Benue, where it finally settled among the Tiv and the leadership of Joseph Tarka. The growth and development of the M-Belt movement is examined in the context of the differences in support and opposition to the demands for the creation of a M-Belt region. Most of the M-Belt groups were subordinated to Islamic leadership in government in the North and felt deprived in the distribution of socio-economic and welfare infrastructure which were conditioned by support for the ruling NPC party in the North. One of the means, some of the M-Belt groups used to benefit from the distribution of amenities from the ruling party, was in their submission to patron-client relationships with leadership of the ruling party, the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). Patron-client relationships are examined in this Chapter as they reflected the extent to which they eroded support for the M-Belt movement in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region and in the specific ways they managed to hold the North together, despite manifest political tensions from the separatist tendencies in the M-Belt areas. Institutional means in undercutting support for the ideas of the M-Belt movement for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the North are also analyzed particularly the Hudson Report in 1957 and the Willink Commission on Minorities Fears in Nigeria in 1958, which recommended that it was unnecessary to create more Regions in Nigeria. The 1959 elections are analyzed as a test of electoral support for the M-Belt areas. The chapter also produces some explanatory reasons on why in the period between 1960 and 1965, the M-Belt movement in its phase as the UMBC party was virtually driven underground with only electoral support still manifest among the Tiv.

Chapter 5 examines the political influences of the M-Belt movement when Nigeria came under Military Governments, in the particular period of the January and July 1966 coups d'etat, the Ad Hoc Constitutional conferences, through to the creation of states in 1967. The Chapter also examines the relationships in behaviour and political loyalty of both the

Nigerian army (the majority of whom were M-Belt soldiers) and politicians with the M-Belt identity in the North and at the National level. While rejecting the Islamic society in the context of politics in the North, in the practice of politics with the M-Belt identity, M-Belt politicians are as much Northern as their counter parts in the Islamic society when it comes to issues on the domination of the North by southerners. At the same time the M-Belt is always prepared to use its socio-religious and political identity to restrain Northern separatism. The M-Belt identity is, however, a distinct identity within the Northern political identity: An identity that always presupposes an alternative Northern identity rather than a rejection of the Northern political identity, particularly for the purposes of balancing the sharing of power in the Nigerian Federation. The Chapter therefore also examines the interplay of these identities and how they saved the Nigerian Federation and caused the creation of BP state in the state creation exercise in 1967 by General Yakubu Gowon. In 1967 BP state was conceived of as the nucleus of a wider conception of the M-Belt Region that might develop to enclose all of the M-Belt groups.

The Epilogue discusses the aftermath of the M-Belt movement and its political struggle and examines what happened to conceptions of BP state as the nucleus of the M-Belt Region of Joseph Tarka. Although optimism characterized initial politics in BP state, the inertia of elite interests caused the wider regionalism conceived of in the state to degenerate into localism and the state tragically disintegrated into Benue and Plateau states in 1976. The Epilogue also examines the extent to which the territorial disintegration of the M-Belt identity affects persisting conceptions of the socio-religious and political identity of the M-Belt groups in Nigerian politics.

PART I

**Historical Background to the Middle-Belt (M-Belt) Problem
In the North**

Introduction: the theoretical framework of analysis and a review of previous academic literature on the Middle Belt (M-Belt) movement.

I. Introduction.

This study on the M-Belt Movement in Nigerian political development has two major themes, both themes being concerned with political identity in politics in the Federation. Firstly, the study examines the extent to which it is possible to have sub-nationalism in a Federal system focussing on a separate unit of the Federation, but not directed into a separate nation. As it will become apparent in the study, the M-Belt identity was an identity within an identity in both the North and in the political conception of the Nigerian nation-state as a Federation. The strength of emotions which surrounded the conceptions of the M-Belt religious and political identity, in terms of its demands on the system were only comparable to the Indian Federation where regional and provincial identities tend to wish separation with almost equal vigour from the existing units. The second theme in the study is that of a religious identity of Christians, supported by non-Moslems against Muslims in the North in a demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region as a unit of the Nigerian Federation. However, this Christian religious identity is not able to express itself overtly on the political arena at both the regional and national level, except at rare intervals. This is so because both the British colonial regime and the evolving Nigerian political culture, discouraged political parties and organizations with explicitly religious identities. Nevertheless, although the identity is submerged, it is powerfully reinforced by tribal identities and the unique geographical setting of the areas it exists on. The religious and political identity of the M-Belt movement also drew its strength from a situation of perceived socio-economic and political deprivations and the subordinate status of the non-Islamic groups in the North. These latter circumstances of the M-Belt

groups, in some ways conform to a situation of internal colonialism in the North. The study uses the theory of internal colonialism as a model in the analysis of researched evidence to explain the causes for the activation of the M-Belt religious and political identity in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt region and as a political force in Nigerian politics.

II. The theoretical perspectives of conflict models in the analysis of the problems of politics in the plural society of Northern Nigeria.

The existence of a plural society is an essential condition for the analysis of political problems with conflict models. This is particularly the case with the theory of internal colonialism which suggests that a situation of plurality exists with inequalities among the group members of a society. This in turn produces potential and sometimes, actual unequal socio-economic and political relationships between the different cultural collectivities and as these relationships polarize interests between the political groups, they also generate conflict. The conflict is essentially one between dominant groups who subordinate other groups in the system¹.

The North in Nigeria comprised the highest socio-political and religious plurality of any of the regional units of the Federation. There were over 200 different tribal groups in the Region. Two universal religions existed side by side of each other: Islam and Christianity. Christianity itself in the North was characterized by between seven to twelve different denominations among three different groups: Roman Catholics, Protestants and "indigenous African Christianity" (churches). Furthermore, Protestants had about nine different denominations which operated in the North². Islam too had its own divisions and these varied along two main lines: the brotherhoods of the Kadiriya and the Tijania Muslims. Besides the variety of the two universal religions there were also many traditional African systems of beliefs and religion, differently practiced by the over 200 tribal groups, the so called "pagan and

animistic" religions. The situation of plurality in the North obviously had enormous potential for severe political conflict, particularly so when the cultural groups were unequal in size and socio-economic and political development.

However most of the plurality in the North was contained in the M-Belt areas, where the tribal groups were many (over 150), smaller in numerical size and territory - the most dominant of the minorities being the Tiv (4.6% of the population in the North in 1952), the Igalla (1.7%), the Idoma (1.6%) and the Birom (0.7%)³. The M-Belt areas comprised 26.3% of the population of the North in 1952, 35.9% of the land area and 13.5% of the Nigerian population⁴. The Islamic society in the North, was therefore bigger in territorial size and more homogeneous in culture than the M-Belt areas. The homogeneity of the Islamic society derived from linguistic uniformity (the Hausa language), similarities of culture and life style (from the influences of the Islamic culture established as early as in the 11th century) and most importantly, the Islamic religion submerged tribal identities between the dominant Hausa-Fulani-Kanuri-Ilorin-Yoruba and Nupe groups. The Hausa comprised (31.7% of the population of the North), Fulani (16.5%), the Kanuri (7.5%), the Yoruba of Ilorin (2.4%) and the Nupe (1.9%)⁵. The territories of the Islamic Society covered about 61.6% of the land area in the North, excluding the Yoruba irredentist areas of Ilorin and Kabba Provinces and 30.8% of the Nigerian population⁶. However, the North as a whole comprised 78% of the land area of Nigeria, over 52% of the Nigerian population and 50% of the 24 Nigerian Provinces, as the administrative units of the regional government in 1952⁷. The two broadly categorized groups in the territories of the North, the Islamic Society and the M-Belt groups, are the focus of the analysis of political conflict which this study examines with the provisions of the conflict model as suggested by the theory of internal colonialism.

The theory of internal colonialism derives from the general theory of

classical colonialism as a social, economic and political system. It also has to do with colonization as a process as was practiced in particular by European nations on Asia, Latin America and Africa, in which there was forceful occupation of foreign-land, followed by establishment of political control and domination, exploitation, oppression, discrimination, prejudice in social relations etc., by a foreign minority over an indigenous majority. The theory of internal colonialism is the theory of colonialism applied with some modification to analyze the structural political relationships between unequal groups, within the same national borders, in which some groups exist in a colonial situation and who, when they gain consciousness on their circumstances, they organize themselves politically for liberation by demanding separation. This can be separation to constitute a new nation, as it is the case with the Basque separatist movement in Spain, Eritrean separatism in Ethiopia and the previous demands of the SNP for the Scots in British politics; or when the type of political system itself conditions the patterns of political demands, as was the case with the M-Belt groups, where separation was demanded for constitution into another unit of the Nigerian Federation. The theory has been applied to countries with minorities problems as diverse in political systems as the USSR, South Africa, China, Italy, USA, Kenya, the UK, Canada and most of the South American countries with Indian minority problems⁸. According to George Balandier, the colonial situation is one in which a particular society exhibits two notable characteristics: there is a colonized society which has an overwhelming numerical superiority and secondly, such numerical superiority is characterized by radical domination to which it is subjected⁹. Although in the colonial situation, the colonized society is in the numerical majority, it is nevertheless a sociological minority. This is so, because:

"Colonization means power which entails the loss of autonomy and a de jure or de facto trusteeship. The function of each segments of the colonial society is to ensure domination in a well defined domain (political, economic and almost always spiritual). The subordination of the colonized society, is for along time absolute, because of its lack of advanced technology and of material might, other than that of numbers. This subordination is expressed both de factor and de jure. It rests on an ideology, a system of pseudo-justification and rationalization, it has more or less avowed or manifest racist basis. The colonized society is subjected to the pressure of all the groups constituting the "colony". All these groups are in some way superordinate in relation to the colonized whose subjection is thereby felt all the more. For the colonials, the colonized are above all an insturment for the creation of a wealth of which they retain only a small part, in spite of their numbers. This role conditions in part, the relations of the colonized with the various colonial groups, which derive that economic privileges from the colonized society. Because of the lack of unity of the colonized society and even more so, because of its cultural heterogeneity, the relationships between the exploiter and the exploited, between the dominant and the dominated are anything but simple... The colonized society is different from the colonial society by race and culture... expressed in the language by opposition of 'primitive' and civilized, 'pagan' and Christian, 'backward' cultures and technical cultures"¹⁰.

One of the most severe critisms the theory of internal colonialism has faced as avariant of the conflict models in the analysis of problems of politics in the plural society has been that it is inconcieveable to have colonialism within the very boundaries of a nation-state¹¹. It is pointed out that colonialism and colony are normally associated with a land and a people subjected to and physically separated geographically from the 'Mother-Country'. The significant empirical differences in the history and social conditions in the 'Mother-Country and Colony-Country' conception of colonialism are also pointed to, as obscurantist and misleading in the analogy¹². Under colonialism, it is further argued, the colony is a source of cheaply produced raw materials such as agricultural produce and

minerals, which the 'Mother-Country' processes into finished products and sells at high profits sometimes back to the colony¹³. The colony itself is also a source of cheap labour, both within the 'colony-country', used for construction work and mining activities, as much as in the 'Mother-Country' where it is used to work in textile industries, dockyards and other 'low-status' jobs, as was the case in Britain after 1945 when West Indian immigrants were encouraged to take up new opportunities in Lancaster, Liverpool, London and Manchester. Obviously, it would be overstretching the theory of colonialism in internal colonialism beyond usefulness and forcing the analogy into a situation that does not fit, if all the elements were to be applied wholesale without modification on the experiences of the M-Belt groups in their relations with the Islamic society in the North, in order to produce explanatory reasons for the causes of the M-Belt movement in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt region. Suffice to say, the above features in the critique of internal colonialism from the pattern of classical colonial types of relationships, do not apply to the relationships that existed between the Islamic society and the M-Belt groups in the North of Nigeria. The conventional critiques of the theory of internal colonialism are useful to the extent that they point to the significant differences between internal patterns of colonialism, that is, colonialism within national borders or a unit of a Federation like the North in Nigeria and the overseas situation in which colonialism is superimposed over all in the Nation-State. In using the theory of internal colonialism, it is the objective colonial relationships which are vital and which count in the analogy and from which parallels are drawn rather than the dramatic geographical differences between European Colonial Creations and the European Nations. The theory is useful as an analytical category, because it provides a more adequate framework, when compared to the conflict - consensus models, in the description of how some groups relate to the larger whole, not as participants who belong, but as resources to be

exploited, administered and sometimes mobilized, not as loyal citizens, but as cannon-fodder, in a situation in which the state can act as an autonomous factor in transforming or reinforcing the social order¹⁴.

However, it is not suggested that the theory explains every aspect of the M-Belt movement and the political identity it activated in the cause of the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in Nigerian political development. The powerful analytical thrust of the theory ends with the destruction of the control and domination of the Hausa-Fulani Muslims on the M-Belt areas in 1967, when the North and Nigeria was re-arranged from a four to a twelve - unit structure of the Nigerian Federation.

There are therefore numerous elements of the general theory of colonialism, to suggest that the M-Belt groups existed in a situation of internal colonialism in relation to the Islamic society, within the very boundaries of the British created North after 1900. These explain the reaction of the M-Belt groups in the organization of a political movement that demanded for separation from the Islamic society and their constitution into a M-Belt Region as a unit of the Nigerian Federation in the period between 1949 and 1967. In the period predating British establishment of the North, as from 1804 there existed an indigenous Islamic colonial system which made socio-economic and political thrusts of conquest toward the M-Belt areas from Sokoto. This indigenous colonial system established a centre and a periphery to which it assigned surrogates to manage the periphery on the claimed territories both those already conquered and others still unconquered. The conquest of the periphery was followed in most instances by colonization and this affected the M-Belt groups in Adamawa, Southern Bauchi, some parts of the Plateau (Kanam, Wase, Dengi, Lafia, Keffi, Jemaa) as well as the Northern parts of Tiv and Idoma land. The political rulership and the judicial administration of the conquered areas with a colonizing population was in most instances Hausa-Fulani and Islamic. In certain instances, however, the Islamic rulers

established political control through an 'indirect rule' system, as was the case with the Angas in Kanam, the Yergam in Wase and Dengi. The Tiv and the Idoma in the Benue valley and most of the groups on the Plateau, however, maintained their independence, although occasionally raided for slaves. Some, more often than others, as was the case with the Plateau group when compared to the Tiv and Idoma. An indigenous colonial system within the very political boundaries of the British created North, therefore, conditioned internal colonialism when the Islamic society and the M-Belt groups were enclosed into one political unit. In the instance political power relationships were modified and in certain instances remained unaltered and were even reinforced to the advantages of the Islamic society under Muslim leadership in the particular application of the British policy of indirect rule.

The historical evidence suggests that in an earlier period and in the particular period between 1804 and 1900 as part of the causes for the organization of the M-Belt movement and the activated political identities it used to gain support, the socio-economic and political experiences in the relationships of the M-Belt groups and societies with the Islamic Societies (Sokoto and Borno) in the territories that came to be defined as the North in Nigeria, might best be described and explained in terms of imperialism and colonialism. These experiences were latterly recollected and they reinforced social and political support for the M-Belt movement and the religious and political identity in the organization in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. The years between 1900 and 1950, however, was a period in which both the indigeneous colonial system and some of its victims, became forcefully incorporated into one political unit of the North, upon impact with British and European influences through conquest and persuasion. In that period conditions were created from the military and political measures of the government of British administration in which the M-Belt groups existed subordinated to the indigenous colonial

system in the Islamic society. These conditions of subordination, created a premise for the M-Belt groups to exist as internal colonies in relation to the Islamic society. Although the period between 1950 and 1967 contained very many political complexities and was characterized by a measure of political skills that were meant to reduce political consciousness (by careful building of patron-client relationships in the political recruitment of leadership from the M-Belt areas) on the patterns and shapes in the development of society in the North (the Western European type as was the case in the M-Belt areas as against the Islamic model in the rest of the North), it is appropriately described as one in which there was internal colonialism, with the M-Belt groups existing in a dependent and subordinate position in relationship to the Islamic Society. The evidence of that period, which is the main thrust of the study, suggests that there was not only dependence and subordination, but the M-Belt groups were considered to be and treated as 'second-class' citizens of the North by the Islamic society. The increasing methods to consolidate the dominance of the Islamic society and dependence of the M-Belt groups in the midst of anxieties over British departure, had an implicit, although at times an explicit alliance between, on the one hand, the sponsoring imperial power of Britain and Islamic leadership with roots from the indigenous colonial system in the Islamic society of the North; and on the other hand, between clients drawn from among the M-Belt groups and political leadership of the Islamic Society. This was particularly manifested in the recruitment of leadership and political participation in governance of the North albeit the Nigerian Federation which came from the NPC party, the party of the Northern establishment. There is evidence which suggests that British imperialism in the North, was not only colonialism between the metropolitan country and the artificially created North, which subsequently was part of the Nigerian political state¹⁵; but it was also and resulted into internal colonial relationships of a dominant indigenous

group in the Islamic society with the British in support as 'joint-political-masters', on the subordinated M-Belt groups who had been territorially incorporated in the political unit of the North. The dependency of the M-Belt groups within the dependency of the Islamic society on the British, resulted into the unequal development of some sections of the North with concomitant consequences of the failure of social and political incorporation of some of the M-Belt groups into the Islamic society and culture, despite the success of territorial incorporation. The political struggle of these groups (indirectly involving the British, but primarily between the Islamic and the M-Belt groups) in the politics of the North and Nigeria, ultimately led to the development of control and dependency in the allocation of socio-economic and political derivations from governments in which political status conceptions rooted in specific political identities conditioned the rulership of one group (collectively the M-Belt areas) by the other (the Islamic society). It was in this situation that the M-Belt groups found themselves as malcontents and their grievances subsequently became articulated by Christian leadership in the M-Belt Movement in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region to adjust for their inequalities.

However, compounding the general patterns of inequalities in the socio-economic and political development of groups and societies in the North, in the context of the growth of conditions of internal colonial relations from the period between 1900 and 1950 in the subsequent functioning of the M-Belt groups as internal colonies in the period between 1950 and 1967, there is also evidence that suggests migration and colonization from the Islamic Society to territories that were unequivocally M-Belt. The social effects of this migration was characterized by a systematic physical subjugation and dehumanization of the cultures of the non-Islamic, non-Hausa-Fulani groups and in particular, those of the M-Belt areas in the North. There is evidence which

further suggests that the processes in the systematic destruction of the cultures of some of the M-Belt groups, took roots from and were shaped by the ideology of the expansion of the Islamic society after 1804 when it was in its period of classical colonialism under the Fulani and their surrogate leadership. However the process was a religious and political parcel of the political processes of incorporation of the non-Islamic groups that took place in the region.

These processes were accelerated in the period of British conquest and by the subsequent political measures in the administrative policies that were used to control the direction of the incorporation of the M-Belt groups into the Islamic society and in the evolving political identity of the North as a premise of unity. The initial policy of indirect rule, for example, laid explicit claims to rulership on the colonizing Islamic population in the M-Belt areas in the period between 1900 and 1930. However in the late 1930s and in the 1940s, there was resurgence of tribal identity from among the M-Belt groups which was used to make demands for the institutions of "Chieftaincies like Emirs", the symbol of the policy of indirect rule and which also served as the symbol of tribal unity. There is also evidence to suggest that in the same period, in the midst of accelerated processes of social and political incorporation of the M-Belt groups and societies into the Islamic society and culture by the government of British administration in the North, the social and religious activities of European Christian Missionaries were encouraged in the M-Belt areas and these altered the 'World Views' and created popular consciousness in the population that was non-Islamic in the M-Belt areas. European Christian Missionaries established institutions and values that contained attractions to European and British patterns of transforming society in the M-Belt areas. It was the Christian religious activities of European Missionaries that caused popular consciousness on the patterns of dominance and the developing shape of society in the North, to permeate and activate the

articulation of the difference in social and political identity between the M-Belt groups and the Islamic society. This consciousness was reinforced by a sense of relative deprivation when there existed a developed Islamic sector with prestigious norms, rooted in a proud cultural tradition of Islam, universally contesting with Christianity and Western European culture and a culturally undeveloped M-Belt area developing with conflictful images of its own culture and the European type. In the midst of these images there was underdevelopment of socio-economic and welfare infrastructure in the M-Belt areas. The differences in political roles and participation in the institutions of society in the North from deprivation were assumed to be the causes of the underdevelopment of the M-Belt areas. It was the perceptions of these differences that caused the organization of a M-Belt Movement.

The deriveable variables as indicators of these perceptions are used in the study to suggest that the political demands for separation from the Islamic society in the North and constitution into a M-Belt Region as another unit of the Nigerian Federation in the political articulation of the M-Belt groups in the M-Belt movement was conditioned by socio-economic and political inequalities. Uneven development in the historical progression of the development of groups and societies in the territories that became the North in Nigeria are therefore taken to be the most determinate factors in the explanation of the causes of the M-Belt movement and the demands of separation from the Islamic society. The mobilization of the Christian religious identity as a political identity of minorities among the M-Belt groups and societies was conditioned by the conceptions of a minority Christian religion and cultures in relation to their access to control of political power and participatory roles in decision making in Government in the North and Nigeria as it affected the distribution of development relative to the Islamic society and as they were related to the distribution of uneven development in the North which affected the M-Belt

groups. The initial political force of the Christian religious identity was reinforced as a political identity of non-Muslims by historical recollections of experiences in socio-economic and political relationships of the M-Belt groups with Islamic leadership or its surrogates from the Islamic society. This was subsequently boosted by perceptions in the unequal distribution of social-welfare and economic infrastructure in the modernization patterns that were taking place in the North. The matrix of the causal variables in the analysis of the M-Belt Movement and the causes of the demands for the creation of a M-Belt movement therefore centre on: uneven development of some sections of the North, mainly the M-Belt areas, which conditioned the activation and mobilization of the Christian religious identity as a political identity among the European educated persons, indigenous to the M-Belt areas. These persons then organized a M-Belt movement in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. The political problems in the politics of the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, as a unit of the Nigerian Federation, among some of the causes, was Nigerian political development with Federation itself, whose unit of the North contained a system of dominance and exploitation (not in the Marxian economic sense) that developed from the partial political incorporation of some of the M-Belt groups. This in one respect, was a result of the state-formation processes that existed in the territories that became the North in 1900.

However, the system of dominance and exploitation was reinforced and partially consolidated in the first fifty years of direct British administration of the North and Nigeria. A further hypothesis therefore is: British and European influences in the North laid the foundation of an unequal modern social order in which a rapidly modernizing and socially mobilized population in the M-Belt areas accepted European patterns of development with a Christian religious identity existed in subordination to a conservative Islamic leadership and society. The existence of the

Christian religious identity which combined, with already nurtured tribal political identities subsequently fed into the M-Belt movement, to produce political consciousness on the internal colonial situation of non-Islamic groups in the North, particularly those of the M-Belt groups. The M-Belt groups, therefore, sought political action in the organization of a M-Belt movement, to demand the creation of a M-Belt Region in the search for solutions to their socio-economic and political problems in the prestigious federal arrangements of the Nigerian political state. However, underlining the conceptions of the M-Belt political identity in Nigerian politics, was Christian solidarity in the religious identity of the M-Belt movement as it contrasted with the Islamic identity in the North. Northern Christians, therefore, developed from this premise to hold a delicate political and social balance of power, between the Islamic society and Southern Nigerian groups over the potential of Islamic hegemony in Nigeria.

The analysis of the M-Belt movement with the internal colonial analogy, produces a framework with which the movement is viewed and explained as one whole collective process of reaction to the dominant Islamic society by the M-Belt minorities of the North. This is unlike the case with what has characterized previous studies of the M-Belt movement.

III. Previous Perspectives in the Academic Literature on the M-Belt Movement

The political influences of the M-Belt movement in Nigerian political development have never been studied in any systematic way to produce one whole thematic picture of the interplay of religious and subnational political identities it activated in the causes of its demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. The academic literature on the M-Belt movement, particularly the empirical work of M.J. Dent on the Tiv and the UMBC party under the leadership of Joseph Tarka¹⁶, as well as the non-academic studies of previous research on the M-Belt movement, have

focussed on particular tribal reactions to domination of the Islamic society in the North and largely by-passed the analysis of the content and the political force of the wider religious and political identity of the M-Belt groups as minorities in Nigerian politics. Except for the research of Tseayo on the Tiv, which used the sociological theory of 'encapsulation, incorporation and integration', and that by Okpu on all minorities movements in Nigeria, which used the 'incompatibility, response and confrontation' model, most other studies of the movement have been outside theoretical considerations¹⁷. The bulk of the academic studies of Nigerian politics, however, have simply brought to the focus of general knowledge on the existence of the M-Belt problem in the North in Nigerian politics and the M-Belt movement alongside of their main themes without analysis of the political identity of the movement itself¹⁸. The mode of analysis in most of these previous studies on the M-Belt movement, however, are underlined by conflict-consensus models which derive from the theories of politics in the plural society.

Most plural theories are essentially concerned with the achievement of stability or "equilibrium" in deeply divided societies, characterized by organizational interest groups¹⁹. Plural theories in general are equilibrium theories of society²⁰. They predict political premises of stability or non-stability however conceived. Thus, for example, a pluralistic model of society emphasizes the divisiveness and conflict aspect of social life. It also emphasizes the relationships between deprived minorities and dominant elitist groups as well as an integrative aspect of society where the emphasis is put on the different functions groups perform within an overall unified social system²¹. In most instances, however, this concerns occupational rather than cultural interest groups and not the interplay of specific loyalties and political identities over objective cultural sections. This is particularly so for the conflict-consensus model of politics in the plural society. It has

emphatic assumptions that social integration is the ultimate goal of society and that integration is attainable and attained on the basis of widespread identification with a representative value system²². These assumptions, however, do not adequately take account of a situation where different groups have been malintegrated into the wider society from differential paths and patterns of political and territorial incorporation, in some instances forcefully achieved with bitter recollections. Furthermore, neither do these assumptions take account of whether the existing political arrangements as they affect the varying interests of the plural sections in a given society, have been accepted or imposed and therefore still contested, even if such a situation was maintained with force²³. Plural theories in general, therefore, assume a static conception of society, where the essence of society is stability for development²⁴. These assumptions are rather idealistic and decidedly optimistic as a model of social change, particularly in the Third World Nation-States and they do not seem to square with what was happening in the North in the period between 1949 and 1967 and with many separatist movements in different parts of the world today - India for example or Spain and Ethiopia. In other words, while the plural theory of society predicts that integration takes place in the society, the reverse is in fact perennially the empirical case of observation²⁵, particularly in the persistence of the demands of the M-Belt movement until 1967 and the increasing demands for further subdivision of the Nigerian Federation in the 1980s although temporarily suppressed by the Military Regime in 1983.

The contention therefore is that if the theories of the plural society and their underlining assumptions, as particularly reflected in the conflict-consensus model explain the conflict management in a deeply divided society as characterized the North, then we would expect that there might not have existed a M-Belt movement demanding separation from the Islamic society and constitution into a M-Belt Region. In other words, a

moving consensus would have been mediated by the dominant elite from the different plural sections in the North, to resolve whatever political tensions existed in the society that generated conflict. This would have preserved the North as one political entity. However, although plural theories explain conflict management, as particularly suggested by the conflict-consensus model, such explanations are only plausible, when, for example political arrangements (who is leader over who and where) are accepted by the different plural sections and by the pluralism that may exist in the given society. Apparently it is from these perspectives of plural theories that some of the tribal reactions of the M-Belt groups have been examined and explained in previous studies of the M-Belt movement. These studies have emphasized certain singularly specific tribal identities in the M-Belt movement in the general reaction of the M-Belt groups to domination from the Islamic society in the North. However, the study of the M-Belt movement with the theory of internal colonialism as a framework to guide the collection and analysis of data was more attractive and acceptable; not only because it adequately handles the analysis of the whole movement with more variables that affected almost all of the M-Belt groups and therefore, the study hopes to fill the existing gap, in the present vacuum of academic knowledge on the movement as one collective organization, despite its internal variation and unities; ~~but~~ also because there is not any previous overall analysis of the causal factors with a singularly specific theory which produces explanatory reasons for the fairly uniform reaction to the common grievances of all of the M-Belt groups. This framework, therefore, fundamentally takes into account the historical context of socio-economic and political development which established unequal relationships on the M-Belt groups in the North, particularly the existence of an indigenous colonial system. However, this is not an invented variable. James Coleman, in his analysis of factors that caused nationalism in the M-Belt areas, suggests that British policy in the

North, unique to the rest of Nigeria: "in the pagan Middle Belt legitimized an indigenous imperial system"²⁶.

However, the existing studies on the M-Belt movement have focussed on the political roles of the numerical dominant groups in the M-Belt areas, such as the Tiv, Idoma, Birom and areas like the Kagoro in Southern Zaria²⁷. The studies examined how these non-Islamic groups raised specific socio-economic and political grievances and how they related to themselves in the political support to the M-Belt movement and supported its demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the period between 1949 and 1967 by building up tribal identities, which they mobilized as support for the M-Belt movement. The Tiv, for example who constituted "a majority of the minorities" of the M-Belt groups and who subsequently produced dynamic political leadership with strong grassroots support in the demands of the M-Belt movement, have been empirically studied in great detail. This has been largely done by M.J. Dent, who utilized his personal political experiences, having been on-the-spot in the period of Tiv 'total' support for the M-Belt movement during his colonial service as District Officer (D.O. Tiv)²⁸. Dent also used his specialized research techniques to study and analyze Tiv social structure as it related to their reasons for commitment to support the leadership of J.S. Tarka of the UMBC party, after 1956 which he suggests also caused the persistence of the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, until 1967 when Benue-Plateau State was created as an autonomous political unit of the Nigerian Federation²⁹. In most of the academic writing of M.J. Dent on Nigerian politics, the Tiv have been given attention, because of their strategic geographical location in the "centre" of Nigeria and thus being in a position to influence the dominant groups in both the North and South of Nigeria. His empirical studies produced many of the variables in the experiences of the Tiv, which this study uses to analyze other M-Belt groups in the M-Belt movement. J.I. Tseayo, has also produced research that focusses on the Tiv³⁰. In 1975 he

analyzed Tiv reaction to forceful political incorporation processes into the Islamic society that were effected within the very boundaries of the North upon impact with British influences in 1900. Tseyo produced explanatory reasons for Tiv reaction to subordination in the North and their political support for the M-Belt movement in its phase as the UMBC party after 1956 and particularly, Tiv support for the ideas of the creation of a M-Belt Region³¹. Other previous academic perspectives in the literature on the M-Belt movement and its political demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the North have relied on the findings of a single theme: Hausa-Fulani Islamic domination and resistance to Islamic institutions, largely introduced by the work of James Coleman³². The variable "domination by Hausa-Fulani" on the M-Belt groups in the North has hardly been related to other significant causal factors for the organization of the M-Belt movement, whereas infact, there existed a matrix of causation to the phenoma. There has been, for example, very little examination and explanation of the relationships between the nature and shape of Hausa-Fulani and Islamic domination of the M-Belt groups after the British creation of the North in 1900 and the historically recollected experiences from the patterns of dominance on some of the M-Belt groups as a direct result of the state formation processes that characterized the region before impact with Western European influences. Similarly there has been little examination of the M-Belt movement in terms of the political means that it employed to demonstrate a preference to European Christian civilization with concomitant consequences of rejection to the increasing influences of some aspects of Hausa-Fulani and Islamic cultural forms. In other words, most of the previous studies on the M-Belt movement have narrowed their researches to examining the events and actions of the period between 1950 and 1967 when there existed "modern forms" of organized political resistance to Hausa-Fulani and Islamic domination or resistance to the group described as "the Northern System" consisting of the Hausa,

Fulani, Nupe and Kanuri³³. Before 1900 however there is evidence which suggests that there existed traditional resistance from each of the M-Belt groups to Hausa-Fulani and Islamic social and political incorporation processes, processes that were characterized by the establishment of dominance and subordination of non-Islamic cultures, particularly so, in the period between 1804 and 1900. In the period between 1900 and 1950, however, traditional resistance to social and political incorporation into the Islamic society in the North was mediated by British control of the state apparatus. This state apparatus was used to enforce law and order, a premise of control on all groups in the North which produced increased advantages in the diffusion of the Hausa-Fulani and Islamic culture over some of the M-Belt groups.

Further to the existing vacuum in knowledge on the political identity of the M-Belt movement, there has been considerable exclusion of examination and analysis of the purposes of Christianity and its socio-political influences on the M-Belt groups. The effects of Christianity were critical factors that shaped and altered the traditional world views of the people in the M-Belt areas in relation to the Islamic religion, culture and patterns of socio-economic and political development. The study therefore analyzes the influences and effects of Western European education and Christianity as a fundamental independent factor of change in the causes for the organization of the M-Belt movement in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. Two basic factors are therefore analyzed as they related to the developments in the political organization of the M-Belt movement: modernization as the causes of minorities Christian consciousness in the North, with Western European skills and the perceptions of socio-economic and welfare infrastructural underdevelopment of the M-Belt areas. This is so, because in the formative phases of the M-Belt movement, Christianity was congruent with Western educational influences. Persons with Western education used the Christian religious

identity as a political identity which was mobilized and directed at Christians generally and particularly Christians with Western European education as well as persons with non-Western European education, who adhered to traditional systems of African beliefs on religion, in the perceptions of underdevelopment of the M-Belt areas. The intensions of the mobilization of the particular identity on the targetted population was meant to gain the political support for the ideas of the creation of a M-Belt Region as a unit of the Nigerian Federation. Indeed the founding fathers of the M-Belt movement saw the initial struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region as a struggle for the creation of a Christian Region in the same sense of the creation of a 'Christian Zone' in the North that was developed from the purposes of Christianity for Africa whose aims were to halt the southward advance of Islam in the 'Sudan Belt'. Besides this intension in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, however, the variables 'Hausa-Fulani and Islamic domination' of the M-Belt groups, is admitted into this study as an important causal factor in the explanation of the political reactions of the non-Islamic groups in the organization of the M-Belt movement. The evidence in the study suggests that this domination permeated popular consciousness which subsequently conditioned political demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region as from 1950, only after Christianity had developed a European educated elite and leadership that was indigenus to the M-Belt areas. This domination, however, was within the context of a historical progression of the exploitative relationships between the Islamic societies and the M-Belt groups, a historical progression of past events that were constantly recollected and compounded the grievances that were articulated by the M-Belt movement and which previous studies have curiously ignored in their analysis. In other words, the internal social and political dynamics of culture contact and the tensions that derived from the expansion of Islam over some of the M-Belt groups in the incorporation processes that historically affected the

region, as well as the subsequent culture change from traditional systems to European patterns, developed from the influences of Christian Missionary activities, which had the concomitant consequence of rejection of Islamic patterns, were equally causal, as intervening variables as Hausa-Fulani domination in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region.

Thus, while most previous academic studies of the M-Belt movement focussed attention on analyzing mono-causal variable relationships, this study takes a multi-variate approach in producing explanatory reasons for the emergence of the political organization and its demands for the subdivision of the Nigerian Federation into smaller units such that in the process it was anticipated that a M-Belt Region might be created. The study, therefore, focusses its analysis on the interplay of the following variables as causes for the M-Belt movement in the specific period between 1949 and 1967: (1) Hausa-Fulani domination, manifested in the composition and ideology of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) party which controlled the institutions of governance and government in the Nigerian political state. (2) The political anxieties that were created by anticipated British departure after 1950. (3) The socio-religious and political influences of Christian Missionary activities on the M-Belt groups. (4) The political consequences of the intrusion of Nigerian Nationalist activities from Southern Nigerian based political parties, which activated tribal political organizations among the M-Belt groups. (5) The interplay of these factors on the perceptions of government activities, the developed sense of relative deprivation over socio-economic and welfare infrastructure and the distribution of modern European amenities among the M-Belt groups which conditioned unequal development of their sections of society in the North. However, in analyzing the researched evidence, the study was guided by the awareness that socio-political movements such as the M-Belt movement, are more complex in their causation than any single or multi-variable causation may suggest in producing total explanatory reasons of the organization and

its demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. In the analysis, particular focus is therefore made on: the structural as well as the attitudinal aspects of the causes of political tensions in the North; to the historical antecedents of the social and political attitudes as they affected the polarization of society in the North and the political identity of the regimes that have performed the functions of government in the North and Nigeria and their effects on the political identity of the M-Belt.

IV. Methodological issues and data base of the research.

This study of the M-Belt movement is ex-post facto research, although the current wave of the M-Belt religious and political identity in Nigerian politics remains a political force. The research was therefore library based: Libraries in Academic institutions (Jos, Zaria, Ibadan), Government archives (London, Kaduna, Jos) and personal individual libraries of dramatis personae on the M-Belt movement as well as Christian Missionary Libraries in Jos^{were used.} The methodology of inquiry was therefore focussed on political history of the North in search for the common causes of the M-Belt Movement. The facts in the common historical experiences of the M-Belt groups were interpreted in the particular context of the religious and political identity under study. The objective of the research were both modest and at the same time ambitious: that of reorganizing presently existing data already known to experts in the field such that a wholly different picture of the M-Belt movement is arrived at and at the same time the production of new empirical data and new interpretation of previously ignored aspects of the movement within a different framework of analysis.

Both primary and secondary sources in the political history of the North that affected the M-Belt groups were used. Political party manifestoes, party political newspapers: the Middle Belt Herald and the Tiv 'Icharagh' were used. Both sources were subjected to internal as well as

external criticism. There is an extensive use of direct quotations from the primary sources. Care was taken to cite only the most unimpeachable testimony from the texts.

Official government publications dating from 1904 were also used in the research and these produced vital statistical source material. This was vital for the particular period between 1950 and 1965 when there was need to measure distribution of government benefit as it affected the M-Belt groups in the North. Two elections were examined and both primary and secondary sources were used to produce statistical tables for the 1959 and 1979 electoral patterns in the M-Belt areas in the North as well as how they related to the rest of the country.

These sources were complemented by personal interview discussions with politicians that participated in the politics of the M-Belt movement from both the Islamic society and the M-Belt areas. Two political events in the period of my field work affected the research climate. In December 1980 there was the fanatical Islamic uprising in Kano. Although many people were killed it was alleged that many more had escaped to other urban centres of the North including Jos, Makurdi, Yola, Bauchi, Kaduna, Zaria and Gboko, where I had scheduled interviews. Many of the politicians in these areas, therefore, approached my subject matter with caution, particularly its religious dimension on the differences between Islam and Christianity. Secondly in Plateau state there was the curious demand in 1981 for the creation of 'a middle-belt state' in the Southern parts of the state. Top government politicians including the Governor of Plateau state were reluctant to discuss topics with the word 'Middle-Belt' in the subject matter: "in order not to give the existing political movement undue publicity in any research with that word!". Where politicians of the previous period of the M-Belt movement were reluctant to talk of the past their political party identity was derived from studying their statements from the Northern House of Assembly Hausards and those of the Federal House

of Representative in Lagos, which were found in the National Archives in Kaduna, Ibadan and Jos. As much as there was effort to produce a clean data set in the report of the study, the historical scope of the study (1804 - 1967), and financial constraints might have imposed obvious limitations on perfection.

Notes to Introduction

1. George Balandier, "The Colonial Situation", in P. L. van de Berghe (Ed.), Africa: Social Problems of Change and Conflict, California, 1965 p41.
2. C. K. Meek, Tribal Studies in Northern Nigeria, Vol. II London 1931 p252; The Protestant Missionaries included: the SUM, SIM, CMS, DRC, Baptist, CML, MBC, SDM and WMC.
3. Northern Nigeria Local Government Year Book 1963 and 1965, Kaduna 1963 p17-20 and 1965 p8-9.
4. Ibid 1963, p17-20; Nigeria 1955, London 1955 p7.
5. Ibid 1963 p17-20.
6. Ibid 1963 p17-20.
7. Nigeria 1955, London 1955, p7 and p178.
8. For some examples, see D. Cockcroft et al., (Eds.), Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy, New York, 1972, particularly Chapters 1, 2, 10, 12 and 13; Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development: 1536-1966, London 1975; Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, "Internal Colonialism and National Development", Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. I No. 4 1965; P. G. Casanova, "The Plural Society and Internal Colonialism" in Donald Gelfand and Russell Lee (Eds.), Ethnic Conflicts and Power: A Cross National Perspectives, London 1973 p240-242; Rodolpho Stravenhagen, "Classes, Colonialism and Acculturation", Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. I No. 6 1965; Dale L. Johnson, "On Oppressed Classes" in D. Cockcroft et al. (Eds.), Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy, New York, 1972 p269-301; Robert Blauner, "Internal Colonialism and Ghetto Revolt", Social Problems, Vol. 16 No. 4, 1969 p393-408; B. J. Berman, "Clientelism and Neo-colonialism": Centre-Periphery Relations and Political Development in Africa, in Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 9 No. 2, 1974 p3-25; M. J. Dent 1976 p962-966; J. E. Spencer, "Kueichou: An Internal Chinese Colony" in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 13 No. 2 p162-172; Harold Wolpe, "The Theory of Internal Colonialism: The South African Case" in Ivar Oxaal et al. (Eds.), Beyond the Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in Latin America and Africa, London, 1975 p229-252.
9. Balandier 1965 p41.
10. Balandier 1965 p43.
11. Robert Blauner, "Internal Colonialism and Ghetto Revolt", Social Problems, Vol. 16 No. 4, 1969 p393-408.
12. Ibid 1969 p395.
13. "Colonialism" and "Colony" in E. R. A. Seligman and A. Johnson (Eds.), The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. III 1930.
14. Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in a Divided Society, Middlesex-England, 1980 p13.
15. It ought to be borne in mind that for very many historical reasons, the North conceived of itself within the Federation in the period between 1950 and 1967, as "a Nation-within-a-Nation" in the developing Nigerian Nation.
16. For examples, see M.J. Dent, "A Minority Party - the UMBC", in John P. Mackintosh (Ed.), Nigerian Government and Politics, London, 1966; M.J. Dent, "Tarka and the Tiv: A Perspective on Nigerian Federation", in R. Melson and H. Wolpe (Eds.), Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, Michigan, 1971.
17. For examples, see J.I. Tseayo, Conflict and Incorporation in Nigeria: The Integration of the Tiv, Zaria, 1975; Ugbana Ukpu, Ethnic Minority Problems in Nigerian Politics: 1960-1965, Uppsala, 1977.
18. For some examples, see varying sections in Eme O. Awa, Federal

- Government in Nigeria, Berkelay, 1964; James Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, Los Angeles, 1965; B.J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, London 1965; K.W.J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Elections of 1959, London 1963; Frederick Schwarz, Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation or the Race - The Politics of Independence, London, 1965; Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation, Princeton, 1963.
19. T.R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, New Jersey, 'Models of Politics' p14-p42.
 20. Ibid 1975 p14-p42.
 21. Ibid 1975 p19-p42.
 22. Elia T. Zureik, The Palestinians in Israel: A study of Internal Colonialism London, 1979 p10-p12.
 23. Ibid 1979 p10-p30.
 24. For elaborate discussion of this critique in respect to structural functional perspectives of the theory of the plural society, see Ocampo and Johnson 1972 p413-p424.
 25. Hechter 1975 p8.
 26. Coleman 1958 p385.
 27. For examples, see Dent 1966; Tseayo 1975; Bill Freund, Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines, London 1981, particularly Chapter 6 on "Peasant resistance: tin mining and the Birom", p156-p173; M.G. Smith, "Kagoro Political Development", Human Organization, vol.19 no.13, 1960 p137-p149.
 28. Discussions with M.J. Dent 1980-1984.
 29. For some examples, see M.J. Dent, "A Minority Party - the UMBC" in John P. Mackintosh (Ed), Nigerian Government and Politics, London 1966; M.J. Dent, "The Military and Politics: A study of the relationship between the Army and the political process in Nigeria", St. Anthony's Papers, No. 21 and African Affairs, No. 3, Oxford 1969; M.J. Dent, "The Military and the Politicians", in S.K. Panter-Brick (Ed), Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to the Civil War, London, 1970; M.J. Dent, "Tarka and the Tiv: A Perspective on Nigerian Federation", in R. Melson and H. Wolpe (Eds), Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, Michigan 1971; M.J. Dent, "Corrective Government", in S.K. Panter-Brick, Soldiers and Oil, London, 1978.
 30. Tseayo 1975.
 31. Tseayo 1975 passim.
 32. For example this is particularly the case with the account of Dudley 1968, Post 1963 and Sklar 1963 who use the findings of Coleman 1958.
 33. R.W. Baxter, Our North: The Story of Northern Nigeria in its Self-Government Year 1959, Kaduna 1959 p9-p29.

CHAPTER 1

The socio-economic and political relationships of an indigenous Islamic colonial system over the non-Islamic groups and societies in the territories that became The North upon British creation in 1900.

"What, have you no slaves in England? What do you then for servants? God is great! ... You are a beautiful people. I will give the King of England a place on the coast to build a town ... God has given me all the land of the infidels."¹

I Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the socio-economic and political consequences in the spread of Islam as part of the political problems that developed from incorporation processes which historically affected groups and societies existing before 1900 in the territories that became defined as The North upon impact with British influences in 1900. One consequence of the spread of Islam in the region before 1900, is in the recollected histories of socio-economic and political relationships and experiences, in which groups and societies that admitted Islam and accepted it as a religion in their society developed and became dominant while the non-Islamic groups and societies remained undeveloped and underdeveloped relative to the Islamic societies and were subordinated to Islamic political authority. The majority of the non-Islamic groups and societies in the territories that became defined as The North were concentrated in the areas defined as 'the political M-Belt' in this study, rather than the geographical middlebelt of the Nigerian Federation. Upon impact with British influences in 1900, The North developed to become dominant in politics as well as an outsized political Unit of the Nigerian Federation.

1. Sultan Mohammed Bello to Captain **Hugh Clapperton** in Sokoto in 1824, cited in E.W. Bovill, The Niger Explored, London 1968 p.132-134

In the period before 1804 and between 1804 and 1900, the political processes of incorporation set into motion by the spread of Islam in the region successfully integrated the Hausa, Fulani and Nupe into an Islamic culture. These groups and societies were numerically dominant among others and they developed to become 'a political society' in the territories of The North. Some of the "majority" of the "numerical minority" groups and societies in The North however experienced partial political incorporation into the Islamic culture. Many other groups and societies in the region were never religiously and politically incorporated by Islam into the Islamic culture before impact with British influences in 1900. Subsequently in the period between 1900 and 1950 the Kanuri, another numerically dominant Islamic group and society concentrated in Borno became successfully incorporated into the Islamic society established in 1804 by dan Fodio and into politics of The North with an explicit Islamic identity because of the Islamic religion. This was so, even when it was the case that they previously resisted the military, religious and political efforts of Hausa-Fulani political incorporation processes before 1900.

A political situation like that subsequently raised severe socio-economic and political problems of integrating different identities into conceptions of the "Northern Identity", particularly so for the M-Belt groups and societies. This was so because in the period between 1804 and 1900, while some M-Belt groups and societies became malintegrated into the Islamic culture because of partial incorporation, others were totally excluded from the process and were outside conceptions of the Islamic society and the Islamic culture. This political exclusion from the incorporation processes into the Islamic society culture was conditioned by the economic needs of the Islamic society in which the M-Belt groups and societies and their land became regarded as functional territory.

At a more basic level therefore the chapter examines political incorporation processes by a dominant group and society in The North that were shaped by the ideology of the Islamic religion. The processes took roots in the Islamic society and became shaped by an explicit Islamic religious and political identity. The processes caused specific types of socio-economic and political experiences in which some groups and societies became dominant and others subordinate. The recollected histories of the period between 1804 and 1900 after impact with British influences became determinate factors which conditioned the political tensions between Islamic and non-Islamic groups and societies in The North, particularly so after 1950 when there was increased demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. This was a political situation developed before British departure from control of political power in The North in the midst of severe inequalities and deprivation as it affected the distribution of modern European infrastructural facilities as amenities for development in The North. This was particularly so because of the specific content of the nature of socio-economic and political relationship between the Islamic society and the M-Belt groups and societies. Implicit in a position like that, it is the proposition of this chapter in the study, that the socio-economic and political inequalities resulting from the nature of the relationships which were characteristic of politics and society in The North in the period between 1804 and 1900 were among the causes of political tensions and conflict between the Islamic society and the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1900 and 1967. Although these tensions and conflicts were mediated by the government of British administration in The North during the period between 1900 and 1960, in the period between 1940 and 1967 they caused a resurgence

of "tribal" identities which became fed into a M-Belt Movement that reflected deeply rooted historical resistance to Islamic political authority in the socio-economic experiences of the M-Belt groups and societies. The historical experiences of the period between 1804 and 1900 became recollected by the 'European Educated' and compounded the political problems^{of} incorporation and the integration of the "majority" of the minority M-Belt groups and societies in the political unit of The North created from impact with British influences in 1900.

In that connection therefore, we are concerned to examine the socio-economic and political transformations in the incorporation processes that took place among the different groups and societies in The North as a direct political and religious consequence of the Islamic Reformist Movement in the Region led by the Fulani, which established a dominant Islamic society and its expansion toward the M-Belt groups and societies. The Islamic Reformist Movement transformed the politics of groups and societies in The North, from a situation of autonomous political existence to a centralized pattern of political and religious authority in the Islamic society based in Sokoto and then expanded for its socio-economic and political needs by colonization and military force. When the socio-economic and political circumstances of groups and societies in the territories of The North before 1804 is compared to the situation that became transformed in the period between 1804 and 1900 sharp contrasts exist largely created by the impact and the nature of the Islamic revolutionary processes.¹

1. The subsequent socio-economic and political transformations which took place after impact with British influences in the region are tackled in Chapter 2

The transformatory processes developed from the Islamic revolution which was led by the Fulani, are held to be responsible for the establishment of conceptions of core and periphery relationships among groups and societies and the development of an indigenous colonial system in The North. This became politically^{and} economically directed at the exploitation of the M-Belt groups and societies as well as other non-Islamic groups and societies in the territories in the period between 1804 and 1900. In other words although politics and society among the groups and societies in the territories that became The North in 1900, was volatile before 1804, with each of the different groups and societies existing as an independent and autonomous political unit with a distinct identity, in the period between 1804 and 1900 the Islamic revolution established and developed a core centre of religion and politics with a periphery. This development conditioned new socio-economic and political relationship between the two. In the instance there was colonialism of the Islamic society on the M-Belt groups and societies as well as on other non-Islamic communities in The North.

The processes that established an indigenous colonial system with its roots in the Islamic society are held to be responsible for the subordination of some groups and societies by military conquest, political manipulation and the domination of their political systems when the exercise of political authority on non-Islamic territory became the prerogative of Moslems. This was so despite the differences in social and religious identities in the region because of the cultural thrust of the Islamic religion. As a result, the M-Belt groups and societies became undeveloped as much as they were underdeveloped relative to the Islamic society. The salient features in the development of the indigenous colonial system with roots in the Islamic society centred on

Sokoto are therefore taken to be the establishment and expansion of the Islamic society, the exploitative relationships between the Islamic society and the M-Belt groups and societies and the development of political leadership with an Islamic religious identity over some of the M-Belt groups and societies and the peripheralization of non-Islamic communities into functional economic roles to the Islamic society. Implicit in these propositions is also the assumption that before the establishment of the Islamic society from the Fulani Islamic Reformist Movement in 1804 which affected a large part of the territories that became defined as The North, there existed disparate and autonomous political units responding differently to the politics of each other with none permanently assuming political, economic and religious dominance on the same large scale to developments which resulted from the establishment of an Islamic Society by the Fulani.

Evidence in support of propositions made in this Chapter largely derive from secondary sources. These were case studies of the histories of some of the groups and societies in The North on political and economic patterns as they affected the development of society before 1900. Few primary sources were used. Statistical evidence, where it was used also derives from similar secondary sources from the early accounts of British travellers like Henry Barth and the German Christian Missionary explorer, Karl Kumm as well as the official accounts of British military and administrative officers before 1930 on the state of politics and economy in society upon impact with European influences. Evidences from interview sources and discussions were also used. These were derived from politicians and Elders among some of the M-Belt groups and societies on recollected histories they were able to invoke from what they heard from ancestors about the state of politics and society

and Fulani wars in the M-Belt areas before impact with British influences in 1900. These sources complimented each other and attempts were made to balance each piece of evidence from the different sources against each other to produce accurate interpretations of the events and actions in the histories of political development in the societies of the region.

II Society and Politics before 1804

The purpose of this section is to examine whether society and politics in the territories that came to be defined as The North existed as distinct and autonomous political units in socio-economic and political affairs before 1804. It is the proposition in this section that The North contained distinct political systems that were autonomous in their socio-economic and political relationships with other groups. None of these systems established a dominant and permanent socio-economic and political centre of power and authority on other groups for a longish period of time. Socio-economic and political differences in the autonomy and distinctiveness of these societies from each other are examined along five basic indicators: (a) Structure of political power and authority (b) Economic patterns and types (c) Social structure and identity patterns: ethnic types with Islamic and traditional systems of African religious beliefs and practices complementing the different ethnic group identities (d) The political volatility in core and periphery relationships in the patterns of established authority (e) The levels of inequalities in terms of social, economic and political development that characterized the different societies in the region.

These five indicators are in turn used to discuss social, political and economic characteristics of the three broadly categorized types of society from the multitudes in The North as used by Margery Perham but with significant modification for clarity purposes. These are: Islamic Kingdoms, M-Belt Kingdoms and Autonomous M-Belt groups and societies. Although these three categories derive from Perham's works¹ there is one important factual inaccuracy in her categorizations. Using essentially socio-economic and political indicators Perham suggests three categories of societies in The North.² In the first category: "are the peoples of the forest lands or the hills of the centre and east, who maintained a primitive culture, socially fragmented, all but self contained economically, nearly all naked and with a very limited range of material possessions".³ A second political Unit type is those found among the Igala, Igbira, Jukun, Nupe and Yoruba groups. According to Perham: "These are pagan Kingdoms which have escaped not only the Mohammedan influences which in the Middle-Ages gradually penetrated the pagan groups in The North, but also that sudden extension of Mohammedan power early last century which overlaid so many pagan populations of Central Nigeria".⁴ It is here that we point out Perham's inaccurate fact in this category. While admitting of her classifications, there is evidence that suggests that the first Nupe Moslem King reigned from about 1770, and Islamic influences are traceable in Nupe, Igbirra and among Igala ruling classes long before the

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1. In particular, Margery Perham, Lugard: the years of Authority 1898-1945, London, 1961; and her, Native Administration in Nigeria, London 1962.
 2. Perham 1962 p.3
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid

Fulani Jihad which established the Islamic society in The North.¹

This suggests that contrary to what Perham has termed "escaped Mohammedan influences" among such Kingdoms in these areas in terms of Islamic influences, Islam was in fact known to exist, particularly so among the ruling classes of these Kingdoms before impact with the Islamic Reformist Movement led by the Fulani. The really crucial factor however as it relates to subsequent religious and political developments in the region is that the more distant Islamic practices and influences were from the core Islamic centres of the 11th and 13th centuries, like Borno and Kano or Katsina respectively,² the more it was mixed with traditional African systems of beliefs and practices.³

The third political category type according to Perham: "is composed of the Moslem Kingdoms of The North of which the greatest are Kano, Sokoto, Katsina and Zaria and Borno, which has a different race and history and covers a huge area in the north-east."⁴ Subsequently R.A. Adeleye was to characterize The North in the period before the Fulani Islamic Reformist Movement into: "Moslem Kingdoms, pagan Kingdoms and an array of disparate autonomous units without ^{centralized} political authority".⁵ The categories of Adeleye and those of Perham compliment each other. This gives justification to the categories used in the study in this chapter, derived from the above discussion. Thus we have: Islamic Kingdoms, M-Belt Kingdoms and Autonomous M-Belt groups and societies.

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1. Daryll Ford, P. Brown and R.G. Armstrong, Peoples of the Niger-Benue Confluence, London 1955 p.18-22, and p.57
 2. Perham 1962 p.45; Adeleye 1977 p.5
 3. The socio-religious and political consequences of a situation like that are discussed in more detail in the next sections when in fact, it was discovered that such Islamic malpractices existed within the ruling classes in the core-centres of Islam in these territories.
 4. Perham 1962 p.3
 5. Adeleye 1977 p.4

(a) Islamic Kingdoms

The most celebrated of the Islamic Kingdoms in the period before 1804 were the Hausa-City-States and the Kanuri Kingdom of Borno. Kings and Queens ruled in the Hausa-City-States, while in the Borno Kingdom, Kings called 'Mais' ruled the Kanuri people. Both these Kingdoms benefited and enjoyed Arabian Islamic civilization and Islamic religious influences from North Africa in their socio-political and economic development from an early period when compared to other parts of The North and Nigeria. In both Kingdoms leadership and some subjects became peacefully Islamized by Moslem Missionaries, traders and scholars, mainly Arabs from North Africa. In the instance of the Kingdom of Borno, civilizing influences took shape as early as the 11th century.¹ The Hausa-City-States had Islam and Arabian Islamic civilization shaping socio-economic and political developments in their society from between the 13th and 15th centuries.²

The Kanuri, who were the majority ethnic group in the Kingdom of Borno, were mainly localized in the geo-political areas surrounding Lake Chad. The Kingdom was established in those areas by a series of 'Mais' in context of the specific Kanuri cultural identity. The legitimacy of their rulers was based on the Arab, non-Sudanic principle of patrilineal descent.³ Subsequently the Kanuri people and their satellites south of the geo-political area of their concentration were brought together by the 'Mais' through conquest, tribute payments and Islam and developed into a strong socio-political identity which

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1. Perham 1962 p.45; Adeleye 1971 p.5
 2. Perham 1962 p.45; Adeleye 1971 p.5; Mahdi Adamu 1978 p.23-58; see also, Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, 1957 p.5-6
 3. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.92

united them under one political authority as early as the 14th century.¹ This Unity was strengthened during the 19th century under the leadership of Mohammed el-Kanemi who repulsed the military, religious and political thrusts of the Islamic Reformist Movement led by the Fulani under Usman dan-Fodio.² As early as in the beginning of the 13th century however the Borno Kingdom was unquestionably the dominant state in the Sudan.³ In that century, a sound political and administrative system of government had been established with a mixture of Moslem law, traditional African and Arabic types.⁴ There were four provincial governors, a powerful army and an orderly system of succession.⁵ The 16th century however was what has been described as the golden-age for Borno because: "the country was triumphant and prosperous",⁶ Through contact with North Africa in trade, religion and education, it was able to attain a high degree of Islamic civilization and developed a highly complex system of centralized political organization. From this it was able to develop a fiscal system and a trained judiciary, administering Moslem Law with a loyal army to the King, trained in comparatively advanced military techniques, when compared to their neighbours.⁷

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1. Coleman 1963 p.23
 2. For examples of the military prowess and the campaigns of Borno, see Alhaji Ibrahim Imam, A short history of Rabeh Ibri Fadel Allah 1838-1900, Lagos, November 1974.
 3. Thomas Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives, London 1960 p.4
 4. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.92
 5. Ibid p.92-93
 6. Ibid p.96
 7. For examples, see an extended quote of Ibin Battuta, the Arab traveller who visited Borno in the period in Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.93-94

Although Borno was strong militarily and politically united, its main preoccupation seemed to have been consolidating its socio-political and economic position by raiding weaker groups for slaves rather than political expansion and empire building. For example, it was content with yearly political tribute from the Hausa-City-States in acknowledgement of its military power rather than superimpose political authority.¹ This suggests that the Hausa-City-States maintained their political independence and autonomy when Borno was the dominant military and political power in the region although it was the case that they acknowledged the authority of Borno through the payment of yearly tributes.

The Kingdom of Borno was notorious for its slave catching activities in order to meet its economic needs in the trans-Saharan trade with North Africa. As early as in the 11th century a battle song praised Sultan Gilmi, one of the Kings of Borno, as a successful slave raider.² In the song, it is suggested that Sultan Gilmi: "... put to flight a warrior chief of the land of Mobber... captured his following, a thousand slaves.. took them and scattered them in the open places of Bagirmi.. the best, you took home, as the first fruits of battle".³ When Henry Barth travelled in the Kingdom of Borno in the 17th century, 800 years later, he found the Kings of Borno still raiding villages and catching slaves.⁴ The accounts of the travels of Barth suggest that the Kings of Borno raided groups and societies southwardly of the Kingdom.⁵ This means that while the

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1. Northern Government Submission to The Willink Commission, Kaduna , 1957 p.5-7
 2. Perham 1962 p.45
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid

military and political power of the Kingdom of Borno was used to condition the payment of political tributes from the Islamic Hausa-City-States, the non-Islamic groups and societies experienced the might of Borno through its constant military raids for slaves. The majority of these non-Islamic villages were the subsequent M-Belt groups and societies concentrated in Adamawa, Gombe and Bauchi.

Barth suggests that he accompanied "a slave-catching-Expedition" and observed a raid in which "there was the senseless destruction of human life and prosperous villages and crops which accompanied the seizure of a few thousand captives".¹ The accounts of Barth suggest that although the Kingdom of Borno was preoccupied with meeting its internal economic and political needs rather than political expansion over adjacent territory, they also suggest that previously prosperous villages and communities south of the Kingdom became economically ruined by military raids. In the instance, while Borno developed from contact with North Africa and Islamic civilization, it did not only stand in the way of diffusing that civilization but also conditioned the undevelopment of the groups and societies it raided for slaves. This means that the undevelopment and underdevelopment of the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa before 1804, for example, dates from the 11th century, largely because of the conditions of insecurity, chaos, unpredictable social and economic existence and depopulation from slave raids.

The trade in slaves and the contacts with North Africa which brought in Islamic civilization through the trans-Saharan trade routes, developed the Kingdom of Borno to become a cosmopolitan and wealthy

1. Perham 1962 p.45

society before the 16th century far more than the Hausa-City-States when compared in the same period.¹ Although the Kingdom in general became socio-economically developed with Islamic culture and civilization the Kings and the ruling classes in particular became very wealthy.² For example, Leo Africanus, the Arab scholar from North Africa who visited the Kingdom suggests the wealth of the ruling classes when he described that the King had: "... his spurs, his bridles, platters, dishes, pots and other vessels wherein his meats and drinks are brought to the table all in pure gold... Yea and the chains of his dogs are gold also".³ The wealth of the Kingdom of Borno derived from and depended on the export of slaves caught from among the M-Belt groups and societies that were found in Adamawa, Gombe and Bauchi and taken to the trans-Saharan market centres of Egypt and other parts of North Africa.⁴ The Kings of Borno became dependent on slaves for economy and wealth because the slaves were currency as well as commodities for export.⁵ For example, slaves were used to buy large numbers of horses from the Berber merchants from North Africa.⁶ The horse in that period was the equivalent of a tank in modern war today and politics, economy and the security of political control for the ruling classes depended on the size of the cavalry rather than the numbers in the infantry. In that instance, about between 15 to 20 slaves were exchanged for a horse.⁷ Historical

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1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.93-96
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid p.94
 4. Ibid p.92-95
 5. Ibid p.94
 6. Ibid
 7. Ibid

evidence suggests that the Kings of Borno became so dependent on slaves as currency that they grudged paying for goods from North Africa in gold and preferred to rather pay in the numbers of slaves.¹ This explains the cause for the intensive slave raids of the Kings of Borno on the M-Belt groups and societies found in Adamawa, Gombe, and Bauchi before 1804, who were non-Islamic and excluded from both the Hausa-City-States and the Kingdom of Borno.

The Hausa-City-States evolved and became developed based on similar socio-economic and political conditions which existed in the Kingdom of Borno. There was the influence of Islamic civilization through the establishment of commercial contacts with North Africa by the trans-Saharan trade routes as well as with the Western Sudanese Kingdoms of Mali, Ghana and Songhai.² The commercial links conditioned the development of the Hausa-City-States with Islamic civilization and culture. The social and political origins of the Hausa-City-States however ties them to a legend of history through the Kingdom of Borno. This has its roots in the history of the founding of Daura, a city that claims social and political seniority over all the other Hausa-City-States.³

According to the legend of history: "A certain man named Abuyazidu, son of Abdullahi, King of Baghdad, quarrelled with his father and people of the city .. then Abuyazidu with twenty companies, journeyed until they came to Bornu and they dwelt there.. the King of

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1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.94
 2. Ibid p.145-147
 3. Ibid

Bornu saw that Abuyazidu was stronger than he... and they counselled him that he should give Abuyazidu his daughter and he became his father-in-law .. and he did so and gave his daughter Magira to be wife and he married her .. and they journeyed until they came to Daura at night ... their son, Bawo begat the first rulers of the seven Hausa-States who were the origins of the Hausa race".¹ Furthermore, according to the legend there were seven "Legitimate Hausa" sons (Hausa bakwai) and also seven "illegitimate Hausa" sons (Banza bakwai).² The "legitimate seven sons" who were the foundations of the Hausa-City-States were Gobir, Kano, ^{Katsina} Rano, Zaria, Bauchi and Daura and these were names of the children of Bawo.³ The legend developed to suggest that the States and Kingdoms of Kebbi, Zamfara, Nupe, Gwari, Yauri , Yoruba and Jukun (Kwararafa) were the seven "illegitimate Hausa sons".⁴ The period at which the seven "illegitimate Hausa sons" became produced and therefore infused with Hausa-blood as a source of social origin is vague and riddled with both political and academic controversy.

Bawo, the progenitor of the Hausa-City-States assigned to his legitimate sons, who subsequently developed the City-States, specific socio-economic and political roles as duties for the welfare of all.⁵ Gobir was to serve as a military rampart between peaceful Hausa-land and the warlike "tribes" of the desert.⁶ It was therefore the war chief of Hausaland with the duties of defending the brethren from the attacks of the desert tribes. Kano and Rano, safe behind the lines

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1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.145-147
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Flora L. Shaw (Lady Lugard), A Tropical Dependency: An outline of the ancient History of the Western Sudan with an Account of the Modern Settlements of Northern Nigeria, London 1905 p.239
 5. Lady Lugard 1905 p.239
 6. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.132

of attacks from the desert chiefs, were assigned as "Ministers of Industries", especially for the crafts of dyeing and weaving and to trade.¹ The Hausa from Kano were to become ubiquitous traders for many years before the Fulani led Islamic Reformist Movement,² and thereafter until this day, Kano developed to be an important commercial and trade centre in The North and Nigeria. Katsina and Daura were assigned to be "Ministers of Intercourse" and ^{Katsina} developed to become a great centre of Islamic learning with a reputation that went well beyond the political boundaries of the Hausa-City-States.³ For example, in 1660 the Yoruba Kingdom of Oyo sought answers from Katsina over an inquiry into the methods of determining the precise moment of sunset.⁴ Zaria which was the most southernly of the Hausa-City-States and founded on the fruitful plains dividing the other states from the hilly country of Bauchi, was assigned the task of agriculture in order to feed the rest.⁵ Zaria also shared with Bauchi the assigned task of chief-slaving-states to supply labour to the other Hausa-City-States for agriculture, industries, military, commercial and domestic needs.⁶

Although the legend of historical origins of the Hausa-City-States suggests that Bauchi was one of the seven legitimate sons of Bawo, there is controversy in the historical evidence and interpretation. For example, Lady Lugard suggests that the hilly country of Bauchi "was for many centuries the home of the cannibal and the hunting ground

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1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.132
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Adeleye 1971 p.16
 5. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.132
 6. Lady Lugard 1905 p.239

for slaves .. its name which was a corruption of "Bonshy" meaning the country of the "Bauwa" (the slave).¹ The historical controversy about the origins of Bauchi might suggest that it developed from the settlement of a colonizing migrant population in the area which raided the indigenous groups and societies for slaves rather than established from the "Seven Hausa Sons" whatever the nature of the conflict in the evidence and interpretation, Bauchi territory became tied in political identity to the Hausa-City-States and to the Fulani Empire centred at Sokoto and subsequently after 1900, to the dominant Islamic society in The North, except for the groups and societies south of the territory which it raided for slaves.

The legend of Hausa origins however gives a clear picture of a political union of states in which there was some form of unity with the northern as well as the southern frontiers ^{being} actively defended. There was an organized economy that became bolstered by the practice of raiding a defined periphery on the south and south-eastern territories to the Hausa-City-States. These territories had a concentration of non-Islamic and non-Hausa groups and societies in political identity and in the contemporary concern of this study, they were part of the M-Belt areas. The raids were meant to supply labour in industry, agriculture, domestic work and for military purposes and were in full force before 1804. For example, the city walls of the Hausa states in centres of power like Kano and Zaria, built for defence purposes were constructed with slave labour.² The legend also suggests that the Hausa-City-States shared a common socio-

1. Lady Lugard 1905 p.239

2. A.C. Burns, History of Nigeria, London 1929

religious and political identity and also with the Kingdom of Borno, even when it is the case that they became politically autonomous of each other. Although at some point in their histories, they paid political tribute to Borno, they were not a functional periphery in terms of political power relationships and economic needs. This was the premise from which the Hausa-City-States developed politically independent of Borno and of each other despite a suggested political union with cooperation in the economic division of labour by Bawo.

In terms of the organization of society and its governance, social structure and political institutions in each of the Hausa-City-States developed to assume a distinctive and durable shape in 1500.¹ This suggests that while Borno achieved the development of the social organization of society with political institutions and a thriving economic system as early as in the 13th century, it was in the 16th century that the Hausa-City-States became similarly developed, again at a time when the historical evidence suggests, that was "the golden age for Borno because the country was triumphant and prosperous".² It was after 1500 that social and political divisions in the structure of society emerged in the Hausa-City-States in which there was an established ruling class with a subject following.³ Similar to the Kingdom of Borno however socio-economic and political development in the transformations of society and politics in the Hausa-City-States were shaped by Islamic civilization and the influences of the Islamic

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1. C.S. Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946-1966, Princeton 1970 p.21
 2. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.96
 3. Whitaker 1970 p.21

religion by way of the Western Sudan from North Africa through Katsina and Borno.¹ This was the premise from which the Hausa-City-States developed the same forms in the structure of government and authority with well organized fiscal systems, a trained and learned judiciary administering the Maliki code of the Islamic law "with ability and integrity".² In the core Hausa-City-Kingdoms of: "Katsina, Kano, and Zaria, the government and the whole organization of society was Mohammedan (before the Fulani Jihad) a fact admitted by the Fulani when they adopted as they subsequently did, the existing Hausa, or as the conquerors preferred to call them, "Habe" systems of law, justice and taxation... all these were based on the Koran".³

There was therefore in the Hausa-City-States, a well developed system of administration of society and politics based on territorial subunits, supervised by Royal appointees of the Kings, who acted as agents. Furthermore there existed in each of the Kingdoms a systematic tribute and taxation system with a state treasury and presiding over this structure was the King and his Council of Advisers.⁴ This rather developed system of organization worked well for the different levels of society and politics in the Hausa-City-Kingdoms and has so enchanted some authorities that it has been described as: "the most sophisticated political organism which Africans had yet attained since (the Hausa Kingdoms) had evolved elaborate systems of taxation and a complex social system based on agriculture".⁵ Traditional agriculture

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1. Sir Alan Burns, History of Nigeria, London 1972 p.47
 2. Burns 1972 p.47
 3. Lady Lugard 1905 p.391
 4. E. John Flint, Sir George Goldier and the Making of Nigeria, London 1960 p.15
 5. Flint 1960 p.15

pursuits and economic patterns in the Islamic Kingdoms in the period between the 15th and 18th centuries were combined with crafts that foreshadowed relatively advanced technology.¹ These included economic activities like iron-smelting, cloth-weaving and dyeing.² A vigorous trans-Saharan trade therefore resulted which became the conditioning factor for a slow and a steady infiltration of religious and cultural influences from the Islamic societies in North Africa to the Hausa-City-States as was the case with the Kingdom of Borno.³ From the North African influences, Kano, for example, became a cosmopolitan commercial city, with merchants and traders settled and travelling to and from North Africa as well as to the cities of the Western Sudanese Empires.⁴ Similarly Katsina became a well developed educational centre and Islamic scholars from Timbuktoo University and Gao as well as from Cairo visited to exchange ideas and knowledge.⁵ Furthermore, there was developed well organized industrial and agricultural patterns of production and distribution in the Hausa-City-States.⁶ For example, cottage industries of weaving and leather works were developed in Gobir and plantation cultivation of rice was well organized in Argungu and other parts of Sokoto.⁷ This suggests that there existed a highly mobilized society in the Hausa-City-States with children, women and men engaged in production and distribution

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1. Adeleye 1971 p.7
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid
 6. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.87
 7. Ibid

that improved social and economic conditions of living in society.¹ These activities stretched economic interests to the extra-territorial market centres of Damagaran, Agades on the trans-Saharan trade route and linked others with Katsina and Kano which became the metro-ports for North African goods, among others in both the Hausa-City-States and the Borno Kingdom.²

It is however significant that in the politics and society of Hausaland in the period before 1804, despite common historical origins, a common set of factors for political identification in the Hausa culture and language, a common structure of power and authority in their governments and the critical inter-dependence in military and the economic division of labour, there was never developed a Hausa-King over all the Hausa-City-States. Instead, each of the Hausa-City-States maintained its own dynasty which stood on its own in military, political and economic interests. Although the Hausa-City-States and the Islamic Kingdom of Borno were not acephalous separate societies, since there was socio-cultural homogeneity and similarities in a hierarchical system of government with Kings, political unity did not exist before 1804. Borno was however unique among the Islamic Kingdoms ,

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1. P. Hill, "Hidden Trade in Hausaland", MAN, Vol.IV No.3 1969 p.393; P. Hill, Rural Hausa: A village and a setting, London 1972 p.245.
 2. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.87; The situational variations in the socio-economic activities and their development to better standards of living in the Islamic Kingdoms as they contrasted sharply with politics, economic activities and society among the M-Belt groups and societies, where there was slave raiding and slave catching which drove off people to live in caves and made society less open, one of the conditions for the undevelopment of the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North are examined in Section II(b) and (c).

developed in the territories that became The North because there was political unity of a single group and society, the Kanuri with the Islamic religion. In the period before 1804 there were even no traces of a political union in the Hausa-City-States, except for the histories of temporary dominance in military and economic activities rather than political.

The academic interest in the development of Islamic Kingdoms before 1804 is not to produce explanatory reasons for the failure of political incorporation and unity among them. The interest for this study is to demonstrate and emphasize that a situation of political disunity existed within their very territorial conceptions before 1804 and that the glories of economic, social and political achievements went separately to each rather than to a collective Hausa society. For example after the 15th century the historical evidence suggests that Zaria under Queen Amina: "enjoyed the fruits of many conquests".¹

Zaria was the one Hausa-City-State which left a history of ambitious military and political attempts at territorial expansion from which political incorporation processes might have developed to create unity in Hausaland for a "Hausa-Empire" in the 15th century.² The political thrust and the domination of other groups and societies by Zaria under Queen Amina in that period extended as far apart as from Benue, over the Niger, extending to Katsina, Kano, Daura, Bauchi, down to Kwararafa (Jukun territory) and conquered Kingdoms like those of

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1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.139
 2. Adeleye 1971 p.5

Nupe.¹ A similar military and political feat was subsequently attempted at a different period by the Hausa-City-State of Kebbi under its warrior leader Kanta, who conquered and exercised political control "over a wide area" in the region although he did not last long.² This suggests that in the period between the 15th and 19th century there were a number of unsuccessful political and military attempts to build a centralized authority pattern derived from the economic interests of Kebbi and Zaria in particular, which wielded together temporarily the numerous city states under one political authority. The non-volatile features in the political systems of the Hausa-City-States before 1804 were the economic interactions in trade and commerce between themselves, the Kingdom of Borno and North Africa through the trans-Saharan trade routes. However, although economic rather than political interactions were stable between the Islamic Kingdoms, they became factors that conditioned political quarrels and hostilities between the Kings. For example, after the 15th century, there was intense rivalry and conflict over the control of trade routes between Katsina, Kano and Zaria when Queen Amina expanded her political and military dominance in the region.³ Katsina and Kano, it ought to be borne in mind, thrived in social, religious and economic development in that period because of the contacts with North African merchants through the trans-Saharan routes.

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1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.119
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid

Characteristic of society and politics in the period before 1804 within the territorial boundaries of the Islamic Kingdoms is that when society rose to a pre-eminence of power it soon became supplanted by another and political dominance remained volatile. In the same period the volatility of political dominance became compounded by political and military developments outside the territories of the Hausa-City-States and the Islamic Kingdom of Borno. For example, this was so in the sudden, rapid rise and expansion of the Kwararafa (Jukun) State.¹ Although detailed evidence on the degree of political incorporation and achieved unity when a particular Hausa-City-State rose to prominence is incomplete, available historical evidence suggests that before 1804 very little political incorporation processes were in motion and there was no permanent core and periphery in socio-economic and political power relationships. Each Kingdom defined its periphery only when it was in a strong military position of power in relation to others and temporarily established dominance in the region. When its military power declined, its economic and political influence also declined with the concomitant consequence that another developing City-State replaced the dominance.

This means that society in the Islamic Kingdoms before 1804 was characterized by "banditory politics" in which military adventures, looting and pleasure seeking took precedence over developing a political dynasty with permanent authority over vast territories. Queen Amina of Zaria, more than the other kings of the Hausa-City-States was an epitome of the pattern of politics in the period, in which there was a relationship between political control by military methods and pleasure seeking. Although Queen Amina developed to be an acknowledged military

1. This is examined in more detail in Section II (b) of this Chapter.

and political force in the region, she "earned an undying reputation as a consumer of lovers ... after each had been enjoyed he would be destroyed".¹ Ayandele further suggests that the pursuit of "Empire Building" in the Hausa-City-States in the period before 1804 depended for success on continued military supremacy of the conquering state with the mode of warfare and the weapons chosen being bows, arrows, spears, swords and a few firearms and these were the same for both victor and vanquished.² This suggests that a devastating defeat of a state by another did not necessarily prevent rapid military recovery which caught the victor by surprise. This military situation conditioned the volatile shifts in political centres of power in the Hausa-City-States and made wars an endemic feature of their societies.³ A situation like that was incompatible with the effective administration of a conquered territory and made the development of a centralized political unit through incorporation into a "Hausa Empire" elusive.

(b) M-Belt Kingdoms

The most celebrated of the Kingdoms among the M-Belt groups and societies in The North before 1804 were those of the Kwararafa (the Jukuns) and the Igalla. This section however includes examining the Islamic Kingdom of Nupe and the subsequently Islamized ruling classes in the Igbirra Kingdom although it is the case that in this study they

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1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.119
 2. Adeleye 1977 p.6
 3. Ibid

are outside the political conception of the territories with groups and societies where M-Belt socio-economic and political problems existed in The North. This is so because historical evidence suggests that Nupe and Igbirra trace their historical and social origins from the Igalla group and society,¹ although the 'Hausa Legend' suggests the origins of the Nupe and the Kwararafa (the Jukuns) to be offsprings of the "illegitimate Hausa Sons" of Bawo.² Perham further suggests that the Igalla group and society trace their historical origins from the Kwararafa (the Jukun): "when a Jukun Prince founded a ruling chief and nine Igalla sub-chiefs all of whose offices, with a toleration common in tribal history, he recognized".³ The Igalla political sub-systems however have controversial, confusing and conflicting accounts about the histories of their social origins which include links and traces from the Jukun, Yoruba and the Beni.⁴

These geneologies of origins, controversial as they are, suggest exclusion of the Kingdoms of Nupe and Igbirra as part of the Islamic Hausa-City-States and the Kingdom of Borno before 1804. This is so because their political and religious identity was ethnic and rooted in African traditional systems of beliefs rather than in the Islamic religion. Islam however began to shape the political influences of the ruling classes among the Nupe and Igbirra groups and societies in the 16th century and became a dominant force in society after 1804.⁵

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1. Ford et al (eds), 1955 p.57
 2. Lady Lugard 1905 p.239
 3. Perham 1962 p.145
 4. Ford et al (eds) 1955 p.80
 5. This will become apparent in the discussions below and also in Section II (b) of this Chapter.

The Gwari and Idoma Kingdoms are however excluded from the analysis in this section because the historical evidence is thin and controversial from which to draw meaningful correlations for the period after 1804. Furthermore the two Kingdoms did not make sufficient political impact on their neighbours in the region to the same extent as the Nupe, Jukun and Igalla Kingdoms. The Idoma and Gwari Kingdoms however shared many socio-economic and political similarities to the Nupe and Igalla Kingdoms before 1804. In the period between 1804 and 1900 both the Gwari and the Idoma successfully resisted Fulani conquest for political inclusion into the Islamic society established by dan Fodio.

If however the 'Igalla Legend' as suggested by Perham is something to go by which traces their origins to the Jukuns and that Igalla in turn produced Kings for the Nupe and Igbirra and that the Idoma also trace their origins from among the Jukun group and society then the Jukun Kingdom was the most influential in socio-political relationships among the M-Belt groups and societies before 1804. In terms of the political definition of the M-Belt areas used in this study however since Islamic influences existed and shaped politics and society in Nupe and Igbirra land before 1804 and subsequently became a dominant force in the period between 1804 and 1900 they are not considered as Kingdoms among the M-Belt groups and societies. The analytical judgement to exclude Nupe and Igbirra as part of Islamic Kingdoms in The North is derived from differences in socio-political and economic characteristics between them and the Islamic Kingdoms of the Hausa-City-States and Borno. For example, while contact with North Africa, conditioned the socio-economic and political patterns in the development of the Hausa-City-States and the Kingdom of Borno, Nupe and Igbirra remained with African traditional political and economic systems before 1804 even when it was the case that there existed traceable Islamic influences. Before

1804 however their economic patterns began to be influenced by European traders from the coast of what came to be Southern Nigeria. Subsequently in the period between 1940 and 1967 both the Nupe and Igbirra groups and societies did not share what became known as "the M-Belt Problems" in The North and remained emotionally outside the sentiments expressed for its political struggle unlike the Jukun and the Igalla in 1968.¹

The Jukun and Igalla Kingdoms and those of the Nupe, Igbirra, Gwari and Idoma were found south of the Islamic Kingdoms of the Hausa-City-States and the Kingdom of Borno. These are the Kingdoms described as "the pagan Kingdoms" in political identity in Northern Nigeria.² Interspersed in the territories between the Islamic Kingdoms and the 'M-Belt' Kingdoms, were numerous non-Islamic groups and societies that were politically autonomous of each other.³

Although socio-political and cultural affinities existed between the 'M-Belt' Kingdoms and the disparate non-Islamic groups and societies, each was distinct in its organization of socio-economic and political patterns. The Kingdoms however, rather than the different groups and societies were politically organized into comparatively powerful societies and made attempts at political expansion to build an Empire through processes similar to those that existed in the Islamic Kingdoms of the Hausa-City-States and Borno. The significant difference in the socio-economic and political processes that characterized the

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1. The differences in the degrees of political support and identification for the ideas of a M-Belt Region before 1967 and thereafter, from among the M-Belt groups and societies are examined in detail in Chapters 4 and 5
 2. For examples see Lady Lugard 1905; Perham 1962; Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966; Adeleye 1971 and the various British administrative reports of provinces in The North in the period between 1900 and 1950.
 3. These are examined in more detail in Section II(c) of this Chapter as 'Autonomous M-Belt groups and societies'.

M-Belt Kingdoms as they attempted Empire building however was that it was not bolstered by the civilizing Islamic influences from North Africa through Moslem scholars, traders and settled Islamic Missionaries among their communities. For example, the Jukun and a majority of the M-Belt groups and societies were cut off from any North African contacts and none of their communities were influenced by local Islamic scholars and traders before 1804.¹ Miller suggests that this was so because there was no social and economic scope for the contacts to be established and become a permanent feature in the processes of society and "Woe to the Hausa trader or otherwise who went there without guarantees. His fate was not pleasant; the least undesirable being to be cooked and eaten".²

The Kingdoms among the M-Belt groups and societies created political impact in the territories that became defined as The North as early as in the 15th century. The military as well as the political influences of Nupe and Jukun Kingdoms for example, were felt in The North in the period between 1463 and 1499.³ The Igalla Kingdom developed and reached its political peak in the first half of the 19th century,⁴ after it dominated the Igbirra Kingdom in the 18th century.⁵ The Igbirra Kingdom was however politically autonomous and independent of both Igalla and the powerful Benin Kingdom in Southern Nigeria in the same period in the middle of the 18th century until in the 19th century when parts of its territories became conquered by Nupe, Ilorin and Fulani armies as well as totally conquered by the British in the years before 1900.⁶ In the closing years of the

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1. W.R.S Miller, Reflections of a Pioneer, London 1936 p.49
 2. Miller 1936 p.49
 3. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.139
 4. Okpu 1977 p.26
 5. Perham 1962 p.148
 6. Ibid

19th century the Igalla Kingdom was weakened and its ruling classes became corrupted by Kings in the Nupe Kingdom and thereafter: "...

only British conquest saved Igalla from becoming a prey of the Fulani from Nupeland".¹ The experiences of 'the Niger Expedition' from England indicate that the political power of the Attah of Igalla was strong in 1841 although it was under political pressure from the Fulani in Nupe besides the persistent slave raids of Rabah from Kontagora under the political control of Sokoto.² This suggests that the politically significant Kingdoms found among the M-Belt groups and societies in terms of their numerical size, political cohesion, military might and territorial gains through military conquest were the Nupe and Jukun Kingdoms. For example political cohesion in the Nupe Kingdom is suggested by a chronology of ruling Kings that date from the 15th century.³

According to Nupe sources the Kingdom was founded early in the 15th century by Tseodo, a son belonging to the King of Igalla from a Nupe princess.⁴ In about 1770 ie. the 18th century, the Nupe Kingdom became a dominant military and political force in the region.⁵ This was at a time when Nupe became ruled by its first Islamic King.⁶ When an indigenous Islamic King ruled in the 18th century the Kingdom became powerful and reached the height of its prosperity.⁷ This suggests

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1. Perham 1962 p.146
 2. Charles F. Buxton (Ed), Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, Bart London (John Murray) 1855 p.554-555; also see M.J. Dent, "Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton", A series on the Saints, preached at St John's Parish Church, Keele Village, Summer 1982.
 3. Coleman 1963 p.23
 4. Forde et al 1955 p.22
 5. Ibid
 6. Akiga Sai, Akiga's Story: The Tiv Tribe as seen by one of its Members, London 1965 p.21
 7. Sai 1965 p.21

a correlation between Islamic influences in a particular Kingdom and the organization of military and political power for the development of society. In the numerous instances there was developed tendencies of expansion to adjacent territories. These tendencies laid the foundations for the ideological force which Islam assumed in the politics of the region leading to the Fulani Islamic revolution in 1804. For example, although the Nupe Kingdom did not build a political Empire to dominate, Nupe culture assimilated smaller cultural identities adjacent to its territories. These smaller cultural groups and societies have been generally referred to as "Sub-Nupe groups".¹ These include the Beni, Bataci, Kyedye, Nupe-'Zeni', Egbagi, Ebe, Gbedye, Kupa, Cekpa, Kusopa, Benu, Dibu, Gwagba and Basa-Nge.² Similarly in the period between 1804 and 1900, although the Nupe Kingdom was conquered by the Fulani, the culture assimilated the Fulani 'Jamaars' who overthrew the indigenous ruling dynasty.³ The Fulani also adopted Nupe institutions and indigenous ruling titles for their own rulership.⁴ This was so because there was political unity in the Nupe Kingdom based on a common historical tradition, the unifying symbol of its Kings, the absence of severe competing economic interests in adjacent territories which became bolstered by the number of persons in the common culture and language sufficiently to enable the development of a strong sense of Nupe consciousness and identification.⁵

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1. Forde et al 1955 p.18-20
 2. Ibid
 3. Coleman 1963 p.24
 4. Adeleye 1971 p.135
 5. Coleman 1963 p.24

The Nupe Kingdom benefited from Islamic and North African Arabic civilizing influences through the Hausa-City-States as early as in 1770, while it maintained its political autonomy and independence.¹ In the last few decades of the 18th century as well as in the 19th century, although the Kingdom was overthrown by the Fulani, it also achieved some development because of contacts from European trading companies on the Southern Nigerian coast, in particular the Royal Niger Company.² In the instance, both contacts with the Hausa-City-States and the Royal Niger Company increased the wealth of the ruling classes in material and intellectual possessions.³ In the instance of contact with European Trading companies/^{Nupe}became interested in the purchase of European firearms with the political intention of dominating society and politics in the region, a tendency that remained an ambition until the Kingdom became conquered by the British in the political incorporation processes that established The North.⁴

The socio-economic and political developments in the Nupe Kingdom in the period before 1804 and between 1804 and 1900 were achieved because of the unique geographical location it enjoyed and exploited. The Kingdom astrided the main internal trade-routes toward the Islamic Kingdoms of the Hausa-City-States in The North and to the coast in The South on the Niger River valley as well as on the confluence with the Benue River.⁵ With these geo-political and economic advantages the Nupe Kingdom developed and remained powerful until the end of the 18th

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1. Coleman 1963 p.24
 2. Ibid p.23-24
 3. Ibid
 4. Flint 1960 p.163
 5. Adeleye 1971 p.4

century when increased wealth among the ruling classes caused bitter recriminations and intrigues within the ruling families over succession.¹ These rivalries were the crucial political factors that conditioned Fulani manipulations in the successful overthrow of the Nupe Kingdom in 1807.² Although the Nupe ruling classes became subordinated to Fulani political authority centred on Sokoto, Nupe people developed and became Islamized with the concomitant gravitation toward the Islamic society established by dan Fodio in 1804 and shared the Islamic identity while maintaining a Nupe identity, particularly so after impact with British influences. The socio-political characteristic that became unique to Nupe on a comparable degree to the Kanuri identity developed in Borno Kingdom, was the success in building and maintaining a cohesive group-inclusiveness based on the Nupe culture even when there was fanatical loyalty to Fulani and the Islamic culture.

In sharp contrast to the socio-economic and political developments in societies and politics in the Nupe Kingdom for the same period, there existed pure military developments in a belligerent Jukun Kingdom. In the period before 1804 the Jukun Kings established strong socio-political and cultural institutions for politics in their society, then their warriors went on marauding economic adventures and the military conquests of the Jukun warriors took them to distant territories as early as in the 15th century from their Wukari capital on the Benue River.³ Although conquest by Jukun warriors and the cultural influence of the Jukuns spread over the vast territories that became defined as

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1. Adeleye 1971 p.4
 2. Ibid
 3. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.165

The North in 1900, there was no centralized administration based on the political authority of their King in Wukari.¹ Where there existed Jukun influence the effects of political dictatorship of the Jukun warriors was short-lived.² This suggests that what appeared to have happened was that when the Jukun consolidated internal political stability in the leadership of their society centred on Wukari, war warriors left and searched for economic adventure because of their astute military skills and courage on the horse.³ It is not clear whether it was the Jukun King and his men who gave political and military orders to go out of Jukun land and do battle in outside territory. This means it was a warrior adventure while the Jukun Kings enjoyed local political control.

The 'Jukun Empire' which is the equation of where Jukun warriors went to, ^{carried out} battles of conquest and won although they never remained to establish the political authority of the Jukun King from Wukari, extended over almost all of the territories that came to be defined as the political unit of Northern Nigeria upon impact with British influences in 1900.⁴ For example the Jukun marched and rode on horses from Wukari on the Benue River to conquer Fulani and Hausa armies in Kano, Katsina and Zaria, conquering all the groups and ^{Societies} on its way before 1653.⁵ Although explanatory reasons are difficult to produce on why

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1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.165
 2. Ibid p.165; p.195
 3. For examples of this tradition see Barrett 1979 p.4
 4. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.165; p.195; In the period between 1950 and 1960 the Sardanna persistently used the historically recollected expansion of the Jukun to suggest that Jukun Kings, like his great-grandfather were concerned to create political unity of The North based on non-religious as much as on religious factors. This is examined in more detail with evidence in Chapters 4 and 5
 5. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.165; p.195

the Jukun warriors directed their interests to distant territories rather than those immediate to its society, it is suggested that the economic wealth in Kano, Katsina and Zaria in the period might have been factors that conditioned the adventure. In 1653 the Jukun conquered Kano, stayed there for three years and suddenly started a homeward march back to Wukari without entering the city of Kano itself or establishing political control, nor leaving behind a political surrogate.¹ Eighteen years later, in 1671 the Jukun warriors visited Kano again in military conquest, broke into the city gates and slaughtered a large number of the inhabitants including the "Malamai" (Teachers) although they failed to capture the King of Kano because he escaped and fled to Daura.² When the King of Kano escaped, the Jukun warriors shifted their pillage to Katsina and attacked the city: "where many of the inhabitants were seized by the fierce Jukuns and cast alive into a great pit which is still known as Giwan Rano".³ The situation however became saved because upon the urgent prayers of Mallam Dan Masini the Jukun warriors pushed home no further success.⁴ This was so because when the Moslem prayers became answered a "Jukun general was kicked in the groins as he was mounting his horse for the final assault (on the city of Katsina) and died on the spot".⁵ Hogben

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1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.165; p.195
 2. Ibid p.165
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
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and Kirk Greene suggest that the result of that development caused other Jukun warriors to flee in dismay.¹ This suggests that besides economic pillage, in the 17th century the Jukun warriors became more political in their military adventures since they wanted to capture kings in order to establish political control like in the instance of the King of Kano.

This is the premise from which Perham, among others, suggests that the 'Jukun Empire' was more political rather than a military adventure, particularly so for the Jukun cultural influences that became traceable among some M-Belt groups and societies which it conquered as it marched to the Hausa-City-States of Kano, Zaria and Katsina.² For example, there were many similar political and magico-religious practices to Jukun practices among some M-Belt groups and societies on the Plateau, Adamawa, Benue, and S. Zaria which included: ".. the existence of chiefs who might not cross water... chiefs who disappear every seven years.. chiefs who were "imprisoned" so that they might be fed fat and kept in perfect condition during their short reigns".³ In other words this means that the Jukun Kingdom lasted longer than history suggests, since its cultural influences became institutionalized in some political practices among some groups and societies in the M-Belt areas. The history of the Jukun Kingdom, however, suggests that it transformed very little of the socio-economic patterns and political

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1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.165
 2. Perham 1966 p.150
 3. Perham 1962 p.150

relationships in both its society and on the groups and societies it conquered besides the spread of its culture. The Kingdom remained poor and undeveloped in economic wealth and did not develop a reading and writing civilization even when it was the case that it was in contact with the Hausa-City-States and the Kingdom of Borno through wars. Furthermore the Jukun Kingdom managed to keep itself without Islamic influences. This was so because the Jukuns simply "came and went away" and only left behind their cultural and magico-religious imprints on groups and societies they conquered.¹ The historical accounts about the political impact of the Jukun Kingdom are still riddled with controversy, particular so because the Jukuns tended to have been assimilated rather than they being cultural and political assimilators. For example, in the 18th century when the Jukun Kingdom declined, Jukun people mixed with the Tiv, as well as, with other smaller groups and societies adjacent to their territories, who were too numerous and virile to be dominated by Jukun culture even when it was the case that the cultural patterns of the Jukuns without their language were traceable in the period of the Fulani Islamic Revolution and upon impact with British influences in 1900.² In other words, social and political boundaries in the identities of groups and societies with Jukun cultural influences did not become blurred before 1804 and in the period between 1804 and 1900. In 1680 however a Borno King defeated Jukun warriors in a military battle and thereafter the great political divide in the patterns of socio-economic and political development between the Islamic Kingdoms and the Jukun became established and the non-Islamic Kingdom began to decline until in the 18th century it ceased to exist as a military and political force in the region.³

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1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, December 1980.
 2. C.K. Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria, Volume I, London 1925 p.81; Margery Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, London 1937 p.144-145.
 3. Meek 1925 I p.81

In the 19th century the Jukuns lived on the glorious memories of their past military adventures with little political interests while interacting independently in socio-economic and political relationships with their neighbours.¹ After impact with British influences in 1900, and in particular in the period between 1920 and 1940 the government of British administration in The North made political attempts to resurrect the prominence of the Jukun Kings and people as a "ruling race" over the M-Belt groups and societies.² This was in a period when there were different interpretations of the policy of Indirect rule among top British officials in the government of British administration in The North. Perham suggests that this was intended to help the Jukuns "exercise their imperial techniques before it had completely atrophied".³ This explains a further suggestion by Perham that upon impact with British influences after 1900 there was "an almost mournful fascination in studying this relic of an Empire which once extended over almost the whole of the northern Provinces and sacked Kano and which now is cut off far to the south in the heart of the pagan bush, still goes through an ancient ritual surrounding a very divine King .. living on the memory of the past ... as an effete remnant".⁴ The Aku Uka of Wukari, the King of the Jukuns, in the period between 1930 and 1940 was seen to be the political representative of the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North. In that period he developed socio-economic and political concerns over all of the M-Belt groups and societies in debates on policies and the activities of government in the NHC.⁵

1. Perham 1937 p.144-145

2. Ibid p.145

3. Ibid

4. Ibid p.144-145

5. These political concerns are examined in more detail in Chapter 2

(C) Autonomous M-Belt groups.

The autonomous M-Belt groups were found geographically interspersed in the territories between the politically centralized Islamic Kingdoms of the Hausa-City-States, the Islamic Kingdoms of Nupe, Igbirra and Borno and the Kingdoms with centralized political authority in the M-Belt areas such as the Jukun, Igalla and Idoma¹. The autonomous M-Belt groups before 1804, were disparate in socio-political organization and mainly existed with subsistence economic units. Their numbers were Legion. C. L. and O. Temple, suggest that the most important groups in the M-Belt areas in numerical size included: the Tiv, Idoma, Gwari, Bassange, Gwandara, Mandara, Jarawa, Montol, Ankwei, Angas, Yergam, Jukun, Batta, Bachama, Sura (Mahavul), Kaje, Birom and Katab². There were numerous other groups that existed in the M-Belt areas and in the North in general. The 1921 census identified about 250 tribes, with over 200 of these in the M-Belt areas alone³. The autonomous and smaller groups of the culturally distinct of the M-Belt areas have their peak of heterogeneity in Adamawa, Southern Bauchi, Plateau, Southern Zaria and the northern parts of Benue. More homogeneous and numerically bigger M-Belt groups were to be found in Southern Benue Province. These included the Tiv, Idoma, Jukun and the Alago⁴. Of the 416 tribal groups in Nigeria with a population under 100,000 in 1921, about 297 (70%) were in the M-Belt areas, 75 (18%) in Southern Nigeria and 44 (9%) in the Islamic Society in the North⁵.

Although Islamic civilization penetrated Kanuri and Hausa lands as early as in the 11th and 15th centuries respectively, the autonomous M-Belt groups retained their separate identities, untouched by these external influences, partly for geographical isolation and the lack of conquest and incorporation. The majority of the people in the M-Belt areas before 1804, therefore, remained outside the Islamic faith and North African cultural patterns, which were influencing the Hausa and Borno Kingdoms. They continued to practice unique forms of African traditional systems of

beliefs and worships, that varied as their cultural forms themselves. In 1905, Lady Lugard described the autonomous 'M-Belt' groups as existing in the North:

"in a belt of formidable pagan strength along the course of the two rivers (Niger and Benue)... the pagan belt stretching from 8° North latitude to the coast, was⁶ practically unknown to the early Hausa races".

The groups were concentrated on a small area, relative to the Hausa and Borno Kingdoms, but the diversities of their tribal customs and languages were great⁷. The main premises of political and social identification among these groups was based on Kinship, linguistic differences and claims to land, rather than culture, because of the enormous similarities in their cultural patterns⁸. It was not until after impact with British influences that the groups found a lingua franca, when there was diffusion of the Hausa language and culture to some parts of the M-Belt areas⁹. Some of these groups maintained their political and cultural autonomy until upon impact with British influences. Although there were tribal wars, where groups failed to contain the military thrust of the Islamic Kingdoms or that of a more powerful neighbour there was forced migration, a pattern that was to become increasingly characteristic of the area after the Islamic revolution in 1804. No organized political authority therefore claimed political suzerainty over these groups, particularly the majority of those found in the Benue Valley and on the hilly Plateau¹⁰. However, vast areas of some of the M-Belt groups in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and some parts of Plateau, were subsequently colonized by the Fulani and conquered in the Fulani Islamic Jihad in the period between 1804 and 1900, who ruled over numerous 'pagan' subjects.

There are certain specific defining social and political features which characterized these autonomous M-Belt groups that make them distinct in the North before 1804 and which remained peculiar to some of them until

impact with British influences. The most important were in socio-political and economic differences in the organization of society and politics. They were comparatively small scale organizations of politics and economies over a smaller area and were undeveloped relative to the institution and political organization of society in the Islamic Kingdom which were trans-local. They also tended to be *acephalous* state systems unlike the Hausa and Borno Kingdoms and the subsequent Sokoto caliphate. Tremearne suggests that although they were undeveloped and relatively backward when compared to the transformation of society in the Hausa and Borno Kingdoms with Islamic culture:

"They shared similarities in customs, life patterns, culture, food, houses, military formations and strategy and their weapons were all the same despite their linguistic divides"¹¹.

Economic activity seldomly went beyond the family unit since it was mainly subsistence economy¹². Furthermore the organization of socio-economic and political activities was on a daily basis, orally communicated and depended on memory for records; there was no writing in contrast to the Islamic scholarship that developed with the written arabic scripts in Islamic centres of Katsina and Maiduguri as early as in the 16th century. Islamic civilization which influenced the Hausa and Borno Kingdoms was used to organize government, commerce and encouraged the accumulation of knowledge. Furthermore while trade and commercial transactions within and sometimes between the M-Belt groups was based on exchange by barter, weighted and measured equivalents of currency were used in the Islamic society. These developments increased the wealth of the Islamic society while the M-Belt areas remained poor. The poor societies of the 'North' in the period before 1804 therefore existed in the M-Belt areas, particularly those in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Plateau, where there were frequent famines¹³. The poverty of the M-Belt areas contrasted with the wealth of the Islamic

societies where Kings boasted of gold reserves and gold plated ornaments. However the wealth of the Islamic society in this period was dependent on a slave-economy and some of the slaves were extracted from the M-Belt areas.

The undevelopment as much as the underdevelopment of the M-Belt groups is therefore explained by the social turbulence that was set in motion both by the economic needs of the Islamic kingdoms in the trans-Sahara as well as by the extended trans-Atlantic slave trade from the southern parts of what became Nigeria. Being geographically sandwiched between more powerful neighbours both to the North and to the South the M-Belt areas became de-populated by slave raids of the Hausa and Borno Kingdoms who exported slaves northwardly across the Sahara and by Nupe who in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries was exporting slaves both for the trans-Saharan trade and southwardly for the trans-Atlantic trade¹⁴. Before 1804 therefore nearly the whole of the M-Belt areas was in a flux and was characterized by very confusing patterns of migration in which many group cultures became modified by those to which the new group migrated into¹⁵. Thus for example while some traditions of origins of non Islamic groups in Adamawa (Bachama) S. Bauchi (Jarawa) and Plateau (Angas) suggest having come from somewhere in the North, the Benue groups (Tiv) and some of the Plateau groups (Biom) suggest migration to their present locations from "the south"¹⁶. This might not have been unconnected to both the trans-Saharan and the trans-Atlantic slave trade. The Islamic revolution and the wars it created on the M-Belt groups was to increase the tempo of migration patterns of non-Islamic groups in Adamawa, Bauchi and S. Zaria to the Plateau where the Jarawa, Kaje and Ganawuri took refuge. Meek suggests that as result of the wars and slave raids on the non-Islamic groups in the period before 1804, particularly those on the M-Belt areas, society and politics was in constant flux and each of the groups ceased to exist in the homogeneity of social practices except for its linguistic differences¹⁷.

Among the M-Belt groups therefore the relationship between politics

and society was minimal and only in so far as it threatened day to day existence of the individual groups members did economy assume a politically meaningful organization. The groups were politically isolated from each other in their identities and the structure of authority in each group was fragmented and only mediated by a 'tribal court' consisting of a council of elders and spiritual heads who had authority over chief and people. Being military weaker than their more powerful Islamic neighbours who encircled them (Borno, the Hausa states and Nupe) they could not create a social order in their society that guaranteed external interaction and influence. They were preoccupied with the self-defence of their groups and identities of their members, which they managed to maintain by living a precarious existence either by hiding in caves or migration. Tribal group boundaries were therefore maintained by the unique geography in the location of the M-Belt groups even before 1804. Where societies are naturally, protected by physical inaccessibility dissident ideas and religions, different from the general patterns of social development affecting other groups, flourish in the highland or forested regions. This was not unique for the M-Belt areas. The Berbers in North Africa for example, remained Catholic for a long time in the midst of an Islamic setting, as were the Moors in the Aragon highlands in Spain who kept their faith in Islam until their expulsion, while everywhere surrounded by Catholics¹⁸. In the hilly lands of Adamawa, Southern Bauchi, Plateau and Southern Zaria and in the forested areas of Benue, South-East of the Hausa states on the Niger-Benue Valley some M-Belt groups maintained themselves inviolate from Islamic influences before and even after 1804¹⁹.

However, from the economic needs of the Islamic kingdoms, reflected in the slave raids on the non Islamic groups, most of the M-Belt areas became underdeveloped. The most affected groups were those adjacent to areas of the Islamic Kingdoms of Borno, the Hausa States and the Nupe Kingdom. This was particularly the case with groups in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau and S.

Zaria. In Benue, the Junkun and Tiv were least affected while the Idoma suffered from the raids of the Nupe Kingdom, although they remained equally undeveloped because they were inaccessible to outside influences. The socio-economic and political differences between the Islamic Kingdoms and the M-Belt groups however remained distinct in the period before 1804. They were to increase after 1804 upon the establishment of the Fulani ruled Islamic Society in the 19th century when Islamic political leadership assumed the governance of a cohesively established society with a centralized religion and political authority in Sokoto over a wider area with the M-Belt areas defined in functional terms in relation to the centres of the new power structure. Before 1804, therefore the social and political frontiers of the M-Belt groups were volatile and political identities being non Islamic, were limited to the groups concentrated in a specific area. Similar to the Islamic Kingdoms and some of the non-Islamic Kingdoms in the M-Belt areas a superimposed core and a periphery did not exist. This was altered with the establishment of an Islamic Society by dan Fodio in 1804 over most of the territories that became the North in 1900.

III. Politics and Society in the period between 1804 and 1900 following from the Islamic revolution of dan Fodio.

The whole pattern of government and politics in the areas that became Northern Nigeria in 1900 were changed by the Jihad of 1804, launched by dan Fodio. Fodio set out to make Muslims out of the Islamic Kingdoms whose Muslims had become rather lax in Islamic practices as his reason d'etat for the Jihad. However, economic and political interests in the established Islamic Society complemented religious goals and subsequently de-emphasized religion with time and space as conquest and expansion got further away from the core-Islamic centres of the revolution toward the other areas of

the North and in particular, toward the M-Belt groups who increasingly became defined as peripheries to be exploited. dan Fodio was however committed to transformation of the socio-religious life of communities living in the region in 1804²⁰. Whatever were the religious motives in the establishment of the Islamic Society in the 'North', the revolution of dan Fodio was another phase in the historical oppression of some of the M-Belt groups, one factor in the complex range of systemic oppressive forces that set into motion the underdevelopment of the M-Belt areas, when the religion of the Islamic society degenerated into something undefineable as it raided both friend and foe alike.

The religious ideas and political conception of the Islamic revolution which established an Islamic society in 1804 over most of the territories that became the North in 1900, was the brain-child of a member of the Tarika, an Islamic Fulani intelligentsia which had migrated from the Western Sudanic Empires and settled in Hausa-land early in the 13th century²¹. In the 15th century, the Fulani were already a distinct group with a religious and political identity of their own as they penetrated Hausa-land, bringing with them: "their cattle and carrying books on divinity"²². By the 17th century the Fulani in Hausaland had established themselves in exclusive colonies²³. In many of the "Fulani colonies" on Hausaland, there was intermarriage with the indigenous Hausa population and some of the Fulani systematically lost their distinctive physical features as they adopted many of the Hausa customs including the Hausa language²⁴. Their academic knowledge and socio-political skills however caused them to move into the metropolitan centres of Hausa-land where they controlled important political roles in the institutions of society: the schools, the courts and the palaces of the Hausa Kings²⁵. By the end of the 18th century Fulani numbers and influence in the Hausa states was enormous²⁶. There was a concomittant increase in the numbers of their educated members, who automatically assumed positions of influence in the

metropolitican centres of the Hausa Kingdoms: "The Fulani in Hausa towns became good traders, teachers and were serving as political advisors"²⁷.

However, it was not until the early years of the 19th century that a highly educated but relatively small class of the Fulani began to establish their dominance over the Hausa Kingdoms by both military and political means. Among other factors in the developing political crisis in the Hausa city states there was an unchecked increase in the class of influential religious scholars and preachers who were Fulani and had successfully achieved a Hausa peasantry following that had Islamized²⁸. One of those Fulani scholars was Usman da Fodio, a teacher and Islamic preacher who had become prominent and influential and had educated Yunfa, the Hausa King of Gobir²⁹. At the age of 33 he had a large Islamic following which attracted the jealousies and envy of his pupil, Yunfa the King of Gobir. It was however dan Fodio who sounded the fateful aratory of the Islamic revolution which charged the Hausa Kings with malformation of the Islamic society and malignant practices of the Islamic religion:

"One of the ways of their government is their impositions on the people monies not laid down by the Sharia being those which they call Jangali and Kuridin Shari and Kuridin Salla. One of the ways of their government is their intentionally eating whatever food they wish whether it is religiously permitted or forbidden, and wearing what ever clothes they wish whether religiously permitted or forbidden and drinking whatever beverages (Ta'am) they wish whether religously permitted or forbidden and riding whatever riding beasts they wish, whether religiously permitted or forbidden and taking what women they wish without marriage contract and living in decorated places, spreading soft (decorated) carpets as they wish whether religiously permitted or forbidden"³⁰.

The Islamic revolution sprang from an observable failure in governing according to the Koran, in the practices of the Hausa Kings whom dan Fodio termed as "Heathen Kings"³¹. The Jihad of dan Fodio therefore in the classic tradition of puritanic Islamic revivalism and its expressions,

ended in a war of conquest to reform the irreligious

By a political process which carefully selected religious and military leadership rooted in the indoctrination of some of his personal students, in order to fulfil Islamic objectives in 'The North', dan Fodio gave political orders directed at the Islamic Hausa-city-states as well as on the non-Islamic groups and societies with the urge: "...to spread the faith and oust the Habe and Kafiri rulers"³². To each of the leaders dan Fodio gave an Islamic religious 'Green-Flag' as the symbol of authority directed by him³³. Then he commended to them an Islamic prayer that he used before the critical battle of 'Tabkin Kwatto' to be used before battle:

"If I fight this battle that I may become greater than my fellow or that my son may become greater than his or that my slave may lord it over his, may the 'Kafiri' wipe us from the land"³⁴.

This is the premise from which there was developed a relationship between an Islamic religious ideology in the political identity and the military battles of Fulani armies to spread Islam over other groups and societies in 'The North' as part of a political process of incorporation. This suggests that central to the political and religious ideas of dan Fodio when he set into motion the Islamic revolution was the establishment of Islamic laws as the basis of government and governing in society in the territories that became the North in Nigerian politics. The process was meant to replace political systems which had developed to become riddled with un-Islamic laws, un-Islamic political practices as was characteristic of the Hausa-city-states and the Kingdom of Borno.

Usman dan Fodio religiously accused the Hausa-Kings of having gone astray from the path of 'Allah' and had therefore "raised the flag of the Kingdom of the world above the flag of Islam and thus were unbelievers"³⁵. In other words, it was meant that Islam as the religion of the state ought to take precedence over the nature of political ideologies as the religion

of the rulers and the ruled. Politics and religion ought to be one in Islam and politics ought to be guided by the Islamic religion. The pattern in the conduct of the affairs of society that was now established focussed on the Islamic religion taking precedence over the policies in politics. This means that according to dan Fodio the theory and practice of politics is guided by Islam and its ideological precepts of 'the political society'. There were therefore strong underlying religious reasons for political commitment in the overthrow of the Hausa Kings by dan Fodio and his followers. Whatever the weight of the religious reasons for political commitment, to engage a religious movement in a struggle to contest for control of political power meant taking the Islamic religion straight into politics through the front door. This created political tensions in the processes of incorporation into the Islamic society established in the period between 1804 and 1810 because there existed non-Islamic groups and societies in the territories. Subsequently after 1900 when there was impact with British influences and the non-Islamic groups and societies became part of the wider conception of the Islamic society, the Islamic religious divide conditioned the nature of political conflict in the unit created as Northern Nigeria.

In the period between 1804 and 1810 when there were religious and political processes in the establishment of the Islamic society and its expansion through military methods on the territories that became the North, dan Fodio accepted and blessed the submission to his authority by Fulani and other Islamic leadership in the Islamic Reformist Movement³⁶. This suggests that in the early years of the Islamic revolution leadership of the scattered Fulani (Jama'as) communities that were settled among the different groups and societies became formally brought under one central political and religious authority of dan Fodio before there was total military victory over the Hausa-city-state. Subsequently some of the chosen leaders were successful in their military and political assignments to

overthrow the Hausa-Kings. For example Modibbo Adama in Adamawa, Yakubu in Bauchi, Isiyaku in Daura, Buba Yero in Gombe, Sambo in Hadejia, Ali-Limi in Ilorin, Sulemanu in Kano, Ibrahim Zaki in Katagum, Umaru Dallaji in Katsina, Dan Tunku in Kazaure, Mamman Manga dan Gwani Mukhtar in Misau, Malam Dendo in Nupe and Mallam Musa in Zaria³⁷. These were all disciples of Shedu dan Fodio before he commissioned them to carry on the Jihad.

Fulani leaders in the Islamic Reformist Movement like Gwani Mukhtar assigned to overthrow the Islamic Kingdom of Borno however only partially succeeded in conquering the western territories and failed to fulfil the overthrow of the King³⁸. The Fulani led Islamic Reformist Movement centered on Sokoto therefore failed to religiously and politically incorporate the Islamic Kingdom of Borno into the Islamic Society of dan Fodio by military means. Within the Borno Kingdom itself the Islamic ruling classes were not religiously attracted and remained unimpressed by the Islamic reformist movement of dan Fodio. For example, after halting the Fulani military advance on the Western territories of the Kingdom of Borno, El-Kanemi requested dan Fodio to explain the attacks;

"since we profess the same religion and it is not fitting that our subjects should make war on each other"³⁹.

Although the explanations that dan Fodio produced suggested a list of evils in the practices of Islam within the Kingdom of Borno, El Kanemi argued back that;

"sin does not make any one a pagan when he has confessed his faith"⁴⁰.

Control over the military situation within the conquered western territories in the Kingdom of Borno by Fulani armies remained volatile until after 1903 when British conquest established a superior military presence in the area.

On the Northern and Western frontiers of the Hausa-city-states overthrown by the Fulani, the Islamic revolution of Usman dan Fodio failed to conquer all the Hausa speaking people in the area⁴¹. Some of the Hausa-speaking communities in the area became bitter political enemies of Fulani leadership in the Islamic revolution because of persistent military raids for conquest even though in the period between 1804 and 1900 many of them became Moslems⁴². The northern and western frontiers to the Hausa-city-states were comprised of the territories of the peoples of Zaberma, Dendi, Fogha, Yagha and Gurma where there were minorities of Hausa-speakers and a few being Moslems before 1804⁴³. This suggests that within the very social and economic boundaries of the Hausa-city-states, political incorporation by Fulani military conquest in the establishment of the Islamic society was not total because historically recollected experiences complimented the persistence of non-Islamic identities.

It is not the intention of the study in this chapter to produce exhaustive explanatory reasons for the underlying motives of the Islamic revolution, whether they were purely political or religious. The interest is first and foremost to describe how the Islamic Reformist Movement established an Islamic Society and how subsequently its leadership became entrenched to dominate politics in the region to produce specific effects on the failure of political incorporation on some of the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1804 and 1900. It however suffices to mention that various underlying socio-political motives have been advanced as the causes of the Islamic revolution that was ignited by Usman dan Fodio. The strongest that discounts the religious motivations of dan Fodio is suggested by J. H. Hogben and Anthony Kirk-Greene when they relate the origins of Islamic religious movements in the Western Sudan to the developing state systems in the region in general⁴⁴. Explicit in the correlation they draw between the state of politics and religion within the Hausa-city-states and the Islamic uprising of dan Fodio is a suggested

political plot masqueraded under the guise of religious purification to install the Fulani in the political positions of the Habe Kings⁴⁵. In other words ethnic political considerations played in the Islamic Reformist Movement and were determining factors in the establishment and political domination of the Islamic society with Islamic ideological consideration taking secondary influences in the contest to control power in all of the Hausa-city-states. This suggests that an Islamic religious ethnic group and society was the political force that effected change and the shape of politics within the Hausa-city-states. This interpretation is supported by new research findings on the relationship between the state of politics in the 19th century Hausa-city-states as the factors that conditioned the Islamic revolution and the political ambitions of the Fulani. For example it has been suggested that the Fulani uprising;

"was preconceived in the minds of its leaders long before (they set about) the overthrow of the Hausa states and the establishment of a new administration"⁴⁶.

Adeleye suggests a number of social and political indicators to support the propositions: dan Fodio's students featured prominently in the whole process and success of the revolution; there was a geographical spread of his Fulani students before the revolution - these included Buba Yaro, Yakubu (who was the only non Fulani), Ali-Limi, Mallam Dendo, Adama, and Gwani Mukhtar who went away from the dan Fodio camp in Gobir to the distant territories that became affected by the Islamic revolution before its expansion on non-Islamic groups and societies; There was no Hausa student of dan Fodio as leader of the Islamic uprising; the students became local leaders preceding the revolution and had begun to preach reform and won fame:

"... and when they heard of dan Fodio's uprising they went back to him for acceptance and blessing"⁴⁷.

This means that there was political timing of a previously existing plot developed from religious teachings rather than spontaneous political activity.

Whatever the nature of the religious zeal in the Islamic revolution it might have been a rare political accident in the whole experience of world history that it used a religious movement to install new rulers in the Hausa- City- States who were all Fulani except for Yakubu of Bauchi. Even then, Yakubu from the Gerawa group and society in Bauchi and the subsequent founding Emir of the ruling family was a former student of dan Fodio and it is suggested that he "was the trusted pupil of dan Fodio"⁴⁸. Even when there was trust between Yakubu and dan Fodio, upon his political and military assignment to Bauchi, Yakubu had to hide for about two years from powerful local Fulani leaders in Bauchi as well as from his own Gerawa tribe, after receiving the flag⁴⁹. Furthermore, Yakubu was to face considerable opposition from Fulani leaders in Gombe and Adamawa in the cause of executing the politics of the Islamic revolution. These political tensions revolved over territorial claims and jurisdiction over territory. They warranted the intervention of dan Fodio to resolve the parties involved⁵⁰.

In the period between 1804 and 1810 the Islamic revolution of dan Fodio successfully overthrew all of the Hausa Kings and established authority over an area of 250 000 sq. miles⁵¹. It however failed to overthrow the Kings of Borno although it conquered half of their territory on the East of Hadeija. The speed and extent of conquest, made the Fulani Empire the fastest growing political entity before the coming of Europeans, with one centre of gravity. Before 1817 it had expanded the political boundaries of the Hausa states to include the Yoruba of Ilorin and the Nupe Kingdom. Usman dan Fodio created an emirate system of government on most of

Hausa-land and subsequently went beyond the Hausa kingdoms and created about 30 emirates in addition to numerous sub-emirates all under a centralized Islamic system of government and religious authority in Sokoto⁵². In all these political and religious developments, Usman dan Fodio was the source of all authority to other leaders. From his leadership, the application of Islamic norms, in the governance of society and political organization, was evolved a structural administrative system. This provided the common bond which held the component parts together as one polity. Over the ruins of the numerous polities of the vast areas, firstly the Hausa city states, the Islamic movement established a new political system based on Islamic law and values. It had initiated a political revolution which ultimately swept away the Hausa dynasties and established an Islamic society, centred at Sokoto radiating political power and authority to the East, South and South-Eastern territories, from that centre. The new society was held together by the Islamic institutions and by the personality of dan Fodio himself. He established a remarkable ascendancy and authority over his appointed rulers⁵³. At the same time cohesion in the society derived from its machinery of government, which while placing a premium on obedience and subordination to the Caliph, was sufficiently flexible to allow rulers a great measure of independence, subject only to their non-infringement of the Sharia and the proper discharge of their functions delegated to them by dan Fodio: ie. repair mosques, teach sciences of Islam, improve markets, wage the Jihad as a duty imposed on Muslims and reporting important events such as the declaration of war on enemies and the infiltration of foreigners on their land⁵⁴. This was a straight forward case of federalism with an ideological commitment: autonomy of the units in the state while acknowledging the supreme authority of the centre, a tradition that has remained strong in the contemporary pattern of politics in the North with Nigeria. Although the established Islamic society was run on a highly decentralized form of power

structure, where each of the flag-bearers took decisions on local matters, such localism was not contradictory to unity. Usman dan Fodio himself remained the ultimate source of all political authority and all powers in the units under the emirs were exercised in his name⁵⁵. This was the political and religious element that held the federal Islamic society together in the North, even after the death of dan Fodio in April 1817⁵⁶.

For all its size, the Islamic society established by the Fulani was economically and socially integrated through Kano and Katsina and politically based in Sokoto. Its interaction with the outside world became more entrenched through these centres. Internal order was secure and orderly and this gave stability to agriculture, intellectual development, centred at Katsina and Islamic civilization that looked up to North Africa thrived⁵⁷. Much more significant for the later political patterns of identities that developed from the Islamic society of dan Fodio, is that Islam in the North, became for its adherants in the Islamic society, a political heritage in which they took a great deal of pride. It also became for them the source of social life and political creativity to the extent that they saw themselves as different from and superior to other groups including all M-Belt people and people in the South of Nigeria⁵⁸. The Fulani established Islamic society had a bond of unity which also produced a cultural unity to a higher degree and with a greater sense of socio-political identity with more cohesion when compared to the M-Belt groups and other parts of Nigeria.

However, after the overthrow of the Hausa-city states the Islamic society developed to become what James Coleman has described as an indigenous imperial system⁵⁹. This was so because it expanded the political boundaries of the Hausa kingdoms by colonization and conquest, particularly toward the M-Belt areas. The pattern in the process was in some ways similar to the subsequent European processes of colonization and conquest of Africa: claiming territory, systematically colonizing the territory and

where there was resistance, this was followed by conquest and establishment of political authority. The instruments of the colonization of territories outside the Hausa states were the "Fulani Jemaas"⁶⁰. The "Fulani Jemaas" that infiltrated and colonized territories all over the North including the M-Belt areas were headed by Islamic 'Mallams' (teachers)⁶¹. In the particular experiences of the M-Belt areas the Fulani usually came peacefully, asked for a piece of land to settle on and to graze their cattle and then refused to move out⁶². They paid token rent to the indigenes of the land with milk on a daily basis and also a cow for each year they stayed to graze their cattle. The indigenes also benefited from this because cow-dung improved farmland and improved crop yields on land where the Fulani cows stayed overnight⁶³. In these ways "Fulani colonies" developed among some of the M-Belt groups, under separate Fulani leaders known as "Ardos" who were usually independent of the local non-Islamic chiefs. This was the general pattern in the colonization of the M-Belt areas of Adamawa, S.Bauchi, S.Zaria, and some parts of Plateau. Where the "Fulani Jemaas" were concentrated in the M-Belt areas there was total success in achieving control or some form of partial control over the M-Belt groups after the Islamic revolution of 1804. In the M-Belt areas where there were no "Fulani-Jemaas", there was no conquest, although such groups were raided directly from the Islamic society by Fulani armies or from a base in a conquered M-Belt area or from pressures on a conquered M-Belt group who in turn raided other unconquered groups in order to catch slaves to pay tributes. This was so for M-Belt groups in the areas of Adamawa, Jukun land, Southern Bauchi, Plateau, Southern Zaria and the Northern parts of Benue. There were therefore some M-Belt groups that neither came into contact with the Fulani or Islamic influences for a longish period of time. M-Belt groups in Benue, like the Tiv who experienced the raids of Dan Karo, for example, only had minimal experience of socio-economic and political relations with the Fulani.

Colonization, colonialism and the imperialism⁶⁴ of the Fulani on the M-Belt groups had its basic characteristic features manifested in the period between 1817 and 1900. In that period:

"A domination which was established in the name of religion and justice had fallen into tyranny, tempered only by the weakness or the moderation of personal rule. Under dan Fodio and Bello, the conquering armies of the Fulani were enjoined to spread the true faith and to convert the pagans to Islamism. At a later period, it was found more profitable to leave the pagans in a condition in which it was lawful to make slaves and to exact tributes and Fulani wars degenerated into little more than slave raiding expeditions"⁶⁵.

Conceptions of the Imperialism of the Islamic society on the M-Belt groups however derived from the dispatches of dan Fodio when he launched the Jihad. Dan Fodio had written that:

"the waging of Holy war (al-jihad) is obligatory by assent ... and that to make war upon the heathen king who will not say 'There is no God but Allah' is obligatory by assent and that to take the government from him is obligatory by assent; and that to make war upon the heathen king who does not say 'There is no God but Allah' on account of the custom of his town (bi-Sababi 'urfi 'L-baladi) and who makes no profession of Islam is (also) obligatory by assent; and that to take the government from him is obligatory by assent"⁶⁶.

The Islamic revolution defined the M-Belt areas as "heathen kings" and as a direct consequence, Adama, one of the flag-bearers with the title of Lamido Fombina was assigned the task of conquest to expand the Islamic society from there Northward to the Nile and southwardly to the Bight of Biafra⁶⁷. Intended expansion of the Islamic society over the M-Belt groups was particularly vigorous in the period between 1830 and 1900. Although there were Islamic ideals in the intentions they also became underlined by socio-political and economic interests of the metropolitan centres of the

established Islamic society. Indeed dan Fodio had instructed his flag-bearers and followers to make war and take governments from the hands of the heathen kings and rulers in these areas but had also been careful to restrain them by pointing out that it was religiously illegal to "enslave them and devour their property"⁶⁸. When Sultan Bello took over the reins of religious and political authority things changed. He laid down three social and religious categories of people in the territories he claimed as God-given for the purposes of the Islamic society and clearly suggested that in the third category slaves were to be extracted:

"Firstly there are the pure Moslems; Secondly there are those that have mingled heathen and Moslem practices ... the third category are those of heathen origins who have never entered Islam ... let their children and women be taken as slaves and their property divided ... the Mallams are in entire agreement upon this point"⁶⁹.

The nature of the Economy of the established Islamic society and the means leadership in centres like Yola, Bauchi, Muri, Gombe and Zaria were obliged to express loyalty to Sokoto conditioned the exploitation of the M-Belt groups during the Fulani wars of conquest. In the instance, the historic economic roles of Zaria, as a slave-raider to produce slaves for labour in the Islamic society and for exchange in the trans-Saharan trade were redefined by Bello to include Gombe, Yola and Bauchi, whose territories he conceived of in a letter to Yakubu of Bauchi: "as most important frontiers"⁷⁰. By this conception the M-Belt areas of Adamawa, S.Bauchi, S.Zaria, Plateau and Benue became conceived of as the periphery of the Islamic society to be exploited for the specific needs of the economy of the Islamic society. This was so because, the economy of the established Islamic society from the Fulani led revolution was an inherited economy and society, which remained as it existed in the Hausa states. Although, the Hausa kings were overthrown and the Fulani successfully centralized

religious and political power to themselves, they did not alter the economic structure, which remained heavily dependent on the trans-Saharan trade as much as on the trans-local trade between the Hausa cities. Furthermore, political and religious leadership in the Islamic society, particularly that from its peripheral centres such as Zaria, Bauchi, Gombe and Yola was expected to show loyalty to Sokoto by yearly visitations. These visits had to be accompanied by captured slaves and other material goods as gifts and contributive tribute from conquered areas. Conquered M-Belt areas were also expected to acknowledge their political status as subordinated to Islamic rulers by payments of tributes, which were in slaves, complemented by material presents. In 1846, when the Emir of Zaria for example, conquered the Gwari and some of the Southern Zaria groups, he demanded their submission to his authority by the payment of tributes: "in the form of slaves, mats and locust beans annually sent to the Sultan"⁷¹. Slaves and material goods as tributes from sub-Emirs were also obligatory, particularly from those established in S.Zaria, Adamawa and Plateau, to superior Emirs in Yola, Gombe, Bauchi and Zaria, to demonstrate political and religious loyalty. Slaves and slavery in the Islamic society was therefore wealth, trade, currency and politics, besides its function of meeting the domestic needs of labour required to work in the Plantations ('rumadas') of the Emirs⁷². The biggest of these 'rumadas' (slave farms) was at Taban Sani, with a labour force of 3000 slaves who were owned by the Emir⁷³. Furthermore, when Mamman Sani, the Fulani Emir in Zaria in 1846 died, he owned about 10,000 slaves who had produced corn that lasted Zaria Emirate for 11 years⁷⁴. Slave raiding and slavery were therefore indispensable military activity on the M-Belt groups for the economy of the Islamic society. The whole social and economic system of the established Islamic society was based on slaves and slavery⁷⁵.

The bulk of the slaves for the economic needs of the Islamic society came through Zaria, an emirate that had extended its influence by the

establishment of vassal kingdoms in Jemaa, Keffi, Doma and Nassarawa, by colonization and stationing military garrisons in these centres⁷⁶. Slaves for the economic needs of the Fulani established Islamic society also came from Adamawa, Bauchi and Gombe who had similarly extended their influence deep into the M-Belt areas by establishing authority in Wase, Dengi and Kanam on the South Eastern parts of the Plateau⁷⁷. The Emirs of Adamawa, Bauchi and Muri had also penetrated deeply into the M-Belt areas and established influence among the Bachama, Chamba and the Jukun in Wukari and Yakubu of Bauchi went as far down as Lafiyan-Berriberi⁷⁸.

However, while some Islamic communities, directly opposed to the Islamic revolution of the Fulani flag-bearers, assisted in the conquest, exploitation and depopulation of the M-Belt groups, others organized non-Islamic communities against the authority of the Fulani in Zaria, Bauchi and Gombe. The Habe dynasty overthrown by the Fulani in Zaria, which escaped to settle in Abuja and the Ningawa in the areas north of Bauchi, with some of their members sandwiched in the area between Zaria and Bauchi, performed these contrasting political roles by creating centres of opposition to the Fulani centres of power. Although the Habe dynasty in Zaria escaped after 1804 to maintain their independence from the Fulani in Abuja, they were spared from Fulani raids only on the promise of regular supply of slaves, which they produced from among the Gwari and other southern Zaria groups⁷⁹. In the areas north of Bauchi, pagans unconquered by the Fulani who came under the influence of a Muslim dissident group with the leadership of Hamza, organized non-Islamic groups to turn the tables on the Islamic slave raiders and terrorized Bauchi and Zaria Emirates and actually threatened to cut-off the regular slave imports from southern Zaria⁸⁰. The Islamic dissident group under the leadership of Mallam Hamza for unclear reasons had previously been expelled from Kano, Zaria, Bauchi in the middle of the 1840s⁸¹. They even took slaves from the Islamic populations under Zaria, Kano and Bauchi although they were not engaged in

the trans-Saharan slave trade. Furthermore, they also engaged themselves in organizing non-Islamic groups to revolt against the political authority of Bauchi, Kano and Zaria⁸². The military raids on Kano, Bauchi and Zaria by the Ningiwa and organized political revolts among the non-Islamic groups encouraged by the Ningi chiefs continued until they were conquered by the British in 1903⁸³.

As much as many pagan parts of the Islamic society remained politically incorporated into the Fulani Empire, there were also many areas of the M-Belt groups that remained un-colonized by the Hausa-Fulani Muslims and unconquered by the armies of the Fulani Islamic revolution. They were, however, militarily raided in varying degrees by Fulani armies for economic interests rather than the religious reasons for the establishment of an Islamic society. These areas remained politically independent and free from Fulani and Islamic cultural influences until British conquest in the years after 1900. They included groups found on the hilly and mountainous areas of the Plateau, Southern Jukun and almost all of Tiv and Idoma land in the Benue Valley. Similarly, in Adamawa, such groups as those centred around the Bachama and the Chamba in Numan and Wurkum areas, the Kaje in Southern Zaria and the Jarawa and Lere districts in Southern Bauchi were also continuously raided but remained unconquered. Parts of the land of the groups in Southern Bauchi and Southern Zaria was however colonized and their people forced to migrate to the hilly and militarily secure parts of the Plateau. All of these groups however had their territories claimed without conquest and divided between Adamawa, Muri, Gombe, Bauchi and Zaria. In the period between 1805 and 1903, Fulani armies attempted conquest to bring the groups under the authority of the particular Emirate. There were varying degrees in the military success of these attempts. The success of established political control from the military efforts at incorporation into the Islamic society was conditioned by the extent of Fulani and Islamic colonization of the particular M-Belt area, the nature

of topography, freedom from the Tse-tse fly of the forested areas and distance from the Islamic centres of religion and politics. Furthermore, all the M-Belt groups and societies, reacted to the forceful Fulani entry into their societies for conquest and political incorporation into the Islamic society by having their roads closed in all directions and going to farms with weapons slung on their backs (bows and poisoned arrows)⁸⁴. As a direct consequence of the Jihad, the Fulani wars became enemies of the open society in the M-Belt areas and the British found them as "closed societies" where the movements of strangers raised fears, suspicions and apprehension.

However, all the M-Belt groups were either directly or indirectly affected by Fulani wars. In 1874, for example, when the Emir of Muri, Mohammed Nya, conquered the Jukuns, he forced Wukari to produce foodstuff and between 35 and 40 slaves at any time the need arose. The Jukun in turn raided the Tiv to meet this requirement⁸⁵. Nya was even less successful when he attempted to conquer the Tiv whom he only raided for slaves using the Jukuns as a spring-board⁸⁶. When Muri was under Emir Hamadu, however, there were four military attempts to conquer the Tiv and to bring them under the authority of the Islamic society⁸⁷. On one occasion, he penetrated as far down as Katsina Ala, which he sacked its population, burned down the buildings and extracted some slaves⁸⁸. The Fulani were however unable to hold the conquest and subsequently withdrew their garrisons⁸⁹. This was not unconnected to the menace of the Tse-tse fly which killed both the Fulani and their horses. The Idoma also in the Benue valley, experienced Fulani wars in the period between 1873 and 1900, when Mohammed Agwe, the sub-Emir in Keffi raided them and penetrated deep down into their territories for slaves but failed to establish political authority over the group⁹⁰.

The Fulani wars on the Plateau and southern Bauchi, first came from Yakubu I of Bauchi. The most celebrated of battles Yakubu fought with

non-Islamic groups however were the battles with the Dass and the Lere districts in Bauchi⁹¹. Although Yakubu conquered them in battle, he was never able to establish permanent political control, because they always revolted and refused to pay him tributes⁹². Dass remained an independent kingdom and was to be so, under British rule, set only some 30 miles from Bauchi; at least half the population was Muslim by 1900. The Jarawa, in southern Bauchi were however, conquered and the group forced to migrate to take refuge among the Buji, Anaguta and the Birom on the Plateau. Largely because of the mountainous terrain of the Plateau area (hills, rocky caves, meandering rivers with grooves etc) the Fulani armies were not successful in establishing political control, although they fought battles and ended these by imposing some form of tributes without the means of seeing that they were paid⁹³. Thus, for example, the Emirs of Bauchi were only able to partially conquer the Angas on the plains with whom they made an arrangement to collect tributes only. He also fought the Montol directly from Bauchi, settled on their area for sometime, but was subsequently driven out by a combined force of Pyem people, which was supported by a huge host of mounted spearmen on ponies from the Sura in Panyam, the Challa in Bokkos and the Birom in Jos who shared tribal land boundaries⁹⁴. However, most of the Plateau groups were saved from Fulani conquest by the mountainous terrain and the consequent difficulty of finding access to the groups in hiding from the Fulani cavalry and the ease with which some of the Plateau groups could find refuge on the hills, mountains and caves for launching counter attacks on the Fulani garrisons made their resistance all the more difficult for the Fulani armies to suppress. Some of these groups therefore remained partially conquered but were intensively raided for slaves and to enforce the payment of tribute⁹⁵.

Besides the distinctive tribal resistance from the M-Belt groups that were unconquered by the Fulani, there were efforts to federate by the smaller tribes to constitute a bigger force to repulse the Fulani. These

were however more of military federations, rather than political unions. There were attempts at such Federation building under the Birom who tried to amalgamate the Ron Kulere, Afusare, Ataka, Ganawuri, Katab (From S.Zaria), Irigwe, Fizere, Jarawa, Anaguta, Buji and Gwandara⁹⁶. Similarly in about 1830, the Sura (Mahavul) under their Warrior Chief Chertu attempted to organize the Burrum, Ankwei, Montol, Pyem, Yergam (Tarok) and Challa from their capital in Panyam, into some form of federated political unity⁹⁷. In the period approximately between 1830 and 1840 this unity succeeded in repelling numerous Fulani invasions from Bauchi. However the military ties did not result into a permanent political unity since groups boundaries resurge when the Fulani were successfully driven off and in most subsequent invasions each group faced the Fulani alone⁹⁸. In some cases local Plateau groups fought each other and raided each other for slaves. Also in Adamawa there was an attempt to Federate the non-Islamic groups consisting of over 30 different tribes under the leadership of the Mandara Kingdom⁹⁹. Although the union of the tribes under the Mandara persisted until British conquest, it was more in resistance to the Fulani from Yola and the Kanuri from Borno, another Islamic society.

By 1900 therefore, most of the unconquered M-Belt groups, identified themselves as culturally distinct and as non-Muslim and non-Fulani, different from the pale-skinned, masked Fulani invader and slaver on horse-back. Both the conquered and unconquered of the M-Belt groups, saw themselves differently from the slave raiders and as victims of the externally induced Fulani (cattle owners) wars, a process that set into motion the movement of people with a shared plight which also affected some of them. While there was more cultural fusion and assimilation among the smaller tribal groups in Adamawa and Plateau, as a direct consequence of the Fulani wars, the Tiv and Idoma seemed to have successfully maintained their independent worlds, undiluted by external influences. Social and political identities however remained essentially distinct and fragmented

on cultural lines and it was inconceivable to think of a M-Belt identity in that period. However, the experience, among the victims of the Fulani raids in the 19th century, created the conditions for the creation of a common M-Belt identity over colonial rule in the 20th century.

The roots of the M-Belt problem, therefore, go back to the 19th century and even earlier, but particularly to the period of the Jihad of dan Fodio. The Islamic movement created a very powerful political and religious identity in vast areas of the territories that subsequently became the North in Nigerian politics. The Fulani ruled these territories as an Empire until the British conquered and ruled it. The conceptions of the Fulani Empire in the British created Northern Nigeria, continued until independence of Nigeria and well after. But since the Jihad failed to conquer all the people the British incorporated into the Northern Region, there was malintegration of those who lived in the unconquered and inaccessible areas of the Plateau, the forested Benue areas and the hilly parts of Adamawa, Southern Zaria and Southern Bauchi. These unconquered people, however, had common experiences of being the victims of slave raiding by the established Fulani emirates. The descendants of these groups, subsequently organized political movements in the areas, in opposition to Hausa-Fulani and Islamic domination. When they were mobilized by a Christian religious identity, a minorities conception of political identity developed among them, in the period between 1949 and 1967. These identities developed from the activities of European Christian Missionaries, which were concentrated in the areas in the period of British administration of the North.

Notes to Chapter 1

1. For examples, see Map 1. The Hausa-City-States, were found on the Western territories that became defined as the North in 1900. The Kingdom of Borno was on the north-eastern boundaries of the territories; The Jukun Kingdom was south of Borno, lying on the Benue in the south-eastern parts of the North. The "M-Belt" Kingdoms of the Gwari, Igalla and Idoma were to be found southward of the Hausa-City-States on the Niger-Benue Valley.
2. C. L. Temple and O. Temple (Eds.), Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, II Edition, London, 1965 p8.
3. Temple 1919; Meek 1925 cited in Okpu 1977 p7 n.3.
4. Franklin Blitz, The Politics and Administration of Nigeria, New York 1965 p17.
5. Computed from Ibid 1965 p17.
6. Flora L. Shaw (Lady Lugard), A Tropical Dependency: An Outline of the Ancient History of the Western Sudan with an Account of the Modern Settlement of Northern Nigeria, London, 1905 p250.
7. Tremearne 1912 p75.
8. Perham 1962 p149.
9. Ibid 1962 p149.
10. Ibid 1962 p144.
11. Tremearne 1912 p12.
12. Ibid 1912 p12.
13. J. G. Davies, The Birom, Typed-Script Jos 1947 p163.
14. S. F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of the Nupe in Nigeria, London, 1946 *passim*.
15. Meek 1931 Vol. I p328.
16. Gunn 1953 p78-79.
17. Meek 1931 Vol. I p328.
18. Hechter 1975 p23.
19. Perham 1962 p132.
20. H. F. C. Smith, "A neglected theme in West African History: The Islamic Revolutions of the 19th Century", Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol. II, No. 2 December 1961 p170.
21. F. W. de St. Croix, The Fulani of Northern Nigeria, London 1972 p5-6.
22. Flint 1960 p16.
23. Ibid 1960 p16.
24. Ibid 1960 p16 cf.
25. Ibid 1960 p16 cf.
26. Tremearne 1912 p63.
27. Flint 1960 p16.
28. Hogben and Kirk-Greene 1966 p378.
29. Ibid 1966 p378.
30. M. Hiskett, "Kital-al-Farg Bayna wilayat Ahl al Islamwa Bayna Wilayat Ahl al-Kufr", (translation), B.S.O.A.S. Vol. XIX No. 3 1960, cited in A. M. Kani, "The Political and Social Basis of the Sokoto Jihad", Post-Graduate Seminar Paper, Department of History, ABU, Zaria, 1981 p11.
31. Hogben and Kirk-Greene 1966 p384-386.
32. Hogben and Kirk-Greene 1966 p382.
33. Hogben and Kirk-Greene 1966 p382.
34. J. A. Burdon, Historical Notes on Certain Emirates and Tribes in Northern Nigeria, London, 1909 p67.
35. Adeleye, 1971 p40.
36. Hogben and Kirk-Greene 1966 p383.
37. Hogben and Kirk-Greene 1966 p383.

38. Hogben and Kirk-Greene 1966 p383; Adeleye 1971 p4.
39. Hogben and Kirk-Greene 1966 p319-327.
40. Hogben and Kirk-Greene 1966 p319-327.
41. Adeleye 1971 p4.
42. Adeleye 1971 p4.
43. Adeleye 1971 p4.
44. Hogben and Kirk-Greene 1966 p21 cf.
45. Hogben and Kirk-Greene 1966 p21 cf.
46. Kani 1981 p2.
47. Adeleye 1971 p14-15.
48. For examples of the rather curious but interesting account of the origins and circumstances of the development of the trust between student and teacher, see Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p455-p460.
49. Ibid 1966 p456 and 1971 p31.
50. Ibid 1971 p31-p32.
51. Kani 1981 p1.
52. Ibid 1981 p1.
53. Adeleye 1971 p39-p40.
54. Ibid 1971 p39-p50.
55. Ibid 1971 p214.
56. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p390.
57. hill 1970 p142.
58. Miller 1936 p23-p25.
59. Coleman 1963 p385.
60. Flint 1960 p234.
61. Ibid 1960 p234.
62. Interview Discussion with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
63. Ibid January 1981.
64. Colonization by the Fulani Jemaas is taken to mean the physical occupation of territories by the external group for its social, political and economic interests. Colonialism of the Islamic society is taken to mean conceptions of a political, social and a military mission, undertaken by a group in order to achieve purification of development in a civilizing context as dictated by the world views of the particular society which undertakes such a mission. Imperialism of the Islamic society is taken to mean control and domination of groups in a specific area for social, political and economic needs of the controlling group - These definitions derive from the work of A.G. Frank, On Capitalist Underdevelopment, Bombay, 1975, especially his discussions in Chapter One.
65. Lady Lugard 1905 p401.
66. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p384.
67. Ibid 1966 p292; p432.
68. Ibid 1966 p385.
69. Perham 1962 p50.
70. Adeleye 1971 p50.
71. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p223.
72. Ibid 1966 p223.
73. Ibid 1966 p223.
74. Ibid 1966 p224.
75. Perham 1962 p50.
76. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p13.
77. Adeleye 1971 p32.
78. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p456.
79. M. Hassan et al (Eds), Chronicle of Abuja, Ibadan 1952 p6-p28; Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p225.
81. Adeleye 1971 p73.
82. Ibid 1971 p74.
83. Adeleye 1971 p74.
84. Lady Lugard 1905 p416.

85. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p450.
86. Adeleye 1971 p56.
87. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p450.
88. Ibid 1966 p450.
89. Ibid 1966 p450.
90. Ibid 1966 p547-p548.
91. Adeleye 1971 p64.
92. Ibid 1971 p64.
93. Ibid 1971 p64.
94. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p457.
95. Adeleye 1971 p32.
96. Harold Gunn Peoples of the Plateau Area of Northern Nigeria,
International African Institute, London, 1953 p78-p79.
97. Temple 1965 p344.
98. Ibid 1965 p343.
99. Adeleye 1971 p63; Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p430.

Chapter 2

Social and Political processes of incorporation of the non-Islamic groups and societies into the Islamic society in the period of British rule and administration before 1945 in the North.

"I believe myself that the future of the virile race of this Protectorate lies largely in the regeneration of the Fulani. Their ceremonial, their coloured skins, their mode of life and habits of thought appeal more to the native population than the prosaic business-like habits of the Anglo-Saxon can ever do ... nor have we the means at present to administer so vast a country. This then is the policy to which in my view the administration of Northern Nigeria should give effect, viz: to regenerate this capable race and mould them to ideas of justice and mercy, so that in future generations, if not this, they become worthy instruments of rule"¹.

I. Introduction

At the beginning of the 20th Century the British sent out an expedition to Northern Nigeria to bring the territory under British colonial rule. The British were encouraged to take military action against the North for three reasons: the murder of Captain Maloney in Keffi, which received a heroes welcome in Zaria and Kano, the massacres of Gwarram of "pagans" by the Emir of Bauchi who still openly sold slaves in the markets of his principal towns and the open declaration of war on the British by the Sultan of Sokoto². Nonetheless, in the climate of the scramble for Africa, it was apparent that despite these incidents, the British were determined and were going to occupy the territory since the Berlin conference of 1884 had declared the areas as British³. The conquest of the Islamic society was short, sharp and rapid and by 1903 most of the Emirs had been placed under British authority⁴. While the Fulani Emirs surrendered without a fight, some were conquered and substituted by those willing to serve under the British crown.

When the British established their authority over the North, they found large scale and hierarchically structured Muslim Emirates more convenient for the administration of the vast territories of the north than they did the tribal and ocephalous societies of the "pagan" M-Belt areas⁵. The British, soon after conquest of the Islamic society, established a conscious rapport with the Emirs, although it took them a long time to pacify the "pagan" M-Belt areas^{6*}. This was particularly so, because the Islamic areas in the North, had certain socio-economic and political advantages over the M-Belt areas, which were rooted in the history of the unequal development of groups in the region. From contacts with Islam and North African influences, for example, the Emirates had developed a Government tax system, Islamic law and large scale administration that maintained law and order in the society. Furthermore, they had a large single language, tied to an identifiable Islamic culture which had influence over many of their people who were literate and this language went beyond the boundaries of the Islamic society.

As a result, the British tended to give to the Islamic Society preferential treatment and prestige⁷. The "Holy North", as the Islamic society was referred to among top British Colonial officers, to describe the Hausa-Fulani Emirates, as well as the Islamic society of Borno, was seen to be and treated as more advanced in civilization, than the "pagan" areas in the North⁸. The result was that in the period of British administration of the North, far more authority was shared with the Emirs and other Islamic rulers than was the case with pagan Chiefs⁹. But there were exceptions; most of the British Colonial officers, who rose to the top of the service in the administrative hierarchy regarded the Muslim parts of the North as more civilized and cultured, than the pagan areas to which were in most instances junior British officers were posted¹⁰.

Clearly, therefore, British processes of social and political incorporation affected the non-Islamic groups, in the sense that political

*¹ See additional comments at the

advantages were tilted toward the Islamic society in terms of the leadership of the North in the period between 1900 and 1945. This was a direct result of British success at territorially incorporating the Islamic and non-Islamic groups into one political entity by military conquest and varying political measures that were used¹¹.

II. British Social and Political Attitudes in the North

The new political unit as the "Protectorate of Northern Nigeria" was a direct creation from British conquest and included the Islamic Society, established from the Fulani Islamic revolution of 1804 and the Islamic society of the ancient Kingdom of Borno. However, when the British arrived in Borno, it had already been conquered by an Arab adventurer, called Rabeh who had earlier been killed in battle by the French. The "Protectorate of Northern Nigeria" also included territories of the M-Belt groups, who were in the majority non-Islamic in social and political identity¹².

The economic activities of the M-Belt groups were local, unlike the trans-local economic activities that characterized the Islamic centres of religious power and politics. This was one of the considerations from which there was British focus of political attention on the Islamic society established by the Fulani and the Borno Kingdom, with religious and political authority centred on Sokoto and the township of Borno itself. Thus although Lord Lugard had his initial headquarters in Lokoja, then shifted to Zungeru and finally to Kaduna, well removed from the Islamic society, in the early years after 1900, Northern Nigeria was conceived of as being the territories centred on Sokoto, Katsina, Kano and Borno¹³. Besides these four centres of trade and politics and other Emirates, British knowledge of other parts of the North was thin until after 1930 when many anthropologists undertook studies of some of the M-Belt groups¹⁴.

In the period between 1900 and 1940, there was British political effort with the policy of indirect rule to incorporate the M-Belt groups

into the structure of power and authority and social ethos of the Islamic society¹⁵. There was little effort by the government of British administration, besides that which encouraged Christian Missionary work, to develop an entirely new political conception of the North with a new political culture within which British civilization might be infused to shape the patterns of modern European socio-economic and political developments. The non-Islamic groups were placed under the direct leadership of Muslims and this leadership was moderated by British Residents, District Officers (DOs) and Assistant District Officers (ADOs). This leadership in most instances was Hausa-Fulani and other Muslims in general because it was assumed by the British that the Fulani and Muslims in the North, held suzerainty by right of recent conquest. That, therefore, involved the ultimate title to land, the right to appoint Emirs and all officers of state, the right to legislation and taxation¹⁶. The Fulani in particular were seen to possess unique qualities of leadership which had made them a class in a superior race which had established an Empire and driven inferior black races backwards towards the impenetrable regions of barbarism of equatorial Africa creating a belt of Cannibalism¹⁷. According to Lady Lugard besides ruling over a civilized society the Fulani political leadership had the natural and physical qualities for rulership:

"The cast of face, even when jet black in colour, being frequently European in form, with the high nose, thin lips and deep set eyes characteristic of the Arab of the Mediterranean coast ... the Aristocratic thin hand and the slight, somewhat square shoulders of the Arabs of the coast are also frequently noticeable ... this blood no doubt penetrated as far as climatic conditions would allow ... the Northern belt of the Soudan has been occupied by races of a higher than negroid type ... the operation of these types upon the purely negroid races was to drive them southwards into the swamps of the coastal belt in which the higher type could not live ... (in the North) their ruling classes are deserving in every way of the name of cultivated Gentlemen. We seem to be in the presence of one of the fundamental

facts of history, that there are races which are born to conquer and others to persist under conquest"¹⁸.

Political and religious leadership of the Islamic society was seen to be stately in appearance, magnificently dressed and holding itself loyal, a conception that moulded the autocratic and overbearing "Rajah" attitudes to Islamic leadership of some of the British in the North¹⁹. This contrasted with the attitudes of the British towards the non-Islamic leadership of the groups in the M-Belt areas. Obviously the potentialities of the M-Belt groups were considerably undermined, so much so that they were considered not to merit any attention in the eyes of the British, particularly in the early period before the 'age of the Anthropologist - colonial officers'²⁰. As early as in the period between 1903 and 1904, the mind of Lugard and British officers who accompanied him on the tour of conquered areas was already made up: the Fulani and Muslims were the educated classes to be appropriately moulded as the ruling classes in the North²¹.

One of the first political acts by Lugard which created differentiation in conceptions of political status, both real and imagined was to create a ranking order of four categories of chiefs and Emirs in the North: Chiefs of first and second class in political status and third and fourth class for minor chiefs²¹. The ranks of first class were reserved for the Shehu of Borno and the Sultan of Sokoto, the Emirs of Kano, Gwandu and Katsina²². The ranks as second class chiefs was for the "lesser" Emirs centred in Bauchi, Katagum, Hadeija and Lapai and Emirs in the midst of "pagan" communities like those of Argungu, Kiama and Busa²³. The ranks as fourth class chiefs were reserved for Fulani district heads and some Chiefs of the M-Belt areas, who had been identified at the time, but these were considered of less importance respectively, although each had executive authority²⁴. To complement the social and political status of the traditional leadership in the Islamic society, salaries larger by African

standards, especially in comparison to the practice in the territories that were more directly ruled, were paid to the Emirs in the British administration of the North. The political and religious leadership in the Islamic centres of Kano, Sokoto, Katsina, Borno, Yola, Ilorin and Zaria, were paid basic salaries of over £2500 as "establishment charges"²⁵. The Emir of Kano, the Sultan of Sokoto and the Shehu of Borno were paid £6000 a year as basic salaries and establishment charges of £2500, while the Emirs of Yola, Ilorin and Zaria received £2000 as basic salaries with an equal amount to the big Emirs as establishment charges²⁶. Emirs and Chiefs at the bottom of the list of "political status" such as the Emir of Jemaare (which only ruled about 300 sq. miles), who earned £400 annually and to give them the appropriate status, meant over-stretching the accumulated internal revenue²⁷. In the particular instance of Jemaare, it meant spending one fifth of the total revenue collected in the Emirate to maintain the political status of the Emir²⁸. The issue of salary differentiation between Emirs and non-Islamic chiefs in the M-Belt areas was to become one of the contested grievances by the M-Belt movement with the Northern government as discriminatory on the M-Belt groups in the period between 1950 and 1965. Before 1930, however, the British problems of identifying traditional chiefs and authority among some of the M-Belt groups were compounded by some Hausa-Fulani migrants "chiefs" who either claimed rulership of some groups on alleged conquest or created a false chronology of a particularly favoured family to be rulers in the group. This was particularly so for Adamawa, S.Bauchi, S.Zaria and some parts of Plateau, where there had been spells of Fulani conquest and it was not clear who held political power and authority. The British depended on the Hausa-Fulani to guide them as interpreters in the M-Belt areas.

The initial advantage which was given to the leadership of the Islamic society in terms of their status and wealth was developed into an identity representative of the Northern political identity. This identity was

subsequently made visible and symbolic in the organizations of the yearly Durbar shows in which the Emirs attended as obligatory to the ruling classes in the North after 1920. In 1922 the ruling classes and the Islamic identity as the identity of the North were institutionalized in the creation of the Northern Advisory Council (NAC) of chiefs. In the period between 1922 and 1931, there was no single M-Belt chief in the NAC. It was ^{from} this situation that the administration crystallized the Islamic identity as representative of the Northern political identity. In the period between 1931 and 1945, however the Attah of Igalla, the Ohenainyo of Igbirra and the Aku Uka of Wukari were appointed by the British administration into the NAC as representative of the non-Islamic groups in the North. In the same period the NAC was converted and became the Northern House of Chiefs (NHC), the most powerful law making institution in the North. The NHC was an institution with an overwhelming dominance of Muslim Chiefs and demonstrated its content of the Islamic political identity by both its composition and the socio-economic and political issues it brought on the agenda of legislation.

However in the early period Lugard was also concerned to educate only the ruling classes with Western European modernizing skills from the Islamic Society in the North²⁹. While it was government policy to educate the ruling classes in the Islamic society, Christian Missionaries were encouraged by a direct government policy and financial resources, although initially meagre, to develop the M-Belt areas with social and welfare institutions³⁰. In 1905 Lugard therefore sketched plans to establish "four grades of schools" required in the North. The 'Nassarawa central schools' in Kano became the model comprising: A-schools for the sons of Chiefs - to train men who will be able to administer the country, understand their people, understand the methods of British administration and be bound to the British not by fear or by commercial interests only, but by ties of cooperation and sentiment³¹. A-school also had political and religious

intentions: "to have a generation of loyal and enlightened rulers without necessarily foregoing their religion"³²; B-schools to train teachers, for branch schools throughout the country; C-schools for purely technical training and agriculture, to train "the native artisan classes" carpenters, blacksmiths, leatherworks, tanners and embroiders. The agricultural branch of the school was concerned with the teaching of seed selection, afforestation and the improvement of agriculture and stock raising; D-schools were concerned with the three-Rs (Reading Writing and Arithmetic) and Elementary Surveying and Hygiene, to produce "native" clerks. The schools were meant to form part of the policy of indirect rule in which they were to be a parcel of "Native Life"³³. Although Lugard sought the constant advice of Dr. Walter Miller, the anti-Islamic crusader with the CMS station at Wusasa in Zaria, he later depended on the advice of Dr. Hans Vischer, who became Director of Education in the North. The appointment of Vischer with the British administration of the North was based on his experience of educating Muslims in the Sudan Republic, an area that shared many similar features with Northern Nigeria³⁴. However, before the educational ideas of Lugard and Vischer were implemented, Mayer Burdon, the Resident in Sokoto and Captain Temple in Kano started Western type European Schools in 1906³⁵. In 1908 Western European oriented educational institutions existed and were functioning in Lokoja, Kontagora, Sokoto, Katsina and Bauchi with direct encouragement and assistance from the government of British administration in the North³⁶. Except for the government institution at Lokoja all the new institutions were centred in the Islamic society established from the Fulani Islamic revolution. While Bible Schools were the main rudiments of Western educational institutions that existed in the M-Belt areas besides the subsequent work of Dr. G.P. Bargery in Kabba in 1914 and at Wannune among the Tiv in 1915, no serious consideration was given to the education of the M-Belt groups before 1914³⁷. This was largely due to the fact that most of the groups were still

unconquered and therefore there was no effective British influence in the areas besides those of the Christian Missionaries. By 1914 however Vischer was engaged in extending the established system of government schools to the M-Belt areas, where previously, European Christian missionaries had been the sole educational agency. When Toro College in Bauchi was opened in 1928 as a Government institution for "pagans" it was of a lower academic standard where only the rudiments of education were imparted³⁸. Although the educational efforts of Hans Vischer were interrupted during the first World War (1914-1918), progress had been achieved: there was a total average attendance in Government schools, mostly in the Islamic society in the North, from 354 in 1914 to 750 in 1916³⁹. The effort to extend the model of the 'Nassarawa Central Schools' to the non-Islamic groups in the North was abandoned in 1914 and in its place Provincial Primary Schools were established in Sokoto, Gwandu, Kebbi, Bidda, Zaria and Katsina⁴⁰.

More direct efforts were reinvigorated to educate the ruling classes in the North after 1918. In the instance Katsina college was opened in 1922 with 50 students in the initial intake⁴¹. At its official opening ceremony, Governor Clifford stated the objectives of the five year structured school:

"(to train) young Mohammedan men of birth and standing from all the Moslem Emirates in Nigeria ... to teach those boys not only the lessons learned from books, which they will acquire, but also the way that good Mohammedans should live, the courteous deportment, without which mere book learning is of little worth⁴².

Many of the 50 students admitted to Katsina college in 1922 (including Admadu Bello, the Sarauta of Sokoto, who became first Premier of the North and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the first Prime-Minister of Nigeria) were to occupy the highest offices of government, both in the North and Nigeria in the years between 1947 and 1966⁴³. Furthermore, there were more Katsina college graduates in the Council of Ministers of the North in the period between 1952 and 1966, than there were ever old Etonians in any British

Cabinet⁴⁴. According to the Sardauna, this was no accident since the choice was based on the old school linkage: "where colleagues in Cabinet had been schooled in the ideas to give a corporate team spirit ... and to work as one unit"⁴⁵.

However, by 1923 the total number of government schools in the North which were concentrated in the Islamic society had risen to 39 with a total enrolment of 1,955 boys⁴⁵. Out of the total of 39 government schools in the North, 2 were in Borno, 4 in Sokoto, 5 in Zaria and 8 in Kano⁴⁷. In other words, 48.7% of these schools in the Islamic society in the North were concentrated in the core-centres of Kano (which included Katsina before its creation into a province in 1926), Sokoto, Borno and Zaria, with the other 51.3% distributed in Ilorin, Bida, Bauchi, Yola and Lokoja⁴⁸. It was not until 1928 that Toro near Jos, was established as "a Government experiment in pagan education" for the non-Islamic groups in the M-Belt areas. The Primary schools concentrated in the Islamic society developed into post-primary institutions, known as "Middle-Schools". Primary and post-primary education in the North before 1930, therefore, were a monopoly of the political and religious centres of Islam. These had higher educational standards, although this was for a selected few, while the educational policies of the Christian Missionaries in the M-Belt focussed on the Bible and the Hoe in the specific cultural context of the particular group. The Government and Provincial Middle-Schools and Colleges in the M-Belt areas in Kuru, Lafia, Katsina-Ala, Gboko and Otobi were developed after 1949⁴⁹.

However it was not until after 1930 that Christian Missionaries adjusted the inequality in the educational standards of their schools, when compared to the Islamic society. The nucleus of the Gindiri Schools, for example, were established for these purposes in 1934. By 1950 Christian Missionary institutions had virtually bridged differences in the gap in education standards with Government schools. In the 1960s Government

schools were below the educational standards in the Christian Missionary schools in places like Baptist High School in Jos, Gindiri in Pankshin Division, St. Joseph's in Vom on the Plateau; Waka in Adamawa; St. Paul's in Zaria; the SIM schools in Zonkwa and Kagoro in S.Zaria; Mt. St. Michael's in Aliade, St. Francis in Oturkpo and Bristow Secondary School in Gboko in Benue⁵⁰. These produced the majority of students who went to University and Military Academies. However Government schools like Keffi in the M-Belt areas and Barewa college in Zaria were also outstanding and compared well with the standards of Christian schools in the M-Belt areas.

Before 1930 however, there were no secondary schools in the North for students from the Middle Schools to develop and enter institutions of higher learning^{50a}. Furthermore, female education in the North was ignored in the early years, largely for religious reasons. It was not until in 1928 that government policy became practical in establishing the Queen Elizabeth School in Ilorin for girls, well removed from the core-centres of the Islamic Society^{50b}. The majority of the school enrolment in Ilorin, however, were girls from the M-Belt areas and Southern Nigerian girls, particularly Yoruba who could claim the Northern identity by asserting they came from Offa in Southern Ilorin. There was a general reluctance from Muslims in the North to educate women with Western European modernizing skills, although dan Fodio emphasized the education of women with Islamic sciences. Christian Missionary development of education in the M-Belt areas, for both male and female were severely limited by financial resources. There were 43 schools in the Yoruba irredentist areas of Ilorin and Kabba and in the M-Belt areas before 1930 with 354 pupils, run by Christian Missionaries. These schools were financially unassisted by the government⁵¹. The pupils were initially generally taught how to read and write the scripture, with simple Arithmetic that would enable them to count the Sunday attendance, collect and record the Sunday offering in the churches⁵². Educational institutions in the Islamic society taught courses

of higher mental value and skills required for a modern society⁵³. This initial educational advantage over the M-Belt groups, produced leadership which was carefully cultivated by the British to take up top posts in government and this had ramification on the nature and shape of the development of the social and political identity of the north, which increasingly emphasized the Islamic religious identity, while there was increasing Christian consciousness on the Christian identity among the M-Belt groups.

III. The Application of Indirect Rule Policy on the M-Belt groups in the North.

In the period between 1900 and 1920, the establishment of Fulani and Islamic leadership over the M-Belt groups was a consequence of the implementation of the policy of indirect rule which was part of the political processes of incorporation, set into motion by the government of British administration in the new political unit of the North. The policy itself underwent numerous political interpretations, which varied from its conceptions as having Fulani and Muslims ruling over the M-Belt groups and using the structure of authority as it existed in the Islamic society, to a search for indigenous Chiefs in the M-Belt areas, which ended with the creation of Chieftaincy institutions among some of the numerically important M-Belt groups⁵⁴. The fundamental axiom of indirect rule policy in all of British African Dependencies in the period between 1900 and 1940 was that the agents of the British Crown and Parliament at Westminster use traditional authorities as instruments of political control:

"through which the African peoples may learn to adapt themselves to social and economic changes brought about by the impact on primitive indigenous societies of European concepts of government, law, finance and education; British ideals based upon Christian morals and the political ideas of personal freedom, equity and the rights and interests of the governed"⁵⁵.

To achieve these objectives in the conceptions, indirect rule policy meant that African chiefs were to be subordinates to British authority and not sovereign authorities or equals: "They are agents and not principals, valuable and welcome agents"⁵⁶. The procedural political practice in the application of indirect rule policy on the M-Belt groups were, however, made clear cut by Lord Lugard as early as in the period between 1900 and 1902:

"Among these tribes, it is my policy to centralize authority as far as may be, in a recognized chief and to introduce the civilizing agency of trade while repressing all inter-tribal quarrels"⁵⁷.

However, against this background, there were many top British officers in the North, who were convinced that the Fulani District Head was the ideal institution in the administration of the M-Belt groups in the practice of the policy of indirect rule. These views continued to be upheld after the provincial reorganization in 1927 until 1934⁵⁸. This was so because of the absence of centralized political authority with traditional legitimacy among the M-Belt groups since many of the M-Belt groups were acephalous societies. There were however other political interests which included the desire to enhance the assimilation of the non-Islamic groups into the wider Islamic society as part of the political incorporation processes that were already in motion under Fulani Islamic leadership as well as the desire to reinforce the social unity from the Hausa language which existed as a Lingua Franca, beyond the territories where Islam had already blurred tribal identities and created unity over two thirds of the North⁵⁹. In the first 30 years of British rule in the North, as the M-Belt groups were systematically brought under British authority the Fulani and Hausa as well as others who were Muslims were the main instruments of indirect rule under British Residents, DOs and ADOs in the M-Belt areas⁶⁰. This was so because the British were accompanied by local Fulani leaders or Hausa Government

Messengers whom they used as interpreters of British political intentions and "path finders" during conquest and who usually ended up as surrogates for the British over a particular group⁶¹. The objective was to have a hierarchical and centralized structure of political authority focussed on one individual and who as in the Emirate system would also have a chain of subordinate district heads, the numbers, depending on the size of the area of his jurisdiction. The British however had difficulty in finding a local ruler in the M-Belt areas and where they found one his claim to exercise power was over a small area and his exercise of power was not complete as it was regulated by a council of elders. It was this situation that Lugard found frustrating and described the M-Belt groups as tribes in the lowest stage of primitive savagery without any central organization⁶². Lugard also set out procedures for the establishment of indirect rule on the M-Belt groups which were based on the patterns that existed in the Islamic society:

"The first step is to endeavour to find a man of influence as chief and to group under him as many villages and districts as possible, to teach him to delegate powers and to take an interest in his 'Native Treasury', to support his authority and to inculcate a sense of responsibility⁶³.

However, where a 'Paramount Chief' was not found to assume political control and authority among the M-Belt groups, the British administrative officers ruled directly. Lugard made the provision clear on the role of the British political officer when he produced the definition of indirect rule in which he suggested the Government:

"utilizes and works through the native chiefs and avails itself of the intelligence and powers of the governing of the Fulani ruling caste in particular ... but among the wholly uncivilized pagan tribes, who owe no allegiance to a paramount Chief it is often difficult to apply these principles to rule and the

political officers have to undertake a more direct responsibility owing to the difficulty and often impossibility of establishing Native courts and to the lawless habits of the people"⁶⁴.

In 1902, however, indirect rule policy was politically flexed to accommodate Fulani rule with Muslims of other tribes over some of the M-Belt groups, while the British searched for Chiefs in order to introduce the hierarchical model of authority⁶⁵. This was the premise from which Lugard suggest that: "the Fulani ruler will be supported in every way, his tribute from his subordinate villages enforced and his native courts upheld"⁶⁶. This pattern in the application of indirect rule affected groups that had been conquered in the period of the Fulani Jihad and who in certain instances, had used the arrival of the British to revolt from Fulani political control. This particularly affected M-Belt groups in Adamawa (the Kilba), S.Bauchi (the Lere), S.Zaria (the Kaje) and some parts of Plateau (the Mada). In the situation, indirect rule on these M-Belt groups meant the political consolidation of Fulani authority and this was supported by the government of British administration. Thus previously existing tribute payment which had been based on Fulani conquest became enforced by the British and non-Muslim population subjected to Alkalai and "mixed" Native Courts with Muslims Presidents. Some of the M-Belt groups that had only been partially conquered in these areas by the Fulani, came to find themselves under Fulani and Islamic authority, from British acceptance of Fulani authoritative claims despite their protestation of independence. This is the premise from which prior to 1927, the non-Islamic groups centred around Numan, Muri, were shared out under Islamic authority in Yola, Gombe and Muri, Plateau under Bauchi and the groups in Southern Zaria under the Emir of Jemaa, a sub-Emir to the powerful Emir of Zaria while the pagan groups in Akwanga, Wamba and Keffi were under the Emirs of Keffi and Nassarawa. From 1927, however, with the creation of Plateau Province, a large number of Plateau tribes - the Birom, Angas, Sura, Yergam and a host

of other smaller tribes acquired independence, including the Bachama and the Marghi in Adamawa, the Chawai and Kaje in S.Zaria.

However, the first political casualties⁶⁷ of the Provincial re-arrangements of 1906 (having abandoned the "double provinces" proposed in 1905) in which 17 provinces were created in the North to enhance the application of the Lugardian model of indirect rule, were the independent Chiefdoms of Doma and Keana who became placed under Islamic rule in the (Kanuri) town of Lafiya⁶⁸. This gave the Emir, political jurisdiction over numerous other Chiefdoms in the area. These Chiefdoms were previously unconquered and were independent from the political control of the military vassals of the garrison towns of Lafia, Keffi, Nassarawa and Jemaa. Similarly when WAFF troops conquered and established British authority in Ilorin, Kabba and Nassarawa areas, non-Islamic groups such as the Yoruba and Igbirra in the South of Ilorin became placed under the Emir and the Igalla and Bassa-nge in Kabba Province were placed under the Emir of Nassarawa⁶⁹. By 1912, Nassarawa Province contained over seven different non-Islamic groups previously independent of political control of the Emirate⁷⁰. After 1912 also the Gwari in S.Zaria were placed under the Emir of Borgu in Kontagora Province. This application of indirect rule was given justification: "imposition of alien district heads appeared to be more successful for taxation ... than attempts to combine small independent groups into districts under one of their own men"⁷¹.

The pre-eminence of Residents in Provinces of the Islamic society who had access to top political decision making and their political interpretation of indirect rule to mean strict application of the Lugardian model, imposed limits on the degree of political adaptation that was sought to be applied over the M-Belt groups. Limits on the extent of political adaptation became even more restricted when Charles Temple was appointed as Chief Secretary of the North in 1910⁷². Later Temple became Lt. Governor of the North. Furthermore Temple had been almost solely responsible for

conducting and directing the first round of military conquest of the M-Belt groups as early as from 1902 in S.Zaria, S.Bauchi and over most of the Plateau and Adamawa. He subsequently served as Resident of Bauchi upon British conquest in 1903 where he gained political experience in ruling the non-Islamic groups through the hierarchical authority structure of the Emir. This experience produced fanatical commitment to the application of the Lugardian model of indirect rule over all of the non-Islamic groups in the North. Although Temple gave wide political discretion on the application of the policy of indirect rule to Residents in the Provinces in the Islamic society, he exerted political influences on M-Belt Provinces to ensure that the Lugardian model was loyally applied in which the Fulani or Muslim surrogates of the Emirs ruled over the M-Belt groups⁷³. Among the Tiv, for example, he caused the policy of gradual penetration to be abandoned. The policy of gradual penetration advocated delaying institutional change, implicit in the application of the Lugardian model until the "civilizing influences" of trade had begun⁷⁴. After 1910, however, there was an immediate creation of district heads from among the Tiv clans and this was accompanied by the imposition of direct taxation⁷⁵. The problems in the administration of the Tiv with a hierarchical structure of authority were further compounded when the Government filled the posts of district Heads with young men who were not 'Tors'⁷⁶. These young district heads behaved in a high-handed way on the ordinary people and their elders because they were supported by British power and authority, a pattern that was outside traditional political expectations of Tiv leaders in their society⁷⁷. With the imposition of the hierarchical structure of authority on the Tiv, also came attempts to introduce education on the designed Lugardian model from the Islamic society⁷⁸. However, when Christian Missionary educational institutions developed among the Tiv in the same period, the British administration was critical of their standards:

" ... because of the tendency to take Natives out of their normal grooves too suddenly, instead of inculcating a respect for native customs and institutions ... the premature teaching of English is thoroughly in keeping with this mistaken policy and inevitably leads to utter disrespect for British ideals and native ideals alike and to a denationalized and disorganized population"⁷⁹.

As laterly as in the 1950s Residents such as McBride were obsessed with protecting "the Tiv as the British met them", against the Hausa patterns as much as against Ibos. McBride was concerned to regulate the development of roads, schools, trade and 'Hausa-Fulani type Chieftaincies', because the development would bring-in an influx of strangers and influences which might be detrimental to indigenous Tiv customs and society⁸⁰. This was, however, at a time when indirect rule had changed its emphasis after 1930 from the application of the Lugardian model to developing indigenous tribal institutions and leadership among the M-Belt groups.

When Lugard returned to Nigeria in 1912 with the political task of amalgamating the Northern and Southern protectorates to become the political state of Nigeria in 1914, he resurrected the Emirate model and sought to apply it through implementing his 1903 scheme of "double provinces" in the North⁸¹. In that instace however, the groups in the Northern territories continued to develop as a distinct unitary administrative system with the Islamic social and religious identity within the Nigerian Federation. In the instance "Hausa-Mallams" (Koranic Teachers) or some form of Islamic leadership were appointed as "Court Presidents" among some of the M-Belt groups: as a temporary and educational experiment⁸². Audu dan Afoda, for example, became appointed as district head firstly for Abinsi in 1914 and according to Tseayo, subsequently was assumed by the administration to be the first Chief of the Tiv although his authority was concentrated in Makurdi. Dan Afoda was a Yoruba Muslim who spoke Hausa and the Tiv languages very well. He had also served as political interpreter for the British with the Tiv in the period of the

conquest of the Tiv and establishment of British authority⁸³. Similarly in what subsequently became Jos Division on the Plateau, where there were over 25 different tribal groups a Muslim Hausa "Mallam" was appointed as Chief of Jos⁸⁴. It was not until 1935 that Chung Gyang was appointed Chief of the "Birom Tribal Area"⁸⁵. In that period (before 1920), the application of the Emirate model was justified by Lugard himself suggesting that it enhanced political incorporation as the non-Islamic groups might be assimilated through the Islamic religion:

"their conversion (the non-islamic groups) to the Islamic faith, may be more advanced and intelligent than anything they are as yet capable of evolving for themselves ... good government is no equivalent for self-government"⁸⁶.

The strong beliefs by Lugard on the application of the Emirate model were conditioned by his conceived primitivity of the M-Belt groups and saw the development of centralization of political and administrative systems as part of a natural process of evolution of man and society that encompassed developments: "from 'mob-law' to courts, from communal to individual property and from clan systems to territorial jurisdiction"⁸⁷. In the instance of the M-Belt groups, however, Lugard had reason and interest to induce this development. Supported by the majority of his administrative staff, in the period between 1900 and 1920, Lugard assumed that the application of the Emirate model over the M-Belt groups and other non-Islamic societies in the North will enhance assimilation and political incorporation into the Islamic society and crystalize a Northern political identity, a process that was already complemented by the gradual but inevitable replacement of disparate languages of the M-Belt areas with the Hausa language as a lingua-Franca⁸⁸. This was the context from which many British colonial officers in the North accepted the wholesale application of the Emirate model over the M-Belt groups before 1920⁸⁹. British

administrative staff in the North in the period of World War I and after 1918, were so fired by their success in developing what they regarded as a special type of administration in the indirect rule system because of the political stability it achieved in the North, particularly in the Islamic society⁹⁰. However, when indirect rule policy was sought to be applied wholesale with the Lugardian model on the M-Belt groups in the period between 1900 and 1920, it lacked political foundation of legitimacy and it was doubly alien. It was doubly alien on the M-Belt groups in that it had not only Fulani and other Islamic variants of political and juridical leadership, but also the hierarchically structured institutions of the Emirs, Chiefs, district Heads had little political attraction and legitimacy to the typical collective political and social organization of society in most of the M-Belt areas, where the political location of authority was in a conciliar system, rather than in autocratic authority that was centred in one man, like the Emir.

When Lugard left Nigeria for the second and final time in 1919, political conceptions of the indirect rule policy for the application on the M-Belt groups were reinterpreted. The reinterpretations of the policy after 1919 which was maintained until 1931, still focussed on centralization of political power with a hierarcical authority pattern. This time, however, the indigenes of the tribes or the tribal areas were to constitute the incumbents, rather than Fulani Emirs, Fulani district heads or a variant of Muslim leadership that was tied to the Fulani ruling class and controlling the M-Belt groups. The reinterpreted policy of indirect rule however only became effective in 1931 when Donald Cameron became Governor of Nigeria. In the period between 1919 and 1931 political views on the change of the meaning of indirect rule remained theoretical since among many of the M-Belt groups Fulani Emirs and Fulani district heads still ruled⁹¹. The pressures to re-interpret the political meaning of indirect rule policy came largely from British administrative officers in the

secretariats at Kaduna and Lagos, who objected to the wholesale application of the Lugardian-Emirate model on the M-Belt groups⁹². This was so because the British administrators at the Secretariats who advocated political change, faced opposition from Residents in the North, particularly those in the Islamic Society and from the British Colonial Office in London.

When Hugh Clifford took over from Lugard in 1919, he was concerned to open up all of Nigeria to Western modernization, particularly Northern Nigeria by reforming the policy of indirect rule. He was also concerned to end the political isolation of the Islamic society in the North from western modernizing influences, which had also developed tendencies toward separatism in both British administrators who served in those areas and from the religious and political leadership of the Islamic society. Clifford was not the great liberator of the non-Islamic groups in the North as his policy provisions would seem to suggest. He endorsed the Emirate model of Lugard on the M-Belt groups, where the Emirs previously ruled by right of conquest⁹³. However, Clifford rejected its wholesale application on the M-Belt groups, where there was no previous conquest or where there had been a successful political revolt and the group maintained its independence from the Fulani until the British arrived in 1900⁹⁴. In the instance, Clifford proposed that the political alternative to the application of the Emirate model over the unconquered M-Belt groups before 1900, was the District Officer (D.O.):

"I think we should abandon once and for all the expectation of ever converting primitive tribal systems (such as they are) into any sort of semblance to the Mohammedan Emirates and should content ourselves with making of the former only such limited use as experience may show to be at once safe and expedient while causing the people to feel individually and collectively that the District Officer is the real 'de facto' ruler of their country and their secure Court of Appeal and Refuge when in trouble"⁹⁵.

Clifford however faced strong political opposition from high authority on his decision to implement the re-interpreted policy of indirect rule on the M-Belt groups. This was particularly the case from the Secretary of State to the Colonies, Lord Milner, in England. Lord Milner preferred the Lugardian-Emirate model for the application of indirect rule to be maintained:

"As far as the Northern Province is concerned, the Lugardian system should be upheld. I think we should tell Clifford politely but firmly that we did not send him to Nigeria to upset everything which his predecessor had done. Why it should be impossible, while maintaining the principle of indirect rule, nevertheless to promote the development of resources of the Country, I must say I do not understand"⁹⁶.

As a result of the opposition to the policy proposals by Clifford from Milner, direct administration by British Officers in the non-Islamic Provinces of the North and in particular, Provinces that contained the M-Belt groups (Nassarawa, Benue, Bauchi and Adamawa) was abandoned⁹⁷. In 1924, G. J. F. Tomlinson, Assistant Secretary on Native Affairs under the government of Clifford, produced a report on 'Pagan Administration' in the Northern Provinces, which pointed to sharp political differences on the 'Various Regimes', which non-Islamic groups, particularly those in the M-Belt areas were placed under by British administration⁹⁸. The report focused its attention on the non-Islamic groups in Adamawa, Bauchi, the hilly Bauchi Plateau, Zaria and Munchi (Tiv) Province (subsequently renamed as Benue Province by Palmer). Although the report is not explicit on the 'Various Regime' types, three patterns derived from its contents: (1) the pure Emirate model with Fulani Emirs, district heads and village heads in Adamawa, Bauchi (S. Bauchi), Zaria (S. Zaria) and some parts of Plateau (Wase, Kanam, Dengi etc.); (2) the modified Emirate model with British officers and Fulani district heads and village heads (Jema'a, some parts of Southern Plateau, and Nassarawa); (3) the adapted Emirate model with

British officers and centralization of political authority in a hierarchical structure in a man indigenous to the group but with no roots whatsoever in traditional claims to leadership⁹⁹. The report also criticized the political use of Fulani district heads, premature political centralization of leadership in some M-Belt groups and the lack of continuity of local services of British D.O.s among the M-Belt groups when compared to the Islamic society in the North.

The 1924 report became the political instrument for the creation of Plateau Province in 1927, which Palmer used to revive an earlier Clifford proposal to remove the Plateau groups from the political control of the Emir of Bauchi¹⁰⁰. The creation of Plateau Province was significant in the sense that it removed non-Muslims, previously under an Emir and brought them under one administrative system with British Residents, DOs and ADOs in direct political control. There were, however, underlining economic interests which complemented the political act of the creation of Plateau Province. The creation of Plateau Province was meant to stabilize society in the area and to enhance the administration of the groups for the purpose of economic operations on the tin mines fields and the Eastern Railway¹⁰¹. Clifford, however, expected that the creation of Plateau Province:

"was politically meant to be in a very real sense a school of pagan administration functioning in an atmosphere undisturbed by the alien influences of the Emirates"¹⁰².

Previous to the creation of Plateau Province, in the period between 1910 and 1920 similar political reforms were made which culminated in the creation of Tiv Province in 1917¹⁰³. Tiv Province, had been organized, when the North-South political boundaries of Nigeria were redrawn on stricter tribal lines in which all the Tiv were regrouped in the North in 1911 together with the Igala, Idoma and Jukun to constitute one Province¹⁰⁴. Before 1914, Tiv land itself was politically and administratively divided

by the Benue river, with the northern parts under the British administration of Northern Nigeria and its Southern parts where the numerical majority of the tribe existed, under southern Nigerian administration¹⁰⁵.

In 1925 there were changes in the top British administrative positions, which had ramifications on the reforms in the application of indirect rule policy on the M-Belt groups, effected by Clifford. The most critical of these changes was in the appointment of Herbert Richard Palmer as Lieutenant-Governor of the North¹⁰⁶. Palmer was a political addict of the application of indirect rule policy, based on the Lugardian Emirate model. The political addiction of Palmer to this model was reinforced by his successes in re-organizing and shaping Katsina Province from Kano, elevating the political status of the Shehu of Borno on strict political procedures of the application of indirect rule and the supervision of the political extension of indirect rule with the Emirate model on the whole of the North before 1920 and to southern Nigeria before 1929¹⁰⁷. In 1925 therefore Palmer focussed his attention in resurrecting the "ruling races" in the M-Belt areas. This conception was based on his strong beliefs about the preservation of the historic destinies of ruling races all over Nigeria¹⁰⁸. As Lt. Governor of the North, in 1926 Palmer took the opportunity raised by political rearrangements of Bauchi Province in which Plateau was created and abolished Tiv, Muri, and Nassarawa Provinces¹⁰⁹. Thereafter, Palmer put forward the political paramountcy of the Lamido of Yola over Muri, by establishing Adamawa Province, elevated the political prominence of the Aku Uka, the Chief of the Jukun by creating Benue Province and brought to political focus the Attah of Igalla by the creation of Kabba Province and claimed that: "...these (areas) were their traditional spheres of influence"¹¹⁰. Palmer like Lugard held extremely negative social and political attitudes toward some of the M-Belt groups who had no histories of political conquest and expansion over neighbouring

groups and attributed their failure to a condition of incapacitated leadership¹¹¹. In contrast any group with a history of expansion and conquest was explained as a ruling race since it achieved centralization of political power and authority. This was the context from which Palmer failed to even conceal his hatred for the Tiv, among other non-Islamic groups in the M-Belt areas, and saw them as outside the political conception of a ruling race. Thus, for example, when he proposed the change from "Munshi Province" to Benue Province, Palmer minuted:

"I think that of late, there has been a tendency to give the status of that tribe rather more than its just due"¹¹².

Despite his hostilities toward the non-centralized M-Belt groups, Palmer is credited for introducing what may be termed as "the Age of the Anthropologists" in the whole of British Colonial administration in the North. In 1927 he established and encouraged anthropological studies for the purposes of understanding the social structure and the political institutions of the M-Belt groups as well as other non-Islamic groups in the North¹¹³. Underlining this anthropological interest however, was a political drive to "discover" the ruling races, among the M-Belt groups, such as the Jukun, the Igalla and the Idoma. The anthropological investigations successfully resurrected the past glories in the military and political thrust, over the neighbours, of groups such as the Jukun and Igalla¹¹⁴. From the findings, Palmer became convinced that the Jukun and Igalla were "Hamitic ruling groups", politically unique among other M-Belt groups. Subsequently, he tried to evolve political means of giving these "races" a legitimate outlet for their ascendancy and to use them as "a contact with other lower races" in the M-Belt areas¹¹⁵. These political efforts and initiative by Palmer were meant to create uniformity on the non-centralized and non-hierarchical patterns of power and authority in the M-Belt areas as well as other non-Islamic groups with the Lugardian Emirate

model for the rest of the North. The Palmer reforms on Provincial, Divisional boundaries and the decisions in the location of their headquarters as well as the names of the Provinces and the Divisions were meant to create an aura of centralization. This was also meant to create a hierarchical structure of authority and emphasize the modified Emirate model in the application of indirect rule policy on the M-Belt groups. The incumbents of the Palmer model, however, were to be persons, who in some way, were from a "ruling race" or tribe. Although Fulani and other variants of Islamic leadership were de-emphasized in the application of this version of indirect rule, indigenous social and political institutions of some of the M-Belt groups were sacrificed. Territorial conceptions of some Chiefs and even district Heads in a historical context became vigorously reasserted and affirmed¹¹⁵. This was so, whether the Chief was from a ruling tribe or an "alien" imposition. Once a 'Paramount Chief' was identified, the Palmer model extended his authority over adjacent groups and this was done for all of the M-Belt groups before 1931. To complement the application of the Palmer model, there was also re-organization of Native Authority areas (the NAs), such that they reflected the territorial sizes and political structure of the NAs in the Islamic society. The NAs in the M-Belt areas between 1920 and 1931 were centered around the location of the "ruling races" of Palmer. The effects of 'Paramount Chiefs' in the Palmer model created tribal consciousness and distinct cultural identity in the tribal groups who gained a Paramount Chief as well as in those who did not. By 1938 this consciousness erupted firstly among the Tiv and created demands for a Paramount Chief subsequently followed by the Idoma and the Birom, among others in the M-Belt areas.

However in the period of the application of indirect rule with the Palmer model which was conceived of in terms of the ruling races of the M-Belt groups, the Lamido (Fulani title of the ruler) of Yola (a town) was renamed the Lamido of Adamawa (a territorial conception) and was given

authority over several non-Islamic groups in the area, who had resisted the Fulani and remained unconquered in the period of the Jihad between 1804 and 1900¹¹⁷. The Emir of Yola, however, lost authority over the Bachama and the non-Islamic groups that were centered around Numan and the Wurkum districts in 1927. However in 1926 when Palmer was Governor of the North he reduced the territorial size of Numan District, took away some of the non-Islamic groups in the area and placed them under the authority of the Lamido of Adamawa with a chain of Fulani district Heads in political control¹¹⁸. Similarly, Wukari Division was created in the same period and the decision to base the headquarters at Wukari town where there was the Palace of the Aku Uka (King of the Jukuns), rather than Ibi, was a political decision. Subsequently, Wukari Division was enlarged, which led to Benue Province, territorially incorporating the Tiv and the neighbouring groups such as the Idoma¹¹⁹. Akwanga Division was also renamed and politically re-designed on territorial rather than tribal district basis and became placed under the political supervision of the Islamic Chief of Wamba¹²⁰. In the instance, Wamba town became the political headquarters of Akwanga Division with political jurisdiction over numerous non-Islamic groups who were unconquered by the garrison emirates of Keffi, Lafiya and Jema'a¹²¹. In 1928, a suggestion to Palmer from the Governor in Lagos to regroup the non-Islamic groups ^{in Southern Zaria} as an autonomous political unit, independent of the Emir of Jema'a after the creation of Plateau Province was dismissed as impractical¹²². The Jema'a areas, which were situated on the south of the Plateau escarpment therefore, became placed under the direct political control of the Fulani Emir of Jema'a town, who ruled with a chain of command of Fulani and Islamic district Heads over such groups as the Attaka, Chawai, Kaje, Kattab and the Kagoro, until about 1950¹²³. The Emir of Jema'a was tied in religious and political loyalty to the Zaria Emirate and therefore indirectly to Sokoto.

Under the same reorganization of Palmer, Audu dan Afoda, a Yoruba

Muslim, who had been Chief of Makurdi since 1914 with a surrogate appointee as the village Head of Taraku in the Northern parts of Tiv, was appointed as President of the 'Tiv Jir' in 1927¹²⁴. In 1929, a similar council was established for the Tiv district of Katsina Ala Division, who were placed under the hegemony of the Aku Uka of Wukari¹²⁵. Although Jato Aka was the President of this Council, dan Afoda was regarded as more useful by Resident Pembleton because he exerted an educational influence on the hierarchical structure of authority¹²⁶. However, in Katsina Ala town, the DO was the executive link between the Tiv districts and the Aku Uka of Wukari¹²⁷. It was not until 1932 that the Tiv were united under one Division with a new headquarters built at Gboko¹²⁸. Among the Idoma, British attention was focussed on the "Ojiri" (the tradition council of clan Heads) under the British and fond hopes were expressed that 'a Paramount Chief' will emerge to rule the whole of Idoma¹²⁹.

After 1930, the Palmer model on the application of indirect rule through the "ruling races" in the M-Belt areas and the whole emphasis of the Emirate model on the M-Belt groups was reversed. This was as a direct consequence of the Warri riots in 1927 and the subsequent Aba riots in December 1929 in the South of Nigeria. Both riots were interpreted by the government of British administration in Nigeria as a development from the political misapplication of indirect rule with the Emirate model in the governance of non-Islamic groups¹³⁰. The Palmer model was also reserved, because of the arrival of Donald Cameron in 1931 as Governor-General of Nigeria¹³¹. Cameron had served under Clifford as Chief Secretary and also had political experience of indirect rule with non-Islamic groups in Tanganyika and these experiences had shaped his strong positions against the wholesale application of the Emirate model over the M-Belt groups, preferring it to be restricted to the Islamic society. As a first step in adjusting the Palmer model, Cameron reversed the existing trends toward political autonomy of the North within Nigeria which had vigorously been

resurfaced by Palmer. Cameron accused his predecessors:

"...of the unhallowed policy insidiously introduced during the latter half of the last decade of thinking of the Moslem Emirates in terms of the Indian States"¹³².

Cameron subsequently developed indirect rule policy and its application on the M-Belt groups within context of a Tribal-framework¹³³. An instant problem its application faced, however, was the disparate nature of the groups in the M-Belt areas, their small numbers and the small areas upon which they were concentrated except for the Tiv, Jukun, Igalla, Idoma in Benue, the Bachama in Adamawa and the Birom on the Jos Plateau. It was, however, the 'tribal model' of indirect rule in the M-Belt areas that crystallized tribal socio-cultural and political identities among some of the M-Belt groups. While it reasserted the fragmentation of unity of the region, the hierarchical structure of power and authority introduced on each of the groups from the Emirate model, produced acceptance of the Northern political identity as each "tribe" identified with the aura of its Paramount Chief.

The tribal model introduced by Cameron in 1931 was in effect British administration ruling through the Residents, DOs, ADOs and instituted political leadership of the "tribes" which were either a collective cultural section conceived of as a political unit in an NA or the amalgamation of tribes into an NA based on common cultural patterns. This political re-interpretation of indirect rule led Cameron into direct conflict with British officers who were determined to protect the Islamic establishment in the North¹³⁴. However, in 1931, the only group that fitted the Tanganyikan experiences of Cameron in the development and application of the tribal model, was the Tiv and they became the focus of British administration with the new interpretation of indirect rule policy¹³⁵. This was so, because the Tiv were almost a virgin area with no

Islamic influences and were numerically the largest group of all the other M-Belt groups. The Tiv became the political focus of British administration also because they had proved most intractable to conquer and when British authority was established over them with the appointments of district heads, instant tensions developed both between them and the British and within the group¹³⁶. These resulted at times, into widespread anomic movements of revolt.

In the period between 1934 and 1936 therefore 'Intelligence Reports' were prepared on districts, tribes and clans of the M-Belt groups, particularly those of the Tiv. These reports were meant to serve as the basis for political reorganization with the Cameron model¹³⁷. From the findings of the reports Cameron suggested four types of NA systems for the practice of indirect rule: A tribal Chief NA; An NA with a Federation of tribal Chiefs; A tribal Council of Chiefs with a rotating 'Chairman Chief' or a District Officer as Chairman of the NA Council; and a clan or village Council of Chiefs¹³⁸. The new political arrangements, as flexible as they were and although they liberated some of the M-Belt groups from political control of Fulani and Islamic leadership did not provide for viable NAs. When Lord Hailey visited the North in 1940 to survey Native Administrations he was forced to warn that the new model might create "permanent backward areas" in some parts of Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Plateau¹³⁹. However the problems of finance were so enormous that for an extended period of time there were further attempts at "Federation-building" in the NAs established from the application of the tribal model of indirect rule¹⁴⁰. The problem was most acute in places closest to the Islamic society, such as S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and some parts of Plateau and these were compounded by the small fragmented units whose contact was limited and political awareness hardly transcended the village level¹⁴¹. In 1935, it became apparent that Native Treasuries in the Islamic society offered more sources of funds for development when compared to the finances available to the

smaller fragmented political units existing in some of the M-Belt areas. This point became a critical political consideration because government funds were reduced to a minimum by the world economic recession of the 1930s¹⁴². As a result Cameron began to abandon the application of the tribal model by emphasizing the development of a corporate spirit in the reforms and suggesting that the tribal model was a long range political objective. Later in 1935 he was blunt on the political objectives of the tribal model in its application to groups in some parts of Adamawa, S. Bauchi, some parts of Plateau and S. Zaria:

"...that pagan tribes should be abruptly taken away from Emirs who have been administering them for many years... that is impossible"¹⁴³.

Although administrative boundaries were redrawn in 1933 on tribal lines for Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and some parts of Plateau, despite the hostilities of the Emirs of Zaria, Bauchi and Yola, in 1935, S. Zaria became restored to the Emir of Zaria under Fulani district Heads along with some groups in the Southern escarpment of Plateau¹⁴⁴. Except for the Numan Federation which survived, in 1934 similar arrangements were approved for the restoration of non-Muslims to the Emirs in Yola, Muri and Gombe. The tribal model was abandoned in 1935. In 1936 indirect rule policy became restated as an administrative expedience:

"The basic reason of a reorganization is to remedy discontent and maladministration. If the people are content with their present form of government then by all means leave them alone. There is no point in making changes which appear to be theoretically correct though they are infact not really needed"¹⁴⁵.

After 1936 Residents were allowed to pursue their own political interpretations of indirect rule policy based on the previous experiences of the conflictful principles that guided the application of the policy in

the M-Belt areas. In 1940 when Lord Hailey visited the North he found a variety of systems of indirect rule policy in the M-Belt areas. In Adamawa for example, he found NA-Federations operated with Chiefs from different groups. The political problem however was that they so disagreed and persistently quarrelled with each other that they finally settled for the choice of the Fulani district Heads system over them, mediated by British political officers¹⁴⁶. In some parts of Southern Bauchi and the Plateau, there existed a multiplicity of small village units without traditional sauctions¹⁴⁷. In Benue Province there was a 23 page list of NAs in the gazette, including 55 clan Councils for Tiv Division alone¹⁴⁸. Among the Igalla and Bassange in Kabba Province and the Idoma, there were nominal clan Heads in the NA system¹⁴⁹. On the main hilly Plateau areas such as Jos and Pankshin Division there existed an assortment of "tribal - Councils", "Village - group - councils" and "tribal-Chiefs-in-Council", some extremely confusing in political structure of authority and the location of traditional political power¹⁵⁰. In Jos Division for example, there was a Federated NA with "a tribal-Chief-in-Council" under a Birom Chairman-Chief, presiding over the "Bwong Gwom Duk Shot" (the Big Chief Room of Judgement) at Ryiom. In 1935 the British hand-picked Chung Gyang as Chief of Birom and presided over 25 different Chiefs from some of the groups in the Division. The curious political anomaly was that while the subordinate Chiefs had traditional legitimacy and each was previously autonomous of the other, the British appointee had no roots in traditional claims to leadership, even among the Birom. He was simply a good ex-service man whom the British had an impressive character record of him in their files, from the first World War records. However, the reorganization and reforms of 1931 activated tribal consciousness, which was directed at the improvement of relations between government and the people. Although it opened the way for groups to seek to improve themselves by making similar political reorganization in southern Nigeria, the same processes among some of the M-Belt groups did

not produce effective local governments¹⁵¹. It created "cells" of underdeveloped areas in Southern Zaria, Southern Bauchi, Adamawa and some parts of Plateau, where the tribal NAs were financially weak. This was the socio-economic and political background in which in the 1940s, there developed the unanticipated political demands from among some of the M-Belt groups for the British administration to create 'Paramount Chiefs' for their groups, who were to be used as the focus of unity and development at the local levels.

IV. Early Political Ideas in the Conceptions of Demands for a 'M-Belt Region' in the North.

Preceding the political demands for the creation of 'Paramount Chiefs', some non-Islamic Chiefs in the M-Belt areas, made requests for the separation of their areas of authority from Fulani and Islamic leadership. As early as in 1908, for example, some non-Islamic Chiefs in the Chamba and Bachama areas of Adamawa, the Lere districts in Southern Bauchi and the non-Islamic Chiefs of Zangon-Katab in Southern Zaria demanded from British Residents to be "removed" from the political rulership of Fulani Emirs and Islamic district Heads¹⁵². Similarly in the period between 1910 and 1920 British Residents in Adamawa, Bauchi, Zaria and some parts of the Plateau, reported increased demands by Chiefs for separation and control by Fulani and Islamic rulers, particularly among areas where British conquest had succeeded in establishing authority¹⁵³. These were areas that had come under the direct impact of the Fulani Jihad and where partial political incorporation into the structure of political power of Islamic rule, had been achieved before 1900. These demands however were not made in terms of a M-Belt identity or Region, but rather in context of a distinct cultural identity that was meant to restore indigenous control in the affairs of the


groups. In the 1940s, the demands by the Chiefs were taken over by the tribal unions which had emerged from achieved social and political consciousness from Christian Missionary activities. When this happened the demands became characterized by violent protests and riots. This was so for the demands for separation from the Emir of Bauchi by the Sayawa in the Lere districts, the Madagali from the Emir in Mubi, the Michichika and Kilba, Chamba and Batta under Fulani district Heads, centered on the Emir in Yola in Adamawa Province¹⁵⁴. Later in 1958, however, the Kilba and associated groups won their independence from Yola after the first refusal of Northern Cameroon in the plebiscite to join Nigeria. The plebiscite result shocked the Saradauna into realization that local grievances of control by an "alien" Adamawa NA were basic to turn support against a Nigerian level interests. Protest and political hostilities also characterized demands for separation from Fulani and Islamic leadership in the district Heads among the Katab and other related non-Islamic groups such as the KareKare and Kika in S. Zaria and the Ngizim and Arago in the Lafia districts¹⁵⁵. The politically significant aspects of these local campaigns which demanded for separation from Fulani and Islamic leadership in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and some parts of the Plateau before the organization of a M-Belt movement in 1949, was that British administration in the North was obliged to introduce some form of elected representation into the NA councils more fully and much more rapidly than in other areas of the M-Belt like the main Plateau areas, Jukun, Idoma and Tiv¹⁵⁶. However, these demands also suggest that separatist demands existed among some of the non-Islamic groups in the M-Belt areas before an over all political movement of separation from the Islamic Society emerged as a M-Belt Movement. Similarly there were ideas and conceptions of a non-Islamic Region on the North that preceded the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region by the M-Belt movement. These conceptions developed from among British officials and associated interests in the North, largely from

the difficulties of political incorporation processes and the administration of the non-Islamic groups with the policy of indirect rule, particularly those of the M-Belt areas. The conceptions of a political identity in the North which was distinct though among disparate groups, from the Islamic society were begun by the British themselves and the words "Middle Belt Areas" were first used by British administrators in reference to the geographical stretch of the southern parts of the Region¹⁵⁷. Conceptions in the political differences of socio-cultural and religious identities also underlined the ideas that developed, of a Region that might contain non-Islamic groups which ought to be separated from a dominant Islamic society in the North.

The earliest of these ideas and conceptions of a "Middle-Belt Region" were those of a German Christian Missionary with the British Sudan United Mission (SUM), Dr. Karl Kumm in 1907, in which he suggested a "Benue Region" to both Christiendom and the British administration in Nigeria. Kumm saw and discussed the conceptions of the "Benue Region" in terms of areas where Christian Missionary Societies might concentrate their social and religious activities in the causes of halting the southwardly advance of Islam¹⁵⁸. The Benue Region in the North was to be comprised of groups in the Niger-Benue Valley: the Igalla, Idoma, Bassange, Tiv, Jukun and extending northwardly to where Islam had not reached, to such places as the Bauchi Plateau (Plateau and S. Bauchi) and the Adamawa areas north of the Benue river¹⁵⁹. However, conceptions of the Benue Region were more descriptive of the areas where Christian Missionary Bodies might concentrate their activities rather than of a political and religious identity for separation from the Islamic society in the North. Kumm, however, saw the areas as non-Islamic, victims of degradation by Fulani slave raids and cultural minorities as "pagans" to a well established Islamic society.

A more serious political conception of an administrative unit in the

Map 2. Suggested Political Division of Nigeria in 1911 By E. D. Morel.



British Protectorate of Nigeria, as a Region for non-Islamic groups and cultural minorities in the North, which received the attention of the government of British administration before there developed a full-blown political organization that articulated demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, came from E. D. Morel. He was an influential journalist, in London and Editor of the British African Mail. Morel made his proposals for the creation of a "Central Region" for non-Muslims and cultural minorities (which he called pagans) in the North in 1911 in the specific political context of the anticipated amalgamation of Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria into one administration¹⁶⁰. Morel proposed a four - Provincial - scheme of amalgamation for Nigeria, which according to him, ought to be based on the political divisions of the country:

"...that correspond as far as possible with natural geographical boundaries and existing political conditions involving as few changes as possible¹⁶¹."

The four "Great-Provinces" of Morel for Nigeria consisted of the Northern Western, Eastern and a Central Province to be created from the Protectorate of the Northern Region¹⁶². The Northern (or Sudan) Province was suggested to comprise areas where Islamic civilization existed for centuries and where the majority of the people were Muslims. These areas were comprised of Sokoto, Kano, Borno, the Zaria Emirate and Kontagora with headquarters in Kano. The Western Provinces comprised all that was later to become the Western Region of Nigeria and also extended northward to Borgu, Ilorin and Kabba and included the right bank of Forcados, and the Niger river formed the eastern boundary, the boundaries of the Province thus following natural lines with headquarters at Oshogbo or its immediate neighbourhood. The Eastern Province, was suggested to be comprised of all that was to become the Eastern Region of Nigeria, with its Western frontiers conterminous with the left bank of the Niger and Forcados, while its northern frontiers were

pushed up to the south bank of the Benue, embracing Bassa, but with parts of Muri and Yola Provinces left out for political reasons and inclusion in the Central Region. As for the Central Region, this was suggested to comprise:

"...the pagan section of the present Zaria Province ie. Zaria outside the limits of the Emirate proper and the Nassarawa, Bauchi, Niger, Yola and Muri (north of the Benue river) Provinces... It is not quite easy to forecast where the centre of gravity of the Central Province will ultimately fall, but if as it possible, the Bauchi highlands become in time a second simla for the Central Executive, the headquarters of the Central Provinces would presumably be fixed at Zungeru, the present capital of the Northern Protectorate"¹⁶³.

The 'Central Region' of Morel, as a conception of a M-Belt Region, might not have solved the socio-cultural and political problems that were articulated by the M-Belt movement in the period between 1950 and 1967. Strong and fanatically loyal Emirates to Sokoto such as Bauchi, Yola and Nupe were included in the Central Region conception. These Emirates raided many of the M-Belt groups for conquest and slaves. After British conquest in 1900, some of these groups in S. Bauchi, S. Zaria, Adamawa and some parts of Plateau had historical recollections of their experiences and did not wish to be associated with Fulani and Islamic ruling classes. Furthermore, if the M-Belt conceptions were non-Islamic, then it was meaningless to divide the Tiv with the Benue river and exclude about 3/4 of their people in the re-composition of other groups with the same socio-cultural and political identity in the North. However, although the 'Central Region' proposed by Morel had many groups who were non-Islamic in religious and political identity, there was also a substantial concentration of the population which was Islamic, as in the Hausa-Fulani colonized areas of Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria, and some parts of Plateau. The patterns of political control that existed in the Islamic society might

have also continued, particularly so, with the strong influences of the Emirs of Yola, Bauchi and that of Nupe which the proposed region enclosed. However, the areas of the proposed Region corresponded to the areas where Christian Missionaries focussed their activities after 1910 and these were also areas where the M-Belt movement in its various phases concentrated its political activities in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, particularly the parent organizations, the Non-Muslims League (NML) and the Middle-Zone League (MZL). Furthermore, the 'Central Region' had its headquarters in the Islamic centre of Zungeru under the Emirate of Bida. This was very distant from the majority of the M-Belt groups in Benue, Plateau, S. Bauchi, Adamawa and S. Zaria. This means that political problems on the distribution of socio-economic and welfare amenities to places that were geographically distant from the centre of political decision making, would still have necessitated demands for the political subdivision of the Central Region. This was apparent of subsequent political developments of Nigeria in Benue-Plateau State and even after the State was split in 1976. While the political proposals of Morel sought to separate social and political identities among the groups in the North into Islamic and non-Islamic Regions, they concentrated on the political separation of land and based this on natural geographical divides eg. Benue river, rather than conceptions of socio-cultural and political identities in the North and between the North and Southern Nigeria. In otherwords, the political proposals of Morel for the creation of a 'Central Region' also contained the contradictions in political identity among th groups it enclosed, on a similar scale to the existing Protectorate of the North.

After the conceptions of the 'M-Belt Region' from Morel, came the ideas of C. L. Temple in 1913 who proposed the organization of 'Benue Provinces' as a distinct political unit in the North to constitute a Region for non-Islamic groups¹⁶⁴. Temple proposed the subdivision of Nigeria, such that besides Lagos Colony territory, the Northern and Southern Provinces

would be subdivided into three units of Provinces. In the North, these comprised the Hausa States, the Chad territories and the Benue Provinces¹⁶⁵. The Hausa States as a political unit were the areas of the traditional Hausa Kingdoms which were overthrown by the Fulani in 1804. It is difficult to conceive, how this unit might have worked without restoring the Hausa dynasties and risk alienating the Fulani ruling classes. The political idea on the Chad territories as a political unit stem from the traditions of the Borno Kingdom, but Temple extended the conception to include Adamawa Province, the subsequent Saradauna Province and Bauchi Province¹⁶⁶. Muri areas which were predominantly Islamic were however excluded. Unlike the political proposals of Morel, Temple proposed the division of the Islamic Society on historically rooted sentiments and political units. The essentially non-Islamic political unit proposed by Temple was Benue Province. This was meant to enclose groups found on the Western and Central areas of the North: "fronting the Niger and Benue rivers"¹⁶⁷. The Benue Provinces proposal as a political unit enclosed the non-Islamic groups found on the Plateau, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria, Wukari and Benue Province itself with the Tiv, Idoma and Igalla but also enclosing the Nupe¹⁶⁸. While Nupe an Islamic strong hold was conceived of as part of the non-Islamic problem in the North, it was apparently contradictory to exclude Adamawa from the Benue unit which was enclosed in the Chad territories. The political solutions to the problem of malintegration of the M-Belt groups in the British created North were compounded by overlapping socio-cultural and political identities because there was no clear-cut territorial boundary for division between Muslims and non-Muslims or between Hausa-Fulani-Kanuri and Nupe and other cultural groups in the M-Belt areas.

In 1919, there were more suggestions from British political officers in the services of the government of British administration in Nigeria for the subdivision of the Protectorate into more units. These particularly

focused on the North, as a solution to the problems of malincorporation of the non-Islamic groups¹⁶⁹. In the period between 1920 and 1939, for example, British officers who had served in the non-Islamic areas in the North made several proposals for the subdivision of the North and Nigeria in general into a dozen or more political units, largely developed from the ideas of Morel and Temple¹⁷⁰. However, when these developments, were gaining the attention of public policy makers, there was a sudden outburst of tribal "nationalism" among the M-Belt groups and for the decade after 1940, interest in political separation from the Islamic society was temporarily submerged.

The malintegration of the M-Belt groups by forceful political measures (ie. conquest) and their subordination to the Islamic society and leadership (ie. in certain phases of the application of indirect rule policy), explain the subsequent resurgence of tribal movements within the very political boundaries of the North. The tribal movements were essentially concentrated in the M-Belt areas, which among other factors, created the foundations and origins in the growth and development of the M-Belt movement. The tribal movements of the 1940s were also to produce political support for the M-Belt movement when it demanded the creation of a M-Belt Region in the North in 1950. One of the most important contributory force in the developments of tribal movements was the attainment of Christian consciousness among the M-Belt groups. This Christian consciousness started from the activities of European Missionary Bodies, intent on winning the "Sudan" for the Christian religion. Among the M-Belt groups in the North, Christian consciousness was developed side by side with political consciousness in the political development of the North in the period of British rule. The work of European Christian Missionaries, did not only produce Christian consciousness in the M-Belt areas, it also deliberately set about to construct a religious and socio-cultural identity which contrasted with the dominant Islamic identity in the rest of the

North. The concentration of the non-Islamic identity in the M-Belt areas, was subsequently used for political purposes as it was forged into a social movement and thus laid the foundations for the growth of the M-Belt Movement.

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
Additional Notes to Chapter 2

*1 There were significant differences in the speed and political measures used to achieve conquest of the North, when the Islamic society and the M-Belt groups are compared. The conquest of the Muslim areas was easy and rapid, because the population cohered in a state system with a recognised ruler over a large area, once the ruler was conquered and he or his traditionally chosen successor accepted British rule, a stable system of peaceful rule had been established and no more military measures were required; whereas Middle Belt peoples had to be pacified in small units, sometimes by persuasion, but often by force and this took a long time.

Part II

**Political Roots and Development of the M-Belt Movement
In Nigerian Politics**

Map 3. Areas with the Concentration of Christian Missionary Activities in the North after 1914.



CHAPTER 3

Foundations and Origins of the Socio-political Identity for the M-Belt Movement in the period between 1900 and 1950

"A clean, fresh, wholesome wind passing through a dusty place will stir up what is not pleasant. New thoughts coming into old settled stereotyped ideas will make their owners wake up and stir uneasily."¹

I Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether socio-political and economic consciousness about the nature of society and political identities among the M-Belt groups and societies in The North, developed from impact with British influences.² It is proposed that British influences among the M-Belt groups and societies conditioned the development of social and political identities which were at variance with the Islamic and conceptions of the Northern political identity in The North within the developing Nigerian political state. Within the very boundaries of The North in the period between 1900 and 1950, political conceptions of the Northern Identity emphasized the Islamic religious and political identity for the whole of societies enclosed in that political unit. The social and political identities developed among the M-Belt groups and societies resulting from the direct consequences

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1. Dr Walter Miller, Light Bearer Magazine, SUM Headquarters, Jos, March 1909, P. 153-154
 2. British influences are taken to be activities of the government of British administration in The North, Christian Missionaries, Commercial and Mining activities which affected the socio-political and economic transformations of groups and societies into Western oriented patterns of development in The North.

of impact with British influences were subsequently mobilized in support of the political demands made by the M-Belt Movement in the 1950s and 1960s for the creation of a M-Belt Region. These social and political identities which became mobilized in the 1950s and 1960s to gain support for the political demands made by the M-Belt Movement were a political reaction to conditions and circumstances of the M-Belt groups and societies as internal colonies in The North.

Christian Missionary activities in particular, besides other British influences that were effecting social change among the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1900 and 1950 are therefore examined in relation to a developing Christian religious and political identity and the assumed political meaning of Christianity for political consciousness in the political organizations of the M-Belt Movement and its subsequent demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the period between 1950 and 1967. It is therefore argued that the spread of the Christian religion through Christian educational and social-welfare institutions, such as western oriented schools, hospitals, dispensaries, churches and by direct 'party' proselytising by Christian Missionaries, which became restricted and concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies, shaped and produced a resurgence of ethnic identities among the different M-Belt groups and societies which became fed into conceptions of a social and political Christian identity that was seen to be different from the dominant Islamic patterns in politics and society in The North.

In other words, this Chapter examines whether social and political attributes which characterized the development of the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1900 and 1950 may be taken as causal factors that gave political meaning to existing differences in political identities in The North and whether such were sufficient

social and political conditions for the M-Belt groups and societies to organize into political movements with the objective of achieving the creation of a M-Belt Region separated from the Islamic society. Although the foundations and origins of the M-Belt Movement took roots and depended on the phenomenon of Western modernizing processes, affecting the M-Belt groups and societies, historically recollected socio-political and economic relationships in the experiences of the M-Belt groups and societies with the Islamic society and institutional development which were bolstered by an infused social and political consciousness developed from Christian Missionary activities, resulted into conceptions of a M-Belt identity. By 1950, developments from impact with British influences created conditions from which new institutions and socio-political consciousness, with new identity patterns within each of the M-Belt groups and societies, became accepted as politically meaningful. Resurgent ethnic social and political identities among the M-Belt groups and societies were the nucleus from which non-Islamic identities became translated into an overall conception of a M-Belt political identity. Linkages therefore existed between Christian Missionary processes to modernize the M-Belt groups and societies and other strands of the modernizing process. These processes produced ethnic nationalism from each of the M-Belt groups and societies. Modernization among the M-Belt groups and societies meant a re-interpretation and change in social and political attitudes on the world views for the ethnic group, politics and society in The North and Nigeria in general.

This is the premise from which we may understand why it was not until after 1949 that there was begun a political organization for a M-Belt Movement in the 1950s when infact malintergration and the political tensions it created existed in the period between 1900 and 1950 and

which was a constant source for concern to British administration in The North.

The analytical focus of this chapter therefore, is on examining socio-political and economic development in The North as they affected the M-Belt groups and societies before a M-Belt Movement was begun in 1949. Analytical interpretations of socio-political and economic developments as they related to the state of politics and society and the events and political actions surrounding these developments, constitute explanatory reasons for the foundations and origins in the formulation of the political organizations of the M-Belt Movement which demanded the creation of a M-Belt Region.¹

Although the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement was characterized by changes in the labels of the political organizations in the period between 1949 and 1956, its political objectives remained constant. After 1956, the M-Belt Movement became a full-blown political force which created specific systemic political responses from both British administration and Islamic leadership and also the NPC political leadership in The North. It subsequently caused the political subdivision of The North in the period between 1966 and 1967 when the Nigerian political state became rearranged into more and smaller political Units of the Federation.

Data and evidences produced to support propositions made in this chapter are based on both primary and secondary sources. These were re-inforced by oral evidences gained from interview discussions with the 'Founding Fathers' and originators of the political organizations and the ideas for a M-Belt Movement among the M-Belt groups and

1. The growth and development of the political organizations of the M-Belt Movement based on the socio-political and economic developments among the M-Belt groups and societies are examined and discussed in Chapter 4

societies like the tribal parties and politicians who were used as clients to introduce the political parties from the Islamic society such as the NPC and NEPU, among the M-Belt groups and societies.

The interview discussions were conducted in Nigeria as well as in Britain in the period between November 1980 and February 1981. In the fieldwork research, intensive interview discussions, using carefully unstructured questions were held with 'dramatis personae' on issues which surrounded the foundations of the ideas for a M-Belt Movement and the tribal political organizations which preceded, such as the role of Christian Missionary work in creating political consciousness and why political organizations came up in the 1940s and not earlier in the 1920s and 1930s.

Although it was an impossible task to go round and interview leadership of all tribal organizations among the M-Belt groups and societies, firstly because of their share numbers and also because of the constraints of time and research funds on travels, discussions were held with some 'tribal' political party leadership that was directly involved in originating the idea of a M-Belt Movement for a M-Belt Region in the period between 1949 and 1956.

Some of the 'dramatis personae' involved with tribal political parties which became fed into the M-Belt political organizations for the period between 1949 and 1956 included Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang, Balla Yerima and Patrick Fom. Six political figures from among the M-Belt groups and societies who gave the M-Belt Movement a dynamic political thrust after 1956 in context of the religious and socio-political identity mobilized from 1949 but with roots in the period between 1900 and 1950 were also interviewed.

These included J.S. Tarka in London, in March 1980 before his death, Patrick Dokotri, Isaac Kpum, Elizabeth Ivase, Azi Nyako and Isaac Shaahu; the political positions of Bitrus Rwang Pam were derived from Dudu Dalyop who worked closely with him in gaining support for the M-Belt Movement from among groups and societies in Jos Division.

Besides J.S. Tarka and Bitrus Rwang Pam, all the others were still alive in the period of fieldwork for this research. One advantage of conducting research into political histories when the actual political actors that made the history are still alive is that it gives the researcher the unique opportunity to confront their present political positions and viewpoints with their past political predilections in the record of events. This gives room for more rigorous interpretation and analysis, particularly so for explanatory reasons on the variations in the theme of the political identity of the M-Belt Movement after 1967 as was characteristic of politics in Benue Plateau State and in the 1979 elections among the M-Belt groups and societies.

Documentary material from Christian Missionary records of their activities among the M-Belt groups and societies in the SUM archives in Jos as well as individual Missionary accounts in books were also used to derive evidences admitted in support of propositions made in this chapter. Published accounts of Christian Missionary activities in The North were also important sources of data and evidences. Statistical data, where used for this chapter, derive from computations of 1921, 1931 and 1952 census figures as well as the 1963 figures published by governments of The North and Nigeria. There were other statistical sources besides the censuses as footnote sources will indicate.

II Christian Missionaries in The North

The purpose of this section is to examine whether the objectives in the subsequent activities of Christian Missionaries in The North were instrumental in creating a Christian religious and political identity among the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1900 and 1950. Christian Missionary activities which became concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies after 1920 created social and political consciousness about society in The North, a consciousness which was subsequently used as a political resource in the 1950s to make demands for separation from the dominant Islamic society.

British influences through Christian Missionaries in The North and Nigeria in general is essentially the development of various Christian Missionary denominations and individual Christian Missionary efforts, rooted in the doctrines of Fowel Buxton about the social and political role of Christianity in civilizing Africa with Western European civilization.¹ The period between 1861 and 1885 in context of the subsequently developed Nigerian political state, was characterized by early Christian Missionary activities, besides the main European commercial interests in the Region.² Christian Missionary interests in The North in Nigeria are however suggested to have been started early in the 18th century. In 1708, for example, ^{according to Ayandele} there were about 100,000 Christian adherents in the Kingdom of Kororafa (Jukun) and a sixty-bed hospital built by RCM priests.³ In the period between 1870 and 1888, the Sultan of Sokoto, the Emirs of Ilorin, Gwandu and Bida were presented with "Leather Bound Arabic Bibles" as

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1. Ifemesia 1980 p. 99
 2. Ayandele 1980 p. 133
 3. Ayandele 1980 p. 133

gifts from the Salisbury Square Bible Society of England.¹ In the same period, there were invitations to the CMS to start Christian stations and work in Bida, Nassarawa, Keffi, Ilorin, Egga, Loko and Yimaha.² The Emirs were prepared to lend a helping hand to the Missionaries as long as the "Christians" were themselves friendly.³

This means that Emirs and other ruling classes in the Islamic society in the territories that subsequently became The North in Nigeria, held pro-Christian Missionary attitudes, tolerated Christianity and were prepared to benefit from Christian Missionary activities. In 1826 Clapperton, for example, found that Sultan Bello of Sokoto, Son of Usman dan Fodio, was keenly interested in Christian theology, asked questions about it, the answers to which Clapperton confessed he had hitherto "left to others".⁴

In 1888 however, a German explorer called Standinger visited Sokoto and thereafter reported to its religious and political leadership: "... that the chief objective of the RNC was not trade but Christianization of Moslems in The North .. (subsequently) the Emirs began to fear the Missionaries as political spies."⁵ Even when that happened many of the Emirs in The North in the period between 1900 and 1906 when Lugard established political control and co-operation between 'the British in The North' and the ruling classes of the Islamic society were keen to have Christian Missionaries civilize their communities with western modernizing skills.⁶

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1. Ayandele 1980 p. 136-137
 2. Ayandele 1980 p. 136-137
 3. Ibid
 4. David Williams, 'A different Perspective', Book Review of The Muslim Discovery of Europe by Bernard Lewis, West Africa Magazine, 10 January, 1983 p. 97
 5. Ayandele 1980 p. 138
 6. Ayandele 1980 p. 136-137

Although Islamic leadership in The North before the arrival of British rule in 1900 entertained no religious fears of Christian Missionaries, what they dreaded were the political accompaniment of the Christian Missionary enterprise.¹ The political policies of British administration in The North in the application of Indirect rule policy and subsequent political attitudes developed by British officials toward Christian Missionaries compounded the uncertainties on the political intentions of Christian Missionaries held among the Islamic ruling classes. In the instance Christian Missionaries became restricted in their work and activities among the M-Belt groups and societies.²

It must be borne in mind however that certain Emirs were against Christian Missionaries and their activities before British conquest and establishment of political authority in The North. In 1893 for example, when the Emir of Yola signed a treaty of trade and "protection of his land and people" with the RNC representative, it is reported that he made it clear "... that we would not interfere in any way with the religious principles of himself and subjects; and that if any whiteman were to come and preach Christianity we would not permit him to remain in our stations; and that he had heard that such men were in Nupe Kingdom".³

In the closing years of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century, however, behind British imperial interests in The North, came Christian Missionaries from Europe, America and South Africa, bringing with them Western European civilization and culture.

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1. Ayandele 1980 p. 137
 2. These points are discussed in more detail below.
 3. Flint, 1960 p. 178

Between 1855 and the 1890s various attempts were made by Christian Missionary Bodies to penetrate into The North, including those by Bowen of the Southern Baptist Church in 1855, Crowther of the CMS in 1865, Bingham in 1893 and the now celebrated "Misguided March" of Bishop Tugwell in 1900 to Kano.¹ Bingham tried again in 1900 but failed.² The result of his third journey however was the eventual organization of the SIM whose stations became established between 1907 and 1910.

Between 1899 and 1907 however, there were four Christian Missionary Societies, operating in the 'Sudan' in 14 stations.³ These were the Church Missionary Society (CMS), the American United Presbyterians (AUP), the Sudan United Mission (SUM) and the Mennonite Brethren in Christ (MBC).⁴

It is the impact of British influences through Christian Missionary activities in The North that is the main concern of this section, particularly so in the ways they transformed socio-political and economic consciousness about society in The North among the M-Belt groups and societies, which were to become identified with the M-Belt Movement in the 1950s and 1960s. These transformations were tied up to Christian Missionary objectives in The North and the whole religious conceptions in the confrontation with Islam in the 'Sudan' as it was understood by Christendom. One of the objectives of Christian Missionaries to the 'Sudan' was aimed at:

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1. Ayandele 1966 p. 117-118
 2. Boer 1979 p. 86

3. For these breakdowns see Table 3.4; the table is discussed and analysed in more detail below.

4. Kumm 1907 p. 216

"...arousing Christendom to a crusade; to arouse His Church to send his apostles to those pagans who are drifting to Islam because his messengers tarry so long ... English Christians especially, though America also will listen, because on us is the nearest responsibility for we have assumed the Government of Northern Nigeria and it is our protectorate of the country which is giving to the Mohammedan traders and Missionaries a security and freedom which they did not enjoy. All the world has a claim on Christians, but Northern Nigeria has a special claim on the Christians of this happy land."¹

Religious objectives in the Christian Missionary conceptions of the whole of The North and the 'Sudan' in general was meant to halt the southwardly advance of Islam.² Although European Christian Missionaries arrived in The North with clear objectives, they subsequently faced religious competition from Islam over the conversion of non-Islamic groups and societies.³ This was so because there were also Moslem Missionaries who came from The Sudan Republic and with the advantage of 'their dark skins', easily integrated into the indigenous communities, quietly proselytizing contrastively to the social problems faced by European Christian Missionaries who were physically visible because of "their white skins."⁴

In the period between 1899 and 1900, the 'Sudan Belt' of Africa therefore became seen by European Christendom as a battle

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1. Robert F. Horton, Preface to The Sudan, in Kumm 1907, p. vii-viii
 2. Boer 1979 p. 141
 3. Gervis 1963 p. xiv
 4. Ibid

ground between Christianity and Islam. This conception had roots in the political interpretations of the historical experiences of groups and societies in that region in which the Islamic religion became tied up to politics, economics and society and the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North were victims of all its systems. The 'Sudan' in the conception of Christian Missionary Societies in Europe did not however only refer to the British political creation on the Lower Nile from Egypt but rather it meant: "... that broad-belt between the Sahara and South Africa from East to West, a huge area constantly described in the SUM's promotional literature as 'a country larger than Europe minus Russia, with from fifty to eighty million people that are waiting to be evangelized.'"¹

After 1850 Christian Missionary communities in Europe, particularly those in England increasingly focused their religious organization and efforts to halt the southward advance of Islam in Africa. This was the premise from which Graham Wilmot Brooks in the 1890s, for whom "the Mission to the Sudan" became an obsession and with the encouragement of the CMS, organized "the Sudan Party", consisting of 11 graduates from Oxford and Cambridge Universities with the objective of conquering The North in Nigeria, for Christ.² Subsequently in 1900, at about the same time when British claims on The North became known and Lugard set about conquest of groups and societies in the territory, during the Conference of Evangelical Missionary Societies of Great Britain, meeting in Edinburgh there

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1. Kumm 1907 p. 63; but see Rodney 1972 p. 66 for a political economy definition of the 'Sudan' differently from the Christian Missionary conception.
 2. Boer 1979 p. 85; G.W. Brooks counted on completing the task within six months!

was an official religious plea on all the Non-Conformist Churches to save the "animist" of The North from Islam.¹ When there was increased British commercial and political penetration far into The North and into the Islamic centres of religion and political power, it was expected that Islam will retreat towards North Africa.² Instead of retreating upon impact with British influences it was observed that Islam infact was advancing more rapidly than was previously the case before 1900.

This was the religious premise from which in 1906 Kumm, the German pioneer Christian Missionary, who had a wide ranging travel experience among the M-Belt groups and societies suggested that:

" ... tribes which were only conquered by the British last year have been taken possession of already by Moslem Missionaries .. I stayed for three days in a place called Kanna. This tribe was only conquered last year and this year is witnessing the building of a large Mosque at Kanna and sees the King and his courtiers bow their knees to Allah and Mohammed. The giant King of the Ankwe at Shendam was a pagan only a short while ago, he is today followed everywhere by his Mohammedan Mallams. In the capital of the Jukum tribe, there is quite a Mohammedan colony .. *not one of these tribes would have let a Mohammedan trader into their countries before British arms conquered them.*"³ At the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh in 1910 "the Islamic advance in Africa" was described "as the most critical Missionary problem in Africa since it was steadily pressing southward and westward."⁴ J.H. Boer summarizes the general religious

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1. Boer 1979 p. 86
 2. Ibid
 3. Kumm 1906; cited in Boer 1979 p. 141; emphases are mine
 4. Boer 1979 p. 102

mood developed from the 1910 World Missionary Conference toward the Islamic challenge in Africa into something like this: "... there is great urgency because of its (the Islamic) advance; it is low in morality; it has left Africa in a state of degradation and does not possess the dynamic to elevate it in future; it is a religion without love and without hope, oppressive of women."¹

The Edinburgh Conference saw the southward achievement in the religious conversions into Islam of some groups and societies in the M-Belt areas as a socio-political and economic threat to the progress of Africa. Christian Missionary appeals were therefore meant to stem the Islamic tide by presenting Christianity before further inroads were achieved. As late as 1916, W.J.W. Roome suggested that: "... the whole strategy of Christian Missions in Africa should be viewed in relation to Islam."² The Christian Missionary role in Africa therefore was meant to prevent Islam from gaining any further foothold among the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North of Nigeria and in the 'Sudan' in general. This was so because Christian Missionaries saw Islam as a religion opposed to the progress of 'Christian European Civilization'. The Islamic advance in Africa was seen to be a danger to the future of the development of European

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1. Boer 1979 p. 102; it is of interest for our subsequent arguments to bear in mind that in the late 1950s Mrs Elizabeth Ivase was to testify before the Willink Commission based on the very same theme of Islam being "oppressive of women" in support of the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region where Christianity might provide more open opportunities in the equal development of women and men - This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 where we analyze the Willink Commission and Politics with the M-Belt Movement in The North and Nigeria.
 2. W.J.W. Roome 'Strategies of Christian Missions in Africa', IRM/16 p. 353-354, cited in Boer, 1979 p. 102.

civilization in Africa.¹

Christian Missionaries from Europe constantly restated religions and political fears which suggested that in the instance of Islam gaining an upperhand over Christianity in Africa: "... this may mean the stagnation of European civilization and the re-introduction of the horrors of slave raiding ... by means of Christian education, Missions assist the magnificent work ... Government is doing today in those lands and thus they help to avert the threatened danger."² This means that Christian Missionaries in The North saw themselves, as much as they were seen by Christendom in Europe, as preparatory to British imperial interests and as aids toward its maintenance within context of a European civilizing process. Furthermore 'Christian Civilization' from Europe was seen by Christian Missionaries as a better alternative in the human progress of the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North and the 'Sudan' albeit Africa in general rather than 'Islamic civilization'.

In the period between 1900 and 1910 the religious options surrounding these themes became considered at the EMC Conference of 1900 and subsequently in the WMC in Edinburgh in 1910 and the Islamic religion became strongly excluded as prerequisite for the progress in the development of the human race in Africa. In that instance it became argued that Christianity ought to tie-up politics, economics and society. For example a spokesman for the ECM suggested that: "... The plea is sometimes heard in professed

1. Boer 1979 p. 147
2. Kumm 1910 p. 270

Christian circles that it (Islam) is better than paganism for the African, is begging the question. Can Islam effect the redemption of Africa? What has Islam made of Africa it has dominated for centuries? What can it make of the future of Africa? It is a religion without the knowledge of the Divine Fatherhood, a religion without compassion for those outside its pale and to the whole of womanhood of Africa; it is a religion of despair and doom. It is a religion without love and only love will redeem Africa. We (in Christianity) are charged with a Mission of Love and *the question is, shall we tarry and trifle in our mission while Africa is being made the prey of Islam?*"¹

Although from a Christian Missionary point of view the primary purpose of Christianity in The North and Africa in general was based on the religious and social notions that the Christian gospel was needed to save the souls of the non-Islamic groups and societies in Heaven, there were other additional reasons which Christian Missionaries considered as politically crucial to British interests. In 1909 for example, Miller suggested that the presence of Christian communities in Africa and The North of Nigeria in particular was the best safeguard against the protection of British interests and any Islamic uprising and therefore in that sense: "... Christian Missionaries may be more valuable to the government than regiments of soldiers."² In 1911 Kumm further suggested that "to civilize

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1. ECM spokesman, New York, 1900, cited in Boer 1979 p. 102
 2. W.L. Miller, Light Bearer Magazine, August 1909 p. 155-156; this suggestion by Miller coming in 1909 is politically significant because he was writing three years after the Satiru revolt of 1906 in which a WAFF detachment of soldiers was wiped out and some British military and political officers executed.

without Christianizing" was a dangerous procedure.¹ With a theme like that, Kumm, among others, saw the religious and political role of Christian Missionaries as that of the vanguards of European civilization in Africa, the powerful agents of peace and justice. This was the premise from which Kumm earlier wrote: "... If Missionaries today cannot be leaders of our Government representative they might, at least be assistants and by carrying Christian civilization to the pagans before these Mohammedans *prevent the unification of the various divergent elements of the Sudan* under the Crescent and with it the possibility of *seeing* raised there at any time the green flag of the Moslem war against our representatives of Christian Europe."² Boer is critical of Kumm because these perspectives suggest preaching a Christian variety of "the Jihad complex" with the same totality based on the assumed "Western Corpus Christianum" as the concept was similarly based ^{on} "Corpus Islamicum".³ Whatever the differences Boer sees, Kumm, as well as other Christian Missionaries in The North had reason and commitment to be explicit about religious and political intentions of Christian Missionaries in The North in Nigeria and the 'Sudan' in general.

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1. H.K.W. Kumm, The Light Bearer Magazine, February 1911 p. 28
 2. It is significant to note that Kumm wrote these arguments under the chapter title 'The Moslem Political Danger' rather than, let us say, 'The Moslem Religious Danger': H.K.W. Kumm, From Hansaland to Egypt through the Sudan, London, Constable and Co. Ltd. 1910 p. 266-267; emphases are mine.
 3. Boer 1979 p. 138

More politically significant on the Christian Missionary objectives and the intentions of their religious activities which became concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies however, was a letter dated 24th June, 1908 to Crossley, who was a member of Parliament in England and a Trustee of The Freed Slaves Home in Lokoja in Nigeria, in which Redmayne, its author, suggested for example, that: ".. the SUM indirectly, is a great political force in counteracting the flood of Mohammedanism which is sweeping over this province and recognized to be a serious danger to peace."¹ Political exigencies developed from notions like these, reinforced the already existing bleak conceptions of Islam and the Islamic society in The North among certain Christian Missionaries and complimented the more heuristic options of planning western civilization with Christianized M-Belt groups and societies rather than with Islamic groups and societies.

Miller for example, was a strong advocate of this political and religious opposition to the Islamic religion and the Islamic society under Fulani rulership as it related to the diffusion of western civilization in The North. In 1910 Miller saw nothing good about Fulani political and religious leadership in the Islamic society of The North. In the instance he suggested that: "... It was the Fulani who brought evil days upon the Hausa .. the Fulani were robbers and it was a great pity that the great Hausa race is in the hands of a small powerful clique who had established the most iniquitous government in human history."² Miller linked Fulani rule

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1. Redmayne, Letter to Crossley, 24th June 1908, cited in Boer 1979, p. 184
 2. W.L. Miller 1910, cited in Ayandele 1980 p. 143

in the Islamic society as similar to that by Genghis-Khan and subsequently to that of Hitler in Germany and Mussolini in Italy because they were not visionary. Instead they were narrow minded, unteachable and so oppressive that he estimated "in his own judgement" the Hausa masses might have overthrown them in 1910 at the very latest had the British not stepped in.¹ It was his conviction that the 'Habe' dynasties ought to have been reinstated in the early years of British rule, that it was direct rule rather than indirect rule which ought to have been established and therefore proposed the removal of Fulani Islamic leadership by force: "... in the interest of the salvation of these (Northern Nigerian) people and for their ultimate good and happiness."² This was so because Miller wanted Christianity to be patronized by British administration in The North which he suggested was in the best interest of its inhabitants. Otherwise, he argued: "... any attempt to improve the people by any other method than first giving them light of the gospel of Jesus Christ will be an utter failure."³

The reasons and commitments in Miller that Christianity was better than Islam in the processes of westernization of The North were to make him work hard and produced a galaxy of talent and a

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1. Ayandele 1980 p. 144
 2. W.L. Miller 1910, cited in Ayandele 1980 p. 144
 3. Ibid

rare breed of Christian political leadership from a small Wusasa Community for both The North and the Nigerian political state in people like Dr R.A.B. Dikko, a Fulani Christian and the very first medical doctor to qualify from The North. He was also a founder member of the NPC. There was also General Yakubu Gowon, who ruled Nigeria for about 10 years, Professor Ishaya Audu, first indigenous Vice-Chancellor of the premier University of The North, Ahmadu Bello University, and ^{former} Foreign Minister of Nigeria, Professor Adamu Baikie, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Benin, and also Dr Christopher Abashiya of the Bible Translation Centre in Jos, among others.¹

Christian Missionaries therefore arrived in The North with the singularly specific objective of halting the southward advance of Islam in the 'Sudan' which they envisaged carried religious and political dangers for the diffusion of European civilization in the development of Africa. Although the SUM, based in England was the leading religious advocate of Christian Missionary objectives in The North and the 'Sudan' in general, other Christian Missionary bodies also shared its anxieties about the rapid spread of Islam upon impact with European imperial interests.²

In that period Christians in Europe dreamed of "an Apostle Street" that would be determined and established, running from North to South of Africa, a religious route along which the King of Glory would enter Africa.³ It was also the religious intention

1. The religious and political roles of Wusasa produces in The North and Nigeria are examined and discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5 and also their political and religious balances they hold in the Nigerian political state

2. Boer 1979 p. 160

3. Ibid p. 101

that a Christian Missionary Station might be established every 100 miles along the route and that the stations would be used for the spread of the Gospel.¹ In the same period, the German CMS Missionary, Krapf, went as far as devising a complete plan for an east-west chain of religious stations in the 'Sudan Belt' of Africa that was a total distance of 2700 miles, divided into sections of 300 miles, each with its own religious sub-stations manned by four Christian Missionaries.² Krapf called the plan "the Equatorial-Mission-Chain" and proposed that the project might be completed in a dozen years.³

This was the premise from which Kumm proposed his political and religious strategies to halt the Islamic advance which were based on the notion that 'Pax-Britannica' was aiding Islam in The North of the developing Nigerian political state. In 1907, Kumm explained to British administration in The North that the objectives of Christian Missionaries: ".. were to counteract the Moslem advance among the pagan tribes in the region. This cannot

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1. Boer 1979 p. 101
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid

be done by going to the Mohammedans and therefore our work will be among the pagan tribes."¹

In order to achieve this objective, Christian Missionary organizations particularly through the SUM that was based in England, appealed to the public, at least for 150 Christian Missionaries for the 'Sudan' to be placed in about 50 stations along a conceived border line where "Islam and paganism" met in The North of Nigeria and in the 'Sudan Belt' in general.² This border-line was approximated to be the territorial space between Latitude 6 and 8 North, stretching from the Niger to the Nile, which corresponded to the route Kumm used in his trans-African exploration tour in 1904.³ For each of the groups and societies

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1. H.K.W. Kumm, "Principles and Constitution" in Documents, 15th January, 1907; as early as 1907 therefore there existed within certain Christian Missionary circles (ie. the SUM), explicit notions of 'a M-Belt Region' exclusively seen as consisting of non-Islamic, pagan tribes, a Region Kumm described as 'the Benue Region' where Christianity will be concentrated. This was three years earlier before the political proposals made by Morel in 1911 for the 'Creation of a Central Region' in The North, discussed in Chapter 2. The 'Benue Region' in Kumm's conceptions is much more close to subsequent reality than Morel's, at least in the name. The context of Kumm's 'Region' for the M-Belt groups and societies was religion rather than politics and administration. The political significance in that conception however is that in 1949, the socio-political identity that leadership in some of the M-Belt groups and societies mobilized into the initial political organizations of the M-Belt Movement was the Christian religious identity which subsequently sought political separation from the Islamic society in The North.
 2. Boer 1979 p. 115
 3. Ibid

formed in those areas: "... at least three white Missionaries: a medical man, an ordained educationist and a horticulturalist could be secured."¹ To achieve the progress of this grand scheme, Kumm became engaged in an international campaign to enlist the interest of Christians, which took him to Australia, New Zealand, Tasmania, South Africa, Denmark, Canada and the United States.² This explains the subsequent and numerous branches of the SUM from different Western European Nations which operated in The North and in the 'Sudan' territories in general.

Between 1899 and 1907 therefore Christian Missionaries from Europe became posted to the 'Sudan' on the conceived border line where "Islam and Paganism" faced each other both in the eastern 'Sudan' and in Northern Nigeria. In that period Christian Missionary focus of religious attention was not as much on the M-Belt groups and societies as it was on groups and societies on the territorial edges of the Islamic society and the Islamic society itself in The North.

Table 3.1 suggests that of a total of 14 Christian Missionary Stations in the total 'Sudan' context, 8 became situated among the Islamic groups and societies with 2 stations located in areas directly affecting some of the M-Belt groups and societies in the conceived 'Benue Region'. These were in Wukari and Ibi. Four (28.6%) of these stations were outside the conceived British political Unit of The North and located in the Nile Valley of Egypt and Sudan. The Nile Valley had a total Christian Missionary force of 19 (33.9%) personnel out of a total of 56 Christian Missionaries serving in the 'Sudan'.

1. Boer 1979 p. 115
2. Ibid

Table 3.1 Concentration of Christian Missionary Stations and Numbers of Christian Missionary Personnel in the Sudan in the period between 1899 and 1st January 1907

Territorial Area within 'the Sudan concept		Number of Christian Missionary Stations	% Missionary Stations	Number of Christian Missionary Personnel	% Missionary Personnel
The Nile Valley: Sudan and Egypt		4	28.6	19	33.9
Northern Nigeria	Niger and Nupe Districts	5	35.7	37	66.1
	Hausa and Gwari Districts including Rock Station (Wase)	3	21.4		
	Benue Region	2	14.3		
Total		14	100%	56	100%

Source: H.K.W. Kumm, The Sudan: A short compendium of Facts and Figures about the Land of Darkness, London, Marshall Brothers Ltd., 1907 p. 216

The religious emphasis in the concentration of Christian Missionary personnel in the 'Sudan' was however on The North in Nigeria. Out of 14 Christian Missionary Stations in the 'Sudan' 10 stations were opened up in The North in Nigeria. British imperial interests in The North therefore complimented Christian Missionary objectives. Within The North itself the emphasis was on the Islamic society. Of the 10 (71.4%) Christian Missionary stations opened in the period between 1865 and 1907, 8 (57.1%) became concentrated on the edges of the Islamic society and also within the territorial area which contained the established Islamic society developed from the Fulani revolution of 1804. These were centred on the Niger and Nupe districts, and the Hausa and Gwari districts, including Rock Station (Wase) with only 2 (14.3%) of the 14 stations in the Benue Region.

Furthermore, while 19 (33.9%) Christian Missionary personnel were posted to the Nile Valley in Egypt and the Sudan, 37 (66.1%) out of a total Christian Missionary personnel of 56, became concentrated in The North in Nigeria. This means that in the period between 1865 and 1907 more Christian Missionary stations and personnel were to be found among the Islamic society rather than among the M-Belt groups and societies. This was so because one initial religious strategy that was used to fulfil the objectives of Christian Missionaries in The North, 'to halt the southward advance of Islam': "... was to penetrate deep into the Islamic religious centres and expose the evils of Islam".^{1*}

1. Crampton 1975 passims; Boer 1979 passims

*1 see comments at the end of chapter 3 on page 661

The Christian Missionary thrust to penetrate deep into the Islamic society in The North in fulfilling this objective is even more explicit from the break-downs in the distribution of Christian Missionary stations in the 'Sudan' by denominations, numbers of Christian Missionary personnel in stations and territorial areas of concentration for the period between 1865 and 1907. This is explicit in the figures in Table **3.2**

In the period between 1865 and 1907 therefore three Christian Missionary denominations, the CMS, SUM and MBC operated in 8 stations with a total staff force of 30 (53.6%) Christian Missionaries concentrated in the Islamic society in The North in Nigeria. These were centred at Shonga, Zaria, Rock Station (Wase), Pategi, Lokoja, Bida, Wushishi and Kuta. The eastern 'Sudan' received more Christian Missionary focus than the M-Belt groups and societies in the same period. In the instance for the period between 1899 and 1906, two Christian Missionary denominations, the CMS and AUP operated in 4 stations with a total staff force of 19 (33.9%) Christian Missionaries. These were centred in Khartum, Dolaib Hill, Bor and Ondorma.

In the instance of the M-Belt groups and societies however there was only one Christian Missionary denomination, the SUM, operating in two stations with a total staff force of 7 (12.5%) out of 56 Christian Missionaries in the 'Sudan'. The two SUM stations were in Wukari and Ibi and opened in 1906.

Table 3.2 Distribution of Christian Missionary Denominations and Numbers of Personnel in stations of 'the Sudan' in the period between 1865 and 1st January, 1907

Territorial Area in 'the Sudan' with Christian Missionary Stations		Missionary Denominations with dates stations opened	Numbers of Christian Personnel in stations	% Christian Missionary Personnel in 'Sudan'	
The Eastern Sudan	Khartum	CMS/AUP 1900	6	10.7	
	Dolaib Hill	AUP 1902	6	10.7	
	Bor	CMS 1906	5	8.9	
	Ondorma	CMS/AUP 1899-1900	2	3.6	
	Total in Eastern Sudan 4	1899-1906 2	19	33.9	
The Western Sudan	(a) Stations in the Islamic Society of Northern Nigeria	Shonga	MBC/SUM Canadian 1905	7	12.5
		Zaria	CMS 1905	6	10.7
		Rock Stn. (Wase)	SUM 1904	4	7.1
		Patagi	SUM Canadian 1902	4	7.1
		Lokoja	CMS 1865	3	5.4
		Bida	CMS/SUM Canadian 1903	2	3.6
		Wushishi	SUM Canadian 1906	2	3.6
		Kuta	CMS 1906	2	3.6
	Total (a)	8	1865-1906 3	30	53.6
	(b) Stations centred among the M-Belt groups & societies in N. Nigeria	Wukari	SUM 1906	5	8.9
Ibi		SUM 1906	2	3.6	
Total (b)	2	1906 1	7	12.5	
Total in Western Sudan	10	1902-1906 3	37	66.1	
Total in 'Sudan Concept'		14	4	56	100%

Source: Computed from Figures in Kumm 1907 p. 213-216

An even more significant lack of focus on the M-Belt groups and societies by early Christian Missionary Societies in the early years of the 20th Century is suggested by the time-lag in opening the two stations in Wukari and Ibi when compared to the point in time, stations were opened in some centres of the Islamic society in The North. While 8 stations were opened in the Islamic Society in The North in the period between 1865 and 1906, it was not until in 1906 itself that Christian Missionaries began to operate in Wukari and Ibi. In Ibi itself where Maxwell, the SUM missionary lived, he found out that the town was in its early stages of Islamizing and most of his contacts were with Moslems rather than with "pagans".¹ In the same period, while all the Christian Missionary denominations concentrated on opening stations in the Islamic society it was only the SUM which extended its Christian Missionary sway toward the M-Belt groups and societies.

This may be explained by the higher numbers of Christian Missionary personnel in the field with the SUM party when compared to other Christian Missionary denominations as is suggested by the figures in Table 3.3. Subsequently in the period after 1920, the SUM was to become the dominant Christian Missionary denomination operating among the M-Belt groups and societies.²

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1. Boer 1979 p. 160
 2. This is discussed in more detail in Sections III and IV of this chapter.

Table 3.3 however suggests that for the period between 1865 and 1907, out of 56 Christian Missionaries in the 'Sudan' 22 (39.3%) were SUM, 18 (32.1%) were CMS, 10 (17.9%) were AUP and 6 (10.7%) were MBC. The SUM subsequently maintained this dominance as the Christian Missionary body which concentrated its religious activities among most of the M-Belt groups and societies with stations in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria, Plateau and Benue in the period from 1920 to the present day, alongside other Christian Missionary denominations who had a lesser geographical spread.¹

The dominance of the SUM however took roots early in 1907 although not all of its Christian Missionary Stations were opened up at the same time. In that year, the SUM had Christian Missionary Stations in Bida, Pategi, Wushishi, Rock Station (Wase), Wukari, Ibi and Shonga operating alongside with other Christian Missionary Bodies.²

Although Christian Missionary Societies became more active in The North after 1907, it was in the period between 1913 and 1920 that there was a shift in religious **focus** from the Islamic Society to concentrate social and religious efforts which Christianized and developed the M-Belt groups and societies along Western European patterns of civilization.³ For the Christian

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1. Map 3 shows Christian Missionary areas of expansion in the period between 1900 and 1910 and the stations opened by the various Christian Missionary denominations. These are discussed in more detail in Sections III, IV and V of this chapter.
 2. Kumm 1907 p. 213-216; see also Table 3.2 for the other Christian Missionary Centres, which shows that the SUM had the highest initial number of stations.
 3. Explanatory reasons for this shift of emphasis are produced and discussed in the next Section.

Table 3.3 Christian Missionary Denominations and Numbers of Missionaries in Stations of 'the Sudan' in the period between 1899 and 1907

Christian Missionary Denominations	Number of Christian Missionaries in Stations	% of total Number of Missionaries in 'the Sudan'
Sudan United Mission (SUM)	22	39.3
Church Missionary Society (CMS)	18	32.1
American United Presbyterian (AUP)	10	17.9
Mennonite Brethren in Christ (MBC)	6	10.7
Total	56	100%

Source: Computed from figures in Kumm, 1907 p. 213-216

Missionary Bodies already established in The North, like the SUM and the CMS, the exploration stage of their efforts was nearly over and the time for organization arrived. This was so because personnel increased as did spheres of influence, with heuristic policies formed in the light of their field experiences. Furthermore, the period between 1907 and 1913 was characterized with debates on organization within each Christian Missionary Body and the degree of cooperation with other Societies. In the same period however the Christian Missionary Bodies became faced with an unanticipated social and political policy problem which restricted their activities. This revolved on their exclusion by the government of British administration in The North from operating in the core of political and religious centres of power of the Islamic society. Christian Missionary Bodies showed considerable and increased political resentment about this British policy which restricted their activities in The North during the period between 1913 and 1950. When British administration began to restrict the activities of Christian Missionaries in The North, only the CMS had established Christian Missionary Centres in the heart of the Islamic Society. The struggle of the Society to extend from the towns of Zaria and Bida and its campaign to enter Kano City aroused interest from both religious and political concerns within The North and in England.

Generally however when there was more overt political restrictions of Christian Missionary religious activities in the Islamic Society in The North in the period between 1907 and 1920, the Christian Missionary Bodies themselves had not made any significant numbers of

Christian converts except a few, the majority of whom were eunuchs.¹ In The North at Wusasa the early converts into Christianity by the CMS were either slaves or political dissidents sent out of the Islamic communities in Zaria, Kano and Bauchi.² This was so because of the political and religious hostilities, some of the Christian Missionary Bodies faced in the Islamic society which were subsequently reinforced by the developing British political restrictions imposed on Christian Missionary activities in the Islamic society, particularly so after 1906 when that policy became conditioned by the events surrounding the Satiru revolt in the same year, the specific context of the pledge Lugard made to the Emirs in Sokoto in 1903 and the subsequent political requirements for the application of the Indirect rule policy in the governance of The North.

The 1903-pledge of Lugard was always reinterpreted by his successors after 1906 and also after 1920 and became used as a policy instrument to restrict religious activities of Christian Missionaries in the Islamic society.³ For example, when the SUM clashed with the Emir of Wase over "holding of religious services and opening a school in the town" British political authority in The North ordered the Christian Missionaries to close the station and move to non-Islamic areas. In that instance, Lugard wrote: "... when you consulted me on the question of the establishment of a mission in this district, you most emphatically assured me that it was intended solely for Pagans and you had no intention of touching Mohammedan

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1. Crampton 1975 p. 131-138
 2. Ibid p. 131-134
 3. See more detailed discussions in Chapter 2, Section where indirect rule policy was discussed in more detail.

centres. When you asked permission to go to Wase, I pointed out that it was a Mohammedan town and I was most reluctant that you should settle there but I understood that it was only temporary until you could select a station in the Pagan area ... I regret I am unable to concur your remaining in Wase or in any preaching or teaching in that Mohammedan centre which is entirely opposed both to our original understanding and to the policy of this Government which has consistently refused to force Christianity upon Mohammedans."¹ Subsequently in the same year, Lugard re-emphasized the policy of restricting Christian Missionary activities among Islamic communities by the government of British administration in The North when he suggested that the Resident in Bauchi ought to tell the Emir: "... that it has been my invariable custom to forbid missionaries to go to any place unless the Emir and the Resident welcome them. I promise them not to interfere with their religion as long as I am here. I have no intention of changing this procedure."²

It was in the light of these developments in the period between 1906 and 1913 that Maxwell mourned the SUM station at the Rock Station (Wase) when he wrote: "... We might have settled down at once among the Burum ... and straight away hurled direct into Mission work, instead of spending life and time and money at Wase, which was a Muslim town."³

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1. Lugard 1906 Letter On Wase Mission, cited in Boer 1979 p. 197
 2. His Excellency's Comments on Resident Horward's Report No. 27 for Quarter ending 31st March 1906 para. 106-107, cited in Boer 1979 p. 201
 3. Maxwell 1954 p. 27

The roots of Christian Missionary reversed emphasis on the Islamic society toward the M-Belt groups and societies^{was} as a result of government restrictions which took shape in 1900, when the religious militant, Bishop Tugwell, whose party included Dr Walter Miller, ended up in Kano and unknown to its members, nearly met their deaths in the hands of the Emir and at a time when Lugard began military pacification of The North.¹ Lugard attached political importance to the prestige of the "Whitemen" in Africa sufficiently so strong that he regarded it as a guarantee of their security.² This was the context of his temporary anti-Missionary feelings which developed from the 1900 incident of Bishop Tugwell and the CMS party in Kano, an incident he came to know about from the British press and how the "Whitemen" had been humiliated and which he considered detrimental to the prestige he sought to build.³

The politically untimely missionary expedition to Kano by Bishop Tugwell was therefore a basic reason for the restrictions imposed on the religious activities of Christian Missionaries by

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1. Boer 1979 p. 86; In the particular instance of the CMS experience in Kano, Lugard was as much concerned about the safety of the Christian Missionaries as he was on the humiliation of fellow "Whitemen", a superior social myth about the 'white-race' in Africa which he was determined to use in ruling The North.
 2. Ayandele 1980 p. 146
 3. Ibid

Lugard and his predecessors in the period between 1906 and 1920.¹ This was so even when in 1901 Lugard himself stressed the importance of Christian Missionary work, which he suggested that it ought to be encouraged, when he wrote: " .. I have .. held out every encouragement to establish missions in the pagan centres, which alone appear to me, to need the influence of civilization and religion."² In that period there existed non-Islamic communities within the very boundaries of the Islamic society as much as they were "pagans" concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies. Also in 1901 when Lugard established friendship with Dr Walter Miller of the CMS Mission Station in Wusasa, Zaria, he: "... promised him (Miller) to tell the Emirs that the Missionaries were his "brothers", respected and valued by him and they should agree to their coming into the country once the territory had been pacified."³ Furthermore in 1904, Lugard suggested Wase as the pioneer camp to the SUM party of four men with Karl Kumm as leader of their exploration venture of The North,⁴ where it was hoped that they might work in Bauchi province. In the period between 1904 and 1907, Lugard also suggested to the British Resident in Muri Province to assist the Christian Missionaires "in every way he could".⁵

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1. Boer 1979 p. 86
 2. Lugard 1901, cited in The Amalgamation Report, 1919 p. 67
 3. Adeleye 1980 p. 146
 4. Boer 1979 p. 69
 5. Kumm 1907 p. 77

This means that in the initial years of British influences in The North, particularly in the period between 1900 and 1906, Christian Missionaries were given religious freedoms to work among the non-Islamic groups and societies as well as in some Islamic centres of religion and political power even when they had explicit objectives of confronting Islam in the core of the Islamic society.

In the same period the Emirs desired to have Christian Missionaries in their areas of jurisdiction in order that education for western modernization might develop among their communities.¹ Significantly for the period between 1900 and 1907 when Lugard governed The North during his first tenure of political office, there were no religious and political grumbles by Christian Missionaries about restrictions to the Christian Missionary enterprise.²

Upon establishment of British political and military control over The North however Lugard felt bound by the pledge he had made to Islamic rulers both in his original speeches and in their subsequent letters of appointments, in which he emphasized non-interference with the Islamic religion in The North. Earlier in 1902, Lugard made this policy clear when he wrote: "... I am myself of the opinion that it is unwise and unjust to force missions upon the Mohammedan population for it must be remembered that without the moral support of the government these missions would not be tolerated. And if they are established by order of the government, the people have some cause to disbelieve the emphatic pledges I have made that their religion shall in no way be interfered with."³ Subsequently this pledge became reinforced

1. Adeleye 1980 p. 146
2. Ibid
3. Lugard 1902 p. 124

by the political and religious fears entertained by Lugard about the potentially dangerous clash of religious faiths in The North if Christian Missionaries became religiously active in the Islamic society.¹

This was so because at the beginning of the years of 1900, Fulani rulers in The North saw British conquest as "Christian Conquest". On 5th September 1901, for example, when the British were successful in doing battle with the Emir of Adamawa, Mallam Zubeuir, he wrote to inform the Caliph in Sokoto: "... about the capture of his town by the Christians and his flight."²

Lugard, as well as other top British officials in The North therefore did not wish that British military conquest and subsequent political control of the Islamic society, be given a religious interpretation as Christian victory. This became an even more serious political objection because Christian Missionary activities had potential of crystalizing the religious interpretation, given the specific contents of their militant objectives in The North.

Besides the pledge Lugard gave to political and religious leadership in the Islamic society, various other explanatory reasons have been suggested for the subsequent political and

1. Adeleye 1977 p. 235

2. Ibid

administrative policies of the government of British administration in The North which restricted the religious performance of Christian Missionary activities in the Islamic society and conditioned their concentration among the M-Belt groups and societies. Ayandele, for example, suggests explanatory reasons which revolve on the overzealous protection of traditional institutions and practices existing in the Islamic society in The North, developed from the political and social application of the policy of Indirect rule and which conditioned British Residents as well as other administrative officials to desire keeping out Christian Missionaries from their districts.¹

According to Ayandele, Burdou, Festing, Cargill and Palmer were autocrats in the application of Indirect rule policy with traditional institutions of the Islamic society and dictated to Emirs on what institutions ought to exist in society.² In a political position of power like that, a Christian Missionary was seen as a political rival to the influential power of a Resident, particularly so as "fellow Whiteman" who was not socially distant to the poorer classes in society, preached doctrines for equality and was a tribune for the oppressed.³ This was so because Christian Missionaries in The North: "... saw themselves as watch-dogs of British interests and never hesitated to bring to the attention of either the colonial office in London nor the public, acts of oppression and injustice."⁴

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1. Ayandele 1980 p.148
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid

Although there is an acceptable logic in this explanation, there was never a single instance in which Christian Missionaries exposed oppression in the political practices of Residents in The North to the British public and the world community, despite their power connections and channels of communications with top politicians in England, the IMC and the facts in their files.¹ W.R. Miller, the Christian Missionary with the CMS station in Wusasa near Zaria has however been often suggested as a concrete example of a Christian Missionary concerned with highlighting the rights and plight of the non-Islamic as well as the peasantry in the Islamic society in The North: "... in instances where British officials were overbearing in their attitudes to the natives and condoned many acts of oppression by the chiefs and Emirs."²

More politically significant in the application of the policies restricting Christian Missionaries, however, were the anticipated political and social consequences in the interpretations of Christian Missionary religious ideology derived from their teachings. It was assumed among some top policy making British officials in The North that the religious teachings of Christian Missionaries and the political orientations in Christianity about

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1. Boer 1979 p. 75
 2. Boer 1979 p. 75; Ayandele 1980 p. 148-149. This is also explicit in the two books which Miller produced: W.R.S. Miller, Reflections of a Pioneer, London, 1936 and particularly so for his Have We Failed in Nigeria?, London, 1947.

"the equality of all" in societies on earth, might turn non-Islamic communities, particularly those of the M-Belt groups and societies under rulership of Emirs and Fulani district Heads into a politically "disobedient and rebellious lot".¹

Major John Burdon for example, with a service record as Resident in Sokoto and Kano advocated a policy which emphasized the fear that Christian Missionary influences and their religious teachings, might lead to a fanatical uprising of the poorer classes in the territories of The North against their rulers.²

The M-Belt groups and societies were historically conditioned in relative undevelopment in socio-economic and political terms to the Islamic society in The North. There were also severer conditions of poverty, diseases and empty stomachs existing among the M-Belt groups and societies rather than in the Islamic society upon impact with British influences after 1900. One need only to go through some of the early British accounts in books with photos of the so-called "pagans" in The North in the period between 1910 and 1950 to notice malformations with short and thin bodies to accept the conditions of undevelopment of some of the M-Belt groups and societies the British became confronted with after 1900.³

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1. Boer 1979 p. 75
 2. Ayandele 1980 p. 148
 3. An example of one such early book is that by Major A.J.N. Tremearne, The Tailed Head-Hunters of Nigeria, an account of an official's seven years experience in the Northern Nigeria Pagan Belt and a description of the manners, habits and customs of its native tribes, Seeley Service Ltd., London 1912.

The conditions of undevelopment were caused by slave raiding and wars with Fulani armies rather than indigenous factors to the M-Belt groups and societies.¹

Christian Missionary teachings were seen to breed "rebellion and revolution" in The North because there was an ultimate Christian Missionary insistence on the equality of the Christian religion to Islam and the better social options Christianity provided on the status of the individual in society for the development of western European civilization.² Christian Missionary teachings with social and political emphasis on the concept of equality of all individuals in the groups and societies of The North were sufficiently strong for the period between 1900 and 1920 that they provoked Lugard into suggesting that: "... the

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1. For examples, see more detailed discussions in Chapter 1. The conditions of undevelopment which the British confronted among the M-Belt groups and societies after 1900 are examined in more detail in Section IV of this Chapter where we relate the socio-economic and political conditions to Christian Missionary efforts in developing that area in the midst of relative underdevelopment to the Islamic society in Western European infrastructure generated by the government of British administration in The North.
 2. Boer 1979 p. 75; Christianity as the better path in the development of Western European civilization became the persistent emphasis of Dr Walter Miller of the CMS, G.H. Farrant of the SUM and also the subsequent emphasis of the RCM in the development of its brand of Christianity in The North, particularly so among the M-Belt groups and societies.

preaching of equality of Europeans and Natives, however, true from a doctrinal point of view is apt to be misapplied by people in a low stage of development and interpreted as an abolition of class distinctions ... the premature teaching of English ... inevitably leads to utter disrespect for British and Native ideals alike, and a denationalized and disorganized population."¹ As early as 1905 British Residents in The North deplored the doctrines of the equality of all peoples before God, whether they were White or Black as they were contained in Christian Missionary teachings.²

Christian Missionaries like Miller however saw the "unrest-arguments" as not something unique to the activities and religious teaching centred on Christianity alone. Miller suggests that all British parties intruding into the different societies of The North created unsettling conditions by imparting specific influences, whether these were Missionaries, the government or commercial companies. Christian Missionaries were however different because they represented "a wholesome positive disturbance" from a political point of view: "... I think it is well to acknowledge at once that Missionaries are a disturbing influence. A clean, fresh, wholesome wind passing through a dusty place will stir up what is not pleasant. New thoughts coming into old, settled stereotyped ideas will make their owners wake up and stir uneasily. Influences which bring new life and reform will always come into violent collision with the powers of death and vested interests,

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1. Lugard, The Amalgamation Report, 1920, cited in Coleman 1958 p. 137
 2. Ayandele 1980 p. 148

whether of bodies or souls of men. If the raising of dust is a necessary concomitant to the ultimate cleaning of the city, should Government seek to sprinkle water and assist the cleaning process rather than enforce the leaving of the matters in status quo?¹

In certain instances however Christian Missionary activities became restricted from the Islamic society in The North, because of the attractions of society and social life in the Islamic society for certain British officials. Charles Temple was the epitome of an attraction like that. In the period between 1900 and 1920 the adoration for the Hausa-Fulani culture in the Islamic society in The North led Temple to suggest that: "... Christian Missionary influences .. would result in its demise and replace the dignified and courteous Moslems into trousered burlesque with a veneer of European civilization, examples of which were alleged to be all too common in the South of Nigeria."²

There has been considerable controversy in the academic literature about indirect rule policy and whether the government of British administration in The North imposed political and religious restrictions on Christian Missionary activities in the Islamic society which subsequently turned their religious focus toward the M-Belt groups and societies. The controversy is centred on whether Lugard as Governor of The North in the period between 1900 and 1906 and subsequently influential in political policies over The North until 1920, made a firm religious pledge to Emirs

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1. W.R. Miller, The Light Bearer Magazine, March 1909 p. 153-156
 2. Charles L. Temple, cited in Boer 1979 p. 75

in 1903 and the nature of its guarantee about religious non-interference with Islam which resulted into the objectionable restrictions of Christian Missionary activities in the Core of the Islamic centres of power. The critical item which has featured prominently in the interpretations, compounding the controversies, of the relationship between the ruling classes in the Islamic society and the government of British administration in The North with ramifications on restricting the activities of Christian Missionaries, is the statement contained in the speech of Lugard to rulers in Sokoto upon British conquest in 1903. In that instance, Lugard suggested to the Emirs: "Government will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion. All men are free to worship God as they please. Mosques and prayer places will be respected by us."¹ Subsequently Lady Lugard suggested that when Lugard made these statements: "a deep and most impressive murmur of satisfaction broke from the crowd."²

This means that "the Sokoto rulers and the crowd" which Lugard addressed in 1903 understood and accepted him as suggesting that their religion would not be interfered with by the conquering "Christian power". Lugard himself restated this promise severally in the period between 1903 and 1919 before he finally left Nigeria.³

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1. for an extended quote of the statements contained in the speech by Lugard to religious and political leadership at Sokoto upon British conquest in 1903, see Lady Lugard 1905 p452 - p453.
 2. Lady Lugard 1905 p. 452-453
 3. Among other sources for examples, see strongly worded letters from Lugard to the SUM pioneer camp at Wase, in Boer 1979 p. 195-202

Boer however, curiously argues that: "... the Lugardian promise has often been wrongly interpreted as an expression of alleged hostility to Christian Missionaries."¹ R.L. Buell has similarly suggested that: "... on the face of it, the pledge not to interfere with the Moslem religion did not confer a monopoly upon that religion or prevent other religions from competing with it for adherents."² Similarly, Ayandele suggests that although: "... the pledge meant Moslems would not be forced to accept Christianity, it did not imply that Missionaries in their capacity as Christian teachers and British subjects would not be allowed the liberty to operate in Moslem districts."³

Obviously this is wrong. There is direct evidence derived from both the reports of Residents in the government of British administration in The North and of the different Christian Missionary Bodies reflecting their particular experiences.

For example, Berkeley, the assistant Resident in Wase suggested in a report to Lugard that: "... If permission is granted to them (the SUM Christian Missionaries in that instance) to start a school in the town I am certain from what they told me .. they intend to make it the thin edge of the wedge and begin a religious crusade ... Wase is a Mohammedan town. The Mohammedan view is that children should learn to read the Koran in the first place, and

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1. Boer 1979 p. 69
 2. R.L. Buell, cited in Kalu 1980 p. 77
 3. Ayandele 1980 p. 72

Mohammedan schools are semi-religious institutions, where religious teaching is given. The establishment of a rival Mission School in the town might I think appear to be aimed directly at the Mohammedan religion ... any attempt either to teach or to hold services in Wase should be expressly forbidden. It would .. be safe for the Mission to establish a station ... in the Yergam country which is entirely pagan and independent of Wase."¹ Similarly the clashes and political tensions which existed between Miller and government authorities over CMS stations in Zariá Province in the period between 1907 and 1930 suggest that there was overt restrictions of Christian Missionary activities in The North.²

Restrictions on Christian religious activities in the Islamic society and other Islamic communities among the M-Belt groups and societies became so bitterly abhorred by the Christian Missionaries that they compared their social and political circumstances: "... to the spirit which in Nazi Germany and communist Russia has destroyed personal liberty and made the state the dictator of ideas ... a principle that is repugnant to ideas of British rule."³

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1. Mr Berkeley, 1906 in Lugard, Letter to the SUM Pioneer Camp in Wase, 1906, para. 19-22, cited in Boer 1979 p. 197.
 2. Boer 1979 p. 308; there is detailed evidence of CMS experience with Palmer showing that although the government of British administration in The North was determined to keep "the 1903 Lugardian promise", it did not keep promises made to Miller and other Christian Missionaries, in Boer 1979 p. 309.
 3. G.H. Farrant, Memo to Oldham, 27th March 1940, cited in Boer 1979 p. 308

It was based on evidences like these that G.O. Gbadamosi draws conclusions which suggest that "the 1903 pledge" involved curtailing and keeping out Christian Missionaries from operating in the Islamic society in The North and in particular in the provision of Western education.¹ C.N. Ubah, in a recent re-appraisal of 'Missionaries in the Moslem Emirates of Nigeria' shows how the whole "1903 pledge of Lugard" became built into a pragmatic policy which was used as a strategy to maintain political stability in The North. While Lugard contended with 'Missionary pressures' by offering the hope that in the future: "... they could operate in the Moslem Emirates ... political realities dictated that he should vigorously oppose the excited, indiscreet proselytisation of Christian Missionaries .. the limited Missionary enterprise in Moslem areas was thus kept under tight rein."²

This suggests that in principle Lugard was not against Christian Missionary operations in The North. The principles Lugard held also explain his friendship with Dr Walter Miller, the CMS missionary who was allowed "to preach openly anywhere in the Islamic Society."³ Furthermore it has been suggested that Lugard was "so pro-Christian Missionaries" that his subordinate officials in The North were unhappy and to the chagrin of such officials, Lugard had Dr Miller as "one of his most trusted Counsellors."⁴ Crampton further suggests that Lugard has been

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1. G.O. Gbadamosi, 'The Establishment of Western Education Among Muslims in Nigeria 1896-1926', Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol. IV No. 1, December 1967 p. 94-95
 2. C.N. Ubah 1979, cited in Kalu 1980 p. 77
 3. Boer 1979 p. 69
 4. Crampton 1975 p. 136; Boer 1979 p. 69

quoted as denying having made a promise to exclude Christian Missionaries from the Islamic society and rather that he promised not to interfere with the Islamic religion.¹ It was therefore only when in the political and social opinion of Lugard, Christian Missionaries betrayed a lack of political precaution that there was need to restrict their religious activities among Moslem communities. For example, this was so in 1906 in the particular instance of the SUM camp in Wase in which case, it was reported to him by the assistant Resident that: "... they (the Christian Missionaries) try to induce his people (under the jurisdiction of the Emir of Wase) to leave the town and that their labourers behave in a very truculent manner when they came into Wase. For some reasons, possibly because Dr Kumm is a German, the Missionaries are locally known as "Germans".² and popular rumour credits them with being the emissaries of a rival administration trying to undermine our influence ... There is constant friction between the King and the Mission folk. The King told me that the Mission was only waiting till they were strong enough to oust the Government and added that when Lt. Pearson and his company came here (for field training in December 1905), he (the King) was in hopes that the troops had been sent to drive the Mission out of the place".³

In order to assure the Emirs that the government of British administration in The North was not interfering with the Islamic

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1. Crampton 1975 p. 136
 2. Dr Kumm was the SUM-party leader and the Station House was locally known as "Gidan German" ie. "The German House" - In the period between 1914 and 1918 when Britain went to war with Germany, Dr Kumm subsequently was seen as a political problem and expelled by British Administration from The North because it was thought he could spy for Germany - Maxwell 1954.
 3. Report of Mr Berkeley, Letter to the SUM Pioneer Camp in Wase, by Lugard 1906, para 19, cited in Boer 1979 p. 197.

religion and to create a situation for the Christian Missionaries to see their circumstances in which they ought not make undue claims of the backing of the administration, Lugard chose to be neutral to both sides by insisting that Emirs were free to invite Christian Missionaries if they wished. He however conditioned the process by suggesting, "subject to the approval of the Resident"¹ In other words, Lugard avoided social and political identification in Christian Missionary practices as "Ethnic Europeans" with Christian civilization confronting Islamic civilization. Christian Missionaries however saw "the 1903 pledge of Lugard" to the Emirs as the basic factor and the subsequent tool used by the government to oppose their activities among the Islamic communities in The North and constantly criticized British administration for inconsistency in policy delivery.² Christian Missionaries interpreted government restrictions of their activities as being anti-Christian, pro-Islamic and described the government of British administration in The North as "a pro-Islamic Government" from a Christian Nation.³

In 1919 this opposition to Christian Missionary activities in the Islamic society in The North were re-emphasized to Farrant when he held interview discussions with Clifford who was Governor of Nigeria.⁴ In the instance, Clifford suggested that allowing

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1. See Letters from Lugard to the SUM Camp in Wase, 1906, cited in Boer 1979 p. 195-202
 2. Boer 1979 p. 287
 3. Ibid p. 276
 4. J.S. Farrant, "Interview with His Excellency Sir Hugh Clifford" Light Bearer Magazine, 20th September 1919, cited in Boer 1979 p. 287

Christian Missionaries among Moslem communities in The North constituted a breach of promise.¹ In the same period, when Palmer was Lieutenant-Governor of The North, he admitted that although restrictions of Christian Missionaries developed from the 1903 pledge of Lugard were a government policy they were secondary rather than basic.² According to Palmer, Christian Missionaries might subsequently be encouraged in their activities in the Islamic society: "... but for the time being .. the government wished to maintain the three Northern most provinces (of Sokoto, Kano and Borno) as Moslem Emirates. This was their definite policy."³ Furthermore when Palmer held discussions with Dr Miller concerning Christian Missionary activities in Zaria and the potential of converting Islamic rulership into Christianity was examined, it has been suggested that: "... Palmer pointed out ... suppose that the Waziri of Zaria were to become a Christian He could not retain his office under a Moslem regime. If half the people in Zaria Province were to become Christians, it would lead to a change of Government and the policy of Government was to rule through the existing Moslem rulers."⁴

Although British administration in The North held explicit policies on restricting Christian Missionary activities from the Islamic society there were uncertainties on the degree of restrictions to be imposed on Moslem communities found among the M-Belt groups and societies as well as other non-Islamic populations under Fulani

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1. Boer 1979 p. 287
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Bishop Smith, "Notes of an Interview" Light Bearer Magazine, 22nd December 1926, cited in Boer 1979 p. 287

and Islamic rulership established in the period between 1804 and 1900 or politically claimed to be under Fulani and Islamic rulership after 1900 when the government of British administration was consolidating its authority with the Indirect rule policy. In certain instances, the government officials explained the pledge as a policy with contradictions.¹

This was the premise from which Bishop Smith suggested that "the 1903 pledge of Lugard" as was expressed to the Emirs was meant to cover the whole of the British created political Unit of The North and therefore included the M-Belt groups and societies which were essentially non-Islamic.² Smith however maintains that although the government of British administration in The North: "... stretched the promise to its utmost limit by refusing Mission sites among Moslems, the government actively encouraged Missions among Pagans".³ Similarly, the SUM field secretary, G. Dawson suggests that "the 1903 pledge of Lugard" prevented the presentation of "the gospel to Moslems eager to listen".⁴

Although in the period between 1900 and 1920, Christian Missionaries were anxious to work and diffuse Christianity through

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1. Boer 1979 p. 287
 2. Ibid
 3. Bishop A. Smith, 'Government and Missions in Northern Nigeria', Notes of an interview between the Bishop and Ormsby-Gore, Under-Secretary of State for the colonies, The Light Bearer Magazine, 10th March 1926, cited in Boer 1979 p. 287.
 4. G. Dawson, The Light Bearer Magazine, July 1926 p. 76

Western education in the Islamic centres of religion and politics they were themselves sceptical about the prospects of converting Moslems into Christianity. For example, Miller is quoted as suggesting that: "... Christianity would never convert Islam in Northern Nigeria, although the destiny of Northern Nigeria would in future be in the hands of Christianized, well-educated pagans of the M-Belt."¹

Lugard himself may therefore be re-interpreted as attempting in discreet ways to advise Christian Missionaries about the foolhardiness of ever hoping to convert Moslems into Christianity by having their religious activities concentrated in the Islamic society. He therefore wished them to divert their resources in men and money to work among the M-Belt groups and societies, where Islam held an insignificant influence in politics and society. That was where there was more likelihood of greater success for the acceptance of the Christian religion.

In the period between 1900 and 1920 and well into the 1930s, all the Christian Missionary bodies held religious and political grievances against the government of British administration in The North over restrictions of their activities in the Islamic society. Miller of the CMS, for example, criticized the restrictions as reducing the principle advanced by the government itself into its "reductio ad Absurdum".² According to Miller, Christian

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1. W.R.S. Miller: An Autobiography, 1949, cited in Ayandele 1980 p. 151; see also Crampton 1975 p. 207
 2. Boer 1979 p. 210

Missionaries were demanding equal opportunity for Moslems and Christians rather than religious advantages for themselves.¹ Miller was suggesting that if Christianity was prevented by the government of British administration in The North from religiously contesting with Islam in the Islamic society, then the same government ought to instruct the Emirs that Moslems are to keep out of the territorial spaces of the non-Islamic groups and societies.² In other words, government ought to "zone" The North into an Islamic society and the non-Islamic groups and societies which were the territorial spaces of the bulk of the M-Belt groups and societies where Christianity and Western civilization might thrive independently of Islamic influences. This according to Miller might meet government claims of religious neutrality, otherwise all else: "... would be confusion of thought for a Moslem is always a Missionary."³

In rather similar circumstances of the government of British administration in the Republic of the Sudan where there existed religious polarities and political tensions rooted in historical recollections of socio-political and economic experiences between Islamic and non-Islamic groups and societies in that country, the Miller prescription for The North, was an initial political strategy used to manage political conflict in the Sudan. In that

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1. Boer 1979 p. 210
 2. Ibid p. 211
 3. W.R.S. Miller, The Light Bearer Magazine, 1912 p. 51, cited in Boer 1979 p. 210

instance, there was political restriction in the movement and settlement of Moslems among the non-Islamic groups and societies in the territories of Southern Sudan.¹

The religious opinions of the SUM as they became expressed by H.G. Farrant, accused the government of British administration in The North for being anti-Christian and guilty of three basic "evils" directed toward Christianity. According to Farrant the Government increased the menace of Islam, antagonized the Christian Church and perpetuated the separation of Nigeria into two cultural regions.² This was the context in which Farrant expressed the religious opinions of the SUM on the restrictions of Christian Missionary activities in The North as: "... the net result of 29 years of rule by a government which professes to see a menace in Islam that by their encouragement Islam is better organized and more of a force than when Britain occupied the country in 1900 ... Missions assert that it is the Nigerian Government and not the Natives who oppose their entrance."³ Furthermore, Farrant suggested that while the South of Nigeria was turned to the West, The North: "... was purposely directed to the Arab World and thus the Government had supported the Moslem bid for spiritual hegemony."⁴

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1. Discussions with M.J. Dent 1980-1983
 2. H.G. Farrant, 'Memorandum to Oldham', The Light Bearer Magazine, 16th December 1929, cited in Boer 1979 p. 308
 3. Farrant 1929, cited in Boer 1979 p. 308
 4. Ibid

The careful shift in Christian Missionary focus of their religious attention from the Islamic society toward the M-Belt groups and societies as a direct response to Government restrictions of their activities is well summarized when Miller wrote: "... Why then does a Christian Government enforce the Pax-Britannica and compel these pagan peoples to permit Mohammedan traders and Malams (teachers) all practising and teaching their religion to come and live and trade among them, teaching their children and perverting them against their will and as we know to their disgust and sorrow, for at present the hatred of Islam is deep and bitter?"¹

In the instance of the SUM, R.L. Maxwell aptly summarizes their religious feelings about government restrictions of their activities in the Islamic society. For the period between 1920 and 1930, Maxwell described the restrictions and SUM frustrations as: "... a virtual denial of the rights of Christians to carry on their religious practices freely without let or hindrance ... If religion is free, well, let it be free. One does sympathize with the administration in their work."²

In the period between 1920 and 1930 Christian Missionaries re-interpreted government restrictions of their activities in the Islamic society, changing from attacking pro-Islamic social and political conditions to: "... the purpose of God to turn the Messengers of the Cross, first to the pagan and not to the Moslem."³ In a subsequent Field Report covering the same period

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1. W.R.S. Miller, The Light Bearer Magazine, 1912 p. 50-51, cited in Boer 1979 p. 211
 2. Maxwell 1952 p. 212
 3. The Light Bearer Magazine, 1933 p. 101

and writing under the title heading 'God's Provision for Mohammedan work', Farrant brought out the shift in emphasis by Christian Missionaries from the Islamic society toward the M-Belt groups and societies. In the instance Farrant suggests that: "... the original Missions in the Sudan aimed at the Moslem communities, but they were prevented and instead ended up building virile Christian communities among the animist people, people akin in race to the Mohammedan tribes... Thus the Moslems witnessed a new phenomenon of the Christian Church, taught in the Spirit, honest in character, growing apace in the wholesome and good things of Christian civilization .. such a Christian community was prepared by God... in order that the Mohammedan people should become dissatisfied with what they have and reach out for reconciliation with him through Christ Jesus."¹ This suggests that although Christian Missionary activities became concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies after 1920, their objectives still emphasized the Islamic society, meant to serve as a 'demonstrative effect' to transform Islam into Christianity for the whole of The North.

When Christian Missionaries in The North shifted their religious focus toward the M-Belt groups and societies after 1920, they were virtually going into a virgin religious sphere of influence where there were insignificant Islamic influences, no Christianity and no Churches, although it was an area

1. Farrant, "God's Provision for Mohammedan Work", SUM Field Report, 1937

characterized by disparate traditional African systems of religious beliefs and practices which were as numerous as the groups and societies. The religious efforts of Christian Missionaries in The North itself had been frustrating to themselves as much as they had been unproductive in fulfilling their objectives in the first few years.

For example, in 1914 there were 45 Christian Churches established among 14 groups and societies and in all about 650 pupils in the Christian Missionary schools in The North.¹ In 1921 however there was some progress in the activities of the Christian Missionaries as they began to produce churches and Christian converts in greater numbers from among the M-Belt groups and societies. This is explicit from the figures in Table 3.4

Except for Zaria (Wusasa) however, it ought to be borne in mind that Christian Churches, Christian adherents and schools with numbers of students concentrated in the Islamic society were to be found in the predominantly Yoruba and Islamic provinces of Ilorin, Nupe and Kabba. These were to be found in centres like Kontagora, Kuta, Wushishi, Mokwa, Bidda, Jebba, Shao, Ilorin, Pategi, Lokoja, Denkina and Rumasha.²

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1. Ayandele 1980 p. 152
 2. See Map 3, which shows Christian Missionary expansion by the distribution of their stations in The North for the period after 1920.

Table 3.4 Concentration of Religious Influences from Christian Missionary Activities in The North in 1921

Territorial Area in The North	Churches		Adherents		Schools		Students	
	Numbers	% Total	Numbers	% Total	Numbers	% Total	Numbers	% Total
Islamic Society	5	3.8	172	2.1	9	9.7	112	5.0
M-Belt groups and societies and others non-Islamic	128	96.2	8,232	97.9	84	90.3	2,110	95.0
Total	133	100%	8,404	100%	93	100%	2,222	100%

Sources: 1921 Census Enumerations, cited in Meek 1925 Vol. 1, p. 167 and Talbot 1961 Vol. IV Appendix B; The population of the North in 1921 was estimated from tax records as 998314 with about 2042335 (20.4%) in the M-Belt area

Table 3.4 therefore suggests that by 1921 in The North there was an already explicit shift in Christian Missionary focus of attention in their religious and social activities toward the M-Belt groups and societies. In 1921 therefore, out of a total of 133 Christian Churches in The North, 128 (96.2%) were developed among the M-Belt groups and societies with 5 (3.8%) concentrated in the Islamic society. While there were 172 (2.1%) Christian adherents in the Islamic society in 1921, 8,232 (97.9%) out of a total of 8,404, existed among the M-Belt groups and societies. Similarly, in terms of the development of Western literacy in The North, by the establishment of schools, while there existed 84 (90.3%) Christian schools concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies out of a total of 93, only 9 (9.7%) Christian Missionary schools were centred in the Islamic society in 1921. Furthermore, while the numbers of students attending Christian Missionary schools centred among the M-Belt groups and societies were attended by 2,110 (95.0%) students in 1921 only 112 (5.0%) students attended Christian Missionary schools centred in the Islamic society in The North, out of a total of 2,222 students in Christian Missionary schools.*

In other words, as early as 1921, while each Christian Missionary school in the Islamic society trained 12 students in Western Liberal arts, Christian Missionary schools centred among the M-Belt groups and societies trained an average of 25 students in Western Liberal arts, from each of their schools. This means that it was mainly the M-Belt groups and societies as well as other non-Islamic societies in The North who began to become Christians and

* The total population of the North in 1921 was estimated from tax records as 9 998 314 with about 2 042 335 (20.4%) in the M-Belt areas - Computed from Meek 1925 p 248.

availed themselves of the rapid opportunities to acquire Western education in The North developed from the activities of Christian Missionaries. In other words, more Churches, more Christians and more Western European skills of literacy characterized the development of the activities of Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and societies after 1921.

This is not to suggest that skills in Western European literacy and Western European education were not developed in the Islamic society in The North. The introduction of Western European education in the Islamic society in The North as early as 1902 suggests that its development predates its introduction by both government and Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and societies.¹

Although Western education in 1921 was not a crucial advantage in a political system whose emphasis was on preserving and diffusing Islamic traditions and institutions in the practice and application of Indirect rule policy, the concentration of Christian Missionary activities and their success in producing Churches, Christians and European oriented institutions with students disproportionately to Islamic society meant that social and cultural differences between the M-Belt groups and societies widened in The North. The development of Churches, Christian adherents which produced Christian communities subsequently increased in the period between 1930 and 1950.²

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1. For more detail examples see discussions in Chapter 2 Sections III and IV; The development of Western European education among the M-Belt groups and societies by both government and Christian Missionaries is examined in more detail in Section IV of this Chapter.
 2. This is discussed in more detail in Section III of this Chapter.

These increases took place at the same time as Christian Missionary development of social welfare institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies.

In the period between 1900 and 1930 however Christian Missionary schools which were concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies were institutions where the 3Rs were taught to enable initial Christian converts and "agents" to read the Bible and develop with a minimal of Western modernizing skills.¹ Perham termed the Christian Missionary institution for that period as "Bush Schools".² This was the premise from which there was underdevelopment of educational and welfare institutions which were concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies by both Christian Missionary Bodies and by the government of British administration in The North in the period between 1900 and 1935. This was so because while the government of British administration in The North emphasized the educational development of the ruling classes in the Islamic society, Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and societies emphasized the development of Christianity, Churches and Christian communities from among both the traditional ruling houses and the ordinary classes in society. Furthermore in the same period some of the M-Belt groups and societies were still unconquered and therefore "unopened" to British influences for both direct government development and the benefits of Christian Missionary activities.³

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1. Albert Ozigi and Lawrence Ocho, Education in Northern Nigeria London 1981, p.14-38
 2. Perham 1962 p.135; These are discussed in more detail in Section III of this Chapter.
 3. See more detailed discussions of the patterns of British conquest and the establishment of political authority and control in Chapter 2 Sections II and IV.

The initial emphasis of Christian Missionaries to achieve the objective of "halting the Islamic advance" in the period between 1900 and 1920, through concentrating their institutions in the Islamic society reinforced the already existing efforts of the government of British administration in The North in developing Western education in the Islamic society as early as from 1902. By 1921, this initial advantage of achieving Western European skills in the Islamic society became reflected in the employment opportunities it provided to individuals from groups and societies from that society when compared to the M-Belt groups and other societies in The North. This is explicit from the figures in Table 3.5. In the period between 1940 and 1965 however the balance of employment opportunities in government institutions, except for top government decision-making posts shifted from the Islamic society to the M-Belt groups and societies as a direct consequence of the rapid development of Christian Missionary educational efforts.¹

Table 3.5 therefore suggests that the majority of occupational roles of adults in The North was dominated by groups from the Islamic society. Out of a total work force of 450,592, for example, there were 364,622 (80.9%) from the Islamic society, with 85,970 (19.1%) from among some of the M-Belt groups and societies and other non-Islamic

1. This is discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5 the development of Christian Missionary Western oriented educational institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies is however discussed in Section IV of this Chapter.

communities in occupational roles which required some Western modernizing skills in The North. Furthermore, in 1921, all the occupational roles were dominated by Hausa Fulani, which was the indigenous group that the government of British administration used and emphasized in ruling The North during the period between 1900 and 1950. British emphasis on the Hausa Fulani as the ruling classes in The North continued to be so until political power became transferred from the British to that group in 1960.

In the instance of 1921 however, out of a total work force of 450,592 in The North, there were 311,684 (69.2%) Hausa Fulani in different occupational roles. Kanuri and Nupe as part of the other groups and societies within the Islamic cohort shared 11.7% with the M-Belt groups and other non-Islamic societies occupying 85,970 (19.1%) of the total work force in The North. The occupational roles with significant M-Belt emphasis in 1921 as suggested by the figures in Table 3.5 was in Administration and Defence. While the M-Belt groups and societies had a share of 6,698 (45.4%) in that occupational role out of a total of 14,755, the Islamic society shared 54.6% with the Fulani and Hausa alone showing a concentration of 6,764 (45.8%)*.

The significant concentration of persons from among the M-Belt groups and societies in the administrative and defence occupational roles as suggested in Table 3.5 in which their numbers in the figures were mostly soldiers is explained by the

* The total population of the North in 1921 was estimated as 9998314 with about 2042335 (20.4%) in the M-Belt areas - computed from Meek 1925 p 248.

Table 3.5 Some Occupational Roles of Male Adults in The North in 1921

Ethnic Group Type and Society in The North	occupational class: Teachers and clerks		occupational class: Defense and administration		occupational class: Textile workers		occupational class: Traders		occupational class: others Artisans		occupational Roles		Total occupational Roles Numbers % Total	
	Numbers	% Total	Numbers	% Total	Numbers	% Total	Numbers	% Total	Numbers	% Total	Numbers	% Total		
The Islamic Society	Hause Fulani	28,635	63.9	6,764	45.8	180,923	73.8	67,839	64.6	27,523	67.3	311,684	69.2	264,622 80.9
	Kanuri	1,401	3.1	545	3.7	17,641	7.2	7,024	6.7	2,271	5.6	28,882	6.4	
	Nupe	3,013	6.7	748	5.1	13,057	5.3	4,416	4.2	2,822	6.9	24,056	5.3	
M-Belt groups and other non-Islamic Societies		11,770	26.3	6,698	45.4	33,527	13.7	25,700	24.5	8,275	20.2	85,970	19.1	85,970 19.1
Total		44,819	100%	14,755	100%	245,148	100%	104,979	100%	40,891	100%	450,592	100%	450,592 100%

Sources: 1921 Census Enumeration Figures, computed from Talbot 1969 Vol. IV Appendix B; Meek 1925 Vol. II p. 167; The total population of the North in 1921 was estimated from tax records as 9998314 with about 2042335 (20.4%) in the M-Belt areas - computed from Meek 1925 p248.

British policy of a cultural division in labour affecting recruitment into the army. It is also explained by the impact of Christian Missionary activities in producing European educated persons who began to participate in the institutions of government in The North.¹

In the instance of the period between 1900 and 1950 however, differential patterns of recruitment into certain professions, created a cultural division of labour. Certain cultural groups and societies became considered good only for specific occupational roles. For example, the Kru (encouraged to migrate to Nigeria from Liberia) were considered to be good manual workers, the Yoruba, good clerks, the Tiv, Bachama as well as other non-Islamic groups and societies in Plateau, S. Zaria and S. Bauchi who successfully resisted Fulani military conquest were considered to be good soldiers.²

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1. The concentration of persons from among the M-Belt groups and societies in the army as an occupational role is examined in more detail in Section IV of this chapter; in the 1950s and 1960s the Sardauna explained the non-interest of the Fulani and Islamic ruling classes in the army as a profession "because the British recruited slaves" in The North to form the WAFF, subsequently the Nigerian Army.
 2. Robin Cohen, Labour and Politics in Nigeria 1945-1971, Ibadan University Press, 1974 p. 27; these occupational divisions of labour survived into the 1950s and 1960s from the period of British rule and became crucial factors in shaping the political developments in Nigeria in 1966. For example, Tiv soldiers played a prominent military role in "the Ikeja siege" under Gowon in the July 1966 **coup**, provoked "a Northern Identity" among soldiers in the 4th Battalion in Ibadan during the January 1966 coup and alongside with other soldiers from among the M-Belt groups and societies strongly supported "the State Creation exercise" by General Gowon in May 1967. Furthermore their stand on this issue influenced the attitude of Islamic leadership in The North and halted threatened Northern succession. This is discussed in more detail in Chapters 4.5 and the Epilogue

III Christianity, Churches and Christian Communities among the M-Belt groups and societies

The purpose of this section is to examine whether the development of Christianity among the non-Islamic M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1920 and 1950 transformed disparate previously existing African systems of religious beliefs and practices into Christian conceptions of a social and political identity. The political consequences of these religious transformations as they affected society and politics in The North and within the developing Nigerian political state for the period between 1940 and 1960 are also examined.

As earlier examined in the previous section, the religious objectives of Christian Missionaries from Western European civilization who subsequently operated in The North was meant to occupy a broad stretch of the "Sudan-Belt" for Christianity, where the "Islamic advance" might be halted. This objective was to be achieved in "the Sudan-Belt" through the development of churches with indigenous African converts.

The religious objectives held by Christian Missionaries in The North however became reversely halted by British administration for political reasons. The result was that there was emphasis on separating the Christian religion from politics, a contrary situation to the emphasis of Islam which tied up politics to the whole processes of society in The North. When Christian Missionaries faced these developments in the policies of British administration in The North, they turned their religious focus toward the M-Belt groups and societies.

In the instance, the religious objectives of Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and societies were to establish Christian communities with churches and other related institutions in which Christianity might expand and develop its converts. After 1935 however Christian Missionary objectives added its emphasis on the development of Western educational and social welfare institutions to promote the development and expansion of Christianity.¹ It was anticipated among top Christian Missionary policy and decision making bodies that although the government of British administration in The North, imposed restrictions over religious activities intended to halt the expansion of Islam within the Islamic society itself, the establishment of Christianity, churches and Christian communities and with the development of Christian civilization among the M-Belt groups and societies, will be a religious launch-pad into the Islamic society where it was hoped "the rest of The North will come to belong to Christ."²

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1. The data and analytical emphasis in this section however is on the development of churches, Christian communities and expansion of Christianity by increased numbers of converts in the period between 1920 and 1950 among the M-Belt groups and societies - The development of Western educational and social welfare institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies is examined in Section IV of this Chapter.
 2. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dush, January 1981; the same emphasis was explicit in the writings of J.S. Farrant, W.R.S. Miller and numerous other contributors to the Light Bearer Magazine in the period between 1920 and 1950.

In the early period after 1900 therefore, the government of British administration divided The North into "Mohammedan territories" which comprised of Islamic centres of religion and politics under Borno, and Sokoto and "territories unhabited by pagan tribes" formed to the South and South-eastern parts of the Islamic society in The North.¹ In the same period the government of British administration in The North "zoned" the non-Islamic groups and societies, concentrated mainly in the M-Belt areas, for purposes of Christian Missionary work by the different denominations.² In that instance, government allocated Protestant Christian Missionaries to particular non-Islamic groups and societies for their activities, differently from the Roman Catholic Christian Missionaries.³ This was the premise, for example, from which SUM Christian religious activities after 1907 became concentrated among M-Belt groups and societies like the Jukun and Tiv in Benue, the Yergam, Angas, Sura, Jerawa and Birom on the Plateau and the Bachama and Dinka in Adamawa.^{4*}

These non-Islamic groups and societies became militantly anti-Islamic with a specific Christian religious identity in the late 1940s, a process which led to the formation of the political organizations of the M-Belt Movement in the 1950s and its political

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1. Maxwell 1952 p. 104
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid p. 105

*2 See comments at end of Chapter 3 p 661.

demands for separation from the Islamic society in The North into a M-Belt Region. The whole political activity centred on the M-Belt Movement and its demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the 1950s and 1960s became concentrated among these groups and societies even when the Movement also attracted political support from S. Zaria, S. Bauchi and groups and societies like the Igala and Idoma as well as political sympathy from the Yoruba irredentist areas of Ilorin and Kabba.¹

Crampton suggests that before 1900, there existed political rivalry between France and Britain which subsequently became reflected in the religious rivalry for "spheres of influence" between British Protestant Christian Missionary Bodies like the CMS and the SUM on the one hand and the French Catholic Fathers of the RCM in The North.² In other words, by "zoning" the M-Belt groups and societies into Christian Missionary denominational "spheres of influence" as suggested by Maxwell, the government of British administration in The North, took into account the potential for religious clashes among the Christian Missionary Bodies.

Although this was so in many places where the RCM came after the Protestant Christian Missionaries, there existed serious religious accusations of "RCM-poaching".³ The religious rivalries

1. The concentration of Christian Missionary Bodies among the different areas of the M-Belt groups and societies is examined in more detail in the next few pages below when Table 3.6 is brought into analytical focus.
2. Crampton 1975 p.153
3. Crampton 1975 p.153; Eugene Rubingh, Sons of Tiv: A study of the rise of the Church among the Tiv of Central Nigeria, Michigan, 1969 p.115-116

between the Protestant Christian Missionaries and the RCM however did not prevent the progress of Christian Missionary work in the development and growth of Christianity through the establishment of churches, Christian converts and Christian communities among the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1920 and 1950. This was so because there were increases in Christian Missionary Bodies and Societies with a concomitant increase in Christian Missionary personnel who arrived in The North to work among the M-Belt groups and societies, as well as among other non-Islamic groups. Furthermore Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and societies began eventually and rapidly to increase their converts, an experience that was previously characterized by few conversions into Christianity when they concentrated their religious stations and activities within the Islamic society in The North in the period between 1900 and 1920.

Table 3.6 suggests the increases in Christian Missionary Bodies, Christian Missionary personnel and their territorial areas of concentration among groups and societies in The North and in particular their distribution by denominations among the M-Belt groups and societies compared to the period between 1865 and 1907,¹ and thereafter as well as in the period between 1920 and 1935 as is suggested by the 1931 Census Religious Statistics. The majority of these Christian Missionary personnel became concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies because according to the Report: "... no missions have so far been established in provinces of Bornu, Kanu, Sokoto or Kontagora, as it is against the Government's policy to permit Christian propaganda within areas which are predominantly Muslim".² There were subsequent increases in Christian Missionary

1. See discussions and Tables in Section II of this Chapter.
2. 1931 Census Report p. 247

personnel in the period between 1935 and 1970 when there was also additional objectives among the Christian Missionaries to focus their activities on the development of Western civilization through educational institutions with a Christian ideological emphasis among the M-Belt groups and societies.¹

Although there was a total of nine Christian Missionary denominations operating in The North in 1931, Table 3-6, which is analyzed in a comparative perspective to figures displayed for 1907 in Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 of this Chapter, suggests that only seven Christian Missionary bodies were operationally active among groups and societies in The North. These were Christian Missionaries in Many Lands (CML), Church Missionary Society (CMS), Dutch Reformed Church Mission (DRCM), Mennonite Brethren in Christ (MBC), Roman Catholic Mission (RCM),^{*3} Seventh Day Adventist Mission (SDAM), Sudan Interior Mission (SIM), Sudan United Mission (SUM) and the Danish Missionary Society (DMS).² Furthermore, although the Danish Missionaries in The North were a separate body, they worked together with the SUM and all their religious activities and their statistical weight were produced as one Christian Missionary body.³

1. The increases in Christian Missionary personnel to meet the needs of their educational institutions which were concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies for the period after 1935 and between 1950 and 1970 are examined in more detail in Section IV of this Chapter

2. Census Report, 1931 p. 247

3. Ibid

*3 See comments at the end of Chapter 3.

Table 3.6 Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and Societies in 1931

Territorial Area in the North	SUM	% SUM	SIM	% SIM	DRCM	% DRCM	CML	% CML	CMS	% CMS	RCH	% RCH	SDAM	% SDAM	Christian Missionary Concentration	% Concentration	Number of Christian Missionaries	% Christian Missionaries	
																			Tiv (Munshi)
Sokoto																			
Borno																			
Kano																			
Kontagora																			
Islamic Society																			
Townships	6			21.4%					2	40.0%	1	33.3%			9	8.6%	20	19.0%	
Ilorin	4			14.3%									3	100%	7	6.6%			
Nupe	4			14.3%											4	3.8%			
Muri	21	44.7%													21	20.0%			
Tiv (Munshi)					11	100%	8	100%							19	18.1%			
Yala	17	36.2%													17	16.2%	85	81.0%	
Bauchi: S. Bauchi & Plateau	5	10.6%	7	25.0%					2	40.0%	2	66.7%			16	15.2%			
Zaria: S. Zaria	6	21.4%							1	20.0%					7	6.6%			
Massawa	4	8.5%	1	3.6%											5	4.8%			
Totals	47	44.8%	28	26.7%	11	10.5%	8	7.6%	5	4.8%	3	2.9%	3	2.9%	105	100%	105	100%	

Source: Census Report 1931 p.251

This means that the Danish Christian Missionary breakdowns are inclusive of the SUM statistics in the 1931 Census Religious Statistics. This was unlike the case with the DRCM which, as much as it worked with the SUM, it saw itself as a distinct Christian Missionary Body and produced its own religious statistics independently of the SUM. Furthermore, Table 3.6 gives only seven Christian Missionary denominations, instead of nine that were operating in The North at that time, because the 1931 census report suggests that no returns were rendered from MBC missionaries.¹

From the breakdowns in Table 3.6 therefore, it is explicit that Christian Missionary Bodies, personnel involved in Christian Missionary work and territorial areas in the concentration of Christian religious focus was on the M-Belt groups and societies. The figures for 1931 were the result of the religious shift in Christian Missionary policy in the 1920s to produce converts from among the M-Belt groups and societies rather than in the Islamic society in The North. Religious concentrations of Christian Missionary influences in the core of the Islamic centres of religion and politics, where it existed, was restricted to townships and the peripheries of Sokoto and Borno. The figures in Table 3.6 therefore suggest that the core of the Islamic society in The North, in centres like Kano, Sokoto, Borno, Kontagora and Zaria only had minimal Christian Missionary influences as latterly as 1931. Out of a total of 105 Christian Missionaries in The North 20 (19.0%) were centred in all of the Islamic societies.

1. Census Report 1931 p. 251

Within the very political and religious boundaries of the Islamic society established from the Fulani Islamic revolution of 1804 therefore Christian Missionary activities after 1920 were centred in the townships of Kano, Lokoja and Minna. In that instance the townships had a total concentration of 9 (8.6%) Christian Missionaries in The North. Similarly, in the political and religious peripheries to Sokoto, Christian Missionary centres became concentrated in Nupe, and Ilorin, although these were among non-Islamic communities but under the political authority of Fulani Emirs. In the instance of Nupe, there were ~~4~~ (3.8%) Christian Missionaries operating among both the Islamic and non-Islamic groups and societies in that area. Ilorin, another peripheral centre of Islam in politics and religion in relation to Sokoto had 7 (6.6%) of the Christian Missionary concentration in The North. This means that British policy after 1920 became effective in restricting Christian Missionary activities from the Islamic society.

As earlier examined, in the instance of these developing restrictions in the activities of European Missionaries in the Islamic society, Christian religious focus became turned toward the M-Belt groups and societies where in 1931 there was a total concentration of 105 in the whole of The North. This is over three times the numbers of Christian Missionaries involved in religious activities in the Islamic society. Among the M-Belt groups and societies, there was a high concentration of Christian Missionaries focussed on the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa. According to the figures suggested by Table 3.6, Adamawa alone had a total of

38 (36.2%) Christian Missionaries. These were centred among the non-Islamic groups and societies under the political authority of Emirs in Muri and Yola. In the instance of Muri there were 21 (20.0%) Christian Missionaries, while in Yola there existed 17 (16.2%). Christian Missionary concentrations in religious focus of attention were however lowest in Nasarawa Province which had 5 (4.8%) Christian Missionaries and Zaria with 7 (6.6%), when compared to their concentration among groups and societies in Bauchi: S. Bauchi and Plateau with 16 (15.2%) and among the Tiv in Benue with 19 (18.1%).

This suggests that the M-Belt groups and societies did not receive an equal weight of Christian religious influences when European Missionary activities became focussed on them after 1920. This was so because the numerical sizes of the M-Belt groups and societies conditioned their attraction to Christian Missionary activities. Groups and societies whose population numbers were over 50,000 were considered a priority for evangelical work by the Christian Missionary Bodies in The North.¹ Like in politics, Christian Missionary strategy for the diffusion of Christianity took account of the potential numbers of converts to Christianity, similar to 'vote catching strategies' in the struggle to control political power in a popular democracy, in policies over particular groups and societies in the M-Belt areas.

1. Rubingh 1969 p. 70

Interestingly and very instructive in the conduct of Nigerian politics with the M-Belt Movement, Awolowo among others, was forced to accept Tiv leadership and support of the M-Belt Movement because the Tiv outsized other groups and societies in the Movement and therefore held higher potential voters to shape the electoral outcome of politics.¹

There was however no relationship between the numbers of Christian converts produced by the European Missionary Bodies in their religious activities in The North and the population sizes of a particular M-Belt group and society in the period between 1900 and 1950 and well into the 1960s. For example in 1931, 1952 and 1963 the different Census figures in The North suggest that there were more Christian converts among the smaller groups and societies found on the Plateau, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Adamawa rather than among the Tiv and Idoma in Benue who had numerically bigger population sizes in their groups and societies.²

This means that when the M-Belt Movement was begun in 1949 and its political struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region went on into the 1950s and 1960s and when its social and political

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1. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5
 2. This is examined in more detail below when the figures in Table 3.14 are brought into analytical focus on the development of Christianity in 1931 and when we produce explanatory reasons for that state of religious development. For examples of the figures for 1952 and 1963 see Crampton 1975 p. 220-222. Christian religious differences between the M-Belt groups and societies are examined in more detail in Section IV of this Chapter as well as in Chapters 4 and 5

consciousness took the form of mobilizing Christians and the Christian religious identity in support of its political objectives there were more Christians to rally in support behind it among groups and societies on the Plateau, Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria rather than among the groups and societies in Benue like the Tiv, Idoma, Jukun and Igala. This explains why Jonah Assadugu travelled to mobilize Christian political support from among the former groups and societies in the period between 1949 and 1952 rather than extend his political travels to among the Tiv, Idoma and Igala when the NML sought support from non-Islamic groups and Christian societies in the M-Belt areas. Instructive in that respect, it was not until in the 1950s, particularly in 1956 that the Tiv became a crucial variable in the analytical strategy in the developing electoral political calculations of the M-Belt Movement rather than Christianity although they also shared anti-Islamic religious and political sentiments and rejection.¹

In the instance of the unequal distribution of Christian Missionary influences among the M-Belt groups and societies, one consequence of this state of affairs was that when the products of these influences became active in society, particularly in terms of Western educational skills there therefore existed sharp and unequal differences between the M-Belt groups and societies.²

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1. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5
 2. This is examined in more detail in Chapter 5 and its social and political consequences are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 when we examine the politics of the M-Belt groups and societies which caused variations in the whole theme of the M-Belt Movement and its political identity in the period between 1967 and 1976.

In the period between 1920 and 1930 however there was more Christian Missionary focus of religious attention on the M-Belt groups and societies rather than on the Islamic society, particularly so on areas where Christian Missionaries had intimate knowledge that there were little Islamic influences and the groups and societies held some hostilities toward Islam rooted in their historical recollections.¹ In Adamawa, Benue, S. Bauchi and on the Plateau for example, the population figures for the 1931 census suggest that although there were Islamic influences among the M-Belt groups and societies concentrated in those areas, there existed more non-Moslems rather than adherents of the Islamic faith. This explains the religious thrust in the concentration of Christian Missionary activities among groups and societies in those areas rather than in places like S. Zaria and Nasarawa where there was a substantial migrant Islamic population and the non-Islamic population was small and therefore a lesser Christian Missionary focus of religious attention and concentration of effort. Furthermore political control of S. Zaria and Nassarawa by the Emirs of Zaria was more **rigorous** and more of a politically sensitive issue to the government of British administration in The North than elsewhere and therefore there were tighter restrictions on the activities of Christian Missionaries.²

1. Boer 1979 p. 500

2. For examples of this political control and sensitivity see some examples in Chapter 2 where the Emir of Zaria held political influence to block 'Indirect rule reform' and subsequently influenced the political transfer of some groups and societies on the Plateau to Zaria Province in 1934. The sensitive political nature of Southern Zaria in the problems of political relationships with the Emir in Zaria after 1950 are examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5, where we discuss politics within the M-Belt groups and societies, politics with the M-Belt Movement within The North as they involved total political identities and the persistent demands of the S. Zaria groups and societies for political merging into BP state and subsequently with Plateau state or separation from the Emir into a separate political unit of the Nigerian Federation.

Table 3.6 also suggests that there were increases in Christian Missionary personnel in 1931 who became concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies, when compared to their concentrations in the same area in the period between 1900 and 1920. That was a period when Christian Missionary objectives emphasized 'doing battle' with the Islamic religion and doctrines in order that Christianity might prevail in The North. In the period between 1920 and 1931 however there was also a significant decrease in the numbers of Christian Missionary personnel who became concentrated in the Islamic society. While in 1907 there were 30 (53.6%) Christian Missionary personnel in the Islamic society in The North with only 7 (12.5%) centred among the M-Belt groups and societies, in 1931 there were 20 (19.0%) Christian Missionaries centred in the Islamic society and 85 (81.0%) Christian Missionaries concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies.¹

More significant to the development of a Christian religious and political identity among the M-Belt Movements, started in 1949, were the Christian Missionary Bodies and the groups and societies the Missionaries focussed upon in concentrating their religious and social activities. Although there was cooperation in fulfilling the Christian religious objectives in The North among all Christian Missionary Bodies including the rather fanatical objectives of the SUM as preached by Kumm became complimented by the activities of the SIM in the particular terms of what G.H. Farrant subsequently described as the "vigour of the American character".² It was from

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1. See figures in Table 3.2 for comparison with figures in Table 3.6.
 2. SUM Reports, Volume 13, August 1942.

among groups and societies where the SUM and the SIM operated that there developed political organizations of the M-Belt Movement which took off and gained social and political support with a distinct Christian religious identity, mobilized to achieve political objectives.

The SUM had the highest numbers of Christian Missionaries with 47 (44.8%), out of a total of 105 Christian Missionaries in The North in 1931. The SUM concentrated all its resources among the M-Belt groups and societies. In this instance the SUM had stations in Muri with 21 (44.7%) Christian Missionaries, Yola with 17 (36.2%), Bauchi: S. Bauchi and Plateau with 5 (10.6%) and Nassarawa with 4 (8.5%). Similarly the DRCM which worked jointly with the SUM concentrated all its resources among the Tiv, the most numerous in population size of the M-Belt groups and societies. In the instance the DRCM had all its 11 (10.5%) Christian Missionaries in Tiv land. The CML also had all its 8 (7.6%) Christian Missionaries concentrated among the Tiv in 1931. The SIM with 28 (26.7%) Christian Missionaries which was the second strongest in Missionary personnel to the SUM in The North, concentrated its activities in both the Islamic society and among the M-Belt groups and societies with an equal distribution of personnel in its field service areas. Similarly the CMS and RCM balanced their religious activities in The North by operating in both the Islamic society and among the M-Belt groups and societies, but then, 50% of their activities were concentrated in the British developed townships in The North.

The SDAM was unique among other Christian Missionaries, by concentrating all its activities only in Ilorin, although these

were centred among the non-Islamic groups and societies under Fulani Islamic political authority. Subsequently in the 1950s these areas became characterized by Yoruba political irredentist feelings.

There were however more Christian Missionary Bodies involved in religious activities among the M-Belt groups and societies when compared to the Islamic society in The North. Out of a total of nine Christian Missionary bodies, four with a total force of 20 (19.0%) Christian Missionary personnel operated in the Islamic society in 1931. These were the SIM, CMS, RCM and SDAM. In the instance of the M-Belt groups and societies however the figures in Table 3.6 suggest that there were five Christian Missionary Bodies with a total personnel force of 85 (81.0%) Christian Missionaries operating in 1931. These were the SUM, SIM, DRCM, CML, CMS and RCM.

Strictly speaking, however, there were seven Christian Missionary Bodies among the M-Belt groups and societies when the Danish Mission and the MBC is accounted for. It was however the SUM and the SIM who trained the majority of the Western educated elite from among the M-Belt groups and societies which subsequently featured in the different phases of the M-Belt Movements. As it is suggested by the figures in Table 3.6, this was so, because the SUM and the SIM concentrated the bulk of their Christian Missionary personnel and religious activities in the M-Belt groups and societies, among other Christian Missionary Bodies.

Although after 1920 Christian Missionaries became concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies, the period between 1907 and 1931 was characterized by initial religious rejection of Christianity

from both the M-Belt groups and societies and from the Islamic society. During that period the different Christian Missionary Bodies also had to cope with an agonizing slow progress in making converts into Christianity. It was not until the 1940s that Christian Missionary Bodies began to produce Christian converts in large numbers who subsequently constituted the churches and the Christian communities they sought to create from among the M-Belt groups and societies.¹

This was so for two basic reasons. Traditional systems of beliefs and practices were still strongly held before 1940. These compounded Christian Missionary difficulties with the different languages of the M-Belt groups and societies, none of which was spread over a wide territorial area. Christian Missionaries had to wait for these barriers to be shattered by modern European practices, particularly in medical work and also to learn the languages of their service areas.²

Secondly, the administration itself, largely for political reasons also restricted Christian Missionary activities among the M-Belt groups and societies who were placed under Islamic political leadership.³ There were also the added problems of getting into contact with some M-Belt groups and societies by the Christian Missionaries because of the military slave raiding experiences with Fulani armies in historical times and also in the period of British conquest after 1900. For example Hepburn suggests that the

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1. This is examined in more detail below and also in Section IV of this Chapter.
 2. Rubingh 1969 p. 102-105
 3. Crampton 1975 p. 72-80; Boer 1969 p. 161-163

Mada people resisted all the Christian Missionaries in the initial days of contact because the British were "feared to be a new group of slave raiders".¹ Similarly among the Birom, Suffil suggests that there was initial resistance to Christian Missionary work because "the Birom, were prejudiced against the whiteman, for the first ones had come with guns to subdue them... that prejudice had to be lived down and the first influence that tended to break them was the Ministry of healing".²

This is not to suggest that Christian Missionaries experienced rejection in all instances of their encounters with the M-Belt groups and societies. There were instances in which some groups and societies showed eager interest in Christian Missionary activities rather than in the government of British administration in The North of Nigeria and in England. For example, Maxwell suggests that when a Jukun-man visited him and a picture book of the British Empire was shown to him: "... after looking at it for a little while, he said, I prefer the story of Jesus".³

The general pattern in the initial experiences of Christian Missionary efforts among the majority of the M-Belt groups and societies however was religious rejection and frustration. In April 1911 for example, when Mr Zimmerman, the first DRCM Missionary to

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1. Hepburn, The Light Bearer Magazine, January 1923 p. 70
 2. Suffil, The Light Bearer Magazine, January 1923 p. 70
 3. J.L. Maxwell, The Light Bearer Magazine, October 1905, cited in Boer 1979 p. 150

settle in Tiv-land, arrived, he had difficulty in communicating with the Tiv people and also in recruiting Tiv as employees to serve as servants to the Missionary party.¹ This was so because the majority of Christian Missionaries were concerned to learn the Hausa language before arriving in Nigeria, rather than any of the languages of the M-Belt groups and societies. Miller for example went to Tripoli in North Africa and spent some time there where he studied the Hausa language before the CMS party set out for The North in Nigeria.²

This however is not to suggest that Christian Missionaries were unaware of any of the different languages of the M-Belt groups and societies before they went to fulfil their religious objectives in Nigeria. Bishop S.A. Crowther for example, had come into contact with "a rudimentary Tiv vocabulary secured from liberated Tiv-slaves at Fourah Bay College in Freetown, Sierra Leone".³

Rubingh however suggests that the language difficulties experienced by the DRCM in the first few years were sufficient to condition their recruitment of "the Hausas as Christian Missionary Workmen" until the Tiv language was learnt.⁴ Furthermore the language difficulty became reflected in the initial Christian Missionary efforts and experiences to make religious contact with the Tiv. For example, when the DRCM suggested to the Tiv that they might settle on their land in order: ".. to speak to them about God; the Tiv asked, what has God done?"⁵

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1. Rubingh 1969 p. 92
 2. Miller 1936 p. 9-13
 3. Rubingh 1969 p. 63 n.15
 4. Rubingh 1969 p. 92; p. 95
 5. Rubingh 1969 p. 94

It was not until after a year among the Tiv that on 21st January 1912, the DRCM made its first Christian convert in Tiv land.¹ This was Akiga. He was an abandoned child in the early years of life by his runaway mother because he was blind in one eye and seen by the family tradition to be the least promising to prosper in life and therefore he might be associated with the Christian Missionaries.²

Even in that instance, Akiga had to work with the Christian Missionaries to become the first Christian in Tiv land,³ rather than "a virgin-cut-convert from paganism". It was not until 1917 that four Tiv converts into Christianity were baptized including Akiga but a year later: "... it was discovered that all four were put under discipline".⁴ In 1922 there were six baptised Tiv converts. After nearly 19 years of religious efforts by the DRCM when they had 19 Christian Missionaries among the Tiv they had only succeeded in converting six people into Christianity.⁵

In S. Zaria and subsequently in Wusasa, where the CMS Missionary Body became dominant there was similar initial rejection of Christianity. Although CMS influences were established in Zaria in 1907 and subsequently became developed by Dr Miller, it was not until 1913 that there was a viable Christian Missionary community.⁶

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1. Rubingh 1969 p. 94
 2. Rubingh 1969 p. 92; Akiga apparently became one of the most famous of Tiv personalities and an able politician in later years - Akiga's role is examined in more detail in Chapter . Sections below and Chapter 4 and 5.
 3. Rubingh 1969 p. 92
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid
 6. Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.18-27

The CMS missionaries in the period before 1914 were unable to make even twenty Hausa converts into Christianity from the entire Zaria district.¹ In the instance of the 1913 events surrounding the development of a Christian community in Zaria however, it was two 'Isawa-Christians' who became the conditioning boost and the influential factor in the development of the Christian Community under Miller: "... because they told of many scattered families who were awaiting the full teaching of Jesus ... it was decided that it would be good for all these scattered Christians to come and live together as a community. A piece of unoccupied land was sought from the Emir (in Zaria) .. and about 120 persons came to live there. Baptisms took place and a school was started".² To compound the social status in society of some of the early Hausa converts, the "Isawa-Christians" or their descendants were slaves redeemed by Miller, although they also included nonslaves of Nupe and Maguzawa social origins.^{3*4}

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1. Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.21
 2. Crampton 1975 p.133; the phenomenon of the "Isawa Christians" is discussed in some detail by Crampton who suggests that, although there is political and religious controversy on their "Christianity" they were a dissenting religious and political group from Kano and with connections with the 'Ningi Rebels' who terrorized Islamic centres of politic like Kano, Bauchi and Zaria - see Crampton 1975 p.131-134; apart from being an initial boost to Christian converts in Zaria in 1913 however they were not related to the development of Christianity among other M-Belt groups and societies like those in S. Zaria. Furthermore subsequently in the political developments with the M-Belt Movements the 'Isawa Christians' and the whole Wusasa Christian population did not politically identify with political organizations for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the 1950s - This is discussed in more detail in Chapter *Sections below* where we examine political identification with the M-Belt Movements in the 1950s and 1960s.
 3. Crampton 1975 p.137

*4 See comments at the end of Chapter 3.

The first thirty years of Christian Missionary work among groups and societies on the Plateau was also similarly characterized by initial difficulties of Christian Missionaries to make converts into Christianity and a general rejection of Christianity in the societies. Between 1900 and 1912 there was only one Christian Missionary station among the Birom at Ngel in the subsequent townships of Jos and Bukuru on the Plateau.¹ Early Christian Missionary efforts in that period as suggested by their reports reveal that in the religious progress of their work on the Plateau: "... the natives are to a great extent boycotting us; unless they want salt from us they never come near".² This was so for example, because Birom chiefs and their traditional religious priests among others, rejected the Christians and Christianity. In 1922 for example the chief of Kuru ordered "public flogging" of the first Christian converts of his village, including the subsequent first Birom Pastor, Toma Tok Bot.³

Among the Birom, it was not until 1928 that a church became formally organized at Forum: "... with 22 members in full covenant fellowship".⁴ It was not until about 1925 when Birom traditional authority began to religiously identify itself with Christian Missionary activities that there was a sudden increase in the numbers

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1. Maxwell 1954 p.67
 2. Ibid
 3. Logans 1975 p.71
 4. 'SUM Reports' The Light Bearer Magazine, 1928-1930 p.14

of converts into Christianity after 1930. In that period of impasse with Christianity, Birom chiefs who were previously hostile toward Christian Missionary activity and Christianity, became characterized by attendance of Sunday services in Christian Missionary camps rather than European Christian Missionaries seeking permission to hold religious services in the compound premises of the chiefs.¹ In the instance, some of the chiefs declared "Sunday" to be kept free in order that: "... the people go to the Mission House, rather than going to work on their farms".² Although there was religious change of attitude toward Christianity on the Plateau, in the period between 1928 and 1938 Christian Missionaries among the Birom still reported: ".. the Natives did not really visit the Camp .. but as usual medicine has proved an attraction".³

In Wukari and Ibi where Maxwell initially opened up SUM stations and worked among the Jukuns in 1907, his frustrations with British prohibitions from preaching Christianity among Islamic communities provoked him, but they suggest that non-Islamic groups and societies in that area were rejecting the Christian Missionaries and Christianity. In that instance Maxwell reports: "... I am not going to be bothered up working among the pagans only. They don't come near me, it is the Mohammedan lot who come".⁴

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1. Logams 1975 p.71
 2. Interview Discussions with Pastor Toma Tok Bot, 1974, cited in Logams 1975 p.71
 3. 'SUM Reports', The Light Bearer Magazines 1928-1938, p.14-34
 4. The Maxwell Diaries in Rhodes House Library in Oxford, cited in Boer 1979 p.160

This suggests that in all areas of the M-Belt groups and societies, although Christian Missionary religious focus of activities shifted from the Islamic society in The North, toward the M-Belt groups and societies the Christian Missionaries became faced with an initial rejection of Christianity by the groups and societies they had come to "save from the Islamic advance" in the period between 1907 and 1931. This however is not suggesting that in the same period there were no converts to Christianity; rather that there was slow progress in making converts until after 1930. Furthermore the initial Missionary converts into Christianity in that period were of low social and political status in their societies and in a majority of cases, they were "social rejects" of their societies. In the rather ironical circumstances of changing life chances when living in society "the social rejects" who became the first Christian converts assumed political and social prominence within their groups and societies as well as in the developing conception of the wider society of The North and Nigeria. This was so for the Wusasa Christian Community, individual Christian families from among the different M-Belt groups and societies like in the subsequent development of Akiga among the Tiv and Toma Tok Bot among the Birom.¹

In rather similar circumstances, the SIM spent resources in money and personnel over a period of 70 years and managed "to win

1. The role of Christianity in producing a prominent Western modernized elite with roots in initial Christian converts will become more apparent in our discussions in Section IV and V of this Chapter and subsequently in the particular roles of individuals from Christian homes in the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement, the nature of politics within the M-Belt groups and societies and politics with the M-Belt Movement examined in Chapters 4 and 5 and the Epilogue.

over only a few people as converts into Christianity in the small Islamic communities existing between Ilorin and Nupe provinces.¹ In the instance, the SIM became frustrated because the people remained Moslems and people from the non-Islamic groups and societies became Moslems rather than Christians.² Crampton suggests that this was so because of 'the political reasons' in the government of British administration in The North in which Islamic leadership was emphasized in the application of the policy of Indirect rule and therefore Islam itself held a political attraction rather than the tenacity of the Islamic faith among the Moslem communities causing the rejection of Christianity.³

However, one of the causes for the initial frustrations which Christian Missionaries faced in regard to their difficulties experienced in making converts from among the M-Belt groups and societies before the period between 1930 and 1940 was that Islamic influences rather than Christian Missionary influences became encouraged in the political practices of the government of British administration in the North. This was the premise from which Farrant and Dawson of the SUM, Cash and Hooper of the CMS and Playfair of the SIM for example, expressed strong opinions that the government of British administration in The North was anti-Christian.⁴

According to Ayandele the roots of anti-Christian Missionary attitudes took shape as early as 1906 when Percy Girouard became

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1. Crampton 1975 p.157
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Boer 1979 p.499-506

successor to Lugard and the policy of Indirect rule: "... became a divine revelation, a sort of natural law against which it would be dangerous to behave".¹ The anti-Christian Missionary stance of Girouard after 1906 became supported by his subordinate officers in The North.² In the instance, they agreed that Christian Missionaries were a political menace to the peace and good government of the country and Girouard himself lashed out: "... Personally I should like to see the Mission retire entirely from the Northern states, for the best Missionary for the present will be the high-minded, clean living British Resident. The opinion of Residents is absolutely unanimous in considering the presence of the Missions as a menace to the peace of the country ... It is a very sad fact that the Missions as constituted are not of the slightest assistance in administering the country: on the contrary a constant source of worry. They say that their religion and common sense bear no relation to each other".³ Furthermore Girouard suggested that CMS Baptisms in Zaria were provocative to the Islamic religion and urged that Christian Missionaries: "... would be far better occupied in fighting Islam at its outposts in the pagan states".⁴

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1. Ayandele, 1966 p.146
 2. Ibid
 3. Percy Girouard, 1908, cited in Boer 1979 p.72
 4. Ayandele 1966 p.146

Based on similar political conceptions and in the development of the policy of Indirect rule, C.L. Temple created precedents for anti-Christian Missionary attitudes when he developed: "... extra-ordinarily extreme adoration of indigenous institutions ... regarded every European symbol and representative as a threat to these institutions, but the Missionary was the greatest menace of all. He sought to keep missions out of Animistic areas as well".¹

In 1916 a government ordinance was passed which created obstacles to the effective expansion of Christian Missionary activities among the M-Belt groups and societies.² Furthermore in 1922 when Hugh Clifford became Governor of Nigeria, he divided the M-Belt areas into three religious categories for the purposes of Christian Missionary work: "... Emirates where the chiefs and the majority of the people were Moslems with scattered pagan communities the Maguzawa pagan people lived in this type of area and the government opposed plans to reach them ... if Christian Missionaries came to them the government would be misinterpreted as ignoring its pledge of non-interference in religion; secondly, independent pagan areas where most of the people and chiefs were pagans ... the government encouraged Christian Missionary work in such areas; thirdly, areas where the people were pagans but the rulers Moslems ... these areas were out of bounds for Christian Missionaries ... (for example) the Emirs in charge of the Kona, Mumuye and Wurkum tribes refused to allow the SUM to enter such areas .. (in order) to preserve pagan rites and fear of disturbances among them".³

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1. Boer 1979 p.72
 2. Ibid p.79
 3. Crampton 1975 p.72-73

Although Christian Missionaries were encouraged in their religious activities among non-Islamic communities, particularly so among the M-Belt groups and societies as a general policy of the government of British administration in The North, they further faced difficulties from British Residents and DOs in the Provinces, Divisions and Districts, who frustrated their efforts toward making converts into Christianity. This was the premise from which H.G. Farrant suggested as latterly as 1929 that : "... Opposition of Government to the advance of Christian Missions has been strongest in the Moslem Emirates, but because Missions have now occupied so much of the pagan areas it must not be thought that their entrance there was unopposed. Objection was made because a tribe was under a Moslem Emir or the claim that a district was unsettled was continued long after the danger had ceased. A Political Officer when interviewing a chief with regard to an application for a site by a Mission would so enlarge on the responsibility that would fall on the chief if the Missionary were murdered that the chief would promptly refuse the responsibility and the application would be turned down on the grounds of the chief's refusal ... a Political Officer would ask so many questions and couch them in such a way that the chief would conclude that the Officer did not wish the Mission to enter and would say therefore that he did not... It was expressed to me by one officer in the words - "The District Officer can help, he can hinder and he can absolutely block" - After a Mission is established there are still interferences varying in magnitude from the destruction of a church ... to instances of petty but vexatious meddling. Some of these latter are due to

the personality of the official ... Interferences arise from the apparent inability of any Political Officer to think of the Christian Church as anything but a foreign organization. In some districts, Islam is not ten years old but is accepted as indigenous and left alone. In the same district Christianity may be twenty five years old and spreading from native to native in the identical way in which Islam spreads. *Yet a native Christian will be interrogated by a District Officer as if he were a dangerous propagandist from Moscow instead of a common farmer* the total mass of interference accumulated throughout the year is prodigious and every bit of it is known and remembered by the native *whether he is Christian or not. The Church therefore is growing up in the consciousness that it was born against the wish of the Government.* The strongest impressions are formed in childhood and *the impression made on the Church in the Northern Provinces will probably never be effaced.* Anyone who studies the history and present position of the Church of Scotland and contrasts it with the Church of England will be assured that lasting benefits accrue to a Church which grows in opposition."¹

In the period between 1900 and 1930 there were numerous instances in which there were vigorous interferences with the efforts of Christian Missionaries to produce converts from the non-Islamic communities in The North. In 1912 for example, a Resident: "... in Kabba Province flogged an African Pastor in public because his activity tended to denationalize the people among whom he (the Resident) was working".² In 1913 the request of the Angas

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1. H.G. Farrant, "Antagonizing the Christian Church" 16th December, 1929 p.4-5, cited in Boer 1979 p.504-505
 2. Ayandele 1980 p.149-150

in Garram and Amper and the Sura in Mopun, Kerang and Kombul for Christian Missionary teachers was refused by the government of British administration in The North because they were termed "unsettled areas".¹ In the general instances of the arguments centred on "unsettled areas" Christian Missionaries confronted the government of British administration in The North by asking: "...When they (the groups and societies in those areas) had become unsettled seeing that we had been invited to occupy them thirteen years ago".² In the same year of 1913, at Kataeregi in Nupe land, B.K. Line, the Resident ordered a CMS school to be demolished without any complaints against the Christian Missionaries from the Islamic communities in the area.³ Similarly in 1918 Captain Rowe, a Resident in Igala Province ordered local chiefs not to grant land permits to Christian Missionaries for the purposes of building schools and churches.⁴ Among the groups and societies on the Plateau in 1924 the experiences of Christian Missionaries were similarly beset with hurdles created by the government of British administration in The North when the Missionaries made initial religious efforts to create an atmosphere in which they might make Christian converts from the non-Islamic communities in that area. For example among the Sura, the pro-Christian Missionary chiefs of Pamyam and Denkina became removed from their thrones and the

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1. Ayandele 1980 p.149-150
 2. G. Dawson, "Government Palaver" 1st July 1927, cited in Boer 1979 p.499
 3. Ayandele 1980 p.149-150
 4. Ibid

chief of Logwar who had anti-Christian Missionary sentiments was put as chief of the Districts.¹ Furthermore in those circumstances, Sura people who had become Christians were ordered by the chief to go to their farms on Sundays like everyone else in that group and society.² Similarly in Kabwir, when Bewarang the chief who controlled the majority of the Angas population became Christian he was deposed by the British Resident of Plateau: "... for failing to perform the 'pagan' rituals associated with his office."³

Christian Missionaries saw these developments and the inherent religious manipulations in them as a grand plot of British officials in The North who were not Christians and held no Christian religious identity. For example in the period between 1927 and 1930, it was from a conception like that which Bishop Smith used to suggest that Christian Missionaries in The North: "... do not believe that these men represent British citizenship of the Empire. We have their own official statements that in permitting Missionaries to enter these very territories there would be no likelihood of a breach of the peace. For thirty years we have worked in Moslem regions and government cannot point at a single place where Missionaries have asked protection or where any disturbance has been created by

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1. Ayandele 1980 p.147
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid

their presence .. they place in control men who are known not to be governing with "British Fair Play" as neutral in this sphere of Religion, but men who are pro-Moslem and anti-Christian ... while acknowledging our debts to many friendly Residents who have sought to aid us, we refuse to be decided by Residents or Governors, many of whom have no interests in the religious .. we are not supplicating for favours and if these rights cannot be assured to us then we must take the only course left open. We are going into the Northern Territories as ambassadors of Jesus Christ, who sitting upon The Throne of power says "All Authority is given unto me in heaven and on earth. Go ye therefore and make disciples of all the Nations".¹

Ayandele suggests that these political and religious circumstances of Christian Missionaries were so because of the emphasis which British officials held over the application of Indirect rule policy with the centralizing authority pattern with the Islamic model in The North.² Although that was so, emphasis on the Islamic model further compounded the difficulties of Christian Missionary activities in their efforts to create a religious atmosphere from which to make Christian converts from among the M-Belt groups and societies. Chains of authority through a local ruler were always negatively enclosed by the government of British administration in The North and these were always cumbersome and involved time-consuming procedures before the Christian Missionaries faced a final rejection when they sought permission to proselytize.³ Furthermore,

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1. Bishop Smith, "Historic Memorandum Presented to the Missionary Conference at Miango when the subject of Relationship of Missions to Government was under consideration" in the 1930s, cited in Boer 1979 p.504
 2. Ayandele 1980 p.147
 3. Boer 1979 p.291

although the traditional rulers had the judicious authority to decide on the issue, Christian Missionary reports suggest that: "... in almost every case the Native authority will follow what he knows or believes to be the wish for the white official".¹ For example, among the non-Islamic groups and societies centred on Randa in S. Zaria, before SUM Christian Missionaries built a church for their converts, they had to get permission from the village chiefs and with them went to the District Head who was a Fulani Moslem and when they got his permission, thereafter took the matter to the Emir in Jema'a and Zaria and then to the Resident who "cleared the matter from the Northern Secretariat in Kaduna".² In the socio-economic and political circumstances of the 1920s and 1930s in The North, this was not a problem that took only days but months of considerable hardships and frustrations.³ As latterly as in the early years of the 1940s W.H. Tett suggests that Islamic chiefs in the villages and Districts centred on Lafia Division of the Plateau were so anti-Christian that they refused the children of non-Islamic parents permission to attend Christian religious instruction classes until either the Emir or the DO were consulted.⁴ Prior to the 1940s

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1. Boer 1979 p.291
 2. Maxwell 1952 p.211
 3. Ibid
 4. W.H. Tett, SUM Annual Report for Lafiya, 1942, cited in Boer 1979 p.281-282

Maxwell made extensive Diary entries in which he described the hostile ways officials of the government of British administration in The North intimidated Christians from among some of the M-Belt groups and societies. Although some of the hostilities were not personally witnessed by Maxwell, they were reported as early as in 1913 during the Northern Nigerian Christian Missionary Conference at Lokoja.¹ In that instance it was suggested that: "... a Christian asked a colonial officer a question about the Bible, whereupon the officer responded by grabbing the man's Bible, throwing it on the ground and stamping on it ... another Christian called to witness in court, refused to swear as Moslems and Pagans were accustomed to doing and he was subsequently brow-beaten and insulted ... a third Christian was instructed by an official to live 400 yards outside his own town (and) government officials warned the people not to listen to (Christians and Christian) Missionaries."²

As latterly as in the period between 1938 and 1945 Christian Missionaries saw these inhibitions as protecting Islam and the creation of conditions for Islamic influences and the Islamic religion to get a hold on the M-Belt groups and societies for The North to be Islamized. This was the premise from which Maxwell lashed-out regret that 'Christians' in the government of British administration in The North: "... so protected Islam that it had found an entry into hundreds of communities where it never had a

1. Boer 1979 p.164
2. Ibid

footing before the Union Jack lent it its protection. Why should the proclamation of Christianity be blocked and forbidden and that too by the representatives of a normally Christian Nation? This is not religious liberty though it was perpetrated under the pretext of religious liberty .. why could the Gospel not be preached in Kano and Sokoto when it could be preached in scores of places in Algeria and Morocco and Egypt and Persia and India?"¹

This however is not to suggest that the government of British administration in The North was in all instances creating ideal conditions for the diffusion of Islam. There were however isolated incidents where British officials discouraged chiefs among some of the M-Belt groups and societies from becoming Moslems. For example, when the traditional chief of the Ankwe in Shendam associated himself with Islamic teachers and was losing political control over his people, the Resident "advised" the King to return to his former ways and he accepted.²

However, in the period between 1900 and 1910 when there was increased spread of Islamic influences caused by the social and political conditions created from impact with British influences, among the M-Belt groups and societies, concern began to be expressed about its political consequences. In 1912 Tremearne argued against the political protection of Islam inherent in the application of Indirect rule policy by the government of British administration in

1. Maxwell 1952 p.253

2. J.L. Maxwell, Diaries, cited in Boer 1979 p.75

The North. In that instance, Tremearne suggested that it was well: "... to remember that any encouragement given to Mohammedanism will recoil on our heads, for the *great factor in the security of our present rule* is the knowledge that we are disinterested arbitrators between peoples varying in every possible way. *Once let these tribes be united by a common religion, once let them be fired with the fanatical zeal of Islam* and well I think there will be trouble ahead .. it is possible to maintain the old beliefs though they may be purged of any particular objectionable features by a sympathetic study of them, *thus keeping the tribes separate and avoiding the danger of their combining to expel us* and also conserving to the savage what he most values instead of teaching him to despise his ancestors; for strange as it may seem to us, there is a great deal of good in his laws and customs and even his religion."¹ The fear of Islam as it relates to the causes for political action was not unique to The North of Nigeria in the experiences of the British as well as other European Nations in ruling over Islamic communities in other parts of the world. Besides the Satiru revolt in The North in 1906, there were also the French experiences in Northern Togo, Samoa, the British political experiences in Northern India and the tragic political experiences of General Gordon in the Sudan. If there was anything to guide policy toward Islamic communities, these were political lessons to gain from. This was so because these were not simply the tragic consequences in the short-comings of European imperial techniques.

1. Tremearne 1912 p.73-p 74

They were also an ideological and religious expression in the objections to European political rule which were rooted in the teachings of Islam. Kraemer suggests that European Imperial regimes, not only in Africa, recognized that Islam held an inherent theological revulsion to non-Islamic domination and Islam itself: "... was a consistent form of imperialism and strongly resents when it itself is subjected to an imperialism by peoples of a foreign religion: it is regarded religiously speaking as "monstrous", a feeling that may be subdued temporarily but is always latently present".¹

Although this political feature of Islam was used as 'the political reason' in restricting the activities of Christian Missionaries in The North even among the M-Belt groups and societies it also became used as a plausible political argument to advance the causes of Christian Missionary politics with the government of British administration in The North. Miller for example, used similar lines of arguments advanced by Tremearne to suggest that Christians in The North: "... were always splendidly loyal to governments ... because they see that the only hope for their country is Christian rule .. government sentiments against Christianity was a suicidal course: the greatest safeguard against a Moslem uprising was a Christian nucleus".² This was the premise from which there was developed some sympathy toward Christian Missionary activities among the M-Belt groups and societies from some British officials in the government of British administration

1. Kraemer p.334, cited in Boer 1979 p.74
 2. W.R. Miller, Light Bearer Magazine, August, 1909 p.153-156

in the North. For example, as early as 1907, Kumm suggests that when he visited Lugard at the government headquarters in Zungeru: "... He (Lugard) was exceedingly friendly and granted us the introduction of certain goods free of customs house duty and expressed his desire to do all he could for the work. As the price for transport had been placed already so low that the government was making nothing out of it, he at first felt that he could not conscientiously agree to a reduction of fares for Missionaries. A few weeks afterwards however I received a communication from him stating that after further thought he felt that the Government should assist the Missionaries in their good work as far as possible and would be very good to grant the Missionaries a reduction of one third of the fares on Government steamers. This practically means that the Government pays one third and the Missionaries two thirds of their passage by government boats."¹ The Christian Missionaries also had miscellaneous forms of cooperation from the Government, like cashing cheques, the use of RNC facilities like Barges, Rest House and the government made 'social visits' to the Missionaries and invited some of them to Government celebrations.² This suggests that despite political restrictions on the activities of Christian Missionaries there were numerous premises in which there was identification with the government of British administration in The North. In the period between 1900 and 1930 there was also initial cooperation between Christian

1. Kumm 1907 p.77
2. Boer 1979 p.156

Missionaries and the government of British administration in The North, particularly in education and medical work, although in that period "medical work was leprosy work".¹ Subsequently in the early 1930s a government enactment which produced "great pleasure" in political identification to the Christian Missions with the government was the introduction of Sunday as an official day of rest in certain parts of The North.² Christian Missionaries through the CMNP conference sought to exploit this development by associating themselves with what they regarded as "their government" in The North and hoped that Sunday as a day of rest might be extended throughout The North, including in other words, the Moslem areas.³ The political effects of these developments on many of the M-Belt groups and societies was that there was developed the impression that there exists a unity of purpose and effort between the Christian Missionaries and the government of British administration in The North.⁴

These impressions became strengthened by the frequency of social intercourse between Christian Missionaries and government officials. For example, in the period between 30th May and 30th November 1921 government officials paid 11 visits to the Wukari Station run by Christian Missionaries.⁵ In 1936 there were about 20 visits to the Christian Missionary station at Ibi.⁶ In the process of the

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1. Boer 1979 p.156
 2. Ibid p.278
 3. Ibid p.276
 4. Ibid p.190
 5. Ibid p.276
 6. Ibid p.277

Military Conquest of some M-Belt groups and societies, Christian Missionaries played social and political roles that were acknowledged by both sides. For example in the conquest of the Bachama the government of British administration in The North acknowledged its success "largely to the work of the Christian Missionaries".¹ In another instance when a group and society in the M-Belt areas had proved particularly resistant and executed 50 members of a contingent of WAFF troops and also the British political officer in the District who were stationed in their midst, the government of British administration in The North called upon Christian Missionaries to open-up the area by beginning Christian Missionary activities.² In that instance, Maxwell commented: "... What was begun by the administration is being peacefully and successfully carried out by the Messengers of the Gospel".³

In the period between 1900 and 1930 although there was an explicit policy of restricting Christian Missionary activities in The North, the period was also characterized by a developing cooperation between Christian Missionaries and the government of British administration. In the period between 1909 and 1929 for example, Maxwell was not only an Evangelist but was also a prolific Hausa language teacher: "... Not only did he teach in Nigeria but also in London; and not only did he teach other Christian Missionaries but also government officials were frequently assigned to study under him ... at one time he was teaching six of them for which they paid a fee to the Christian Missionary body (the SUM) and to him."⁴ Similarly in the period between 1900 and 1925 there

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1. Boer 1979 p.314
 2. Boer 1979 p.314
 3. J.L. Maxwell, cited in Boer 1979 p.314
 4. Boer 1979 p.144

was cooperation between government and the Christian Missionaries focussed on the Freed Slaves Home in Lokoja. In 1920 for example, the Primary School educating inmates of The Home became a government assisted institution and received grants.¹ In the period when Girouard ruled The North, the SUM was permitted to open another Home for the Freed Slaves and inmates in a government equivalent became transferred to the Mission Centre and subsidized it with annual grants.²

In the 1920s and 1930s, it was from these developments that the relationship between the government of British administration in The North and the Christian Missionary bodies became acknowledged as one of team work in which each member had his own task. This was the premise from which the early suggestion of Reverend Horton became developed. In 1907 Horton argued that there was a need in The North: "... for men who are good great Christians but also politicians ... else the team would not be adjusted. He attributed to the government the task of safeguarding the country politically, while the Christian people must be committed to the country's evangelization."³ Latterly in 1933, Farrant in a speech given at Cheswick in England further suggested that: "... the government may have the chair, but the Church should not sit upon his knee ... the Church is not to be courted by or nursed by a government .. she has her own sphere. The respective tasks of government and of Church are complementary."⁴ Subsequently in the period of the 1940s and

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1. SUM Report, The Light Bearer Magazine, 1920 p.60
 2. Boer 1979 p.76
 3. Horton, The Light Bearer Magazine, cited in Boer 1979 p.184
 4. Farrant 1933, cited in Boer 1979 p.302

and 1950s and well into the 1960s the government of British administration in The North in certain instances cooperated and invited Christian Missionaries to harness "their abilities and interests" in the development of education, welfare and medical work, not only among the non-Islamic communities in the M-Belt areas but also in the core of Islamic centres of political power and religion like Kano.¹

Despite initial difficulties which Christian Missionaries faced in their religious activities among the M-Belt groups and societies, in the period between 1920 and 1940, they successfully achieved the development of Christianity through the establishment of churches, medical work and European oriented educational school systems and related institutions. This was the premise from which there was developed religious and social identification with Christian Missionaries serving among the M-Belt groups and societies. The Christian Missionaries complimented this developing identification by mediating over social issues and the problems of their service areas with the government of British administration in The North way back from the mid-1920s as the issues affected the evolving Christian communities. The problems and issues raised by Christian Missionaries with the government of British administration in The North as they affected the Christian communities mostly concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies ranged from the

1. These developments and their subsequent impact on the developing Christian identity among the M-Belt groups and societies are examined in more detail in Section IV of this Chapter and also in Chapter 4

1922 concerns over the marriage of inmates in the Freed Slaves Home, child murder and rituals, protection of Christian girls about to be forced into "Moslem or Pagan Marriages" against their will, tax exemption for leprosy patients in recognized Christian leprosy camps; to the demands for the exclusion of farmers on the Plateau tin-fields who were forced into 'political labour' on the mines and into the camps in the period between 1938 and 1945 when there was increased demands for tin-ores during the second world war.¹ In the particular instance of the problems of farmers forced to leave their homes to work on the tin-mines, the SUM for example, while acknowledging high remuneration on the tin-fields, suggested to the government of British administration in The North that the farmers be relieved of inclusion in 'political labour' during the farming seasons and the request was granted.²

In certain instances however Christian Missionary methods and the nature of the problem affecting the group and society in their service areas brought them into instant identification with each other without a mediating need with the government of British administration in The North. In 1909 for example the Miango people on the Plateau rounded up and slaughtered about 60 cattle-heads belonging to a Fulani nomad and the government met violence with violence in an attempt to force the community to compensate their owners.³ In the instance a section of the town was attacked and the troops left behind them casualties.⁴ Subsequently the chief

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1. Boer 1979 p.277
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid p.214
 4. Ibid

of Miango called upon the SUM doctor to provide medical aid to "the wounded innocent".¹ The Miango incident produced an opportunity for Christian Missionaries to imprint in that group and society the idea that the Christian Missionaries held a distinct identity different from other "whitemen" in the government of British administration in The North, the tin mining companies and other commercial companies. For example a SUM Reporter of the incident wrote: "... it is encouraging to know that they (the Miango people) know enough of the Missionary to distinguish him from other whitemen...they have learnt ... that he has come to their midst to save life and not to destroy it".² Latterly in the 1940s Miango town developed to become an important Christian Missionary Centre where conferences and conventions of indigenous Church and Christian Elders with Missionary Committees met.³

It was from experiences like these that there was developed a focus, on Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and societies to solve social and political problems, particularly so for the Plateau groups and societies, rather than any direct involvement with the government of British administration in The North.⁴

1. Boer 1979 p.214

2. Ibid

3. This is examined in more detail below.

4. For example, this Author remembers, when as a small boy, his father as Evangelist/Headmaster of the Mission Primary School at Fan, became very ill in the middle of the night; other Christians rode bicycles a distance of some ten miles to go call Mr Barrow, the Christian Missionary at Forum in the late 1950s and early 1960s, to take the sick person to Vom Christian hospital 30 miles away, rather than call at the ATMN officials 4 miles away at Dorowa Camp or 'Sabon Gidan' Forum 6 miles on the way to the Mission House to attend the Government Hospital at Barakin Ladi 8 miles away from Fan! Mr Barrow always came down to take my father to Vom on several occasions in that period.

In the period between 1930 and 1950, when there was developed identification between Christian Missionaries and the M-Belt groups and societies Christian Missionaries sought less social and political identification with the government of British administration as well as with other "whitemen" in The North. Walter Miller for example, made strong pleas against close social and political identification between the Christian Missionaries and "whitemen" in the government of British administration in The North as well as with other British officials with commercial companies and the Tin Mines on the Plateau.¹ In the instance Miller suggested to his colleagues: "... not to claim the privileges that often accrue to a ruling caste .. for it may be taken as an axiom that any apparent social gain, any political advantage gained, any legal victory scored by the Missionary will have disastrous effects on his work and after influence Decorations from Government, Government favour and even too much association with Government officials are not among the things which conduce to the increase of Christ's Kingdom .. To be too much in the lime light of Government favour is not a thing which the true Missionary seeks."²

Boer suggests that Miller was not being against British colonialism in The North, rather he was using arguments previously advanced by Balmer another Missionary contributor in which there were two suggested reasons against the dangers of social and political identification by Christian Missionaries with the officials in the government of British administration in The North.³ Firstly, Christian Missionaries associating with government meant dependence,

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1. W.L. Miller, The SUM Magazine Vol. 6 p.223-224, cited in Boer 1979 p.214
 2. Miller, cited in Boer 1979 p.214
 3. Boer 1979 p.214

help and protection and these attributes weakened "their spirit of selfreliance upon their resources in God and entire devotion to their work".¹ According to Miller, in a situation like that there existed concrete instances in which social and political pressures with criticism became applied by the government on the Christian Missionaries in The North.² Secondly, Miller suggested that social and political association with British administration in The North was identification with Islam since government favoured Moslems.³ In a situation like that where Christianity sought the eradication of "paganism", the M-Belt groups and societies (where "paganism" was formidable) might become resentful toward the Christian Missionaries if they noticed a close identification with government and there did not exist better thinking conditions to show that there was no favour for Islam.⁴ These religious and political identity positions by Christian Missionaries in the 1930s were meant to protect the developing Christian communities among the M-Belt groups and societies as a result of increased Christian converts after that period.

As a direct result of the increases in the numbers of Christian converts after 1930 there developed visible - Christian communities which became noticeable among the M-Belt groups and societies. This was so because Christian converts moved their settlements from the traditional set-ups to become centred around the Christian Missionary compounds and stations, the Churches and where Christian Pastors and Teacher-Evangelists lived. These Christian settlements

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1. Boer 1979 p.214
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid

also attracted non-believers in the "new faith" to move from their traditional places of residence, previously in hill-tops, mountains, cave-like places and thickly forested areas to the open plains.¹

In the 1950s and 1960s when electioneering became a vigorous characteristic of politics in The North, these settlements became the centres of political campaigns, outside the urban centres developed from British commercial companies which were concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies. The religious activities of Christian Missionaries became directed from these Christian Missionary and 'Christian Community' settlements. These activities included classes for religious instructions, the organization of gospel preaching parties, preaching the gospel in specific religious centres (quasi-churches), medical work in Dispensaries and attached maternities for treatment and the deliveries of babies and also the baptisms of new members of the Church.²

Other Christian Missionary Bodies however operated in The North with different objectives, policies and strategies creating a concomitant variation in the rate and growth of the numbers of Christian converts, besides the conditioning factors of indigenous resistance to Christianity and Christian Missionary activities and the degree of Islamic influences in a particular area among the M-Belt groups and societies.³ For example, although the SIM and

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1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu and Barnabas Dusu, December 1980 and January 1981; also for examples see Miller 1947 p.14-15.
 2. Maxwell 1952 p.249
 3. Crampton 1975 p.157

the CMS were the most territorially spread Christian Missionary Body in The North with stations in very different areas their most successful achievements in building up Christian communities with churches became concentrated in Yagba areas of Kabba Province and in S. Zaria.¹ Crampton suggests that this was so because there was little Islamic influences and chiefs as well as government officials in the areas were not Moslems.²

However in terms of religious methods and strategy, the SIM and the RCM produced churches and Christian communities by focusing and emphasizing a rigorous policy of European educational training.³ In the instance of Protestant Christian Missionaries who emphasized the policies advocated in the ideas of Brookes that Christianity be transplanted independently of European education and the Christian Missionaries concern themselves with evangelical work only and therefore neglected the development of European education, their developing Christian communities shrank and weakened because their converts shifted to other denominations.⁴ This was so for the Danish EUB (Evangelical United Brethren: now United Methodist of Nigeria) branches of the SUM who concentrated their activities in Adamawa.

For example Christian churches and communities among the Kilba and Chamba in Adamawa are more tightly knotted with European educational development resulting from the activities of the

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1. Crampton 1975 p.157
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid p.159
 4. Crampton 1975 p.159; for Tiv examples see also Rubingh 1969 p.115-121

Lutheran Missionaries when compared to the EUB Christian communities among the non-Islamic groups and societies centred on Muri.¹ In other words, the EUB was not seriously interested in establishing a relationship between the Christian communities and Christian produced European education in the centres from where Christianity diffused to the rest of a particular group and society. This was so because it was from these centres that Christianity diffused outwardly to the rest of a particular group and society where there was a Christian Missionary station. For example, the SIM Christian communities among the Tangale-Waja expanded in this way and a strong Christian church grew and became established.² Similarly this was the pattern in the pioneering work of the DRCM among the Tiv in Benue.³

The patterns in the expansion and diffusion of Christianity among the Yoruba in Ilorin and Kabba under the CMS, SIM and SDAM however was mainly done through Yoruba Evangelists brought in from the western provinces of Nigeria.⁴ In that instance many 'Northern' Yorubas in Ilorin and Kabba attained post-primary educational qualifications in the western provinces, largely due to and through Christian Missionary efforts before educational facilities became developed in their own areas.⁵ Crampton suggests that this is in

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1. Crampton 1975 p.159
 2. Ibid p.157
 3. Ibid p.145
 4. Ibid p.123
 5. Ibid p.124

apparent contradiction to the ideas produced by Trimingham which assert that "the Yoruba churches in the West have shown no desire to evangelize among their fellows in the Ilorin Region".¹

However the Christian religious and European educational linkages between the Yorubas in Ilorin and Kabba with those from the West in the Nigerian Federation explain the subsequent irredentist feelings in the political movements centred on Ilorin in the 1950s which were led by Christian European educated persons who school in the West.²

The Anglican, Baptist and Catholic Christian Missionaries were to use Nigerian Christians from among groups and societies in Southern Nigeria to promote the diffusion of Christianity in The North.³ Crampton further suggests that the majority of Christians as Anglicans, Catholics and Baptists in The North before 1945 were from Southern Nigerian groups and societies who were the employees of government institutions, companies and the Christian Missionaries.⁴ Except for the RCM, among the few other Christian Missionary Bodies, it has been suggested that Southern Nigerian Christians played only a little positive role in the evangelization of groups and societies in The North.⁵ In the instance of the RCM, it was able to call on the services of teachers trained in its colleges in the South to work in the Christian educational institutions in The North in the early days of developing its work.⁶

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1. Crampton 1975 p.123
 2. This is examined in more detail in Section VI of this Chapter and in Chapters 4 and 5
 3. Crampton 1975 p.141
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid
 6. Ibid p.123

This means that apart from the impact of 'Southern Nigerian Christians' in Ilorin and Kabba Christians and Christianity among the M-Belt groups and societies were the products of European Christian Missionary Bodies. These expatriate Christian Missionary Bodies produced Christians from among the M-Belt groups and societies using external sources of funding to build institutions like the European school system, hospitals and other social welfare services in The North.¹ This is the premise from which indigenous Christian Churches among the M-Belt groups and societies became historically linked to Missionary minded churches in overseas countries and before 1970 there was an almost total non-existence of Nigerian Separatist Church Movements indigenous among the M-Belt groups and societies.² In many respects this also explains the differences in the Christianity of the M-Belt groups and societies which has remained "pure" on the principles of its pioneers and path makers when it is compared to Christianity in Southern Nigeria and with Ibo or Yoruba Churches in The North which became ethnic in languages, attendances as well as in their total religious identification.

The political consequences of a situation like that has been that Christians in The North have shared insignificant and volatile political identification crystallized by the Christian religious identity with Southern Nigerian Christians in politics.³

Table 3.7 suggests the achievements of the SUM, as an example in the period between 1938 and 1945. The analytical concern with

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1. Crampton 1975 p.163; This is examined in more detail in Section IV of this Chapter.
 2. Crampton 1975 p.163
 3. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5

Table 3.7 Christian Missionary Influences developed in The North from SUM Religious Activities in the period between 1938 and 1945

Type of Religious Activity	1938	1945	Increases over 1938 in 1945	% increases over 1938 in 1945
Christian Religious Instruction classes	121	298	177	146.3
Christian Preaching Centres (semi Churches)	23	43	20	87.0
African Voluntary (Evangelical) Workers	143	312	169	118.2
Church Members on Roll	1,442	3,126	1,694	116.8
Average Attendances at Sunday Services	6,881	13,048	6,167	89.6
Baptisms	211	432	221	104.7
Africans as Dispensary Attendants and Midwives	24	45	21	87.5
Patients Treated in Christian Dispensaries	29,403	46,075	16,672	56.7
Total Persons under known Christian Missionary Influences	38,248	63,379	25,131	65.7

Source: Computed from figures in Maxwell 1952 p.249; The 1952 Census report showed that the North had 17 000 000 people, with 11 661 000 Muslims and 4 616 000 Animists, 558 000 Christians, the majority of whom were in the M-Belt areas.

figures in the Table, more than anything else, is with the progress of SUM Christian religious activities. The figures in the Table suggest that there was religious progress toward Christianizing The North, although the process was concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies. The significant increases over the 1938 year in 1945 was the focus on Christian Religious Instruction classes where there was an increase of 146.3%. These religious classes produced Christians as well as African voluntary (Evangelical) workers with a concomitant increase in Church membership on roll and Baptisms. These increased in 1945 by 87.0%, 118.2% and 116.8% respectively over the 1938 figures. Average attendances at Sunday Services also increased by 89.6%. Christian Medical work also produced Christian Missionary influences over persons who attended Christian Missionary Dispensaries to be trained as Dispensary Attendants and Midwives, in 1945 these trainings produced 45 of these personnel. This represents an increase of 87.5% in 1945 over the 1938 figures. One of the ways in which Medical work produced Christians was in the intensive religious sermons before European Medicines became served; the emphasis became placed on God rather than European human medicine to compliment the cure of diseases.¹ While in 1938 there were 29,403 patients treated in Christian dispensaries, the figure went up to 46,075 in 1945. This represents an increase of 56.7% in 1945 over 1938. Christian Missionary activities produced by the SUM however increased the total numbers of persons under the direct religious influences of Christianity by 65.7% in 1945 over the figures suggested for 1938.

1. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu January, 1981; for some Tiv examples of this path to Christianity, see discussions in Rubingh 1969 p.140.

This was the premise from which in the 1940s, Miller, for example, while arguing 'British Failure' in The North suggests that in that decade: "... Missions have been started in nearly all parts of the country. Thousands of men and women once naked pagans and some even cannibals, are now "clothed and in their right mind". Schools are rapidly springing up in town and village. Thousands of children are learning to read and being taught crafts, trades and useful methods of earning a living. The whole Bible has been translated into two chief languages of the country and parts of it into various smaller languages and dialects. Churches of various kinds and denominations, big and small in the country and towns are being built by those who have become converts and partly as a consequence many of the worst forms of savagery and cruelty have disappeared. Hospitals have been built and many hundreds of African male nurses have been trained. Patients of all sorts and with every kind of disease are free to attend these and be treated by able physicians and surgeons .. Pagans and Moslems who in pre-British days were always fighting are now before the law equal and thousands of Pagans who before the occupation had their houses in the rocky fastnesses and only came down armed with the spear and poisoned arrows are now free to farm in the plains without fear and are doing so everywhere, while markets, open to all, are increasingly the scene of lively inter-tribal friendship and commerce. One language, the *Lingua Franca* of Western Equatorial Africa, the Hausa Language, is being rapidly learnt and used as "market" language by most of the tribes; and from the schools, mainly mission, is emerging a generation no longer oppressed and down-trodden, to take its full share in every way that they may become able in the functions

of the Body Politics".¹ This suggests that behind the Christian Missionary enterprise, particularly for the British SUM there was an implicit socio-political and economic 'liberating Movement' directed at the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North to fulfil the religious objectives that were tied up with the 'Sudan concept' and politics and society with Islamic leadership. The roots of Christian Missionary theme of Liberation in their religious activities in The North were shaped from the ideas of Karl Kumm. In June 1910 at the World Missionary Conference (WMC) Kumm emphasized a list of "tribes" not yet evangelized by Protestant Missions. In the instance he suggested that: "... Fulani, Hausa, Yoruba (some), Guari, Bassama, Mutchi, Rago, Afo, Kibyen, Panyam, Dimmock, Miriam, Kwolla, Ankwoi, Angass, Pirpum, Montoil, Yergam, Gurkawa, Burmawa, Jukun, Djem, Dengele, Mbula, BeriBeri ... numbering from five thousand to two million each along the borderline of Central Africa, Paganism, driven out by the crescent faith from the fruitful plains of the northern half of the Sudan took refuge in the mountains of the Murchison range, the Bautchi Hill country, in Adamawa, the Mandara Mountains, the Sudd region and the more inaccessible parts of the Shari Valley. The barrier which nature has built against the advance of the religion of Mohammed in the Central Africa was made the best use of by the warlike pagan tribes of those lands and successfully they maintained their independence and their fetish worship. Now through the conquest of the European powers... the better education of the Moslem and the prestige connected with

1. Miller 1947 p.14-15

his creed are enabling him to spread the faith of Mohammed in an almost unprecedented way amongst the independent pagan tribes ... *European administrators are directly advancing and assisting Mohammedanism. These tribes living in the mountains of the central Sudan are the most warlike in Africa. They are worth the winning and it will be an eternal shame on our generation if we let those tribes go over to Islam*".¹

Although colonialism was never defined by Christian Missionaries, their different bodies subsequently operated with the objective of civilizing and halting the advance of Islam under the political view of colonialism may be summarized like this: "... colonialism is a form of imperialism based on a divine mandate and designed to bring liberation—spiritual, cultural, economic and political by sharing the blessings of the Christ-inspired civilization of the West with a people suffering under Satanic forces of oppression, ignorance and disease effected by a combination of political, economic and religious forces that cooperate under a regime seeking the benefits of both ruler and ruled".² This suggests that the basic attitudes toward British colonial ventures in The North were appreciated even when this attitude did not preclude criticisms of its various practices. The means by which Christian Missionaries sought to complement British colonialism was by establishing preaching centres which became Churches and the centres of Christian communities from where there was diffusion of "the blessing of the Christ-inspired civilization of the West" might benefit the suffering people of the 'Sudan'.

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1. Dr H. Karl Kumm (Sudan United Mission, London), Presentation and discussion of the Report at the Meeting of the Conference on Wednesday, 15th June 1910, World Missionary Conference, Volume I p.406, cited in Boer 1979 p.495
 2. Boer 1979 p.218

In the period between 1900 and 1940, although there was growth of the Church with concomitant increases in the numbers of Christian converts which expanded the Christian communities, it was in no way comparable to the rapid growth in both Churches and Christian numbers in the shorter period of 20 years, between 1940 and 1960.¹ This was so because Christian Missionary work among the M-Belt groups and societies became linked with indigenous Christian converts who were trained as Pastors, Evangelists and Teachers and upon the completion of their courses returned to serve among their different groups and societies.²

In the period between 1940 and 1960 Christian Missionary Policy was that the indigenous Pastors, Evangelists-Teachers and well established Christian converts proselytise under European Christian Missionary guidance and supervision, who might subsequently be forced to go back to Europe depending on the nature of political relations that develop with the governments in The North of Nigeria.³

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1. This is examined with more concrete data and examples in Chapter Sections below
 2. Crampton 1975 p.156
 3. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5 significant as a result of this initial strategy, while in the period between 1900 and 1950 European Christian Missionaries 'did battle' with government of British administration in The North over issues of religion and social welfare deprivations affecting the M-Belt groups and societies, in the period between 1950 and 1967 the Christian leadership produced by Christian Missionaries, supported by Christian converts as well as other non-Islamic persons in the M-Belt areas who organized the 'Tribal' parties subsequently fed into the M-Belt Movement, took over the same struggle with governments in The North to demand not only 'equal rights and the basic freedoms of society' but political separation from the Islamic society into a M-Belt Region within the political framework of the Nigerian Federation. These political demands intensified at a period when institutions of government and political leadership in the causes of political development in The North became systematically transferred by the British to Islamic leadership. These issues are examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5

Table 3.8 Christian Missionary Institutions, Numbers of Christian converts, Indigenous Teachers/Evangelists, Church numbers and numbers of students in Christian Missionary schools developed among groups and societies in The North in 1931

Territorial Area in The North	Evangelists and Teachers	% Total	Churches	% Total	Converts	% Total	Schools	% Total	Student Numbers	% Total	
The Islamic Society	Core Islamic Centres	23	24.7	24	16.0	4,309	22.4	27	26.2	723	24.4
	Yoruba Irredentist Areas	24	25.8	82	54.7	11,014	57.4	31	30.1	1,103	37.2
Others with M-Belt groups and societies	46	49.5	44	29.3	3,868	20.2	45	43.7	1,138	38.4	
Total	93	100%	150	100%	19,191	100%	103	100%	2,964	100%	

Source: Computed from Tables of the 1931 Census Report in Talbot 1969 p.248-263; Subsequently in 1952 the population of the North is suggested to be 17 000 000, with 11, 661 000 Muslims, 4 616 000 Animists and 558 000 Christians. Of the 17 000 000 people in the North in 1952, 2 596 425 were found in the M-Belt areas of Tiv, Idoma, S.Zaria, Jos, S.Bauchi, Muri, Nuwan and Shendam Divisions.

In the period between 1920 and 1931 however, as suggested by the figures as they stood in 1931, in Table 3.8, there was emphasis in the establishment and development of Christian institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies which produced dedicated Christians who consolidated and expanded the Christian communities in the 1940s and 1950s. In 1931 for example, there were 93 indigenous Christian Teachers (Evangelists) in The North. 49.5% of these Teachers were among the M-Belt groups and societies, 25.8% among groups and societies in the Yoruba areas of Ilorin. In the 1950s and 1960s, these Yoruba areas of Ilorin became characterized by political irredentist feelings in the causes to join a pan-Yoruba Region in the West of the Nigerian Federation. 24.7% of the Christian Teachers were concentrated in the core of the Islamic centres of political and religious power in The North.*⁵ There were also 150 Churches established by Christian Missionaries in The North in 1931.

50 (33.3%) of these churches were established by the CMS and were all concentrated in Ilorin Province with 3 other churches inside Ilorin township itself.¹ However, of the total of 150 churches established in The North by 1931, Ilorin Province alone had 82. This represents a 54.7% concentration of churches in Ilorin in the overall distribution of churches in The North. This suggests that the religious divide between Christianity and Islam was brought out into sharper focus at an earlier period in Ilorin Province more than elsewhere in The North.

1. Talbot 1969 p.252

*⁵ See comments at the end of chapter 3.

Other Provinces in The North, containing the M-Belt groups and societies had a total of 44 churches in 1931. This represents 29.3% of the churches established in The North from Christian Missionary activities. There were also 24 (16.0%) Christian churches in the core Islamic centres of political and religious power in places like Nupe and in the townships of Kano, Zaria and Minna. Similarly in 1931 there were about 19,191 Christian converts in The North, out of a total population of 9, 998,314.¹ Christian converts in The North in 1931 represented about 0.2% of the total population in that year.

An institution that was developed by Christian Missionaries and which became collateral to Christianity among the M-Belt groups and societies was the European school system. In the instance of their development among the M-Belt groups and societies Christianity became equated with literacy.² In 1931 there were 103 Christian Missionary schools in The North producing educated persons literate in Roman scripts and adapting European patterns of civilization. 43.7% of the Christian schools with 38.4% of the students on the Missionary roll in The North were concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies.

The Yoruba areas in the Islamic society centred on Ilorin and subsequently irredentist in the 1950s had 30.1% of the Christian Missionary schools in The North with 37.2% of the students on roll in the institutions. The core Islamic centres of politics and religion in The North had 26.2% of the Christian Missionary schools with a 24.4% share of student numbers in 1931. This suggests that Christian schools and student numbers under the religious influence of Christianity became the monopoly of the M-Belt groups and societies as well as of the groups and societies centred on Ilorin.

1. Talbot 1969 p.248
2. Rubingh 1979 p.137

Although the figures in Table 3.8 suggest that European Missionaries consolidated their progress in Christianizing The North, there was still little Christian religious impact on the majority population in both the Islamic society and the very M-Belt groups and societies that had become the focus Christianity. Many people remained non-Islamic as well as non-Christian in 1931.

Table 3.9 suggests that a large proportion of the population in The North was still non-Christian as much as it was non-Moslem in both the Islamic society and among the M-Belt groups and societies after over 30 years of Christian Missionary religious efforts. While there were many Moslems among the M-Belt groups and societies, the majority of the population was non-Islamic and practised African traditional systems of religious beliefs. This is implicit in the high proportional scores under African traditional systems of beliefs concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies in 1931 as suggested by the figures in Table 3.9.

However, the significant patterns in the Christian religious developments in 1931 suggested by the figures in the Table is that where there were numerically more Christians in The North there were less Moslems. For example, this was particularly so in the sharp contrasts between Kano and Benue. While there was a proportion of 0.03 Christians and 965.0 Moslems to a thousand persons in Kano, in Benue there was a proportion of 0.4 Christians and 14.4 Moslems. Similarly where there were more Moslems there was also a lesser number of Christians and persons practising African traditional systems of beliefs. The sharp contrasts between groups and societies found in Kano and Benue are again explicit of these suggested patterns in Table 3.9. The crucial difference for the development of Christianity

Table 3.9 Proportions in Thousands of Religious adherents to Populations of groups and societies in The North in 1931

Territorial Area in The North		Christians	Moslems	African Traditional Systems of Beliefs
Core of the Islamic Society	Kano	0.03	965.0	34.9
	Sokoto	0.04	869.6	110.4
	Borno	0.08	687.9	312.0
	Kontagora	0.22	205.1	794.7
	Nupe	1.50	503.7	494.8
Yoruba Irredentist groups and societies	Ilorin	18.7	324.1	657.2
Others with M-Belt groups and Societies	Yola	0.1	426.7	573.2
	Benue (Munshi)	0.4	14.4	985.2
	Nasarawa	0.7	160.2	839.1
	Bauchi	0.9	448.8	550.3
	Zaria	0.9	697.5	301.6
	Muri	1.2	186.4	812.4
Proportion for The North as a whole		1.9	670.1	328.0

among the M-Belt groups and societies in the 1940s and 1950s as suggested by the figures in Table 3.9 however is that where there were Christians there was also a high concentration of persons practising traditional African systems of beliefs at a higher proportion than Moslems. The general pattern among the M-Belt groups and societies however, except for the instance of Zaria Province was that Moslems were outnumbered by persons identified with traditional African systems of beliefs. In the instance of Zaria Province the small population sizes of the non-Islamic groups and societies concentrated in S. Zaria explains the smaller proportions of persons with traditional African belief systems rather than an Islamic predominance in the whole of that territory. In other instances however, particularly so for the majority of the M-Belt groups and societies like the Tiv¹ in Benue who were almost all non-Islamic, and eclipsed Christianity by the practice of traditional African systems of beliefs and worship, there was a consistent concentration of persons who were non-Christian and non-Moslem in religious identification.

The initial increases in Christian Missionary converts who subsequently built the churches and the Christian communities were attracted by medical work in Christian Missionary centres. Using the Tiv experience as an example, Rubingh suggests that traditional world views about religion and society were given "a mortal blow and became eroded" by a variety of forces upon impact with British influences after 1900.² The most significant of these forces which were most dramatic in influencing the Tiv Society were Christian Missionary European school systems, Western European medicine with its concomitant consequences on eroding traditional religious beliefs and practices as cures and Christianity itself within the institution of the church

1. Scored as "Munshi" in the 1931 Census Reports
 2. Rubingh 1969 p.130

and its converts.¹ These influences affected the general patterns in the development of Christianity after 1930 among the other M-Belt groups and societies albeit the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North where Christian Missionary activities became concentrated. Although the Christian Missionary school system was an instrument in creating socio-political and economic consciousness about the nature of unequal relationships in society in The North and as it related to the development of a Christian religious identity among the M-Belt groups and societies, before 1930, the educational emphasis was on Reading, Writing and Simple Arithmetic, the basic 3Rs in European literacy with the Roman script and numerals.

This process of educating the initial Christians from among the majority of the M-Belt groups and societies found on the Plateau, Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria was with the Hausa Language, which was the dominant language of society and government in The North. As latterly as in 1937 however Perham still termed the Christian Missionary institutions of European type of learning as "Bush Schools", because their educational standards were lower when they were compared with similar institutions developed in The North by the government of British administration.² For example, the English language was not taught in the Bible Training Schools in the period between 1900 and 1930. Rather the linguistic emphasis was on the Hausa language as well as each vernacular language of the different groups and societies in the M-Belt areas.

1. Rubingh 1969 p.130-170

2. For more detailed examples, see discussions in Chapter Sections III and IV.

However in instances where the groups and societies were numerous and concentrated over a small territorial area, the dominant languages of the groups and societies that were numerically big became emphasized. This was particularly so for the development and translations as well as selections of the Bible to be translated into indigenous languages by the Christian Missionaries. This was so for the Birom in Jos Division, the Sura and Angas in Pankshin, the Yergam in Shendam Divisions on the Plateau and the Bachama in Adamawa, the Tangale Waja in S. Bauchi, the Jaba and Chawai in S. Zaria and the Jukun and Tiv in Benue.¹

The Sura^{*6} were the first of the M-Belt groups and societies to have "selections of the Scriptures" translated into their indigenous Mahavul language as early as 1913.² In the instance of the religious developments affecting the groups and societies in Jos Division, the Birom language was learnt by SUM Christian Missionaries before 1916 and in that year the Gospel according to St. Mark became translated into the indigenous language.³ Similar religious emphasis on dominant groups and societies characterized the development of the Bible and indigenous languages in Pankshin and Shendam Divisions on the Plateau. The Gospel according to St. Mark became translated into Sura and Angas languages in 1913 and 1916 respectively and into the Yergam language in 1917.⁴ When compared to the smaller Plateau

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1. This is implicit in the chronology of the development of 'Translations of the Scriptures into Languages of The North' produced by Crampton 1975 p.218
 2. Crampton 1975 p.218
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid

*6 See comments at end of chapter 3.

groups and societies it took decades before the Irigwe had the Gospel of St. Mark translated into their indigenous language in 1923, the Rukuba in 1924 and the Jarawa and Gamawuri in 1940.¹

Christian Missionary emphasis on indigenous local languages was strong, sufficiently that they wished to integrate themselves socially into "the tribes" with their Christianity rather than integrate "the tribes" into Christianity.² This was so because in the period before 1930 Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and societies were concerned to create total ethnic Christian communities that practised Christianity without the influences of an external culture rather than that which was indigenous to their group and society.

Similarly among the Tiv in Benue, Rubingh suggests that Christian Missionary methodology aimed at the conversion of the soul with "strong aversions" to the teachings of English and the Hausa languages.³ The Tiv therefore received the Gospel in Tiv and became initially educated in the Tiv vernacular.⁴ This was so because Christian Missionaries, particularly the DRCM wished that the Tiv be sheltered from the

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1. Crampton 1975 p.218
 2. In my interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu in January 1981, it was suggested to me that Dah Jang Chollom, an early Birom convert into Christianity, is crippled in one leg because of "frustration kicks" caused by Mr Suffil, the SUM Missionary at Forum Station, when Dah Jang Chollom dared to greet Mr Suffil in the English language with a "good morning" instead of using the Birom language. Dah Jang Chollom was the Christian Missionary Gardener and cook until about 1970.
 3. Rubingh 1969 p.100
 4. Ibid

insidious influences of secularism and materialism and therefore sought to isolate the Tiv from the corruptive forces outside their own group and society.¹ This was the premise from which, according to Rubingh: "... The DRCM insisted that the Tiv remain Tiv and school children who affected foreign ways were soon brought to heel. *Corporal punishment, given by the Missionaries themselves was common for those who essayed to speak English, to wear shoes or to ride a bicycle.* When in 1930 the Government went in the direction of introducing Hausa into the schools .. the Mission refused to accede and continued its instruction solely in Tiv. The DRCM had no desire to see Hausa become the medium of instruction and in time, the language of the Church. This never happened in Tiv".²

Furthermore, on the Jos Plateau, where the SUM was the dominant Christian Missionary Body, its educational policy in the period between 1907 and 1930 de-emphasized Western education and European modernizing skills. Instead the focus was on the Gospel, Christianity and the Hoe. This was meant to make the "tribes" self-sufficient and to remain to work on their indigenous lands, the lands of their ancestors.³ This was also the case with the Tiv when the American branch of the SUM offered the Tiv-field to the South African DRCM. In that instance

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1. Rubingh 1969 p.100
 2. Ibid p.101
 3. Maxwell 1954 p.152

the suggested reason was that the Tiv: "... were an agricultural people. This would give your branch special favour with them as you favour industrial work. As far as I know the country, there is some excellent farmland near Salatu. I think that horses, cattle and other livestock could be kept there".¹

Furthermore, in the period between 1920 and 1930, Christian Missionary efforts focussed their energies and attention on each of the M-Belt groups and societies as a distinct cultural entity rather than create socially integrated communities built on a Christian conception of an identity. One consequence of this was that there developed notions of "tribes" with a Christian identity rather than Christians with "tribal" identities among both European Missionaries and Christians in the different M-Belt groups and societies.² In other words, the "tribal" identities persisted before they were partially eclipsed by the Christian religious identity.

In the 1940s however Christianity began to transcend the identities of ethnic social and political boundaries. This was a consequence of the social consciousness achieved by indigenous Christians about religious polarities existing in society in The North

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1. E. Casaleggio, cited in Rubingh 1969 p.100
 2. As latterly as 1981 for example in the course of my field work research interviews in Numan, although the cultural lifestyle is typically Hausa and Islamic which restrained my entry into houses for fear of interferring with women in Purdah, I was bluntly told that "the Bachama are Christians" rather than 'the Christians here are Bachama'.

rather than as a process induced by European Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and societies.¹ Christianity among the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1900 and 1940 therefore initially generated and maintained disparate ethnic identities which became reinforced, despite an existing collective social and political identity externally imposed on the M-Belt groups and societies. This being that the M-Belt groups and societies were "pagan" and "non-Islamic" in identity in The North.

Although the initial religious emphasis in Christian Missionary activities on the Bible, the vernaculars and the 'tribal land' of each of the groups and societies in the M-Belt areas conditioned and reinforced previously existing social and political identities, in the 1940s and 1950s there was increased development in the consciousness of the Christian religious identity that became conceived of by each of the groups as belonging to part of the family of the "children of Jesus".² Hausa was 'the language of the Church' among the majority of the ethnic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas after 1920.

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1. It is however acknowledged that achieving social consciousness about the religious polarities in society in The North was a function of Christian Missionary activities which shaped and conditioned its form.
 2. This is a direct translation from the Hausa language conception: "Yayan Yesu", which became explicit in interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang, Dah Chunun as well as highly European educated persons like Barnabas Dudu and Patrick Dokotri in January 1981.

This was so, even when there were changes of emphasis from doing battle with Islam to produce a Christian society in The North to creating "tribal Christian communities" which might be used to evangelize other "pagan" communities.

In the period between 1930 and 1950 social conceptions of the "Children of Jesus" as an identity remained within each of the M-Belt groups and societies. The really significant social difference to earlier patterns of identifications in the period before 1940 is that non-Moslems as well as people who practised various forms of African traditional systems of beliefs and worship identified with the Christian concept before they became Christians.¹ It was from these social and political identity patterns that the M-Belt groups and societies began to see threads of unity among themselves which enabled their transcendence from ethnic Christian communities to a community of Christian people from the different ethnic groups. Subsequently this consciousness produced political support for the M-Belt Movement when it was begun in 1949. In the period between 1950 and 1960 and well into the 1970s, many Christians, albeit others in The North saw M-Belt territories as "the Bible Belt" centred on the Plateau.²

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1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, December 1980; in his own experience, this was particularly so when he travelled in Adamawa, Plateau, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria. Jonah Assadugu did not travel to Tiv, Isoma and Igala Christian communities in 1949 when they built up social and political support from Christian communities for the M-Belt Movement.
 2. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu and Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.

In the instance of the Plateau groups and societies however unlike the situation of the DRCM among the Tiv, the SUM used Hausa to become the language of the Church while it maintained 'tribal' languages to evangelize, make converts into Christianity and diffuse Christian ideas. When individuals from the different groups and societies experienced Christianity, they also became "Hausa speaking Christians". Except for the Tiv, Idoma and Igala, Christianity among the M-Belt groups and societies united disparate social and political identities with the Hausa language.

Unlike what Tacitus, the Roman historian suggests, the language of the conqueror became the language of Christian unity among the M-Belt groups and societies and was subsequently used in the political rhetoric of the M-Belt Movement.¹

In the instance of the development of Christianity among some M-Belt groups and societies, this suggests the premise from which Maxwell, among other Christian Missionaries became involved in translating Anglican religious hymns into Hausa.² For example: "... 25 have been published in the most recent edition of "The Littafain Wakoki", an ecumenical Hausa Hymn Book for the Protestant Missionaries and Churches in Nigeria".³ Yet among the Jukun, where

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1. Tacitus suggested that: "The language of the conqueror in the mouth of the conquered is forever the language of the slave", cited in Hechter 1975 p.150.
 2. Boer 1979 p.144
 3. Boer 1979 p.144

he spent a substantial amount of his life-time in doing Christian Missionary work, he attained only "a measure of competence" in that language, which enabled him to translate portions of the Scripture.¹ Furthermore it was not until 1927 that the Kona Jukun had the Gospel translated into their own indigenous language.²

This was so because in the period between 1853 and 1932 the Christian religious emphasis of European Missionaries in their efforts to diffuse Christianity was on the languages of the Islamic groups and societies in The North. In 1853 for example selections of the Book of Genesis in the Bible became translated into Hausa and Kanuri languages.³ In 1860 there were similar selections of the Book of Genesis which became translated into the Nupe language, a predominantly Islamic group and society which is fanatically loyal to Sokoto in politics and religion.⁴ In 1880 the whole of the New Testament of the Bible became translated into the Hausa language.⁵ In 1881 the Igbirra who had substantial Islamic communities had the Gospel according to St. Matthew translated into their language by the Christian Missionaries.⁶ In 1915 Nupe, like the Hausa had the

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1. Boer 1979 p.144
 2. Crampton 1979 p.218
 3. Crampton 1975 p.218
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid
 6. Ibid

New Testament translated into their language.¹ In 1919 the Gospel according to St. John was translated into Fulani and the whole of the New Testament in 1964.² The whole Bible became translated into Hausa by Walter Miller in 1932 and into Nupe by other Christian Missionaries in 1953.³

The Hausa Language Bible as was translated by Miller from the English version has become the effective element of the religious forms of the M-Belt Christian identity and to the present day generation of Christians in that area it ought to persist unchanged. Ayandele suggests that it has become a religious legacy for the "Hausa speaking Christians" in The North, particularly for those in Adamawa, Benue as well as other groups and societies in the territories of the political M-Belt, whose "Book in Hausa" is just the Bible produced by Miller.⁴ Ayandele further suggests that despite: "... the discovery of grammatical and literacy shortcomings of the Miller Bible, the Christian Churches have not succeeded in having another translation .. they have refused to cooperate, saying that the Miller Bible is the only version they will have and that to attempt to alter it is tantamount to undermining its sacredness".⁵ *7

In the instance of translations of the Bible into the indigenous languages of The North, the Tiv being the most populous of the non-Islamic groups in The North and among the M-Belt groups and societies

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1. Crampton 1975 p.218
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid p.128, p.218; Ayandele 1980 p.153
 4. Ayandele 1980 p.153
 5. Ayandele 1980 p.153; although this is a contested opinion, Ayandele does not give any crisp sources of the rejection.

*7 See comment at end of chapter 3.

had selections of the Book of Genesis translated into their language as early as 1914, the New Testament in 1936 and the whole Bible in 1964.¹

In context of the indigenous languages to the M-Belt groups and societies and the development of translations of the Bible, there was therefore emphasis on the Hausa language. It was only the Tiv language that compared with Hausa in the early development of the Bible into indigenous languages followed by the Tangale Waja who had St. Luke translated as early as 1920 and subsequently the New Testament in 1932.² The Burra also were characterized by the early development of the Bible in which selections of Genesis became translated in 1924 and all of the New Testament in 1939.³

The translations of the Scriptures into languages of The North, suggested by 'the Crampton Chronology' show that only selections of the Book of Genesis and the Gospel of St. Mark, Luke, John and Matthew were completed before 1950.⁴ It was not until in the period between 1950 and 1970 that there was the development of translations of the New Testament and subsequently all of the Bible into languages of the numerically dominant groups and societies in the M-Belt areas like the Igala and Tiv in Benue, Tangale in S. Bauchi and Adamawa, and the Burra also in Adamawa.⁵ The Tiv and Igala for example had all of the Bible translated into their languages in 1964 and 1970 respectively.⁶

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1. Crampton 1975 p.218
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid
 6. Ibid

The use of Hausa as the language of the churches among groups and societies found in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria, Plateau and Benue¹, except for the DRCM and RCM churches among the Tiv, Idoma and Igala which were in their own indigenous languages, was later on regretted as a proselytizing strategy in the process of establishing the Christian churches among the non-Islamic and non-Hausa communities in those areas and in The North generally. This was the premise from which in the 1950s Maxwell suggests that Christian Missionaries, particularly the SUM: "... made one somewhat grave mistake, for we did our preaching and teaching mainly in the Hausa language, instead of the mother tongue of the people... (for example) The Gospel should have reached the Jukun in their own home speech, not in the tongue of the Mohammedan Strangers".²

This was so for example because SUM policy in the period between 1900 and 1930 focussed on Christian evangelical work rather than on creating Western European civilization. Maxwell suggests that for SUM Christian Missionaries it was: "... sternly necessary for the Mission worker to remember that he is there to evangelise, not to civilise much less to Europeanise. He must never forget that the soul of the culture is the culture of the soul. All true life and progress must come from within".³

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1. Before 1940 Benue Province included the six Divisions of Lafiya, Nasarawa, Keffi, Idoma, Gboko and Wukari.
 2. Maxwell 1952 p.61
 3. Ibid p.152

At the Gindiri Training schools therefore, the religious focus of activities was on producing Pastors from the different groups and societies in the M-Belt areas. In the period between 1925 and 1930 the Gindiri schools produced Pastors like Toma Tok Bot (Biom), Bali (Yergam) and David Lot (Sura) with Toma Tok Bot becoming the first Pastor of the SUM churches indigenous to 'the Sudan concept'.¹ In the period between 1925 and 1927 for example the Gindiri schools trained over 380 Christian Pastors and Evangelists.² These came from among groups and societies where by 1920 Christian Missionary religious activities had created a community of Christians. For example, in that period there were 200 Yergam, 80 Jukun, 70 Biom and 30 Ninzam studying in the Gindiri Training schools.³ According to Maxwell, the SUM among other Christian Missionary Bodies in The North saw the policy and process of "Evangelizing without civilizing and Europeanizing" as fruitful in the period between 1920 and 1940: "... because it avoided the rush to become clerks which is evident in some places in Nigeria (ie. Southern Nigeria) .. as young folk aspire to the collar and tie jobs, easy and big money and a position for themselves, regardless of what happens to home, village and tribe".⁴

After 1930 however the SUM for example regretted their initial policy on education as it related to the needs of its converts in the Christian communities among the M-Belt groups and societies to participate in politics and society when nationalist political demands

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1. Maxwell 1952 p.217
 2. SUM Report, The Light Bearer Magazines, 1925-1927, p.66
 3. SUM Report, The Light Bearer Magazines, 1925-1927 p.66
 4. Maxwell 1952 p.152

increased political participation in society. This was the premise from which in the period between 1930 and 1950, Christian Missionary Bodies in The North made frantic efforts to improve the quality of Western European education in their schools concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies. Maxwell suggests that this was so because Christian Missionary Bodies like the SUM felt there was a religious need: "... to grasp the remaining chances of making good this matter wherein we have failed. We must turn out men and women competently trained to teach the members of their own tribe up to a standard which will enable them to think for themselves and wisely to play and work for the future of the country ... *It is for us no longer merely the question of winning a group of individuals for Christ .. it is now the question of settling the destiny of a nation which demands for its carrying out the formation of a powerful Christian community, intelligent, progressive and far-seeing.* The days of easy conclusions are gone for ever ... mere holding of services will not suffice. They must be thoroughly equipped with and taught to use the Sword of the Spirit, for they will have to fight for faith against deceptive doctrines and diabolical propaganda. To this end, it is imperative that we do our best to give them competently trained Pastors, able not merely "to break the bread of life" as we say to them, but also to perceive and expose the falsehood of much of the talk of today which leads men to look for heaven upon earth and find satisfaction upon things and not in God."¹

1. Maxwell 1952 p.300

In 1930 all the Christian Missionary Bodies in The North had a total of 152 schools with 3,446 pupils enrolled.¹ Subsequently in the period between 1930 and 1960 Christian Missionary schools with concomitant student enrolments dramatically increased among the M-Belt groups and societies.² In the same period there were also enormous increases in the numbers of Christian churches and converts, with the Christian converts being from a younger age group than was previously the case. This constituted a second generation of Christians whose children in the 1940s and 1950s became born into Christian families.³ It was this group of Christians who consolidated the emergent Christian communities among the M-Belt groups and societies.

Crampton suggests that Christian numbers have consistently increased since 1921.⁴ For example in the period between 1921 and 1963, while the percentage of Moslems rose from 67.01 to 71.8 that of Christians rose from 0.13 to 19.6.⁵ This means that more people in The North became Christians rather than Moslems. This was particularly so for M-Belt groups and societies found in Adamawa, S. Bauchi,

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1. Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.33
 2. This is examined and discussed with more analytical detail in Section IV of this Chapter and also in Chapters 4 and 5 .
 3. For example my father and mother among others became Christians when they were 18 years old before they were married in the church and subsequently sent to Gindiri for Christian religious training. This was so even when my father came from a Moslem family and my mother from a non-Moslem and non-Christian family. They both produced their nine children in Christian communities that ranged from Fan village itself, the Gindiri schools to Jos Township.
 4. Crampton 1981 p.4
 5. Crampton 1981 p.4

S. Zaria, Plateau and Benue, where by 1963 Christian numbers in the local communities either equalled or overtook the numbers of Moslems.¹

In the period between 1930 and 1950 therefore Christian Missionary evangelical and education policy changed and became characterized by a combination of religious teachings with knowledge and skills required for Western European modernization. This was a departure from the pure emphasis of only Christian religious teaching to produce exclusively "Christian tribes" doing agriculture on the traditional lands of their ancestors. These developments in the changed educational policy, produced the establishments of SUM post-primary institutions in Gindiri in 1934, SIM institutions in Kagoro in S. Zaria in 1935, RCM in Zonkwa and Kafancham in S. Zaria in 1939, CMS in Zaria in 1942, DRCM centred at MKar among the Tiv in Benue in 1948.²

Previously academically "promising Christian converts" from the different M-Belt groups and societies were sent mainly by the RCM to seminaries and post-primary Christian institutions in Ibadan, Lagos and Enugu in Southern Nigeria.³

The Christian Missionary post-primary institutions developed in The North after 1930 were based on the ideas contained in the proposals made by the SUM as early as in 1911.⁴ In that instance,

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1. Crampton 1981 p.4
 2. Crampton 1975 p.101-118; Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.33; Perham 1962 p.278-279.
 3. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri and Alexander Fom, January 1981.
 4. Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.33

it was suggested that seminaries be built for the training of Christian Teachers and Evangelists from among the different M-Belt groups and societies.¹

In the instance of the SUM however the proposals were not implemented until 1932 when the Gindiri schools were started with 15 of the 18 men admitted being trained by W.M. Bristow, while the remaining 3 were trained as School Teachers by Miss Elsie Rimmer.² This suggests that even when the schools began with an explicit policy objective the educational emphasis still remained firmly rooted in the training of Christian Pastors and Evangelists.

The majority of the students admitted into these post-primary institutions were recruited from among the groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria, Plateau and Benue areas with the bulk of the students coming from groups and societies in its surrounding territorial location. For example, Gindiri became the Christian Missionary educational institution, training the majority of the Plateau groups and societies.

Table 3.10 suggests that 56.5% of the students in Gindiri schools came from among the Plateau groups and societies. 19.3% of the students were Fyem which is the group and society indigenous to the territorial location of the schools. The Gindiri schools also trained and educated mainly people from the indigenous groups and societies in the M-Belt areas. These constituted 89.2% of the total number of students in the institutions.

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1. Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.33
 2. Ibid; Crampton 1975 p.107

Table 3.10 Ethnic Origins of Students in Gindiri Schools in the period between 1934 and 1952

Territorial Area	Ethnic Origins	Number of Students	% total number of students
Plateau	Fyam	162	19.3
	Birom	99	11.8
	Sura	77	9.2
	Yergam	49	5.8
	Angas	41	4.9
	Others: Mapun, Kulere	46	5.5
	Total	(474)	(56.5)
Behue	Tiv	52	6.2
	Igala	29	3.5
	Jukun	18	2.1
	Idoma	9	1.1
	Others	14	1.6
	Total	(122)	(14.5)
Adamawa	Bura	26	3.1
	Bachama	9	1.1
	Longuda	8	0.9
	Others: Marghi, Kilba Wurkum	19	2.3
	Total	(62)	(7.4)
S. Zaria	Ninzam	22	2.6
	Kaje	11	1.3
	Jaba	7	0.8
	Others	16	1.9
	Total	(56)	(6.6)
S. Bauchi	Jarawa, Lere, Mbula	(34)	(4.1)
The Islamic Society in The North and Other Nigerian Regions	Ibo	30	3.6
	Ilorin Yoruba	26	3.1
	Hausa/Fulani/Nupe	17	2.0
	Southern Yoruba	8	0.9
	Other S. Nigerians	10	1.2
	Total	(91)	(10.8)
Total		839	100%

Source: The Gindiri Jubilee Magazine 1934-1959, Jos, 1960 p.22 ;
 In 1952, the population of the M-Belt areas was about 3 868 245 (22.8%) in a population of 17 000 000 in the North.

It is expected that other similar Christian Missionary Institutions like those of the DRCM at MKar among the Tiv in Benue, the SIM at Waka in Adamawa and Kagoro in S. Zaria, the RCM in Zonkwa and Kafanchan in S.Zaria and subsequently in Oturkpo among the Idoma in Benue similarly focussed attention in the patterns of admitting students from the local groups and societies while at the same time admitting others from distant places from the M-Belt areas. It was not until in the 1940s and 1950s therefore that when there were more European educated Christian young men in the midst of increased Christian converts among the M-Belt groups and societies, developed from the activities of Christian Missionaries that ethnic socio-political consciousness and political identity patterns developed. At about the same point in time this consciousness in political identity patterns began to transcend ethnic confines into conceptions of the "Children of Jesus" as a religious cum political identity to produce initial social and political support for the M-Belt Movement in the 1950s which attracted European educated young men from these societies.

While Christian Missionary policy on educating the M-Belt groups and societies faltered in the period between 1900 and 1930 government policy in the same period and in many respects thereafter was clear-cut and headed toward the development of political leadership from the Islamic society as leadership for The North. In that instance literacy in the Roman script which conditioned European modernizing skills developed among the Islamic groups and societies rather than among the M-Belt groups and societies. Since Christian

Missionary focus was concentrated on the Islamic society in the same period, the M-Belt groups and societies lagged behind in literacy with the Roman scripts. However when Christian Missionary attention became focussed on the M-Belt groups and societies, there was rapid development in the increases of the % population, literate in Roman scripts.

The figures in Table 3.11 ought to be understood in context of the smaller population proportion relative to the Islamic society which was concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies. Table 3.11. therefore suggests that literacy rates in Roman scripts in the period between 1900 and 1920 was concentrated among the Islamic groups and societies, with the M-Belt groups and societies showing a 0.6% of the population literate. This means that while more people read and wrote in Roman scripts in the Islamic society only a few had those skills from among the M-Belt groups and societies. This initial advantage complimented the dominance of the Islamic society already literate in the Arabic script.

One of the ways in which social and political prejudices directed against the M-Belt groups and societies became built in The North was rooted in the civilizing notions of a non-reading, non-writing civilization, a civilization that was based on human memory.¹

Table 3.11 further suggests that in the period between 1920 and 1950 there was increased literacy rate in Roman script in The North. While literacy in the Roman script in the Islamic society increased from 15.6% in 1921 to 22.1% in 1951, there was a similar

1. For more detailed examples see discussions in Chapter 1 and 2.

Table 3.11 Literacy in Roman and Arabic Scripts in The North for the period between 1921 and 1951.

% Literacy Figures in The North

Territorial Area in 1921	% 1921 Literacy in Population with Roman Script	Territorial Area in 1951	% Literacy in 1951 Population	
			Roman	Arabic
Kanuri	5.3	Ilorin Yoruba and Kabba	10.3	-
Islamic Society in The North	Fulani	Zaria	5.6	10.8
	Hausa	Kano	0.9	8.0
	Nupe	Katsina	1.6	4.8
	Ilorin Yoruba	Niger	2.8	4.0
		Borno	0.9	2.1
Others in The North including the M-Belt groups and societies in Adamawa, S.Bauchi Plateau, S.Zaria and Benue	0.6	Plateau	5.1	2.2
		Benue	1.9	1.0

Sources: 1921 figures are derived from C.K. Meek, 'Northern Tribes' 1925 Vol.2 p.258; the average literacy rate in Roman Scripts for The North in 1921 was 1.94%; the 1951 figures are derived from NHA Debates, 15th January 1953 p.29; the average literacy rate in Roman Script for 1951 was scored as 2.1% - John Smith (1972 p.66-68) further suggests that the figures for literacy in Roman scripts for 1951 in Zaria Province may be safely assumed to be a concentrated literacy rate of S.Zaria because of the numbers of schools and the smaller population proportion of the province in that area when compared to Northern Zaria where there is the interesting converse literacy rate in Arabic script to the Roman, The population of the North in 1921 was estimated from tax records as 9998 314 with about 2042 335 (20.4%) in the M-Belt areas. In 1952, the population of the North was 17000 000 and about 2596 425 lived in Tiv, Idoma, S.Zaria, Jos, S.Bauchi, Muri, Numan and Shendam Divisions.

increase among the non-Islamic groups and societies from 0.6% in 1921 to 7.0% in 1951 for groups and societies concentrated in Plateau and Benue Provinces alone. Furthermore, while in 1921 Yoruba in Ilorin were the least literate in Roman scripts among other groups and societies in the Islamic society in The North, in 1951 the highest level of literacy in Roman script was from the population concentrated among the Yoruba in Ilorin and other groups and societies in Kabba. In 1951 the Plateau groups and societies were the most literate of the M-Belt groups and societies. While 5.1% of the population on the Plateau was literate only 1.9% was literate in Benue. In the late 1940s and in the early 1950s, the M-Belt Movement assumed organizational form from among the groups and societies on the Plateau just as irredentist separatist political demands for merging with a pan-Yoruba Region became characteristic of Ilorin and Kabba areas at about the same period. This suggests that Christianity and literacy were instruments directly related to consciousness about patterns of political identity and the circumstances of social and economic relations existing among groups and societies in The North.

As expected, Table 3.11 further suggests that literacy in Arabic script was concentrated in the Islamic society in The North. In the instance of groups and societies in the Plateau and Benue Provinces, 2.2% and 1.0% of the population was respectively, literate in Arabic script. Ames suggests that upon impact with British influences in the period between 1900 and 1937 some groups and societies on the Plateau: "... adopted some of the outward culture

of Mohammedans owing to a certain social status which they imagined is acquired by so doing and send their children to Koranic schools".¹ Although that was so, it is suggested here that the significant percentage literacy in Arabic script on the Plateau and that in Benue is explained by the presence of a migrant population after 1900 rather than groups and societies indigenous to both areas.

Literacy in Roman script in both the instances of Ilorin and Kabba and in the political core of the M-Belt areas being Plateau and Benue was a direct consequence of Christian Missionary activities, in particular on educational development rather than from the educational efforts by the government of British administration in The North.² This is the premise from which Ozigi and Ocho suggest that the Tiv, Idoma, Sura, Jukun, Birom, Angas, Igala, Gwari and numerous other groups and societies in the M-Belt areas of Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria: "... have a life debt to pay to Christian Missionaries for transforming their socio-political and economic outlook into that of the twentieth century".³

In the period between 1950 and 1965 the government of the NPC party in The North depended on European educated Northerners, the majority of whom were Christian Missionary products, to manage the Western European institutions of governing society.⁴ The Christian

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers* 1937, 1972 p.307
 2. This is examined in more detail in Section IV of this Chapter
 3. Ozigi and Ocho, 1981 p.38
 4. *Ibid*

Missionary products filled up the administrative, and in some instances, political vacancies created by the departing British officers, even when there were increased political tensions developed from demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region or over irredentist feelings directed toward joining a pan-Yoruba Western Region of Nigeria from Ilorin and Kabba areas in The North.¹ The majority of Christian Missionary products recruited into government jobs in The North in that period however came from groups and societies in the M-Belt areas and from Ilorin and Kabba areas.

Although responsibility became shifted to Christian Missionaries to educate the M-Belt groups and societies with European modernizing skills as a partial policy of the government of British administration in The North, the political and religious problems Christian Missionaries faced became compounded by meagre financial assistance from public funds.² In the period between 1900 and 1940 Christian Missionary educational institutions which were concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies operated with little financial assistance from the government of British administration in The North. Christian Missionary social and welfare institutions similarly suffered from a lack of financial assistance during the same period. For example, as lately as 1944, Dr Barnaden, the SUM Christian Missionary Medical Officer suggests

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1. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5 where in the instance of the period in question, it is argued that the recruitment of administrative officers into the Bureaucracy of The North was tied up to the very nature of the politics among the different M-Belt groups and societies.
 2. For example initial financial assistance to Christian Missionaries from the government were small. Government and NA schools were directly funded while only a few Christian Missionary schools received little funding despite the higher proportions of student attendance were recorded in the Christian Missionary schools in the period between 1900 and 1940. Government assistance to Christian Missionary schools and social welfare institutions in the period between 1940 and 1965 when there was the M-Belt Movement is examined in Section IV of this Chapter and in Chapters 4 and 5

that the Vom Christian Hospital, as it was then called, received no government financial assistance.¹ Dr Barnden further suggested another example of a voluntary Medical Agency which according to him had "no Christian personnel" and got various forms of government financial assistance including rail travel and free leprosy clothing that were imported duty free.² From that situation, Barden suggested that: "... no such aid applied to the Mission because of Christianity. The attitude of Government toward Christian leprosy institutions in Moslem areas is a warning that no help will be given to any Christian work unless secularized".³

The religious reason for the government policy was suggested as: "... the Christian Missionaries try through Christian services to win confidence and friendship of the Moslem communities (and also proselytise) .. and by proselytising, it was meant the unwelcome visitation from house to house and pressure brought to bear on a person to accept another faith".⁴ The problems faced by Christian Missionaries however did not prevent their progress of Christianizing the M-Belt groups and societies. When in the 1940s Christian Missionaries became successful in making more converts, establishing churches and with a concomitant growth in the numbers and sizes of the Christian communities among the M-Belt groups and societies, they sought to organize Christian unity from the disparate socio-cultural and political identities into a solid bloc directed against Islam. This was in terms of both the dangers Islam poised on the contest for converts with Christianity and

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1. Boer 1979 p.284
 2. Boer 1979 p.284; Government financial assistance to Christian Missionary Bodies in The North is examined in more detail in Section IV of this Chapter and also in Chapters 2 and 4 where we also examine the religious tensions it created.
 3. Dr Barnden 1944, cited in Boer 1979 p.284
 4. Boer 1979 p.284

and over the contest of issues in government, governing and politics in The North and Nigeria. This was so because in that period Christian Missionaries were anxious to establish "a collective element" in the social identity of Christianity to enable the M-Belt groups and societies to become Christian oriented over issues that are of concern to the nature of politics in society in the same of the political performance of Islam in The North.

The religious method which the Christian Missionaries used to achieve this objective was by organizing Christian conferences and conventions, which brought together Christians as well as Church leaders and elders from the different M-Belt groups and societies. For example, Protestant Christian Missionaries, through the organizational channels of the SUM held several annual Christian conventions and conferences in the period between 1940 and 1950.¹ The Christian conventions and conferences were held in rotation from year to year at the different Christian Missionary centres as well as in the district stations.² They were functionally specific because they did not only bring together Christians of different denominations and from the different groups and societies of the M-Belt areas but also created a sense of Christian solidarity.³

For the purposes of creating this sense of "Christian Solidarity" the SUM for example appropriately named one of their settlements as FORUM where church leaders and elders on the Plateau and particularly among the Birom Districts met from time to time.⁴ Besides creating

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1. Crampton 1975 p.135
 2. Ibid
 3. Maxwell 1952 p.261
 4. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot and Barnabas Dusu, December 1980 and January 1981 respectively.

"Christian Solidarity" among the Christian communities, the conventions and conferences also shared and discussed the religious and social needs of the different M-Belt groups and societies for educational development with the development of Christianity. Crampton suggests that requests for teachers with higher qualifications became a persistent theme at these meetings.¹

Although the religious and social objectives in the organization of the Christian communities were numerous, Maxwell suggests that one of the most important was that they were meant to be forums where the Christian community learnt to be: "... a vigorous element in the life of the country, speaking with a voice that must be heard in advocacy of the things that are just and seemly and of good report".² Furthermore Maxwell suggests that although the process of Christian religious training taught the Yergam, Angas, Birom, Sura, Jukun, Jari, Montol and Kulere etc. that they were "brothers and sisters in Christ", Christian conferences and conventions produced opportunities for those Christians who had not the privilege of studying and living at either Training schools or Boarding schools "to develop the same sense of oneness and solidarity".³ In the period between 1940 and 1950 the emphasis in Christian training, whether this was in the Bible schools, the Training Colleges, the secondary schools and the women schools became focussed on the development of a Christian feeling of brother-hood among the M-Belt groups and societies, although

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1. Crampton 1975 p.135
 2. Maxwell 1952 p.261
 3. Ibid p.293-294

it also transcended to accepting other Christians as brothers.¹ Maxwell suggests that by 1950 the Gindiri Training Schools already achieved that objective and implicit in that suggestion the process became consolidated in the 1950s and 1960s. For example in the Gindiri Bible school in 1950: ".. there were 50 students from 20 different tribes represented, each with its own tongue ... but in close daily association with members of the other tribes in study and work and worship which brought about a real experience of oneness of the Christian Church".² According to Maxwell this was important in more than the spiritual life of the country: ".. for it is precisely in this matter of a sense of solidarity and mutual loyalty that one great danger lies for *our non-Moslem people*. *If they do not stick together in these days of a new governmental order, when the executive and legislative work of Nigeria is being transferred to African hands they may find themselves being exploited by the Moslem peoples of The North. The only unifying force for the non-Moslem is the Christian Church.*"³

Implicit in these political anxieties expressed by Maxwell is a suggested strong relationship between the emphasis on "*our non-Moslem people*" and the initial political organization of the M-Belt Movement in the *non-Moslem league* of Northern Nigeria which was begun in 1949. Although the political intensity of Christian Missionary involvement is not very precise, it is apparent that they were deeply engrossed in the M-Belt Movement before the government of British administration alerted them on its political consequences. This was particularly so for the SUM and the SIM Christian Missionaries.⁴

1. Maxwell 1952 p.293-294

2. Ibid

3. Ibid; emphases are mine

4. This is examined in Chapter 4 where the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement is discussed.

The first step toward organizing the Christian communities among the M-Belt groups and societies for "a vigorous life in the country" and for "a sense of solidarity and mutual loyalty", was begun in 1943 when the first Christian convention was held as "The Taron Zumunta" (a fellowship meeting).¹ This was a gathering of African Pastors and Church Elders with members of the European Christian Missionary staff.² In that instance Maxwell suggests that the religious objective of the gathering: "... was just a fellowship meeting, a sort of first step in the formation of a ruling-body for the Church in the Mission's area composed of both African leading Christians and Missionaries; it looked forward to the day when the whole Christian Church would be taking counsel for its affairs as *a solidarity, speaking with one authoritative voice as representing the judgement of those whose aim it is to serve the Kingdom of God established among men and establish a civilization based on truth and love*".³ In 1947 the first Birom Christian convention was held at the SUM centre of Forum: "... arranged entirely by the indigenous members of the Church".⁴ In that instance there were about 2000 people from the different M-Belt groups and societies who attended with an explicit Christian religious identity.⁵ In a subsequent convention held at Takum, the special guest speaker was Bulus Gbajor, an Evangelist with the DRCM among the Tiv, Maxwell wrote: "Tiv differ greatly from the local Jukun and Kutev in speech and custom but in *Christ they are brothers*".⁶

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1. Maxwell 1952 p.261
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid p.261-262; emphases are mine
 4. Crampton 1975 p.135
 5. Maxwell 1952 p.294-295
 6. Ibid p.268

In the period between 1940 and 1950 when there were increased political activities over constitutional developments in Nigeria, Christian Missionaries in The North also became faced with an even more urgently self-created task over the need to organize the Christian communities as Christian Unity in a social movement to enhance political participation. This was the social and political premise from which Maxwell suggested that: "The Moslem element was much more vocal and united than the pagans, for the latter tribes were... not yet aware of how important it is for them to abandon their haughty independence of each other and get together realizing that only in union with each other can they hope to realize their dreams of survival and progress".¹ Implicit in this observation is that the Christian converts as well as the non-Islamic communities in The North were outside the main stream of affairs in the evolving participatory politics in both instances of effects on The North and Nigeria in the particular period of the years between 1940 and 1950. In the period between 1949 and 1951 the Christian conventions and conferences became the most noticeable inclusion into Christian Missionary activities among the M-Belt groups and societies.² This was so because in addition to the Christian Missionary political anxieties about the future of their Christian communities and Christianity in The North, there was also the more specific political and constitutional developments of Nigeria that were shaping the nature and control of political power.

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1. Maxwell 1952 p.270
 2. Ibid p.279; in a very significant way this was the psychological stage from which the Non-Moslem League (NML) launched itself as a political organization - this will be examined in more detail in Chapter 4

In that period political steps were taken by the government of British administration in Nigeria to revise previously existing constitutions with the objective of giving the indigenous people of the country more share in government and governing.¹ In that instance, the government asked the people at all cultural levels right down to villages in society for suggestions and were encouraged to say how the country ought to be governed.² Maxwell suggests that constitutional changes and political developments in Nigeria in the period between 1945 and 1952, raised a three-fold problem for Christian Missionary work in The North and the political future of the Christian communities concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies: "Firstly, there was a great possibility that Moslem members of the Government would greatly outnumber the non-Moslem, so that the Christian minority would be hopelessly outvoted. That would apply to the Northern part of the country only. When the House of Representatives, which combined all the regions of the country in one body would be constituted it was likely that the non-Moslem would have a small minority. The outlook was not too bright for those to whom our society has been ministering. It would have been much better if we had not been so unwilling in the past to venture on a more thorough educational program. As things were the Christians were far too backward educationally to be able to take an active part in political leadership. The pagans were too unenlightened to see the danger to which reference has already been made of being swamped and exploited by the Moslem. Secondly, it brings us a very urgent call to do all that is in our power to grasp the remaining chances of making good this matter wherein we have failed. We must turn out men and women competently trained to teach

1. Coleman 1963 p.271-279; Maxwell 1952 p.229-230
2. Ibid

the members of their own tribes up to a standard which will enable them to think for themselves and wisely to plan for the future of their country. As the teachers of the community are, so will the thinking of the community be. It is for us no longer merely the question of winning a group of individuals for Christ, tremendous though that is, it is now the question of settling the destiny of a Nation which demands .. the formation of a powerful Christian community, intelligent, progressive and farseeing. Thirdly we must have ever before us the possibility that unfriendly developments may in Nigeria, as in China, expell all foreign workers. Our districts must be so staffed that our people will be adequately taught in the things that belong unto their peace. There must be planned, persistent instruction in the actual Scripture itself. They must be thoroughly equipped with and taught to use the Sword of the Spirit, for they will have to fight for their faith against deceptive doctrines and diabolical propaganda".¹

This means that the "Melting Pot" theory within the Christianity that was affecting the socio-cultural and political identities of the M-Belt groups and societies, held by Christian Missionaries in The North, emphasized the religious needs to become unified with the Christian religions rather than remain "Christian tribes". However, this did not mean rejecting existing cultural patterns of identification as it meant respecting their origins as secondary to the primary of the Christian religious identity among the M-Belt groups and societies. In other words, according to Maxwell, the basic infrastructure which might reinforce the already existing Christian superstructure in the Christian communities among the M-Belt groups and societies was training in Christian ideology with European education as it was practised in England in the period after 1950.

1. Maxwell 1952 p.229-230

Significantly the standards of Western European Education in Christian Missionary institutions concentrated and with students from among the M-Belt groups and societies after 1950, increased rapidly and became equal with those of students in Government owned institutions. In the mid-1950s and in the 1960s Christian Missionary institutions produced better educated students with European skills of modernization from their Primary, Secondary, Teacher Training Colleges and the High Schools, who found their way into Universities and other institutions of higher learning in the 1970s, rather than students from Government institutions in the M-Belt areas and in The North in general.¹

It ought to be borne in mind however that Maxwell wrote his experiences and anxieties of the 1930s and 1940s in the closing years of the 1940s which became produced into a book in 1952 and revised in 1954. The ideas contained in his books reflected the general Christian Missionary socio-political anxieties for the subsequent period between 1950 and 1960.

The path toward political participation anticipated by Christian Missionaries from among the M-Belt groups and societies was meant to come not only from European educated persons trained in Christian institutions but also from dedicated Church Members.² In the subsequent socio-educational origins of political leadership in the M-Belt Movement, while the initial leadership before 1956 like in David Lot, Jonah Assadugu, Patrick Davou Fom, Bala Yerima were dedicated Christians and had attended Christian institutions in the

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1. The political and social consequence of these developments are examined in more detail in Section IV of this Chapter and in Chapters 4 and 5
 2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu in November 1980.

period between 1936 and 1947, political leadership in the M-Belt Movement^{after 1956} in men like J.S. Tarka, Bitrus Rwang Pam, Patrick Dokotri, Moses Nyam Rwang was mixed in educational origins, having attended both Christian Missionary institutions as well as Government Institutions both outside the territorial areas of the political M-Belt. Furthermore some of them were only "Christians" on Sundays and when they answered questions on religious affiliations, rather than actual dedication and Church attendance.¹

It was however Maxwell who in his suggestions pounded on the social and political importance of the Christian conventions and conferences asserting the political protection of the Christian communities in the period between 1949 and 1952. He did this by presenting very lengthy arguments of their necessity as a "Christian social Movement" and how they brought about and demonstrated a sense of "Christian oneness and solidarity" even when it is the case that different ethnic socio-cultural identities from the M-Belt groups and societies were fed into the Christian religious identity. In one instance for example, Maxwell argued: "One can easily appreciate how that may happen (the Christian social Movement, Christian oneness and solidarity with ramification on a Christian religious identity). Here let us say is a small handful of converts from some semi-Moslem area. They have been well used to being taunted with following a vain teaching. They have seen the local Moslem parading on their horse, dressed in their flowing robes and turbans on the days of the big festivals. They have been despised and reviled in local judicial

1. The political predilections in the Christian religious identifications of the political leadership in the M-Belt Movement are examined in Chapters 4 and 5 their concomitant causes in the political variations of the theme of the M-Belt Movement and identity are examined in Chapters 4 and 5

courts when they had a matter there. They have felt themselves small and poor and of no account. And then they attend some conference like that already referred to ... at Forum: they suddenly find themselves among a great throng of folks who obviously are of their own way of thinking. Here is no petty little group of unimportant people engaged in their "vain-religion". Here are a multitude of well dressed, intelligent people, *every one with his book in hand*, joining in ordered worship. "Why" says the newcomer, as he looks over the vast crowd of men and women: *"We Christians aren't just a few of the negligible people, we're somebodies and there are a big lot of us"* and as they join in the singing and share in the hospitality and meet time after time, the hearty welcome of friendship, their hearts burn within them and the messages in the addresses given, gain an added earnestness and reality, and then on the Sunday, when they meet for worship and the whole great gathering rises to its feet and begins to repeat its avowal of faith: "I believe in God the Father Almighty" .. can't you feel the thrills of emotion that shoot through the visitor's soul and body as for the first time he realises what the Communion of Saints really can be. So he goes back to his village but his head is in the air now, and the Moslem mockery has lost its sting, for he knows that he is on the conquering side, one of a great multitude which no man can number, who glory in acknowledging Jesus Son of Mary as Jesus Son of God, their Lord and Master who has redeemed them by his blood. He is in the light; it is the Moslems who are in the darkness, poor souls".¹

In the 1950s and 1960s when the Christian conventions increased in the numbers of attendances and always culminated in Christmas gatherings in the thousands at the many different Christian Missionary

1. Maxwell 1952 p.294-295

centres among the M-Belt groups and societies, Moslem traders in their midst exploited the economic demand situation for cooked foods and light refreshments in the sales of bean-cakes, groundnuts, and non-alcoholic drinks like Krola, Coca-Cola, Fanta at inflated prices.¹ There were instances when Christians openly accused Moslem traders of price inflation at the gatherings during Christmas, particularly so because Christian traders were discouraged from trading on Sundays and during Easter and Christmas gatherings or when there was a Christian convention.² The Christian Churches reacted to this situation by producing cooked food and 'Kunu' for the convention attendants, which became the social responsibility of the local church where the convention was held.³ Moslem traders however were generally encouraged to bring cooked food items to sell at the Christian Conventions, although in the late 1950s and 1960s Christians attending the Conventions were encouraged to bring along their meals.⁴ In the 1970s however opinions became expressed that "inflated prices be paid for from Christian buyers to Christian sellers".⁵ At the Jarawa Christmas Festival in December 1980 at the Shere Hills ground, Christian women sold fried meat, cooked food, Coca-cola, sugar cane sticks, alcoholic beverages at very exorbitant prices alongside Moslem traders.⁶

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1. Interview discussions with Baba Sanda and Pastor David Lot, November 1980 and January 1981 respectively.
 2. Interview discussions with Baba Sanda, December 1980 and with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981
 4. Interview discussions with Baba Sanda, December 1980 and with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 5. Ibid
 6. This is a personal observation at the Christmas Festival which I attended during my fieldwork in December 1980.

According to Maxwell however the Christian conventions were the religious premise from which the spirit of Christian fellowship developed and expressed itself as early as in the 1950s to an extent that they: "... overflowed the limits of our society".¹ Also in the period between 1950 and 1960 there were more frequent Christian conferences in the Miango-Five-Day Inter-Missionary African conference, where Christian leaders gathered to discuss religious affairs and the need: "... for better schools for their children, where they could be taught in a Christian atmosphere as the few secular schools in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria were in most cases pro-Moslem in their outlook".² In one instance of the Christian Missionary Conference at Miango, Maxwell suggests that there were: "... one hundred and seventeen African delegates representing over 50 tribes present, some elected by their Churches and some from Moslem districts where local churches had not yet been formed owing to the fewness of the converts. Some of them were from tribes which not so long ago had been hostile to each other, but now they were sitting in God's House in peaceful fellowship with each other."³

In the period between 1960 and 1965 and before the Military coups of 1966 the religious efforts of Protestant Christian Evangelization in The North changed from the annual conventions of Christians and the conferences of Church leaders and elders to "mass hysteria, channelled through: 'The New Life For All' Movement and Campaigns".⁴

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1. Maxwell 1952 p.268
 2. Ibid p.269
 3. Ibid p.268
 4. Crampton 1975 p.174

This involved intensive evangelization on a large scale and the participation of indigenous Christians from among the M-Belt groups and societies or of M-Belt origins, where the Campaigns were outside the M-Belt areas.¹ The New Life for All Movement and the Campaigns were begun in Plateau and S. Zaria and became most successful in appealing to youths and women who had finished Primary Schools, were unemployed and redundant in the urban centres of Jos, Bukuru, Zaria and Kaduna.²

Furthermore, when Christian Missionaries sought to organize the Christian Communities into a Movement with "an affectionate love of Christianity" through the Christian conferences and conventions the religious energies and the sense of Christianity that became developed in the communities did not become channelled into a purely pietistic Movement. Rather it soon became translated into the nature of socio-economic and political relationships among groups and societies in The North and finally burst out to find political expression in the NML in 1949. This was when M-Belt Christian consciousness through the organizational channels of church leaders and elders showed discontent over inequalities in The North. In other words Christianity among the M-Belt groups and societies did not remain as a heavenly haven.

These "reactive Christian religious strategies" were so because of the general religious developments in the Islamic society, particularly in the government of the NPC in The North, which began to give a vigorous thrust of Islamic expansion that obviously affected the Christian communities in the M-Belt areas.³ The Sardana for

1. Crampton 1975 p.174
2. Ibid
3. Ibid

example sought to coerce some chiefs, army officers and politicians from among the M-Belt groups and societies, into Islam by using political and professional means in the period between 1961 and 1965.¹ For example, in that period, the Sardauna began to make "Tours of The North, including all of the major towns and districts among the M-Belt groups and societies, which were meant for conversions into the Islamic religion."² Furthermore, in certain M-Belt areas where Islamic influences were strong, the cultures of the Islamic society in The North, in the Hausa-Fulani patterns, gained more influences rather than Christian influences and Western European cultural patterns.³ For example, persons from the Marghi group and society who became Moslems, socially identified with the Fulani and Hausa as well as other Moslems rather than the Christian and "pagan" Marghi.⁴ This was also the case with Birom, Tiv, Idoma among other M-Belt groups and societies who became Moslems.

Implicit in the developments of the Christian religious conventions and conferences however is that by 1950, a Christian religious identity crystallized among the Christian communities which were concentrated within the M-Belt groups and societies. This is the premise from which Maxwell, for example, suggests that by the end of the 1940s: "... in district after district, our people had, in their conferences, been given a sense of the power of Christianity as a social movement... the uniting spirit of fellowship between the tribes was at work".⁵ In the period between 1949 and 1952 when there was an established relationship between a visible and highly mobilized Christian and

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1. These issues are examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5
 2. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981
 3. Crampton 1975 p.76
 4. Ibid
 5. Maxwell 1952 p.268

Church leadership, developed from the conventions and conferences, with the Christian communities in mass support, Christian Missionaries found that the churches and their councils had been taken straight into politics in The North. That was at a time when the M-Belt Movement in the Non-Moslem League of Northern Nigeria (NML) was begun. This was so because the state of the Nigerian political environment in that period showed signs of becoming mature and favourable to participatory and electoral political activity, as a result of the Richardson constitutional reforms in the Macpherson proposals after 1947.¹

In the instance of the late 1940s, as it is suggested by Maxwell, there was "increased temptation" to use Church channels and the Church Machinery to achieve political objectives.² This was so because the Church was already organized and well accustomed to leadership, organization and control of Africans: ".. simply by virtue of its being to such an extent developed along indigenous church lines before constitutional reforms."³ In the instance of the period between 1949 and 1952, although Maxwell does not give a detailed account of what happened when Church channels and the Church Machinery became used to achieve political objectives, he suggests that: "... on one or two occasions ... politically ambitious leaders ... made havoc on an unwise church council".⁴ It ought to be borne in mind that in the period between 1949 and 1952 there was the initial organization of the M-Belt Movement which developed from the NML to the MZL under political leadership that was Church leadership in persons

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1. This is examined in more analytical detail in Section IV of this Chapter and in Chapter 4 where the Growth and Development of the M-Belt Movement is discussed.
 2. Maxwell 1952 p.324
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid p.268

like Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu. It is however not clear whether Maxwell made reference to Mr S.O. James "the Yoruba Christian" based in Jos and who became one of the political representatives of Christians in 1949 in the NHA and who in that year met the Christian Missionaries, indigenous Church leaders and Elders from among some of the M-Belt groups and societies at a meeting in Jos to suggest that "Christians ought to organize to seek political representation in the NHA" or Maxwell is making reference to Pastor David Lot, the first President of the NML and the MZL.¹

Although Christian Missionaries were anxious that the Christian communities among the M-Belt groups and societies participate in politics and the political process in The North and Nigeria and that Christianity itself be seen as a social Movement that ought to shape society, Christian Missionary policy was against European Missionary involvement with any form of participation in the political process in The North, Nigeria and in other parts of the world.

Apparently there were severe ambivalences in maintaining a policy position like that. The Christian Missionary policy on overt political participation which influenced Christian Missionary attitudes to political organizations in The North had its roots in the period between 1900 and 1910 during the Madras Christian Missionary Conferences. The Christian Missionary Conferences at Madras asserted that: "..... Political action by Churches may be as Christian as any other type of Christian social action .. in the past, Christians organized for political action for such causes as temperance, Sunday observance..

1. This is examined with more analytical detail in Chapter 4 where we discuss the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement and the Christian religious identity it mobilized for its political objectives.

this did not imply that the Church should identify itself with a particular party.. but it did mean that *the Church should stimulate its members to make a right use of a political machinery for the welfare of those who suffer from oppression or exploitation* the Church could, for example, encourage and promote small groups within the fellowship, organize for specific types of social action, even when those groups work through legislatures and political machinery".¹ This was so because in the Madras Christian conferences, the overriding point of agreement was that behind the imperial expansion of the West and behind all the developments of the century: "There was the providential hand of God at work which the Missionaries must take advantage of and establish His Kingdom on earth".² This was the political premise from which Christian Missionaries openly advocated their roles as "reinforcers of the Colonial Enterprise" and in particular teaching their adherents political obedience and loyalty to whatever European Colonial regime was in power.³ Although this was so, there was unanimous rejection of overt political action as a legitimate constituent of the Christian Missionary program to establish 'His Kingdom on Earth'. While Christian Missionaries saw themselves as instruments that inculcated loyalty, sought the protection of Western interests and opposed the negative aspects of colonialism, there was also a policy which was directed on emphasizing disassociation from politics because: "Everywhere a Missionary is under a moral obligation to abstain entirely from Politics".⁴

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1. Boer 1979 p.259; emphases are mine
 2. Ibid p.103-105
 3. Ibid p.106
 4. Ibid

Although Christian Missionary policy on overt political involvement in politics remained vague it was taken to mean keeping clear of associating with any type of political movement.¹ In the instance of Christian Missionaries in The North, SUM policy on political involvement in the political process suggested that it ought to be channelled through its central offices and thereafter it was at the discretion of a Superintendent in that office who might act politically rather than the individual political actions of a Missionary.² In the instance, SUM staff in The North became forbidden to interfere in matters concerning the administration of Justice by Native Courts, the Collection and payment of tributes and other taxes, the inter-relations of Native Chiefs as adjusted by the Government.³ In the period between 1950 and 1960 when the M-Belt Movements were vigorous in politics in The North, these were some of the social and political issues which became used to demand for separation from the Islamic society and in 1957/58 were brought as explanatory reasons before the Willink Commission.⁴ CMS policy on the other hand about the overt political involvement of Christian Missionaries in The North and Nigeria in general were contained in the ideas put forward by its secretary, M.D. Hooper to the government of British administration.⁵ The ideas of Hooper were also made explicit to all CMS Christian Missionaries in The North about the degree of their involvement in

1. Boer 1979 p.106

2. Ibid p.275

3. Ibid

4. The Willink Commission is examined and analyzed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5 where we discuss Politics with the M-Belt Movement.

5. Boer 1979 p.275

politics as early as in 1931.¹ In that year Hooper explained to the government of British administration in The North that CMS regulations: "... expressly warns its Missionaries against engaging in political intrigue and would expect Government to require the removal of any of its agents when adequate proof of such activities could be adduced; and the Society would be prompt in exerting its own authority in such an event. If any Missionary transgressed the limits of political liberty it is the duty of the Society to obey instructions of Government and to remove their agent without delay; in the belief that Government will not withhold the substantial charges on which their instructions were based."² Whatever these policy positions were meant to achieve, in the period between 1940 and 1952, Christian Missionaries became engrossed in politics, sometimes overtly, among the M-Belt groups and societies. That was a period when the Christian Missionaries organized the Christian communities and Christianity into 'a Social Movement' through bringing together Christians to conventions and conferences. Furthermore in 1944 Farrant suggested that one of the objectives of Christian Missionaries: "... was to make the Church to be heard in the State, advocating the things that are true, honest, -just, pure, lovely and of good report".³

In the period between 1940 and 1960 Christian Missionaries in The North became inclined to appreciate any evidence that their converts from among the M-Belt groups and societies participated in

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1. Boer 1979 p.275
 2. Ibid
 3. G.H. Farrant, SUM Field Report 1944, cited in Boer 1979 p.302

some different roles of governing and government institutions. This was seen to be a recognition of the "potential importance of non-Moslem people as well as giving them an opportunity of expression ... and the Church by Christian living wins its way to acceptance".¹

This means that when Christian Missionaries sought to involve their converts into Government and politics it was an issue that became based on the political ethnics of Christianity itself. Maxwell suggests that justice according to "Christian ethics required the elimination of domination of one people by another".² The M-Belt groups and societies were seen to be dominated and exploited by the Islamic society in The North, and idea that was rooted right from the period before 1900 based on their historical experiences which became compounded by the nature of problems in The North, because of the Christian Missionary objectives that were shaped by Karl Kumm. In that instance Kumm preached an ideological doctrine of Christianity which emphasized the political dangers of Islam over the non-Islamic and the M-Belt groups and societies in socio-economic and political terms with very critical denigrations to the Islamic religion as a premise for the development of the society in The North.³ Underlining the ideas of Karl Kumm was a liberating intrusion by Christian Missionaries and British imperial interest since both processes had caused the cessation of slave raiding, arbitrary powers of traditional rulers, the dangers that used to inhibit travel and trade, and a Liberation whereby the whole country-side was now open to residence: "... and there was no need to live in large communities for purposes of defence".⁴ Furthermore, when the SUM pioneers travelled from Lokoja to Ibi in the RNC steam-boat named "Liberty" they became thrilled that

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1. Farrant 1944, cited in Boer 1979 p.302
 2. Maxwell 1952 p.39
 3. For examples of Kumm's religious and political positions, see more detailed discussions in Section II of this Chapter.
 4. Maxwell 1952 p.39

the name of the boat was "appropriate enough" for Christian Missionary objectives in The North.¹

This "Liberating theme" was to dominate Christian Missionary conceptions of their religious objectives among the M-Belt groups and societies. In the period between 1950 and 1965, the same theme found its way into the political rhetoric of Christian politicians in the M-Belt Movement. Furthermore, it is politically significant that there was inclusion of the same "Liberating theme" for the conduct of government and governing in the essentially non-Islamic state of BP, upon its creation by General Yakubu Gowon in the 'state creation exercise' in 1967.² However, in states created in 1967 in The North, it is politically significant that where there was a M-Belt political and religious problem and where there also existed an electoral vote in support of the M-Belt Movement for the creation of a M-Belt Region in 1959, as an alternative vote for the dominant Northern political party of the NPC, in votes for the UMBC and NEPU, the state motto on its 'Code of Arms' contained the words: Liberty and Justice or both, among others.

This was particularly so for BP state, NE state and NC state which existed until the political reorganization of the Nigerian Federation in 1976.³ It is politically significant that of the six states created in The North, it was in territorial areas where political tensions existed before 1967 that the name of the state became developed from previously existing Provinces with established provincial identities among the groups and societies in The North. For example,

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1. Maxwell 1952 p.39
 2. This point is examined with more analytical detail in Chapters 4 and 5
 3. For examples, see The Armorial Bearings of the Northern States, Kaduna, 1968, posters: this point is further examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5

except for Kwara state, which was an entirely new name coined up from the indigenous 'Northern Concept' of the River Niger (Rafin Kwara) in order to neutralize Yoruba political irredentism of the 1950s and 1960s implicit in the initial name of the state: Central-West, Provincial identities became contained in BP state and Kano state. In the period between 1950 and 1965 the Northern Provinces of Kano and of Plateau/Benue were the core centres of political movements showing discontent over inequalities in The North with collateral demands for adjusting them as suggested by the political struggles of NEPU and the M-Belt Movement in the UMBC respectively.¹ The other states created in The North in 1967, which were the predominantly Islamic areas besides Kano and which in the period between 1950 and 1966 showed consistent political support to the government and party of the NPC, were North-West, North-Central except for the S. Zaria parts, North-East also except for the Numan parts in Adamawa and the Lere-Jarawa areas in S. Bauchi became geographically descriptive in their names until 1976.²

In the instance of the concepts of 'Liberty and Justice' on the code of Arms for BP state, it was a demonstrative and deliberate political choice by J.D. Gomwalk, suggested by some of his political commissioners. The motto on the Code of Arms was meant to suggest that the M-Belt political struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region triumphed and had achieved Libelation from Islamic hegemony in The North, into a state where justice will be the practice of Government, governing and politics, even when the political product of the 1967 exercise was 'a quasi-M-Belt Region' given the territorial political enclosures of BP state.³ The BP state political commissioners

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1. Nigeria: The Creation of States, Kaduna 1968 p.13-15
 2. Nigeria 1968 p.13-15; these points are examined with more analytical detail in Chapters 4 and 5
 3. Interview discussions with Isaac Shaahu, January 1981; this point is examined with more details in Chapters 4 and 5

who made these suggestions were the old war horses from the UMBC struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the period between 1950 and 1965.¹

The 'Liberating theme' persisted and became a political strategy in the actions and political rhetorics of politicians in the NPP government of Plateau state. This has been so in the political justification of local Government reforms in that state in which instance new Local Government Areas became created, non-Islamic traditional chiefs became elevated in status as they were politically removed from the traditional judicial authority of Emirs.² The recurrent word which became used collaterally with "Liberation" among the Plateau Christian NPP politicians was the "Emancipation" of the non-Islamic groups and societies who were still under the political authority of Emirs in Keffi, Lafia, Nassarawa and Wase.³ The creations of the LG Units on the Plateau state in the period of the NPP civilian Government and the accompanying political reforms in which non-Islamic groups and societies became removed from the political authority of Emirs was characteristic of the M-Belt sentiments in the period between 1950 and 1967. In the political circumstances of Plateau state, the Islamic communities of Lafia, Nassarawa, Keffi and Wamba reacted to the political meaning in the reforms by demanding separation and constitution into a curiously defined state called "a M-Belt State".⁴

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1. Interview discussions with Isaac Shaahu, January 1981.
 2. This point is examined in more detail in Chapter 4 and 5
 3. Interview discussions with George and Catherine Hoomkwap, January 1981; for examples of the nature of issues in these political rhetorics with the recurrent use of the word "Emancipation", see Plateau State House of Assembly Debates, Local Government Bill, Jos, Hansards 1979-1982.
 4. These issues are examined in more detail in Chapters 5 and the Epilogue.

The "Liberating theme' is also characteristic of the political mood in the state movements of the 1970s that are centred on Numan for the creation of a 'Taraba State' separated from the dominant political concentration of the Fulani in Gongola State.¹ Similarly, it is also the case with non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Bauchi and S. Zaria where there are political demands for merging with Plateau State because some of the Local Chiefs among other reasons are still under Emirs with predominantly Islamic personnel in the NA bureaucracies despite the Local Government reforms in 1976.²

The consequences of the development of Christianity among the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1900 and 1950 was that in 1950 Christian communities were well established and identifying themselves more with European Christian Missionaries in the search for solutions to their socio-economic and political problems rather than with officials in the government of British administration in The North. This became more socially and politically pronounced among the Plateau groups and societies rather than for those in Benue. Furthermore, although the Christian communities were still essentially rooted in each of the "tribes" in 1950, the Churches, the Christian Missionaries with indigenous church leaders and elders

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1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, December 1980.
 2. Interview discussions with George and Catherine Hoomkwap, January 1981; the 1976 Local Government Reforms were meant to bring in elected councillors to run the NA bureaucracies. These issues are discussed in more analytical details in Chapters 4 and 5. These political demands of the groups and societies in S. Zaria and S. Bauchi are also very explicit from the submissions from these areas to the Irikefe Commission on the creation of more states within the Nigerian Federation in 1975.

achieved social and religious mobilization of Christians among some of the M-Belt groups and societies with the consequence that Christianity became a visible force as a social movement criss-crossing "tribal" identities with the Christian religious identity through regular conventions and conferences of Christian leaders. It was some of this Christian leadership from churches in Adamawa, Plateau, S. Zaria and S. Bauchi who began to organize the NML in 1949, the first political organization in the M-Belt Movement.¹

IV Undevelopment, Underdevelopment and the Development of the M-Belt groups and societies

The purpose of this Section is to examine whether the undeveloped socio-political and economic nature of the M-Belt groups and societies, conditioned Christian Missionary activities to establish Western European patterns of society in those areas after impact with British influences in the period between 1900 and 1950. When Christianity, through the development of churches, Christian religious leadership and Christian communities became established and consolidated among the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1900 and 1935, and thereafter Christianity itself rapidly expanded, Christian Missionary Bodies in The North changed policy from their previous emphasis on Christianizing, to the development of the M-Belt groups and societies with Christianity and Western European skills, rooted in the English civilization .

It is therefore suggested that the shape of society among the M-Belt groups and societies, increasingly developed toward Western European patterns of modernization, a situation that was a function

1. The political development of the NML to become the UMBC is examined in detail in Chapter 4

of Christian Missionary social and welfare activities. These developments had ramifications on the forms of social and political identification, within an overall framework of Christian social consciousness which became established in European educated persons among the M-Belt groups and societies. The Christian Missionary activities became centred on Christian schools and medical work through social welfare institutions like hospitals, dispensaries, maternity and leprosy clinics.

In the period between 1900 and 1950 and in particular the 10 years before 1950, the Christian Missionary schools produced a core of European educated persons from among the M-Belt groups and societies, some of which in the 1950s and 1960s became the political leadership of the M-Belt Movement as well as participated in political leadership of The North and Nigeria. In the period between 1960 and 1970 Christian Missionary institutions with government financial grants increased the development of European patterns of modernization among the M-Belt groups and societies.¹

Undevelopment, underdevelopment and the development of the M-Belt groups and societies was a cumulative process of the effects of events and activities in two historical epochs, before and after establishment of British rule in the territories that became politically created as The North in 1900 by the British. Undevelopment is taken to be the general lack of universally accepted specifics in the functioning of a society which can be imitated. For example, there might be no writing, no organized system of education beyond that

1. These developments are examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5 in the specific context of politics and society in The North in that period.

which is based on memory, no large scale organizations in politics, trade and commerce, no large scale social intercourse beyond the village or ethnic unit and there is no accumulated wealth either collectively or wealth by individuals that transforms society.

In the instance society is therefore characterized by poverty, disease and primitive living conditions in which the human beings may survive only on basic necessities to which they have access. Underdevelopment is taken to be an absence of the basic specifics, such as a road, a bridge, electricity or a school which might condition social and economic changes in society, an absence that might be caused by a government as a policy or as a deliberate political act based on the nature and colouring of its politics and its envisaged political alliances in the cause of the society it wants to achieve. In the instance of the M-Belt groups and societies, it is also taken to mean a general absence of exploitable raw materials as well as their expropriation. An exception as such was the presence of tin and columbite on the Plateau which in some way conditioned the development of physical infrastructure that transformed society on European patterns of development as it did in the urban centres of the Islamic society and on the Jos Plateau upon impact with British influences and as directed by the government of British administration in The North. Development is taken to mean processes which produced enlightened human beings with universally accepted social, economic and ^{political} consciousness with specifically achieved attitudes about the nature, shape and patterns of societies that have a Western European infrastructure. It also means creating the basic infrastructure for the development of the human being and the resources of society for political and socio-economic development.¹

1. These definitions derive from the contents of Appendix I in the thesis; but also see among others: Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, London, 1972

Educational development among the M-Belt groups and societies is however differentiated from other patterns of development in The North, particularly those to do with economic aspects. This is so because, although it is suggested that Christian Missionaries 'developed' the M-Belt groups and societies the process took the emphasis of establishing educational and social welfare institutions. Obviously the development of education and social welfare institutions has ramifications on economic development,¹ but then, it is meant that the development of industries and related economic institutions in society were not a prerogative of the Christian Missionary Bodies in The North. This means that economically, the M-Belt groups and societies were relatively underdeveloped when compared to the concentration of economic development in the Islamic Society in The North in the period between 1900 and 1950.

The undevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies, as it became seen by the British in the period between 1900 and 1950, particularly so on the socio-economic and political concerns in Christian religious intentions, held by Christian Missionaries, was rooted in the expansion of the Islamic society in the period between 1804 and 1900. In that period, there were intensive Fulani wars on the M-Belt groups and societies with concomitant consequences of slave raiding and the slave trade which depopulated the area and conditioned undevelopment.² In the instance of the events and activities surrounding the underdevelopment of the M-Belt groups

1. Rimmer 1981 p.109-119

2. For examples, see earlier discussions in Chapter 4

and societies in the period between 1900 and 1950 when there was a government of British administration in The North, there was developed socio-economic neglect and discrimination in economic aspects of European patterns of modernization. However, in the same period, the activities of European Christian Missionaries in The North, became directed toward the development of the M-Belt groups and societies, focussing on the establishment of modernization skills. In other words, there might not have been rapid European infrastructural development to the benefit of the indigenous groups and societies in the M-Belt areas, were it not that Christian Missionaries produced the basic infrastructure to serve the dual objective of creating European civilization with Christianity, as an alternative path to Islam in the development of societies in The North. This is the analytical base of data and arguments produced in this section.

Although there exists gaps in the data and evidences produced about the years between 1900 and 1950, which ought to suggest concrete facts about underdevelopment and the subsequent levels of development achieved in the Islamic society when it is compared with the M-Belt groups and societies what is available is sufficiently explicit to show that there was unequal European infrastructural development for modernization as lately as 1950 when the government of British administration was in political control of The North. Subsequently in the period between 1950 and 1965 the M-Belt groups and societies were accustomed to political allegiance by the political distribution of infrastructure because of the nature and colouring of politics by the governments of the NPC in The North. This was so because

infrastructural development became dependent on anticipated political support for the Northern government and for the NPC party, received from particular groups and societies.¹ This ought to be expected because of the very nature of politics in The North, albeit in the Nigerian Federation, given the political strength of patron-client relationships and the degree of dependent patronage politics in that period.²

The first 50 years in the underdevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies generated by the activities of the government of British administration and the development of the M-Belt groups and societies by the objectives in Christian Missionary activities are given analytical justification for the purposes of this section because after those years of impact with British influences in The North, the M-Belt groups and societies became characterized by a rapid organization of "tribal" political associations which subsequently converged with a specific Christian religious identity to form the NML, the nucleus of the M-Belt Movement. This is so because

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1. These points are examined with more analytical detail in Chapter 4
 2. This will be examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5 where in the particular instance of Benue Province for example the Idoma benefitted from the NPC government in The North, disproportionately to the Tiv, even when the Tiv were a numerically bigger group and society in that Province. This was so because the Tiv, unlike the Idoma, consistently voted against the NPC party and were anti- its government at the local NA and Regional levels as well as at the National Level when politics was taken to the electorate and to the legislatures, particularly so in the period between 1956 and 1965.

of the importance of the relationship, which is sought to be established, between the underdevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies relative to the Islamic society as was generated by the government of British administration in The North and the development of Christian consciousness from Christian Missionary activities causing the resurgence of "tribal" identities, subsequently fed into the M-Belt political struggle. The political objective in the convergence of the "tribal" identities on to the Christian religious identity was meant for a struggle to readjust for the socio-political and economic inequalities¹ in the existing state of underdevelopment in their territorial areas, relative to the Islamic society as a direct consequence of the activities of governments in The North. Furthermore the first 50 years are given analytical justification because in that period Christian Missionaries provided the mechanisms among the M-Belt groups and societies whereby the fact of popular consciousness about the nature of inequalities and domination in The North became developed and productive at both individual and the collective levels of the "tribes". This is so because after 1940, it became mobilized as a political force, firstly among each of the "tribes" to contest over the state of local politics and issues

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1. Inequality is taken to be the perception of difference between groups and societies over conceptions of political and social status, the distribution of economic institutions and infrastructure which may create wealth in society. In the instance of existing inequalities in a society they cause sharp difference in living conditions between the benefiting groups and those who are outside its main stream with concomitant frustrations for the latter - see Appendix I for more detailed discussions of definitions of some of the terms used in the study.

affecting the concerns of the M-Belt groups and societies. In the period between 1949 and 1967, the contest over the state of local politics and socio-economic issues that affected each of the M-Belt groups and societies generated a collective sense of discontent which increasingly developed and there was political demand for separation from the Islamic society in The North.

There was "culture shock" in the period between 1900 and 1950 which was evident in the social and political as well as in the economic experiences of both Christian Missionaries and British officials in the government of British administration in The North, when they became faced with the nature of undevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies. In the instance the government of British administration and Christian Missionaries pursued different paths in the strategies to transform the situation of undevelopment and underdevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies into a new type of society.¹ The alternative path to remedy the situation of socio-political and economic undevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies in the policies of the government of British administration in The North was cultural and political integration into the Islamic society, upon the successful establishment of the new political unit. In the instance, the Islamic culture in Hausa-Fulani patterns became imported into the M-Belt areas and the destruction of cultural patterns indigenous to the M-Belt groups and societies through legal and institutional means that were bolstered by military force, was

1. For detailed examples and discussions of the social, economic and political examples of the reactions to the state of undevelopment in the experiences of the officials in the government of British administration and the socio-political efforts to remedy the situation, see Chapter 2 Sections II and III; this section is concerned to examine the reactions of Christian Missionaries and their religious and educational efforts to remedy the situation.

accomplished, partially for civilizing reasons.

It ought to be borne in mind however that there was never a 'total cultural eclipse' of the indigenous cultures of the M-Belt groups and societies by either Hausa-Fulani culture in the way it affected the Yoruba in Ilorin, the Nupe and the Igbirra or European cultural patterns in the way it has affected Black American citizens in the U.S. The significant fact however is that both Hausa-Fulani culture and the European cultural patterns on the M-Belt groups and societies have fundamental force of determining socio-political and economic relationships rather than any of the indigenous cultural patterns of the M-Belt groups and societies in the European modernizing processes on the shape of society in Nigeria.

Contradistinctively to the path taken by the government of British administration in The North however, because Christian Missionaries held Islamic aggression responsible for the undeveloped state of the M-Belt groups and societies, they emphasized that the only alternative path to change was by generating the Christian civilization of European nations. Implicit in the processes that produced 'a culture change' among the M-Belt groups and societies is that Hausa-Fulani culture was as much alien to the M-Belt groups and societies as was the civilizing cultures of European nations in the emphasis of the Missionaries. The impact of Hausa-Fulani culture was however transposed over the cultures of the M-Belt groups and societies, affecting a larger population, rather than the Christian culture of European nations. This was a process that Christian Missionaries themselves complimented the policies of the government of British administration in The North since Hausa Language was the language of Christianity among the majority of the population of the M-Belt groups and societies.

As early as in 1900, the undevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies and the whole Christian Missionary strategy directed toward its solution was conceived of on "the Light versus Darkness theme" affecting Africa.¹ This was also tied up to European ethnocentrism about African cultures outside the influences of the Islamic religion. Kumm for example in the period between 1900 and 1910 consistently suggested the "darkness of African civilizations" and the contrasts it produced when compared with the "Light of European culture". For example, in his book which was produced in 1907, he suggested that while European culture was a divine gift of God: "Africa was burdened under the power of demons and the curse of them".² Similarly Farrant suggested that while African civilizations were "dark and desolate" the civilization of European Nations was equipped to be the guardian of African people.³ This was so because of the primitive nature of the living conditions of the people on the Plateau. In 1923 for example he made a typology in which he classified the degrees of civilizations in Africa ranging from: "the Birom... who wear no clothes at all and are only two generations removed from the use of stone weapons to the highest; consisting of the Hausa and Fulani who had a civilization akin to that of the Arabs".⁴ As latterly

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1. Boer 1979 p.168
 2. Karl W.H. Kumm 1907, cited in Boer 1979 p.146
 3. Boer 1979 p.298
 4. G.H. Farrant 1923, cited in Boer 1979 p.298

as in 1934, in his report of SUM medical work among the Plateau groups and societies, Farrant suggests that it is clear some of the M-Belt groups and societies: ".. were a crowd of sufferers and the naked pagan .. shows in his bare unwashed and uncared-for body all the horridness of disease".¹ At about the same period, the inhabitants of Kabwir and Panyam, where the Angas and the Sura were respectively concentrated among other groups and societies in that area, were described by Christian Missionaries as : "wild, naked savages ... given over to cannibalism ... without God or hope .. in village after village, a condition of sin stained darkened souls ... existing in a reign of unmixed darkness and unmitigated depravity .. they wander about in a moral midnight ... they know not what they do."² Furthermore, when a Christian Missionary observed a traditional religious festival at Donga among the Yergam, and Jukun he described their town as: ".. sunken in sin and degradation where women were engaged in a "bori" dance .. an awful sight ... their facial expressions were terrible and they appeared demon possessed".³

Compounding the social and religious 'culture shock' in the experiences of Christian Missionaries on the undevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies were the primitive methods of organization and the degree of civilizations which had no large scale socio-economic and political systems of organization of society. Foremost was that there was no formal system of education except that which was based

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1. Farrant 1934, cited in Boer 1979 p.298
 2. Boer 1979 p.169
 3. Ibid

on the socialization of age-grades rooted in the separate practices of each group and society. This was not based on reading and writing, rather it was a process transmitted from the memory of elders to specific developing age grade structures.

In the instance of economic undevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies, this was conditioned by an absence of commercial organization which inhibited substantial surplus production of exchange goods before impact with British influences in 1900.¹ In the subsequent period between 1900 and 1950 the undevelopment as well as the underdevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies was modified by the introduction of cash crops like cotton and groundnuts in The North although the more successful cash crops among the M-Belt groups and societies after 1930 were: Beniseeds and Soya beans among the Tiv in the Benue valley, the potato on the Plateau, ginger in S. Zaria and sugar cane in Adamawa.² This was so because the economies of the M-Belt groups and societies were mainly for subsistence, based on their agricultural products. For example, agricultural practices among the Tiv group and society preceding British control was based on a custom of planting yams, their major food crop, together with other subsidiary food crops like grain crops and cowpeas on freshly cleared land, shifting every second year which after 1930 also included the growth of cotton, soya beans and Beniseeds (sesamen indicum).³ This agricultural practice was centred on a single household and was meant for subsistence rather than for exchange value outside the Tiv "tribe" except after the 1930s and 1940s when cotton, soya beans and Beniseeds as well as yams began to produce cash to farmers. As latterly as 1945 Forde and Scott suggest that Tiv economy itself required

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1. Daryll Forde and Richenda Scott, The Native Economies of Nigeria, London 1945 p.180
 2. Forde and Scott 1945 p.180; the consequences of the introduction of these cash crops are examined in more detail below.
 3. Forde and Scott 1945 p.190

"exceptional needs of remedial measures designed to restore a balanced system of land use and productivity".¹ This was so because the Tiv practised "an extravagant farming system and a particularist land tenure surviving from more spacious days".²

Furthermore Tiv land itself was Tse-Tse fly-infested and there were no 'economic animals' in the same way that there were goats, cattle, donkeys and sheep in the Islamic society, except for a small number of "dwarf-cattle", allowed to roam free, being valued only for gift exchanges and ritual purposes.³ Although the "fly" saved the Tiv as well as other groups and societies in the Benue Valley from the political and social tensions developed on the Plateau, Adamawa, S. Zaria and S. Bauchi because of the economic problems of land over-grazing by Fulani cattle and crop-trampling, it did not help their condition of undevelopment economically.

It was not until in 1929 when Beniseed became introduced as a cash crop, when the East Railway Line from Port Harcourt to Jos, passed through Tiv-land that economic cultivation for exports was stimulated.⁴ Although cash began to find its way into the pockets of some Tiv farmers, the development of Beniseed as a cash crop produced maldistribution of the population and congestion in many areas

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1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.190
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid

of Tiv-land with serious consequences on soil degradation.¹ For example Forde and Scott suggest that: "So rapidly has the population increased in many parts of the country that the region to the West of Katsina Ala is said to have densities as high as 300 to the square mile. On the other hand, there are also large areas that are very thinly settled, but the particularism of the clans and lineages has until recently frustrated attempts by the people of conquered areas to secure access to the vacant land in the hands of other groups. Over half the population of half a million in the Tiv Division is, in consequence, compressed into the small Kpareu section between the Katsina Ala river and the Ogoja border".² This was the premise from which Forde and Scott suggested in 1945 that in the instance of producing solutions to the state of undevelopment of Tiv economy: "It is only too clear that an assured cash crop alone cannot be expected to remedy a situation which both demographic conditions and ill-suited agricultural methods have produced".³

Unlike the Tiv economy, which was centred on a single household practising subsistence agriculture, the M-Belt groups and societies

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1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.190
 2. Forde and Scott 1945 p.189; for more detailed examples, see a valuable study of Household production and consumption patterns among the 'Southern Tiv' by G.W.G. Briggs, 'Crop Yields and Food Requirements in Tiv Division', Farm and Forest, Vol. 5 No. 2 1944 p.17-23; G.W. Briggs, 'Soil Deterioration in Southern Tiv Division', Farm and Forest, Vol. 2 1941 p.8-12; R. Downes, The Tiv Tribe, Kaduna, 1933.
 3. Forde and Scott 1945 p.190

found in Adamawa, Plateau, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria, although similar in the practice of subsistence agricultural economies, these were based on "collective cultivation by multiple households".¹ In the instance of the groups and societies indigenous to the Plateau, for example, farming was organized and directed by the Head of each compound which contained the households of several kinsmen, involving the use of several large plots.² The farmlands were under the control of the compound Head and the other members of the group shared only small patches which were reserved to them personally.³ Labour on the farmland of the compound Head was a priority with the crop yields stored in the main granary under his control.⁴ Besides the collective cultivation, there was also 'a collective storage system'.⁵ This was economically directed at purely meeting the subsistence needs of the 'collective community of households' rather than for external exchange either to the benefit of the household or the other community of households in the "tribes". Forde and Scott suggest that from the granary of the Head of the households: "... supplies for beer are taken and household rations are drawn when members' own harvests are exhausted. The main harvest is also regarded as the reserve against famine and for the next year's planting. Both men and women have their own smaller granaries in which their personal harvests are stored. These... provide for their own household needs for most of the year. Despite this collective storage system, it has been claimed that Plateau farming groups often show little foresight in reserving adequate

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1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.192
 2. Ibid p.193
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid

supplies of seed for the next harvest ... a recent feature associated with the introduction of money incomes from mine labour and the increased opportunities for purchasing grain".¹ Forde and Scott further suggest that this was so because besides the fact that farmed grain yields were used for consumption, a considerable further quantity was needed to meet the production and demands for beer consumption.²

This was so even when the economy was 'self-contained', the crops grown being mainly several small varieties of grains and root crops which were "much inferior in yield and food value". to, for example, the guinea-corn, grown in the Islamic society in The North.³ The most staple of the grain crops characteristic of the groups and societies on the Plateau, in Adamawa, S. Zaria and S. Bauchi was "Acha" ('*Digitaria exilis*') and these existed in several varieties.⁴ This was so because it grew and ripened early and was well suited for the thin and frequently leached soils in those areas.⁵

In the period between 1900 and 1950 it was an acknowledged fact that foodstuffs among the M-Belt groups and societies were generally thought to be of inferior food value when they were compared to the quality of food in the Islamic society in The North, particularly so for the absence of the consumption of milk products. As latterly as 1951 for example, when there was an outbreak of "a peculiar epidemic" which in many ways resembled the disease of Yellow Fever in Jos Division and causing the death of as many as 700 Birom people

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1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.193-194
 2. Ibid p.194
 3. Ibid p.192-193
 4. Ibid p.193
 5. Ibid

there was medical focus in the explanation that: "... the disease may in fact be due to some fungoid condition of the 'Acha'".¹

The other root crops grown, generally among the M-Belt groups and societies for subsistence were yams and coco-yams ('Gwaza').² This suggests that among other things the majority of the non-Islamic groups and societies ate basically the same type of foodstuff for subsistence in yams, coco-yams, acha, peas etc., unlike the concentration of guinea-corn, millet and milk in the Islamic society in The North.³ When the root crop, cassava was introduced on the Plateau after 1930, to produce more for the mines workers, it became socially and religiously rejected and was not grown on any considerable scale as latterly as 1945.⁴ This was so because there was rooted objection to agricultural reforms: "... in the ritual prohibitions associated with the groves spirits ('tsafi') of the village which often serve

1. C.R. Niven, Plateau Province 1951 - Northern Region of Nigeria: Provincial Annual Reports, 1951, Kaduna 1953 p.63; this is examined in more detail below and also in Chapter 4 where we relate the underdeveloped nature of the M-Belt groups and societies to political support of the M-Belt Movement. It ought to be borne in mind however that 'Acha' has continued to be eaten by many of the M-Belt groups and societies even when the Sarda for example, among others, in the 1950s became insultingly specific when he told leaders of the M-Belt Movement in the NHA that there was no pride in the food crops they grew because he only once "ate Acha and yams", the predominant food crops among the M-Belt groups and societies.
2. Forde and Scott 1945 p.193
3. In the general course of my field work interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, among others, it became an explicit point of emphasis that the M-Belt groups and societies "were the same because of the similarities in food, housing (huts) and life style (social and political independence) besides other externally imposed identities - this point is discussed in more analytical detail in Chapters 1 and 2
4. Forde and Scott 1945 p.193

both to restrict and petrify the agricultural system, since they may include taboos on the cultivation of various plants and the rearing of particular stock".¹ This was the premise from which agricultural productivity remained economically poor among the Plateau groups and societies since there was no variety in the growth of even subsistence crops.

In the period between 1900 and 1950 there was increased attention on the production of 'Pennisetum Millet' exceeding the growth of 'Acha' by the majority of the groups and societies concentrated in Adamawa, Plateau, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria.² This was caused by the demands for beer consumption,³ because the 'Pennisetum Millet' was the best grain for that purpose even if it had to be made unavailable for daily meals since "considerable amounts were required to produce beer".⁴ Forde and Scott suggest that: "Beer drinking, in which the pagans differ conspicuously from the Moslem peoples of The North, although it can be abused, is by no means to be regarded as an entirely unfortunate diversion of good grain from its proper use (ie. grain for cooked meals). The pagan beer has the consistency of porridge and considerable food value, while the process of fermentation provides a supply of protective elements which would otherwise be lacking in a diet which includes no dairy products".⁵ In other words, beer drinking

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1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.193
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid p.194
 4. Ibid p.197
 5. Ibid p.194

was to some extent 'a dietetic counterpart of milk which was generally available elsewhere in The North, particularly in the Islamic societies.¹ Although this might have been so, alcoholism was a social problem among the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1940 and 1967 and is very much still a characteristic of the area. It was also as much a consequence of frustrations to the state of underdevelopment since it was not only a fact among farmers but also with Christian trained European educated persons.²

However, similar to groups and societies in the Benue valley, like the Tiv, Idoma and Jukun, only a few livestock were kept on the Plateau. This was so despite the ideal climatic conditions and Tse-Tse fly-free grassland plains. In some communities on the Plateau there were only a few horses and "dwarf-cattle" which were not milked but used for funeral feasts, horse display and only eaten when they die.³ In Vom for example, the most populous of the Birom villages, Forde and Scott suggest that in 1945 there were 2000 goats, 1 per able bodied man, 402 horses and 16 mares and no cattle at all. There also existed a few chickens and dogs found in most compounds receiving little care but eaten.⁴

The economic absence of cash products among the M-Belt groups and societies suggests that the basic exports of The North being in

1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.197
2. This point is examined with more analytical detail in Chapters 4 and subsequently discussed in Chapter 5 where the failure of the military coup of 1976 is discussed
3. Forde and Scott 1945 p.194-195
4. Ibid

the production of groundnuts, cotton, hides and goatskins, which produced money for a wealthy new middle-men-class as well as money into the pockets of the ordinary man was a monopoly of the population in the Islamic society. For example in 1937 from only one district in Kano there was enumerated about 441 horses, 335 mares, 6516 donkeys, 33,133 goats and 8554 sheep with a total value of £9,599 9s 10d.¹

The animal wealth in the Islamic society gave rise to a thriving economic export trade between The North and Southern Nigeria. For example, Forde and Scott suggest that: "The cattle trade between north and south is in the hands of big dealers, mostly Hausa, who act as the middle-men between the Fulani and the southern purchasers ... it is not uncommon for a Hausa trader to spend £200 at a time in the purchase of livestock. In 1939, the price of slaughter cattle varied from 10s to £8 according to size, weight and condition ... it takes at least three months for the animals to complete the journey from the pastures of Sokoto, say, to Abeokuta, a trader may have several hundred pounds locked up in the cattle on the road on which he cannot look for any return for several months ... the record animals passed on hoof across

1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.147

the Jebba Bridge which is one of the main points of crossing over the Niger. Others would come into the Southern provinces on foot by different routes, for instance, in 1936 an additional 14,000 cattle passed through Adomawa province on the eastern road, and in 1939, 23,380 cattle and 29,771 sheep and goats came via Ago Are".¹ In the period between 1900 and 1940, 1936 was the "Cattle Boom Year" when 100,847 cattle crossed the Niger bridge at Jebba to the slaughter houses of Southern Nigeria.² Although there was a decline in the cattle export after that year, it subsequently increased from 73,500 cattle in 1938 to 96,538 in 1940.³ Similarly, while 79,198 sheep were "exported" in 1936, there was a record total of 100,116 sheep exported in 1940.⁴ 423 goat exports in 1936 increased to 1751 in 1940.⁵ In addition to "hoof-crossing" in 1936, 23,590 cattle were carried by rail to markets in The South of Nigeria, increasing to 37,523 in 1939.⁶ There were similar increases in the sheep and goat exports, from 12,796 in 1936 to 17,200 in 1939 carried from Kano by rail to markets in Southern Nigeria.⁷ In other words besides the economic poverty in

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1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.277
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid
 6. Ibid
 7. Ibid

the production of subsistence crops, the majority of the M-Belt groups and societies were characterized by a total absence of animal wealth comparable to the Islamic society from which 'cash flows' permeates all the spectrums of society to establish improved living conditions on the basis of the new monetarized economy of The North, developed from impact with British influences.

This was the economic premise from which after 1930, there was effort by the government of British administration in The North to introduce the cultivation of the potato (*solanum*) as a cash crop among the groups and societies on the Plateau to be sold to the population in the township of Jos, although initially it was meant for the consumption of Europeans concentrated on the tin mines.¹ In the instance however the indigenous groups and societies faced competition with the Hausa and settled Fulani who were used to better farming methods. The production of the potatoes as a cash crop became so successful that the seeds were issued on a considerable scale with the hope that the production competed in quality, quantity and price with those imported, to enable the establishment of a permanent cash crop for the Plateau groups and societies, particularly so when the Europeanized urban population in the South of Nigeria showed increased inclusion of the potato in their meals.² Similarly during the same period in S. Zaria the government of British administration in The North introduced the cultivation of ginger as a cash

1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.199
2. Ibid

crop to benefit the non-Islamic groups and societies in the area. In the instance Forde and Scott suggest that: "The success of the development of ginger cultivation among groups in Southern Zaria is not without significance for the future development of the Plateau. Production of this largely alien crop, which requires very careful preparation for the market has been achieved in a very short time, an advance which indicates both aptitude and responsiveness to opportunities for cash crop production on the part of pagan groups, whose conservatism has on occasion been over emphasized on the side of the administration".¹ It ought to be borne in mind however that in both instances of the Plateau and S. Zaria there was competition with Hausa and Fulani migrant farmers in the growth of the "new cash crops", just as there was competition in the M-Belt areas for cotton growers in S. Bauchi, Adamawa, Keffi, Lafia and Nassarawa. However, the introduced cash crops in the period between 1930 and 1940 among the M-Belt groups and societies: Tiv with Soya Beans and Beniseeds, Plateau with the potato, S. Zaria with ginger, Adamawa, subsequently with sugar cane suggests that the government of British administration in The North was concerned to establish an economic premise from which cash flows might find their way to benefit indigenous farmers among the M-Belt groups and societies for improved conditions of living and participation in the monetarized economy.

As early as in 1930 however the economies of the M-Belt groups and societies no longer remained 'self-contained' and in an undeveloped state, particularly so for those communities that were in close contact with "alien groups which penetrated the areas".² This however did not

1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.199 n.1
2. Ibid p.145

mean that it developed to become equal as the economic patterns existing in the Islamic society in which indigenous historical advantages complimented the economic activities introduced from impact with British influences. The changes in the new economic patterns became the conditioning factors in the underdevelopment and exploitation of local economic circumstances among some M-Belt groups and societies. For example, on the Jos Plateau, where there was a large concentration of tin-mines with many communities of mine workers there grew high market prices for food, firewood and other farm products for home consumption in the 1930s and 1940s.¹ In the instance, although the price of ten bundles of firewood cost as low as ten shillings per person per year, the total value in the exchanges were estimated to be at a value of £513 per year in the period between 1920 and 1930.² Firewood became the largest economic item of income value in the new exchange economy for raw cash, after the sales of subsistence crops from farms, sold to the tin mine workers by the local population.³

The price of foodstuffs and firewood in the exchange process subsequently conditioned socio-economic tensions between the indigenous population to the Jos Plateau and the migrant population on the tin mines, particularly so with the Hausa in the mining communities. The tensions were centred on commercial participation in the new economic system. For example, in the one instance of the money worth of foodstuffs and their demands in the market place, where Hausa and other alien communities already established themselves chiefly to labour on the tin-workings, they began to employ both men and young women to work on farm plots they claimed to be theirs.⁴ The farm work was carried out

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1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.195
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid

under an agreement, whereby two shillings was paid for a given farm job.¹ Among the Birom in Vom, it was estimated that 75% of the labour on the farm plots owned by the Hausa communities as well as by other mine-working aliens, was done by the indigenous groups and societies.² The land was not rented, neither were the subsequent crop yields produced which found their way into the market places and fetched substantial cash incomes shared with the land-owners or the farmers.³ In the other instance of the high demands with concomitant costs for firewood for urban centres like Jos as well as other markets serving the mining camps, Hausa middle-men as traders developed, began to buy firewood from the indigenous 'traders' outside the market places which led to the townships, which became subsequently sold at higher prices in the markets.⁴

To compound these socio-economic problems with the alien migrant labour force on the tin-mines, there also developed severe economic problems with their concomitant socio-economic tensions between the indigenous groups and societies and Fulani Pastoralists. These tensions subsequently shaped hostilities toward the Fulani because of historically recollected experiences in the period between 1804 and 1900.⁵ Although this was so, Forde and Scott further suggest that the problem was fundamentally economic in that: "...the hostility and suspicion of

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1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.195
 2. Ibid
 3. Interview discussions with Dudu Dalyop, January 1981; this is examined with more analytical detail in Chapters 4 where we discuss the consequences of these economic tensions on electoral politics. In December 1964 for example Vom became characterized by severe political tensions ^{between} the migrant Hausa population which supported the NPC political party and the indigenous population which was UMBC and these tensions culminated in setting fire on the Mercedes belonging to one of the UMBC leaders, Bitrus Rwang Pam on the night of December 25th, 1964, an act that was widely interpreted as conceived and executed by NPC thugs.
 4. Interview discussions with Dudu Dalyop, January 1981
 5. Forde and Scott 1945 p.198

the pagans towards the Fulani, who have been coming into the area for both seasonal and all year occupation in greatly increasing numbers with the establishment of settled administration and the growth of a market for dairy products among the alien population have further complicated the problem of economic advance on the Plateau".¹ The Fulani with their cattle, were attracted in large numbers to the Plateau because of the wide and open Tse-Tse fly-free grasslands.²

In the period between 1940 and 1945 Forde and Scott estimated that there were about 100,000 cattle on the Plateau in the wet season and of this total about 30,000 remained in the dry season and grazed at will.³ In the instance, all of the farming population on the Plateau at one time or another suffered loss of crops from the trampling of straying cattle.⁴ Furthermore, Fulani cattle-overgrazing caused increased soil erosion which was already a problem due to deforestation by heavy cutting to meet the urban firewood needs and demands.⁵

This economic problem existed side by side with the already accute problem caused on farm land from the mining activities of Tin companies, particularly so in the period after 1926. For example, when the Drag-lines became introduced in the tin mining process one drag-line excavator in its life time removed about 3 million cubic yards of alluvial soil, creating huge artificial mounts on farmland or on places

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1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.198
 2. Ibid p.197
 3. Ibid p.198
 4. Ibid p.192-198
 5. Ibid p.198

where it was placed to process for tin.¹ In the late 1920s the drag-lines were the latest innovations in tin mining machinery, combining the operations of excavating and elevating with automation.² It floated on a pontoon over a flooded area of tin-bearing ground which it raises by means of a chain of buckets and washes the alluvial earth for tin on board.³ The trailings are dumped behind it in the previously worked-out area of the tin deposits.⁴ The use of this machinery was characteristic of the period between 1926 and 1938,⁵ with increases in the annual imports of mining machinery from £41,475 in 1926 to £123,562 in 1938.⁶ As expected there was a decline in the numbers of companies from 72 in 1926 to 31 in 1938.⁷ This was so because the cost of importing machinery forced the tin companies to amalgamate, the biggest merger being The Amalgamated Tin Mines of Nigeria Ltd., a company controlled by the London Tin Corporation and by 31st March 1940 had produced 7050 ton of concentrates or 47% of the estimated total output in that period.⁸ This suggests that there

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1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.23 n.2
 2. Ibid p.17
 3. Ibid p.17
 4. See Section V of this chapter for examples of the intensity of tin mining activities on the Jos Plateau.
 5. Forde and Scott 1945 p.18
 6. Ibid p.20-21
 7. Ibid
 8. Margery Perham (ed), Mining, Commerce and Finance in Nigeria: Being the second part of a study of The Economics of a Tropical Dependency, London, 1947 p.23

were very many drag-lines on the Plateau. The fundamental point to be made as it relates to maintaining undevelopment and conditioning the patterns of underdevelopment on the Plateau is that it destroyed farm land and forced people to work at very low wages.¹ This was so because there was a monopoly of freedom of the tin industry from competition in the labour market, the absence of trade union organization and a complete absence of a minimum wage legislation.² Trade union organizations on the tin mines on the Plateau were not begun until after 1945 and it was not until in the period between 1950 and 1960 that they became politically vigorous.³

In 1926 when the industry expanded, there was a severe labour shortage and that conditioned the payment of high wages.⁴ For example, wages for labourers increased from five shillings and six pence in 1926 to six shillings and six pence per week in 1928.⁵ In 1931 however there was evidently a sufficiently large core of labour which was thoroughly broken into mining, willing to continue work at a very low wage and there was nothing to prevent the mining companies from imposing drastic wage cuts.⁶ In the instance the average wages for a labourer fell from six shillings and six pence per week to about two shillings and seven pence.⁷ Although after 1931 there was an increased demand

1. Perham 1947 p.24

2. Ibid

3. Trade Union Movements on the Plateau Tin Fields are examined with more analytical details in Chapters 4 where we relate their activities and influences in the politics of the M-Belt Movement.

4. Perham 1947 p.24

5. Ibid p.23 n.3

6. Ibid p.23

7. Ibid p.24

for labour there was only a slight increase in wages, averaging three shillings and six pence in 1937 and fluctuating to between two shillings and three pence per week in 1938.¹ Penelope Bower suggests that in the period between 1930 and 1940 and thereafter there were fluctuations in wages: "... because another decade of civilization had increased the desire to earn wages and the former difficulty in recruiting labour was not experienced to the same extent".² That was a period when socio-economic consciousness of the Plateau groups and societies became no longer 'self-contained' and apart from selling farm products and firewood, also began to take an interest in wage earnings from the tin mines. Implicit in these developments is that when the indigenous groups and societies began to take an interest in the mining industry the wages became low and when they were earned they did not assist in the transformation of living conditions of the groups and societies immediate to the tin mining fields. Even when this was so, the majority of the indigenous population was fed into the unskilled labour categories of the tin mining companies because they were undeveloped in Western European educational skills before 1940.³ This was also the case with unskilled labour which was recruited from the adjacent regions to the Plateau, from Benue, Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria.⁴

The unskilled and skilled labour on the tin mines fields were distinct types. The unskilled labour force which was employed on the

1. Perham 1947 p.23 n.3

2. Ibid p.24

3. For more detailed examples of the social and religious conditions which produced this undevelopment, see discussions in Section II and II of this Chapter.

4. Perham 1947 p.25

'pick and shovel and head pan' work in the period after 1940 was composed of recruited 'political labour' from among the M-Belt groups and societies, particularly from Plateau and Benue.¹ It also included Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri and Nupe who previously migrated and were permanently settled on the Plateau.² The emphasis on 'political labour' was however in the period of the second world war particularly so for the years between 1941 and 1944 and thereafter was subsequently abandoned. The majority of the labourer work force on the tin-fields in the period between 1940 and 1967 however remained largely persons who migrated from the Islamic society in The North as was the pattern since 1903.³ Both the indigenous unskilled and the migrant labour force on the tin mines on the Plateau was illiterate and was unable to speak English.⁴ In the instance of the indigenous population to the Plateau, their occupational roles in society were essentially hunting and agriculture for their small scale subsistence and only appeared on the mines to earn money to pay taxes and buy some European imported goods, when the short period of harvest was completed.⁵ Contrastively, the supervisory work over the 'pick and shovel and head pan' labourers, the semi-skilled drag-line work and the skilled jobs in the offices and technicians were filled for the companies by Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo.⁶ Headmen in charge of "sluice boxes" where the indigenous

1. Perham 1947 p.24

2. Ibid

3. For examples, see more detailed discussions and tables in Section V of this Chapter where the migrant population increases on the Plateau are examined from the period between 1903 and 1940.

4. Perham 1947 p.24

5. Ibid

6. Ibid

M-Belt groups and societies and Hausa unskilled labour worked, were usually Hausa, while Southern Nigerian immigrants worked as fitters, electricians and clerks.¹

When the Japanese seized by military force the British colony of 'Malaya' in 1942 and there was the consequent necessity to increase the output of tin, the tin mining companies were impelled to seek the assistance of the government of British administration in The North to create extra labour.² In the instance however, local labour was already depleted by recruitment into the army from among the essentially non-Islamic groups and societies centred on the Plateau.³ There was also the additional problem created by a diverse need in labour demands to grow food for the increased need for local foodstuff for additional men to work on the tin mines.⁴ The situation conditioned attempts in February 1942 to "import" 10,000 men conscripted under the Nigeria Defence (compulsory National Service) (Essential Mines Northern Provinces) Regulations No.23 of 1942 from the Islamic society as well as from among the M-Belt groups and societies.⁵ The scheme however resulted in maintaining only 515 conscripted men who still worked on the tin fields by July 1942 because of frequent desertions and the absence of proper organization for their welfare.⁶ Subsequently in the same year, because

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1. Perham 1947 p.24
 2. Ibid p.25
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid
 6. Ibid

of the failure of 'The February 1942 scheme', another became devised in which there was provision of a special machinery and the appointment of an Administrative Director of Mineral Production: "... with wide powers to recruit the necessary labour, to fix wage rates and to provide for the welfare of the "selected labourers" during the period of 4 months for which their services were required at the mines".¹ To give the scheme a boost, two Administrative Officers were posted to the mines fields to act as Labour Welfare Officers and two others became assigned and detailed: "... for constant touring and propagation work in the Plateau Province to stimulate the flow of voluntary labour from the tribes which are accustomed to meet the requirements of the mining industry".² The consequences of reorganizing 'The February 1942 Scheme' was that by December 1942, the total labour force on the tin-mine fields reached 70,800 men, in which 14,000 were compulsorily recruited from other provinces, 15,000 voluntarily recruited within the Plateau Province, and the balance of 42,000 were made up of permanent employees of the Mining Companies and voluntary labour from the various regions adjacent to the Plateau.³ The policy of compulsory recruitment of 'political labour' meant for the mines however became changed and ended in April, 1944.⁴

Although Penelope Bower suggests that this was so because of further installations of machinery which reduced the need for extra labour with concomitant financial costs,⁵ the findings of Tseayo and Unongo on Tiv recruitment as political labour for the tin mines suggest that there was a critical level of death rate. For example it is

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1. Perham 1947 p.25
 2. Ibid
 3. Report on the Department of Labour 1942 p.2, cited in Perham 1947 p.25
 4. Perham 1947 p.25
 5. Ibid

suggested that: "Thousands of able bodied young Tiv were removed forcefully ... to the temperate cold of the Jos Plateau ... most died even before they arrived at their shacks ... many more died from the unfamiliar (climatic) conditions".¹ This suggests that while the M-Belt areas and people were undeveloped, there were new socio-economic and political conditions which underdeveloped their groups and societies. Furthermore this also suggests that in the period between 1900 and 1950, besides the outstanding feature in the absence of the major cash crops of either the Islamic society or The North and those characteristic of Southern Nigeria, there were internal economic problems within the area itself which made the M-Belt groups and societies persist in an undeveloped situation which established a premise for the underdevelopment of socio-economic institutions. It is very little wonder that a M-Belt Movement was begun from Jos, given the multivariant nature of shared socio-economic and political problems in the experiences of people brought up from among the M-Belt groups and societies to work on the Plateau tin minefields.

By 1950 therefore there existed a number of striking and sharp contrasts between the economies of the M-Belt groups and societies and the economy of the Islamic society in The North. This was most apparent in the total absence of cash crops, particularly in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau and S. Zaria had "no real cash crops" in the period between 1900 and 1945.² In the instance of the Tiv in Benue Province,

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1. Paul Iyorpuu Unongo, "Where Do We Go From Here", An Open Letter to the Tiv People, 1969, unpublished, cited in Tseyayo 1975 p.151
 2. Forde and Scott 1945 p.196

among other groups and societies in that area, it was not until in 1929 that the Beniseed crop commercialized the Tiv economy on an export basis.¹ In that year 8,889 tons became exported and the export tonnage of the Beniseed crop increased to 19,000 in 1955.² Soya beans became an additional cash crop from Tiv land after its introduction in the period of the second world war.³ Although ten tons of the product became exported in 1947, its popularity grew and in 1955, 19,700 tons were exported, the highest recorded production before the dramatic political changes of Nigeria in 1967 conditioned BP state to score production differently from the rest of The North.⁴ Furthermore, unlike the grain economy in the Islamic society, production of food-crops among the M-Belt groups and societies was purely within the community and meant for home consumption. Where there were financial exchanges, they became tied-up to the new economic activities developed from impact with British influences and also connected to the development of alien communities among the M-Belt groups and societies. This means that economic activity among the M-Belt groups and societies contributed to internal rather than external financial exchange. Forde and Scott suggest that this condition of undevelopment with its concomitant consequences on the underdevelopment of some of the M-Belt

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1. Tseayo 1975 p.126
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid

groups and societies on the Plateau contributed to the sizes of families which were smaller than those in the Islamic society. A family on the Plateau consisted of only a man and a wife with one or two children or three adult units.¹ Although family fertility was "fair" infant mortality was high among the Plateau groups and societies.² For example, the gynaecological histories of 82 Birom women of various ages showed that while the number of pregnancies were high, infant mortality, taken to be the age before walking, was over 50% in 1945.³ Although there was growing interest in the money economy, particularly so to meet the needs of buying new products, the majority of the M-Belt groups and societies in the 1940s remained relatively undeveloped socially as both men and women went about naked and in decorative attire with the bulk of their economic instruments and utensils being produced within the villages or districts.⁴ Furthermore, the economies of the M-Belt groups and societies were less developed than that of the Islamic society because they simply lacked an integrative economic base with the new British economic forces after 1900 and therefore remained undeveloped as much as they became underdeveloped. This was more particularly so for the groups and societies on the Plateau where there were intensive extractive economic industries in the Tin and Columbite Mines.⁵ In other words, while a developed

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1. Forde and Scott 1947 p.197
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid p.197 n.1
 4. Ibid p.197
 5. For more detailed discussion and examples see Section V (c) of this Chapter.

economic system in the Islamic society became easily tied to the British extractive economy in The North, there was no previously existing trans-local economic system among the M-Belt groups and societies.

This was so because historically, the trans-local economic centres developed from the Hausa markets and which became integrated into the religious and political state of the Fulani Islamic revolution, were both relatively larger and generated more wealth than any market centre among the M-Belt groups and societies taken singularly or in aggregate economic terms.¹ While the markets among the M-Belt groups and societies were essentially local, albeit mainly centred in the villages of the different communities, the economic markets in the Islamic societies were trans-local, cutting across with merchandise beyond the political boundaries of the Islamic state of the Fulani revolution and the Kingdom of Borno to North Africa and received merchants and goods from the Middle and Far East as well as from Europe through the trans-Saharan trade routes. The trade with the commercial links did not only generate wealth but also shaped the socio-political skills of reading and writing in the Arabic scripts. These were some of the historical bases in the roots of inequalities which developed in The North, when the Islamic society is compared to the M-Belt groups and societies. These initial historical economic patterns in the Islamic societies became consolidated and magnified

1. For detailed discussions and examination of the trans-local economies of the Islamic societies of Sokoto and Borno, see Chapter 1 and 2

advantages upon the establishment of The North by the British. In the instance, when the socio-economically disadvantaged M-Belt groups and societies became territorially incorporated into the new political unit of The North, they were in subordinate and socio-political and economic status. Furthermore, the economic growth of the old and new centres of trade and commerce which were concentrated in the Islamic society intensified urbanization on both, but with a decline and economic stagnation of the old, when trade became redirected toward the coast rather than based on the traditional trans-Saharan routes.

The new centres of trade and politics however became built-up on the old. This is explicit from the figures in Table 3.12. While there were 16 major centres of trade and politics before impact with British influences, they only increased with a single addition of one to 17 after the establishment of The North. Of the 16 centres of trade and politics in the territories that became enclosed as a political unit of The North, only one trade centre rather than a political centre existed in Jos (Naraguta) which might be taken to be centred among the M-Belt groups and societies, before impact with British influences in 1900. Table 3.12 also suggests that the centres of trade and politics in the Islamic society were maintained upon impact with British influences, increasing from 15 to only 16 when there was the growth and development of Kaduna as the major centre for administration by the government of British administration in The North. In the instance however, when trade and politics shifted from Naraguta to Jos, it developed as a major centre after 1900 largely due to the tin and columbite mines. This means that economic patterns were not altered in the Islamic society in the same sense of the experiences of the M-Belt groups and societies. This

Table 3.12 The main Commercial, Trade and Political Centres in The North in the period between 1885 and 1960

Territorial Area in The North	Centres before impact with British influences in 1900			Centres after impact with British influences in 1900		
	Commerce and Trade	Politics	Total	Commerce and Trade	Politics	Total
The Islamic Society	8	7	15	8	8	16
The M-Belt groups and societies	1	-	1	0	0	0
Total	9	7	16	8	8	16

Source: Breakdowns are from Okpu 1977 p.46.

A commercial and trade centre is taken to be a market where there existed trans-local merchants and merchandise for exchange purpose; a political centre is taken to be where an important Emir or a British senior administrative officer existed with political decision-making powers, built up from a traditional base.

was so because the British while consolidating the existing economic patterns in the Islamic society also introduced new administrative (political) and commercial centres and influenced the redirection of the trans-Saharan trade routes by the introduction of the cash crops, notably groundnuts and cotton with their concomitant new cash exchange value to the ordinary farmer and trader. In the instance the political and religious centres of trade centred in Kano, Katsina and Zaria became the 'groundnut triangle' of The North, generating wealth and revenue to local farmers and the government while cotton was widely grown but concentrated in the Islamic society.

The introduction of groundnuts for export purposes dates from 1912 when the Lagos to Kano rail link was opened to give the crop production a boost and the subsequent production of cotton led to differentiation in the material development of society with sharp contrasts between the Islamic society and the M-Belt groups and societies in the amount of cash flows to both middle-men traders, the farmers and the housewives.¹ For example, in 1934 Forde and Scott suggest that a farming household in Kano Province with groundnut got seventeen pounds gross value by its marketing,² while a housewife in the same household earned a gross income of about ten pounds a year from weaving goods in Kazaure because of the availability of cotton.³ Furthermore in 1933 it was estimated that farmers in Kano produced an average of 37416^{tons} of groundnuts from $\frac{1}{4}$ acre plot of land giving a basic cash return of over eight shillings.⁴ There were about between

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1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.245
 2. Ibid p.140
 3. Ibid p.138
 4. Ibid p.144

15000 and 80000 acres of land in Kazaure Division alone which produced 16000 tons of groundnuts with an approximate cash value of £34,000 in a year.¹ Cooking oil is also extracted from the groundnuts and marketed by women for cash. The residue paste from the process is mixed with salt and baked as "Kulli-Kulli" and becomes sold as a popular item of food in the market place.² The two processes of producing cooking oil and "Kulli-Kulli" from groundnuts is exclusively carried out by women who are the professional extractors.³ It ought to be borne in mind however that groundnuts were a widely grown cash crop in The North. For example in 1935 there was a record production of 13000 tons of groundnuts in Benue Province.⁴ This was only 4.9% of the total production of groundnuts in The North for that year which was 267,000 metric tons.⁵ The process of producing oil and "Kulli-Kulli" however remained a monopoly of Hausa women.

Cotton production in The North was centred on a belt 'South of the groundnut belt', the most productive areas being in Misau, north of Bauchi Province.⁶ The 'Cotton Belt' in The North was essentially concentrated in the Islamic society, although like groundnuts it was a widely grown cash crop with variations in production levels among the M-Belt groups and societies. Wealth generated by cotton and groundnut production in the Islamic society was supplemented by the growth

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1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.144
 2. Ibid p.224
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid
 6. Ibid p.144

of tobacco, vegetables and sugar cane in areas where there were damp soil conditions like in Hadejia.¹ These were also cash fetching agricultural products for industries and urban populations, although they were not comparable to the cash output from groundnuts and cotton. For example in 1937, typical cash returns were estimated for groundnuts at twenty two shillings and twelve shillings for cotton per pound per year.²

The economic importance of groundnuts and cotton and their impact in shaping the economy of the Islamic society albeit The North is suggested by their rapidly increasing levels of production and the financial revenues they accrued to the government. For example the groundnut trade expanded from a few hundred tons in the first five years of the century to over 300,000 tons in 1937 while its value increased from less than 1% of the total export value of Nigeria to as much as 24% in the trough year of 1933.³ Similarly the exports of cotton lint increased by 100% in the period between 1913 and 1931 and the export value of cotton comprised 5% of the total export of Nigeria in 1921.⁴ After some production fluctuations in the period between 1903 and 1930, it reached its highest level of production before 1950 of 192,000 cwt. in 1937.⁵

A product which the M-Belt groups and societies completely lacked in export and value and which contributed enormously to the economy of The North was untanned hides and skins. This was so because they simply did not have the "animal wealth" when it is

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1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.144 n.1
 2. Forde and Scott 1945 p.145; it is suggested by Forde and Scott that there were no comparative statistical prices beyond their personal observations.
 3. Forde and Scott 1945 p.7
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid

compared to the Islamic society sufficiently to be an export product. The figures in Table 3.13 suggest that only 14.9% of the animal wealth in The North existed among the M-Belt groups and societies. Pigs were widely kept among the M-Belt groups and societies, consisting of 73.5% of their numbers in The North. The Tiv alone kept about 27,773 pigs, which was 58.5% of the total numbers of pigs in The North in 1931.¹ The rather high number of pigs in the Islamic society is explained by their concentration among the non-Islamic groups and societies centred around Ilorin and Nupe. This ought to be understood because Moslems have a religious and social revulsion toward keeping dogs and pigs, animals that were widely eaten as a source of protein among the M-Belt groups and societies.² One of the ways in which mobilization was achieved for electoral political support for the UMBC party in the late 1950s and 1960s in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region among the Tiv was in a political song which suggested differences in the types of food eaten between the Islamic society in The North and the M-Belt groups and societies, particularly the pig. For example, this was so when the Tiv sang "Semba Uke ga Semba Yan Igo", (We are not 'Uke' (Hausa) we eat pig).³

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1. Talbot 1969 p.237
 2. This point will be revisited and examined in more detail in Chapters 4 : where we analyze the nature of social issues that were fed into the political demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region separated from the Islamic society in the Nigerian Federation.
 3. Discussions with M. J. Dent, 1979-1983

Table 3.13 Livestock wealth in The North in 1931

Livestock Type	Livestock Total	Islamic Areas	% Total	M-Belt Areas	% Total
Swine (pigs)	47,445	12,584	26.5	34,861	73.5
Sheep	1,731,609	1,353,170	78.1	378,439	21.9
Stallions (Horses)	62,153	50,180	80.7	11,973	19.3
Goats	4,281,131	3,475,330	81.2	805,801	18.3
Mares	96,526	84,942	88.0	11,584	12.0
Donkeys	436,757	408,392	93.5	28,365	6.5
Cattle	2,248,913	2,196,460	97.7	52,453	2.3
Ostriches	369	365	98.9	4	1.1
Camels	4,802	4,788	99.7	14	0.3
Total	8,909,705	7,586,211	85.1	1,323,494	14.9

Source: Computed from Talbot 1969, Table 43 p.237

It ought to be borne in mind however that the respectable concentration of sheep, horses, goats, mares, donkeys and cattle among the M-Belt groups and societies is explained by the provincial scores in the 1931 census. This means that the animal wealth in the M-Belt areas as suggested by the figures in Table 3.13 was concentrated with Hausa Fulani in the Islamic centres of religion and politics like Yola, Bauchi and Zaria, rather than among the M-Belt groups and societies. It was from the concentration of this animal wealth in the Islamic society in The North that as early as in 1908, 10,000 untanned hides and skins reached the Nigerian ports for export purposes.¹ The following years witnessed steady increases in the extraction of the products until in 1937 when 6,000,000 hides and skins were exported from The North with a total revenue value of £853,000 for the government.²

It was in these economic advantages that the territorial incorporation of the M-Belt groups and societies into the political Unit of The North with a dominant and wealthier Islamic society reinforced political inequalities upon impact with British influences. This affected the causes of the developing dependence of the M-Belt groups and societies on the cultural, economic and socio-political patterns of the Hausa-Fulani Islamic society in the period between 1900 and 1950. Except for Tin and Columbite products, which were gained from the territorial areas of the M-Belt groups and societies and which subsequently created an enclave industry and infrastructural development on the Jos Plateau, there was nothing comparable to the development of 'cash crops' in the Islamic society. This was one of the economic premises from which as early as in 1933, Cameron became

1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.10
2. Ibid

concerned over the undevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies. In that year he pointed out that the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North had made less political progress in 30 years when compared to similar socio-economic and political units in the South of Nigeria, who achieved rapid development in three or four years.¹

In the period between 1900 and 1930 the economic and socio-political undevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies was also characterized by depravity and moral degradation which was constantly compared to European and Islamic civilizations. This became fitted to be the general patterns existing in the non-Islamic parts of Africa. In particular, this was so for Christian Missionary choice selection of observ socio-economic and political patterns in the societies of the M-Belt areas. According to Christian Missionaries from European nations who went to The North in Nigeria, the socio-economic conditions of the undevelopment and the underdevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies were caused by the consequences of Islamic slave raids and the persistence of the slave trade in the period between 1804 and 1900. These ideas were however previously and rigorously propounded with their remedies suggested by T.F. Buxton in about 1840 in England.²

At the beginning of the 20th Century however, Christian Missionaries still maintained that it was Islamic raids for slaves and the slave trade which reduced the West African Nations: "... into fragments of nations ... disintegrated nations .. broken nations ... that are the spent waves of a stream of harrassed humanity, testifying to terrific tempests of strife that for ages have swept over the seething millions of the vast interior ... a calamity that left

1. Kirk Greene 1965 p.195

2. For examples, see discussions in Section II of this Chapter.

the crushed African mass a mere heap of particles."¹ In one instance for example, Maxwell used a report from the government of British administration on existing political and economic conditions before impact with British influences in 1900, which suggested that in The North: "The country was controlled and ruled under conditions giving no guarantee of liberty or even strife ... slave raiding was being carried on by the Mohammedans upon the pagans and the pagans in general were engaged in inter-tribal warfare .. further realities were those of exorbitant taxation, extermination of populations, cannibalism, trial by ordeal, highway robbery, ignorance, illiteracy and disease."²

This was the political and social premise from which conceptions of religious cum political paternalism for the development of the M-Belt groups and societies in Christian Missionaries became established to support the government of British administration in The North.³ Kumm for one, suggested that like people, the nations of the world can be divided into adults and children, with "The Negro" being the "Hobbledehoy" of the Human Family.⁴ According to Kumm, with a typology like that: ".. The heathen clans amongst whom we are today administering justice in Central Africa, are in our hands as little children whose fate and future we may make or mar... older than the whiteman in years, but in mind and soul, a child; and as children they must be treated .. They are our brothers and sisters

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1. Boer 1979 p.169
 2. Maxwell 1952 p.131
 3. Boer 1979 p.131
 4. Ibid

in common humanity. They are one of us in sin and ruin .. eventually they will occupy a responsible and respected position in the Council of the Nations, the Parliament of Mankind ... characterized by peace, justice, increased health and wealth, modern education and technology - all stamped with Christian morality."¹ It was this paternalistic path geared toward creating a specific type of society, among the M-Belt groups and societies albeit the 'Sudan' which Christian Missionaries followed and sought to create, a type of society that might be different from patterns in the Islamic society and therefore hold an attraction to the adherents of the Islamic religion, sufficiently for Christianity to thrive in fulfilling the objectives of Christendom in civilizing Africa with European civilization.² However contrary to the general ideas of Karl Kumm which were based on his wide travels in the 'Sudan', in the social and political experiences of Lowry Maxwell centred on the Jukum towns of Ibi and Wukari as well as among other M-Belt groups and societies: "The Native was an ignorant lot that needed the protection of the government than paternalism."³ In other words, Maxwell saw the relationship to the government of British administration in The North as 'Loco parentis to the Natives' rather than the isolated paternalism of Christian Missionaries advocated by Kumm with no complimentary patterns.⁴

Although there were differences in the emphasis among Christian Missionaries on who was "protector of the pagan" in The North, for example, whether it was the government of British administration or

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1. Extracts from the writings of Karl W.H. Kumm in the period between 1900 and 1910, cited in Boer 1979 p.131-132
 2. For more detailed discussions and examples of Christian Missionary objectives in the 'Sudan' see Section II of this Chapter.
 3. Boer 1979 p.151
 4. Ibid

the Christian Missionaries, government became supported because it represented the government of England, a country where there existed the highest attributes and virtues of the West, especially those of Liberty and Justice for the cause of humanity.¹ For example, Kumm, a German Christian Missionary in The North, suggested that within the Western Nations of Europe: "Britain outshone all other nations in justice where truthfulness, honesty and liberty are valued more highly than in any other on earth."²

The Christian Missionary path to transform the undeveloped nature of the M-Belt groups and societies with the development of European educational school systems and social welfare institutions became shaped by these socio-political notions. Unlike the progress of Christianity through the establishment of Christian churches which made converts and produced the Christian communities, Christian Missionary development of education among the M-Belt groups and societies was characterized by neglect in the pre-1940 period with almost relegation to the backwaters of achieving European modernization. This was so because of the religious preference in the emphasis of the development of Christianity. Both processes however shared a characteristic initial slow growth in the period between 1900 and 1930 when it is compared with the subsequent Christian conversions into Christianity and Christian educational development in the period between 1930 and 1950 and in the period between 1950 and 1970.³

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1. Boer 1979 p.130
 2. Kumm 1910, cited in Boer 1979 p.130
 3. The concern of the next few pages will be to show how Christian Missionaries made efforts to transform societies in the M-Belt areas by the development of European type of educational and welfare institutions in the period between 1900 and 1950. Educational developments as a direct consequence of Christian Missionary activities in the period between 1950 and 1970 are examined in Chapters 4 and 5.

In the instance of the initial slow growth of education among the M-Belt groups and societies before 1930, this was caused by a deliberate Christian Missionary religious policy. For example, Maxwell suggests that Christian Missionaries did not advance the frontiers of educating the M-Belt groups and societies before 1940 because according to "indigenous Church principles it would seem well to wait until the people were prepared to advance".¹ However, when it was in the experience of Christian Missionaries that Christianity developed more rapidly with learning European modernizing skills in the school system, the two began to develop collaterally after 1940. The period between 1930 and 1940 was characterized by Christian Missionary refinement of its educational policy for the development of the M-Belt groups and societies.² Although there were numerous socio-economic and religious factors with political ramifications, which conditioned the development of European educational institutions by Christian Missionaries after 1940 among the M-Belt groups and societies, one of the most significant was the social feedback they experienced from Nigerian soldiers whose ethnic origins were from among the M-Belt groups and societies who were Christian converts and had been recruited into the Army to fight the second world war in Abyssinia (Ethiopia), India, Burma and North Africa. For example, Maxwell suggests that although in the

1. Maxwell 1952 p.252

2. For more detailed discussions with examples, see Sections II and II of this Chapter.

experiences of Christian Missionaries the "African mind" was not yet "woken up" to the real needs and facts of the circumstances: "We found that we had been far too slow in our schools .. the world and life will not wait upon our tastes and prejudices. Our young people joined the forces. Their services took them to Abbyssinia, India, Burma and North Africa. Letters came back home from these lads, sometimes to parents who could not read them. So there arises a demand for schools and schools need teachers and teachers nowadays may be greatly attracted by the possibilities of other professions with less (religious) ties and more pay: Mines, commerce, transport, army, police, medical services, public hygiene, local administration, engineering, railway, forestry - all beckon the clever boy who knows enough to be able to take or give written instructions or to keep an account or a register or to rise out of the rut of native handicraftsmanship".¹ Maxwell further suggests that in the 1940s, Christian Missionaries realized that they might not be able to build up longer lasting churches and Christian communities in socio-economic and political ignorance since: "There ought to be someone in the Christian community who knows something about the historical and geographical setting of the Bible Story, something about the history of the Christian Church, of the civilization of today and its urges and perils, something of the errors of Romanism, Millennial Dawnism and other "isms" that are seeking to seduce Africa today. Then when

1. Maxwell 1952 p.252

the new Hausa Bible is in their hands and the more thorough exposition of it, may not be either shirked or postponed .. and lastly our people need much help, properly competent help too, in bridging the gap between the primitive way of life into which they have been born and the terrific rush of modern civilization that is pouring in like a flood over poor Africa, with its harsh calls for nationalism and self-government and its glittering line of money and more money, pleasure and more pleasure, power and more power."¹

Although Christian Missionary work in The North which subsequently became concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies was begun as Evangelical work, it became more and more involved with establishing the European school system for modernization. In the instance, it rapidly opened and organized Christian institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies after 1940. The Christian institutions were established with an explicit Christian religious ideology, cutting through the whole spectrum of the curriculum. In these institutions there was a rigorous programme of Christian religious indoctrination, firstly into the Christian faith and also directed toward building up anti-Islamic sentiments.² Furthermore, although in the period between 1900 and 1930 there was political and religious restriction of the activities of Christian Missionaries in The North contained in explicit anti-Christian Missionary policies,³ there was no comparable venture in which the government of British administration in The North and the different Christian Missionary Bodies, together cooperated as closely as they did in the educational

1. Maxwell 1952 p.181

2. This will become apparent in the details of the next few pages.

3. For examples, see more detailed discussion of these policies in Section V and III of this Chapter.

sphere.¹ In contrast to the Medical Departments which were run by the government it was not until 1945 that the Educational Departments "cordially invited" the cooperation of Christian Missionaries and the churches for the progress of educational development among the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North.²

It was Lugard in the period between 1900 and 1920 who set the precedent for the developing correlation in the relationship between Christianity and the establishment of European type of educational institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies. In the instance, Lugard suggested that Christian Missionary interests might "take off the burden" from the government in the education of the "pagan tribes".³ Subsequently as early as in 1910, Rower, a top British Resident stationed in Yola, suggested to Maxwell that "the Education of pagans was the Mission's task".⁴ Furthermore, unique in the political and religious policies of the ruling caste he belonged to, Governor Bell suggested in 1911 that Christian Missionary work and the education of the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North was crucially important "in order to forestall the advance of Islam".⁵ In 1918 when the provincial government in Benue appointed a clergyman, Reverend G.P. Bargery as Director of Education "for the pagan areas, Missions were asked to cooperate in education".⁶ In 1924 Farrant

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1. Boer 1979 p.303
 2. Ibid
 3. Maxwell 1952 p.253
 4. Boer 1979 p.163
 5. Ibid p.192
 6. Ibid p.194

suggests that there existed a principle in the government of British administration in The North: "... more or less accepted that Mohammedan education is in the hands of the government but the education of pagans was to be left in the hands of the Missions... and in any case Government schools offer no hope at all (to Christianity) for the satisfactory education of Christian children".¹

In the period between 1900 and 1926, government effort in the education of the M-Belt groups and societies was however practically non-existent.² For example as latterly as in 1926 while there were 68 government and NA schools in The North, which were mainly concentrated in the Islamic society with a total average attendance of 22,207 pupils, there were 56 Christian Missionary schools concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies which had 3,003 pupils in average attendance with only one of their schools receiving government financial assistance.³ In that year however the Australian-New Sealand Branch of the SUM expressed happiness with an educational grant of £50,103 from the government of British administration in The North.⁴ Furthermore in 1927 the provincial government on the Plateau proposed that Christian Missionaries undertake all elementary school development in the province.⁵

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1. G.H. Farrant, SUM Circular, 22nd February 1924
 2. Boer 1979 p.194
 3. Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.32
 4. Boer 1979 p.279; The socio-political and religious controversies over government financial assistance is examined in more detail below.
 5. The Light Bearer Magazine, 6th March 1937

Although the government of British administration on the Plateau never implemented this formulated policy, the development of European-type educational institutions in the school system became the exclusive concern of Christian Missionaries. As early as in 1908, the first European-type schools to be operational on the Plateau were those opened by the CMS at Kabwir among the Angas and at Panyam among the Sura.¹ In the period between 1908 and 1940 educational development on the Plateau was almost entirely derived from the work of various Christian Missionary societies.² In 1937 for example when there was a total number of 61 schools of all grades on the Plateau, 55 were Christian Missionary schools with only one government school in Jos township and five Native Administration schools.³ Ames suggests that even when this was the case, the government and Christian Missionary schools in Jos township in 1926, were specifically meant to meet:

"... the demands for schools for the children of educated and semi-educated natives of Southern Provinces of Nigeria and other African colonies... There are also at Jos four other schools maintained by Missions. The total pupils' number was 456 of whom not more than five per cent are natives of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria. Teaching in these schools is entirely in English and the work reaches a more advanced academic standard than in the village Mission schools."⁴

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers* 1937, 1972 p.312
 2. *Ibid*
 3. *Ibid*
 4. *Ibid* p.314

This suggests that although there were lower academic standards in Christian Missionary schools, the majority of which were directly influential in the diffusion of Christianity, while the Christian institutions were begun as early as in 1908, it was not until in the 1930s that government educational development began to take shape among the Plateau groups and societies. For example, in 1930 an NA Elementary Day School became opened at Jema'a but for Moslem boys only.¹ In 1933 similar NA schools were opened at Ngel, Haifan and Bokkos, followed by another at Rim in 1934.² These schools served the Birom and the Challa as well as the migrant labour force on the tin mines. Ames suggests that it was intended: "Further Elementary Schools for non-Moslem pupils will be opened from time to time as the students from the Province at the Toro Training Centre complete their training."³

The Toro Training Centre Institution was opened by the government of British administration in 1929, exclusively for the training of teachers for NA Elementary schools in the non-Moslem parts of Bauchi and Plateau.⁴ In 1933 seven students indigenous to the Plateau groups and societies passed out from the Centre and became posted

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972* p.314; it ought to be borne in mind that Jema'a Federation was a Division in Plateau Province until it became politically transferred into S. Zaria as part of Zaria Province in 1934. For examples and discussions see Section V (c) of this Chapter.
 2. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972* p.314
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid

to work in schools in Jos and Pankshin Divisions.¹ Two of these students, Rwang Pam and Gwamna Kagoro subsequently became Headmasters of NA schools and in the 1950s were first-class-chiefs of the Birom and Kagoro respectively in the NHC. In the same year 11 students, indigenous to the Plateau groups and societies were still studying at Toro, 4 having passed through Elementary Christian Missionary schools.² While the government of British administration in The North trained non-Islamic teachers, not necessarily Christians, at Toro for service among the M-Belt groups and societies, the Missionaries trained Christian teachers at the RCM institutions in Shendam, opened in 1933 and the SUM colleges at Gindiri opened in 1934 which also had an Elementary practising school attached to it.³ Ames suggests that training some of the Christian teachers in Gindiri reached an advanced academic standard.⁴ This means that although government was concerned to develop education among the non-Islamic groups and societies on the Plateau, the efforts of Christian Missionaries, similar to other areas of the M-Belt groups and societies were more characteristic of the process.

Table 3.14 suggests that 90% of European-type educational institutions on the Plateau were Christian schools with 90.3% of student attendances rather than in government schools. In these institutions, it is significant that while there were 496 girls in Christian schools

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972* p.313
 2. *Ibid* p.314
 3. *Ibid* p.313
 4. *Ibid* p.314

Table 3.14 Concentration of European-type Educational Institutions on the Plateau in 1933

Origins of Institution	Number of Schools	% Schools	Number of Pupils	% Pupils
SUM	28	46.7	790	35.9
RCM	16	26.7	629	28.6
Lagos Diocesan Synod	5	8.3	271	12.3
SIM	4	6.7	237	10.8
Native Administration	5	8.3	129	5.9
Government	1	1.7	85	3.9
Baptist Mission	1	1.7	58	2.6
Total	60	100%	2,119	100%

Source: computed from Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937*, 1972 p.315

on the Plateau, the six government schools were educating, 214 boys only, in 1933.¹ This suggests that even when educational development began to take shape as a direct consequence of government involvement, it became conditioned by the practices of modernization as it existed in the Islamic society in The North in which women were excluded from the process. There were however 1,489 boys in the Christian Missionary schools in 1933.² This is about three times the number of girls in the Christian schools. Although this suggests that there were more boys rather than girls in the Christian Missionary schools, the significant fact however is that the education of girls was completely excluded from government and NA schools on the Plateau in 1933.

Ames suggests that these figures were only the numbers of pupils shown as enrolled in regular attendance but that in the Christian Missionary schools in the villages: "The number in attendance is considerably in excess of those on the roll so that these figures should not be regarded as an accurate index of the number of persons influenced by the Missions from an educational point of view."³ In other words, unlike Christian Missionary circumstances in the urban centres, there was more Christian influence in the villages, where the Christian schools took in pupils of any age provided they were willing to attend regularly.⁴

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972* p.315
 2. *Ibid*
 3. *Ibid*
 4. *Ibid* p.313; My father suggests that when he was the Evangelist-Headmaster at Fan village in the 1950s the ages of pupils in the SUM Elementary Primary school ranged from 10 year-olds to married adults of about 25 years old who sat in the same classes.

However in addition to the 54 Christian Missionary schools on the Plateau in 1933, there were also 32 classes of Christian Religious Instructions which were maintained by different Missionary Bodies.¹ In these classes, only a little reading and writing was taught based on the need to understand the Bible.² In other words these were not formal schools.

The socio-religious emphasis in the objectives of the government of British administration in The North when it encouraged Christian Missionaries to develop educational institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies was to achieve "character building and with a universal religion".³ This was so because society and social control among the M-Belt groups and societies was not understood but assumed to be non-existent and therefore the appropriate entities to civilize with European modernizing influences.⁴ In the instance it was suggested that although the Christian religion was to be taught and not Islam, its instruction being compulsory in the Christian schools, objectors were to be excused.⁵ In 1930 the Christian Missionaries acknowledged the policy, placed some of their schools under government control in acceptance of their functional role of "character building and religion".⁶ The government of British administration in The North

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972* p.315
 2. *Ibid*
 3. Boer 1979 p.194
 4. For more detailed discussions and examples, see Chapter 2, Section I and II where British social and political attitudes toward the Islamic society in The North contrasted sharply with those held toward the M-Belt groups and societies.
 5. Boer 1979 p.194
 6. *Ibid*

complimented this by recognizing Christian Missionary graduates as "proper graduates, eligible to compete for positions on the same basis as graduates from government schools".¹ From this development there was increased cooperation after 1930 between Christian Missionary Bodies and the government of British administration in The North in the development of educational institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies.

Although this was so, Coleman suggests that educational cooperation between the government of British administration in The North and the Christian Missionaries was "a marriage of convenience" and like all marriages there were socio-economic and political tensions.² The tensions were three-fold. Firstly, financial assistance to Christian Missionaries with its concomitant consequences on social and political control by the government of British administration in The North. Secondly, on a policy, although it was never implemented, of deploying trained teachers from the Islamic society to all educational institutions in The North inclusive of Christian Missionary schools. Thirdly, Christian Missionary religious teaching for conversion into Christianity in all schools in the M-Belt areas after 1940 in order to produce virile Christian communities with knowledge about "the civilizations of today".³

Before 1940 there was a suggested policy in the government of British administration in The North that Moslem teachers among the

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1. Boer 1979 p.194
 2. Coleman 1974 p.4
 3. Maxwell 1952 p.181

M-Belt groups and societies might be more prestigious in social status.¹ When this developed to be policy of government of and fact to Christian Missionaries, Maxwell counter-acted the assumed prestige of Moslem teachers by suggesting that properly trained teachers from among the M-Belt groups and societies were more prestigiously acceptable, especially where there was "anti-Hausa and anti-Islamic sentiments".² This was the religious premise from which there was developed the urgent Christian Missionary need to produce educationally qualified Christian teachers by training indigenes from among the M-Belt groups and societies in order to reduce the need for Moslem teachers in Christian educational institutions. In that instance although it was not until in the 1940s when Christian Missionaries began to implement a counter-active policy of educational development of teachers, as early as in 1910 Maxwell vigorously suggested to Christian Missionaries in The North: "That they are now even training at Kano a number of teachers in the rudiments, linking book and handwork. These will be utilised up and down the country. They will all be either Moslem or Islam-invested Missions, it's up to you to provide teachers that Government will recognize as qualified for the pagan districts so that the schools in them need not be taught by Moslems .. before the Government comes with its Kano-taught 'Mallams' to set up an Islamic-tainted Government school ... It is coming ... and we must get up to meet it".³ In the developing relationship between the

1. Boer 1979 p.162-163

2. Ibid p.162

3. Maxwell Diaries 1910, cited in Boer 1979 p.162

the Christian Missionaries and government of British administration in The North, however, it has been suggested that Vischer subsequently intended a programme of cooperation whereby the government establish schools among the M-Belt groups and societies and Christian Missionaries supply only teachers: "for distinctly Christian religious instructions".¹ This was the premise from which the development of schools among the M-Belt groups and societies became shaped by Christian Missionary Teachers who trained indigenous Teacher-Evangelists from each of the "tribal areas". In the period between 1900 and 1940 the concern of the Christian Missionaries was therefore with the Training of Teachers who will also be church leaders and do evangelical work. This was the premise from which Dawson the SUM Field Secretary emphasized that "it is the government's business to promote education while the Mission is interested only in evangelism and training of church leaders".² This suggests that Christian Missionaries were interested in the development of Education among the M-Belt groups and societies only as long as the process aided the cause for Christianity. Although this was so, after 1940 the Christian Missionaries had many reasons which caused regret for an insistance like that.³

When the educational process was begun however, similar to the developing patterns in the Islamic society, both Christian Missionaries and the government of British administration in The North before 1950 initially tried to focus their attention on providing education only

1. Boer 1979 p.193

2. Ibid

3. These reasons will become apparent in the more detailed discussions below.

to the M-Belt groups and societies. In 1913 for example, the government planned an Elementary School at Ibi at the site of the Christian Missionary Headquarters for the sons of chiefs.¹ In the 1930s, Bristow sought the political cooperation of the government in having chiefs and other prominent persons in society send their sons to Christian Missionary schools.²

However, in the instance of the socio-religious tensions over the deployment of government teachers who might be Moslems to teach in schools among the M-Belt groups and societies, Christian Missionaries counter-acted the plans by directly involving themselves in teaching programmes in their schools as well as with a rapid programme of developing indigenous Christian teachers. For example in 1931 while there were 14 European teachers with 180 "Native" teachers in 30 Government schools, mainly in the Islamic society, there were 48 European teachers with 108 "Native" teachers in 102 unassisted Christian Missionary schools which were concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies.³ In that year however there was one Christian Missionary school with two European teachers and six "Native" teachers which received grants and financial assistance from the government.⁴ This suggests that there was more direct European influence in the development and training of the M-Belt groups and societies through

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1. Boer 1979 p.193
 2. The Light Bearer Magazine, 6th March 1937
 3. Talbot 1969, Table 57 p.260
 4. Ibid

the school system rather than in the Islamic society. The social consequences in these direct European influences with Christianity in the transformation of the M-Belt groups and societies to European patterns and views are obvious.¹

In the instance of the tensions between the government and Christian Missionaries over religious teachings in the period between 1900 and 1950 in the developing schools, these were centred on the prohibition of 'teaching Christianity' outside Christian Missionary schools among the M-Belt groups and societies. For example, although it was the politics of Lugard that determined that education among the M-Belt groups and societies was to have Christian religious bias for the pragmatic reason of obtaining a higher level of morality, when government established schools in the area, they prevented the teaching of Christianity.² Since Government schools had Moslems as teachers, Farrant suggests that the government of British administration in The North was "a proselytising force for Islam" among the M-Belt groups and societies.³ Bishop Smith further suggests that there were instances in which boys from among the M-Belt groups and societies were forcibly enrolled in government schools rather than those of Christian Missionaries and in the instance they were taught by Moslem teachers with Moslem textbooks and therefore "were morally bound to become Moslems".⁴ There were also instances where Christian boys

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1. This is examined in more detail in Chapter 4 where the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement with a distinct Christian religious identity is discussed.
 2. Boer 1979 p.303
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid p.281

attending government industrial schools became compelled to work on Sundays.¹ Furthermore in 1942 Doris Spencer also suggests that the series of The Government Readers for schools "Magana Jari Ce" were unsuitable for use in schools where there were Christian boys in the M-Belt areas because the books contained an Islamic ideology about society with denigratory social attitudes toward European civilization. Spencer listed a number of bad qualities raised in the books on European civilization which included "saying bad things about Europeans, cruelty, invective, lying, perversion of justice, nepotism, loose living, immorality, gambling, drinking, smoking, harlots and concubines".² Spencer therefore suggested that the books were Moslem inspired, contained Islamic doctrines and concluded: ".. were children in schools for Moslems only given reading books upholding Christian doctrines there would quickly be strong objections made. Instead of this we get approved school books made almost into a handbook on Mohammedanism".³ There were also suggestions that Moslems exerted strong pressures against having Christian teaching of Moslem children in government schools, Moslem chiefs preventing children from attending Christian schools and Spencer felt Christians ought to display a similar zeal "to prevent their children from exposure to Moslem influence".⁴ In the

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1. Boer 1979 p.281
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid

one instance of Moslem chiefs preventing non-Islamic children from attending Christian schools Tett for example suggests that "Moslem overlords use threats to prevent the pagan peoples from allowing their children to attend our Christian Religious Instructions in Lafiya".¹ Complaints of this nature continued through the pages of the Light Bearer Magazines in the period between 1903 and 1950 from different Christian Missionary Bodies in The North.²

However the greatest issue that became a problem in the period between 1900 and 1950 in educational cooperation between Christian Missionaries and government for the development of the M-Belt groups and societies was government financial assistance and grants to Christian Missionaries for educational purposes. Although the Christian Missionaries subsequently accepted grants from the government of British administration in The North, particularly so after 1945, the initial strong suspicions about the political and social intentions of the grants and financial assistance remained and sometimes meant outright opposition. This was so because Christian Missionaries were always alerting themselves that government sought to use them for its own aims rather than those of Christianity.³ It was after 'The 1910 Lokoja Conference' that Christian Missionaries

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1. W.H. Tett, Annual Report for Lafiya, 1942
 2. Boer 1971 p.282
 3. Boer 1979 p.280

adopted a policy on accepting grants and financial assistance from the Government.¹ The policy suggests that government grants and financial assistance were to be accepted: "... only when given unconditionally to make sure no limits would result on the Mission's spiritual work".² This suggests that Christian Missionaries were prepared to receive grants and financial assistance from the government of British administration in The North provided that social and religious control of their institutions remained in Christian Missionary hands. Furthermore Christian Missionaries desired that government grants supplement the income of the Christian schools.³

In 1916 however there developed political indicators which began to suggest that the government's grants and financial assistance were not without strings. In that year, the government presented an Educational Ordinance which prohibited grants to Christian Missionary schools established after the law took effect.⁴ When this development occurred, Christian Missionaries in The North interpreted The Ordinance as meant to control the expansion of Christian Missionary education among the M-Belt groups and societies since the Missionary financial resources were too thin to continue with expansion without the government grants and financial assistance.⁵ In that instance the SUM in conjunction with the CMS vigorously contested the Ordinance

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1. Boer 1979 p.192
 2. Ibid p.280
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid

and objected to the measures and its provisions. SUM and CMS Christian Missionaries suggested to the Governor-General of Nigeria in Lagos that the 1916 Ordinance: "... was discriminatory ... its definition of 'school' was too wide to include even ecclesiastical gatherings as choirs, Sunday Schools, catechumate classes and even sewing classes ... it was in effect a withdrawal of the earlier promises of cooperation in Pagan Education."¹ This was one of the premises from which when in 1924 the government gave grants for the Gindiri schools, and prior to their acceptance, Bristrow was instructed by the Missionaries: "... to enquire as to the implication of the grant".² Later in 1936, Farrant received a formal communication from the government of British administration in The North, attempting to allay the fears of the Christian Missionaries by suggesting that: "I hope that you are not under the impression that by taking a grant you are terribly bound (to government policies) .. There is a more broad-minded view now. It is the spirit and not the letter that we go by".³ This however did not stop the political fears in policies of Christian Missionaries over receiving financial assistance and grants from the Government. In 1941 for example, Farrant was forced on the issue to send circulars to SUM Christian Missionaries to solicit

1. Boer 1979 p.194

2. Ibid p.280

3. Bieneman 1 February 1936, cited in Boer 1979 p.280

opinions on grants from the government for educational development.¹ The responses ranged from wholehearted acceptance to outright rejection.² The main religious and political reasons produced for the rejection were twofold: "... it would create a class distinction among servants of the church, since teachers would get much higher salary than the church could ever pay Pastors and Evangelists and secondly these grants would give power to the government in Mission schools with the result of increasing secularization".³ In other words educational development was maintained at an underdeveloped level before 1945 because Christian Missionaries did not concede secularization of their religious objectives in the Christian schools for accelerated development of modernization on European patterns.

When in 1942 the government of British administration in The North and Nigeria adopted a new educational scheme and policy in relation to the "Colonial Development and Welfare Fund" that provided for wholesale government support of increased education in The North, including the Christian Missionary Schools, grants and financial assistance became accepted: ".... on condition that no strings be attached prejudicial to freedom of religious teaching".⁴ This suggests that the underdevelopment and the slow progress in the Christian Missionary educational development of the M-Belt groups and societies

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1. Boer 1979 p.280
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid

relative to the activities of the government of British administration concentrated in the Islamic society in the period between 1900 and 1940, besides the essential focus on the diffusion of Christianity through the development of Churches and Church leaders, is also explained by the political caution which Christian Missionary Bodies exercised over receiving grants and financial assistance from the government of British administration in The North.

There were however other additional religious and political problems in the experiences of Christian Missionaries which inhibited the rapid development of educational institutions with Christianity among the M-Belt groups and societies. For example, although it was government policy that Christian Missionaries "actively cooperate" in educational development among the M-Belt groups and societies there were instances where the government discriminated against Christianity in favour of Islam. This was so because of certain specific education policies and the religious preferences of certain British officials which were always tied up to the policy of Indirect rule and Islam in The North.¹ There was the perennial problem of restricting the activities of Christian Missionaries among assumed Islamic communities among the M-Belt groups and societies which subsequently extended to medical work.² For example, it was not until 1936 that the policy of

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1. For examples, see Chapter 2 where the political consequences of Indirect Rule over the M-Belt groups and societies were examined. Also see Crampton 1975 p.51-55
 2. Boer 1979 p.303; Christian Missionary Medical work is examined below where we discuss their efforts in developing the M-Belt groups and societies by creating social and welfare institutions like hospitals, dispensaries and clinics.

restricting Christian medical work among Islamic communities in The North became relaxed and Christian Missionaries were invited to begin medical work in the Islamic areas.¹ This however was mainly leprosy work among the Moslem communities in the Islamic society.² Leprosy and lepers were more characteristic of the Islamic society in The North rather than among the M-Belt groups and societies. The lepers were uncontrolled and walked about as beggars and mingled with unaffected people.

Table 3-15 suggests that 61.8% of lepers in The North in 1931 were in the Islamic society with the highest concentrations in Kano and Sokoto, while 38.2% were to be found among the M-Belt groups and societies. The highest concentration of lepers among the M-Belt groups and societies was in Bauchi Province where there was 14.0% of the total in The North. This suggests that although Christian Missionary work was restricted from the Islamic society, it was an area of greater need rather than the M-Belt areas. However while there was wealth in the Islamic society, poverty and disease was characteristic of the lower classes of society. This was unlike in the M-Belt areas where undevelopment and underdevelopment existed side by side with disease and poverty and was more visible at all levels of society. For example, the most prevalent of the diseases of the M-Belt groups and societies was sleeping-sickness.³ In the instance of the Plateau

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1. Boer 1979 p.303
 2. Ibid
 3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.317

Table 3.15 Lepers in The North in 1931

Territorial Area in The North		Number of Lepers	% Numbers	Total Lepers	% Total
The Islamic Society	Kano	10,653	32.5	20,237	61.8
	Sokoto	5,068	15.5		
	Nupe	1,604	4.9		
	Ilorin	1,189	3.6		
	Kantagora	886	2.7		
	Borno	837	2.6		
Areas with M-Belt groups and societies	Bauchi	4,605	14.0	12,535	38.2
	Zaria	2,321	7.1		
	Tiv (Munchi)	1,970	6.0		
	Nasarawa	1,708	5.2		
	Yola	1,034	3.2		
	Muri	897	2.7		
Total		32,772	100%	32,772	100%

Source: computed from Talbot 1969 Table 44 p.238

groups and societies, Ames suggests a list of about 15 other diseases that were characteristic of the area which included Small-pox, Amoebic Dysentery, Tropical Ulcer, Tapeworm, Hookworm, Bilharziasis, Schistosomiasis, Guinea worm, Leprosy, venereal disease, Chigoes, Malaria, Pneumonia and fevers¹. Leprosy on the Plateau was on an average of 5 per 1000 people². Venereal disease however were "imported" diseases from the Islamic society and were prevalent among the non-indigenous population, particularly the Hausas although incidences also became common among the indigenous groups and societies³. Although there was government effort to cope with these diseases, it was Christian Missionary Medical work that cared for a wider area and a greater number of people. For example, of the 22 Dispensaries on the Plateau, 13 were maintained by the various Christian Missionary Bodies while 9 belonged to the NA⁴. Furthermore in 1933 the SUM hospital at Vom had about 55 402 treatments given to 4339 patients⁵.

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1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p317-p318.
 2. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p318.
 3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p318.
 4. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p316.
 5. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p316; Christian Missionary Medical work in the development of the M-Belt groups and societies is examined in more detail below.

In the period between 1900 and 1945, although the political and religious restrictions by the government of British administration in The North on Christian Missionaries caused tensions and inhibited the rapid development of the M-Belt groups and societies with Christian schools and social welfare institutions, there was progress. For example, Table 3.16 suggests that as early as in 1912, SUM schools were territorially and widely spread among some of the M-Belt groups and societies. In that year there were as many as 989 school sessions in SUM schools with a total of 12,459 students in attendance. In 1912 however there was a total of 29 Christian Missionary schools in The North with 5 government schools which had an average attendance of 350 pupils.¹ It ought to be borne in mind however that the Christian schools in the period between 1900 and 1940 were more of Christian Religious Instructional classes rather than the formal school systems. It was only in the government schools that there was a standard quality educational system.² This is significant because, while the Christian Missionary schools were concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies, government schools were the prerogative of the Islamic society in The North before 1940. As earlier examined, this suggests that the educational standards were lower in academic standards in Christian Missionary schools in the period between 1900 and 1940 while higher standards were attained in the government schools concentrated in the Islamic society. In the years before 1940 therefore, even when there was progress in the development of Christian educational establishments, the academic break-through in the quality and quantity

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1. Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.32 Also see the breakdowns in Tables below.
 2. For more detailed discussions see Chapter 2 and also Section III of this Chapter.

Table 3.16 Sudan United Mission Educational Statistics for 1912

Station	Sessions of Schools	Total Attendance
Donga (Yergam and Jukun)	119	3,446
Wukari (Jukun)	220	3,012
Salatu (Tiv)	229	2,459
Langtang (Yergam)	176	2,058
Ibi (Jukun)	151	1,127
Du (Biom)	94	541
Total	989	12,459

Source: S.F Graham, Government and Mission Education in Northern Nigeria 1900-1919, Ibadan University Press, Ibadan 1966 p.127; cited in Albert Ozigi and Lawrence Ocho, Education in Northern Nigeria, Allen and Unwin, London 1981 p.25.

of the standards of educational achievements only came after 1936 and its impact began to imprint itself on society in The North in the mid-1950s and 1960s.¹

A subsequently recognized problem among Christian Missionary Bodies in The North that developed from the lower quality of educational academic standards was that the majority of the M-Belt groups and societies were oblivious over the political developments in Nigeria in the period before 1950. This was so because when political nationalism became a factor in the considerations of Christian Missionary objectives in The North, the Missionaries were concerned that their converts were outside its main stream. This was the premise from which in one instance for example Bristow of the SUM suggested that the M-Belt groups and societies: "...would have been in a better position if the Missions had not been so reluctant in the past to venture upon an educational programme... All the Christians are still too backward educationally to take active part in political leadership ... true, Missions are at long last beginning to take up educational work in a small way, but it is probably too late to have any effect on the present situation."² This suggests that it was not until after 1950 that Christian Missionary Bodies in The North recognized the political importance of education as it related to the whole strategy of halting "the Islamic advance" centred on the M-Belt groups and societies within the territorial concept of the 'Sudan'. This means that the M-Belt groups and societies were underdeveloped as latterly as in 1950 in their socio-political and educational levels of development for participation in trans-local

1. This will become apparent in our discussions in Chapters 4 and 5
 2. W.M. Bristow, The Light Bearer Magazine, July 1950 p.71-72

activities, particularly so in political leadership. This was the premise from which in the same year Bristow also expressed the recurrent Christian Missionary concern suggesting that the M-Belt groups and societies as well as other non-Islamic groups and societies in The North might end up with little or no political representation in an independent government.¹ According to Bristow, it was a situation like that which "gave added importance and urgency to our educational work."²

Although that was so, in the period between 1949 and 1951 Christian Missionaries were satisfied that the Christian converts had organized the NML as a political organization. It was from impact of the organizational thrust of the NML that Bristow, although disappointed with standards of education among the M-Belt groups and societies suggests: "...Nevertheless, few Christians were already leading in the Movement to safeguard non-Moslem interests and their leadership so far had been wise and a credit to the quality of their Christianity".³

In the period between 1900 and 1950, although all the Christian Missionary Bodies in The North became involved in the development of the M-Belt groups and societies by the establishment of Christian schools and social welfare institutions, the religious and political pace of the process was championed by the SUM, particularly its British Branch. This was so because the SUM-British Branch was seen to be in a unique position of political advantage in relation to the government of British administration in The North. This was the

1. Bristow 1950 p.46

2. Ibid

3. W.M. Bristow, The Light Bearer Magazine, October 1951 p.68

premise from which it developed to be the coordinator of "The International Inter-denominational and non-denominational Alliance" of Christian Missionary Bodies in the 'Sudan'.¹ The SUM-British Branch was accepted in that capacity by other Christian Missionary Bodies in The North for two reasons: it originated the entire Christian religious concept and effort to the 'Sudan' in order to develop a Christian society to halt the southward advance of Islam, a religious premise from which most of its branches served under British Imperial regimes, particularly so in Africa.² Secondly, with its religious headquarters in London as well as that of the government of British administration in The North, the SUM-British Branch was expected to be more influential, not only with the colonial office in England but with Christendom as well rather than any other Christian Missionary Body in taking up issues concerning the problems of developing Christianity.³ Boer suggests that this was not simply because of national affinity since the British as well as the non-British Christian Missionaries in The North were aware of the peculiar advantages in the potential of the SUM to be influential in London.⁴ Thus in the practical experiences of Christian Missionaries in The North in the period between 1900 and 1950, where other Christian Missionaries hesitated to take up issues with the government of British administration, the British Missionaries were expected to lead the struggle.⁵ It was from this premise that Farrant suggests:

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1. Boer 1979 p.117
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid p.116
 4. Ibid p.117
 5. Ibid

"... the non-British Missionaries feel embarrassed in taking up a matter with the Nigerian Government ... it might make it easier if a British Missionary were in charge ... my feeling is that it may be expected of British folk to defend the liberties of all".¹

However, although the SUM was like a collosus in the amount of social and political influence it wielded on the government of British administration in The North, because of its British origins, Farrant suggests that SUM-British Christian Missionaries were looked upon, because of certain difficulties Christian Missionary Bodies like the SIM experienced in their relationships with the government of British administration.² The difficulties conditioned social and political reliance on British Christian Missionaries. Farrant explained these difficulties of the SIM as caused by "the vigour of the American character", a premise from which it was assumed that the SUM being essentially British "could better understand the mind of the administration".³ This suggests that in the development of Christianity, educational and social welfare institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies the process was shaped by the compromises produced by the SUM-British Branch with the government of British administration in The North. In other words, "the Christian society" in The North among the M-Belt groups and societies was based on the model of society which existed in England rather than in Germany, Canada, S. Africa, the US even when it was the case that the Christian Missionaries were from different variants of Western European civilizations.

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1. G.H. Farrant, SUM Magazine, Vol.21, 30th August 1954, cited in Boer 1979 p.117
 2. Boer 1979 p.117
 3. Ibid

The 'national characters' of the different western European nations were however to influence the different attitudes towards government and the Islamic religion on socio-political and religious issues among the M-Belt groups and societies where the different nationality Christian Missionary Bodies concentrated their activities. For example where the SIM focussed its Christianity among other Christian Missionaries, in areas like S. Zaria, Lere in S. Bauchi and Wurkum in the Numan Division of Adamawa, there was more violent political reaction with an explicit Christian religious identity, demanding for freedom from Islamic domination of political rulership. The phenomenon was in political support for the ideas of the M-Belt Movement in the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region. These were contradistinctively to political reaction toward Islam produced by the brand of Christianity from the SUM where there was emphasis on political loyalty toward government and the struggle for religious freedoms and liberties through political dialogue by talking to government. The 'national characters' of the different Christian Missionary Bodies explains the religious emotions which accompanied the political reactions in the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement, the bloodshed which greeted the activities of the Wurkum Tribal Union and the demands for a "Kilba State" led by the Kilba Tribal Union in the 1950s.¹

After 1945 however Christian Missionaries in The North maintained their efforts to achieve their religious objectives by the traditional

1. These political issues at the start of the M-BELT Movement in the demands of the creation of a M-Belt Region are examined in Chapter 4 where the growth and development of the Movement and its built-up political support interplayed the variation in the degrees of political support created by the 'national characters' of Christian Missionaries which operated among the different M-Belt groups and societies.

"three-pronged-approach" to diffuse Christianity by Evangelism, Medicine and Education.¹ After that period however there was distinction between Christian educational development among the M-Belt groups and societies when Christian Evangelism became combined with the practice of producing Christians from Medical work in Christian hospitals, maternities and leprosy clinics. In the instance of the diffusion of Christianity through Evangelism by medicine, the Christian Missionary strategy used the friendly contacts developed from people in need of pain relief as well as other humanly distressing conditions of bodily health: "... to make Christ known by definite evangelistic instructions and appeals."²

The development of the social and political cooperation between the government of British administration in The North and Christian Missionary Bodies was similar to that in the development of Christian educational institutions. Christian Missionary work in the development of medical institutions in The North in general was however less extensive than the educational efforts and also less charged with political tensions. There however developed more religious tensions from medical work than the educational from Christian Missionary activities.³

It was not until in 1930 that the government of British administration in The North invited Christian Missionaries to have its dispensaries join the government system in order to upgrade services.⁴

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1. Maxwell 1952 p.200
 2. Ibid
 3. This point is revisited when we analyze the motion of Bello Dandogo in which he suggested the expulsion of all Christian Missionaries from The North.

This suggests that the development of welfare institutions by Christian Missionaries in the period between 1900 and 1930 among the M-Belt groups and societies was a neglected theme of government policy. Even when this was so, some Christian Missionary Bodies did not accept the government proposals. This was particularly so for the SUM.¹ This was so because Christian Missionaries wanted to continue with Christian religious introductions to patients before medical attention and treatments were given and also similar to instances of grants for educational development, the Christian Missionaries suspected government aid unless given unconditionally.² Subsequently however government gave grants and financial assistance to Christian Missionaries for the development of medical institutions under the conditions that new Christian dispensaries were opened where there was no government dispensary to serve the people.³

Since Christian Missionary work was concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies, this means that in the period between 1900 and 1950 they suffered a major disadvantage in the share of the distribution of government medical facilities.⁴ For example, while everything was provided freely in government hospitals essentially

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1. Boer 1979 p.283
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid

derives from tax payers funds, there was less chance of the government building a hospital where there existed a Christian hospital or dispensary: "... because there were many other places without a government or a Mission hospital at all".¹ In the period between 1950 and 1965 this became a political issue in the demands of the M-Belt Movement for separation of the M-Belt groups and societies into a M-Belt Region. This was so because while they paid taxes, government did not develop medical institutions. Furthermore where government developed medical institutions through Christian Missionaries, where Christian Missionary hospitals and dispensaries existed, people paid for medical attention while in the government hospitals treatment and medical attention was free of charges.

Besides the financial costs of medical attention in Christian Missionary hospitals and dispensaries there was also a preference for government hospitals which were few among the M-Belt groups and societies, because of the use of European medicine as an Evangelical Strategy in Christian medical institutions. In the period between 1940 and 1960 this Evangelical Strategy became a political issue, firstly in the NHC and later in the NHA where Islamic chiefs and NPC politicians who were Moslems argued that while Christian Missionary work was appreciated, government ought to intervene to stop "coercion into another faith" in reference to Christianity.² In the period between

1. Crampton 1975 p.161

2. Although this point has been examined in some detail in Chapter 2 it will be revisited in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5 where the motion in the NHA suggested by Bello Dandogo in 1949 that 'European Christian Missionaries be asked to leave The North' because they were involved in politics, a political rhetoric that helped to trigger off the organization of already mobilized Christian communities with the Christian religion as a social movement into a political movement.

1928 and 1930, Maxwell suggests that in one of those years alone Christian Missionary hospitals and dispensaries treated between 30,000 and 40,000 patients.¹ In the period between 1927 and 1929 about 77,205 people came under the influence of Christianity from Christian medical work centred on the Vom Christian hospital and dispensaries alone.² According to Maxwell, in circumstances like that, the process enabled "a thoughtful mind to appreciate the enormous amount of opportunity for friendliness which was made available."³

Christian Missionaries also used leprosy clinics to consolidate and diffuse the Christian religion as much as the process was meant to create a healthy society for the development of the M-Belt groups and societies with Christianity. Maxwell suggests that: "In those earlier days the treatment required a long stay at the settlement. This gave the patient a chance of learning "the story of redemption" and also learning to read so that when discharged "symptom-free" he might well become in turn winner of others for Christ."⁴ For example, at the leprosy clinic at Vom, Nyam became Christian, learnt how to read and write, thereafter he took "the story of the Saviour" to his Jarawa group and society, whereby the process "laid the foundation among them for the acceptance of the Mission overtures later on".⁵ It ought to be borne in mind however that when the Dapsome tablets for

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1. Maxwell 1952 p.200
 2. The figure was arrived at from totaling the numbers of patients who received treatment at Vom as provided in The Light Bearer Magazine and SUM: Go and Tell Magazine, 1929-1930 p.71
 3. Maxwell 1952 p.200
 4. Ibid p.217
 5. Ibid

leprosy patients were developed in the 1950s the Christian Missionary strategy of diffusing Christianity through the leprosy clinics became less effective. This was so because the lepers simply only had to visit the clinics to collect monthly doses of Dapsone and stayed in their homes for treatment. This development however provided the Christian Missionaries with a larger audience to preach Christianity to. For example when Christian Missionary doctors visited patients in their homes to make sure the correct doses were being taken regularly and that there was curative progress they preached Christ to the families.¹ In that way the majority of families with leprosy patients became tied to Christianity.

This was the premise from which Christian social welfare institutions became developed among the M-Belt groups and societies and trained midwives, nurses and dispensary attendants who had government recognition and with financial assistance.² For example, in the late 1930s it was suggested to the Vom Christian Hospital and Dispensaries to institute a system of dispensaries to be staffed by trained Africans from different districts and the Medical Officers periodically visit the outstations to help in their work.³

Implicit in these developments is that Christianity did not remain at the level of educational institutions established by Christian Missionaries after 1945, although that became the emphasis

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1. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981
 2. Maxwell 1952 p.200
 3. Ibid

in the Christian Missionary objectives. This means that after 1945 while Christian Missionary objectives sought to develop an advanced educated Christian leadership for political purposes they were also concerned to create a followership with an explicit Christian religious identity among the M-Belt groups and societies.

In the instance of the development of the Christian religious institutions with advanced educational standards they became developed side by side with the needs for modern agricultural education and practices. For example, the Christian Missionary post-primary institutions centred in Kagoro (SIM) and Zonkwa (RCM) in S. Zaria, MKar (SUM-DRCM Branch) in Benue and Gindiri (SUM-British) combined agricultural educational and practice with rigorous religious and academic work, an educational system that declined only after 1970.¹ The development of educational and social welfare institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies by Christian Missionaries was an independent Missionary policy with little government financial assistance. Before 1945 the greater numbers of Christian Missionary

1. An examination of the curriculum in these schools suggests that besides the higher academic standards than was previously the case, there was also taught agricultural science/rural science with practical lessons in which each student owned a plot of land on which crops and vegetables were grown and subsequently sold to the institution either to pay for school fees or to earn pocket money - interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.

institutions received no government financial assistance and grants. In 1936 when Christian Missionary schools overtook the numbers of schools owned by the government and the NAs, there were only 22 Christian schools that received government grants and financial assistance, out of a total of 344 Christian Missionary schools.¹ This means that government development of education in The North was in the Islamic society. The increases in government schools in 1936 is suggested by the establishment of 'Provincial Schools' in all the provinces in The North which provided opportunity for the M-Belt groups and societies to benefit from government educational facilities. As latterly as in 1947 only 167 Christian Missionary schools in The North received government financial assistance out of an increased total of 610 Christian schools with 64.6% enrolment of the total pupils in The North.² This suggests that while there was government neglect in the development of the M-Belt groups and societies with education, there was also discriminatory practices in funding the Christian Missionary efforts, the only agencies that determinately developed educational facilities among the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North.

Table 3.17 suggests the rapid development of education in The North by Christian Missionaries concentrated among the less populous

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1. Ogunsola 1975 p.27; Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.32
 2. Ogunsola 1975 p.27; Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.32

Table 3.17 Government and Christian Missionary Schools in The North in the period between 1912 and 1953

Year	Total in The North		Government and NA Schools				Christian Missionary Schools			
	Schools	Enrolment	Numbers	Schools %	Enrolment	Enrolment %	Numbers	Schools %	Enrolment	Enrolment %
1912	34		5	14.7	350		29	85.3		
1926	125	5,210	68	54.4	2,207	42.4	57	45.6	3,003	57.6
1936	539	20,269	195	36.2	9,130	45.0	344	63.8	11,139	55.0
1947	1,010	70,962	400	39.6	25,122	35.4	610	60.4	45,840	64.6
1949	1,383	95,238	532	38.5	33,150	34.8	851	61.5	62,088	65.6
1950	1,456	108,735	605	41.6	40,705	37.4	851	58.4	68,030	62.6
1951	1,535	107,561	646	42.1	41,891	38.9	889	57.9	65,670	61.1
1952	1,693	122,145	703	41.5	47,853	39.2	990	58.5	75,670	60.8
1953	1,777	143,809	744	41.9	51,303	35.7	1,033	58.1	92,506	64.3

Source: A.F. Ogunsoola, Legislation and Education in Northern Nigeria, Ibadan, 1975 p.27: computed figures cited in Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.32-36. In 1952, the population of the North was about 17,000,000, with about 3,868,245 (22.8%), living in the M-Belt areas, where the bulk of Christian Missionary activities were concentrated.

groups and societies in the M-Belt areas. While as early as in 1912 there were more Christian Missionary schools in the M-Belt areas with consistently higher numbers of school - enrolment over the years rather than in the government schools which were concentrated in the Islamic society, there was generally fewer numbers of government schools with lesser school-enrolments. Christian schools and their total school-enrolment in the M-Belt areas outnumbered the government schools in the Islamic society by at least 4 to 1 even when it was the case that the M-Belt groups and societies consisted of about one third of the population in The North.

This is crucially significant in more than just the sense of developing the M-Belt groups and societies with Christianity and European education because it had ramifications on the developing social consciousness over political power relationship about the nature of society in The North. For example in the period between 1950 and 1965 the potential for "reverse colonialism" developing in the relationship between the M-Belt groups and societies on the Islamic society became real. This was so because of achieved literacy and skills, requisites for the control of a modern state which became concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies, a consequence of Christian Missionary activities. This became an alarming potent political weapon because of the religious polarities in The North and the fact of historical recollections in the experiences of the M-Belt groups and societies to the Islamic society. This was the premise for bureaucratic discrimination and political control of the M-Belt groups and societies in The North. For example, while social and political consciousness

about the nature of the modern state system based on European patterns became an accelerated developing process among the M-Belt groups and societies at all levels of society, government catered for only a few in The North, mainly the ruling classes of the Islamic society before 1950.¹ After 1950 the problem of "reverse colonialism" on the Islamic society in The North became compounded when the academic standards of education in both primary and secondary schools improved because of the changes in Christian Missionary policies to develop the M-Belt groups and societies to higher educational levels than was previously the case.² One of the socio-economic problems that had direct bearing on politics caused by increased education in the period between 1950 and 1965 was that more persons from among the M-Belt groups and societies became unemployed and flooded the industrial centres of The North. This was particularly so for groups and societies from S. Zaria who found their way to Kaduna.³ It was these differences in socio-economic patterns of development that maintained the roots of malintegration of the M-Belt groups and societies into the Islamic society in The North. These differences also had concomitant consequences on the failure of the political incorporation processes of the majority of the groups who saw themselves as outside the mainstream of society in The North. Subsequently in the period between 1950 and 1965 when there was more education among the M-Belt groups and societies, achieved social con-

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1. For examples of the process see more detailed discussions in Chapter 2
 2. The political problem of the potential of reverse colonialism as a consequence increased standards of education among the M-Belt groups and societies is examined in Chapters 4 and 5. The fall in the standard quality of education in schools in the Islamic society in the period between 1955 and 1965 was more of an educational problem rather than a political problem.
 3. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5

sciousness conditioned awareness about religious differences and the advantages of controlling political power for socio-economic development. This became compounded by the existing inequalities relative to the Islamic society in The North and the discriminatory distribution of social welfare, economic and educational amenities from an Islamic dominated government in The North, a premise from which one political solution was seen to be in the creation of a M-Belt Region.¹

However besides the development of education and social welfare institutions, Christian Missionaries made efforts to develop the M-Belt groups and societies by building basic economic infrastructure like roads and bridges. For example, as early as in 1907, the idea of the road from the Benue to Wase, was suggested to the government of British administration in The North by Karl Kumm.² In the instance, although Kumm suggests that it was agreed that Christian Missionaries build half the road and the government the remaining half, Lugard subsequently: "... replied that the Government would be glad to build the whole road".³ Except for Jos Division on the Plateau where the road network system is one of the most dense in Nigeria, largely developed for the needs of the Tin Mining Industry,⁴ Christian and non-Christian Communities among the M-Belt groups and societies became

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1. The discriminatory patterns in the distribution of government amenities like schools, hospitals, dispensaries and economic institutions like agricultural establishments, electricity, roads and bridges, water supply, industries and housing as a cause of the persisting underdevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1950 and 1965 as they affected the political demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region are examined in Chapters 4 and 5
 2. Kumm 1907 p.77
 3. Ibid
 4. Dudley 1966 p.236-262

socially and economically linked by roads and bridges built by Christian Missionaries. For example, the Bristow Bridge in Gindiri built before 1950 still stands and it was not until after 1970 that government built a motorable bridge to link the Gindiri village market, the Christian Missionary compound and the feeder road to Mongu.

In the period between 1950 and 1970 the Christian Missionary effort to develop the M-Belt groups and societies with basic social and economic infrastructure however created problems in "the Unity of the tribes" with Christianity and to some extent inhibited the rapid growth of the churches and Christian converts. For example while Christian Missionaries preached that the churches and the Christian religious identity ought to transcend "tribal" socio-cultural and political boundaries, historical recollections of the experiences between the different M-Belt groups and societies conditioned the contest over citing Christian Missionary social and welfare as well as educational institutions. The contest always split Christian Unity and the church councils.¹ The Fyem group and society for example, who were predominantly Islamic in religion became unpopular among the Sura, Angas, Birom and Challa because of their historically recollected slave raids on non-Islamic groups and societies and this inhibited the growth of the Christian churches and Christians even when it was the case that the Gindiri schools were in their midst.² Furthermore the rivalry over the distribution of Christian Missionary facilities, independently of historically recollected experiences was

1. Crampton 1975 p.158
2. Ibid

characteristic of the relationship between the Bachama and the Kilba group and society where the Lutheran Christian Missionary Body concentrated its activities in the development of the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa.¹ This suggests that there were also factors internal to the M-Belt groups and societies which conditioned the persistence of underdevelopment despite Christian Missionary efforts.

Although there were internal problems to the M-Belt groups and societies as much as there was discriminatory practices by the government of British administration on the socio-economic development of the M-Belt areas, by 1950 Christian Missionaries achieved infusing a Christian religious dimension to M-Belt consciousness by educational and social welfare development of institutions. In that respect, Church, school and medical institutions organized by Christian Missionaries became catalyst for both "tribal" and "Christian" consciousness among the M-Belt groups and societies. It was from these achievements that Christian Missionary converts from among the M-Belt groups and societies began to participate in the activities of government both within their territories and in the wider society of The North, Nigeria and in other parts of the world. This was particularly so for the Army Services. In the instance of this development particularly for the predominance of soldiers from among the M-Belt groups and societies in the contingents from The North recruited to fight the second world war and quite significant for political developments in 1966 and 1967, Maxwell suggested that: ".. it could be of the greatest

1. Crampton 1975 p.158; this point is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 where we examine the politics of the M-Belt groups and societies as it affected political support for the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region by the M-Belt Movement.

service to the 'Sudan' that among its leaders and in its most progressive communities men should be in control whose faces were not turned toward Mecca and whose minds were not fettered with the philosophy of Islam. Government had become aware of this alteration in the status of the non-Moslem communities".¹ Although the majority of these soldiers were initial Christian Missionary converts and therefore upheld for their services in government, the Christian Missionaries had cause for contempt upon the return of the soldiers as ex-servicemen of the Nigerian Army in the period between 1941 and 1947. This was so because the ex-servicemen created problems to Christian Missionaries in the practices of the Christian Faith and by their "unusual" state of independence in social relations with both church and government. For example a Danish Christian Missionary Report suggests that: "...the Christian ex-soldiers have done and are still doing much harm. Many of them have become heavy beer-drinkers and now try to persuade the others to stand by them against what they call the absurdity of the prohibition of beer-drinking and tell them that all the white-men whom they met during the war drank beer. Many of them have taken a second wife after returning from India."²

In the period between 1938 and 1956, the ex-servicemen were one of the decisive forces in the organization and political mobilization of people into "tribal" unions, clubs, associations and political organizations and subsequently in the organized development of the M-Belt Movement from the NML to the MZL until they became eclipsed in

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1. Maxwell 1952 p.253
 2. Ibid p.266

its political leadership by European educated Christians from among the M-Belt groups and societies.¹ This was so because by their military training and battle experiences, they came back to their groups and societies with strength and courage to travel great distances through lonely countryside and had seen how organization and mobilization achieved results.² The ex-servicemen from among the M-Belt groups and societies set a tradition of military service, particularly in the infantry of the Nigerian Army in the period between 1940 and 1970, a pattern of military tradition that was crucial in shaping political developments in The North and Nigeria after 1966.³

A major consequence of the development of the M-Belt groups and societies by Christian Missionaries through the establishment of European educational and social welfare institutions that emphasized Christianity is that there emerged a class of persons with Christian consciousness as it related to the dominance of Islam in society and politics in The North. These European educated persons with an explicit Christian social and subsequently political identity found their ways into government services and other modernizing sectors of society in the period between 1950 and 1967. The concentration of European educated persons in government services from among the M-Belt groups and societies subsequently gave rise to anticipated fears of "reverse colonialism" on the Islamic society, particularly so with increases in both education and the standards of qualifications attained in the same period. This was one premise from which there was developed discriminatory practices in the employment of the 'European educated' from among the M-Belt groups and societies into top government jobs.

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1. This is examined in more detail in Section VI of this Chapter and also in Chapter 4
 2. This fact is derived from my interview discussions with Baba Sanda in Neman, Moses Nyam Rwang at Bukuru, among others, both who were ex-servicemen after World War II.
 3. This point will be examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5

Furthermore the activities of Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and societies produced in 1950 a convergence of European patterns of civilization and modernization with Christianity in the transformations of society. This was the alternative society to the Islamic type that was envisaged when Christian Missionaries set out to do battle with the Islamic religion in the 'Sudan'. It was also from the convergence of Christianity and modernization that a M-Belt Region became demanded when the political organization developed from the NML seeking political participation in The North, to MZL demanding the creation of a Region where like in the Islamic society, the Christian religion might be the base of a social and political identity. In the period between 1900 and 1950 the social and political consequences of Christian Missionary activities among the M-Belt groups and societies was the development of an externally conceived M-Belt identity from "uncivilized pagan" groups and societies to "non-Moslems" and subsequently from "non-Moslems" to "Christian tribes" with "animists" conceptions of the "Christian tribes" developed and became internalized when the M-Belt groups and societies began to see themselves as "the children of Jesus" in social identity. It was at the terminal height of this internalized conception of the Christian religious identity between 1940 and 1950 among the M-Belt groups and societies that a M-Belt Movement was begun as a political organization in 1949, known as the NML. The very nature of politics in The North and Nigeria however in the period between 1950 and 1967 conditioned the development of the M-Belt identity from conceptions of the "children of Jesus" and Christian Minorities in religion and politics in The North to conceptions of "Northern Christians" with an accompanying resurgence of ethnic identities.¹

1. This point will be examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5

The common characteristic that cut through the whole shifts and subsequently fragmented conceptions of the M-Belt identity however was the deprivation in social welfare facilities and the distribution of economic amenities by government in The North which became increasingly demanded by the different groups and societies.¹ This was so even when it was the case that political leadership in the period between 1938 and 1967 from among the M-Belt groups and societies were Christian Missionary products. Unlike political leadership from the Islamic society in the same period, which was deliberately developed and shaped by the government of British administration in The North for political purposes, Christian Missionaries in their religious activities only provided bases for the development of leadership.² Political leadership from among the M-Belt groups and societies which dominated the arena of politics in the M-Belt Movement cannot be said to have been shaped by the Christian Missionaries for purposes other than for the protection of the Christian society and Christian interests in The North. This explains the premise from which in the period between 1949 and 1956, until upon the political entry of J.S. Tarka in the M-Belt Movement

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1. The shifts in the identity from "the children of Jesus" to ethnic types, conditioned by the contest for the distribution of amenities is examined in more detail in Chapter sections below
 2. The development of leadership for political purposes from the Islamic society is explicitly presented in the writings of Morel as early as in 1911 as suggested by the purposes of the central schools. It was not until 1936 that the models of the central schools became extended to provinces in The North which contained the M-Belt groups and societies. For detailed discussion of the contrasts see Chapter 2

political leadership from the M-Belt groups and societies focussed its attention on the local political arena and on Islamic dominance in The North rather than national. In those years there was a more vigorous tie between the Christian religion and politics as it affected the M-Belt groups and societies.¹ Socio-economic and political grievances over discrimination beyond the Christian religion however became political issues in the M-Belt Movement after 1956 even when it was the case that they existed before that time.

By 1950 therefore the significant political aspect in the educational development of the M-Belt groups and societies with Christianity by Christian Missionaries was that conscious social relationships were achieved. These conditioned the organization of "tribal" as well as religious alliances. In the instance education and Christianity created a resurgence of the older "tribal" identities in each of the M-Belt groups and societies which existed side by side with the newer Christian social identity that increasingly developed. Both these patterns of identities became used as political resources in the M-Belt with the older ethnic identities increasing taking precedence over the newer Christian religious identity. While education and Christianity developed conceptions of "Tiv Christians", "Biom Christians", "Bachama Christians" and subsequently "Northern Christians" the context of "M-Belt Christians" never gained currency in political rhetoric of the Christian politicians in The North. This was so because 50 years of Christianity

1. This is examined in more detail in Chapter 4 where the rapid growth and development of the M-Belt ideas on participation in politics led to the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region based on a Christian religious identity with strong anti-Islamic sentiments rather than socio-economic and welfare deprivation.

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among the M-Belt groups and societies was not long enough to break by socialization processes "tribal" identities in the same socialization process that "tribal" identities in the Islamic society became eroded by Islam religion where it existed since the 11th century. This was the premise from which the Christian religious identity among the M-Belt groups and societies remained volatile and never became a permanent political identity in the same way as Islam in The North.¹

V Institutional Development and Socio-political Identities and Consciousness achieved among the M-Belt groups and societies before 1950.

The purpose of this Section is to examine whether variations in impact with British influences in the period between 1900 and 1950 conditioned the progress in the development of institutions and socio-political consciousness which came into existence among the M-Belt groups and societies during the 1930s and 1940s. It is proposed that differences in the development of social and political institutions,² which became operational among the M-Belt groups and societies were caused by the point in time British influences became receptive among the M-Belt groups and societies, a process that was set into motion by

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1. The volatile nature of the Christian identity as a political resource rooted in the M-Belt Movement is constantly revisited and cuts through the discussions of the thesis in the remaining chapters.
 2. Institution, as used in this study refers to standardized routines of solving the fundamental problems and needs of a society. Once institutions become formalized they develop personnel with vested interests in the survival of the institution - G. Duncan Mitchel (ed), A new Dictionary of Sociology, London 1979 p.106

the government of British administration in The North and European Christian Missionary activities.

Government and Christian Missionary institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies developed in the period between 1900 and 1950, created socio-political consciousness about society, politics and government in the wider society of The North and of the developing Nigerian political state. This consciousness which was developed from the new institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies as a direct consequence of the impact with British influences was instrumental in bringing into sharper focus the differences in political identity patterns existing in the North. Consciousness about the differences in political identity patterns in The North were politically mobilized in the 1940s for ethnic political organizations in many of the M-Belt groups and societies and subsequently became fed into the political organizations of the M-Belt Movements with the objectives of struggling for the creation of a M-Belt Region which might become politically separated from the Islamic society. Institutional and socio-political identities with subsequent, political meaning for the M-Belt groups and societies found in Adamawa, Benue, Plateau, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria are therefore examined in context of the differences in social, political and economic characteristics of the M-Belt territories as they had experienced transformations in the period between 1900 and 1950.

This was a period before the political organizations in the M-Belt Movements began to challenge and create impact on the conceptions of political unity previously existing in The North. This is meant to illustrate that there was enormous variation in social and political

institutions and new identity patterns as well as differences in economic levels of development within the M-Belt areas. Differences in economic levels of development among the M-Belt groups and societies were in many respects conditioned by their exclusion from political power and powerlessness in political decision-making. This is analytically crucial in understanding the shifts and strength of political identification with the subsequent M-Belt Movement in the 1950s and 1960s by each of the different M-Belt groups and societies and the variations in the theme of the identity in the Movement.

The territories of the M-Belt groups and societies contained enormous variations in the patterns of social, cultural and political identity. For example, out of about 416 different ethnic groups and societies in Nigeria, identified in the period between 1921 and 1931, while 75 were concentrated in the South of Nigeria, 341 existed in The North. Within the very political boundaries of The North itself, while there were 44 different ethnic groups and societies in the Islamic society in 1931, and who since 1804 were increasingly ^{Islamized. In the} politically defined M-Belt territories of Adamawa, Plateau, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Benue, ^{there were also over 300 tribes} each quite distinct in its own culture although partial assimilation into the dominant Islamic culture took place.¹

The 299 (300) ethnic groups and societies identified among the M-Belt territories were indigenous to the area rather than 'a colonizing group', characteristic of the period between 1804 and 1900 when there was Fulani expansion of the Islamic society established by dan Fodio. Furthermore, these groups and societies were also indigenously distinct

1. Blitz 1965 p.17

from other migrant groups from the Islamic societies in The North, other parts of Nigeria and West Africa after 1900 upon the successful establishment of The North as a political unit and when British influences created increased social mobility alongside the social and political changes that took place.

The figures in Table 3.18 and 3.19 are therefore discussed and examined as their breakdowns relate to the different concentrations of the M-Belt groups and societies in the specific context of the political institutions which became developed and socio-political consciousness achieved from impact with British influences and as it might subsequently be related to the development of political organizations among the M-Belt groups and societies.

(a) Adamawa

Table 3.18 suggests that Adamawa with about 180 ethnic groups out of a total of about 300 ethnic groups concentrated in the M-Belt areas had the highest concentration of different non-Islamic groups and societies in The North within the political and social concept of the M-Belt. Adamawa was also politically distinct in the nature of the socio-political problems characteristic of the M-Belt groups and societies because it had one of the highest concentrations of a colonizing Fulani ruling class and with a substantial Hausa-Fulani Islamic population.

In 1931 for example Fulani and Hausa alone consisted of 82,317 out of a total population of 270,971.¹ This is 30.4% of the total

1. 1931 Census Report, Table 8 p.182

population of Adamawa province. Subsequently in 1952 when British political authority in the period between 1900 and 1950 in The North conditioned new social and political relationships with increased horizontal social mobility, Hausa-Fulani alone, among other migrant Nigerian groups in Adamawa consisted of 217,649 out of a total population of 1181,024.¹ This was 18.4% of the total population of Adamawa province.

A majority of the groups and societies in Adamawa were either militarily conquered or harrassed with military raids sufficiently to pay political tribute in acknowledgement of Fulani authority during the period between 1804 and 1900.² Only a few of the Adamawa groups and societies centred around the Mandara Kingdom and in Bachama territory around Numan successfully resisted Fulani conquest, payment of tributes and Fulani political authority before impact with British influences from about 1900.

Establishment of British influences by both the government of British administration in The North and from the activities of Christian Missionaries from Europe in Adamawa were not completed until after 1950 even when the Fulani and Islamic rulers in Yola were conquered before 1910. The Mumuye and Pire for example were outside the considerations of British Administration in Adamawa as late as in the period between 1950 and 1951.³

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1. Secret Report of the Government of the NPC in The North to the Willink Commission in 1957: Northern Region of Nigeria, Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna 1958 p.147.
 2. For more details see discussions in Chapter 1 Sections III and IV.
 3. W.H. Paul, Acting Resident, Adamawa Province, Northern Nigeria Provincial Annual Reports, Kaduna, 1951 p.3

Table 3.18 Territorial Concentrations, Numbers and Population sizes of some of the M-Belt groups and societies for the period between 1921 and 1952.

Territorial Area of the M-Belt		Population Numbers in 1952	% M-Belt Population	Numbers of Ethnic groups identified in 1921-1931	% Ethnic groups, M-Belt in 1921-1931
Adamawa	Bachama	121,438	3.1	About 180	60.0
	Chamba	19,571	0.5		
	Others M-Belt	775,717	20.1		
Plateau	Birom	116,200	3.0	50	16.7
	Angas	55,242	1.4		
	Sura	51,300	1.3		
	Others M-Belt	594,407	15.3		
S.Zaria	Jeba	41,082	1.1	35	11.7
	Kaje	35,782	0.9		
	Others M-Belt	224,882	5.8		
S.Bauchi	Jarawa	17,007	0.4	30	10.0
	Others M-Belt	245,082	6.3		
Benue	Tiv	800,000	20.7	5	1.6
	Idoma	203,479	5.3		
	Others M-Belt	568,056	14.7		
Total		3,868,245	100%	Over 300	100%

Sources: Meek 1925 Volume I-IV; Meel 1931 in Talbot 1969 Volume I-IV; Blitz 1965 p.17; A.H.M. Kirk Greene, 1972 p.347-348; Northern Nigeria Statistical Year Book, 1964 p.16-17.

Table 3.18 further suggests that although Adamawa had about 180 (60.0%) different ethnic groups, out of a total concentration of 300 groups and societies indigenous to the M-Belt territories, it had 23.7% of the total M-Belt population for 1952. The most populous of the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa were the Bachama and Chamba. While the Bachama were 121,438 (3.1%) out of a total M-Belt population of 3,868,245 the Chamba were 19,571 (0.5%). Both groups and societies were instrumental in providing initial political leadership which was vigorous in the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement within Adamawa and also in Plateau, S. Zaria, and S. Bauchi.¹ Other non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa consisted of 775,717 of the total M-Belt population. This was about 20.1% of the total M-Belt population in 1952. Although this is a substantial population concentration when compared to Plateau, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria relative to the Tiv in Benue, it ought to be borne in mind that there were about 180 groups and societies in Adamawa with enormous variations in their population sizes.

In the period between 1900 and 1930 most of the non-Islamic groups and societies came under the political authority of the Fulani Emirs in Yola and were also ruled by Fulani District Heads when there was political application of the Indirect rule policy based on the centralizing model of political authority as it existed in the core of the Islamic society in The North.² This was so because besides the Mandara Kingdom which was a centralized political system in the authoritative control of society, most of the other groups and societies in Adamawa

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1. This is examined in more detail in Chapter 4.
 2. For more detailed discussion of the application of the Indirect rule policy see Chapter 2 Section IV.

like Bachama, Chamba, Tangale, Marghi, Kilba, Batta, Bura were decentralized small scale political organizations under a collective leadership of different chiefs, African traditional religious priests ruling jointly with a council of elders for each group.

Although in the period between 1804 and 1900 political resistance to Fulani authority was centred around the Mandara group and society, it shifted to the Bachama, Kilba, Chamba and Bura in the period between 1900 and 1950. In that instance these non-Islamic groups and societies organized other non-Islamic groups and societies in the Numan areas to seek separation from the political authority and control of the Emirs who were based in Yola. This was the political premise from which the Numan Federations in the development of NA systems as 'the government in the Divisions' became created and developed.

The desire for political separation from Fulani political authority by the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa were however not started until 1950.¹ It was a political phenomenon started by the Kilba and directed at objections to continued Fulani political leadership. The Kilba were found north of the Benue river in The North.² Political demands for separation from Fulani political authority and control became subsequently followed by similar ethnic movements among the Batta who were also found along the banks of the upper Benue river and also by the Chamba who were concentrated on the southern banks of the Upper Benue river.

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1. NPAR 1951 p.2
 2. Tribal Map of The North 1931

Historical sources suggest that most of the non-Islamic groups and societies centred around Yola, Muri and Numan have a common origin. According to Ballard, their migration patterns from somewhere to the East of their present territorial location is suggested by their cultural and linguistic unities in the languages.¹ Cultural and linguistic unities is not however narrowed to the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa. Some archaeological evidence suggests that a certain measure of "cultural unity" exists among the majority of the M-Belt groups and societies rooted in the Nok culture which extended over a large area of the M-Belt.² Furthermore recent research evidences produced by the Benue-Congo working group of the West African Linguistic Society based at Ibadan and Tervueren suggest that there is internal unity of the Benue-Congo sub-family and its clear distinction from the neighbouring Chadic languages to the north and east and the Adamawa Eastern languages, the Kwa and the more heavily disputed sub-families of the Niger-Congo to the south and west.³

In the instance of Adamawa however the direction of migration has been inferred from the distribution of ethnic languages based on the hypothesis that: "where homogeneous groups are geographically contiguous on only one side with groups speaking languages most closely related to their own, migration took place in the direction away from the area of contiguity".⁴ This is the premise from which it has been suggested that neighbours of the Plateau-speaking peoples on the east and south-east

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1. Ballard 1979 p.14
 2. B.E.B. Fagg, "The Nok Culture in prehistory" Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol.I 1959; G.P. Murdoch, Africa: Its Peoples and their culture history, New York 1959; cited in John Ballard "Historical Inferences from the Linguistic Geography of The Middle Belt" Private Seminar Paper 1979 p.1
 3. Ballard 1979 p.2
 4. Ibid p.2-5

those speaking Chadic, Adamawa or other Benue-Congo languages show a similar high degree of internal linguistic differentiation, implying that they are very long-term residents within the general area which they occupy.¹ This means that many of the groups and societies in Adamawa were for a long time indigenous to their territorial areas rather than having experienced any recent migration whatever was that historical period in the time of migration patterns of the Adamawa groups and societies. Ballard suggests that they came from somewhere to the east of their present locations and have subsequently only migrated within territorial areas of the M-Belt, such as toward S. Bauchi, Ningi, Boguberi and out towards the Plateau to Angas land and some as far inwards as the Mama Hills.²

Local political movements about political separation from Islamic and Fulani rulership centred among the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa began to possess vocal political powers in the 1950s, although they were started with the general political organization of the 'tribal' Unions. This is explicit from the political report of the Resident for Adamawa in 1951 which suggests that although there were no immediate "obvious remedy" to the growing political situation: "... the reasons for objection to the Fulani or complaints against the Fulani are for the most part demonstrably untrue... and the movements do not seem to be supported by a majority of the people".³ This was so because political representation and initial participation was based on Fulani district headmen with selected elders from each of the non-Islamic groups and

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1. Ballard 1979 p.9
 2. Ibid p.14
 3. NPAR 1951 p.2

societies rather than in a developed traditional chieftancy institution. The village Headmen and Elders from the non-Islamic groups and societies were held in subordinate political status positions relative to the Emirs and Fulani district Heads by the government of British administration. This group participated in "the Annual Adamawa Emirate Conferences" held twice each year in which: "Genuinely useful and interesting debates result although members tend to grumble, justifiably up to a point that little attention is paid to their resolutions."¹ This therefore suggests that political agitation for separation from Fulani Islamic rule by the non-Islamic groups and societies came from the excluded European educated teachers and catechists who had been trained by Christian Missionaries, even when selected village Headmen and Elders by the government of British administration in The North, also had "grumbles" and did not pay attention to "resolutions".² In that instance however, the government of British administration suggested that the political problems be solved: "... by steady touring by Administrative Officers charged particularly with developing District Councils and expenditure by them on the funds at their disposal; but it cannot be denied that there is an established dislike of the Fulani in some quarters which are now finding they possess vocal powers and that this can be dispersed only by the Fulani."³

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1. NPAR 1951 p.2
 2. The political role of European educated teachers and catechists is examined in more detail in the development of 'tribal' political consciousness which found expression through Tribal Unions, Clubs, Associations and Political Parties in Section VI of this Chapter.
 3. NPAR 1951 p.2

Although District Councils in Adamawa were created and developed as from 1946, they did not meet regularly until 1951.¹ Although they were created and developed for the purpose of diffusing overt political tensions between the Fulani and the indigenous non-Islamic groups and societies, British administration found that their increases over the years became shaped: "... by the numerous petty territorial Fulani District Headships which the Native Authority has always had the natural desire to maintain unimpaired in status".² Before 1950 for example, there were about 31 District Heads in Adamawa under the political authority of the Lamido in Yola, a figure that was described as "far higher than that of any other Emirate except Sokoto".³ The institution of the District and village councils were subsequently described as "imperfect in structure" as a political institution and attention became focussed on the development of Federations to politically enclose the non-Islamic groups and societies centred on Numan.⁴ It was however not until April 1951 that the Federated Numan Division became constituted as single Native Authority politically independent of control by the Lamido in Yola.⁵

The Numan Federated NA developed from a council of chiefs from the non-Islamic groups and societies around Numan and consisted of the

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1. NPAR 1951 p.2
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid

four non-Islamic chiefs of Batta, Bachama, Mbula and Shelleng and also the President of the Longuda 'tribal' council, six other elderly members from the same five districts, the Alkali of Numan and the NA treasurer who maintained a subtle Islamic presence.¹ With the Alkali of Numan and the NA treasurer as non-political members, the presidency of the Federated NA Council was rotated among the four non-Islamic chiefs and the president of the Longuda 'tribal' council.² The council therefore had about 13 political constituents which reflected the social cleavages within the Numan area alone.³ Unlike Adamawa and Muri Divisions which were 'chiefs-in-council NAs' with the Emirs controlling political authority from 'a throne' and ruling over numerous other non-Islamic groups and societies, the Numan Federation NA was a council with collective policy and decision-making powers.⁴ The political authority of the Numan Federation however controlled about 18 other non-Islamic District Councils, village group councils as well as village councils.⁵ In other words, the Numan NA Federation was not organized on a similar structure of political power based on a chief as a traditional leader ruling with a specific political identity over a single ethnic group and society. Rather different chiefs with different political identities at different points in time controlled political power jointly with other chiefs from a different cultural background in the Numan NA Federation. This was so for the period before 1950.

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1. NPAR 1951 p.2
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Northern Nigeria Local Government Yearbook, Kaduna 1963 p.17
 5. Ibid

The development of chieftaincy institutions in the Numan Federation and among the non-Islamic groups and societies in Muri was from British appointed individuals as chiefs who became subsequently approved by the District and village Councils dating from 1941.¹ In the period between 1940 and 1950 for example Ngbale became appointed as third class chief of the Bachama in September 1941, while in January 1944, Biyapo also became appointed as a third class chief of the Mbula all in the Numan Federation NA.² Similarly before 1950, Ibrahim became appointed as the chief of Zinna in Muri Division in December 1947.³

Although third class chiefs^{*8} became appointed from among the non-Islamic groups and societies in the Numan Federation and subsequently given the political status of belonging to the Northern House of Chiefs it was not until after 1950 that they assumed political roles in that Assembly. During the period between 1929 and 1947

the names of chiefs from among the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa do not feature until after 1950. Even then, chiefs from among the M-Belt groups and societies were not politically significant in shaping policy and politics at both the local and regional levels. For example, in the period between 1931 and 1950 it was only the Aku Uka of Wukari who raised socio-political and economic issues affecting the M-Belt groups and societies in terms of policy and politics in The North.⁴ In the period between 1940 and 1950 however the chieftaincy

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1. Northern Nigeria Local Government Year Book, 'Facts on Chiefs', Kaduna 1963 p.90-99.
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. For more detailed examples, see discussions in Chapter 1 and 2 Section IV.

*8 See comments at the end of chapter 3.

institutions developed by the government of British administration in The North from among the M-Belt groups and societies in Adamawa were instruments which created a 'tribal' focus in the development of a political identity for each ethnic group. Subsequently in the 1950s Enoch Swade became appointed as the chief of Batta in August 1955, Isa as the chief of Shelleng in January 1956 and Yoila as the chief of Longuda in May 1957.¹

(b) Benue

The figures in Table 3.18 suggest that Benue with only 5 (1.6%) different ethnic groups and societies out of a total M-Belt concentration of over 300 groups and societies was the most socially and politically homogeneous of all the M-Belt territories. The figures in the Table also suggest that Benue had about 40.7% of the total 1952 population concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies with the Tiv alone comprising 20.7%.

Territorially, the Tiv and the other Benue groups and societies were the most distant of all the M-Belt groups and societies from the Islamic society and Islamic influences in The North. They therefore were the most minimally affected by Fulani wars and their concomitant Islamic influences in the cause of expanding the Islamic society in the period between 1804 and 1900. This means that the Benue groups and societies were also the most minimally affected by subsequent Fulani slave raids and payment of political tributes to Islamic centres of power like Lafia, Nasarawa, Jema'a and Keffi, a socio-economic and

1. Northern Nigeria Local Government Yearbook, Kaduna, 1953 p.90; The political status conception of the non-Islamic chiefs in the NHC as a grievance factor in the political demands of the M-Belt Movement for separation from the Islamic society in The North is examined in Chapters 4 and 5.

political experience that was historically recollected with strong resentments among other M-Belt groups and societies in Plateau, Adamawa, S. Zaria and S. Bauchi.¹ Much more than the Tiv people however the Idoma group and society also in Benue experienced Fulani wars and their concomitant slave raids on a protracted scale. Old men in Idoma land today still recollect Fulani slave raiding parties on their land from Nasarawa and the wars that accompanied the raids before impact with British influences in 1900.² Furthermore, upon the establishment of British influences and the political control of The North after 1900, the Tiv and Idoma, who are the dominant ethnic groups and societies in Benue did not experience socio-cultural influences from a migrant population coming from the Islamic society on the same scale of intensity as the M-Belt groups and societies found in Adamawa, Plateau, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria. In 1931 for example while there were about 768,525 (99.0%) people indigenous to the Benue groups and societies, there were only 7,841 (1.0%) people, the majority belonging to Islamic groups and societies in The North, like Fulani, Hausa and BeriBeri who were identified as settlers in the total population of Benue Province. Similarly, as latterly as 1952 even when previous British political authority in the period between 1900 and 1950 conditioned new social and political relationship with a concomitant increase in horizontal social mobility, the population of groups from the Islamic society in The North which became concentrated in territories that were equivocally Tiv, Idoma and Jukun in Benue Province comprised a total of only 19,550.³ This was 1.3% of the total population of Benue Province.

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1. For more detailed discussions and examples see Chapter 2 Sections III and IV.
 2. Interview discussions with Prof. A.R. Armstrong, January 1981
 - 3 1952 Census Report, Lagos 1952 p.18-19

Tiv have always been the numerically dominant group and society in the Benue area even before a Benue Province became organized by the government of British administration in The North. This has been so, both in terms of their population size and the territorial area of land on which they were concentrated. Historically, the Tiv people have been characterized by migration, largely due to pressure on their farm land caused by their population increases. This is so because the Tiv are prolific. For example, although they numbered about 800,000 in 1952, population estimates based on the 1963 census suggest that the Tiv numbered well over 1,000,000.¹ In other words within a time period of 10 years the Tiv increased their numbers by over 200,000, producing 20,000 Tiv each year by an average birth rate of over 2,000 Tiv babies each month, in a population of over 1 million.

Tradition of social origins suggest that the Tiv people migrated from "somewhere in the South" during the 19th century to their present territorial location.² In the instance of their initial migration from the South after some sojourn in "the hills of the Cameroon's border" they moved northwardly until they arrived to their present territorial area.³ It has been suggested that because of their constant migration, Tiv people have been in existence on their present territorial location for not more than 200 years since about 1700 AD.⁴ In the process of their migration, they met other groups and societies and interacted with them, in particular the Chamba and the Jukun.⁵

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1. D.C. Dorward, "Ethnography and Colonial Administration: A study of Working Misunderstandings", Draft Paper presented at The Institute of African Studies, Fourah Bay College, Sierra Leone, February 1972 p.1
 2. Perham 1962 p.153
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid p.152 n.2
 5. Ibid p.153

Tiv-Jukun socio-economic and political relationships when the Tiv were in the process of migration to their present territorial area, were volatile. Before 1860 for example, the Jukun raided the Tiv for slaves to enable the payment of political tributes to the Fulani.¹ Subsequently in the period between 1860 and 1900 both groups and societies combined to do battle against socio-economic and political intrusions into their society by the Fulani.² Furthermore in 1906 even when there had been impact with British influences, the Tiv came to the aid of the Jukun when there was a quarrel with local Hausa traders.³

In the instance of the period between 1860 and 1900 however the original culture of the Tiv became influenced by the "powerful Jukun culture".⁴ Perham further suggests that an earlier "dual authority among the Tiv gave way among those nearest to the Jukun capital, to single leaders known as Tors who went to obtain recognition from the AKu of Wukari and were subsequently accompanied home by Jukun Drummers."⁵ These were called by the Tiv, 'Tor U Gbande' and subsequently in the 1930s and 1940s were not of any political significance when the British set out to develop the chieftaincies institutions among the Tiv.⁶

Although this means that Tiv were at one time or the other under a Jukun oligarchy, they did not depart from their decentralized and

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1. Perham 1962 p.153
 2. Ibid
 3. Crowther 1966 p.229
 4. Perham 1962 p.153
 5. Ibid
 6. Discussions with M.J. Dent, 1980-1983

democratic system of politics.^{1*} The Tiv people still maintained about 36 clans as a polity system only distinct to themselves. Gordon has produced, perhaps the most singularly specific features of the Tiv polity as a segmentary lineage structure in which there is the limitation of political consensus of leadership and the bases upon which leaders might build a modicum of power. This is so when he wrote: "There is little doubt that all the clans are descended from a common stock, each clan representing a separate family. As these families got bigger they split up into sections and these sections again subdivided into clusters of villages. The sections have in every case a name and it is by this name in a clan any particular man is located... The division by clans is explained by the growth of the numerous family of a common ancestor. What organization exists is therefore that of the family but it has been broken up ... There is no permanent chief of the Munshis, nor has one ever been found, although there are without doubt certain men in each clan who are recognized as being stronger than others either from prowess or riches.... The clans are divided into sections in which there is one man who is spoken of (as) the headman but his position is to a great extent honorary and unless popular or feared has little authority in the sections outside his own cluster of villages. These clusters of villages represent the immediate family of the man whose name it bears and if each member was examined it would be found that he was one of the immediate descendants or co-relatives of the headman. The rest of the clan is spoken of as "a kin". From the foregoing it would appear as if in theory there was a chain of responsibility but in

1. Perham 1962 p.153

* See Comment at end of Chapter 3.

practice this is not so. In their relations however with the Government the recognized headman of the section has generally been pushed forward but, it is seen apparent that he is only there as a figure-head, and that each individual (the only unit) may hear what is going on but not bind himself in spite of their representation having seemingly done so."¹

Although Tiv political leaders were recognized by the government of British administration in The North, the system within which they worked did not meet the political requirements of a centralized model of political authority for the application of indirect rule. This was the premise from which Divisions became developed among the Tiv by the government of British administration through the institution of clan chieftaincies for native administration. Dorward describes the development of Native administration among the Tiv as a "working misunderstanding".²

This was so because for the first 30 years, the British did not understand patterns of authority among the Tiv and also because it took a long time before conquest over the Tiv was established. Perham suggests that it was not until 1923 that the Tiv were brought under British political control,³ although they were one of the first of the M-Belt groups and societies to do battle with WAFF troops on 8th January 1900, one week after territories of The North became claimed by the British.⁴ The period between 1900 and 1923 was characterized by "inflicting punishment on the enemy" rather than a

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1. Gordon, cited in Dorward 1972 p.5
 2. Dorward 1972 p.4
 3. Perham 1962 p.154
 4. Dorward 1972 p.2

British military victory from conquest.¹

It was however not until in the period between 1914 and 1915 that there was an attempt to develop an administration among the Tiv.² The political establishment of Tiv Division was conditioned by the continual expansion of the Tiv into the neighbouring territories of the Jukun. In 1914 it was the experience of Ruxton that the Tiv had migrated and engulfed nearly the whole of Wukari in search of farmland.³ In 1917, Freemantle ordered the expulsion of all Tiv people from Wukari districts and subsequently a boundary was demarcated representing the 'tribal' boundary as it supposedly existed in 1906 and the Tiv were forbidden to occupy Jukun territory.⁴ In the same year "the Munshi boundary wall" became built as the southern boundary of Tiv land to separate the Tiv and halt their expansion southwardly toward the groups and societies of the Ogoja areas in the southeastern corner of Nigeria.⁵ The "Munshi boundary wall" was a rampart about three feet high with a ditch from which the material was excavated on one side with 'a boundary forest reserve' measuring about 15 miles long and half a mile wide.⁶ Although this was meant to represent "a no-man's-land" between the Tiv and their southern neighbours it has been suggested that: "... the Tiv merely climbs over... and believe it is their right to migrate and expand their territory at will".⁷

To enhance political control of the Tiv, the government of British administration in The North created district headships for what was considered convenient areas and fitted these posts with

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1. Dorward 1972 p.4
 2. Perham 1962 p.154
 3. David Craig Dorward, 'The Development of British colonial Administration among the Tiv': 1900-1949 African Affairs Vol 68 p.169 cited in Tseyayo 1975 p.21.
 4. Dorward 1969, cited in Tseyayo 1975 p.21
 5. Prescott 1960 p.99
 6. Ibid
 7. Ibid

"generally thrusting youngish men who were not 'tors' but drew upon British authority to behave in a high-handed way to the people much to the dislike of Tiv elders".¹ Political dislike to British chieftaincies existed because Tiv were traditionally attracted to "strong personalities or big men" of society, a pattern of political power which the British ignored and did not understand its existence among the Tiv and which the 'British created chiefs' did not have.²

Dorward gives two examples of Tiv attraction toward strong personalities and its relationship to political loyalty. In the 19th century, the Tiv were willing followers of the Fulani freebooter, Dan Karo and the renegade Chamba War-Chiefs, Masar and Kachella.³ Within the Tiv group and society itself, tradition abounded with tales of indigenous "big men" of society like Kogi of Turan who acquired wealth and influence by providing "protection" to Hausa traders.⁴ Furthermore G.J. Podevin suggests that Tiv were ruled by big-men of society and strong personalities. In that instance, he wrote: "The Munchis cannot be bracketed in the same category as other pagan tribes in the Eastern Province; they are superior intellectually, physically and socially and represent what would seem to be a medium between the Mohammedans, their neighbours to the North and the pagan tribes in the South. To describe the Munshi as a tribe would be almost a misnomer; they are undoubtedly a nation and a very powerful one, and form the predominant race in Southern Nigeria, in the same way as the Zulus, Basutos and Swazis form the predominant race in South Africa.

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1. Perham 1962 p.154
 2. Dorward 1972 p.6
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid

Many of the *chiefs are men of much influence and power and appear to have their people under thorough control*".¹

In the evolution of the chieftaincy political institutions among the Tiv, the government of British administration in The North therefore attempted to develop a system of district Heads modelled directly on that which existed in the Islamic society.² Dorward suggests that the system ^{attempted to} absorb the Tiv into 'the Northern system' as second grade "pseudo-Hausa" rather than as a distinct ethnic group and society with viable indigenous political institutions even when they were cultural in a cross-cultural political unit of The North.³ This was so because it was assumed that imposition of Hausa-Fulani type of political institutions in the district Headmen system might lead to changes in Tiv social and political views of the world.⁴ In other words the government of British administration in The North sought to produce Hausas out of the Tiv and began to emphasize the Hausa-Riga as a fitting gift for a Tiv Tor.⁵ The process however was a political expediency as well as administrative, because Hausa was the language of official communication for the whole of The North, particularly at the levels of the institutions of government in the Divisions. In the instance of the Tiv, it was not until 1931 that the only British officials to sit for Tiv Languages examinations were Education Officers.^{6*}

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1. G.J. Podevin, District Commissioner of Obudu, 1911, cited in Dorward 1972 p.6; emphases are mine.
 2. Dorward 1972 p.8
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid p.9
 6. Ibid

*10 See comment at end of Chapter 3.

In the 1950s however administrative officers like D.F.H. MacBride sought to preserve the Tiv as they originally existed by the discouragement of "Hausa and Ibo-like habits" in favour of a Tiv model.¹ Dent further suggests that MacBride was so obsessed with protecting the original Tiv culture that he always imagined a scenery of round huts of Tiv compounds neatly cleaned with elders sitting in them and peacefully smoking their pipes.

In the instance of the developing chieftaincy institution among the Tiv the social and political consequences was that Tiv District Heads before 1930 began affecting Hausa mannerisms, language, and dress and this fitted British stereotype on the social and political identity of The North.² This however became rejected by the mass of society and the new system therefore broke down in the period between 1912 and 1916, among other reasons, because of the imposition of direct taxation and also because Tiv elders as District Heads refused to perform the role of tax collectors.³

In the period before 1930, the Tiv people were administered as if they were two groups and societies. In the instance two groups of districts became organized which split the concept of unity of the "tribe" concentrated over a specific territorial area.⁴ There was a district which grouped together some Tiv to the east of Katsina Ala

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1. Discussions with M.J. Dent 1980-1983
 2. Dorward 1972 p.9
 3. Ibid p.8
 4. G.L. Monk, Annual Report for Benue Province, cited in Tseyo 1975 p.39.

river including Katsina Ala town, Utur and Mbagen which became centred on Ibi, a Division that was removed from the political control of the Emir in Muri Province.¹ The second group of districts which enclosed the remaining Tiv became centred on Abinsi with their headquarters in Abinsi town itself, although the centre of the Division was later transferred to Makurdi.²

This was at a time when Palmer sought to reorganize the provinces in context of new anthropological findings to meet the political reinterpretations of Indirect rule policy of the 1930s.³ In 1926 therefore when Palmer was Lieutenant Governor of The North he used his political power to place some of the Tiv people who were concentrated east of the Katsina Ala river under the political authority of the Aku Uka of Wukari, the Jukun 'paramount chief', whom he expected might be groomed as the eventual overlord of all Tiv land or "a quasi-Emir" in political authority to some of the non-Islamic groups and societies found in adjoining territories to Wukari.⁴

In Abinsi Division where there was the majority concentration of Tiv people, Audu dan Afoda, a Yoruba Moslem from Bida, became 'chief of the Tiv' and the dominant political figure in the Division. Audu dan Afoda had been chief of the developing Makurdi town since 1914 and had previous political experience as 'political agent' for British District Officers.⁵ In 1917 Tiv clans in Maser and Harev whose territorial claims also covered Makurdi town became placed under

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1. Tseayo 1975 p.39
 2. Ibid
 3. For more detailed discussions on these shifts in the Indirect rule policy see Chapter 2 Section III
 4. Dorward 1972 p.9
 5. Tseayo 1975 p.40

dan Afoda who presided over a superior B-graded Native Court of Law.¹ It was anticipated by the government of British administration in The North that this political arrangement might be a temporary measure: "... until such a time as the clans could produce their own rulers."²

Although a district Head became appointed from the Masev clan of the Tiv as early as in 1922 he was placed in a subordinate political status to dan Afoda the Moslem Yoruba chief of Makurdi.³ It was not until 1934 that Masev District Head became politically independent of the Chief of Makurdi.⁴ In 1927, although the Iyonov and Njiriv clans of the Tiv people became amalgamated into one district by the government of British administration in The North the new district remained under the political control of Audu dan Afoda and all the district Heads were agents of 'the Chief of the Tiv'.⁵ In the Taraku settlement founded in 1924 with a mixed population of some 200 people Audu dan Afoda appointed his own messenger Mallam Garuba who subsequently lived there as the village Head of Taraku settlement and became recognized by the government of British administration.⁶ The district Heads of Iyonov and Njiriv however became politically independent of dan Afoda in 1932.⁷

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1. Tseayo 1972 p.40
 2. Tseayo 1975 p.40
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid
 6. Ibid
 7. Ibid

This suggests that by 1930 a system of 'political district Heads' had emerged and became accepted by both the majority of Tiv people and by the government of British administration in The North, although they remained in subordinate political status to British appointees in the chieftaincy institution developed at the Tiv Divisional level.

It was from this political acceptance that when in 1927 the District Heads of Abinsi Division met over the non-political issue of "the abolition of exchange marriage and its substitution in all cases for the Bride Price form of marriage" the occasion became used for the formation of a Tiv council for Abinsi Division. E.S. Pembleton, who was Resident for Benue Province justified the elevated political power position of dan Afoda as: "... still useful, believing an educational influence is being fulfilled".¹ By "educational influence" it is suggested that it was meant the diffusion in the practices of the centralized patterns of political authority based on the Islamic model existing in The North. In 1929 a similar council became developed for the Tiv districts in Katsina Ala Division which was under the political authority of the Aku Uka of Wukari with a Tiv man, Jato Aka as President of the Council.²

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1. E.S. Pembleton, Annual Report for Benue Province 1929, cited in Tseyo 1975 p.41
 2. Tseyo 1975 p.41

Tseyo suggests that the political status of Jato Aka was incomparable to the President of the Abinsi Divisional Council where dan Afoda was chief ruling over the majority of the Tiv population. In the instance of Katsina Ala Division however the District Officer was the political link between the Tiv, the Aku Uka of Wukari and subsequently with the government of British administration in The North.¹ In other words, where there was Islamic political authority, the government of British administration established direct political links while in the instance of the non-Islamic President of Katsina Ala Division, the Tiv became managed by a three tier structure of authority.

In the period between 1927 and 1933 Tiv districts which were politically centred at Katsina Ala became administratively united with those centred at Makurdi to constitute Tiv Division,² and its headquarters became built in Gboko. These developments took place within the general political and administrative reorganization that took place in the whole of The North in which Plateau Province was created in 1926 with some non-Islamic groups and societies under the Emirs of Bauchi, Muri, Yola, Zaria and Jemaa becoming politically separated from the Islamic society.³

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1. Tseyo 1975 p.41
 2. Ibid p.43
 3. This is examined in more detail in Section V (c) of this Chapter where there is discussion of the non-Islamic groups and societies concentrated on the Plateau.

Ethnic political consciousness through the development of the political institution of chieftaincies among the Tiv however became conditioned by the trip of some Tiv district Heads to Kaduna in May 1926. In that instance a party of 260 Tiv district Heads and Elders accompanied Captain G.G. Feasey, a District Officer and Audu dan Afoda, the Chief of Makurdi to visit Kaduna, the political capital of The North.¹ Although the visit to Kaduna was meant to encourage the migration of Tiv farmers so that they might become "a farming colony" in order to produce food to meet the needs of the developing urban population of that town², there was an unintended political consequence on Tiv leaders when they came into contact with patterns of Western modernization already achieved in the capital territory, the prestige, wealth and political status of the Emirs which became the conditioning factors in the subsequent political and social demands for "a Tiv Chief like an Emir".

In 1940 there was further Tiv and Idoma presence in Kaduna which compounded the demand. In that instance, the Resident for Benue, D.M.H. Beck suggests in his 1940 report that: "... The Chiefs' Conference at Kaduna was attended by the Emir of Nasarawa. Interested visitors on the last day of the conference were representatives of the Tiv and Idoma councils. The Tiv party consisted of five clan Heads

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1. G.L. Monk, Annual Reports for Benue Province, cited in Tseyo 1975 p.41
 2. Tseyo 1975 p.41

with wives and attendants; they were much impressed with what they saw.¹

This was also the same experience for the Idoma. This means that M-Belt groups and societies like the Tiv and Idoma were not only seen as subordinate and in an inferior political status position relative to the Emirs but also that Western European infrastructure in the processes of modernization and the gravitation toward conceptions of political status based on the centralizing model of authority seen in the Emirs as 'one man' of authority had become an attraction power to relate to the political circumstances of their groups and societies. In other words by 1940 M-Belt groups and societies began to accept the prestigious norms attached to a central political figure acclaimed to be the focus of leadership and unity for their group and society. This also means that before 1950 western European infrastructural development was lacking among the Tiv and Idoma, a situation of development along those patterns, that was the general circumstance in the territories of the M-Belt groups and societies in The North.^{2*}

Before 1930 when there was political search for "natural ruling classes" among the M-Belt groups and societies by Palmer at the time he was Lieutenant Governor of The North,³ the Aku Uka of Wukari and

1. D.M.H. Berk, Annual Report for Benue Province 1940, cited in Tseayo 1975 p.42
2. This is examined with concrete data as examples in Section IV of this Chapter.
3. For examples see discussions in Chapter 2 Section IV.

*|| See comment at the end of Chapter 3.

the district head of Takum attended the NPAC in Kaduna as representatives of the non-Islamic groups and societies in Benue and also other areas of the M-Belt. In the period between 1900 and 1926, although the Emir of Nasarawa was considered as the 'natural ruler' of that province as conceived by Lugard which enclosed the Tiv, Idoma and Igala, in the period after 1930, political emphasis shifted toward the Aku Uka and he became the political representative of the non-Islamic groups and societies in that Assembly. Government watched the personality of the Aku Uka of Wukari, to develop as chief of the M-Belt groups and societies. This was the premise from which W. Morgan suggested that: "... the mere attendance of these chiefs' attendance on equal terms with the important Emirs is of the greatest mutual benefit. The two chiefs comported themselves well".¹ It was in that connection that Tiv Division became placed under the political authority of the Aku Uka of Wukari in the period between 1927 and 1933.^{2*12}

It was however not until after 1947 that the Tiv may be said to have achieved political autonomy when 'a paramount chief' of their group and society became appointed. Political consciousness about the Tiv political identity which became mobilized in support for the demands of the creation of 'a Tiv chief like an Emir' in the 1940s, found mass expression through European educated Tiv who attended the government schools at Annune and Katsina Ala and had worked with the NA establishment in Gboko.³ In the period when European educated Tiv

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1. E. Morgan Annual Report for Benue Province 1930, cited in Tseayo 1975 p.43
 2. Tseayo 1975 p.43
 3. Tseayo 1975 p.39; p44-49

*12 See comment at the end of chapter 3.

sought the creation of a Tiv chief Audu dan Afoda had "become a sort of de facto paramount chief of Tiv".^{1*} Furthermore Tseayo suggests that initial political expression of a Tiv political identity in the period between 1937 and 1947, from "the young Tiv intelligentsia" was caused by a set of interrelated factors centred on the political meaning of the dominant prominence of dan Afoda as the head of Tiv Native Administration.² In the instance, Tseayo suggests that: ". . . The young educated Tiv rejected him on grounds that he was a foreigner imposed on the Tiv people by the British. Audu dan Afoda usurped a position which legitimately belonged to any one of them. Audu dan Afoda constituted a threat to the ambitions of young educated Tiv .. his presence represented or reflected the Hausa Fulani... which the British favoured (although) not all British officials favoured.. Those who would have argued the preservation of the democratic system of the Tiv influenced the young educated Tiv."³ The political consequences of a situation like that was a movement with an explicit Tiv political identity. This was the TPU.⁴ Tseayo further suggests that this political movement expressed: "The zenith of the level of Tiv consciousness and particularism."⁵

Although "Tiv consciousness of being Tiv" was achieved before 1937 and therefore they began to act politically with that identity,

1. Tseayo 1975 p.48

2. Ibid p.45

3. Ibid

4. The Tiv Progressive Union is examined in more analytical detail in Section VI of this Chapter.

5. Tseayo 1975 p.45

*13 see comment at the end of Chapter 3.

the "Tiv intelligentsia" did not channel their political actions through Tiv traditional institutions; neither did the Tiv intelligentsia confront British administration with the political demands for a Tiv chief. The demands for a Tiv chief by the "Tiv intelligentsia" had to be channelled through the British created 'Tiv Central Council'. It was political ambivalence within the Council that caused a more forceful political movement under leadership of the 'Tiv intelligentsia' when their sponsored candidate lost the contest to be Chief of Tiv.

The first political request from the Tiv which became directed to the government of British administration in The North, for the creation of the post of a chief for all Tiv was suggested at a meeting of the already existing 'Tiv central council' held in Gboko in 1937.¹ Gboko town itself was founded in the period between 1907 and 1933 when the headquarters of the developing Tiv Division shifted from Abinsi to Makurdi and settled in the 'new' town.²

The political request in 1937 for the creation of a Tiv chief took the government of British administration in The North by surprise. This suggestion is explicit in the 1937 Annual reports of Captain H.H. Wilkinson who was the acting Resident for Benue in that year. In the instance Wilkinson wrote: ".. the suggestion that there should be a chief of Tiv came as a bombshell but on close inquiry in individual clan areas it was clear that there was not the slightest desire or intention that *an outside person* should have any control over clan

1. Tseayo 1975 p.45
2. Ibid p.43

affairs... the suggestion possibly originated with a few of the more ambitious as a means of self aggrandisement .. gradually as higher education marches with growing feelings of nationality (Tiv nationality) a real central administration may be evolved."¹ Implicit in this perspective of the Tiv political demand is that British administration sought to create a political institution in which one of the clan District Heads might develop to control "over clan affairs" as well as affairs that were equivocally Tiv, rather than "an arbitrary Tiv man" chosen from the intelligentsia class.

Tseayo however suggests that Wilkinson was necessarily against a Tiv-man being chief of the Tiv because of the faulty interpretation of the words "outside person".² 'Outside person' in whatever interpretive sense from what Wilkinson reported did not mean someone from outside Tiv land as is implicit in the interpretations of Tseayo. Furthermore, in 1938, British political intentions for the development of the Tiv chieftaincy institution was from the clan district heads rather than from the European educated Tiv men. This became even more explicit when D.M.H. Beck visited Tiv land to reiterate political views from the clan heads concerning the issue of a Tiv chief. In the instance the clan heads rejected the very concept of "an outside person" from their own class being chief of Tiv. This is explicit in the 1938 report of Beck when he wrote: "... the last annual meeting gave rise to a *half hearted demand* (of the Tiv central council) *for the appointment of a paramount chief to represent the Tiv tribe at the conference of chiefs at Kaduna. This demand was quickly dropped by the clan councils themselves*, but the agitation was fostered sporadically by literate members

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1. H.H. Wilkinson, Annual Report for Benue Province 1937, cited in Tseayo 1975 p.46.
 2. Tseayo 1975 p.46

of the tribe, more with a view to their own personal aggrandisement than to the interest of the people .. the proposal (for a Paramount Chief of the Tiv) in so far as it was prompted by the literate employees of the Native Administration *working behind the smokescreen of their tribal council with their own interests in view* arose from a vague realization that the Council itself is far too unwieldy to achieve practical results."¹ Contrary therefore to what Tseayo suggests in his interpretation that "British officials were not aware of the fact that the demands by the literate leaders of Tiv society for a paramount chief could be related to their general position in The Northern Provinces" they were infact very aware (!) since Beck himself suggests that the Tiv Central Council "itself is far too unwieldy to achieve practical results."² Thus when the Tiv Central Council was addressed in the period between 1946 and 1947 by the political representatives of the TPU, J.B. Ukpada and Iguse Adoki they lashed out that there was political need for the Council ".. allowing the voices of the literate young Tiv to be heard".³

Although there was political communication between the European educated men of Tiv and the British-created traditional political authority in the institution of the Tiv Central Council for the purposes of creating a Tiv chief they both lost in the political manoeuvres for the post. The sponsored TPU candidate Gondo Aluor for example, lost the contest for the job and Makere Dzakpe became appointed as the first chief of the Tiv in 1947 by the government of British administration in The North.⁴ Makere Dzakpe was a less European educated person than

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1. D.M.H. Beck, Annual Reports for Benue 1938, cited in Tseayo, 1975 p.4
 2. Tseayo 1975 p.47
 3. 'Pagan Administration' Nak Gbodiv 246 Vol.I and TPU letter 1946, cited in Tseayo 1975 p.49.
 4. Tseayo 1975 p.49

Gondor Aluor, the NA chief scribe. Although this was so, it ought to be borne in mind that while Dzakpe came from the larger and better educated parts of Tiv, the Ipusu, Gondor Aluor came from the Chango.¹

Makere Dzakpe was a former Sergeant Major in the WAFF and subsequently became the chief of NA police.²

Dorward suggests that the victory of Makere Dzakpe for the Tiv chieftaincy job in 1947 undermined initial Tiv traditional political solidarity with the Tiv European educated young men. While the European educated Tiv, sponsored and supported Gondor Aluor who was chief scribe of the Tiv Native Administration, British administration favoured Makere Dzakpe: "... because of his loyal military background and more conservative outlook".³ This was what caused political polarities to develop between European educated young men in Tiv land and the created traditional institutions of the government of British administration in The North which split political support for the M-Belt Movement along those lines among the Tiv in the period between 1956 and 1966. While some European educated became supported in the M-BELT Movement by the majority of the Tiv in the rural areas, others with the sympathies of the 'traditional' institutions were outside the M-Belt Movement and gave their support to the government of the NPC in The North until after 1965.⁴

The analytical significance of these political developments for this Chapter as well as for the subsequent chapters in the thesis on the

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1. Discussions with M.J. Dent 1980-83; for discussion of the political differences between the Ipusu and Chango, see Tseyayo 1975 p.87.
 2. Dorward 1972 p.18
 3. Ibid
 4. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5

creation of Tiv Division and the evolution of the institution of Chief of Tiv (Tor Tiv) and his subordinate Chieftaincies is that there were marked contrasts with similar political developments when compared to the experiences in the establishment of administrative divisions and the political institutions of chieftaincies among the other M-Belt groups and societies concentrated in Adamawa, Plateau, S. Zaria and S. Bauchi in the period between 1900 and 1950. For example, while the initial political struggle of the Tiv was over the imposition of British authority with a centralized Islamic model, which resulted in the political institution of the chief of Tiv, other M-Belt groups and societies sought political separation from the political rulership of Emirs or Fulani Islamic distinct Heads and the development of a chief for their groups and societies. In the instance of the Tiv, this was so because of the little social and political impact, expansion of the Islamic society in the period between 1804 and 1900, had on conquest and political control of their society. Unlike the Tiv however in many of the M-Belt groups and societies found in Adamawa, Plateau, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria, there existed village chieftaincies rather than clan heads found among the Tiv who were built around the "personality of a bigman" in society and whose decisions did not commit the rest of the group and society.

Idoma who were found toward the west of the Tiv territorial areas, shared many of the Tiv political characteristics in the development of a 'Native' Authority, the Idoma Division and the political institution of an Idoma chief for the political requirements of both the government of British administration in The North and for the Idoma group and society.

However, while the Tiv wanted 'a Tiv chief like an Emir' the Idoma accepted the development of the chieftaincies institutions as a direct result of the political need for a powerfully centralized authority caused by an externally induced competition for 'land use' from the Ibo and Tiv who were their neighbours to the south and east.¹ There was also the political concern to unite the different sub-ethnic groups and societies among the Idoma.² The need for Idoma unity was an important consideration because they were politically and culturally fragmented and existed in a congeries of small sub-ethnic groups and societies with language and customs the only basis of developing unity.³

It has been suggested that about 23 sub-ethnic groups exist within the Idoma with the Eggede being the most politically prominent.⁴ Although they have always spoken related dialects of their language they differ about the origins of their migration patterns and social origins.⁵ The majority of Idoma who became concentrated in the British created Idoma Division trace their social origins to the Jukun or "Apa" from where they suggest that they migrated to their present territorial location because of the "horse war".⁶ This might be suggesting migration caused by the Fulani cavalry raids, but then, the Jukum also used horses when they became marauding Empire builders of the 16th century.⁷

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1. Dudley 1966 p.61
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid p.60
 4. Ford, Brown and Armstrong 1955 p.91
 5. Ibid
 6. Ibid
 7. For detailed examples see discussions in Chapter 1 Section I and II.

In the period between 1804 and 1900 the Idoma found in Doma and Keana, came under direct military impact and Islamic influences developed from raids by Fulani armies for political conquest and for slaves from Nasarawa and Keffi. The Fulani armies also crossed the Benue river southwardly on several occasions to undertake slave raids from among the majority of the Idoma groups and societies.¹

Fulani authority and political control of the Idoma was however not established because the Idoma succeeded in resisting total military conquest.² Upon impact with British influences after 1900 some Idoma in Doma and the Keana areas became placed under the political authority of the British "created Emir and Emirate" centred on the Kanuri town of Lafia as early as 1905.³

Idoma Division might be said to have been conceived as early as 1917 when "the North-South" boundaries of Nigeria were redrawn on ethnic lines.⁴ In that instance the administrative and political subdivisions affecting the non-Islamic groups and societies in the Benue areas became organized as "independent pagans" of Igala, Idoma, Tiv and Jukun.⁵ After 1926 Palmer placed the political subdivision of Igala under the Attah of Igala and those of the Tiv and Idoma under the political authority of the Aku Uka of the Jukun based in

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1. Forde et al 1955 p.97
 2. Ibid
 3. Ballard 1972 p.4
 4. Ibid p.8
 5. Ibid

Wukari Division.¹ Subsequently when Idoma Division became organized, it was bordered by the Benue River in The North, Tiv Division in the east, Igala Division in the west, a concentration of Ibos in the south and on the southeastern edges of the Division was to be found numerous other groups and societies of the Ogoja Province.²

Table 3.18 suggests that in 1952 there were about 203,479 Idoma people in Benue Province, which makes them the second largest group and society within the political conception of both Benue Province and in relation to other groups and societies in the M-Belt territories. Magid suggests that the majority of the Idoma numbers were concentrated in 16 of the 22 districts of Idoma Division.³

As early as 1927 the government of British administration in The North considered the establishment of a Divisional Chief for the accephalous Idoma groups and societies.⁴ After 1928 the Idoma 'Ojira' became developed as a political institution: "... and fond hopes were expressed that from the 'Ojira' will eventually be found a paramount chief who will rule the whole of Idoma".⁵ The 'Ojira' was a traditional Idoma political institution in which all adult men of the group take part in its mass meetings.⁶ Before 1940 however, the political emphasis of the government of British administration in The North in regard to political organization of the Idoma into a single entity,

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1. Ballard 1972 p.9
 2. Magid 1971 p.360
 3. Ibid p.360 n.5
 4. Ibid p.362 n.19
 5. The Tour of Brigadier-General, Sir S.H. Wilson, Permanent Under-Secretary, in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, 27th August - 10th September 1928, Colonial Office Library Pamphlet Series, cited in Ballard 1972 p.10
 6. Magid 1971 p.347

was on the development of a 'Native Authority system' by strengthening the sub-institutions of the District Chiefs. In that instance district headship posts became created and were filled up with both traditional clan heads and political persons without any roots in the legitimacy of the office or title.¹

It was from this class of persons created by the government of British administration in The North that Idoma representatives to the 1940 Conference of Emirs and Chiefs in Kaduna became chosen. Beck, the Resident in Benue Province suggests that upon their home-coming from Kaduna the Idoma representatives: "... returned somewhat awed and with a modified opinion of their relative importance: not unexpectedly they were particularly impressed with aeroplanes, the lighting and water supplies in Kaduna and the wealth and dignity of the Emirs".² A rather interesting but very understandable correlation to this experience is that in the period between 1951 and 1965 Idoma politicians in the NHA and their representatives in the NHC became concerned to raise issues about electrification, pipe borne water, postal services and dispensaries in the town of Oturkpo.³

Very much like in the instance of the Tiv, the visit to Kaduna served the political value in attracting the non-centralized Idoma groups and societies into appreciating the prestigious political status of the Emirs. In the period between 1940 and 1947 the previously decentralized Native Authority system in Idoma Division became a centralized administration designed with emphasis on developing Idoma Unity.⁴ Also in that period when the government of British administration

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1. Magid 1971 p.347
 2. D.M.H. Beck, Annual Report for Benue Province 1940, cited in Tseayo 1975 p.42.
 3. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5
 4. Magid 1971 p.347

was effecting reorganization of the Native authority system, Idoma consciousness found expression among a growing body of primary school graduates in the Division, who formed the Idoma Hope Rising Union as early as 1942.¹

The IHRU, attracted employees of the Idoma Native Authority, particularly those who had lost their employment with the NA and also among those who were still in NA employment but faced frustrations.² As early as 1942 one of their political objectives was to support British intentions to centralize the NA under an Idoma chief. This was so because they wanted to break the political hold of members of the British created District Head Council on the NA, stimulate the NA to make more progressive development in the Division and influence policy in the local administrative apparatus.³ Unlike similar developments in Tiv Division in the same period the Idoma European educated, were on the same side with British administration, although they did not make use of any existing created political institutions as the Tiv did. In 1947 however a chief for all of the Idoma groups and societies became created from the Idoma district and clan council.⁴ He was Ogiri Oko who had combined leadership as the clan district headship of Adoka and the British chieftainship of the Idoma under the designated title of the 'Ochi Idoma'.⁵ In 1948 an Advisory Council became established by British administration to assist the 'Ochi Idoma'

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1. Magid 1971 p.344-345
 2. Ibid p.345
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid p.348
 5. Ibid

in the administration of Idoma Division.¹ In the same year, the Council became the 'Idoma Central Court'. Both the processes which led to the appointment of 'Ochi Idoma' and members of the Advisory Council, subsequently the Idoma central court excluded suggestions by the IHRU that literate European educated Idomas ought to hold the posts.² By 1949 when Ogiri Oko became inaugurated as 'Ochi Idoma', and a district head with three other illiterate clan heads became elected into the Advisory Council, political exclusion of European educated Idomas was sealed off from political participation in British created institutions.³ When after 1950 electoral processes of politics developed in The North, 'traditional' authority, created by the government of British administration in Idoma Division was in effective control of influences to shape electoral choices and completely overshadowed the ambitious political objectives of the IHRU.⁴

Other groups and societies significantly related to the political concept of the M-Belt in The North, who were sociologically concentrated alongside the Tiv and the Idoma were the Jukuns and the Igalas. Both the Jukun and the Igala had centralized social and political institutions in the systems of their societies before impact with British influences in 1900. In the instance of the Jukuns, it has been suggested that in the 16th century, they built a political Empire over the whole territories which became politically defined by the British as The North in the period after 1900.⁵ Archaeological

1. Magid 1971 p.348

2. Ibid

3. Ibid

4. The political roles of the European educated young men in the formation and development of Tribal Unions among the M-Belt groups and societies is examined in more detail in Section VI of this Chapter.

5. Perham 1962 p.144

evidence and the massive anthropological researches produced in the period of British administration in The North suggest that the Jukun expansion created a cultural diffusion among the majority of the M-Belt groups and societies.¹

In the period between 1804 and 1900 however Jukun territory north of Wukari was over-run and conquered by Fulani armies and the Jukun chiefs made to pay political tribute to Emirs in Yola and Muri.² After impact with British influences in 1900 and in the period between 1914 and 1940 the government of British administration in The North sought to resurrect the Jukun Empire over some M-Belt groups and societies so that "they might exercise their imperial techniques".³ This was at a time when the government of British administration in The North searched for a centralizing model, indigenous to the non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas so that they might meet the political requirements in the application of the Indirect rule policy.

Resurrecting the military and political Empire of the Jukun however became mainly directed at groups and societies like Tiv, Idoma and Igala in the Benue Province. For example, as earlier noted in this section, some of the Tiv population concentrated on the Eastern banks of the Katsina Ala river were ruled for about 10 years by the Jukun chief of Wukari until the 1940s when the Tiv gained their independence under a British created chief. In the instance of the Jukuns, this means that

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1. Ballard 1979 p.1
 2. For more detailed discussions and examples see discussions in Chapter 1 Sections II and III.
 3. Perham 1962 p.145

although the British reinforced an already existing chieftaincy political institution they sought to transpose that institution onto other groups and societies where centralized political authority was not the political experience. A Jukun Division called 'Wukari' Division was however created after 1930 and became centred in the Native Administrative headquarters of the town of Wukari.¹ Political conceptions of Jukun political dominance on some M-Belt groups and societies centred on the AKu Uka of Wukari became narrowed to Wukari Division upon the creation of Tiv and Idoma Divisions, the creation of chieftaincy political institutions among these groups and societies and the administrative transfer of the Igala to Kabba province in the period between 1934 and 1938.²

The Igala who numbered about 150,000 in 1931³ and about 294,400 in 1952⁴ trace their social origins to the Jukun dynasty of Wukari.⁵ It has been suggested that a Jukun prince founded their ruling chiefs and that of nine other Igala sub-chiefs.⁶ The Igala were however about the first of the political M-Belt groups and societies to come into contact with British influences with Christianity based on the Buxton principle of Christianity civilizing Africa rather than Islam.⁷

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1. Perham 1962 p.145
 2. Ballard 1972 p.11
 3. Perham 1962 p.145
 4. Okpu 1977 p.24
 5. Perham 1962 p.145
 6. Perham 1962 p.145
 7. M.J. Dent, Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, One of a series on the Saints, preached at St John's Parish Church, Keele, Summer 1982.

Before 1918 the Igala group and society were politically split between the governments of British administration in The North and South of Nigeria, divided in The North between two provinces and existing in three Divisions with different political authorities.¹ The traditional chief of the Igala, the Attah himself was politically cut off at Idah under the southern Nigerian administration while his subordinates ruled the majority of the Igala population concentration in The North.² It was by political and administrative policy decisions in 1918, 1921 and 1926 that the government of British administration brought all the Igalas into one administrative Division under the authority of the Attah with a Native Court under his jurisdiction.³ In the instance, Igala social and political identity emerged and looked up to the Attah for unity.

This was the premise from which politics in Igala similar to the circumstances of the Jukun, became tied up to traditional political institutions unlike in other parts of the M-Belt groups and societies. In both instances of the Jukun and the Igala, European educated young men and their subsequent political formations were not instrumental in shaping the development of political institutions. In the instance of the Tiv and Idoma however both with different political paths, 'British created traditional political institutions' were developed in the specific context of an emergent traditional ruling group of "Elders" and a politically interested European educated group that was more conscious of political processes in society because of the impact with

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1. Perham 1962 p.146
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid p.147

European influences. Among all of the Benue non-Islamic groups and societies variation in the development of political institutions was centred on the political interests within factions in the groups and societies rather than against an overbearing "outside" political group. This means that the M-Belt groups and societies who were concentrated in Benue did not face Islamic groups to contest the development of political institutions which were created by the government of British administration in The North in the same political sense that groups and societies in Adamawa, Plateau, S. Zaria and S. Bauchi did after 1940.

(C) Plateau

Table 3.18 suggests that by 1950, Plateau Province with about 50 (16.7%) of the different ethnic groups and societies and with over 100 different linguistic groupings¹ so far identified, was a territorial area with the second largest concentration in ethnic group numbers of the different non-Islamic groups and societies indigenous to the areas which were within the territorial political conception of the M-Belt in The North, even when upon closer perusal, many of them were numerically quite small. The total population of the Plateau groups and societies constituted about 18.0% of the population concentration within the political conception of the M-Belt areas in the territories of The North. The numerically dominant of the disparate Plateau groups and societies were the Birom, Sura, Yergam and Angas.²

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1. Ballard 1972 p.2
 2. Northern Nigeria Statistical Year Book, Table 19, Population of Northern Nigeria by Tribe and Province, 1952 Census; Table 20 (a) some smaller tribes in Northern Nigeria by Province 1952 Census, Kaduna, 1964 p.16-17.

Although these four groups and societies were numerically dominant relative to other groups and societies on the Plateau, they jointly constituted only about one third of the indigenous population in the area. Thus for example, Birom, Angas and Sura constituted only about 27.3% of the total indigenous population of Plateau Province.

Although the Ankwe people who were concentrated in Shendam Division of the Plateau were a numerically small group and society in 1952 they were prominent in the 1950s and 1960s at two levels of government and politics opposed to each other. For example, while some of their European educated young men under the leadership of Michael Audu Buba identified with the government of the NPC in The North, the churches and the electorate identified and voted in 1959 for the M-Belt Movement which sought political separation into a M-Belt Region from the NPC government and the Islamic conception in the political identity of The North. This suggests that although the numerical size of a group and society was crucial in the politics that affected the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement, there were other determinate intervening factors that shaped the political performance of a group in the strength of its political activity in support of M-Belt demands.¹

The choice of the Birom, Angas and Sura as representative of the focus in the development of political institutions and achieved consciousness in political identity before 1950 is therefore analytical

1. These factors and their explanatory reasons are examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5 where politics within the M-Belt groups and societies and with the M-Belt Movement in The North is discussed.

justified by the political roles, leadership from these groups performed in the development and growth of the M-Belt Movement. This was particularly the case with political and religious leadership that emerged and developed from European educated young men among the Birom and Sura in the period between 1949 and 1956.¹

Apart from the Angas, examined below, most other Plateau groups and societies shared similarities about their migration patterns and traditions of social origins before they arrived at their present territorial locations.² There has however been much more cultural fusion among all the Plateau groups and societies, when compared to Idoma, Tiv, Igala and Jukun in Benue Province. This cultural fusion makes the distinctive social origins of the Plateau groups and societies difficult to unravel for each to stand out on its own account. This also is traceable in the instance of the different groups and societies found in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria, where cultural similarities exist similar to those groups and societies found on the Plateau. Plateau groups and societies share linguistic similarities.

It has been suggested that implicit in these linguistic similarities there might be inferred migration patterns.⁴ A Plateau language

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1. Political leadership from among some of the different groups and societies on the Plateau and its political performance in the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement is examined in detail in Section VI of this Chapter and also in Chapters 4 and 5.
 2. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers* 1937, 1972.
 3. Ballard 1979 p.8
 4. *Ibid*

which is spread over a large territorial area is the Birom language. Birom belongs to the Benue-Congo group of languages.¹ The language extends from its territorial frontiers with the Sura of the central Chadic group, Ron and Monguna of an "older" Chadic group, to fill the entire level northern salient of the Plateau.² The languages closely related to the Birom on the Plateau are those of the Aten or Ganawuri and the Chara.³

Patterns of migration within the territories of the subsequent Jos Division however suggest that the Birom language is related to that of Jarawa, particularly the Afusare or "Hill Jarawa".⁴ Afusare oral tradition in turn indicates a close relationship with Chawai and Ingwe (Miango) on the western escarpment of the Plateau.⁵ Other M-Belt groups and societies including the Kagoro in S. Zaria have a tradition of having come from the Plateau.⁶ In addition the Rukuba in Jos Division bear close linguistic affinities with the Nimran of S. Zaria.⁷ Their territorial location provides the strongest linguistic evidence that the Birom have migrated from south to north, pushing various related people like the Chara and the Aten off the Plateau to the east, north and west.⁸

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1. Ballard 1979 p.8
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. H.D. Gunn, Peoples of the Plateau area of Northern Nigeria, London 1953, cited in Ballard 1979 p.8
 6. Tremearne 1912, cited in Ballard 1979 p.8
 7. Ballard 1979 p.8
 8. Ibid

Gunn suggests that the majority of the Birom villages on the Plateau trace their origins to the village of Riyom.¹ Riyom in turn claims to come from an area off the Plateau to the south-west, an area now occupied by Gwandara. In the process of their migration the Birom incorporated and assimilated various groups on their frontiers.² Most of these processes of migration took place before the beginning of the 20th century. Tiv are the only M-Belt group and society to have migrated to their present territorial location within the last 200 years since about 1700 AD.³

Traditions of origins on the migration patterns of the Birom suggest that they previously lived further to the south and south-west of their present territorial location centred on Jos in the Plateau. For some unknown reasons they moved as a group and society from a "forest country" in those southern territories to Riyom where their clan heads dispersed to become the nucleus of the Birom village of: Bachit, Du, Fan, Forum, Gashish, Gyel, Kuru, Heifan, Riyom, Ropp and Vwang (Vom).⁴

The Birom became the dominant group and society in the subsequent Jos Division which was created in the period between 1926 and 1927, centred on the developing metropolitan town of Jos earlier in 1910.⁵ This was so because the Birom occupied the greater parts of the territory of Jos Division in terms of their population size, number of Dis

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1. Gunn 1953 p.78-79
 2. Ballard 1979 p.9
 3. Perham 1962 p.153
 4. Harold Gunn, "The Peoples of The Plateau Area of Northern Niger. in Darl Forde (ed), Ethnographic Studies of Africa, Part VII, International African Institute, London 1953 p.24
 5. Jos Division, Ministry of Information and Internal Affairs, Jos, 1970 p.3

and territorial area of land. For example, while the Birom were concentrated on 948 (66.2%) sq. miles out of a Divisional total of 1431 sq. miles, other groups and societies in Jos Division shared 483 (33.8%) sq. miles.¹ The Birom were concentrated in about 80 villages before they were Federated with other groups and societies to constitute Jos Division as a single administrative unit in 1935 by the government of British administration in The North.²

Previously however in the period before impact with British influences, although there was social unity within the Birom through language, customs and other cultural forms, there was no traditional political integration in an existing 'Birom Polity'.³ In other words the basic unit of political organization among the Birom was the village where chiefs and a council of Elders governed politics, economy and society. Although the village chieftaincy system among the Birom was historically hereditary, there were no political institutions which served or united all the dispersed villages, even when warriors from a neighbouring village might assist another to do battle with another village or another outside group, to drive away the enemy. In other words, Birom had no standing army which might be called upon to fight a war.⁴ This means that "political units among the Birom were smaller than the tribe" and each unit was autonomous, independent and owing no political loyalty to the others.⁵

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1. Jos Division 1970 p.3
 2. Dudley 1968 p.61
 3. Ibid
 4. Logams 1975 p.26
 5. R. Apthorpe, 'Political Change, Centralization and Role Differentiations', Civilizations, Vol.10, No.2 1960 p.221.

This was the general pattern of political organization of society among the other groups and societies in Jos Division, like the Jerawa, Jarawa, Anaguta, Ingwe, Rukuba and miscellaneous others.¹ Like other M-Belt groups and societies therefore the Birom did not have any formal state system and a hierarchical political organization in control of the whole group and society.²

Subsequently upon impact with British influences none of the groups and societies on the Plateau achieved the creation of a political and an administrative Division in the same political and cultural sense as the Tiv in Tiv Division, Idoma in Idoma Division and the concentration of the Jukuns in Wukari Division. Like most of the groups and societies found in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, and S. Zaria they became either politically organized into "Federated Native Authority Divisions" or under the direct rulership of Fulani Emirs and some variant of Islamic political leadership. This was so, because the Plateau groups and societies were numerically small and dispersed with each of the village chiefs politically independent of the other villages within the same ethnic groups. Dudley has aptly summarized and described the majority of the M-Belt groups and societies as the "non-centralized, dispersed societies of The North".³

Jos Division which became politically functional in 1927 had the highest concentration of different indigenous non-Islamic groups and societies on the Plateau. There were 25 different groups and societies in Jos Division in the Plateau Province.⁴ Ethnic group concentration

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.53-121
 2. T.M. Baker, *The Social Organization of the Birom*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1954 p.274.
 3. Dudley 1968 p.57-65
 4. 1931 Census Report p.184; Jos Division 1970 p.3

which became concomitant with cultural fusion, unique to the Plateau in general and in particular to Jos Division was so because many other groups and societies, previously existing in S. Bauchi and S. Zaria migrated to take refuge on the Plateau hills and caves in the period between 1804 and 1900 as a direct consequence of the impact with the expanding Islamic society from political centres of religion and politics like Zaria, Bauchi, Muri, Jemaa, Wase, Nasarawa, Keffi and Lafia.¹

Ames suggests that in the creation of administrative Divisions on the Plateau particularly in Jos Division, political problems existed: "... because in one or two instances, where segments of a tribe have left their main body and eventually settled in between tribes of a different genus, the ethnological basis of administration has had to give way to that of geography".² This means that there were migrations of other groups and societies onto the Plateau, and in particular to the territories which subsequently became the administrative Divisions centred on Jos. Furthermore, Ames suggests that although the three Irigwe (Miango) towns of Kwal, Miango and Kimakwe with a total population of 6693, located on the edge of the Plateau escarpment were a part of the "Irigwe Tribe" they were never conquered and were not under Fulani domination. Their "much smaller part" was however in Zaria Province (mainly concentrated in Southern Zaria), ruled firstly by the Chawai and afterwards came under Fulani political authority based on the Emir of Zaria.³

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1. See more detailed discussions of the expansion of the Islamic society in Chapter 1 and its effect on the non-Islamic groups and societies in Chapter 1 Section III.
 2. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, p.47
 3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.57

Similarly, on the eastern side of the Plateau escarpment where the Anaguta were concentrated there were: "... Jarawa villages of Jos with a population of nearly 1000. The main part of the Jarawa tribe is in Bauchi Emirate, the Jos section originally coming from Lamingo to avoid conquest by the Emirs of Bauchi. They still have association with their main body and return to Lamingo in Bauchi for circumcision and other Tsafi purposes. In fact Jos (Jarawa) and Lamingo form a dual village and alternately provide a chief for certain Tsafi purposes. The Anaguta tribe have assimilated much Jarawa customs and have always been allies of the Jarawa of Jos. Naraguta and Jos (Jarawa) fought side by side against the Fulani, who camped on the outskirts of Jos but were eventually driven out and also against the Rukuba tribe".¹ Similar traditions of origins and cultural fusion were characteristic of Birom-Ganawari, Kaje-Birom-Rukuba-Herawa, Jarawa-Kaje-Jaba, Irigwe-Moroa-Kagoro-Kaje, Kaje-Chawai and Kagoma in S. Zaria and the Gamawuri on the Plateau,² even when it has been suggested that the "Ganawuri were runaway slaves of Fulani from Adamawa".³

In the instance of the Plateau groups and societies found in Pankshin and Shendam Divisions traditions of origins suggest that they belonged to an original Angas group which was part of the main Chadic-group that migrated from Borno with subsequent factions branching off

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers* 1937,1972 p.57
 2. *Ibid* p.83
 3. *Ibid* p.76-77

in the course of migration to form the different tribes.¹

Before migrating to their present territorial location on the Plateau, the Angas lived in Borno and their traditions of origins suggest that they belonged to the same stock as the Beriberi and the Jukun.² They set off from Borno "a long time ago under a single chief" and first settled in Yam in the district of Kanam.³ Thereafter, they moved to Sur, Zwal, Jekka and eventually settled at Amper District when "hostilities" had caused: "the chief and the tribe to move from Yam".⁴ When factions within the Angas group and society became more severe, some of their members broke off to found Kabwir, Gyangyan and Dawaki.⁵ Also in that instance some of the Angas from Kabwir branched off and went to Fier where they founded "the Pyem tribe",⁶ while other factions went to become a variant of the Angas in the town of Garram, the celebrated last victims of the brutal slave raiding expedition by the Emir of Bauchi even when impact with British influences had begun to take shape.

Similarly Ames suggests that the Chip, Tal, Pai, Ron-Kulere, Kaleri among numerous others as well as the Sura, originated from Angas factions who left their main body in Garram during "ancient times" and migrated to their present territorial location on the Plateau.⁷ Their languages, culture, tribal law and land tenure system as well as the

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1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.122-217.
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid p.132
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid p.134
 6. Ibid p.135
 7. Ibid p.146-152

method of selecting chiefs were similar.¹ In the instance of the Yergam, Burumawa, Ames suggests that they came from Wukari and might have belonged to the Jukun in "ancient times".² Meek classified these groups and societies as belonging to the "semi-Bantu section of the Sudanic group of languages".³

Similarly in instances of the different groups and societies who became concentrated in Shendan Division, Ames suggests that: "They were closely related to each other and also to the Angas-Chip-Tal group of tribes... from whom they trace their descent".⁴ The majority of the Shendam groups and societies also came under Jukum influence. The Ankwe for example were at one time a tributary within the Jukun Empire: "... and they absorbed much Jukun culture".⁵

Although these groups and societies subsequently maintained and stood differently in their social and political identities, they shared common socio-political and economic patterns. This means that groups and societies in Pankshin and Shendam Divisions, although differently from groups in Jos Division, shared a lot of cultural fusion before impact with British influences from 1900

Impact with British influences among the groups and societies on the Plateau were begun in July 1899.⁶ In that instance troops of

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1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.166-167
 2. Ibid p.169
 3. Meek, cited in Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.169
 4. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.177
 5. Ibid p.179
 6. Ibid p.36

the RNC did a two day battle with the Montols which subsequently resulted in the capture of Wase.¹ The company however did not remain there but rather, it returned to its Depot at Ibi. This military clash was meant to open up trade routes into the interior of The North from Ibi.²

Military conquest of the Plateau for political purposes in the processes that established the government of British Administration in The North were however first experienced in 1904 and were to continue until 1934 when a stable administration was consolidated.³ This means that the establishment of political control was a protracted military struggle.

Conquest of the Plateau groups and societies was developed from "the urgent requests of the RNC" centred on advancing its economic interests of Tin prospecting and whose representative, Colonel Laws, had been on the Plateau since 1903.⁴ Ames suggests that in the period between 1903 and 1904 when WAFF Platoons marched through the Plateau groups and societies to Bauchi, Gombe, Muri, Yola and Borno, the very presence of these stranger elements on those territories: ".. temporarily caused unity among the tribes than could have been the case for many a generation... the government's forces met with opposition in several places, particularly Ganawuri, Hos and Rukuba. When the issue was

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1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.37
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid p.117
 4. Ibid

decided, this unity among the tribes fell away as quickly as it had arisen".¹ In other words, unlike other M-Belt areas, the Plateau groups and societies initially united, militarily to resist British intrusion and only as conquest progressed and became successful by superior British arms did they recoil into their ethnic political identities which were used to resist the British. This was however similar to the instances in the battles resisting Fulani armies and conquest of the same groups and societies on the Plateau and in Adamawa.²

Upon the successful conquest of the Plateau groups and societies however, and in particular the groups and societies who became centred around Jos when the government of British administration in The North sought to establish political control with the centralizing Islamic model of political authority, it found: "... a plethora of petty chiefs, many having sentimental ties with another, and a few being under the nominal suzerainty of another, but none being under the effective control of any one. Even Government's own control was nominal... The principal obstacle to obtaining effective control was the large numbers of units with which Government had to deal... The result was that some villages (who became firstly conquered by the Platoons of the Government of British administration in The North) acquired a

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.117
 2. For more detailed discussions see Chapter 4, where battles in resisting Fulani conquest caused the formations of three quasi-political Federations but essentially military alliances: one in Adamawa and two on the Plateau. Firstly under the Mandara Kingdom in Adamawa and also among the groups and societies centred on the Birom and Sura on the Plateau in Jos and Pavhshim Divisions respectively.

political importance for geographical reasons which history or tradition would not have given them".¹

In the political organization of society that followed the conquest of some of the groups and societies on the Plateau for the purposes of British administration after 1930 the Administration dealt with the political problems described as "untractable and unintelligent conditions" by creating artificial NA Divisions.² In other words they were politically artificial because they were not based on a single traditional ruler with control over political decision-making affecting a singularly specific ethnic group. Similar to British political experiences among other M-Belt groups and societies with no clear-cut patterns in the structure of their political authority, like the Tiv and the Idoma in Benue as well as the Bachama and Chamba in Adamawa, among other groups and societies in the instance of the Plateau groups and societies, although the British created a District Head system and was acknowledged as "not at all appropriate" for the Plateau, it became used as a measure of political control for all of the groups and societies.³ Subsequently these district heads became legal heads of the British created Native Courts even when they had no relation to past indigenous judicial institutions.⁴

Before 1940 when no centralized political institutions were developed among the Plateau non-Islamic groups and societies, the government of British administration in The North made use of "Hausas as political Agents" as late as 1934.⁵ This is the premise

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.117-118
 2. Perham 1962 p.150
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid

from which Ames suggests that: "when this system of administration was organized for the indigenous population, the District Heads were not sufficiently advanced or experienced to cope with the administration of the large number of extraneous towns and villages which had come into being since the British occupation. These were therefore grouped to form four areas called Hausa Village Areas ... Each village area is under the control of a Headman appointed by Government and includes a multitude of extraneous villages, the boundaries of each area being coincident with the external boundaries of three or four adjacent Pagan Districts. This facilitates cooperation between the headmen of these Hausa village areas and the District Heads and will also enable them to be subdivided without difficulty when the pagan district heads are able to take over the administration of everyone and everything in their districts. This event, however, is not yet in sightThe Administrative staff of Jos Division supervise the coordination of the activities of the Hausa Areas and the Pagan Districts and also those of the integral parts of each."¹ Within this general framework in the development of Divisions among the Plateau groups and societies therefore, there was direct political control of the "Hausa Agents" by British DOs.² Subsequently in the period between 1940 and 1950 political effort was made within the general framework of the Divisions in order: ".. to sort the people out into the group which they themselves desire and to bring the

1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.120; emphases are mine.
 2. Perham 1962 p.150

Administration in detail nearer to the customs and wishes of the people".¹ According to Perham the process of political re-organizations after 1934 produced slow results. This was so because traditional leadership refused to identify itself with the government even when attempts were made: "... to coax the real heads to come out of their obscurity and assume the leadership of their groups. Their religious character still presents difficulty. A priest has great powers of obstruction ... a dual headship which did in fact often exist has been accepted".²

It was these socio-political problems existing among the Plateau groups and societies that caused constant political reorganization of the Divisions in the period between 1930 and 1950. The political and administrative Divisions of the Plateau only became politically stable after 1940 when knowledge about the Plateau groups and societies was achieved by British administration and also when Christian Missionary activities and the government school at Toro produced European educated teachers indigenous to the Plateau, enabling some Federations of NAS to develop as Divisions, particularly those centred around what Perham described as "the small and parochial groups", although the political adjustments did not square with regulations in the application of Indirect rule policy among the Plateau groups and societies.³

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1. Perham 1962 p.150
 2. Ibid p.150-151
 3. Ibid p.150

Plateau Province itself was formed in 1926 when there was the general provincial reorganization of The North for the application of Indirect rule policy to use indigenous political institutions and personnel.¹ In the instance, the creation of Plateau Province was a deliberate political act of the government of British administration in The North to separate political control of the non-Islamic groups and societies from rulership by Fulani Emirs and other variants of Islamic leadership.² This was the political premise from which Plateau Province became created from the provinces of Bauchi, Muri and Nasarawa, where previously Emirs and Islamic district heads ruled over a greater number of non-Islamic groups and societies.³ As a direct consequence of the political creation of Plateau Province, Muri and Nasarawa Provinces were no longer bigger political units with the political status of provinces. In that instance, although Emirs and Islamic political leadership still ruled over non-Islamic groups and societies, it was in the smaller political confines of the Divisions of Nasarawa and Muri. In the instance of Plateau Province however, its creation politically incorporated the following areas into a new political unit: "From the Bauchi Province: Jos Division without alteration, The Pankshin Division intact plus the Gindiri village Area, the plains of Angas District, and the Kanam District, without Duguri, which remained a district under the political control of the Emir of Bauchi;

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.7
 2. For more detailed discussions and examples see Chapter 2 Section III where the application of Indirect rule policy on the M-Belt groups and societies in general was examined.
 3. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.7

From the Former Muri Province: The Shendam Division, less Awe District and the Wase District proper ie. the plains Yergam District of the former Wase Emirate remained as part of the Shendam Division; From the Former Nasarawa Province: The Jemaa Division without alteration, but since reduced by the transfer of the three independent tribal units of Moroa, Kagoro and Jaba to Zaria Province; The Lafia Division (exclusive of the Lafia Emirate) which is now called the Southern Division".¹

The new political unit for the majority of the Plateau non-Islamic groups and societies therefore became separated from Islamic rule, that was centred on its north-western parts on Zaria, on its northern parts centred on Bauchi and on its south-eastern parts centred on Muri and Yola.² On its southern parts however there was Benue Province where the majority of the other non-Islamic groups and societies like the Tiv, Idoma, Jukun and Igala were concentrated.

In the long run however the creation of Plateau Province albeit other provinces in The North developed a sense of political identity among the groups and societies which the territorial area enclosed. Although very perverse in political identity the territorial units of administration continued to grow with specific political identities even after the provincial boundaries were no longer the political boundaries of the units of government in Nigeria. Thus for example, besides the State Creation Movements that characterized the political

1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.7-8
 2. *Ibid* p.8

separation of the M-Belt groups and societies enclosed in Benue-Plateau state, political tensions within that state were also underlined by explicit notions of a Plateau and Benue political identity, which were developed and became consolidated from the provincial boundary creations of 1926.¹ It ought to be borne in mind however that the migrant population on the Plateau and Benue as well as the colonizing Islamic population in Adamawa on a fairly equal level with the indigenous groups and societies assumed political identification with the provinces created in 1926. For example, during the 1979 elections campaigns Hausas in Jos, Bokkos, Pankshin and Barakin Ladi: "saw NPP as the party for their Plateau state and discouraged PRP and NPN for Plateau".²

However, while there were Emirs and Islamic village heads with political and religious thrones, supported by a substantial Islamic population who became politically enclosed in the administrative unit of Plateau Province, as was apparent in places like the Gindiri Village Area, the Kanam District, Wase Emirate, Jemaa Division and Lafia, the political unit of Benue Province, politically enclosed the more prominent Emirs of Nassarawa, Lafia and Keffi who were tied up to the

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1. These political tensions in the identity patterns in BP state are examined in more detail in Chapter 5 and the Epilogue
 2. Interview discussions with Samuel Mafuyai, Lagos January 1981; This is examined in more detail in Chapter 5 where the 1979 elections are discussed in the specific context of the variations in the theme and political identity of the M-Belt groups and societies.

prestigious throne of Zaria and also supported by a substantial Islamic population in their territories of jurisdiction.

Plateau Province as a political unit in 1926 was divided into five divisions: Jos, Pankshin, Jemaa, Southern and Shendam.¹ These political developments on the Plateau, although similar to the circumstances of groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria, they contrasted sharply with the creation of divisions in Benue Province among the Tiv, Idoma and Igala, where ethnic categories were emphasized rather than territoriality. In many respects this explains the development of stronger ethnic identities tied up to territoriality of a specific ethnic group in Benue rather than on the Plateau, Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria. Thus for example, in the 1950s and 1960s as much as in the 1979 elections when politics was taken to the electorate, as an ethnic bloc for the party of their choice, Plateau groups and societies, like the Birom, Jarawa, Sura, Yergam and Angas were characterized by split votes within each of the ethnic groups and societies for the different parties and factions of the group chosen.²

The political processes for the development of the groups and societies into political divisions within the politics and administration of the Plateau were begun in 1906.³ In that year the groups and societies concentrated in the subsequent Jos Division were administered as part of Bauchi Division.⁴ The remaining Plateau groups

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers* 1937 p.7
 2. This is discussed and analyzed in more detail in Chapters 5 and the Epilogue
 3. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers* 1937, 1972 p.42
 4. Ibid

and societies were, until 1926, a sub-division under the Emir of Bauchi with headquarters at Bukuru.¹ Subsequently, groups and societies centred on "Kanam Emirate and the Angas Tribe" formed another sub-division with headquarters at Pankshin.² Since there was no chief but a council of district heads among the Angas, the Islamic chief of Kanam was politically prominent. Also in 1906 the Ankwe people were nominally under the political authority of an Emir centred on Wase, although under a political division with headquarters at Ibi.³

Although the non-Islamic groups and societies south of the Plateau were not organized into any political division in 1906, they were theoretically assumed to be under the Islamic chief who was based at 'Lafia-Beriberi' where a British Administrative Officer exercised some political control as early as in 1905.⁴ It was however not until in 1911, when the Administrative Station in Lafia became moved to Wamba that Wamba Division came into existence as a political unit in Plateau, with an Islamic chief ruling over the non-Islamic groups and societies who were centred around Akwanga and Mada Hills.⁵

In 1907 however there was political reorganization of the sub-divisions, with headquarters in Bukuru and Pankshin. In the instance of the developing Pankshin Division when a WAFF detachment from Bauchi

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.42
 2. *Ibid*
 3. *Ibid*
 4. *Ibid*
 5. *Ibid* p.43

became stationed in Pankshin town, the Sura and the Ron-Kulere were removed from the political and military control of the British sub-division with headquarters centred at Bukuru.¹ The political organization of Pankshin Division was therefore begun in 1907.

In 1911 however the Bukuru and Pankshin sub-divisions were again reorganized as one political sub-unit with headquarters at Naraguta under Bauchi Division and the territories of the Anaguta Jerawa and Jarawa districts which were concentrated between Toro and Jos township added to it.² Following these developments, in 1913 the Angas Districts of Gyangyan, Kabwir and Amper were also removed from the non-Islamic political control in the previous Pankshin sub-division, constituted into an Angas District and placed under the political control of the Emir of Bauchi.³ This political arrangement remained so until 1926 when Plateau Province was created and the Angas District became removed again from Bauchi to constitute Pankshin Division.

It is difficult to see how ethnic identities might reinforce territorially conceived political identities in the divisions on the Plateau since in the processes of political reorganizations 'tribal' Districts often got split up under different political authorities.

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.42-43
 2. *Ibid* p.43
 3. *Ibid* p.44

In 1914 however the political sub-divisions centred on Bukuru and Pankshin were again politically separated into two distinct divisions with headquarters at Pankshin and Naraguta.¹ Subsequently in that year when there was rapid urban growth of Jos, the Naraguta headquarters became moved into the township.² This political act was to compound the problems of politics in the administration of a political division with a rapidly developing cosmopolitan metropolitan centre in the period between 1940 and 1970.³

It was from these political arrangements that there was the subsequent development of chieftaincy political institutions which were centred on the Angas in Pankshin and on the Birom in Jos Divisions during the period between 1940 and 1950.

The political processes which led to the creation of Shendam Division which became centred on the Ankwe were begun in 1909.⁴ Previously before 1909, the Ankwe, Yergam, Montol and Gerkawa were under the Fulani Emir in Wase. Ames suggests that in the long period of Fulani political domination of these groups and societies, particularly so for the Ankwe, there was: ".. disintegration of the tribal authority for executive purposes".⁵ In the instance of the 1909 political reorganization for the development of Shendam Division however, the Yergam, Montol, Gerkawa became organized into the same political unit with the Ankwe, as an Ankwe District and the process

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1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.43
 2. Ibid
 3. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5 cf.
 4. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.43
 5. Ibid

separated them from the political control of the Emir in Wase.¹ In the same year, a British administrative cum military officer became posted to rule over the Ankwe District from Gerkawa.

In 1910 however the headquarters of the Ankwe District became moved from Gerkawa to Kwolla in order to enhance the military conquest: "... of the lawless tribes in the north and north-east of Shendam Division".² In 1912 the conquered groups and societies to the north and north-east of Shendam, including the Ankwe became territorially enclosed into the political unit of Ibi Division and Kwolla ceased to exist as an administrative political unit.³ In 1913 however they were removed from Ibi Division, reorganized again into a political district with the ethnic title of the District changing from Ankwe District to Shendam District.⁴

In 1919 however 'the plains Yergam District' was removed from the Shendam District and became placed again under the political control of the Emir in Wase.⁵ This political act split the Yergam group and society into two: those centred on the hilly terrains of Gazum, independent of Islamic rulership and those with a Fulani district head as a leader, under political control from Wase. This political arrangement remained without further changes until 1926 when Plateau

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1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.43
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid p.44

Province was created and the Yergam, Ankwe, Montol, Gerkawa became organized as Shendam Division.¹

These constant political reorganizations resulted into six political units on the Plateau which were theoretically administered as five divisions. These six administrative and political units were organized like this: "A group of tribes sharing common central departments at Jos. This group by itself forms the Jos Division and is under the supervision of an administrative staff whose headquarters are at Jos; A group of tribes sharing common central departments at Pankshin; The Kanam District; These two units (Pankshin and Kanam) together comprise the Pankshin Division, the headquarters of which are at Pankshin; The Shendam Native Administration and two Independent Districts which share its Treasury. This group forms the Administrative Division of Shendam; The Jemaa Emirate with headquarters at Kafanchan; Another group of tribes sharing a Treasury at Wamba. This group forms an administrative Division called the "Southern Division" and having its headquarters at Wambe".² The headquarters of Plateau Province became developed and centred on the Jos metropolis which strictly speaking was another administrative political entity standing on its own, although geographically it became a political enclave within Jos Division.³

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers* 1937, 1972 p.44
 2. *Ibid* p.47-48
 3. *Ibid* p.48

This was the premise from which Perham suggests that in 1935 socio-political and economic problems between the groups and societies in the township of Jos developed and faced the government of British administration in The North were between "classes" rather than "regarded as a pagan problem".¹ According to Perham, four classes existed among the groups and societies which built up Jos Township and which were the basis of the sharp divisions between people: "Firstly European traders, miners and bankers; secondly Southern Christians or at least Europeanized natives who work for the Europeans as clerks, chauffeurs and so on; thirdly the Hausa Fulani Moslem community centred round their mosque and their Alkali; and fourthly, the local pagans who come and go with their foodstuffs and firewood. The Europeans in the township proper present the least difficulty. In the native town the pagans hardly count as yet. The other two classes by no means easy neighbours ... (Then) The Southern educated group suddenly began to take interest in Municipal affairs. Instead of being ignored or discouraged (by the government of British administration in The North) they were invited to form part of an unofficial Advisory Council. In 1934 its members were asked to assist in the assessment of the town revenue. They also sit as honorary members on the court of the Alkali when he deals with cases in which Southerners are parties".²

In the 1940s and 1950s when there were more European educated people, indigenous to the Plateau groups and societies, particularly

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1. Perham 1962 p.151
 2. Northern Nigeria Annual Reports, Kaduna, 1933 p.53-54; 1934 p.43-45, cited in Perham 1962 p.151. Emphases are mine.

the Birom, who had achieved socio-political consciousness about a European modernizing society from Christian Missionary activities, the social and political grievances on the Plateau became lashed out on Nigerian "southern Christians" in Jos as well as the "Hausa Fulani communities" rather than on "European classes" or other ethnic groups and societies within the Plateau and from among the M-Belt groups and societies.^{1*17}

In the instance of political developments on the Plateau which led to the creation of administrative Divisions, territorial political identities were not reinforced by ethnic social and political identities. This was so for all the five divisions which became politically functional on the Plateau.

Even when District Administrations became organized on the Plateau they were not based on specific ethnic social and political identities, rather they were 'Federated tribal Districts'. For example, the Ankwe District consisted of the Yergam, Kwolla and Montol, all previously under Fulani domination in political authority.

The political significance about the creation of Plateau Province and the political reorganizations within the political unit itself, was that demonstrative efforts were made to separate non-Islamic groups and societies from Fulani rule and other variants of Islamic rulership. In the process however not all the political goal of separating Islamic rulership from ruling over non-Islamic groups and societies was achieved, since some groups and societies like those centred around Jemaa Federation, subsequently in S. Zaria under the Emir of Zaria, Wamba, Kanam, Wase, remained under Islamic chiefs.

1. This is examined in more details in Chapters 4 and 5 of *17 see comment at the end of Chapter 3.

While the political reorganization solved the problems of political separation from Islamic rulership for some non-Islamic groups and societies on the Plateau, it however compounded the political problems in developing chieftaincy institutions on the political territories of the different ethnic groups and societies in the British created Divisions. This was so because of the numerical share of the different ethnic groups and societies in the units the divisions contained.

The government of British administration in The North coped with these problems in two ways: it created a Council of Chiefs from the different groups and societies who constituted the "total traditional authority" for the Division and thereafter imposed a chosen individual completely outside traditional patterns of legitimacy in political authority over the Council of Chiefs. In the instance it was hoped that a charismatic personality might submerge other chiefs as the traditional Head of the Division.

These political solutions worked in the particular instances of divisions where the majority numerical numbers of a group among the minorities underlined the political development of a chief for a division. Thus for example it was the Chief of Birom in Jos Division who dominated the development of the chieftaincy institution in the 1940s and 1950s and subsequently that was only remotely contested by other smaller groups and societies in the same division. Similarly in Pankshin Division the Chief of the Angas politically overshadowed the Chief of Sura in the cause of developing a paramount chief for that division, although the Sura contested the issue. This was the political premise from which Ames observed that: "Prior to 1934 the

village areas (of Angas, Chip, Tipap, Ron, Pai, Kumbul, Vodai, Tal etc.) were all subordinate to Panyam, whose village head was Chief of Sura. As a result of investigations carried out in that year it was found that Panyam had no claims to being the paramount village for any other reason than that it was so made by our administration... the Sura District has therefore been divided up in accordance with the traditional associations of the people".¹

In the Divisions where Islamic leadership and non-Islamic chiefs existed among the different Plateau groups and societies, as was the political situation in places like Jemaa Federation, Lafia, Wase, Wamba, Mada and Kanam and Akwanga, existing patterns in the practices of centralized leadership of the Fulani, took precedence over the development of chieftaincy political institutions. As suggested by the incumbents of the posts in 1963, the development of chieftaincies as traditional political institutions on the Plateau was begun in 1919 based on Islamic chiefs among the territories of the groups and societies which subsequently became enclosed as that political province.²

In that instance, the very first chief to be appointed by the government of British administration in The North on the territories that became Plateau Province was Mallam Mohammodu Kwore who was the Chief of the Islamic, but non-Fulani town in 'Lafiya-Beriberi' and subsequently the Chief of 'Akwanga Federation' with the title of "Oriye Rindiri" of Wamba when the administrative headquarters shifted from Lafia to Wamba.³ His early appointment as chief in 1919 is explained by the British establishment of an administration in

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.127
 2. Local Government Year Book, prepared by the Department of Local Government, Institute of Administration, Northern Nigeria, Zaria 1963 p.98
 3. Local Government Year Book, 'Facts on Chiefs' 1963 p.98

'Lafiya-Beriberi' as early as in 1905 which was directed at the conquest of groups and societies on the Plateau.¹

The earliest non-Islamic chief who became appointed for his ethnic group from among the groups and societies on the Plateau was the Chief of Ankwe. This however was not until in 1931, when Nyelong became the 'Long Kemai' of Shendam Division, subsequently of Lowland Federation NA.² The early appointment of Nyelong as Chief is explained by the British search to establish an early "safe and peaceful trade route" from Ibi into the interior of the non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas.³ This means that the development of the chieftaincy institution among the groups and societies on the Plateau was less to do with the development of unity in a specific context of a cultural identity. Rather it emphasized economic, political and administrative necessities of the government of British administration in The North.

Table 3.19 suggests that before 1950 there were six "British created" chieftaincies for the Plateau from both Islamic and non-Islamic patterns of centralized political authority. In that instance, while there were four Islamic chiefs, there were only two chiefs from the non-Islamic groups and societies on the Plateau. The four Islamic chiefs on the Plateau were the 'Oriye Rindiri', Mohammed Kwore in Wambe, appointed in 1919, Mallam Ibrahim in Kanam in 1938, Mallam Musa in Mada in 1943 and the Emir of Wase, Abdullahi Maikano in 1948. The two non-Islamic chiefs on the Plateau before

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.40-43
 2. *Local Government Year Book, 'Facts on Chiefs', 1963* p.98
 3. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.177-221

Table 3.19 The Development of non-Islamic Chieftaincy Institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies.

Territorial Area of the M-Belt	British created Chiefs before 1950		British created Chiefs after 1950	
	Numbers	%	Numbers	%
Plateau	6	37.5	6	30.0
Benue	3	18.7	5	25.0
Adamawa	3	18.7	5	25.0
S. Zaria	3	18.7	2	10.0
S. Bauchi	1	6.3	2	10.0
Totals	16	100%	20	100%

Source: Northern Nigeria Local Government Year Book, Kaduna, 1963 p.90-99. The Yearbook indicates the names and dates the chiefs became appointed way back from 1919 as the incumbents stood in 1963.

1950 were the 'Long Kemai', Mallam Nyelong, the Chief of the Birom in Jos, Mallam Rwang Pam who was appointed in 1947.¹

Subsequently in 1951 when there was increased representation of the Plateau groups and societies in the NHC, the Islamic chiefs of Wase, Kanam and Wamba were an addition to the Emir of Jamaa, with only the Birom chief chosen into that Assembly from among the non-Islamic chiefs.² This suggests that before the political impact of the M-Belt Movement was felt in The North, the path in the development of chieftaincies institutions on the Plateau emphasized Islamic patterns and personnel.

As it is further suggested by the breakdowns in the figures in Table 3.19, after 1950 of the six created chieftaincy institutions on the Plateau, five were non-Islamic and only one was an Islamic chief. The Islamic chief was the Chief of Eggon, while the four other non-Islamic chiefs appointed after 1950 were the chiefs of Angas (1954), Ron-Kulere (1955), Yergam (1955), Sura (1957) and Montol (1962) and all of these chiefs became members of the NHC although with subordinate political status as third and fourth class chiefs.³

When the British set out to develop chieftaincy political institutions on the Plateau, none of the non-Islamic groups and societies had a centralized chieftaincy, controlling the whole group. Rather, they were characterized by autonomous village chiefs within each of the different ethnic groups and societies. Unique however among all of the Plateau groups, albeit, the majority of the other

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1. Local Government Year Book, 'Facts on Chiefs' 1963 p.98.
 2. C.R. Niven, Senior Resident Plateau Province 1951, Northern Region of Nigeria Provincial Annual Reports 1951, 1953 p.60
 3. Local Government Year Book, 'Facts on Chiefs' 1963 p.98

M-Belt groups and societies, the Angas in "ancient times" had a tradition of a chief controlling the whole of their group and society.¹

In the majority of instances in the processes of these British chieftaincy creations, there was direct British involvement in producing a chief over the whole ethnic group and society as well as over other different numerically smaller groups and societies which became politically subordinate to the authority of the 'paramount chief' in a Division. This was so in the instance of the Chief of Jos, 'the Bwong Gwom' of the Birom, whose subordinate chiefs were not only Birom District Heads but also previously autonomous village and District Heads of other ethnic groups and societies such as the Jerawa, Ganawuri, Buji, Rukuba and Irigwe.²

The development of the chieftaincy institution among the Birom in the 1940s however, became complimented by increased political and social consciousness about their ethnic identity in the politics of the chieftaincy. This ethnic political identity found expression through the political demands of the 'tribal' party which began demanding for the creation of a chief for all Birom, at about the same time that the British were reorganizing the groups and societies into NA Federations after the creation of Plateau Province in 1926. Although the process was begun in 1926, as late as 1951 Niven, the Resident on the Plateau still maintained that in that year: "... There has been a noticeable movement towards the Federation of the various tribes. The progress has not been spectacular but it is visible. We

1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.131
2. *Post 1963* p.78 n.2

have not yet reached a position, without which true progress is impossible, where definite executive committees have been evolved from the mass of Native Authorities".¹ This was so because, according to Niven, Plateau Province was a political province of contrasts: "There is probably no such small area in Nigeria where contrasts are so striking except in some of the larger towns. Here we have the customary progress in civilization as represented by motor vehicles, elaborate mining machinery, tarred roads and fine buildings. The reverse of the picture is the naked pagan living in a small village on the well nigh inaccessible crags, still isolated and still suspicious of his neighbours. Between these, lie innumerable shades of contrast and colour. The natural beauty of the high Plateau is often marred by the frenzied efforts of man to wrest Nature's precious minerals from below ground. In the same way, the natural beauties and graces of the people are being marred by the sordid and dirty clothes, the wearing of which makes them think they are becoming civilized... Further contrasts with the Missions and their many schools, the dispensaries, the six hospitals and the wild dances of the masked men at the Juju festivals, the superstitions and prejudices of the remoter people. Through all the contrasts run two threads, the first is an ancient threat, that is, the life of the people, *the life of diverse communities, jealous and suspicious of each other, the inability to agree on a common policy, the inchoate chaos of a human nebula. Tribal jealousies are still very acute; the parochial outlook is still overwhelming; the lack of proper feeling of responsibility amongst officials and chiefs is notable.* The work of the administration here is in

1. Niven 1951 p.59

general an up-hill struggle. The second thread is the modern one of the tin mines, the threat which runs through the entire life of the Plateau. Far away in the plains, away from the sight of the dumps, the life of the people is affected by the rise and fall of the price of tin; the corn they grow and the wood they cut, the cattle they rear are all affected by the demand for them on the minesfield. The two threads are so separate and yet cannot be separated and between them they control the life of this involved Province".¹

In the instance of the administrative developments on the Plateau however, in 1927 Jos Division became reorganized into 15 village Districts.² The districts became named after the towns of the Head Chiefs in each instance. These were Amo, Buji, Achakka, Gonawuri, Jere, Kwal, Naraguta, Machi, Forum, Gashish, Heipang, Kuru, Rim, Ropp and Vom (Vwang).³ Eight of these districts were from among the Birom group and society. With the single exception of Jere District Area, all the other District Areas were intensive tin-mining areas: "... and consequently have a large population of alien natives from other parts, a fact which added to administrative problems",⁴ and this compounded the problems of developing a chieftaincy institution in the politics of Jos Division with severe political ramifications on issues like the Registration of voters for the 1959 Elections.⁵

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1. Niven 1951 p.59-60
 2. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.53
 3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.53
 4. Ibid
 5. Post 1963 p.201

Complexities in the administrative and political problems in Jos Division was so because, besides the indigenous groups and societies the government of British administration on the Plateau also had to deal with three other categories of people under their political control. The rush of the "alien population" into Jos Division was conditioned by tin mining activities and increased with the years as the mining industry was developed. "Tin Mining Camps" were provided for the alien population on land leased through the NA to the Tin-Mining Companies which became dotted all over Jos Division.¹ Mining companies provided this population with modern European infrastructural facilities and social welfare services exclusive to the residents of the 'Tin Camps'.² This means that members of the indigenous groups and societies who were not on the 'Tin Mining Camps' became excluded from benefitting from these facilities and services that were exclusive to an "alien population". The "alien population" also consisted of people who came to trade and this population settled in villages where trade might be most conveniently developed.³ Ames suggests that a third category of the "alien population" were the nomad Fulani: "who came later, wandered everywhere and settled nowhere".⁴

According to Ames, all the immigrant population except for those on the "Mining camps on Mining leases" were theoretically within jurisdiction of an indiscernible Jos Native Administration.⁵ In the instance of the indigenous population found among the groups and societies in Jos Division, District Heads were in political control and each possessed a court and its own "small police forces".⁶ The members of the District

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1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.118
 2. Logams 1975 p42-44
 3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.118
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid
 6. Ibid p.119

Courts consisted of chiefs of the subordinate towns and villages within the districts and the district heads were the Presidents of the Courts.¹ The personnel that formed the courts were also 'a social and political council' which the district head used to discuss district issues and to take decisions on all affairs of concern to the district.² This was the political and legal premise from which the wandering Fulani settlers in the districts came under the political control of indigenous district heads. Although the Fulani had one or more of their own rulers in "the Hardos" who were the head-men of the 'Fulani in the Districts', in 1930 indigenous District Heads supervised and collected cattle taxes from the Fulani for the government of British administration on Jos Division.³

This was unlike the political circumstances of groups and societies found in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and some of the Divisions within Plateau Province itself, where Fulani and Islamic leadership controlled society from the top right down to the grassroots levels.⁴ This however suggests that in the instance of the Birom and other groups and societies in Jos Division, the political consequences of developing institutions of the District Head with a court and a police force under their control at such grassroots levels, maintained and generated already existing sub-ethnic political identity patterns at village and district levels before an institution, assumed to be politically 'traditional' to the Birom, became developed to be the focus of unity of the whole group and society.

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1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.119
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. For more detailed examples see discussions in Chapter 1 Sections III (a), (b) and (c) and also Chapter 2 Section III.

The processes of uniting the Birom under a single 'traditional' institution of a chief, were begun in 1935. This was about 10 years earlier to political conceptions of the institution of the 'Tor Tiv' in 1938, the 'Ochi Idoma' in 1945 and the subsequent institution of the 'Bwong Gwom' in 1947 which became created among the Birom themselves. In 1935, for example, Da Chung Gyang became chief of Riyom and the chief representing all other Birom village chiefs in the "Great Judgement Court" at Riyom which was a council consisting of other non-Birom chiefs in Jos Division.¹ Da Chung Gyang as "chief" over all other Birom village chiefs became President, in the first instance of the Divisional Council of 15 village chiefs from the different districts of the 'Birom Tribal Area' to judge over social and legal traditional problems affecting groups and societies in Jos Division.

The British emphasis on the chief of Riyom as chief of Birom was rooted in the traditions of origins of the Birom which suggest that the Birom in their migration path first settled at Rioym, from where the different clan-heads dispersed to form the Birom villages and districts. Emphasis on the chief of Riyom as chief of Birom however became contested by other Birom village chiefs which resulted into the removal of Da Chung Gyang in 1943 as chief of Birom and as President of the 'Birom Tribal Area'.² In 1944 the chief of Vwang

1. Jos Division 1970 p.12

2. Interivew discussions with Moses Nyam Rwant, January 1981.

was again wrongly appointed to be 'Chief of Birom' based on similar traditions of origins and initial settlement patterns which were also contested by other village chiefs in the 'Birom Tribal Area'. The British upon further investigations removed him immediately in the same year of his appointment because there was no basis to bolster his legitimate rule over the whole of the other Birom villages and the 'Tribal Area'.¹

When in 1945 Birom village chiefs disagreed over who ought to be chief of the Birom, other chiefs in the Divisional Council from the different ethnic groups and societies alongside with the Birom village chiefs and based on the advice of the government of British administration in Jos Division, decided to adopt a system whereby: "The 15 of them rotated the chairmanship of their monthly meetings, with each District Chief taking turns as Chairman".²

In the instance of that development different chiefs from the Birom, Irigwe (Miango), Buji, Rukuba, Anaguta held the rotative post in each of their monthly meetings for a while, with interpreters in Hausa in their midst to enhance communicativeness between the chiefs. In the closing years of 1945 however the government of British administration in The North attempted to turn the chairmanship of the Council into a more permanent institution by suggesting that the 15

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1. George Hoomkwap, The Evolution of the Institution of 'Bwong Gwom', BSc dissertation, Department of Government, Abu, Zaria 1971.
 2. Interview discussions with some Birom chiefs at Fan, Vwang, Du, Elders at Cwelnyap, Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri, in 1974, cited in Logams 1975 p.57.

chiefs elect one of their members as "Chairman-Chief" until he "died" and thereafter another chief in their ranks might take over the post.¹

When this proposal was placed before the Council of Chiefs in the Division, the British faced a problem of political reluctance, because the District Heads will not give up their traditional chieftaincies to that of "Chairman-Chief-until-death" of Jos Division.² Subsequently this initial political rejection of a rotating chief of the Birom, split support for the chieftaincy institution and for the Jos NA from both the Birom European educated and chiefs in the villages in 1953.³ The chieftaincy of Jos and the Birom as it exists today is a prerogative of any indigene of the Birom who might be "tied up in some way to the NA Councillors" in Jos and not based on a dynasty as was sought to be centred on Rwang Pam and the Birom village of Du in the 1950s and 1960s.⁴ This is the premise from which Fom Bot, the present incumbent from Ropp village, having been the longest serving councillor in the NA Council became elected by the Jos NA

1. 'Death' did not necessarily mean exit from earthly society, it also meant failure to perform responsibly. This is, I think, a gimmick from - Patrick Dokotri in an interview discussion in January 1981.
2. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri January 1981
3. Post 1963 p.82; this is examined in more detail in Chapter 4 where we examine the factions in the political development of the M-Belt Movement and the politics of the M-Belt Movement within the M-Belt groups and societies.
4. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981; Logams 1975 p.61

and the Council of Chiefs in Jos Division with the approval of the military government of BP State under Joseph Gomwalk in 1970.¹

In 1945 however the British became faced by political demands from European educated Birom who organized themselves into a Birom Progressive Union. In that instance, among other issues that conditioned the Birom political Union, it was suggested that an "educated Birom Man" ought to be appointed not only as Chief of Birom but also as Chief of Jos, rather than a village District Head representing the Birom in the "Bwong Gwom Duk Shot".² In 1945 however two related but quite distinct issues caused the semblance of European educated Birom to organize themselves with political focus on the issue of chieftaincy. Firstly there was perception of political disunity, envy, jealousies between the villages and that had cost the Birom, the removals of Da Chung Gyang and the Chief of Vwang ^{of the developing institutionalization of the chieftainship of Jos and} as chiefs of Jos Division in the period between 1935 and 1946, even when the government of British administration on the Plateau insisted on focussing the development of that institution on the Birom.³ Interestingly, all these developments took place right under the nose of Rwang Pam, subsequently chief of Birom and Jos, when he was Headmaster of the Government school in Riyom and an executive member of BPU with the post of Treasurer of the political organization in 1946.⁴

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1. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981
 2. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981
 3. Ibid
 4. Dudley 1968 p.92

Secondly from 1910 until 1954, Hausa chiefs vigorously increased their claims to rule in Jos and Bukuru besides other Hausa and Islamic chiefs in places like the tin mining camps of Bisichi, B/Ladi and Dorowa Babuje who were independent of Birom village heads in those areas.¹ This situation was perceived as political dominance and existed since 1910 when Jos grew as an urban centre and the tin mining camps increased with Hausa migrant populations disproportionately to that of the Birom and other M-Belt groups and societies indigenous to the Plateau.²

At about the same time in the instance of the 1945 political formations among the Birom, when European educated individuals began to demand the creation of a Birom Chief, British administration on the Plateau changed policy in regard to developing a chieftaincy institution from among the Council of Chiefs for Jos Division. The change in policy emphasized that "some suitable person be selected " to give the required leadership to the small groups and societies in the Division.³ The policy also emphasized "literacy in European education" in the choice of the "suitable person" as chief of the Birom. The political meaning of this new policy position was that it met the requirements of both the Government of British administration on the Plateau to have a "European educated literate" person as chief and also the political intensity in the agitated demands and petitions of the European educated Birom who organized the BPU.⁴

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri, January and February 1981.
 2. Dudley 1968 p.235
 3. Jos Division, 1970 p.12
 4. Dudley 1968 p.92

In 1947 therefore Rwang Pam who was already under the scrutiny of British officers having been trained in Toro and was Headmaster of the government school in Riyom, became appointed as the Chief of Birom.¹ In the same year of his appointment, Rwang Pam as Chief of Birom was moved from Riyom to Jos, although his political authority remained restricted only to the Birom.² Subsequent political developments in The North in the 1950s, consolidated the position of Rwang Pam as the paramount chief of Jos NA, with political authority over other non-Birom villages and District Chiefs in Jos Division.³

In contrast to the development of chieftaincy institutions among the Tiv and Idoma in Benue province political interests of all three 'parties' clashed: those of British administration, British created traditional councils and those of European educated young men in those groups and societies. In the instance of developing the institution of the 'Bwong Gwom' among the Birom for example, the process became characterized by complimentary interests of European educated Birom to British administrative expediencies, resulting in the choice of a member of the BPU as Chief of Birom. This is explained by the political difficulties the British experienced in trying to create a chief in Jos Division from a similar council to the Tiv 'Jir ~~tarmen~~' and the Idoma 'Ojira'. Another sharp contrast in the development of the institution of the 'Tor Tiv' and 'Ochi Idoma' is the complete lack of factions within their traditional councils from the clan heads in the processes of their evolution

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1. Dudley 1968 p.92
 2. Ibid
 3. Post 1963 p.82; the political tensions in these developments were tied up to NPC party politics on the Plateau and are examined in Chapter 4

when compared to the village, district and ethnic factions which developed in Jos Division. In the instance of developing the institution of the 'Bwong Gwom' however although factions were inevitable between the numerical strong Birom and other ethnic groups and societies, there were also considerable political disagreements on who ought to be "the big chief" from among Birom Districts and villages.

Besides the small population sizes¹, which compounded the problems of politics in the development of chieftaincy institutions, as was characteristic of political developments in Jos Division, and which make Plateau unique among other M-Belt groups and societies, Plateau also stood out differently in social characteristics among other M-Belt groups and societies as these relate to socio-political and economic experiences and developments during the period between 1804 and 1900 and also in the period between 1900 and 1950, characteristics which consolidated conceptions of inequality and political prejudice among groups and societies in The North.

In the period between 1804 and 1900 some of the Plateau groups and societies in its northern, western and southern escarpments became conquered by Fulani armies and were forced to pay political tributes in slaves and material goods in acknowledgement of Fulani rule. Similar to other non-Islamic groups and societies in the territories that came to be politically enclosed in The North which were found in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria, Fulani conquest of

1. The smallest ethnic group and society among the M-Belt groups and societies, albeit The North and Nigeria, existed on the Plateau. This was the Pakara 'tribe' who numbered just about 937 people in 1931 and became assimilated into the Birom, Rukaba and Buji by the time the 1952 census was conducted. Earlier in 1937 Ames suggested that the "tribe will die out"! Ames 1937 p.108

some groups and societies on the Plateau was conquest without civilizing by the government of the Islamic society in the Fulani Empire. Rather it was conquest that became increasingly characterized by exploitative relationships of both human and material resources.¹ In the instance of the Plateau, this was so for groups and societies centred around the Jarawa, the Anaguta, the Jerawa, groups and societies around Wase, the numerous groups around the Mada Hills, the Angas, and in Shendam, the Ankwe.² Groups and societies on the Central Plateau highlands militarily resisted Fulani conquest and therefore were not made to pay political tributes, although Fulani armies from Bauchi, Zaria, Muri and Wase raided the Birom, Irigwe, Anaguta, Yergam, Montol and Sura and took away some of their members as slaves.³

In the period between 1900 and 1950 more severe, brutal and protracted military methods were used to establish British political control and influences among the Plateau groups and societies than elsewhere in the M-Belt areas, albeit the whole of The North. In 1937 Ames acknowledged that: "... Government could not immediately create responsible Native Administrations such as are to be found in the so-called Hausa states, nor could the principle of Indirect Rule be adopted throughout the whole Province (because) .. Apart from the fact that *contact with the majority of the tribes* had only been established in the first place *by the use of armed force* and, in many instances, *has only been maintained by a show of armed force and... by its use*, the vast number of separate and distinct units would have

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1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.33; Also see more detailed discussions in Chapter 1, Sections III (a), (b) and (c).
 2. See more detailed discussions in Chapter 1 III and also A.H.M. Kirk Greene, C.G. Ames Gazetteers of the Plateau Province (Nigeria) 1937, London 1972 passing
 3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers: 1937,1972 passing

precluded the possibility of organizing a self-contained central Government in each, while differences in language, origin and customs rendered amalgamations under head chiefs or even under Federal Council impracticable."¹

Among other British military experiences of the Plateau groups and societies Ames suggests that "numerous punitive expeditions" were made against the Montols in July 1899, June 1901, September 1902, June 1904, August 1905 and February 1909 with "severe measures taken against them by government" before they were quiescent.² In August 1916 however the Montol revolted against the government of British administration in The North and showed this by executing 60 persons associated with the social and political intrusion of British influences into their society in the town of Lalui.³ This was about 0.4% of the whole Montol population. The victims of the Montol revolt included F.E. Maltby, the Assistant District Officer of Shendam Division, Rapman, the 'Long Kemai' and his two brothers and also 56 other persons who were associated with and accompanied the British DO and the British appointed chief of the Montol.⁴ Ames suggests that the reaction to this "bloodbath" by the government of British administration in The North was that: "... a punitive patrol severely punished the Montols, the ringleader being eventually arrested and hanged. The Tal section of Montol (who) were chiefly responsible for the outbreak ... were expelled from their land, the majority being

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1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.46; Also see more detailed discussions in Chapter 1 Section I (b).
 2. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.194
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid

exiled in Ankwe territory .. on the Jos-Ibi road".¹ It was not until after 1920 that the Montols acknowledged the political authority and control of their society by the government of British administration in The North.²

In the specific context of the military experiences of other M-Belt groups and societies upon impact with British influences, the Montols might be described as "the Tiv of the Plateau" for their protracted resistance which earned them administrative characterization as "uncivilized adversaries", "lawless", "treacherous", "intractable people", unresponsive to anything except severe chastisement.³ Furthermore the Plateau groups and societies stood out differently from the majority of the M-Belt groups and societies on two other critical social and economic factors developed from impact with British influences. Firstly there was a massive and sudden increase of a non-indigenous population from the Islamic society in The North as well as from other parts of Nigeria and 'British West Africa' who were encouraged to migrate to earn wages in the new economic activities developed by the government of British administration and the Tin and Colombite Mines on the Plateau in the period between 1900 and 1950. This created social and economic pressures on their land and society.

The population increases on the Plateau were unlike the population increases by a 'colonizing population' from the Islamic society in The North characteristic of places like Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers* 1937,1972 p.194
 2. *Ibid*
 3. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers* 1937,1972 passims; Dorward 1972 p.2

before impact with British influences in 1900. After 1900, while groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria were familiar with "strangers" and "outsiders" intruding into their social and political systems, and while the Benue groups and societies experienced 'stranger intrusion' on a gradual scale, the Plateau groups and societies became faced by a sudden and massively huge number of 'stranger populations' which increased rapidly over the years into the 1950s. This explains why social and political tensions developed against other southern Nigerian groups which subsequently compounded the problems of peaceful relationships between Islamic groups of The North on the Plateau with the indigenous groups and societies in that period.

In the instance of the Plateau, the Birom and other groups and societies indigenous to Pankshin and Jos Divisions became the most affected; for example as early as 1903 Colonel Laws introduced 625 "strangers" to some of the Plateau groups and societies who were concentrated in Jos Division.¹ These initial 'strangers' came from distant places. The majority were from the southern provinces of Nigeria and were employed as carriers of mining equipment, tin diggers as well as 25 soldiers from the 2nd Battalion of the WAFF Regiment stationed in Lokoja as protectors against "the Natives" on the Plateau.²

Subsequently, with soldiers as their guards, Colonel Laws and his men used large steam shovels, bucket dredges and very huge hydraulic monitors and dug up Buji, Anaguta, Jarawa and Birom lands in search of tin cassiterites. Colonel Laws and his men did not have

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1. J.G. Davies. The Birom, Type Manuscript, Jos Museum Library, 1947 p.50, cited in Logams 1975 p.61.
 2. Davies 1947, p.50, cited in Logams 1975 p.61

permission from local chiefs in the area, in the form of treaties; they were simply fulfilling an assigned economic and military task by the government of British administration in The North in the service of the interests of the RNC.¹ There was never an earlier economic intrusion of British interest which became complimented by military force anywhere else in the M-Belt areas albeit in other parts of The North such as the Plateau experience. This was before the Plateau groups and societies became conquered by British arms which opened up trade and peaceful social relations which became established by the government of British administration in The North.

Although the accounts by Ames admit that social and economic reaction of "the Natives" in that instance and over the subsequent tin mining activities clashed, European and African because farms and crops were destroyed in the process he contradicts himself when he further suggests that: ".. In the early days of mining there were no clashes between natives and miners and (only) one European miner was killed as the result of one such conflict".² According to Ames, rather that the clashes were explained by Europeans digging up land for tin and therefore destroying farm land and in certain instances crops, they "... were not clashes of *native interests and mining interests* but were caused by the *resentment of one race at the intrusion of another race* and would have occurred whether these early pioneers had been miners, (BBC) Cameramen (or) of filming companies, tourists or anything else. Since the time when European intrusion became an

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1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 passims.
 2. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.306

accepted fact, conflicts between mining and native interests have been remarkably few and relations between the pagan inhabitants and the companies are entirely amicable".¹

'Resentment of one race at the intrusion of another race' does not explain the political and military ruthlessness of Colonel Laws in 1903 and thereafter. For example Colonel Laws captured many chiefs from groups and societies such as the Buji, Jarawa and Birom who refused to surrender their land for mining purposes. In an encounter with a Birom chief at Ngel, for example, Colonel Laws suggests this pattern of resistance and control when he wrote: ". . . I captured an old chap well inside the cactus and after the fighting was over, took him to Naraguta (the base camp) .. not knowing what on earth to do with the truculent old devil, a problem he solved for me and himself by dying during the night. As far as I could see he had done nothing but eat gravel sand".² This suggests that some chiefs who were captured by Colonel Laws preferred to commit suicide by eating gravel sand rather than surrender their lands for tin mining activities.³

In the 1940s, one of the political grievances which resulted into indigenous political organizations among the Birom was the issue centred on farmlands destroyed by the mining activities of the tin companies, their lack of adequate compensation and land reclamation and the total laxity of the governments to enforce land reclamation programmes where tin mining activities had been completed on previously

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972* p.306; emphases are mine
 2. Colonel Laws, cited in Norman Perchonock, "Jos and Its Hinterland" A paper delivered at an Historical Seminar in Jos, April 1974 p.3 in *Logams 1975* p.55.

arable land. For example, in 1944, when there was the Gyel Farm survey, 10.3% of the original arable land was already destroyed through the operations of the mining companies, 2.2% was taken over for occupation by the miners, 86% was under mining leases of some sort or other, though not all necessarily taken up and 4% was settled and farmed by strangers employed in the tin mines.¹ The land situation on Jos Division became compounded by the fact that the best tin bearing areas were also the most fertile farm lands.²

Although there was initial resistance to mining activities on the Plateau by indigenous groups and societies to the area, military force became used which eventually overthrew the resistance and drove off the indigenous population from initial participation in the tin mining industry.³ In the period between 1909 and 1912 however it was anticipated by the government of British administration in The North that with the enforced introduction of direct taxation by cash payments the indigenous population of the Plateau were obliged to work as permanent employees of the tin mining companies. For example one tin company spokesman, J. Astley Cooper: "... spoke almost lustfully in 1912 of the 200,000 'native Pagans' of the Bauchi Plateau as the complete solution of the labour question".⁴ Birom however resisted and preferred to earn tax money by selling foodstuffs and firewood to the labour force on the tin mining camps rather than from selling their labour on the minesfields.⁵

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1. J. Davies, Gyel Farm Survey, 1944, p.196-212, cited in Dudley 1968 p.112 n.77
 2. Dudley 1968 p.112
 3. Interview discussions with Birom tin miners in 1974, cited in Logams 1975
 4. J. Astley Cooper, Mining World, 1 February 1913, cited in Freund 1981 p.55
 5. Freund 1981 p.55

The concomitant consequences of a situation like that was that a migrant labour force became encouraged and the process increased the concentration of a non-indigenous population on the Plateau. In the period between 1903 and 1930 and right through to 1945, labour force on the tin mines came from the Islamic centres of Sokoto, Katsina, Kano, Zaria, Bauchi and Borno.¹

Table 3.20 suggests increases in the concentration of the migrant labour force for the tin mines on the Plateau for some years in the period between 1903 and 1930. This suggests that although there were substantial increases in the labour force on the Plateau after 1903, in the period between 1926 and 1930 however, when there was the pre-second-world-war "Tin-Boom", there were over 30,000 people employed on the tin mines on the Plateau, the highest numbers being reached in 1928 with 363 Europeans and 40,000 Africans.²

The majority of the labour force which developed on the tin mines on the Plateau was from freed slaves from the Islamic society in The North. The institution of slavery itself in The North became smashed following political measures that were taken by the government of British administration based on the slavery Proclamation Act of 1900.³ In that instance all children born after 1 April 1901 were declared free and the legal status of 'the slave' was abolished.⁴ Perham suggests that upon impact with British influences many slaves achieved freedom although: "... as an immediate measure it was neither possible, nor desirable (for slaves to be completely freed)

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1. This is explicit in the Map in Freund 1981 p.83
 2. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers* 1937,1972 p.303.
 3. Perham 1962 p.50.
 4. Ibid

Table 3.20 Increases in the Labour Force on the Plateau Tin Mines in some years in the period between 1903 and 1930.

Years	Labour Force on the Tin Mines	% Total Labour Force* ¹⁴
1903	625	0.6
1912	12,000	11.5
1917	22,000	21.0
1926	30,000	28.7
1928	40,000	38.2
Totals	104,625	100%

Source: Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, p.301-306

*¹⁴See comment at the end of Chapter 3.

as the bottom would have completely dropped out of society and the country would have been flooded with masterless and homeless people. Slave raiding, the curse of the country disappeared with the advance of our power. Slave trading was prohibited as soon as the northern Emirates with their large markets, were brought under control ... the slaves were (however) given "a permissive freedom" the initiative lying with the slave and not with the Law".¹ In the period before 1910, Colonel Laws in his initial operations at Tilden Fulani, near Naraguta, secured labour by hiring slaves from local masters who subsequently used their wages to pay for their manumission.² In the same period however most of the labour for the tin mines also came from great distances. In 1906 for example, Colonel Laws brought up labour from Lokoja which included Yorubas, Hausas and Nupes who subsequently became trained in "pick and shovel work".³ After 1910 however, the bulk of the labour on the Plateau tin mines came from the Islamic society in The North: mainly Hausa from Kano, Zaria, Bauchi and subsequently Kanuri from Borno.⁴ The majority of this labour force consisted of slaves and fugitives escaping from justice or both.⁵ In 1917 for example slaves belonging to Shuwa Arabs in Borno left their masters in search of new opportunities in parts of the M-Belt areas. In the instance: "... when the slaves go, they go

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1. Perham, 1962 p.50; for more detailed examples and discussions see also M.G. Smith, "Slavery and Emancipation in Two Societies", *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. 10 1954 p.239-289; Michael Mason, "Population Density and 'Slave Raiding' - The case of The M-Belt of Nigeria", *Journal of African History*, Vol. 10 No.4 1969 p.551-564.
 2. Laws, cited in Bill Freund, Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines, Longman Ltd. Ibadan 1981 p.47.
 3. Freund, 1981 p.50
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid

they go right away; formerly they took to highway robbery, but now they go to big towns - become woodcutters or casual labourers or go in for trade. *Many have gone to the Tin Mines*, and there are villages of runaway Shuwa in the Pagan Division of Marghi".¹

In the period before 1900 most slaves were captured from among the M-Belt groups and societies and taken to the Islamic society in centres of trade and politics like Sokoto, Kano, Zaria, Bauchi and Borno.² This piece of evidence suggests that it was the bulk of M-Belt labour which became used to extract the mineral wealth of some of the M-Belt groups and societies. Most of the labour force for tin mining activities became concentrated among the Birom, Ganawuri, Anaguta, Jerawa and Jarawa in Jos Division and also among the Sura in Mongu as well as the Challa in Bokkos and Gama Ropp in Pankshin Division, where the bulk of the tin mining activities on the Plateau were centred.³

Plateau also was unique because it was initially an economically exploited territory, one of the first, among other M-Belt groups and societies albeit other parts of The North, as a direct consequence of tin mining activities developed from 1903. This is suggested by the figures in Table . . . of the amount of tin tonnage extracted from the land and the value in British currency in the period between 1903 and 1930. The bulk of this extraction in tin tonnage and financial

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1. NAK: SNP 15, 215/1917, cited in Freund 1981 p.52; emphases are mine and as in Freund.
 2. See more detailed discussions of this point in Chapter 1; also in Smith 1954 p.239-289 and Mason 1969 p.551-564. It is however significant to note that of the slaves who left Borno as suggested in the 1917 report, some settled in Marghi, probably recollecting the society to which they belonged.
 3. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers* 1937,1972 p.347-348

Table 3.2) Tin Mining Activities on the Plateau in the Period between 1903 and 1930

Year	Tin Tonnage	% Tonnage	Tin Value *15 in British £	% Value
1903	59	0.06	-	-
1910	774	0.7	-	-
1911	1,809	1.7	294,481	1.7
1912	2,000	1.9	325,573	1.9
1913	4,000	3.7	651,147	3.8
1914	6,000	5.6	976,720	5.7
1916	8,000	7.5	1,022,975	6.0
1917-1922	7,000	6.5	895,103	5.2
1923-1924	8,937	8.3	1,626,700	9.5
1925	over 10,000	9.3	1,626,700	9.5
1926	over 10,000	9.3	3,180,000	18.5
1927	11,509	10.7	2,365,324	13.8
1928	over 10,000	9.3	1,000,000	5.8
1929	15,129	14.1	2,000,000	11.6
1930	11,902	11.1	1,206,816	7.0
Total	107,119	100%	17,171,539	100%

Source: Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.301-306

*15see comment at the end of Chapter 3.

profits went away as profits to British Companies based in the Metropolitan country rather than reinvested for social and economic transformations on the territories of the Plateau groups and societies.

A total of about 107,119 tons of tin cassiterites were extracted from the Plateau with a value worth of about £17,117,539 in the first 30 years of impact with British influences.^{*16} Furthermore European salaries in the early days of tin mining activities ran into several hundreds of pounds per annum, roughly about fifty times the wage earnings of a Nigerian labourer and those Europeans who settled on the Plateau lived well from the profits made on the minefields.¹ This was so because Europeans with the tin mining companies: "... expected a high standard of amenities to compensate them for living in Nigeria".²

This was the premise from which Plateau, and in particular Jos Division became a developed area with modern European amenities relative to other areas of the M-Belt groups and societies rather than by the direct benefits from the governments of British administration and the subsequent government of the NPC in The North. The highly critical factor however was that the indigenous population on the Plateau, and in particular the groups and societies in Jos Division did not benefit from the development of European modern infrastructural amenities concentrated on the Plateau, rather, it was the monopoly of European tin mining company camps and the non-indigenous African population centred in urban centres like Bukuru, Jos, Rayfield, Barkin Ladi, Kurra Falls, Bisichi, and Forum among others.³

1. Freund 1981 p.52

2. Ibid

3. These "cells of European modern infrastructural development" on the Plateau are examined in more detail as social and political issues in Section IV and VI of this Chapter as well as in Chapters 4 and 5 where the politics of the M-Belt groups and societies are examined.

*16 See comment at the end of Chapter 3.

In the 1950s for example, the Birom population in the developing metropolitan township of Jos was about 1-2% of the total town population.¹ The economic consequences of tin mining activities on the Plateau were that many of the groups and societies concentrated in Jos and Pankshin Divisions like the Birom, Challa, Sura and Ganawuri continued to exist in poverty in the midst of socio-economic and welfare transformations taking place on their land. This was the premise from which in the 1950s and 1960s Sharwood Smith observed and suggested for example that the Birom: "... spent and still do, their lives in unimaginable squalor, in tumble-down villages, hedged with cacti ... and within sight and sound of these villages, large motor cars journey to and fro between the mining camps ... and the well painted, electrically lit bungalows of the tin mines managers and their European staff contrasted sharply with Birom settlements and style of life."²

Between 1926 and 1927 about 32.2% of a total tin value of £17,171,539 and its profits were extracted from the Plateau. This was in a period before the majority of the Plateau groups and societies became conquered and before the establishment of political control with peaceful social relationships by the government of British administration in The North.³

It is rather curious that the initial political reaction in the 1940s by the groups and societies on the Plateau was not directed against the European tin miners and the government of British administration in The North, but rather it became lashed out on the migrant labour force

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1. Perchonock 1974 p.10
 2. Sharwood-Smith 1969 p.138
 3. A stable political administration became established over all of the Plateau groups and societies only after 1934 - Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.46-48

on the Jos Plateau, a reaction that was mainly spearheaded by the Birom. Three explanatory reasons suggest themselves. The military experiences of the Plateau groups and societies when they were conquered for the British to establish political control and their lands taken away from their control: in the 1930s and 1940s the Plateau groups and societies focussed their attention on British development of political institutions of chieftaincies which diverted attention from economic issues. The politically conscious European educated therefore focussed on political issues rather than on economic issues. Economic issues therefore became taken out of the political, while infact they were complimenting and reinforcing each other in the particular case of politics and society on the Plateau in that period. In other words the Plateau groups and societies were falsely conscious of their own circumstances of existence as they related to other Nigerian groups on their territories and as the total situation related to the pillage of their land by European tin mining companies who had the military and political support of the government of British administration in The North.¹

The value of tin and tin tonnage for the years between 1903 and 1930 is as generally provided in Ames Gazetteers for the Plateau. However, when tin values for certain years were not provided in the Gazetteers, estimates were made of the tin tonnage values from those of a previous year on the value of tin per ton. This was particularly

1. This is examined in more detail in Sections IV and VI of this Chapter and also in Chapters 4 and 5

so for the years between 1912 and 1914, between 1917 and 1922 and for the 1928 year as suggested by the figures in Table 3.21. Otherwise, the figures in Table 3.21 were computed from the secondary evidence as produced in the Ames Gazetteers of 1937. The price of tin reached an overall pre-second world war peak of £318 per ton in 1926.¹ This explains the high value of tin for that year as suggested by the figures in Table 3.20 even when the same amount of tin tonnage was produced in 1925 and 1928. A high grade-concentrate of tin oxides have an assay value of at least 70% metallic tin.² However, in the period between 1930 and January 1931 the average tin profits per ton dropped from £30 in 1930 to £1 in 1931.³

The period between 1926 and 1930 was the "boom" period for the tin mining industry on the Plateau. In that period it brought to the Plateau many "strangers and outsiders" mainly Hausas from the Islamic society in The North as labour force on the minefields as well as people from other parts of Nigeria and West Africa as traders and commercial agents to European companies. With its already disparate ethnic groups and societies and the added heterogeneity

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1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p.303
 2. Ibid p.302
 3. Ibid p.303; the tin mining industry on the Plateau, particularly in Jos Division in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s as it affected the political developments and the political grievances to condition the growth and development of political organizations in the M-Belt Movement is examined in Section VI of this Chapter and subsequently in Chapter 4 where the politics of the M-Belt groups and societies is discussed.

from the migrant population, Plateau and Jos Division became unique in The North and Nigeria, with its developing socio-political and economic problems being the microcosm of those in the developing Nigerian political state in the period after 1940. The "Tin Boom" period also resulted into intensive and extensive mining activities which destroyed farmland without adequate compensation while it took away huge financial profits to England rather than reinvest on the Plateau for socio-economic transformations of society.¹

However in the period between 1945 and 1960, The North became conceived of as developing largely on the financial revenues derived from the tin companies which partly went into the Treasury of the government.² This was so because the tin mines were a major source of revenue to both the governments of British administration in The North and the subsequent government of the NPC as well as to the Federal Government. This was the premise from which the Plateau groups and societies, particularly those in Jos Division became unique among the other M-Belt groups and societies because the nature of their socio-economic problems which became fed into the M-Belt struggle, were centred on the tin mining industry.³

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1. The political and social grievances raised by intensive and extensive mining activities which became compounded by inadequate compensation to farmers on the Plateau and in particular those in Jos Division is examined in Section VI of this Chapter and also in Chapter 4
 2. Freund 1981 p.58
 3. This will become more apparent in our analysis of the socio-economic and political problems which produced local political organizations that became the focus of the M-Belt Movement in Sections IV of this Chapter as well as in Chapters 4 and 5

(d) Southern Bauchi

Table 3.18 suggests that there were about 30 different non-Islamic groups and societies indigenous to S. Bauchi. This however was 10.0% of the different ethnic groups and societies found among the territorial areas of the M-Belt in The North.

Although this suggests that there were numerous different groups and societies in S. Bauchi their numerical sizes, like some of the groups and societies in Adamawa, Plateau and S. Zaria, were quite small. For example, the most politically significant group and society in S. Bauchi were the Jarawa with a total population size of 17,007 people in 1952, which is 0.4% of the total population of the M-Belt groups and societies. Other non-Islamic groups and societies were about 245,082 people, which is about 6.3% of the total population of all the other M-Belt groups and societies. In terms of the population sizes of the groups and societies in S. Bauchi when the whole political concept of the M-Belt is accounted for, S. Bauchi with a 6.7% share, was the least populous of the M-Belt territories in The North when comparisons are made with Adamawa, Benue, Plateau and S. Zaria.

The majority of the non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Bauchi were centred around the Tangale Waja, the Longuda villages on the territorial edges of Numan, Biliri, Dunguri in Kanam District which included numerous Angas, Jarawa and Pyem Districts, numerous other groups found between the towns of Bauchi, Toro and Tilde Fulani as well as the Lere Districts and Dass.^{1*18}

1. Northern Region of Nigeria: Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna 1953 p.7-12; Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 passims.

*18 see comment at the end of Chapter 3.

In the period between 1804 and 1900, the majority of these different groups and societies concentrated within the territorial political concept of the M-Belt in S. Bauchi, there was direct impact with the expanding Islamic society centred in Bauchi town. While some of these groups and societies were over-run by Fulani armies in the battles for conquest, and subsequently came under direct Fulani and Islamic political rulership others like those found around the Dass Districts militarily resisted Fulani conquest although political tribute was paid in acknowledgement of the conqueror. This was so in the instance of the majority of the Jarawa who were concentrated in S. Bauchi, the Lere and Dass Districts and the Angas in the Kanam District of Duguri.¹

In the instance of those groups and societies who paid political tribute to Bauchi, they were allowed to maintain their political independence through a brand of 'Indirect Rule system' uniquely practised in the exercise of political authority by the Emirs of Bauchi.² After 1900 when there was impact with British influences, groups and societies who paid political tributes developed from the practice of 'Indirect rule' by the Emirs of Bauchi, while they maintained their political independence, were the first to agitate for political separation from Fulani and Islamic leadership. For example, this was so, for the Dass, who were the epitome of political resistance to Fulani and Islamic rulership in S. Bauchi as early as the 1920s and 1930s.³

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972* p.169-176; also see Chapter 1 Section III.
 2. For more detailed discussions and examples see discussions in Chapter 1 Section III; also Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972* passim on 'Pankshin Division'.
 3. For examples of these instances of appeals to British officials see more detailed discussions in Chapter 1 Section III, Chapter 2 Section IV.

Military resistance by the non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Bauchi to British conquest was not on the same scale to that on the Plateau, Adamawa, S. Zaria and Benue. In fact it was almost non-existent except for sporadic instances like those in the Lere Districts. This was so because the British did not expect any either, except, according to Temple for the Jarawa people around the Highest Mountain Ranges in Nigeria at the Shere Hills: "... who fought and defeated an army sent from Bauchi to conquer some two years ago, may choose to fight, but I hope to talk them into a reasonable frame of mind."¹ Furthermore, anticipated military welcome from the groups and societies in S. Bauchi, was so because British conquest of Bauchi was seen to be liberation of the non-Islamic groups from Bauchi. This political perception was from both the British and the S. Bauchi groups and societies. For example, in the instance of the Jarawa experience, which was unique from other political and military experiences of the M-Belt groups and societies, their chiefs from Fobor went to the British and surrendered political authority, expressing willingness to cooperate with the new conquerors without doing battle. As early as 1902, Temple suggests that in his path to conquer the M-Belt groups and societies: "... the chief of Fobor met me on the road to Tilde and expressed his willingness to serve the whiteman .. I do not expect to have any trouble with the Jarawa tribes after this".² This instant need to cooperate with the British is explained by the military and political experiences of the Jarawa from Fulani armies in the period between 1804 and 1900 which caused their migration to different parts of the Plateau, splitting the 'tribe' with the majority remaining under the political control of the Emirs in Bauchi.³

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1. C.L. Temple, Letter Reports From Gosting and Fobor: Bauchi Reports, April-June 1902, SNP 15, ACC. 40 para.17
 2. Temple 1902 para.17
 3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.27

However when British conquest was accomplished and an administration became consolidated through the practice of British indirect rule policy, the non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Bauchi became placed under the Emir and in some instances under Fulani District Heads appointed from Bauchi. This was so for the Lere Districts and around Dass. Although there was strong resistance to Fulani political rulership in S. Bauchi, particularly by the Lere and the Longuda, the Jarawa in S. Bauchi and in parts of Plateau, ^{part of the Jarawa tribe} centred on their chief in Fobur became the politically prominent group and society who gave support in the 1950s and 1960s to the political ideas of the M-Belt Movement and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. S. Bauchi, like S. Zaria has been unfortunate in the political rearrangements of the Nigerian Federation into more political units. This is so because the groups and societies in those areas have never had their traditional patterns of power relationships with the Emirs in Bauchi politically altered except for the Jarawa who became removed from Bauchi and put into Plateau State in 1976 by General Murtala Mohammed.¹ The very nature of the political problems which caused a M-Belt Movement have persisted among the groups and societies centred around the Lere and the Districts of Dass. Their political struggle has remained as vigorous as it was in the period between 1940 and 1960 right through into the 1970s. For example the recurrent theme in the political agitation that has been well articulated by their spokesman, S.T. Bitkon, since 1967 has been

1. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5

for political separation from the Bauchi NA and for the merging of "Lere (Tafawa Balewa) Districts with the Plateau" State.¹

However, the Jarawa whose history and tradition of origins are rooted with the majority of the 'tribe' in the territories of S. Bauchi,² were a widely dispersed linguistic group and society, although they are numerically small.³ It was in the period between 1925 and 1927 that the Jarawa became identified as a distinct group and society by the anthropologist, Thomas, who expounded "their very great linguistic uniformity despite their scattered location".⁴ Ames suggests that the "migrant section" of the Jarawa "tribe" on to the Plateau proved themselves to be: "... such born explorers and pioneers that they are now to be found in places as widely separated as the Kanam District of Pankshin Division, Inshar of Shendam Division, Jos, part of Forum, Gnar and Kwakwi of Jos Division. They also provide a portion of the fusion which became the Irigwe Tribe and account for much of the formation of the Anaguta Tribe... classes as Bantu and distinguished from others ... who are semi-Bantu".⁵ There also existed isolated Jarawa groups among the Mbula, Bare and Bille, in S. Bauchi.⁶ This

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1. Submission of Lere Students Association to the Irikefe Commission on the Creation of More States in Nigeria, 3rd April 1975, 29th September 1975; This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5
 2. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.27
 3. Ballard 1979 p.6
 4. Ibid
 5. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.27
 6. Ballard 1979 p.6

wide "dispersion of the tribe" was caused by their migration to "avoid conquest of the Emirs of Bauchi".¹

According to Ballard however the inference in migration patterns in the origins of the Jarawa, that might be derived from this is that their western branch in S. Bauchi have migrated to the north-west from the Wurkum hills on the Benue river.² This according to Ballard explains their location over a very wide swath from the Wurkum Hills to Dass Hills, south of Bauchi and up to the base of the Plateau escarpment north of Pankshin.³ It has been suggested that the 'Jarawan Kogi' in Bauchi belonged to an "original stock" of the Ankwe and therefore that their origins are tied up to the Jukun.⁴ This was particularly so for the Jarawa who were concentrated around the town of Yelwa and whose first chief was appointed from Shenadam by the 14th 'Long Kemai' of the Ankwe.⁵

Although there has been little historical and anthropological studies of the Jarawa that are conclusive about their traditions of origins and migration patterns to the present territorial location of the majority of the group and society there is "one morsel of oral tradition", which suggests that they came from a place called Kantana.⁶

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1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers, 1937,1972 p.57
 2. Ballard 1979 p.6
 3. Ibid
 4. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.179
 5. Ibid
 6. Ibid

This town however is the name of a clan village located in Kanam District, east of the Plateau and it has been suggested that this was the main starting point from which the main western branch of the Jarawa journeyed along the base of southern escarpment of the Plateau to the present territorial location of the Mama group and society.¹

In the period between 1900 and 1950 the non-Islamic groups and societies in southern Bauchi were under the political authority of the Emirs of Bauchi and controlled by the administrative apparatus of the NA in Bauchi Division. It remained so for the Dass, Tangale Waja, the Longuda and for the Jarawa until 1976 when the latter group and society became part of Plateau State.

Unlike other non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas of S. Zaria and Adamawa where similar political circumstances developed from Fulani conquest and political control before 1900, the S. Bauchi groups and societies never attained the political status of a self-governing federation of different ethnic groups devoid of political control by Emirs and Fulani District Heads. For example, while the Dass and Jarawa remained under Bauchi Division, other non-Islamic groups and societies in Bauchi Province, were under the political control of Emirs centred in the NA Divisions of Gombe, Katagum, Jamaare and Misau. This was so for groups and societies centred on Tangale Waja, Biliri and the Longuda.

1. Ballard 1979 p.7

The political arrangements in Bauchi produced demands for separation from Islamic rulership in two different directions. The Dass and Jarawa for example initially sought the creation of a separate Division to constitute all the non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Bauchi. This has been the persistent political demand even when the Dass chieftaincy was Islamic. When this was not forthcoming they demanded political separation and a merging with Plateau Province. In the instance of the Longuda, the Tangale Waja and the Districts centred around Biliri, there was persistent political demands "to secede and join their fellow tribesmen over the border".¹

Although the non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Bauchi made these political demands before 1930, it was not until in the 1940s that there were attempts to reorganise them into units that might be politically autonomous in local affairs even when they remained under the authority of the Emir of Bauchi.² In that instance the majority of the non-Islamic groups and societies became organized into "a multiplicity of small village units without traditional sanctions".³ These however were not Divisions, rather they were political units of traditional authority in the non-Islamic areas within the NA Divisions of Bauchi Province. It was however the small non-Islamic Kingdom of Dass which remained politically autonomous of Bauchi but its ruling classes became Moslems in the 1950s.

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1. H.C. Gill, Resident Bauchi Province 1951, Northern Region of Nigeria: Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna 1953 p.8
 2. Ballard 1972 p.12
 3. Ibid

Although there was desire by the government of British administration in The North to merge the non-Islamic groups and societies with others outside the territorial context of S. Bauchi in Bauchi Province, the political process was inhibited by scepticisms on whether "Federation NAs" with non-Islamic and non-centralized political authority were functional. This was the premise from which as late as 1951 when there was increased Longuda and Tangale Waja demands "to secede" from Bauchi Province, H.C. Gill suggested that: "... the question has been deferred until the new Longuda Native authority in Numan Division proved itself".¹

In the instance of S. Bauchi therefore there was no political focus on a particular group and society to develop a 'paramount chief' for non-Islamic groups and societies in the same political sense as there was for the chiefs of the Bachama, the Longuda in the Numan Federation and the chief of the Kagoro in S. Zaria or the singularly prominent chiefs of the Birom, Angas and Ankwe on the Plateau or the Tor Tiv and the Ochi Idoma in Benue Province.

In the instance of S. Bauchi, chieftaincy political institutions were developed from Fulani and Islamic personnel ruling over the non-Islamic groups and societies largely from the appointments by the Emirs of Bauchi. There were eleven chieftaincy institutions in Bauchi Province, with the Emir of Bauchi as the tradition of political legitimacy rooted in the history of the expansion of the Islamic society by military conquest. Of the eleven chiefs in Bauchi Province only two were non-Islamic and subsequently became Moslems in the 1950s. These were the chiefs of Dass, Mallam Maleka and the chief of Tangale Waja, Mallam Iliyasu who were both members of the NHC in the 1950s with the political status of third class chiefs.²

1. Gill Annual Reports 1951, 1953, p.8
 2. Local Government Year Book 1963 p.91

Table 3.19 suggests that before 1950 it was the chief of Dass who was the only non-Islamic chief acknowledged by the Government of British administration in The North. After 1950 however two other chiefs became appointed from among the non-Islamic groups and societies. These were the chief for the Tangale Waja and the other for groups and societies in West Tangale Waja in Gombe Division.¹ The incumbent of the Dass chieftaincy in 1963 was appointed as early as 1928.²

The only chieftaincy institution that was directly created by the British with no roots in traditional legitimacy, to rule over non-Islamic groups and societies was a Moslem as the chief of Biliri,³ an appointment that went through as late as 1951 even when it was vigorously opposed by Christian converts in the area. This was at a time when Christian Missionary activities had created new consciousness about politics and society among the non-Islamic groups and societies in some parts of S. Bauchi. Socio-political and economic consciousness about European modernizing patterns among the groups and societies in S. Bauchi was largely a function of Christian Missionary activities. These were concentrated among the Tangale Waja, Lere Districts in Fobor and also among the groups and societies around Biliri.

Although the influences of Christianity compounded the historic problems of political opposition to Islamic rule from the Emirs and Fulani District Heads in Bauchi, Islamic and Christian communities

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1. Local Government Year Book 1963 p.91
 2. Ibid
 3. Gill, Annual Reports 1951, 1953 p.8

in places like the Lere Districts and Dass existed without local political tensions upon the advent of electoral politics in 1951. In that instance for example, although there were only two Christians as 'the chief representatives' of the non-Islamic groups and societies of the area, within the 'District Council' one became elected into the 'Provincial Electoral College' despite an Islamic majority.¹

Generally in S. Bauchi however as was the similar circumstances of the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, Plateau, and S. Zaria, British created chieftaincy institutions did not produce ethnic identities in the same political sense that the development of chieftaincies produced Tiv and Idoma 'nationalism', which subsequently became fed into the M-Belt Movement. In the instance of S. Bauchi, non-Islamic groups and societies who came under the influence of Christianity saw themselves more as Christians rather than as ethnic categories. It was this Christian social and political identity which caused their support for the ideas and political demands of the M-Belt Movement in the 1950s and 1960s, rather than specific political institutions developed for each of their groups and societies by the government of British administration in The North.

(e) Southern Zaria

Table 3.18 suggests that there were about 35 different groups and societies which were indigenous to the territories of S. Zaria. This is about 11.7% of the total different non-Islamic groups and societies concentrated within the territorial political concept of the

1. Gill, Annual Reports 1951,1953 p.8

M-Belt areas in The North. Although this suggests that there were numerous different groups and societies in S. Zaria their population sizes, like those of groups on the P1 , S. Bauchi and Adamawa, were numerically small.

The Jeba were about the numerically dominant group and society in S. Zaria with about 41,082 people. This population size was about 1.1% of the total of all the M-Belt groups and societies. The other substantially populous group and society in S. Zaria after the Jeba were the Kaje with about 35,782 people which is about 0.9% of the total population of the M-Belt groups and societies. Other non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Zaria constituted about 224,882 people, which is 5.8% of the total population found among the M-Belt groups and societies. In terms of the population concentration of the non-Islamic groups and societies indigenous to S. Zaria, they only shared about 7.8% of the total population of the M-Belt groups and societies.

This means that besides being numerically small in population size, there was also great variation in the numbers of people constituting each group and society in S. Zaria. This however was not unique to S. Zaria because there were enormous variations in the population sizes of groups and societies in other areas of the M-Belt, albeit other parts of The North and Nigeria.

The majority of the S. Zaria groups and societies are centred around the railway town of Kafauchan, although as early as 1903 it developed as a Division from the subordinate Emir to Zaria based in Jemaa.¹ Jemaa was established and developed in the period between

1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.221-156

1810 and 1897 when there was expansion of the Islamic society through military conquest.¹

Although many of the groups and societies in S. Zaria were conquered and paid political tribute in acknowledgement of Fulani authority in Zaria and Jemaa, they remained non-Islamic. The Emir of Jemaa for example ruled many of the S. Zaria groups and societies through Fulani and local agents who were resident in Jemaa: ".. and only visited the tribes when tribute had to be collected".² After impact with British influences in 1900, this system of political control became used in the application of Indirect rule policy on the groups and societies in S. Zaria until about the 1940s. Jemaa however only maintained a weak form of political control on the majority of the groups and societies and subsequently reduced its relationship "to periodical expedition against them to collect slaves or other forms of tribute".³ Some of the groups and societies in the territories of S. Zaria who became placed from 1903 under the political control of the Emir in Jemaa included: the Ayu, Kagoma, Numana, Kaninkwom, Ninzam, Gwandara, Yeskwa, Birom, Kagoro, Attaka and also a few Mada and the Kajuru.⁴

Unlike many of the M-Belt groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau and Benue, the traditions of origins of the majority of the groups in S. Zaria is still obscure because there have been few anthropological studies into their histories. It has however been suggested that the 'Jeba-Kaje-Kagoma-Katab group of tribes' trace their migration, pre-Fulani conquest of 1804 to places as distant as Katsina, Kano and to Panda and Sanga in Southern Bauchi.⁵ There has however

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.225-226
 2. *Ibid* p.250
 3. *Ibid* p.222
 4. *Ibid*
 5. *Ibid* p.235

been intensive local migration, particularly in the period between 1804 and 1900 which were caused by Fulani wars, to the Plateau where it has been suggested that the Irigwe in Jos Division are an "off-shoot of the Kaje".¹ Furthermore, the Kagoro have a tradition of origin of having come down from the Plateau to occupy their present territorial location in S. Zaria.² In addition there is close linguistic affinity between many of the Plateau groups and those of S. Zaria. For example, this is so for the Rukuba in Jos Division and the Ninzam in S. Zaria.³ Similar to the M-Belt groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and Plateau, in the instance of S. Zaria local migration patterns resulted into enormous cultural fusion although many of the groups and societies were characterized by cultural similarities.⁴

Cultural similarities among the S. Zaria groups and societies became reinforced by the considerable inter-marriage that has taken place between the different groups, particularly among the "Katab-Kaje-Jabe-Kagoma group of tribes".⁵ Customs in the performance of the marriage act among the Kaje-Jaba and Katab for example were similar. Apart from similarities in social patterns of existence, the S. Zaria groups and societies were also characterized by the same patterns of

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1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.247
 2. Ballard 1979 p.8
 3. Ibid
 4. Tremearne 1912
 5. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.234

political organization. Except for the Ayu who had a tradition of a chieftaincy institution for the whole group but now virtually assimilated into other groups and societies,¹ the majority of the other groups and societies in S. Zaria had no centralized patterns of authority beyond the clan and village heads.² Each of their groups and societies were organized as "village confederacies" of the ethnic type with no chief having a commanding loyalty of the others.³

This makes the S. Zaria groups and societies similar in social and political organization to groups and societies in other parts of the M-Belt areas like Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau and Benue. Historically however, quite differently in the socio-economic and political experiences of the other M-Belt groups and societies, S. Zaria has had more persistent hostilities with the Islamic society centred on Zaria, well before the Fulani Islamic revolution of 1804. For example, the Kajuru, among others, were subject to the Hausa dynasty of Zaria in pre-Fulani days.⁴

Impact with British influences were begun in 1903 and focused on the conquest of the Emir of Jemaa who was assumed to be the politically dominant authority over the groups and societies in the territories of S. Zaria.⁵ In that instance although the Emir made a formal submission to WAFF forces in that year the conquest of the non-Islamic groups and societies of S. Zaria was as protracted and militarily thorough as was characteristic of the other M-Belt areas.⁶ As early as

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1. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers* 1937,1972 p.238
 2. *Ibid* p.228
 3. *Ibid*
 4. *Ibid* p.249
 5. *Ibid*
 6. For examples, see Tremearne 1912, examined and discussed in Chapter 2 Section I.

October 1904, a British administrative officer became stationed in Jemaa together with a detachment of WAFF troops.¹ Subsequently upon this political focus, S. Zaria developed until 1934 as a distinct Division within the territorial concept of Plateau Province, and was centred on the authority and the administrative set-up of the Emir of Jemaa. In that instance, the groups and societies in S. Zaria became politically organized for administrative purposes into four districts under Districts-Head-System who were all subordinated and responsible to the Emir in Jemaa.² The developing metropolitan centre of the railway junction at Kafanchan which was centrally located to the majority of the non-Islamic groups and societies and the town of Jemaa itself were under the direct political control of the Emir.³

Before 1926, the four organized administrative districts in S. Zaria containing disparate groups and societies were Kaje-Kagoma-Yeskwa, Ayu, Ninzam and Jemaa,⁴ which subsequently in the 1930s and 1940s became reorganized as the 'independent districts' of Kagoro, Zangon Katab, Jaba (including Moroa) and Birnun Gwari. Of these four District areas, the 'Kaje-Kagoma-Yeskwa' ^{experienced the influences} of a colonizing Islamic population outside Jemaa before impact with British influences in 1900.⁵ The 'Kaje-Kagoma-Yeskwa' District was ruled by a Fulani District Head

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1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.249
 2. Ibid p.250
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid p.251

who was one of the sons of the Emir of Jemaa.¹ In the instance of the Ayu and the Ninzam however there were indigenous traditional rulership by a chief who controlled their group.²

Although these chiefs were indigenous to their groups and societies, they were appointed by the Emir of Jemaa and owed political loyalty to him.³ In the instance of the Jemaa District, there was also a Fulani District Head who ruled over non-Islamic groups and societies like, the Kaninkwom, Ningwon and the Gwandara.⁴ Besides Fulani District Heads ruling over the majority of the non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Zaria, there were also 'Hardos' as Fulani chiefs who were responsible for the rulership of the 'nomadic cattle Fulani' in S. Zaria.⁵ The 'Hardos' were responsible to the District Heads. The Emir of Jemaa however filled both executive and judicial roles in the governance of all the groups and societies in S. Zaria.⁶

This was so because the 'Central Council' of the Division was dominated by Islamic personnel under his authority. For example in that instance, the Emir was the President of the Council with six other members who were the 'Liman' of Jemaa, the Confidential Envoy of the Emir and other four ward-heads of Jemaa town who were all Fulani and Moslems.⁷ In the instance of the administrative arrangements of

1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.251
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.253
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid p.250
7. Ibid p.255

S. Zaria before 1929 however, the District Heads spent most of their time in Jemaa town. This was particularly so for the son of the Emir who ruled as District Head over the 'Kaje-Kagoma-Yeskwa District' until forced in 1929 into permanent residence at Fadan Kagoro, the most central town of the District.¹ In 1933 however the headquarters of the Division were moved from Jemaa to Kafanchan.²

Further to the patterns of Islamic domination established in S. Zaria in the period of British application of the Indirect rule policy, in each of the four Districts where Fulani and indigenous appointees of the Emir ruled, there were 'Hausas as scribes' appointed from Keffi or Jemaa.³ According to Ames, this was so because of "the lack of any sufficiently educated people in the indigenous tribes".⁴ As late as 1930, Ames further suggests that the government elementary school opened that year in Jemaa-na-Sarari was the "only one in the Province (Plateau)".⁵ It was however, not until the 1940s when Christian Missionary influences gained grounds on the essentially non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Zaria that there were social and political tensions between Fulani Moslems and the non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Zaria which conditioned demands for political separation into an autonomous Division from the Emir of Zaria within Zaria Province. Subsequently after 1967 there was political demand

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1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.251
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid p.255
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid

from the S. Zaria groups and societies for merging with BP State and in 1976 with the present day Plateau State.¹ Christian Missionary activities in S. Zaria besides the CMS station on the outskirts of the Islamic town of Zaria itself, were concentrated among the Ninzam, Kagoro and the towns of Kwoi and Zonkwa. In that instance, the SUM, SIM, and RCM developed stations and expanded their work within the groups and societies in S. Zaria from Randa, Kwoi and Zonkwa respectively.²

In 1934 however the 'independent' Districts of Jemaa Division centred on Jaba, Kagoro, Kaje and Moroa became transferred from the political control of the Emir in Jemaa and placed in Zaria Division under the Emir of Zaria.³ Ames suggests that this was so because: "of the fact that a large number of their kindred tribes had been settled for generations on the Zaria side of the boundary".⁴

This suggests that unlike the political reorganization in the same period which took place in Numan, S. Bauchi and Plateau, in the instance of the groups and societies in S. Zaria became removed from the political authority of one subordinate Emir only to find themselves under a more dominant authority of the Emir of Zaria. In that instance, although there was already developed political consciousness, mainly from the activities of Christian Missionary institutions among the different groups and societies in S. Zaria, this consciousness became

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1. These are discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5
 2. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.255; C.V. Williams, *Resident Zaria Province 1951, Northern Region of Nigeria: Provincial Annual Report 1951, Kaduna 1953* p.74
 3. Kirk Greene, *Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972* p.256, p.345
 4. *Ibid* p.256

jointly and outwardly directed against Fulani and Islamic domination rather than inwardly toward the development of ethnic identities. Political hostilities toward Fulani rule in S. Zaria therefore became superimposed by consolidated conceptions of a Christian social and political identity among the S. Zaria groups and societies.

Individual ethnic political identities in S. Zaria became insignificant political resources because the groups and societies were numerically small. This was explicit in the development of non-Islamic chieftaincy institutions in S. Zaria which was a policy process delivered to meet direct British administrative expediencies rather than the demands of a particular group and society in S. Zaria to consolidate an ethnic political identity. Thus in 1934, although it was suggested that the S. Zaria Districts ought to be reorganized "on tribal lines" and their representative District Heads deal directly with the Emirs of Zaria, rather than through District Heads appointed by the Emirs, the proposals were rejected: ".. because the Residents were concerned to maintain the authority and the goodwill of the Emirs and there was no great willingness to upset stable arrangements in the cause of speculative benefits to pagans".¹ That there was no 'tribal' consciousness among the S. Zaria non-Islamic groups and societies, developed from the creation of administrative units in the village and district is explicit in the political regret of the Resident of Zaria in 1934 who suggests that: "... Had these Districts been arranged otherwise from the start 'tribal' consciousness and the tribal

1. Ballard 1972 p.11

machinery might have been preserved to an extent which would have made it possible to utilize them as an effective part of the administrative organization".¹

As late as 1951 for example, the Moroa District were so politically demoralized from the non-emphasis of any political institution centred on a particular group and society in the District that they were dismissed as "a backwater so placid that it may be said to stagnate".²

It was from political circumstances like these that there was developed non-Islamic chieftaincy institutions which focused on the more politically dominant groups and societies in S. Zaria like the Kagoro, Jaba, Moroa and Birnin Gwari. Although the Gwari were essentially non-Islamic before the 1950s, as early as 1945 a Moslem chief, Mallam Jibirilu as the chief of Birnin Gwari became appointed by the government of British administration in The North.³ Furthermore, although there were five chiefs ruling over the non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Zaria, besides the Emir of Zaria who was in an overall position of political authority, the Emir of Jemaa and the Chief of Birnim Gwari were Moslems.

In the period between 1935 and 1955 there was developed three non-Islamic chieftaincy institutions from among the essentially non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Zaria. These were the chiefs of Kagoro, Mallam Gwamna (1945), the chief of Jaba, Mallam Ishaya Andrew (1955) and the chief of Moroa, Mallam Kaza (1935) who from the 1940s became members of the NHC with third class political status, except for the chief of Kagoro who was second class in political status.⁴

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1. Ballard 1972 p.11
 2. C.V. Williams, Resident Zaria Province 1951, Northern Region of Nigeria: Provincial Annual Reports, 1951, Kaduna 1953 p.75
 3. Local Government Year Book, 1963 p.99
 4. Ibid

In the instance of the three non-Islamic chiefs who became prominent in S. Zaria, by the appointment of the government of British administration in The North, they were not only seen as non-Moslem chiefs but also became the focus of a Christian social and political identity which they also sought to represent.¹

Table 3.19 however suggests that although there was a decrease in the trends of the appointments of non-Islamic chiefs from 18.7% to 10.0% in the development of non-Islamic chiefs in S. Zaria there was increased political focus as a Christian representative on the Chief of Kagoro which became bolstered by the "special appointment" of Mallam Haruna Dauda Kwoi, the Headmaster of the SIM school in the 'Independent District' of Jaba in S. Zaria, as member of the NHC in 1951.²

In S. Zaria therefore, similar to the political circumstances of the groups and societies in S. Bauchi and many other parts of Adamawa and Plateau, patterns of economic and political dominance established in the period between 1804 and 1900 continued well into the 1950s and 1960s and remained unaltered in the 1970s. For example, in S. Zaria District council funds derived from the general community taxes became used for religious purposes of the ruling Islamic classes to build mosques in the midst of non-Islamic communities and a highly mobilized Christian community.³ Furthermore, when in 1951 politics became taken to the electorate, the four Provincial

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1. Interview discussions with Mallam Gwamna, January 1981
 2. Williams, Provincial Annual Reports, 1953 p.74
 3. Ibid

members of the NHA elected from Zaria Province were all Moslems.¹ In that instance, according to Williams: "... this result caused considerable disappointment among the predominantly non-Moslem population of Southern Zaria whose numbers though considerable were not sufficient to outvote the Moslem representatives of Northern Zaria".²

This was the premise from which in the instance of S. Zaria, political organizations became developed among the non-Islamic groups and societies based on Christian religious affiliations rather than on indigenous socio-cultural categories. Similar to the political and religious experiences of groups and societies found on the Plateau, Adamawa, and S. Bauchi, ethnic political identities were less consolidated by the political institutions created by the government of British administration in The North. Rather, they were a function of Christian Missionary religious institutions which developed conceptions of a Christian religious and political identity. Even when there was the development of an ethnic identity among the S. Zaria groups and societies in the 1940s and 1950s from Christian institutions, they were activated within an overall religious conception of "the children of Jesus".³

This conclusion suggests that unlike the Tiv, Jukun, Idoma and Igalla in Benue Province, the groups and societies on the Plateau, Adamawa, S. Zaria and S. Bauchi saw themselves more in Christian religious categories responding to the affairs of government, politics and society rather than the precepts of ethnic categories. This further suggests that political identification was more with the Christian Missionaries and the churches

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1. Williams, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, 1953 p.74
 2. Ibid
 3. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5

and less with the political institutions created by the government of British administration in The North. It was from this premise that in the period between 1950 and 1965 there were covert efforts to encourage Rwang Pam, the chief of Jos and Mallam Gwamna, the chief of Kagoro in S.Zaria politically to stand out as personalities and institutions representing Christians from both the Churches and Christian ^{Communities} and in very subtle ways by the government of British administration in The North. This was when the M-Belt movement began to grow and develop its demands for a M-Belt Region that might consist of the majority of non-Islamic groups and societies in the North, separated from the Islamic society, within the Nigerian Federation.

VI Ex-Servicemen and the European educated in Tribal Unions, Associations and Political Organizations among the M-Belt groups and societies.

The development of "tribal" unions and Associations as political organizations in Nigeria in the period between 1930 and 1950 were phenomenal to achieved social and political consciousness on the socio-economic and political transformations taking place among the different groups and societies.

It was a consciousness that was established from European patterns of education, a process in which Christian Missionaries from European nations played a very significant role.¹ An important indicator of the socio-economic and political consciousness developed from European patterns of education was the ability to perceive and relate the circumstances of a particular group within itself to developments among other groups and societies in Nigeria. Thereafter the European educated from the group and society organized their political identity which often had roots in traditional culture and became mobilized to uplift the status of the "tribal" unit. This was so for Ibo and Yoruba nationalism, the numerically dominant groups and societies in Southern Nigeria and which developed their cultural identities into political parties like the NCNC and the AG respectively.² However in instances where there was a culture fusion among different "tribal" units which were numerically small and concentrated in a specific territory, a collective social and political identity became organized as well as activated by mobilization as was the case with Christian religious influences in the conceptions of the M-Belt identity among the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North.³

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1. For detailed examples see Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation, Princeton 1963; James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, London 1958; Richard N. Henderson (1971), "Generalized Cultures and Evolutionary Adaptability: A comparison of Urban Efik and Ibo in Nigeria" in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe (Eds), Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, Michigan 1971 p.215-253; Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu 1978 p.140-168.
 2. Sklar 1963 p.41-86
 3. For more detailed discussions of this point see Sections III and IV of this Chapter.

Unlike other parts of Nigeria however the development of "tribal" Unions as political organizations among the majority of the M-Belt groups and societies was caused by the state of local politics which subordinated non-Islamic groups and societies and the nature of modernization as well as by British economic expropriation activities which were effecting changes on M-Belt territories, a process that became bolstered by achieved socio-economic and political consciousness through Christian Missionary activities. The activities of Christian Missionaries produced a European educated elite from among the M-Belt groups and societies.

In contrast to the development of political activities among the M-Belt groups and societies, in the Islamic society in The North, although a European educated elite was developed from the ruling classes by the government of British administration there was never developed a 'Hausa Tribal Union', a 'Fulani Tribal Union', 'Nupe Tribal Union' nor a 'Kanuri Tribal Union' even when it was the case that there was a Kanuri Improvement Union and a 'Habe Tribal Union'. The two latter Unions were an expression of political discontent in the peripheral centres of the Islamic society that was based on Sokoto in places like Maiduguri and Bauchi. The 'Habe Tribal Union' in Bauchi made political attempts to invoke images of the lost glory of the Hausawa as a 'ruling race' before their overthrow in 1804 by dan Fodio.¹ Similarly in the period between 1955 and 1960, there was organized the Borno Youth Movement (BYM) which was territorially defined with political

1. Sklar 1963 p.371; For detailed discussions of the overthrow of the Hausa Kingdoms by Usman dan Fodio in 1804, see Chapter where the expansion of the established Islamic society in the period between 1804 and 1900 was also examined.

and cultural roots in the ancient Empire of the Islamic Kingdom of Borno rather than an equivocally "tribal" Union.¹ In the period between 1956 and 1965 the BYM was concerned to organize political protest over the domination of political roles in The North by the established Fulani ruling classes centred on the political and religious authority of Sokoto. In the instance, it demanded the creation of a North Eastern Region separated from the Islamic society centred on Sokoto, to consist of Borno, Adamawa, Bauchi and Plateau Provinces.² In the period before impact with British influences in 1900 some non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, Bauchi and Plateau were functional economic peripheries of the Borno Kingdom from where slaves were extracted for the trans-Saharan trade, a commodity that was vital to the economy of the Kingdom.³ This suggests that in the period between 1956 and 1965, Borno with the Kanuri group and society was equally anxious to establish itself in the politics of The North with a specific sphere of influence that was based on an equal political footing to the dominant patterns of political roles and decision making that were based on the Fulani Empire centred on Sokoto. Political protest by the BYM also found expression in the rejection of NEPU because it became seen as a Hausa-Fulani political party even when it was the case that its programme contained reforms that were directed at uprooting the established bases of political support for the Fulani ruling classes in The North.⁴ In the period

1. Sklar 1963 p.340

2. Ibid

3. For detailed discussions with examples see Chapter 1 where the slave raiding activities of the Kingdom of Borno on the non-Islamic groups and societies found toward its southern territories were examined.

4. Sklar 1963 p.340

before 1956 however, one of the factors that squeezed-in "tribal" identities in the Islamic society in The North into the Islamic religious identity to become the dominant political identity was the Islamic religion. This was so because the majority of the population in The North was Moslem for a longish period of time before impact with British influences and upon the establishment of British political authority the diffusion of Hausa-Fulani Islamic culture over other groups and societies was encouraged by political means.¹

The purpose of this Section is to examine how far ex-servicemen and the European educated were the causal instruments in the development and organization of "tribal" Unions and Associations among the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1938 and 1966. It is also examined whether the "tribal" Unions and organizations which became political in nature were shaped by the state of socio-economic and political consciousness about the increases in European patterns of modernization that were rapidly transforming society in The North and in particular the M-Belt groups and societies. It is proposed that the vigorous resurgence of "tribal" identities among the M-Belt groups and societies was a political reaction to the exploitative and dominant socio-economic relationships developed from the new influences on their territories upon impact with colonialism as directed from England. In the short period between 1938 and 1950 there developed in different years as many "tribal" political organizations as the numbers of the different groups and

1. For detailed discussions with examples on the development of the Islamic religious identity as the political identity of The North in the period between 1900 and 1960 see Chapters 2

societies in the M-Belt areas.¹ Many of the "tribal" Unions had explicit cultural and political identities and were concerned to struggle for the socio-economic and political improvement of their groups and societies as they related their circumstances of existence to the provincial and regional governments on the transformation of society in The North rather than to the national society of Nigeria and the national government. Although the "tribal" organizations were explicitly cultural in social and political identity, the identities became subsequently fed into the Christian religious identity of the M-Belt Movement as political support in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region when it was begun in 1949. In the instance, "tribal" political identities were mobilized as the political identity of the M-Belt Movement. The "tribal" identities became bolstered by the Christian religious identity in the period between 1950 and 1965. This was so because in the period between 1930 and 1950 European Christian Missionaries were successful in organizing the different groups and societies as "Christian tribes" through Christian conventions and conferences of Church Elders with representation from the different M-Belt groups and societies.²

It ought to be borne in mind however that the M-Belt Movement was not begun on the crucible of "tribal" identities. It was begun with an

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1. The Section however only examines a few of the "tribal" Unions that were crucial in shaping developing patterns in the different areas defined as the 'Political M-Belt' like the Tiv and Idoma in Benue, the Kagoro in S. Zaria, the Birom on the Plateau, the Kilba and Wurkum Unions in Adamawa and the Sayawa and Jarawa leagues in S. Bauchi. This is so because the numbers of tribal unions among the M-Belt groups and societies were simply legion for all to be considered and examined.
 2. Although the development of the Christian religious identity among the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1930 and 1950 has been examined in detail as a social movement in Section III of this Chapter, the interplay of the religious and tribal identities in the M-Belt Movement are given analytical emphasis in Chapters 4 and 5 where the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement and the politics of the M-Belt groups and societies with the M-Belt Movement are examined.

explicit Christian religious identity vigorously directed at reducing Islamic hegemony of political roles and decision making in government in The North. In order to achieve its objectives it directed its appeals to Christian "tribes" in The North to gain political support. For example, although "tribal" Unions were characteristic of the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1938 and 1950, each stood on its own until in 1949 when the Christian identity became activated by exclusively Christian interests to produce a common political front for articulating the problems and interests of the different non-Islamic tribes. Mobilization of the Christian religious identity took political shape before 1950 from Plateau, Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria where there were more European educated persons as Christian adherents than elsewhere among other M-Belt groups and societies. The development of "tribal" Unions among the M-Belt groups and societies was however more shaped by the numerical sizes of the groups and the degree of in-group cultural cohesion rather than by achieved social consciousness on society developed from European patterns of education. Where a group was numerically bigger and had some European educated persons, it organized its unity earlier than a group with more European educated but fewer in-group members. Table 3.22 suggests that the numerically bigger of the M-Belt groups and societies like the Tiv, Idoma and Birom organized into "Tribal" Movements with political interests earlier than the numerically smaller tribal Units. For example, while there existed "tribal" organizations influencing about 1441,041 people which is about 55.5% of the total M-Belt population over seven years of age in eight Divisions in 1945, it was not until after 1949 that

Table 3.22 The development of 'Tribal' Unions among some M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1938 and 1952

M-Belt Areas with Tribal Organization	Population size in 1952: 7 years of age and over	Numbers of European Educated with Elementary IV and Higher in 1952	% Population with European Education	Year of Organization
Tiv Division (Tiv Progressive Union)	533,267	4,905	0.9	1938
Idoma Division (Idoma Hope Rising Union)	226,339	1,764	0.8	1942
Zaria (Southern Zaria Freedom Movement)	562,850	14,961	2.7	1944
Jos Division (Biom Progressive Union)	118,585	7,308	6.2	1945
Bauchi Division: 1) Pan Jarawa League 2) Pan Sayawa League 3) Habe Tribal Union	378,047	3,284	0.9	1949
Muri Division (Kilba State Union)	555,706	3,956	0.7	1950
Numan Division (Wurkum Tribal Union)	86,797	994	1.1	1951
Shendam Division (Yergam Tribal Union)	134,834	1,354	1.0	1952
Total in eight Divisions	2,596,425	38,526	1.5	

Sources: Dudley 1966 p.90-95; Post 1963 p.80; Sklar 1963 p.344-350; Smith, 1960 p.137-149; C.S. Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition, Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946-1966, Princeton 1970 p.204-205; Population Census of Northern Region of Nigeria 1952, Zaria 1952 p.30-31.

the remaining 45.5% of the M-Belt population began to be influenced by similar movements. The level of educational achievement which conditioned socio-economic and political consciousness on the state of society in The North seemed to have had only minimal intervening effects on the development of tribal movements in the period between 1938 and 1952. For example, if educational achievement was the causal factor rather than the numerical size that bolstered group cohesion, earlier tribal organizations might have been characteristic of the groups and societies in Jos Division where there was the highest percentage of the population with European education rather than in Tiv, Idoma and S. Zaria. As will become apparent in the discussions below the concentration of ex-servicemen and their apprehension of the state of local socio-economic and political problems conditioned initial political reaction to organize their 'tribes' rather than achieved consciousness from education held by the European educated. The high concentration of ex-servicemen explains the earlier development of tribal unions among the Tiv and Idoma where as early as in the period before 1940 many soldiers from these Benue groups and societies served in the Nigerian Army. In the period between 1930 and 1950 the patterns of recruitment into the Nigerian Army changed from non-Islamic Hausa Fulani to focus on persons from among the M-Belt groups and societies.¹ This was so because: "To the chiefs and to the (Fulani) ruling classes of the North ... the Nigerian Regiment had always been an essentially British creation .. had been

1. Sir Bryan Sharwood Smith, But Always As Friends: Northern Nigeria and the Cameroons, London, 1969 p.139-140

the instrument by means of which they and their own armies had been subdued.. Apart from this, the soldiers in the eyes of the ruling caste, were excessively addicted to strong drink and loose living and to practices that were displeasing to orthodox Muslims. The army was for pagans and for the rootless labouring classes of the big cities. It would be unthinkable for any young man of decent family to risk corruption by enlisting .. by 1939 a high proportion of these superb fighting troops came from the pagan tribes of the Niger and Benue valleys and the hill country beyond, but there was still a good sprinkling of the solid Hausa peasantry that had once formed the backbone of the regiment ... the Northerners formed 90% of the army in pre-war years (although) they lacked the education needed to take them beyond the rank of warrant officer".¹ This suggests that while political reaction to the state of local socio-economic and political problems was of particular concern to the ex-servicemen, the subsequent protest within the "tribal" unions among the M-Belt groups and societies directed at Islamic hegemony in local affairs and in the wider society of The North and Nigeria, was conditioned by higher educational standards that became complimented by Christian consciousness. It was Christian consciousness among the European educated Christian persons that led to the organization of the non-Moslem league even when it was the case that the ex-servicemen raised local problems as a basis for "tribal" unity.

The political roles of ex-servicemen in the development of tribal unions as a focus of unity for their groups and societies is suggested

1. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.139-140; The concentration of recruitment into the Nigerian Army of both officers and infantry ranks from among the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1940 and 1970 and its political consequences in 1966, 1967 and 1976 are examined in analytical detail as they related to the political goals of the M-Belt Movement in Chapters 4 and 5

by the fact that the very first British created chieftaincies among the Birom who generated the political ideas for the creation of a M-Belt Region and the Tiv who maintained the ideas until the political objective was achieved were ex-servicemen. For example, this was so for the appointment of Dah Chung Gyang the first paramount chief of the Birom in Jos Division and for Makere Dzakpe for the Tiv in Tiv Division of Renue Province.¹ In the period between 1940 and 1970 the development of Christianity became collateral with the development of European type of education among a majority of the M-Belt groups and societies.² Christian Missionary Bodies like the SUM with schools centred on Gindiri pursued policies which ensured that "the children of Christians" from their districts benefitted from European education in their institutions because "only bright young men and women throbbing with spiritual life, trained and equipped for their job will be able to win and hold this rising generation for God and his work".³ However while education and Christianity do not wholly explain the formation of "tribal" unions among the M-Belt groups and societies. they are the critical variables that explain the initial organizations of the M-Belt Movement, the Non-Moslem League and the Middle Zone League, which took off from among groups and societies where there were more European educated persons as Christians in 1952. For example, when "tribal" organizations and the cultural political identities they

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1. For a detailed examination of the development of the chieftaincy institution among some M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1940 and 1950, as a focus of "tribal" unity for the application of the policy of Indirect Rule see Chapter 2 and also Section V of this Chapter.
 2. Rubingh 1969 p.137
 3. The Light Bearer Magazine, London 1938 p.47-48

mobilized, developed and became fed-in as political support for the Non-Moslem League and the Middle Zone League which were begun in Jos Division. The 1952 population census report suggests that 6.2% of the people were European educated, the highest among the M-Belt groups and societies. Subsequently the M-Belt Movement gained rapid political and social support from S. Zaria Division which had 2.7% of its population with European education, Numan Division with 1.1% of the population with European education and Shendam Division with 1.0% of the population literate with European education.¹ In the period between 1950 and 1965 when there was increased development of education with Christian consciousness among the Tiv which became bolstered by their cultural numerical weight in strengthening their "tribal" identity the struggle for the political demands of the M-Belt Movement shifted from among the groups and societies on the Plateau, Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria where previous to 1956 there existed more Christians and non-Moslems, to find political leadership among the Tiv in Benue Province where there was an insignificant concentration of Islamic influences. Islamic influences and the concentration of Moslems among the Tiv was least visible, constituting just about 1.0% in 1952.²

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1. The relationship between the causal variables, Christianity and European education as factors in creating social and political consciousness in the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement is examined in more detail in Chapter 4 when the transformation of the Non-Moslem League to the United Middle Belt Congress is analyzed.
 2. For more detailed analysis and discussion of the social and political experiences of the M-Belt groups and societies and their different degrees with Islamic influences see Chapter 2 and Section V of this Chapter.

Plateau, Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria were the areas where the M-Belt Movement was begun and gained initial political support before it was maintained by the Tiv in Benue Province until in 1967 when its political objectives were achieved in the creation of more units of the Nigerian Federation with BP State as the epitome of the political struggle. When the Nigerian Federation was restructured in 1967 by General Yakubu Gowon the success of the M-Belt struggle was from the military control of political power rather than one which was based on the political skills of the leadership in meeting the needs of the people. This was so because of the "tribal" concentration of the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North, particularly those from the M-Belt areas in the Nigerian Army like the Tiv. The Tiv were the most highly represented group and society from the M-Belt areas, albeit other Nigerian groups and societies, as rifle-men in the infantry ranks of the Nigerian Army.¹ For example, as early as in the period of the Second World War in the years between 1938 and 1945, there were 6,000 Tiv as against 2,000 Idoma people from Benue Province in the contingents that were recruited from The North.² As earlier suggested these figures increased with the changes in the recruitment policies into the Army of The North and the Nigerian governments. Changes in the recruitment policies of the Nigerian Army focussed on the non-Islamic groups and societies, the majorities being from the M-Belt areas. This was caused by Northernization Policy^{3*} and the Military performance of persons from the non-Islamic groups and societies as soldiers in the

1. Tseayo 1975 p.122

2. Ibid

3. Interview discussions with General Yakubu Gowon, May 1980.

*19 see comment at the end of Chapter 3.

battles of the Second World War.¹ These political policies increased conceptions of the M-Belt groups and societies as functional to the political leadership of the Hausa-Fulani in The North and Nigeria. While persons from the M-Belt groups and societies were recruited into the Army and Civil Service of The North as "Northerners" because of their achieved skills in European education, they were excluded and maintained in subordinate positions in political leadership and decision making in top government posts.²

The first cultural political organization among the M-Belt groups and societies was begun by the Tiv who were a numerically dominant group and society among the other non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas as early as in 1938.³ This was a social and political movement founded by Tiv ex-servicemen upon their return to Nigeria from East Africa, Burma and other areas of the Far East.⁴ The ex-servicemen with the support of the Tiv European educated on Tiv land called the "tribal" political movement the Tiv Progressive Union (TPU).⁵ The ex-servicemen that were active in the TPU had fought in both the First World War in the period between 1914 and 1918 and in the Second World War in the period between 1938 and 1945.⁶ These included John Aemberga Samu, Guse Doki, Makele Dzakpe and some European educated like Makondo Igbon, Tsedzugh Tyungu and H.O. Abaagu, Gbile Gundu, Wuam Gambe, Yough Agera, Pagher Mue, Chia Aka, Akiga Sai.^{7*}²⁰

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1. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.139-140
 2. Northernization policy, the political consequences of the concentration of non-Islamic groups and societies in the Nigerian Army from the M-Belt areas and their exclusion from political roles and decision making in The North are examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5
 3. Benue Provincial Annual Report, NAK 1953, cited in Tseyayo 1975 p.179
 4. Tseyayo 1975 p.179
 5. Dudley 1966 p.91
 6. Paul K. Loko, "Political Activity and Unity in Tiv Land" Text of An Address to the 23rd Convention of the Community of Tiv Students, Gboko, 31st December 1982 p.2
 7. Loko 1982 p.2

*20 see comment at the end of chapter 3

The last eight persons became elected representatives from Benue Province in the NHA in the 1951 indirect elections. Loko suggests that the ex-servicemen rather than the European educated were influenced to organize "tribal" unity when in the period between 1938 and 1945, Emirs from The North, Obas from the West and Warrant Chiefs from the East visited the Nigerian Contingents at different times in India, Burma as well as those stationed in Britian.¹ The Tiv, obviously being the dominant soldiers in the Nigerian Contingents "felt a conspicuous absence of a Tiv chief during the visits" and were determined that upon their return after the war they will demand the creation of "a Tiv Chief like an Emir for Tiv land".² It was with these interests in their minds that organized political activities in Tiv land was begun by the ex-servicemen in 1945 even when it was the case that the "tribal" movement was formed in 1938. When the Tiv European educated subsequently dominated the TPU they were concerned with a subsequently similar recurrent theme that caused the emergence of "tribal" unions among other M-Belt groups and societies to struggle for "the general improvement of the Tiv people".³ The method envisaged for improving the Tiv people was to use the TPU as a pressure group that might push the Tiv Native Authority to award overseas scholarships to Tiv sons for study in Britain.⁴ Although the TPU pushed hard the issue of scholarship awards by the Native Authority, one of its members, Bala Usman was unsuccessful.

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1. Loko 1982 p.2
 2. Ibid
 3. Dudley 1966 p.92
 4. Tseayo 1975 p.187

The educational interests centred on the award of scholarships for studies in Britain was developed in the TPU after 1946 as a direct consequence of the NCNC political ruralization tour of Nigeria.¹ In the instance the NCNC delegation which included Herbert Macanley and Nnamdi Azikiwe "promised to help in the training of the sons of Tiv in higher institutions of learning".² Tseyayo suggests that although James Ityowua Adzakpe was selected for the NCNC educational training the scholarship never materialized for a study in Britain.^{3*}²¹ This suggests that although the state of local socio-economic and political issues and problems conditioned the development of "tribal" unions among some M-Belt groups and societies, social and political developments among other groups and societies in the overall political arena of Nigeria were also crucial factors in shaping their accelerated cultural patterns. TPU for example was organized as a vehicle for achieving progress among the Tiv: "... because many Tiv had watched with interest how their bigger trading neighbours, the Ibo, had organized various Ibo Unions especially for the award of scholarships for their people to institutions of higher learning".⁴ This was the premise from which when the TPU was organized, its members pressed for the award of a scholarship in the period between 1940 and 1945 for Bala Usman, the son of a Tiv train driver and the first Northerner to be a qualified train driver with the Nigerian Railways.⁵ Furthermore, when Bala Usman became stranded in Britain in the course of his studies the TPU pressurized the Tiv Native Authority to finance the scholarship for his stay.⁶

1. Tseyayo 1975 p.188

2. Ibid p.187

3. Ibid

4. Ibid

5. Ibid

6. Ibid

*21 See comment at the end of Chapter 3.

The demonstrative effects of external political influences were crucial social factors in shaping the development of "tribal" unions and the generation of political ideas among some M-Belt groups and societies. BPU, the Non Moslem League and the Middle-Zone-League were influenced by Ibos and Yorubas who were in Jos Division as skilled labour on the tin-mine fields. It was for example S.O. James, a Yoruba who suggested to Christians on the Plateau that their under-representation in the NHC in Kaduna required political organization.¹ In Gboko the headquarters of Tiv Division that was established in 1932, the NCNC tour of The North in 1946 left behind a political impact on a seven-year-old girl that subsequently shaped and conditioned her participation in the M-Belt struggle for the creation of more units of the Nigerian Federation as well as total involvement in politics. The little seven-year-old in 1946 is now Elizabeth Ivase, a Minister in the NPN Government in Nigeria. Political impact of the NCNC tour of The North in 1946 on Elizabeth Ivase was caused by the inclusion of the only female in the delegation, Mrs Ransome Kuti who was active in the political orations of the Nationalist rally in Gboko.² Ivase suggests that Mrs Ransome Kuti: "...being the only woman in the delegation, there was something about her dynamism when she spoke ... my father had taken me to the rally and had encouraged me to donate money he had given me for the nationalist cause and the NCNC party. I remember Zik was with the party. The delegation taught us a song at the rally which we all sang. The words that were repeated were remembered "... we want our Freedom.. freedom... freedom. Freedom from the whiteman..." At the end of the rally my father told me to work

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1. This point is examined in more analytical detail in Chapter 4 where the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement is examined.
 2. Interview discussions with Elizabeth Ivase, January 1981.

and study hard so that some day I will be like that woman...¹ Later when I went to study at Sacred Heart College in Kaduna I still remembered the Nationalist Song which I constantly hummed and sang... In the 1950s when there was a M-Belt Movement for political struggle from Hausa-Fulani rule in The North the NCNC song and the M-Belt struggle became related to the Nationalist struggle from British rule. It also became particularly related to the Freedom of women in The North. If Northern women could not be liberated because of the Islamic religion then in a M-Belt Region that goal could be achieved because of the Christian religion and the different cultural environment of the M-Belt groups and societies.¹

However, the Tiv European educated in TPU were also concerned that the institutions of governance by the Tiv NA in the Division ought to be controlled and managed by persons indigenous to the Tiv tribe rather than Hausa-Fulani or a variant of Islamic leadership, a premise of political subordination in the rulership of the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North which was shaped by the needs of the government of British administration for the application of the Indirect Rule policy which affected all of the M-Belt groups and societies until indigenous "tribal" institutions were developed in the period between 1930 and 1940.² The political status of the British developed chieftaincy institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies as they related to the powers of the Emirs in the Islamic society was a major political issue to the demands of the

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1. Interview discussions with Mrs Elizabeth Ivase, Commissioner for Education in Benue State, January 1981.
 2. For more detailed discussions with examples of the application of Indirect Rule policy which subordinated the indigenous patterns of political authority among the M-Belt groups and societies, see Chapter 2 Section III. The development of indigenous chieftaincy institutions among some of the M-Belt groups and societies has also been discussed in Section V of this Chapter.

"tribal" unions and the M-Belt Movement in the period between 1940 and 1960. However this was the premise from which in the period between 1938 and 1945 European educated Tiv became involved in the political demands for the creation of a Paramount Chief of the Tiv land to rule the Division. In 1946 Makere Dzakpe was elected from 'The Tiv Majalisa Council' by the Jirtamen (the Tiv Central Council) and became the first Chief of the Tiv.¹ There were political and social influences of both the European educated and the ex-servicemen in the TPU as distinct pressures in the Tiv Central Council which selected Makere Dzakpe as Chief of the Tiv. While J.B. Ukpada represented the ex-servicemen for example, Iguse Adoki was the representative of the European educated in TPU in the Tiv Central Council.² Makere Dzakpe himself was an ex-serviceman whose popularity as "Seargent-Major Makere Munchi" among both the Tiv and the government of British administration in The North conditioned his preference for the appointment as the Tor Tiv.³ There was however political effort to influence the choice of the TPU, Gondo Aluor to be chief of Tiv although he subsequently lost the contest to Makere Dzakpe. Tseyayo suggests that the British Resident who conducted the elections fiddled the votes of the Council in favour of Dzakpe because the administration distrusted the politics of Tiv intelligentsia.⁴ This opinion is given credibility because in the instance of the elections in the Council, the Resident rejected the first round of votes which favoured the election of Gondo Aluor: "... hushed-up the matter and a second nomination was called, in which Makere Dzakpe was declared the winner".^{5*}²²

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1. Tseyayo 1975 p.184-189; this has been examined in detail in Section V of this Chapter.
 2. Tseyayo 1975 p.184
 3. Interview discussions with Professor David Muffet, 25 September 1980
 4. Tseyayo 1975 p.185
 5. Ibid

*22 see comment at the end of Chapter 3.

This conditioned the European educated in the TPU represented by Iguse Adoki who opposed the pressures of the British administration on the Tiv Central Council to suggest that rather than listen to the British: "... there was need of allowing the voice of the literate young Tiv to be heard".¹ This suggests that the TPU wanted politics in a changing Tiv society to be influenced and controlled by the European educated even when it was the case that they were outside the political institutions of society on Tiv land. This was so because the European educated were a class of persons who had a consciousness on the patterns and paths of European modernization having achieved a certain measure of skills required for running a European type of society. The political consequences of this initial emphasis on educational achievement compounded the grievances developed from the political distrust of the European educated Tiv by the government of British administration in The North. This subsequently caused TPU to accept the call by Patrick Dokotri that the M-Belt Movement be led by a Tiv European educated, rather than the rich but illiterate Tiv contractor, Abuul, even when it was the case that he gained the nominations based on the Tiv constituency and won the Presidency by a large Tiv vote in 1956. Abuul won massive popular support in Lafia in 1956 during a leadership conference of "tribal" unions that supported the M-Belt Movement because as a contractor he was able to transport his supporters to Lafia from different parts of Tiv land by a hired fleet of lorries, a feat that none of the other leadership

1. Gbodiv, Nak Vol. 2/1: 329, cited in Tseyo 1975 p.184

contestants had imagined and financially had been unable to do on the same scale.¹ Ab I was replaced by the election of J.S. Tarka as President of the UMBC party, which marked his political entry into the national political arena and the direction of commitment in the whole vigour of the M-Belt Movement changed.²

However, although TPU was concerned to influence the Tiv Central Council over decision making in local affairs, their influence was also felt in the Gboko Central Court. This was represented by the TPU membership who were mainly European educated in persons like J. Bendega Ukpada, Tarka Nachi, Ula Lisa and Amyamnyian.³ When TPU established its political influences within the institutions of local government that controlled society in Tiv Division, it became more active in changing the shape of political and economic dominance by the Hausa-Fulani who enjoyed the support of the government of British administration in The North. In 1946 the European educated and the ex-servicemen in TPU effectively opposed and prevented the son of Audu dan Afoda from becoming a separate chief of Makurdi Town and the adjacent hinterland areas.⁴ In 1947, largely from TPU pressures, it was suggested to the government of British administration in The North that rather than have an Islamic chief, Makurdi Town ought to be administered by a council consisting of each section of the Tiv clans and that the Makurdi Town Council be subordinated to the Tor Tiv (the chief of the Tiv) and his Council: "... because Makurdi Town had been founded originally on Tiv land".⁵ Although political interests

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1. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot, Isaac Shaahu and Isaac Kpum in the period between November 1980 and February 1981.
 2. The political entry of Joseph S. Tarka as President of the UMBC is examined in more analytical detail in Chapter 4
 3. Tseayo 1975 p.185
 4. Ibid p.188
 5. Tiv Central Council Minute Meetings, 3rd April 1947, cited in Tseayo 1975 p.188.

which revolved around the status of the Tor Tiv were the major issues surrounding the politics of controlling Makurdi Town, there were also economic and commercial interests which were in the hands of non-indigenes particularly dominated by Hausa-Fulani and Ibo traders. Tseyayo suggests that the economic and commercial interests centred on non-indigenous control of Makurdi Town clashed with Hausa-Fulani traders as well as other Moslem traders with the Tiv in 1947.¹ In the instance: "... the Hausa-Fulani fought the Tiv and many lives and much property were destroyed".²

In general, although the European educated and the ex-servicemen in the "tribal" unions among the M-Belt groups and societies sometimes operated as separate social and political pressure groups, they were never strange bed-fellows. Although the European educated dominated the executive posts of the "tribal" unions among each of the M-Belt groups and societies, where there existed ex-servicemen, they always were elected to some of the posts and those outside the executive positions always gave their political support to the organizations.³ This was so because the major "tribal" unions were begun by the ex-servicemen, particularly the TPU and the BPU. For example, this was so in the initial organization and expansion of the TPU from urban centres like Lagos. Tseyayo suggests that it was Peter Dodo, an ex-serviceman, who started and organized the Tiv "tribal" political organization from Lagos in 1945.⁴ Within the Lagos Branch of the TPU itself, while there were 5 European educated persons in the executive who had achieved a measure of European modernizing skills in the control and management of society, the only ex-serviceman however

1. Tseyayo 1975 p.188

2. Ibid p.188-189

3. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Choji Bot, Jonah Assadugu and Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.

4. Tseyayo 1975 p.186

was Peter Dodo himself.¹ These were Ityeku Yough who was President of the TPU and an employee of the Nigerian Railway, Ayila Yough, Secretary of TPU and an associate of the NCNC, serving as NCNC party reporter with 'The Pilot', Peter Dodo a member of the executive and the only ex-serviceman in the Committee, Atim Atedze, a member of the executive committee and Yakubu Adam, Patron of TPU in Lagos, all of whom had achieved a measure of European education.² It was however a European educated person from among the Tiv, Ayila Yough, who upon his return from Lagos to Gboko after 1945 that was asked by the other European educated in the Divisional headquarters of Tiv land to organize the TPU with District branches from the town of Gboko.³ Thereafter, with headquarters in Gboko, TPU became organized among other urban centres of The North and Nigeria wherever there was a concentration of European educated Tiv.⁴ In Gboko town, where there was the highest concentration of European educated Tiv persons, almost all the adult members joined the TPU, the most politically influential members being Native Authority employees and rich traders like Ugor Iwoo and Sekpe Abaagu.⁵

Implicit in the organizational development of the TPU before 1956 was that it directed its "tribal" appeal to the European educated as well as to people who were already participating in the modernization sectors of the new economic^{order} introduced by the government of British administration in The North. It was not geared toward political mobilization of the remaining mass of the ordinary Tiv people in the rural

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1. Tseyo 1975 p.187
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid p.188
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid

areas. As latterly as in 1952, MacBride, the Resident for Benue Province suggests that : "Party organization does not mean much in Benue, even to the educated minority; tribal and local loyalties are still paramount and in this field popular interest still belongs to the mainly illiterate heads of large and successful families who as elders, chiefs or councillors are the customary community representatives and the accepted arbiters in matters of common concern.. the advice of literate juniors may be heard and considered if it is offered with deference, but the fact that a man has been elected to the legislature does not make him a prophet in his own country".¹

Before 1956 therefore the TPU was basically a political phenomenon of the European educated and did very little to mobilize the rest of the Tiv population as a socio-cultural movement. In many respects the whole processes of "tribal" unions influencing the patterns of politics in a particular group and society was initially restricted to the developing metropolitan centres of The North similar to the experiences of other groups and societies in Southern Nigeria.² In Tiv land before 1956 political mobilization by TPU hardly went beyond the confines of urban and district centres of social and economic

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1. D.F.H. MacBride, Annual Report for Benue Province, 1952, cited in Tseayo 1958 p.184.
 2. For detailed examples and discussions of situational ethnicity (tribalism), of the urban centres in Nigeria, see Ulf Himmelstrand, "Rank Equilibration, Tribalism and Nationalism in Nigeria" 1971 p.254-291, Andrey C. Smock, "The Political Role of Ibo Ethnic Unions" 1971 p.320-341; Leonard Plotricov, "Situational Ethnicity in Jos, Nigeria", 1971 p.606-628, in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe (Eds), Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, Michigan 1971; Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation, Princeton 1963 p.64-71.

development and did not influence villagers in the rural areas. Earlier in the 1951 Indirect Elections into the NHA, MacBride suggests that in Tivland: "... despite the efforts of administrative officers and others to publicise the objects and reasons of the primary elections, only a very small proportion of the country people had more than a dim idea as to what it was all about. In the District colleges however interest began to awake, but because of apathy at the lower level they contained few men of distinction and most of those were servants of the Central Native Administrations, who had had the enterprise to go and stand in the primary areas in which they were born".¹ This was unlike in the Islamic centres of religion and power where people were easily mobilized for elections by a hierarchy of authority based on accepted traditional legitimacy from the Emir, District Heads and flowed down to the Ward-Heads in the urban centres. For example in the 1951 elections in Borno Province while the predominantly Islamic population had a turn-out of about 60%, Gwoza areas that share the same non-Islamic characteristics with the Tiv had an average poll turn-out of 40%.²

In contrast to the limited state of political consciousness achieved by the Tiv in 1951, among the Idoma group and society the IHRU³ created a mobilized electorate from both the ranks of the European educated as well as from the traditional system sufficiently to sponsor fifteen of its members out of the thirty members from the Divisional College including two men of considerable talent that were outside the services of the Idoma Native Authority.⁴ In the instance,

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1. MacBride 1953 p.14
 2. F Humphreys, Bornu Province 1951, Northern Region of Nigeria: Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna 1953 p.20
 3. Examined in more analytical detail below.
 4. MacBride, 1953 p.14

only comparable to the political circumstances in Jos Division on the Plateau, it was in Lafia and Idoma Divisions that party labels were evident in the 1951 elections in Benue Province.¹ While in Lafia Division the Hausa Fulani as well as other Islamic communities identified with the NPC and the Idoma affiliated to NEPU,² the majority of the "tribal" Unions in Jos Division on the Plateau, particularly the BPU leadership in centres of commercial and economic life like Jos and Bukuru and in Kafanchan where the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement was active, they became affiliated to the NCNC.³ This was so because of the political influences developed from the concentration of non-indigenes from Southern Nigeria who worked as Tin Miners on the Plateau and in Kafanchan being an important railway junction, developed a large Ibo community with commercial interests.⁴ Subsequently in the period between 1951 and 1956 some of the Tiv European educated were affiliated to the NCNC political party.⁵

In Benue Province however despite a highly more measurable degree of political consciousness among the Idoma group and society when it is compared with the Tiv, it was the numerical sizes of the group and society that determined the outcome of the 1951 indirect elections. This is not suggesting that political consciousness was directly related to political solidarity of a particular group and society. In the instance of the Idoma group and society higher consciousness from achieved European

1. MacBride 1953 p.14

2. Ibid

3. Niven, 1953 p.60

4. Ibid

5. The shifting patterns of alliances among the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1950 and 1965 in the cause of politics and political support for the objectives of the M-Belt Movement are examined in more analytical details in Chapters 4 and 5 where we discuss the growth and development of the Movement and the politics within the M-Belt groups and societies with the M-Belt Movement.

patterns of education produced severe political schisms within the IHRU. This became compounded by their smaller numbers of representation relative to the Tiv in the Provincial Electoral College for Benue. In the Final Electoral College for example, out of 140 members, 68 were Tiv including two Tiv members that were elected from Wukari where there was a high concentration of migrant Tiv people as farmers, against 30 members who were indigenes of Idoma Division with 15 as committed members of the IHRU.¹ There were also three Ibos in the Final Electoral College for Benue Province while the Turst-Territory District of Ndoro produced one member.² This was the premise from which there was shown a rather unusual demonstration of Tiv political solidarity in the outcome of the final elections of members from Benue Province into the NHA which underscored the politically mobilized Idoma unity. In the instance, by their numerical weight, the Tiv elected members filled all the eight seats assigned to Benue Province with Tiv indigenes.³ Of the Tiv elected members for Benue Province, three were Native Treasury officials, two were schoolmasters and of the remaining three, one was a Government clerical service pensioner, one the Editor of the Tiv newspaper "Mwange-U-Tiv" based in Enugu and the third person, a contractor and member of the Makurdi Town Council.⁴ These were Gbile Gundu, Wuam Gambe, Yough Agera, Pagher Mue, Chia Aka, Akiga Sai (the first Christian Convert among the Tiv group and society), Makondo Igbon and T. Ayilla.⁵ Some of the Tiv European

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1. MacBride 1953 p.14
 2. Ibid p.15
 3. Ibid p.14
 4. Ibid
 5. Nigeria Year Book 1952, A Daily Times Publication, Lagos 1952 p.8

educated however felt regret over their established dominance in the electoral process developed from the 1951 indirect elections.

Paul Loko for example, described the representation as selfish that "these people represented the whole of Benue Province in the Northern House of Assembly ... I was present and witnessed the conduct of the election myself. It was funny the way people voted. The method of voting was primitive and undemocratic .. because the two contestants stood up and those who supported them lined up behind them".¹ The non-Tiv members in the Benue electoral College who gained nominations and lost the election votes were J.C. Obande, an Idoma from Idoma Division and Ibrahim Shangai, a Jukun from Wukari Division.²

Previous to these political developments in Benue Province in 1951 the Tiv group and society caused social and economic anxiety among other neighbouring groups and societies, like the Idoma, the Jukun as well as other smaller non-Islamic groups and societies in Lafia, Nasarawa and Shendam Divisions, by their overland expansion in search of farmland, where they settled as indigenes.³ The 1951 election results into the NHA caused further political resentment of the Tiv by the neighbouring groups and societies and increased tensions in the area, particularly so because two Tiv were elected as Jukun representatives from Wukari in the Final Benue Electoral College and there was a total non-representation of the Jukun and the Idoma. This was so because in the 1951 Elections a culturally heterogeneous Benue

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1. Paul K. Loko, "Political Activity and Unity in Tiv Land". Text of an address to the 23rd Convention of the Community of Tiv Students, Gboko 31st December 1982 p.3-4
 2. Loko 1982 p.3
 3. This has been examined in Chapter 7 with some detailed examples of the tensions that resulted and caused the expulsions of the Tiv as "aliens" from Wukari Division.

constituency for political representation in the NHA became a Tiv constituency. MacBride infact ridicules what he describes as "the working of democratic institutions in a heterogeneous constituency" because "In selecting the candidates whose return they wished to ensure the Tiv members of the Final College paid regard to clan affinities and personal repute; political parties had nothing to do with their choice and the only influence that these had on the final election was to split the Idoma vote and complicate the lobbying that might otherwise have given one or more of the eight seats to non-Tiv members".¹ This suggests that before the political ideas of a M-Belt Movement filtered to the Tiv group and society, "Tiv nationalism" in shaping political patterns of dominance in a democratic electoral system was already established. The electoral political weight of the Tiv rooted in their numerical size in relation to other M-Belt groups and societies subsequently gave recalcitrant leadership in the M-Belt Movement demanding the creation of a M-Belt Region opportunity to produce political arguments in favour of co-existence in The North as political minorities rather than in a separate region from the Islamic society in which the Tiv might dominate and shape electoral patterns.² Subsequently in the period between 1968 and 1976 the assumed dominance of the Tiv in government institutions of BP state was a major issue in the developing political tensions that tore apart the equivalence of a M-Belt Region when Plateau and Benue states became created in 1976. While the European educated among the Plateau groups and societies were concerned that the Tiv dominated decision making in the institutions of government in BP state, political under-

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1. MacBride 1953 p.15
 2. The political issues surrounding the numerical size of the Tiv electorate is examined in more analytical detail in Chapters 4 and 5 where the social and political grievances of the M-Belt groups and societies brought before the Willink Commission in 1957 are discussed.

representation surfaced as a grievance from among the Tiv European educated because of the numbers they represented of their group and society.¹ As early as in 1967 when there was political anticipation that The North will be subdivided into more Federal Units of the Nigerian Federation there was Plateau representation to General Yakubu Gowon that political opposition existed to the merging of Benue and Plateau provinces to become a political unit because of the 'political fears' centred on the Tiv potential electorate in the instance of a return to civilian rule.² Subsequently in 1975 the Plateau Students Association in ABU Zaria produced similar arguments that re-echoed the 'political fears' of the Tiv numerical weight which might be used in electoral processes to demand the split of BP State into Plateau and Benue states when it was evident that electoral processes will be resumed in 1979.³ In the instance, the Plateau European educated became instrumental in shaping the demands for the separation of Plateau from BP State and for the two previously distinct provinces to constitute separate political units of the Nigerian Federation.⁴ This was done by mobilizing one of the political fears that was centred on the potential of the size of the Tiv electorate upon anticipated return to civilian control of political power even when it was the case that the political interest was complimented by

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1. The political problems in BP State which caused increased variations in the conceptions of the social and political identity over the creation of that State as a M-Belt Region for 'Political Minorities' in The North are examined in more analytical detail in Chapters 5 cf
 2. Interview discussions with George Hoomkwap, January 1981
 3. Interview discussions with George Hoomkwap, January 1976; The 'break-up' of BP State into Plateau and Benue states are examined in detail in Chapters 5 cf
 4. Interview discussions with George Hoomkwap January 1981

economic interests that were centred on access to top government jobs a new state administration will create.¹

Although in 1952 the Tiv group and society were more numerous in population size than any others among the M-Belt groups and societies they only had 0.9% of their total population of 533,267 people that was European educated and over seven years old.² This suggests that the TPU was based on the ideas of a few European educated Tiv and the ex-servicemen who mobilized themselves for protest and participation over local socio-political and economic problems rather than involving the rural population in the process. It was however the ex-servicemen and the developing commercial class among the Tiv who brought in the ideas of a M-Belt Movement to the European educated in Tiv land largely from the social and economic interactions of persons like Sekpe Abaagu, Peter Dodo and J.B. Ukpada who had travelled to centres of commercial and economic activities like Jos, Kafanchan, Zaria and Kaduna.³ Unlike the social and political experiences of ex-servicemen and the European educated in the "tribal" unions among the groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau and S. Zaria, the Tiv did not develop political separation from Hausa Fulani and Islamic domination in The North before 1956. Political separatism was however characteristic of the other "tribal" unions among the groups and societies in the M-Belt areas in the period between 1940 and 1956 before the political entry of the Tiv leadership in the M-Belt Movement. The TPU, similar to

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1. A.D. Yahaya, "The struggle for power in Nigeria 1966-1979" in Oyeleye Oyediran (Ed), Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule 1966-1979, London, 1979 p.259-275
 2. This is explicit from the figures suggested by Table 3.21 which are discussed in more detail below.
 3. Tseayo, 1975 p.184-187; Interview discussions with Ajiva Aji and Isaac Kpum, January 1981

the subsequent IHRU, directed its mobilized cultural identity into a political organization to benefit a European educated class of the group and society. In the period between 1950 and 1965 however when there developed more persons with European education as Christians and there was increased social and political consciousness on the shape and pattern of dominance over society in The North, the Tiv became a significant force in the separatist demands of the M-Belt Movement, a process they bolstered by their numbers, the political vigour of their leadership that was encouraged in the tradition of their ex-servicemen.¹

The organizational skills and political courage of the ex-servicemen from among the M-Belt groups and societies in the development of "tribal" unions were gained from socio-economic experiences on two political arenas. Firstly there was experience gained from military service outside Nigeria. Secondly upon their return from both the First and Second World Wars they shared frustrating social and economic experiences in Kaduna, the capital of British administration in The North when they frequently travelled from different areas to converge and make claims and demands for their gratuities from the government.² The circumstances of the experiences in Kaduna, conditioned the organization of confrontation and protest with the Regional authorities. In the instance of experiences gained from military services in the Second World War which took them to Burma, North Africa, East Africa and India, "the outside world" to the societies of the M-Belt areas,

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1. Interview discussions with Professor David Muffet, 25th September 1980.
 2. Interview discussions with Baba Sanda and Moses Nyam Rwang, in the period between December 1980 and February 1981.

with European patterns of development became opened and served as the attraction model of society in which they wanted to live.¹ This was the premise from which upon the return of ex-servicemen from 'foreign lands' to their groups and societies in Nigeria, they began to look more closely at the patterns of development and the institutions of government in their areas and demanded political control as a means to change in society. In the instance of the experiences of the ex-servicemen upon their return to The North and in Kaduna the social and economic frustrations derived from government policy on claims by demobilized soldiers for gratuity and pensions. The frustrations caused the soldiers to develop a shared sense of anxiety as Christian ex-servicemen dependent on an Islamic dominated government.² The experiences of persistent travels to Kaduna became compounded by the social and political problems of underdevelopment existing among their different societies which were explained as caused by their lack of control of the apparatus of a government that discriminated against Christians and the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North. This was the crucial political perception of government activities and its policies in the period between 1945 and 1950 as they related to the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North which caused the Christian ex-servicemen to translate personal experiences into collective

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1. In both instances of my discussions with Baba Sanda and Moses Nyam Rwang the recurrent theme that was emphasized in their experiences gained from Burma was that: "da mun je wuje mun ga duniya sai idon kowa ya budu. Mun dawo mun ga gida da bam ... Kuma dole a gaya wa Gwamnati ta gyara Kasa" (meaning): upon our travels outside of our societies, we "saw the World" and everybody became wiser (everybody's eyes opened). Upon our return to Nigeria, home was a different place and it became obligatory to tell the government to produce development.
 2. Interview discussions with Baba Sanda, Moses Nyam Rwang and Choji Bot, January 1981.

forms of political grievances in shaping the patterns of protest in the "tribal" unions and the political purposes of the M-Belt Movement.

It was from the Kaduna experiences however that ex-servicemen like Baba Sanda, a Bachama from Numan in Adamawa, Moses Nyam Rwang, a Birom from Jos Division on the Plateau and Peter Dodo, a Tiv from Tiv Division in Benue, among others, established social contacts based on their aggrieved experiences. These became politically crucial after 1949 in the development and spread of the ideas for political participation in government institutions in *The North* and subsequently demanding for political separation from the Islamic society and constitution into a M-Belt Region.¹ However it was from the organizational efforts of the ex-servicemen with the literate support of the European educated in the "tribal" unions that the socio-political and economic problems of the M-Belt groups and societies became taken into the maturing political arena firstly of *The North* and subsequently became a national political issue in the period between 1950 and 1965 when the European educated dominated both the political leadership of the "tribal" unions and the developing M-Belt Movement. In other words in that period there was a political shift in the control of both the leadership and the political organization of the "tribal" unions from the ex-servicemen to the European educated among the M-Belt groups and societies. This was particularly so for the Igalla, Idoma and Tiv whose ex-servicemen dominated the formations of "tribal" unions until the European educated took to reinvigorate the unions with expanded local socio-political and economic interests.² Although the ex-servicemen

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Baba Sanda, January 1981
 2. Interview discussions with Professor Armstrong, Professor David Muffet and Isaac Kpum in the period between November 1980 and February 1981.

*23 See comment at the end of chapter 3.

featured in almost all the "tribal" organizations among the M-Belt groups and societies, their political roles were more pronounced among the Tiv, Igalla and Idoma in Benue Province and among the Birom on the Plateau. In the instance of societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria church leadership with Christian European educated persons were the main social forces in the political organization of the "tribal" unions.¹ In the period between 1940 and 1950 the successful political roles of the ex-servicemen in organizing tribal unions among groups and societies in Plateau, S. Zaria, S. Bauchi and Adamawa is explained by educational achievement and the concentration of Christians which produced consciousness and a sympathetic understanding to the few ex-servicemen, rather than the actual numbers of demobilized soldiers involved in the support of the movements as was the case with the Tiv, Idoma and Igalla. However, unlike the social and political circumstances of the European educated among the groups and societies on the edges of the Islamic society in The North, in Benue Province, there was little previous experience of Islamic dominance of political leadership and decision making as well as confrontation with the Islamic religion. For example the social and political dominance by the Hausa Fulani and Islamic leadership in general was experienced by the Tiv only after 1900. When the European educated therefore joined the "tribal" unions, their interests became centred on jobs and political control of the apparatus of government at the local levels rather than developing separatist tendencies that were directed at the Islamic society in The North. The distribution of the concentration of the European educated

1. This will become apparent in the next few pages below where we examine the development of "tribal" unions among other groups and societies in other areas of the M-Belt.

as Christians among the M-Belt groups and societies seems to explain the early development of separatist political tendencies in the period between 1945 and 1950 and subsequently joined by others in the period between 1950 and 1965 within the political demands of the M-Belt Movement rather than the concentration of demobilized soldiers. For example while statistical evidence suggests that there were more European educated as Christians on the Plateau, Adamawa, S. Zaria and S. Bauchi,¹ where separatist tendencies were overtly articulated before 1950, intelligent statistical estimates suggest that there were more ex-servicemen among the Tiv, Idoma and Igalla who gave vigorous support to the separatist tendencies only after 1950. In all the instances of the three main groups and societies in Benue Province the Idoma, Igalla and Tiv, the Jukun being considered as fused into Tiv interests in the period between 1938 and 1954 socio-cultural identities and its concomitant political consciousness conditioned political reactions to the state of socio-economic and political problems which were championed by the ex-servicemen.

One of the initial economic problems that concerned TPU was Ibo domination of commercial enterprise and their social consciousness developed from European educational literacy that was advantageous in manipulating financial profits in Tiv market places. This was as much on Tiv land as it was in areas where there were Tiv migrant farmers like Nasarawa, Lafia and Wukari. MacBride in fact described the migration of Ibos to Tiv land and their concentration in the market places as an "invasion of Tiv trade centres by Easterners".² Although

1. For example see Table 3.21 in this Chapter
 2. MacBride 1953 p.13; Tseayo 1975 p.178

Ibo commercial enterprise that existed among the Tiv raised the material standards of living in Tiv Division, the exploitative exchange rates annoyed local people.¹ While the Ibos introduced the sales of clothing and fancy articles, which the Tiv paid for in cash from the sales of their farm plots in the town layouts of Tiv and Wakari Divisions and also with beans, yams, and rice which were produce included from Adamawa trans-shipment by canoe to Ibi, there was also an evolving pattern of dominating the resale of soya beans and beniseed beans by Ibos who became agents and sub-purchasing agents of the Marketing and Export Board, an economic pattern that increased political tensions directed against non-indigenes in the Division.² Ibos and Idomas however dominated private industries in Makurdi, the most modern town with European infrastructure in Benue Province. Two power driven mills for example in Makurdi were owned by an Ibo and an Idoma who were also successful in different businesses in Enugu, even when it was the case that the mills served the needs of domestic neighbours.³ Economic tensions between the Idoma group and society and Ibo commercial enterprise were as equally bitter as was the case with the Tiv. For example besides Ibo domination of market stalls in Oturkpu town, the headquarters of Idoma Division,⁴ in 1951 two rice mills which were started with the aid of loans from the Production Development Board ^{were} by non-indigenes to Idoma Division,⁵ While one of these rice mills was owned by an Ibo and built at Utonkon in Idoma Division the other was the property of a Cameroon man, naturalized in Donga.⁶ This means that

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1. MacBride 1953 p.13
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid p.14
 4. Interview discussions with Professor Armstrong, January 1981
 5. MacBride 1953 p.13
 6. Ibid

both Tiv and the Idoma were concerned with the "tribal" unions to adjust for the dominance of economic control of local enterprise by non-indigenes among their groups and societies. In the period between 1950 and 1960 however while the Tiv saw the solutions to their local socio-economic and political problems in the creation of a M-Belt Region, the Idoma group and society saw non-indigenous domination of economic life in Oturkpo town, particularly by the Ibos a sufficient threat that required the political support of a powerful Northern Region Government of the NPC with its vigorous policy of "Northernization" to deal with the situation. This was so even when it was the case that the Idoma European educated supported the ideas in the M-Belt Movement for the creation of a M-Belt Region as against its traditional leadership who controlled the apparatus of government of the Native Authority. The circumstances created a strategically balanced risk taking in politics in which the Idoma kept themselves politically active in two camps to protect their interests. While the Idoma European educated were politically rhetorical about support for the ideas of the M-Belt Movement, the traditional leadership wielded the NA apparatus to mobilize political support and fetched electoral votes for the NPC consistently demonstrating an anti-M-Belt Movement vote.¹

However, similar to the development of the TPU early in the 1940s, the IHRU became organized in 1942,² with an explicit political objective of raising the social and economic status of the Idoma people by controlling the powers and authority of the Native Authority in Idoma Division.³ Dudley however suggests that the IHRU was organized at the later date of 1944, rather than in 1942.⁴ Like the Tiv in 1938 and

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1. The Idoma support for the M-Belt Movement, while consistently voting for the NPC party is examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5 where Politics with the M-Belt Movement is examined.
 2. Magid 1971 p.344
 3. Dudley 1966 p.91
 4. Ibid

and subsequently the Birom in 1945, the IHRU was concerned to attain "greater tribal autonomy or form their own region".¹ In 1942 however the phenomenon of the Idoma "tribal" Movement was begun as "a group of youths meeting" at Oturkpo Town.² It is not clear from the available sources whether "the group of youths meetings" suggested by Magid which began the IHRU consisted of ex-servicemen, European educated or both. It is however clear that while as latterly as in 1952 the European educated in Idoma Division constituted only 0.8% of the Idoma population aged over 7 years (Table 3.21 in this Chapter), similar to the Tiv, there was a large concentration of Idoma as ex-servicemen as demobilized soldiers of the Nigerian Army when the "tribal" movement was begun.³ It is therefore suggested that given this concentration of demobilized soldiers from the Nigerian Army from among the Idoma group and society, the IHRU was also an initial "tribal" movement that was started by the ex-servicemen, particularly so since the organization existed before it began to recruit members and supporters: "... from the growing body of primary school leavers in the Division ... (and attracted) both employees and former employees of government or the Idoma Native Authority ... who had been dismissed from positions in government or the NA and those who had been led by feelings of frustration and disillusionment to resign their positions".⁴

The political strategy followed by the IHRU to achieve a higher status for the Idoma people included pressing the government of British administration in The North to make democratic reforms in the running

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1. Coleman 1963 p.365
 2. Magid 1971 p.347; Although Magid does not give a definition of "Youth" a youth in Nigeria may be defined as a person who is less than 50 years in chronological age from his day of birth and is outside the mainstream in the control and shape of socio-economic and political power influences - this definition is derived from Tutorial Discussions with James O'Connell who taught me in an undergraduate class in ABU Zaria in 1974.
 3. Tseyo 1975 p.122
 4. Magid 1971 p.345

of the Idoma Native Authority and for members of IHRU to participate in policy formulation over local affairs.¹ The IHRU was also concerned to accelerate the rate of social and economic development in Idoma Division by lobbying governments in Nigeria for the provision of better roads, pipe-borne water systems, postal facilities in rural districts, provision of agricultural cooperatives, more NA schools, scholarship awards to indigenes of Idoma and seeking government assistance to sponsor traditional art and music.² The IHRU also petitioned various Native Authorities throughout Nigeria to repatriate Idoma prostitutes who were alleged to be damaging the reputation of Idoma people.³ Although this was so, the IHRU was mainly concerned to struggle for the infrastructural transformation of Idoma land with modern European amenities which were either lacking or underdeveloped in Idoma Division. Furthermore there was the problem of the alienation of Idoma land to non-indigenes, particularly the Ibos and IHRU lobbied both the government of British administration in The North "to restrict stranger migration into the Division".⁴ Economic issues were therefore also central to the organization of "tribal" political movements directed at non-indigenous domination of these activities rather than exclusively cultural expressions of the identity of a group and society.

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1. Alvin Magid, "Minority Politics in Northern Nigeria: The case of the Idoma Hope Rising Union", in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe (Eds), Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, Michigan, 1971 p.343.
 2. Magid 1971 p.346
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid

One of the political strategies of IHRU in organizing to transform Idoma land into a modern group and society within the wider Nigerian Society was to generate support and influence on an Idoma Paramount Chief. This was so even when it is the case that the institution of the "Ochi Idoma" was not created from the direct political demands of the IHRU.¹ As early as in 1942 when the "tribal" organization was formed, it supported the government of British administration in its efforts to centralize authority and power under a single chief for all Idoma clans in the Division.² The political interest of this support however was centred on the destruction of 'the political strangle-hold' of traditional District Heads and Clan Heads over local affairs in order to stimulate "Progressive development in the Division and secure for it a major policy role in the local administrative apparatus".³ This objective and the pattern of political support for reforms of traditional institutions from the IHRU however created for it, political stress with the NA and with the government of British administration. The stress led to the demise of the "tribal" Union because it became increasingly dominated by demands for radical reforms that were articulated mainly by literate Idoma youths.⁴ For example although it supported the political existence of traditional institutions, the Idoma "tribal" Union wanted personnel in it to be literate.⁵ In 1948 IHRU was outraged that a District Head and three elderly Clan Heads were elected into the First Idoma Advisory Council because all four

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1. Magid 1971 p.348
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid

were illiterate.¹ Furthermore even when the IHRU supported the institution of the "Ochi Idoma", in 1949 many of its members were opposed to the formal inauguration of Ogiri Oko because he was seen to be a corrupt conservative.²

However, although the IHRU did not resolve its contested issues over the chieftainship of the Idoma, it was successful in creating sufficient political impact in the Division to be invited to attend the Provincial Conferences in 1950 to discuss matters concerning local government reforms and electoral procedures under the Macpherson Constitution in anticipation of the 1951 elections.³ In 1951 it gained control of the electoral colleges at both the district and village levels in Idoma Division.⁴ In the same year the government of British administration in The North responded to its political pressures by appointing two literates to combine the Clan and District Head posts of Boju and Orokram.⁵ In 1952 the political activities of the IHRU produced more concessions from the government of British administration in The North as well as from the Native Authority. The Idoma Advisory Council became enlarged to include a scribe and two members elected for a three year term of office with nine new members of whom six were literates and three of the six were members of the IHRU.⁶ Furthermore, it was from the direct activities in the political pressures of the IHRU that District Councils became empowered

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1. Magid 1971 p.348
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid p.349
 5. Ibid
 6. Ibid

to appoint one person each, to sit with District Heads on the Intermediate Area Council as well as effecting the reorganization of the District Court system to include court members with an elected status from officially recognized kindred based on the different Idoma clan constituencies.¹ In the light of these political achievements, the IHRU was about the most radically committed political organization among the M-Belt groups and societies that produced a programme for change and delivered rather than politically walked into the existing structures of the government of British administration. In the period between 1950 and 1965 however, the social and economic problems on the distribution of modern infrastuctural facilities from the NPC government in The North remained as issues of concern to the IHRU even when it was the case that the Division benefitted more than other Benue groups and societies largely so, because of political identification with the NPC and the concept of "One North" in the Nigerian Federation.²

The political significance in the development of the concessions that were given to the "tribal" Movement in Idoma Division was that moderate members of the IHRU and the Idoma NA found government responsive to the needs of their group and society. In the period between 1950 and 1965 the moderate members of the IHRU and the Idoma NA became tied to the NPC and the regional government policies in The North. This was an experience that very little of it was received in the socio-economic and political circumstances of the Tiv, Birom, Bachama, Tangale-Waje and Jaba, among others of the M-Belt groups and societies where "tribal" Unions made little political impact and the issues and problems

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1. Magid 1971 p.349
 2. This point is revisited and examined in more detail when we discuss Politics with the M-Belt Movement in The North in Chapters 4

remained contested with no concessions given. However, it was from these experiences of the Idoma that there was developed split images on the performance of government in The North and the political problem of whether to give support for the ideas of the M-Belt Movement for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the period between 1950 and 1965. In the instance the Idoma group and society was concerned whether a M-Belt Region might be politically powerful enough to protect their interests, particularly those that related to Ibo domination of economic activities as well as Ibo and Tiv migration to farmland in the Division, in the same political sense that the NPC government in The North was responsive to their demands and needs with a policy of "Northernization" which they stood to benefit from. The alliance with the NPC furthermore meant an open route to development with modern European infrastructure and a counter-point to the Tiv dominated UMBC.¹ In the same period however besides the contested political support for the creation of a M-Belt Region, which caused political schisms among the Idoma group and society, there existed local political issues that were a persistent source of friction between the European educated and traditional Idoma leadership in the NA. The European educated for example persistently held the Idoma NA as politically responsible for the state of socio-economic and cultural underdevelopment existing in the Division. This was so because IHRU officials suggested the NA personnel and the "Ochi Idoma" were inefficient, corrupt and undemocratic in the practice of local governance.² In the instance the IHRU increased

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1. Discussions with M.J. Dent, October 1979-1983; The patterns of "tribal" Union alliances with the political parties in The North are examined in more detail in Chapters 4
 2. Magid 1971 p.347

its anti-corruption campaigns against the "Ochi Idoma" and the NA officials through newspapers.¹ Since the government of British administration in The North generally treated the anti-corruption campaigns as political trivialities, the issues raised brought the IHRU into direct controversies with the NA in Idoma Division.² The Native Authority responded by encouraging its employees to resign membership of the "tribal" Union.³ Subsequently in 1955, the NA persuaded a group of recalcitrant European educated who were members of the IHRU to organize a rival "tribal" Union which became known as the Idoma State Union.⁴ The political objectives of the new "tribal" Union among the Idoma group and society were no different from those of the IHRU because both movements were committed to supporting demands for greater tribal autonomy in dealing with local affairs in the Division.⁵ Local political differences therefore came to the fore of "tribal" Unity to split its organizational leadership. This was so because of the "virulent newspaper" attacks on the Idoma NA apparatus as an instrument for the development of the Division and also because of the political weight the European educated in IHRU gave to supporting the developing demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region separate from the Islamic Society which was opposed to the NPC conception of "One North".⁶ The European educated who led both "tribal" movements however merged in 1957 to try to resurrect the IHRU although its credible

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1. Magid 1971 p.350
 2. Ibid p.351
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Coleman 1958 p.365
 6. Magid 1971 p.351

influence was in decline retrospectively to the more permanent institution of the Native Authority, the NA personnel and the "Ochi Idoma" on people in the Division.¹ This was the premise from which in the same year, the President-General admitted the political failure of the IHRU to achieve the aims of the "tribal" Movement in Idoma land. In the instance, the President suggested that the IHRU collectively: "... had little or no say in planning policies and in the affairs which affect the mass of the people in the Division for whom we fight to release... from political and economic prisons... we have struggled in vain to make our cries heard through one of the legislature of the country ... By standards which mortal beings assess success and failures, we have seen no convincing signs of our achievement".² This suggests that before 1959 the IHRU virtually ceased to exist as a "tribal" force in shaping politics and electoral outcomes in Idoma Division. This was critical to electoral political support for the M-Belt Movement because the 1959 elections provided a political opportunity to show grassroot support for the demands of the creation of a M-Belt Region. In that year however, the IHRU was a spent wave of political mobilization among the forces that shaped electoral outcomes on the political arena of Idoma Division. In the instance the NA personnel and factions of the IHRU who were in step with the conservatism of traditional leadership shaped the electorate for political support to the NPC even when it was the case that some of the European educated Idoma maintained support for the creation of a M-Belt Region as was championed

1. Magid 1971 p.351

2. "Address of The President-General" Idoma Hope Rising Union Annual Conference at Oturkpo, 1957, cited in Magid 1971 p.351.

by the UMBC in alliance with the Action Group Party.¹

Before 1959 however the IHRU had succeeded in bringing to the fore of politics in Idoma land as it related to the NPC party and government in The North, the resources of bargaining for amenities with political support through the institution of the Native Authority.² While it is clear that Idoma land was underdeveloped by a lack of modern amenities relative to patterns of development that existed in the Islamic society in The North, the political reaction to a situation like that which was led by the ex-servicemen and the European educated was conditioned by the need to accelerate development. There was little political concern in the rhetoric of the IHRU leadership to show that domination at local levels by non-indigenes was responsible for the state of underdevelopment in the Division. The concerns remained hidden political and economic fears that were tolerated in the name of peaceful-co-existence among Nigerian groups and societies until their gates were burst open in 1966 when the events surrounding the January coup were given political interpretation as Ibo domination not only at local levels but also at the national level. In the instance the Idoma took over Ibo commercial positions in Oturkpo market as if the process itself was planned while many observers and the NA suggest that it was

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1. Electoral political support from the different "tribal" Unions among the M-Belt groups and societies for the ideas and demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, articulated by the M-Belt Movement in the 1959 elections are examined in analytical detail in Chapters 4 and 5
 2. As will become apparent in Chapters 4 and 5 Idoma Division benefitted more than the Tiv and Igala, the other groups and societies in Benue Province in the distribution of modern infrastructural facilities because of their electoral political support for the NPC and the government in The North, a political lesson the Tiv and Igalla also learnt when politics was returned to the electoral market place in 1979 - The Tiv vote in the 1979 elections is examined in Chapter 5 where explanations are produced to suggest why they voted NPN rather than NPP and UPN.

spontaneous.¹ The domination of political roles and decision making by Hausa Fulani and Islamic leadership was however absent as a causal factor in the organization of the IHRU. This was unlike the existing political factors that caused the organization of the TPU, BPU as well as "tribal" Unions among the other M-Belt groups and societies, where the structure of political domination by non-indigenes in the apparatus of local government in the period between 1900 and 1940 compounded existing social and economic problems to create political reactions in the organization of "tribal" Unions.² The political domination of the apparatus of local government by Hausa Fulani as well as by a variant of Islamic leadership in political roles and decision making was one of the severest problems that conditioned the development of the Birom Progressive Union in Jos Division on the Plateau. There were similar political reactions to this pattern of domination which conditioned the organization of "tribal" Unions among other non-Islamic groups and societies in Pankshin, Shendam and Jemaa Divisions of the Plateau in the period between 1940 and 1952.³

The Birom Progressive Union was organized in 1945 by ex-service-men and Christian trained evangelists and teachers and later joined by

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1. Interview discussions with Professor Armstrong, January 1981.
 2. M.J. Dent, "A Minority Party - The United Middle Belt Congress" 1966 p.461-507 in John P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics, London 1966.
 3. The political development of the BPU and the issues it contested is examined in detail in the following pages as it related to the political reactions on the state of socio-economic problems in Jos Division because the initial organizational thrust of a M-Belt Movement for the creation of a M-Belt Region was begun by the BPU. In the period between 1940 and 1965 Jos Division was characterized by all the socio-economic and political tensions existing among other M-Belt groups and societies.

a very young first generation of advanced European educated from both Christian Missionary and Native Authority schools.¹ Sklar suggests that the original founders of the BPU were Patrick Fom, Patrick Dokotri, Stephen Ajani, John Fom, Lawrence Fom and Frank Adu.² Evidence from research interviews for this study conducted in the period between 1980 and 1981 with some of the politicians Sklar mentions over the initial organization however suggests that although these persons were active members in the BPU and subsequently dominated its political roles in the executive, they were not the founding fathers of the Birom "tribal" political movement.³ When the Birom "tribal" movement was organized in 1945 the initial political support came from indigenes of Jos Division who were mainly Birom.⁴ They were mainly employees of the Native Authority in Jos Division who also enjoyed the social and political support of Headmasters and Evangelist-Teachers in Christian Missionary schools in the villages of Jos Division.⁵ Moses Nyam Rwang suggests that BPU directed its political appeal to this class of Birom because they

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1. Dudley 1966 p.92; Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang Choji Bot, Patrick Dokotri and Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
 2. Sklar 1963 p.345; These were in chronological order, President 50 years old in 1945, an ex-serviceman later a forester and an RCM Teacher-Evangelist; 25 years old, a Teacher and member of the RCM Church; 30 years old, a driver with RCM Missionaries in Jos and member of the RCM Church; 30 years old, an Agricultural Overseer and member of the RCM Church; 26 years old and a nurse with the RCM hospital in Jos.
 3. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pam Tee Buk and Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
 4. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981
 5. Dudley 1966 p.92; Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981

afforded payment of membership subscriptions and donated money at meetings for the political activities of BPU.¹

It ought to be borne in mind however that the BPU was not an exclusively Birom political organization in the same sense as was TPU for the Tiv and the IHRU for the Idoma in Benue Province. Two members of the BPU executive that are closely associated with the formation and initial political activities of the "tribal" political movement for example were non-Birom and non-indigenes to Jos Division. These were Stephen Ajani, an Igbirra who was a Christian Missionary Teacher with the RCM in Jos and Frank Adu, a Ghanian who was a nurse with the RCM hospital also in Jos.² Both persons however had lived in Jos Division and other parts of the Plateau for a long period of time. Although they were not Birom and did not speak any of the languages of the groups and societies in Jos Division, they closely associated with the ex-servicemen upon their return from the Second World War as well as with the European educated Birom before BPU was formed.³ It further ought to be borne in mind that BPU was also not exclusively Birom because of the "tribal" heterogeneity in Jos Division which conditioned extra-tribal political support for BPU from the different groups and societies rather than from as numerous unions as the tribes themselves. This was so because some of the groups

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981
 2. Sklar 1963 p.345; Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
 3. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981

and societies were exceedingly small,¹ and also because the nature of the socio-economic and political problems which BPU subsequently raised in the period between 1945 and 1960 affected all of the indigenous groups and societies in the Division who saw themselves as sharing a common dilemma and this conditioned support. This does not mean that there were no other "tribal" unions in Jos Division. Among others, in the period between 1950 and 1970 there was developed a strongly organized 'Rukuba Tribal Union'. It was BPU however that dominated and mobilized political activities in the period 1945 and 1960. This did not only attract indigenous groups and societies to Jos Division but also the political sympathies of non-indigenes who were not Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri and Nupe as active members of the organization.² The political leadership and followers of PBU, both indigenous and non-indigenes to Jos Division were all identified with Christianity.³ This suggests that there was a Christian identity that organized-in the formation of the Birom "tribal" movement and the name of the movement was a political tag rather than reflecting a cultural identity. Furthermore the non-indigenous members to Jos Division in the executive of BPU were Christians even when it was the case that BPU itself was almost a family affair of three brothers, Patrick Fom, John Fom, Lawrence Fom, in the executive committee from the Birom

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1. The Pakara group and society for example numbered less than 500 in 1937 and the tribe was experiencing increasing disintegration because of assimilation into other cultures. In the 1952 census it was not scored as a distinct group and society. For more detailed examples of some of the very small groups and societies on the Plateau see Section V of this Chapter.
 2. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
 3. Sklar 1963 p.345

village of Kuru.¹

Richard Sklar however does not account for the initial beginning of the political ideas of a "tribal" organization among the Birom which were generated by the ex-servicemen to contest and protest over the state of local socio-economic and political problems and issues in Jos Division upon their return after the Second World War in 1945.² Although the political personalities suggested by Sklar as founding fathers of BPU were later active in the movement after its inception, it was ex-servicemen like Moses Nyam Rwang, Choji Bot, Pam Tee Buk who organized and urged Birom European educated persons like Patrick Dokotri, Moses Rwang Pam (subsequently Chief of Jos in 1947 after being Treasurer of BPU for two years) and his son Bitrus Rwang Pam, of the social and political necessity to organize Birom unity in order to struggle for the readjustment of the unjust state of the welfare of the groups and societies in Jos Division.³ Patrick Dokotri himself, one of the most politically active members of BPU and subsequently in all the different phases of the M-Belt Movement admits that he joined the Birom Movement rather than that he was a founding father.⁴

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1. Sklar 1963 p.345; Interview discussions with Dr Alexander Fom, the son of Patrick Fom, one of the founding fathers of the BPU Movement.
 2. For examples of this missing link in the story of the PBU see Sklar 1963 p.345
 3. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.
 4. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.

Similar to the formations of the Tiv, the Igalla,¹ and Idoma Unions, organized in the period between 1938 and 1945, Birom ex-servicemen featured in developing ideas of "tribal" unity to contest and protest over the state of local political issues in order to solve social and economic problems on their land. In the short period between 1945 and 1950 there was organized three distinct "tribal" political organizations among the Birom which subsequently gave political support to the M-Belt Movement when it was begun in 1949. These were the Birom Progressive Union, the Birom Tribal Union (BTP) and the Birom Educational and Cultural Organization (BECO).² However the main political movement among the Birom, albeit affecting the shape of politics in Jos Division after 1950 was the BPU which directed the activities of the other Birom organizations.³

The Birom Progressive Union was a mass movement of all adults, indigenous⁴ to Jos Division. The Birom Progressive organization also

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1. Not examined in this Section because in the period between 1950 and 1965 the Igalla politically identified their total "tribal" unity with the NPC rather than with a M-Belt Movement. However it was only when the Igalla formed themselves as political and religious minorities in Kwara State where there was a predominantly Islamic population of the Nigerian Federation with a powerful Emir whose traditions were established in the Islamic revolution of dan Fodio, that in 1967 upon the creation of states in Nigeria they sought political inclusion into BP State as a M-Belt Region - This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5 of where variation of political identities in the theme of the M-Belt Movement are examined.
 2. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, Alexander Fom and Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
 3. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981
 4. An indigene meant persons who belonged to groups and societies with residential existence in the area before 1900 and whose traditions of origins suggest that they occupied a territorial space within Jos Division for at least 200 years before 1900. This narrows indigenes to Jos Division to groups and societies like the Birom, the Rukuba, the Irigwe, the Jerawa, the Anaguta and the Ganawuri (Jal), among others rather than including a migrant group and society - This was the unwritten "legal" conception of an indigene among the leadership of BPU - Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.

admitted politically sympathetic non-indigenous persons living in Jos Division in the period between 1945 and 1965 for membership.¹ This explains the presence of Bala Yerima from the Kilba group and society in Adamawa and Frank Adu, a Ghanian, who were active members of BPU and belonged to its executive committee. With a manifesto that suggests commitment for a political struggle to establish Truth in Jos Division,² BPU suggested in the Hausa language to its members that it was a "Jam'iyar Yan Kasar Jos" (a congress of the sons of the soil of Jos) seeking the political support of indigenes and non-indigenes.³ The first aim of BPU as suggested by its manifesto, an aim that was subsequently and obsessively emphasized in the period between 1951 and 1960 among others in a list of twenty objectives set out to be fulfilled, was "the establishment of truth" in Jos Division.⁴ The more politically practical objectives of BPU that concerned the state of politics in Jos Division however was that there ought to be an established relationship between control of political authority and the indigenous groups and societies as it exists else-

1. Dudley 1966 p.90; Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Dokotri, January 1971; see also BPU Manifesto 1951 p.3
2. The BPU motto was "Gaskiya za ta ci Nasara" meaning "Trust will triumph"
3. In the Hausa written manifesto this was: "BPU tana son dukan yan kabilu na asalin Kasar Jos, maza da mata su hada kai a Cikin BPU, ko ma ba acikinta su ke ba" - BPU Manifesto 1951 p.3
4. "BPU tana goyon bayan Gaskiya, Saan nan ta aikata Gaskiya, ta kuma faɗa Gaskiya, tana son Gaskiya" - BPU Mainfesto 1951 p.3, meaning "BPU is a supporter of Truth, a messenger and deliverer of Truth, a spokesman of Truth and likes Truth".

where in other parts of The North and Nigeria, recognition and respect for all religions in the Division, concern that legal judgement in the courts of law be based on truth, the controversies over the issue of certificates of occupancy for residential buildings in the expanding metropolis of Jos, the planting of overhead electrical routes over farmland without the permission of farmers by the Native Authority and the Electricity Company, NESCO (Nigeria Ltd.) from Kurra Falls.¹ Social and welfare issues were also of concern in the political protest of BPU.² These included the concern over lobbying the governments in The North and the Native Authority in Jos to establish hospitals, dispensaries, clinics for infants and children, maternity clinics, trade and agricultural cooperatives as well as concern over demarcation and financial compensation for land that government and mining interests took over from farmers.³ The purely political issues that were subsequently raised by BPU were centred on mobilization of support to elect indigenes of Jos Division in the 1951 elections for the NHA and the 1954 elections into the Federal House of Representatives as well as the question of an indigene to Jos as the confirmed Paramount Chief with political authority over the whole Division.⁴ It was however not until 1955

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1. BPU Manifesto 1951 p.2-3
 2. "Shaanin raya Kasa" meaning: "Concerning the development of the land with socio-economic and welfare infrastructure" - BPU Manifesto 1951 p.2-3
 3. BPU Manifesto 1951 p.2-3
 4. Ibid

that a Birom, Rwang Pam, was confirmed as Chief of Jos and the Paramount Chief of the Division with a second class chieftaincy status.¹ In its attempts to emphasize the issues it was contesting in Jos Division, the Manifesto of the BPU concluded that it will "forcefully arbitrate" in matters that affected the groups and societies who were its 'children' in the instance of hostilities between two personalities as well as non-indigenous communities in the Division.²

While the BPU was non-tribal, the Birom Tribal Party was an exclusively cultural movement, meant to contest local elections into the NA councils in the period between 1950 and 1965. The Birom Tribal Party (BTP) was also meant to serve as a political body representing the Birom to screen and nominate Birom members into the executive bodies of the BPU and the M-Belt Movements like the , the MZL, MBPP and the UMBC as well as other political parties which the leadership chose to identify with the Birom group and society.³ Although BPT was an organization within the political unity of BPU in Jos Division, its main socio-economic and political interests were focussed on the culture and interests of Birom unity. This was so even when it was the case that the political protests it articulated over the state of socio-economic problems affecting the Birom were similar to those that were

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1. Northern Nigeria Local Government Year Book 1965, Zaria 1965 p.16; Dudley 1966 p.112
 2. BPU Manifesto 1951, article six p.3
 3. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981

of concern to BPU. The BPT however provided a political vent to occupy executive positions that were contested by both the ex-servicemen and the European educated in BPU and prevented the organization of a rival union in the instance of an excluded developing leadership. BECO also fulfilled this political function of keeping all potentially rival leadership in executive positions of organizations under BPU. In the period between 1950 and 1965 BECO was another exclusively Birom organization that was meant to bring together a younger generation of European educated Birom "who were outside the mainstream of political stress and competition".¹ The organization was concerned to encourage Birom Youth to attain higher European based educational qualifications and to create conditions for the preservation and persistence of Birom culture.² Both the initially composed and subsequently reviewed copies of the BECO Constitution were produced by Dr Alexander L.M. Fom, John Wash Pam, Lt. Pam Mwadkwon, Inspector Toma Gambo, Sgt. Chiroma Danyang, Sgt. Gyang Pam Kuru, who became the first members of the executive committee of the organization.³ It is interesting that similar to the formulation of BPU there was still a military personnel concentration in the formation and organization of BECO. Four out of the

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1. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri and Barnabas Dusu, January 1981
 2. The Constitution of the Birom Educational and Cultural Organization, 1951, Review copy 1966 p.1; Since 1978 BECO has been resurrected as a focus of Birom unity for socio-economic development and the mobilization of all the Birom in support of a political party its leadership thinks will best serve and protect Birom interests - This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5
 3. BECO Constitution 1966 p.15; interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981

six members in the executive committee of BECO were in the armed services of Nigeria and only two, Alexander L.M. Fom and John Wash Pam were the purely European educated. The political involvement of armed services personnel in the organization of "tribal" movements generally among the M-Belt groups and societies is explained by the influences outside their areas of the observations made of other Nigerian groups and societies who agitated for socio-economic improvements of their groups and societies, since work in the armed services took them away from the home areas.

However, while BPU and BTP used Hausa and English as the languages of their political meetings, BECO was concerned to use only the Birom language even when it was the case that minutes of their meetings were taken in the English language.¹ Furthermore the constitutions of BPU and BECO were both written in English and Hausa and none of the published documents sponsored by both organizations in the period between 1950 and 1965 were in the Birom language. Although BECO was theoretically concerned with culture its major emphasis in the list of projects it set out to achieve was focussed on "cash-programs" for the development of Birom unity and culture. Essentially these were money making projects rather than creating conditions for the persistence of Birom unity and culture. The projects included the establishment of economic and commercial enterprises for BECO: "to own houses.. establish 'The Birom House' and Birom commercial enterprises in all parts of the country, starting first at home... establish Birom bakeries, a Birom 'club', a Birom transport company to provide easy means of transportation of our local foodstuff

1. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981

and crops to the bigger markets in the townships.. This transport company shall be composed of taxis, omnibuses and lorries and shall bear the inscription of "Biom Taxi Service" or "Biom Transport Company" on the sides of the vehicles ... the commercial projects shall include all forms of commercial activities with special emphasis on retail trading; establishment of the 'Biom Super Markets' for the provisions of local foodstuffs and (the establishment of BECO owned) petrol stations".¹ This suggests that while BPU was essentially a social and political organization, BECO, an organization within the political directives of BPU was concerned with organization for the economic and commercial advancement of the Biom within the unity of the Nigerian political state. This is to be expected because political and economic interests themselves are not independent of each other since they tend to compliment and reinforce each other.² The "tribal" identity of the Biom was therefore meant to be organized into Biom economic interests by BECO as they stood in relation to other groups and societies in Jos Division albeit The North and Nigeria.

There were some social objectives of BECO however which emphasized Biom unity in cultural terms. Firstly BECO itself was a Biom Educational and Cultural Organization. The organization emphasized culture in its desire for Biom unity when it suggests that: "The key word in the name of the organization is "Biom" .. with the aim to deepen love and mutual understanding among Bioms all over the world.. to inculcate the spirit of oneness in order to render the Biom fit and well informed as capable leaders and helpers of the Biom... to

1. The Constitution of BECO, Reviewed Copy 1966 p.3
 2. Lavers 1980 p.18

preserve the Birom culture and traditions that have been inherited from our forefathers and to uphold the glory of the Birom-man and his farm".¹ Furthermore although the BECO constitution emphasized that the organization was not political and not religiously Christian, it suggested that "the Birom man must be God fearing (in Christian religious ethics)... and membership is strictly *Birom* ... *God help the Birom that we may be one. For divided we fall, but united we shall stand*".²

The socio-economic and political problems and issues contested by BPU were three-fold. In the period between 1945 and 1950, when there was increased political activity in Nigeria because of the changes in the constitution of the country, BPU was concerned to organize political representation for the groups and societies in Jos Division by elected indigenes.³ It was from this premise that political representation became an issue sufficiently to be included in all of its manifestos in the period between 1950 and 1960. In the period 1955 and 1958 for example two of its major objectives were exclusively concerned with political mobilization for the 1956 elections of representatives into the NHA and planning for the Federal House of Representative Elections in 1959 from among indigenes of the groups and societies in Jos Division.⁴ The BPU Manifesto also suggested that one of its political objectives in the struggle was that the indigenes of the groups and societies in Jos Division ought to be "left alone"

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1. BECO Constitution 1956 p.1
 2. BECO Constitution 1966 p.1; p.15 Emphases are as in the Constitution
 3. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981
 4. Birom Progressive Union ("Jamiyyar Yan Kasar Jos), Manifestos, Serial No. 861, 1954-1958 p.4: "Zaben Wakilai zuwa Majalisar Jihar Arewa da Majalisar Nigeria daga yankin Kasar Jos" meaning "the elections of representatives to the NHA and the Nigerian FHA from Jos Division".

to choose whom they wanted as a political representative into the legislative assemblies of Nigeria.¹ This suggests that within the very social and geographical boundaries of Jos township as well as Jos Division, there was political interference by some outside and non-indigenous authority that dictated the choice of political representation for the indigenous groups and societies in the Division. In the instance of the period between 1954 and 1965 political representation from among the groups and societies indigenous to Jos Division was subjected to the dictates of the choices of the NPC leadership in Kaduna based on the political recommendations and manipulations of the Hausa Fulani communities and migrant Islamic leadership in Jos Division.² The purely local political problems that were of concern to BPU were centred on the domination of political roles and decision making in the NA institutions by Hausa Fulani, particularly so in the NA of the Division and the townships of Jos and Bukuru. The Native Authority was seen to be responsible for unjust laws, unfair issues of certificates of occupancy for buildings in the townships, activities which were seen to favour the non-indigenous richer population. This problem became compounded by the fact that the NA processed and approved the applications without the permission of the indigenous owners of the land plots in the urban areas.³ The NA in Jos Division was also held responsible for laxity in the rapid development of plots by non-indigenes with commercial buildings, which in most instances were also erected without

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1. Manifesto No.861 1954 p.4: "... A bar Jamaar gari, Ko Kasa su zabi wanda suke so" meaning: "Let the people of the town (Jos) and land (Jos Division) be free to elect the person of their choice".
 2. Political manipulation in the choice of indigenous leadership to Jos Division is examined with more analytical detail in Chapter 4 where Politics with the M-Belt Movement in The North and Nigeria is brought into focus.
 3. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981

the permission of the farmers who owned the land and the overall township lay-out of building sites.¹ The particular political and economic tensions in Jos Division over the domination of the NA apparatus were compounded by persistent claims of the Hausa Fulani and Islamic communities in the Division for Hausamen to be the 'Paramount Chiefs' in the townships of Jos and Bukuru. The political problems centred on the chieftaincy of Jos however were rooted in the political practices and application of the Indirect Rule Policy. The policy and its application in the period between 1900 and 1932 meant the centring of political authority on the Hausa Fulani which the British initially used as political interpreters as well as a variant of Islamic leadership that was based on the patterns of authority which existed in the Islamic society in The North.²

In 1910 when the government of British administration in The North established Jos as a developing metropolis and became the most important political and economic centre of the Plateau, it appointed a Hausa, as Chief of the township.³ It was however not until in the period between 1940 and 1950 that the Birom who were the numerically dominant group and society in the hinterland of Jos and Bukuru town-

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1. Manifesto of the BPU No.861 1954 p.4: "Shaanin gine-gine da wadansu suna yi da babu izinin mai gona, wuri, Ko mai Kasar" - meaning: "The issue of buildings and constructions which some people do without the permission of the farmer, place or land".
 2. For detailed discussions with examples on the policy of Indirect rule and the changes in the political meaning of its interpretation in the period between 1900 and 1932, see Chapter 2 where its application over the M-Belt groups and societies was examined.
 3. Dudley 1966 p.92

ships as well as in Jos Division in 1952 and who were in the midst of an economically and socially developed enclave of the M-Belt groups and societies with a literacy rate of about 6.0% of the Divisional population total and with well established functioning modern European infrastructural facilities, began to voice objections to a Hausa continuing as chief over land and people where the Hausa communities were non-indigenes. Although Rwang Pam, a Birom, was appointed as chief in 1947 after being a Treasurer of BPU in 1946 and even when he was moved to Jos township in 1947 his political authority was restricted to taking decisions over the Birom group and society as "Chief of Birom".¹ The BPU however produced political pressures for him to be titled as the Chief of Jos, in the same political sense to the Emirs (Chiefs) of Kano, Zaria and Katsina, a political demand that was contested by the Hausa communities in the township. This was so because as Chief of Jos there was potential for him to be chairman of the NA council and this will condition his meeting the incessant representation to the NA and to the government of British administration in The North by the BPU over compensation for lands acquired for tin mining.² BPU also anticipated that Rwang Pam as chief of Jos might also have influence over plot allocation for private and commercial building of houses in the lay-outs of the developing metropolitan townships of Jos, a situation that will reverse discrimination on the non-indigenous population.³ In the period between 1947 and 1954 there was increased pressure from BPU members of the executive

1. Dudley 1966 p.92

2. Ibid

3. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.

to make Rwang Pam, the "Chief of the Birom", Chief of Jos. When the leaders of the Islamic Hausa Fulani communities protested against this demand in 1953, BPU delegated Moses Nyam Rwang, one of the executive members of BPU, to write a strongly worded petition to the Sardauna of Sokoto, the Premier and Minister for Local Government in The North discounting the claims of the Hausa communities to the chieftaincy of Jos. In that year Moses Nyam Rwang wrote arguing that: "... If any Hausaman wants to ascend to a throne, the people of Birom land have no objection to his going back to his town to become either a chief, a district head or a village head.. he can become anything he wants to in his native land... Have the Hausas, Ibos and Yorubas come in search for food in Birom land or for chieftaincy? If the three of them have come to look for chieftaincy, each should go back to his native land and ascend to the throne he wants. But if they have come in search of food they should concern themselves with that alone and stop causing trouble among the peoples of this land".¹ As a direct consequence in response to the political pressures of BPU the chief of the Birom, Rwang Pam became the chief of Jos in 1955.²

In 1956 however the political pressures generated by BPU which shaped the ascendancy of the Birom in the political affairs of the NA in Jos became checked when there was organized a Hausa Tribal Party (Jammiyyar Hausawan Jos) with the objective of protecting "the interests of the Hausa elements in Jos area".³ When the Hausa Political Party^{was organized}

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1. Extracts from A letter of Petition, by Moses Nyam Rwang, addressed to the Premier and Minister for Local Government in The North, Ahmadu Bello the Sardauna of Sokoto, 18th July 1953. The English translation above from the original Hausa language version is mine.
 2. Dudley 1966 p.112
 3. The Nigerian Citizen, 5th May 1956 and 28th August 1956, cited in Dudley 1966 p.112.

to contest the political issues raised by BPU, local politics in the Division became taken into the Regional House of Assembly in the interests of the non-indigenous Islamic communities by the Hausa Fulani members that were elected from the constituencies on the Plateau as well as by Islamic members of Parliament who were outside the electoral districts of the Jos area. In 1958 for example, Ibrahim Imam who was politically affiliated to the AG and the M-Belt organization, the UMBC suggested to members in the NHA that the Chief of Jos, Rwang Pam was a rascal, and derided as "a corrupt Emir" who ought to be removed from the Chairmanship of the Jos town council because "... of the unusual position in Jos where the chief is not only chief and chairman of the Local Town Council ... The unprecedented situation was well within rights to be changed (by the Assembly)."¹ Similarly Alhaji Isyaku Gwamna who was NEPU in party political identity and the elected member in the NHA from Jos Township constituency argued that "the Chief of Jos should be removed from the chairmanship of the town council because ... when the town council of Jos was established the Native Authority was to choose the chairman. The leader of the Native Authority appointed himself to be the chairman .. how many second class chief are chairmen of town councils! ... it means the Chief of Jos has promoted himself instead of demoting himself and I hope that before long he will be removed from the council".²

Although BPU became deeply involved and subsequently divided over the political issue of the chieftaincy in Jos Division this was

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1. Northern House of Assembly Debates, Ilorin NA Council, 5th August 1958 p.444-445
 2. Ibid p.445

not of central concern on the necessity for unity of the Birom as a cultural group and society in the same political sense that the institution of chieftaincy was considered as crucial in the expression of tribal "unity" and identity among the Tiv, Idoma and Igalla in Benue Province. While socio-political and economic problems were paramount issues which raised the need for the organization for the "unity of the tribe(s)" in Jos Division, purely political problems with peripheral economic issues conditioned the development of "tribal" identities among the Tiv, Idoma and Igalla. When "tribal" cohesion was achieved among each of the groups and societies in Benue Province it became used as a joint political resource to urge for the solutions to the social and economic problems existing in their societies. While "tribal" identities were first and foremost consolidated among the Tiv, Igalla and Idoma before their mobilization was activated as political support which was fed into the M-Belt Movement, non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau, S. Zaria experienced a "non-tribal" identity before regression into "tribal" types. In the instance of the latter this was in the Christian religious identity before increased modernization caused the development of their "tribal" organizations within the M-Belt Movement. Among other factors, the variation in the development of "tribal" identities and socio-political consciousness on the nature of society among the M-Belt groups and societies within the developing M-Belt Movement in the period between 1949 and 1960 explains the volatile nature of political support for the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. In other words when the M-Belt Movement was begun in 1949, while "tribes" in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Plateau gave their political and social support because they were Christians in a non-Islamic religious movement, the Tiv for example

joined in the Movement as that of "non-Islamic tribes" rather than "Christian tribes".¹

However BPU was also concerned to organize political and social protest to stop the evacuation of Birom as well as other groups and societies indigenous to Jos Division who were being encouraged to migrate to a resettlement scheme at Sabon-Zawan, a territory along Old Jemaa road to Kafanchan. Although the policy in the scheme was developed as early as in 1939 when there was increased demand for tin ores to meet the needs of the Second World War, it was not until in 1945 that the ideas in it began to be implemented.² The Sabon-Zawan resettlement scheme for the groups and societies in Jos Division was meant to create an undisturbing environment for tin mining activities,³ and was also intended for the development of "a European Colony" because the climatic conditions were uniquely temperate for European settlement.⁴ It is further suggested by Dokotri that conceptions of developing "a European Colony" in Jos Division to serve as a holiday resort as well as a place where British retiring Officers might settle is explained by the unusually high development and concentration of functionally stable modern European facilities in the Division as early as in 1950. There was for example a very stable supply of electricity by NESCO Ltd. from Kurra Falls, stable pipe-borne water supplies from Lamingo and an ultra-modern hotel in the GRA in Jos - the Hill Station Hotel.⁵ The critical point however was that most of the

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1. These differences in the social and political conceptions of the political identity of the M-Belt Movement will become apparent in Chapter 4 when we examine the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement from the Non-Moslem League (NML) in 1949 to the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) in 1956.
 2. C.R.Niven, Plateau Province 1951, Northern Region of Nigeria: Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna 1953 p.61
 3. Freund 1981 p.156-169
 4. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981
 5. Ibid; although Dokotri further suggests that one of the political motives in the development of the scheme was that Jos Division was meant to be developed as a military base where units of the WAFF might be stationed for use to crack down on nationalists in British West African Colonial countries, there is no evidence to support this.

modern infrastructure developed in Jos was for the benefit of the mining industry and British administrative institutions of Government, Commerce and industry rather than for the indigenous population.

The economic problems caused by tin mining activities among the Birom however conditioned the justification of the scheme. These were based on the arguments that: "The Birom does not depend upon farming for his living as he can always get money from mining and the shortage of firewood is such that manure tends to be used as fuel rather than on land; further, in some cases the land is scattered into small units which makes true mixed farming very difficult".¹

The government of British administration in The North used different incentives which were mainly directed on the Birom group and society, the numerically dominant in the Division, to induce farmers to move their families to the resettlement scheme at Sabon Zawan. In 1945 for example, the fifteen chiefs in the Birom Districts were promised that any of them who successfully persuaded his people to move and first completed the process will ascend to political power to be the "Bwong Gwom Birom" (Big Chief of Birom).² Furthermore, financial inducements of two shillings per week with "two measures" of free grains of corn and millet per day were given to each family for one year when they moved to Sabon-Zawan.³ This was meant to enable the farming families to settle down on the new land before they started farming on the government allocated plots while they built their own houses without government assistance. Moses Nyam Rwang further suggests

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1. Niven 1953 p.61
 2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pam Tee Buk and Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
 3. As (2)

that it was only the Chief of Zawan village who responded positively to the inducements of the government before they, the ex-servicemen in particular, stepped in with the BPU Movement. There was however never any political pressures from the government of British administration in The North to coerce Birom chiefs to move their populations to Sabon-Zawan.

Zawan, Du and Gyel are the three Birom villages where farmland was most affected by tin mining activities. They are close to each other and were centred on the township of Bukuru where there were the headquarters of the ATMN Ltd, the biggest of the tin mining companies in Nigeria.¹ It is the concentration and the causal effects of the problems developed from tin mining activities on the Birom village of Zawan and the efforts of the government to move the majority of the population centred on the village that explains the name of the new resettlement scheme as "Sabon Zawan" meaning New Zawan. Of the forty families that Niven suggests had moved to 'Sabon Zawan' in 1951, all were from the original Birom village of Zawan.² In the period between 1950 and 1965 the Chief of Zawan village fell out permanently with the other Birom chiefs as well as with political leadership of the BPU over the issue of moving Birom people to 'Sabon Zawan'. This was so because in the period between 1950 and 1965 the Sardauna of Sokoto who was also the Premier of The North exploited the social and political divisions among the Birom created by the 'Sabon Zawan' issue, converted the Chief of Zawan

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1. For more detailed discussions of the social and economic problems developed from the activities of tin mining companies in The North and in particular on the Plateau as it related to the exploitation of land and labour, bringing an influx of non-indigenous population to Jos Division, see Sections IV and V of this Chapter.
 2. Niven 1953 p.61; Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.

to Islam and promised him the chieftaincy of Jos Division to replace Rwang Pam if only himself and the Zawan people (with very strong Catholic communities) towed the lines of government policies and disassociated themselves from the political demands of BPU and subsequently those made in the different phases of the M-Belt Movement which BPU leadership supported.¹ The chief of Zawan village has remained the only Birom chief who is Moslem. All other Birom chiefs are Christians.

However, in the period between 1940 and 1950, while the government of British administration in The North was concerned to successfully implement the 'Sabon-Zawan Scheme' it increasingly required Birom labour on the tin mines fields. For example, while the impact of the Second World War on tin ore requirements increased land alienation in Jos Division (an economic premise from which the 'Sabon Zawan' scheme became justified) there existed political and administrative pressures to recruit people as 'political labour' to work on the mines.² In Gyel, one of the fifteen Birom villages, an average of 463 persons out of a total adult population of 3093, worked on the mines in the period between 1942 and 1943 with wives carrying tin ores besides their husbands.³

In the period between 1945 and 1950 when ex-servicemen like Patrick Fom, Moses Nyam Rwang, Pam Tee Buk and Choji Bot returned from Burma, India and East Africa to find the 'Sabon Zawan' scheme under implementation in the midst of increased destruction of farmland as a result of tin mining activities without adequate compensation,

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Dokotri, January 1981; the political pressures on non-Islamic chiefs from among the M-Belt groups and societies to convert and accept the Islamic religion which were produced by the Sardauna of Sokoto are examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5
 2. Freund 1981 p.160
 3. Ibid

besides the political tensions existing in Jos Division over the domination of political roles and decision making in the Native Authority by HausaFulani and a variant of non-indigenous Islamic leadership, they organized the BPU as a political movement to contest the solutions of the issues. Firstly however, the main objective of the ex-servicemen with BPU, was to mobilize chiefs in the Division and their people in the different Birom villages "to refuse moving out from their fatherland to Sabon Zawan".¹ The political success in the efforts of BPU that discouraged chiefs and their people not to move is suggested by the fact that in the period between 1945 and 1951, forty families from a single village had moved to 'Sabon Zawan'.² This was the premise from which in 1951, Niven himself suggests that: "The resistance offered by the Biroms to mining has still remained serious and irreducible. One can of course understand and sympathise with the individual farmer whose land is destroyed by mining. It is not so easy to understand the attitude of people who refuse to improve their farms, who will not endeavour to stop erosion by simple methods, who will not go in for simple irrigation schemes at no expense to themselves ... obviously there is a natural reluctance to leave one's home and go to distant places to farm, but this natural reluctance has stopped many Birom families from going of their own free will to farm down in the Plains.

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang. There were similar views expressed by Choji Bot and Patrick Dokotri during interview discussions, January 1981.
 2. Niven 1951 p.60

The more surprising it is therefore when one considers that the Jemaa Resettlement Scheme last year, which was created especially to assist these Birom on the Plateau and which considerable Government money has been spent on, was only strengthened by the arrival of two settlers so that the whole settlement still only comprises forty families".¹ Although the scheme was eventually abandoned by the government of British administration in The North after 1956 because of its unhealthy location, the BPU in particular led the fight to kill the scheme for its underlying political and economic motives as serious remedies to the problems of the groups and societies in Jos Division.² In the period between 1950 and 1956 the 'Sabon Zawan' Resettlement Scheme was a contested political issue in both the NHA in Kaduna as well as in the Federal House of Representatives in Lagos.³

BPU was also concerned to organize resistance to tin mining activities and alternatively struggle for indigenous participation in the mining industry, as well as make demands for compensation on land leased to the mining companies and reclamation by re-forestation upon completion of mining activities on the land. This was so even when it was the case that British colonial legislation made all land in The North the property of The British Crown.⁴ The farmers were entitled to compensation from the mining companies for mining activities on his land under the Mineral Ordinance of 1916.⁵

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1. Niven 1953 p.60
 2. Freund 1981 p.164
 3. For examples, see Debates in the House of Representatives, The 1955-56 Appropriation Ordinance 1955, Lagos, 28th March 1955 p.646-649
 4. Freund 1981 p.159
 5. Ibid

In most instances before 1945 when BPU became organized the financial compensations were simply handed over to the chief of a village where the mining companies operated as a form of bribe rather than compensation to the farmer.¹ The tin companies paid low compensations and always made their own dubious arrangements with the farmers whereby the farmer continued to work his land on a mining lease that was actually not being mined.² Although the chiefs were dissatisfied with the patterns of company arrangements and operations their positions depended on the government and that cost them political influence to protest.³ In the situation direct expropriation of land for mining purposes was only one of the systemic forces pressing down on the groups and societies in Jos Division and on their agricultural land. This problem became compounded by the fact that after tin was mined on agricultural land, the land was left unreclaimed by reforestation. This does not mean that the government of British administration in The North made no efforts to reclaim destroyed farmland. Reforestation was the only programme which surfaced in 1947 that appeared economically viable to the government in the options of solutions to the mining problems on farmland in Jos Division. The reforestation efforts however turned out to be mainly eucalyptus plantations.⁴ While the eucalyptus plantations had potential for stemming soil erosion, it did little or nothing directly to the Birom farmer and the process became less enthusiastically accepted with gratitude. This was so because the eucalyptus plantations became government forest reserves and it was illegal practice to hunt wild

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1. Freund 1981 p.159
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid p.164

life as well as to cut the grown trees for use as fuel or sell to earn cash.¹ In 1949 the government rejected the efforts in reafforestation: "... because there was no economic sense in a reclamation policy which was carried out solely for the sake of political propaganda".² Subsequently in 1951 it was estimated that it required £440,000 to restore between 4000 to 5000 acres of land for agricultural use.³ This gave the government a further reason to drop efforts of land reclamation by reafforestation. As early as in 1946 the tin mining companies were held liable by the government for primary reclamation work on mines dumps as well as on other land damaged by mining activities.⁴ The government however established a Forestry Department in the NA and recruited indigenes of Jos Division, mainly Birom as workers and inspectors. In the instance the founding fathers of BPU in ex-servicemen like Patrick Fom, Moses Nyam Rwang and Pam Tee Buk who were very active in mobilizing protest over issues affecting Jos Division and who were not sufficiently educated for the attention of top government jobs, all became appointed as Forest Inspectors with the Forest Department of the NA in Jos, wage earning jobs that they held until their retirements. This suggests that there were subtle strategies to reduce the impact of political

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981; Moses Nyam Rwang was one of the NA employed BPU leaders as Forest Officer in the period between 1960 and 1970.
 2. Mining Policy Compensation, Comments on the Memorandum, D. de M. Robin 1949, cited in Freund 1981 p.164
 3. NAK: JOSPROF III 8248, Annual Report of Plateau Province 1951, cited in Freund 1981 p.164
 4. Nigeria: Legislative Council Debates, 5th March 1945; NAK: JOSPROF III Mining Policy Compensation 1947; Report on Farm Survey of Area Occupied by the Zawan Community of the Birom Tribe, Jos Division by J.G. Davies, cited in Freund 1981 p.162

activities generated by BPU as some of its leadership became engaged and integrated into government activities as alternative roles related to their protests and demands.

The socio-economic and political problems of Jos Division however remained unsolved and there was increased discontent over their contested solutions in the period between 1950 and 1965 and the protests echoed well into the years after 1970. One that was of major concern to BPU and preoccupied its energies on an equal scale to protest over the 'Sabon Zawan Scheme' and land reclamation by reforestation was compensation direct to farmers for mining activities on agricultural pieces of land. In 1944 the Gyel Farm Survey suggested that in Jos Division 10.3% of the original arable land was already destroyed through the operation of the mining companies, 2.2% was taken over for occupation by the miners, 86% was under mining leases of some sort or another although not all was necessarily taken up, 4% was settled and farmed by non-indigenes employed as labour on the mining camps.¹ In Gyel village itself, which was at the heart of tin mining activities in Jos Division there remained only 4.4 acres of farmable land left per adult factor with a 6.4 average acreage for the entire Birom country in 1944.² Where arable land existed it was farmed on alternate fallow years and about 6.4 acres produced food for a 'sufficient diet' and

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1. J. Davies, Gyel Farm Survey, 1944 p.196-212, cited in Dudley 1966 p.112
 2. J. Davies, The Gyel Farm Survey, 1944 p.8, cited in Freund 1981 p.161

4.4 acres produced food for 'sufficient energy'.¹ In Birom country as a whole there was hardly any unused agricultural land left and the people existed below diet sufficiency.² In practice food sufficiency was achieved by a gross over-use of agricultural land.³ In 1947 the Birom as a whole were obliged to purchase an average of 20% of their food requirements because of the destructive state of agricultural land created by mining activities.⁴ To Baker suggests that in Bachint village an area of Jos Division least affected by mining activities and less crowded in population than Gyel village, the people had to buy grain before a new harvest.⁵ In the period between 1947 and 1952 the majority of the Birom population depended on wage earning rather than farming their crops in order to eat,⁶ because the farmland areas were considerably reduced.

It was from the deteriorating relationship between agricultural production and the destruction of farmland that a new mineral ordinance altered the compensation for arable land from £2 per acre in 1939 to £27 in 1946.⁷ This was one year after the formation of BPU. The tin mining companies strongly objected to the new aspects of the 1946 regulations because they increased costs and lowered tin company

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1. Freund 1981 p.161
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Tanya M. Baker, The social organization of the Birom, London 1954 p.22
 6. Freund 1981 p.161
 7. Ibid p.162

profits since the compensation payments were higher.¹ By 1950 for example, the ATMN Ltd, the biggest of the tin mining companies operating in Nigeria, paid £10,000 per year in land compensation, an increasingly important cost factor in their operations especially for the small companies operating in the congested areas of Du, Zawan and Gyel.²

Political pressures from BPU mobilization in resistance to tin mining activities pushed the government to extend legislation even further inspite of objections by the tin companies.³ In the period between 1940 and 1955 the government of British administration in The North was extremely nervous about the rising tide of mobilized Birom resistance by BPU to tin mining activities.⁴ For example, in 1946 Gyel villagers were successfully mobilized to force the ATMN Ltd. to wait until crops were harvested before mining was begun.⁵ In 1950 the first organized violence against mining prospecting on the high plateau in half a century took place.⁶ In 1951 Moses Nyam Rwang, a BPU executive member led a crowd in obstructing mining operations on site which proved to be an invalid claim to contain tin deposits, to the delight of the Birom.⁷

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1. Freund 1981 p.164
 2. Ibid
 3. For a detailed account of the patterns and nature of this mobilized resistance, see Chapter 6 of Bill Freund 1981 p.156-173 where he examines "Peasant Resistance: Tin Mining and the Birom"
 4. NAK: JOSPROF III Annual Report, Plateau Province 1952, 8379: Resident to H.R.E. Brown, Secretariat Kaduna 9th January 1953.
 5. NAK: JOSPROF III Annual Reports, Jos Division 6450 Jos Division Annual Report 1946
 6. NAK: JOSPROF I/2 Annual Report, Plateau Province 1950
 7. NAK: JOSPROF III Annual Reports, Jos Division 6450 Jos Division Annual Report 1951

Following these developments organized by BPU as early as 1946 the government of British administration in The North was prepared to press cases against the tin mining companies who operated without the consent of farmers in Jos Division.¹ In 1951 the government introduced new exclusive prospecting licences which limited tin-mining prospecting operations to one square mile.² In 1954 an amendment to the Mines Regulations permitted objections to be heard over land given for new mining leases before farmland was excavated for tin ores.³ It was from these concessions that BPU further organized Birom communities to proclaim land as 'stafi' (sacred) areas in order to exclude mining as well as to increase bargaining for compensation prices.⁴

In the period between 1955 and 1970 the character of Birom resistance to tin mining activities changed and its force weakened. This was not because of an improvement in the socio-economic standard of living of the groups and societies in Jos Division. The mining companies continued to nibble land in Jos Division with mining activities and the problem of land reclamation remained with increased deterioration on the environment.⁵ The changed character and weakened force of resistance to tin mining activities on Jos Division is explained by the rechanneling of political energies rather than an

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1. Freund 1981 p.165
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid
 5. Logams 1975 p.100

improvement in the socio-economic and political situation of the groups and societies. Firstly in the period between 1949 and 1956, BPU leadership became the initial political leadership in the NML and the MZL which championed the struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region.¹ Secondly when there was decline in agricultural production, as a direct consequence of the destruction of arable land caused by tin mining activities many Birom individually turned to other ways of making money to make a living outside selling firewood and farmed food crops. One of the new ways of making money was through what became "illegally" defined in legal terms as "tin-stealing" by both the government of British administration in The North and the tin mining companies.² Furthermore in the period between 1950 and 1965, the political policy of 'Northernization' which sought to indigenize the civil service in The North, opened up a bevy of well paid jobs and took away some of the European educated in the leadership of the BPU who were politically acceptable to the NPC party,³ a situation that was accelerated in 1968 when the BP state government apparatus began to function.⁴

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1. This is examined in more detail in Chapter where the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement and its ideas for a M-Belt Region are discussed.
 2. Logams 1975 p.104-105
 3. Freund 1981 p.115
 4. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5 where jobs in the civil service of The North are discussed as important resources for buying political support as well as the political tensions that resulted from elite competition upon the creation of BP state in 1968.

Before 1945 Hausa and other immigrants to Jos Division were the sole participants in "tin-stealing".¹ The earliest instance of Birom participation in "tin-stealing" was in 1937.² In that instance it was suggested that "Birom villagers near Ropp put on Hausa clothes in order to sell contraband tin".³ In the period between 1940 and 1950 when many European tin mining employees privatized and operated as 'Private Miners' who had mining licences, "tin-stealing" increased among the Biromas as a quick money making activity.⁴ Oumar-Shittien suggests that in the period between 1950 and 1970 earnings from "tin-stealing" sold to private miners were in excess to cash values from Birom farm crops like "Acha" and the potato and concludes that ".. in Birom villages wealth is unequally distributed according to ones access to the tin and how one can control its acquisition".⁵ In a survey of the Birom villages of Du and Shen at the end of 1972 it was estimated that 80% of the adult male population was engaged in "tin-stealing".⁶ Tin stealing became an acceptable as well as an essential part of Birom village economy.⁶ This was so because it was a means of capital accumulation for a few and a way of expressing defiance to a system that destroyed agricultural land and the older ways of life among the groups and societies in Jos Division.⁷

In the period between 1950 and 1970 there were increases in the numbers of Birom as 'private miners' and who were also the ring-

1. Freund 1981 p.167

2. Ibid

3. Ibid

4. Ibid

5. Aishatu Abigail Oumar-Shittien, The New Economic Factor: Social Impact of Mining on the Birom 1973 p.82

6. Freund 1981 p.168

7. Ibid

in the tin-poaching operations and some acquired private mining rights which enabled them to legally sell tin ores.¹ This is suggested by the value of privately bought tin from incidences of "tin-theft". For example Freund suggests that while in 1950 £250,000 was spent on contraband tin, it rose to £1,000,000 in 1971.² Between the private miners and the ordinary villagers who were the real poachers, there existed a network of middlemen who were Birom.³ Birom who served as fences and as middlemen in the 'tin stealing' business were viewed by the community as 'brothers'.⁴ In the period between 1950 and 1965, the Birom political elite with connections to government personalities in Kaduna acted to protect the communities that were economically dependent on "tin-stealing". This was particularly so for the Birom villages of Du, Shen and Gyel. For example when Danboyi Zang from the Birom village of Gyel who developed to become the wealthiest of the Birom private miners was accused of running a network of "tin theft" the ATMN Ltd suggested that he used political connections with the NPC government in Kaduna to prevent legal procedures that might prove the allegations to be true.⁵ This was so because in the period between 1960 and 1965, Danboyi Zang became appointed as one of the mining members in the NHA from Jos Division,⁶ and enjoyed the political patronage of the Sardauna of Sokoto.⁷

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1. Freund 1981 p.167
 2. Freund 1981 Table 6-I p.167
 3. Freund 1981 p.167
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid
 6. Ibid
 7. For examples of the apparent ties between Zang and the Sardauna see the farmer's first speech in the NHA in NHA Governor's Speech: Debate on the Address, 26 February 1965 p.61-62

It was in the midst of these socio-economic and political problems that there developed split images in the envisaged support and patterns of solutions that might be created in a M-Belt Region over the contested issues in Jos Division. While severe economic problems remained at the bottom of society frustrating the ordinary people, personal economic gains took precedence over organization for their solutions in an anticipated M-Belt Region. In the period between 1956 and 1965 within Jos Division itself where a 'M-Belt Movement' was begun and where socio-economic and political problems were severest, there was volatile political support for the ideas of a M-Belt Region. This was so because both political and economic leadership in the membership of BPU became clients to the government of the NPC in The North. The political clientele of some of the leaders and supporters of the BPU as well as in the subsequent M-Belt organizations weakened the vigour of the demands for a M-Belt Region to solve socio-economic and political problems in Jos Division. This is explained by dependence on patronage to NPC leadership. For example, in 1965 it was patron-client political sentiments that conditioned the very first speech on the floors of the House of the Northern Assembly by Danboyi Zang to retort: "I, Danboyi Gyel always dreamt that I was in the midst of the members of this House, but for the good leadership of the Premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, who said that every person whoever he may be, should ask for his rights and it will be given to him, has thought it necessary for my dream to be fulfilled ... We have good government under the leadership of the Hon. Premier Alhaji, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto which is unique in the whole of Nigeria. In the first place, he likes everyone to enjoy without caring what tribe you belong to... I am appealing to our ministers to emulate the good character of the

Hon. Premier to help everybody who comes to them for help".¹ Although this suggests patron-client relationship between political leadership in the NPC and some top economic elite in BPU albeit among some of the M-Belt groups and societies the patterns in maintaining the relationship were meant to bargain for the solutions of the socio-economic problems and issues in the constituencies. For example, Zang in the same "first time speech" since 1962, went on to suggest that although the people of Jos Division have sufficient wealth of tin and columbite: "We are at times treated like slaves and our farms are taken away... in Jos Division people suffer a lot. So many lands belonging to farmers have been seized and this has brought a lot of stealing. If someone's farm has been excavated and he has not got any other piece of land upon which to farm, he will obviously tend to steal".²

Although 'tribal' unity was also of concern to the Birom political organizations, it was the land question that was central as a political issue conditioning the unity for confrontation between the government of British administration and subsequently with the NPC in The North as well as with non-indigenous groups and societies on Jos Division. Although it was not until 1945 that the state of the land became a political issue in the organization of "tribal unity" in Jos Division, the problem existed as early as 1940, when individual farmers took complaints to Residents and Dos over the effects of mining activities

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1. NHA, Governor's Speech: Debate on Address, 26 February 1965 p.61-62
 2. Ibid; Patron-client relationships which weakened "tribal" unions and their political alliances in the M-Belt Movements are examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5

on agricultural productivity.¹ The economic issues between the mining companies and the groups and societies centred on land became compounded and complicated contested solutions to the problems caused by mining activities because the tin-bearing areas were also the most fertile farming land in Jos Division since the Plateau areas itself were rocky with granite terrain.² This was the premise from which E. Bathurst, the special member in FHR representing Tin Mining Interests, suggested as latterly as in 1955, that the wrong impressions were being created on the land problems of Jos Division.³ According to Bathurst there was sufficient monetary compensation and the groups and societies in Jos Division were not losing their land.⁴ Furthermore it was suggested that: "... the question of farmers losing their land is a question which is not quite accurate .. money is being spent on reclamation and a lot is being done on reclamation. The question is that this mineral is useful to Nigeria's revenue and economy and the farmer's land is being restored to him. It is only a question of an interval of time. It is not a question of his having lost his land for ever. It is just a small interval of time whilst the mineral which is useful for Nigeria's economy is being brought out of the ground ... that you can see vast areas of dumps in Bukuru, I am afraid is true, but that was done in the past, before one thought of restoration. Let us not think of the past but the future. Restoration and Reclamation is now being done and will continue to be done. That is why money has been voted for - to

1. Logams 1975 p.87

2. Dudley 1966 p.112 n.77

3. Debates of the House of Representatives, The 1955-56 Appropriation Ordinance 1955, Lagos 28 March 1955 p.648

4. Debates 28 March 1955 p.648

recover these areas... All the land is not good arable land; much of the land was useless before mining took place. It is not that the mining companies have destroyed over much... in 1948 38059^{sq.} miles^{*24} of the congested areas in Jos Division have only been used ... it is a very small percentage of the total arable land... Little of the land has actually been used by the mining companies".¹ This suggests that as latterly as in 1956 the government of British administration in The North and Nigeria as well as the tin mining companies themselves realize the gravity of the land problem as it affected the economy of the groups and societies in Jos Division. This was so because solutions to the problems caused by mining activities were differently seen by the parties involved in economic activities in Jos Division.

In the period between 1955 and 1956 10,000 tons of tin were extracted from Jos Division alone with tin prices per ton valuing £700 and columbite varying from between £2000 to £3000 per ton in 1954.² In that year, tin and columbite brought in for the Nigerian government a total cash value of £13 million, which was "very nearly the total revenue of the Government of Northern Region".³ In the period between 1950 and 1956 and thereafter until 1965 royalties (as opposed to rights) from mineral products in Nigeria were Regional revenue sources and the Federal Government only acted as a collecting agent.⁴ Although the government of British administration in The North got at least about £2,000,000 every year for about 50 years

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1. Mr E. Bathurst (special member) Debates in The House of Representatives: The 1955-56 Appropriation Ordinance 1955, Lagos 28 March 1955 p.648
 2. Patrick Dokotri (Jos Township), Debates in the House of Representatives, the 1955-56 Appropriation Ordinance 1955, 28 March 1955 p.646; These figures were not disputed by the Minister for Land, Mines and Power in the House.
 3. Dokotri 1955 p.646
 4. The Minister of Land, Mines and Power, Debates in the House of Representatives, the 1955-56 Appropriation Ordinance 1955, 28 March 1955 p.649

*24 See comment at end of Chapter 3.

the Tin Mining Industry in Jos Division never gained local support and sympathy because it destroyed local interests. These centred on the destruction of land by mining activities without adequate compensation. In the period between 1940 and 1950 when the government of British administration in Nigeria was very keen on tin and columbite in Jos Division it was at the same time unduly touchy over the question of compensation to farmers. This was the premise from which Patrick Dokotri suggested that while the government got "lucrative revenue from the Industry (about £2,000,000 a year)... government has voted only £500,000 which is half a million pounds to reclaim land which has been destroyed by mining. This amount is really very small... If this Industry is to be expanded local interest should be adequately protected ... to the Birom, particularly, government has adopted an attitude of "laissez faire" towards their educational, cultural and economic set-back in order to give full prominence to this industry. It was thought that by educating the people they would be in a position to voice out their legitimate aspirations .. the Birom is in dire need of assistance to survive the economic pressure imposed upon him by circumstances beyond his control. Whatever may be the cause, it is government's moral duty to help them ... the economic position of the Birom is far worse than what is occurring in South Africa and I would very seriously and sincerely warn government that if proper action is not taken to rehabilitate the Biroms properly something worse than what is happening in East Africa might occur in Nigeria... It makes little sense to criticize the system in South Africa if here in Nigeria, Nigerians are suffering the same fate. We should first of all think about the welfare of the people here".¹ In the instance of the

1. Dokotri 1955 p.646

particular problem of land reclamation by 1955 about 207 acres of land had been reclaimed at a cost of £250 per acre giving about £51,750 spent by direct government disbursement.¹ The political issue that was more severely contested however was the rehabilitation of the Birom from their home area in Jemaa Division some fifty miles away. Although the government of British administration voted £100,000 in 1955 for the scheme, many people simply were not sufficiently attracted.² Even when that was so the government of British administration was reluctant to rehabilitate the Birom within Jos Division and preferred to push through with the scheme. It was this particular position on the Sabon Zawan scheme that there developed early considerable political sympathy between the BPU and the NCNC as well as the AG, an early situation that conditioned subsequent patterns of alliances for the 1959 elections. Most of the Southern Nigerian politicians used socio-economic and political problems in Jos Division, particularly those that centred on the activities of the tin mining companies to raise issues with other parties as well as with the government of British administration. For example in one instance R.C. Agwuna argued that the government cannot "expect the average Birom to live on anything else if you remove his land from him and it does not pay to vote sums of money to transport somebody from his place of birth where his ancestors have lived for years, to a strange place, no matter whether it is in the same Region or in another Region. You cannot expect a man

1. Debates in the House of Representatives, The 1955-56 Appropriation Ordinance 1955, 28 March 1955 p.647

2. Ibid

so transported to be happy and to continue to be a loyal member of the governing machinery of that area. It is the duty of this Federal Government to look into the conduct of the mining companies over the native Biroms. In places where the miners have exploited so many acres of Birom territory you only find big ravines and wide pits in very many places ... talking of the proposed settlement in Jemaa, how many Biroms will that place contain? If you put them there where will you give them the land to farm... We all know that the average Nigerian is fundamentally a peasant farmer and this is even truer in The North".¹ As early as in 1955 it was suggested to the government in The North "... to see that the Birom people are given a special consideration in the proceeds of mining royalties and to take into consideration and make a grant, however small, from the royalties being received to Jos JA for the sole benefit of the Birom people who are directly affected by the mining operations."² Although this was so, it was maintained that it ought to be regarded as "an act of grace rather than as a right because mineral deposits are a national asset... and government in The North determined how the money will be spent".³ In the period between 1955 and 1965 politicians in BPU and in the political organizations of the M-Belt Movement within both the NHA and in the FHR persistently re-echoed this grievance centred on the failure of the NPC government in The North to disburse funds from mining royalties rather than the tax on tin profits to go to the Jos Native Authority.⁴

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1. R.C. Agwuna (Awka Division) Debates in the House of Representatives, the 1955-56 Appropriation Ordinance 1955, Lagos 28 March 1955 p.648
 2. The Minister of Land, Mines and Power, Debates in the House of Representatives, the 1955-56 Appropriation Ordinance 1955, Lagos 28 March 1955 p.649
 3. Ibid
 4. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981

It was from the political perceptions that being outside the mainstream in controlling decision making in government in order to solve local social and economic problems that there was anticipation that a government in a M-Belt Region might perform better than the NPC government in The North whose politicians had roots in the Islamic society. It is however significant that the social and economic problems in Jos Division which were instrumental as factors for the initial organization of a M-Belt Movement and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region were never raised as issues by politicians in the FHR from the Islamic society in The North on the same scale of political contest as became the concern of both Southern Nigerian politicians in the NCNC and AG parties which were dominant in the Eastern and Western Regions respectively.¹ In the period between 1950 and 1960 when there was increased political demand for the solutions of social and economic problems existing among the M-Belt groups and societies, particularly those existing in Jos Division that were often easily quoted as exploitation, domination, expropriation and oppression and discrimination of the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North and centred on the state of land destroyed by tin mining activities there was a concomitant increase in the vigour of political mobilization to gain support for the ideas of a new political unit of the Nigerian Federation in The North.²

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1. For examples of very elaborate political rhetoric on the socio-economic and political problems in Jos Division by the politicians of both parties see Debates in the Federal House of Representatives for the period between 1950 and 1960.
 2. This is examined with more analytical detail in Chapter 4

It was also the microcosm of the socio-economic and political problems in Jos Division in the period between 1950 and 1965 that the Birom became the centre of political activity and controversy on the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region by politicians in the M-Belt Movement in both the NHA and FHR. In other words, political differences with roots in socio-religious identities existing in The North, between the Islamic and the M-Belt people became seen as factors that caused the problems of society in the M-Belt areas. This was so because control of political power also conditioned choice and selection of social and economic problems in the organization of policies for the solution of the problems of society. This became critical for the non-Islamic people in The North, because after 1947 politicians with an Islamic religious identity began to control political power as a dominant group.

The available evidence on the socio-economic and political problems affecting the M-Belt people in the period between 1950 and 1965 suggest that when local issues were taken into the grievances in the conditions for the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, the "tribal" unions ceased to be the political machinery for pushing through options for the solutions of local problems on the political arenas they had access to in Nigeria. This is not suggesting that the severity of local socio-economic and political problems ceased to be a premise for "tribal" unity. When there was resurgence of "tribal" unity in certain instances it was channelled into a M-Belt movement, meant for the solution of local problems in the political demands for the creation of the M-Belt Region. This means that the political demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region was related to the "tribal" intentions of solving their socio-economic and political problems rather than an explicit need to maintain a non-Islamic religious identity, based on the Christian religion, the driving force in the organization of the demand. In the period between 1956 and 1965, for example, when the political fires of the UMBC as the M-Belt Movement flared

most glaringly, Christianity did not feature as an issue in the political rhetoric of the leadership in the same political sense that Christianity was used and seen to be a social movement in the period between 1940 and 1955 when social, economic and political issues conditioned Christian solidarity among the M-Belt people. In other words, the causal factors in the M-Belt movement and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region were mult-variant in nature and these were differently emphasized among the M-Belt people, to gain political support from the non-Islamic people in The North. Non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, S.Bauchi and S.Zaria, where there had been more direct Fulani Islamic colonization, for example, saw their political demands and support for the ideas of the M-Belt movement in terms of social and political liberation from Islamic domination of political decision making in local affairs. The Plateau groups and societies were concerned with social and economic problems on their land and mobilized the Christian religion as a political identity with anti-Islamic sentiments. In general terms these issues became directed at Hausa-Fulani and Islamic domination of political roles in The North to gain support for the ideas of the demands of the M-Belt movement. In Jos Division, there was a completely different socio-economic and political situation to what existed, for example, in S.Zaria, S.Bauchi, Adamawa and among the Idoma, Igalla and the Tiv, where by their culturally and numerically bigger groups, spread over a wider geographical area they successfully asserted "tribal" political identities to press for socio-economic and political changes in their areas¹. Furthermore, the non-Islamic people in Jos Division for example, were in more contact with social and economic influences from outside their areas, on a more intensive scale than any others of the M-Belt groups and societies, which created pressures for political organization. This was so because of the Tin-mining activities which brought in an influx of stranger elements in their midst from distant areas, beyond the Nigerian borders. This was the

premise from which Jos Division became officially defined as "a congested area" and most sensitive on political issues indigenous to the area². Dudley suggests that the alien migrants to Jos Division produced a situation: "whereby Jos district has the peculiarity of being the only area in the North, where the indigenous inhabitants are more than outnumbered by the non-indigenes, and in the division as a whole, it is the only area where non-indigenes constitute more than half the total population"³. Jos Division therefore produced examples of profound fears and frustrations over the socio-economic and political problems characteristic of all the other M-Belt groups and societies on indigenous loss of control in the conduct of their local affairs. The situation in Jos Division therefore explains why the BPU was less of a singularly specific "tribal" political organization as it stood for socio-economic and political grievances affecting all the groups and societies in the area. It was from this all embracing concern for issues and problems, that were not necessarily "tribal", that BPU was to develop into a M-Belt movement in the political struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region to enclose a majority of non-Islamic groups and societies, where there existed similar problems to those in Jos Division.

Although initial political leadership in the BPU was rooted in persons with military experience as Ex-Servicemen, there were additional factors that served as boosters to their political roles. Some of the Ex-Servicemen, for example, achieved social consciousness from European education, had wide travel experiences within different Nigerian groups and societies and had been influenced by the patterns of political organizations which struggled and resisted domination and discrimination. They were also familiar with the types of socio-economic demands made on the activities of government for the transformation of deprived societies, which influenced their own shape of organization of issues into demands. This was so for example, for Patrick Fom who was an Ex-Serviceman and one

of the six original founders of the BPU, who at fifty years became the first President of the tribal union in 1945⁴. When he returned from India, he served as Evangelist Teacher with the RCM school in Kuru. Previous to his military and religious career however, Patrick Fom stayed and schooled at Ibadan, worked in Lagos, where he married a Ghanian Yoruba. Before 1950, he was about the most European educated among the Ex-Servicemen that were involved after 1945 with the political organization of the BPU. While at Ibadan and Lagos he was influenced by the local political organization of Yoruba and Ibo which subsequently found expression in facing the government of British administration in Nigeria with political demands of freedom and the rights to make demands on the government for the allocation of modern infrastructure for the transformation of traditional African societies, in the benefit of the local tribal population. It was however, not the state of local problems and policies in Jos Division which caused him to leave Lagos and return to the homeland where he became politically involved. Rather, it was the social stress caused by the experience of a divorce with the Ghanian wife that made him leave Lagos to seek solitude in his indigenous homeland at Kuru⁵. It was from Kuru that in 1945, he began to redirect his energies to contest for the solutions to land problems in Jos Division which had become political issues between the Birom and the Tin mining companies and the government of British administration in The North⁶.

Although the economic issues raised by the destruction of land from tin mining activities were the central causes of the political activities in the formation of the BPU under the leadership of the Ex-Servicemen and the European educated in Jos Division, other social problems intervened to compound relationships with government institutions in the area. When there was Hausa domination of decision making in the NA institution in Jos Division, for example, social and religious attitudes of Hausa Fulani and Islamic communities in the urban centres as well as in the tin mining

camps, toward the indigenous people was characterized by prejudice on what was termed as non-Islamic practices. There was overt insult and covert ridicule of the indigenous people and this centred on the types of food that was eaten such as dogs, pigs, rats, lizards and alcoholic beverages. In reaction to the social Islamic prejudices, some of the indigenous groups and societies sang songs which suggested: "May those who disapprove of drinkers of alcoholic beverages be cursed by our people"⁷. The Hausa-Fulani Islamic population also had numerous songs that sought to ridicule and discourage the decorated nudity of indigenous people in Jos Division. In Jos Division, albeit on the Plateau, there was also the problem and concern to organize protests on overgrazing of the land as a result of the Fulani presence with their cattle, which had created severe soil erosion which was encroaching on Farm land. The problem with Fulani cattle grazing constantly developed into hostilities in which lives were lost, particularly so when the Fulani cows ate food crops. These economic problems on land and food crops with the Fulani, were however not confined to Jos Division and the Plateau, but also affected almost all the M-Belt areas, wherever the Fulani went with their cattle. As recently as in April, 1983, Godwin Terhemba suggests Fulani herdsmen still destroyed food crops by driving their cattle over Tiv farms:

"As the Fulani herdsmen are always invading, so they are always ready to fight when smelling trouble. So they strike and kill innocent Tiv farmers ... seven Tiv farmers were killed in a violent clash with the Fulani on 31st March, 1983"⁸.

It was from the nature of these over-bearing socio-economic and political problems in Jos Division the non-Islamic people de-emphasized "tribal" identities and used the Christian religious identity to contest the 1951 elections. This christian religious identity that became used for political purposes was bolstered by administrative changes in Jos Division, which

caused the Federation of other smaller non-Islamic people into a bigger Jos NA⁹. The 1951 elections, therefore, provided an opportunity to test the already mobilized and developed solidarity of Christian unity with the non-Islamic communities for political purposes, against Moslems among the groups in the Jos NA, albeit groups on the Plateau. This solidarity subsequently found expression in a temporary alliance with the NCNC party which was seen at that time to share the Christian religious identity rather than an Ibo dominated party. Christian mobilized solidarity became apparent in the 1951 elections and this was acknowledged in the Annual Report for Plateau by C.R. Niven, the Resident:

"the elections held during the year have done a great deal towards bringing the people together. It can be safely said that they acted as a reagent in this fluid mass ... in the primaries, which involved the choosing of over 7,000 members to the next colleges, the remote villages had a good idea of what it was all about ... although some were more politically minded than others, which caused active feelings over the elections"¹⁰.

The tribal unions however controlled political mobilization in the rural areas among the different groups on the Plateau and this effectively neutralized party decisions, unlike the urban areas where there were divisions along party political lines among the tribal unions in electoral centres like Jos, Bukuru and Kafanchan. This variation is explained by the concentration of a socially mobilized population in these urban areas. In the Jos area, for example, there were many educated Southern Nigerians and Jos Division itself had one of the highest percentage of an indigenous literate population, when compared to other M-Belt areas (6.2% of the population over seven years old was literate and some had certificates of Elementary Primary Standard Four). Dudley suggests that about 17.3% of the population in the Jos area was Ibo and Yoruba alone, besides other Southern Nigerian tribes¹¹. Although tribal jealousies were reported to be "still

very acute" among the Plateau groups in 1951, the elections were contested with a Christian political party identity, rather than tribal, a situation that was caused by the development of the NML to the MZL which maintained the Christian religious identity for political purposes, despite a change in political label¹². The political situation on the Plateau with a mobilized Christian religious identity as a political party identity, contrasted with the circumstances of the groups in Benue Province, where, by the strength of their numerical sizes, cultural identities persisted in the tribal unions and these were used to determine representation into the final electoral college in the 1951 elections. The consequence was that the Tiv, who were the biggest group in Benue, dominated in the Provincial College and elected their tribal members. Some of the numerically stronger cultural groups on the Plateau, like the Birom, Angas and Sura, for example, did not use their strength to sweep the board by electing only their members as representatives of the Province in the final electoral college. Thus in the electoral outcome from the final stage of the indirect election into the NHA from Plateau, was that representation came from four Divisions out of the five Divisions of the Province¹³. Four of these five representatives from the Plateau were all Christians on the party label of the MZL, unlike it was the case in Benue Province, for example, where all the representatives were Tiv from Tiv Division and members of a particular tribal union, the TPU, having outvoted the Jukun and the Idoma in the final Provincial electoral college. The variation in the pattern of political representation between Plateau and Benue: One based on a Christian religious identity and the other on a purely tribal identity, is explained by achieved political organization and mobilization of the MZL which in 1951 had not penetrated into Benue Province and Tiv land as much as it is explained by Tiv tribal solidarity on its own. However, reinforcing the Christian religious identity, Plateau representation in Kaduna, was further increased by the special appointments of Major H.E. Wilson, as

representative of mining interests, S.O. James a Yoruba, as representative of non-indigenous Christian communities in Jos Division into the NHA and by the appointments to the NHC, Rwang Pam, the Chief of Birom (later the Chief of Jos), while to balance the Christian dominance in the representation of the Province, Moslems like the chiefs of Kanam, Wamba and the Emir of Wase were appointed into the NHC¹⁴. The nominated representation of non-indigenes of the Plateau to both the NHA and the NHC was caused by Christian domination of the electoral process in 1951 and this was meant by the government in Kaduna to balance social and political diversity that existed on the Plateau. In the instance, there was one indigenous Christian chief, five elected Christian politicians, two non-indigenous nominated Christians and four Moslem chiefs. This gave a total of about eight Christians as representatives of the Plateau in Kaduna as against four Moslems. The electoral patterns of political protest, directed against Islamic domination on the Plateau, therefore, crystalized and remained as a political resource after 1951. However in the period between 1952 and 1965, Plateau political leadership which came from the different tribal unions and which shaped support in the Divisions was not consistent in the use of the Christian religious identity as a political resource. The leadership shuffled between support for "One North" (seen to be Islamic) and separation into a M-Belt Region (seen to be Christian). On many occasions the political behaviour of the leadership contradicted the trans-tribal political unity achieved with the Christian religion and which was presented in their political organization as a political identity. Political behaviour on the Plateau, however, was essentially shaped by Christianity and the state of local socio-economic and political problems affecting particular tribes. The Christian religion as a political identity was consistently used because the tribes are small and the appeal to a trans-tribal political identity with Christianity had greater political impact, rather than the cultural tribal identities standing on their own.

The issues and problems that conditioned the organization of tribal unions in Adamawa, S.Bauchi and S.Zaria were centred on political rulership and control of decision making by the Hausa-Fulani as well as some other variant of Islamic political leadership over the local affairs of the non-Islamic people in those areas. Furthermore, historically, many of the non-Islamic and Christian people in Adamawa, S.Bauchi and S.Zaria were perforce subject to the Moslem judicial and legal system which embodied standards of justice often uncongenial to their own indigenous traditional systems as well as to those that were sought to be established by the government of British administration in The North¹⁵. Some non-Islamic people on the Plateau, conquered in the period of the Fulani Jihad, like those that were found in Wase, Kanam, Jemaa, Shendam, Keffi, Lafia and Gindiri, were similarly subjected to the alien application of the Islamic legal system. The political problems on the legal application of Islamic laws over non-Islamic people in the M-Belt areas, in general, were compounded by the social and religious resentment of being derided "as 'Kafiri' (unbelievers) for adherence to Christianity or animistic worship"¹⁶. Similar to the social and political experiences of non-Islamic groups and societies on the Plateau, where there were many "tribal" unions who fed in their cultural identities into those of the bigger tribes like the Birom, Yergam, Angas, Sura and Ankwei, in Adamawa, S.Bauchi and S.Zaria, although there existed other "tribal" unions, the majority also fed in their cultural identity into the political leadership of the Kilba State Union movement and the Wurkum Tribal union in Adamawa. The Pansayawa League in S.Bauchi also incorporated the cultural support of the Lere and Jarawa tribal unions. The Pan-Jarawa League, apparently was politically active in S.Bauchi as well as giving its political support to the protests and problems that were articulated by BPU on the socio-economic and political issues in Jos Division on the Plateau. This was so because there was a respectable concentration of Jarawa people in S.Bauchi, while the majority

of the group and society was found to the north and north-eastern escarpment of Jos Division with their chief centred at Fobur town, a premise that conditioned their separation from the Emir of Bauchi and political inclusion in Plateau State in 1976. This was unlike the Pan-Sayawa League which to the present day still struggles for a merger with Plateau state as a protest against their political control by the Emirs and Islamic District Heads appointed by the royalty of Bauchi. This may be the case, because the Sayawa were part of the Lere group in S.Bauchi and they had their own District Head. However, the political struggle of the Pan-Sayawa League which most vocally articulated the grievances of the non-Islamic groups and societies in S.Bauchi is still maintained through its elite and the Lere Students Association at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

Similar to the situation in the development of "tribal" unions on the Plateau, particularly in Jos Division, because the cultural groups and societies in S.Zaria, were numerically small in the size of their membership, the numerous "tribal" unions which developed, fed in their political unity and support into what became known as the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement, which was led by political leadership of the Kagoro tribe¹⁷. This suggests that the "tribal" political identity was even weaker among all the groups and societies in S.Zaria when compared to the peoples of Jos Division albeit on the Plateau and with those in Benue where powerful tribal unions shaped political development, although political leadership in the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement was dominated by educated persons from the Kagoro tribe. In the instance, rather than assume the tribal identity of a Kagoro group and society that was dominant in the political leadership of the movement, as was the case in Jos Division with the Birom in BPU, a territorial category became used as a political tag to meet the political objectives of Christians and non-Islamic people in S.Zaria. This was so because the political tensions in S.Zaria were

developed from the domination of political roles by Hausa and Fulani imposition of Islamic laws in British established courts, discrimination and harassment on Christians and Christian Missionaries, expropriation of land, as well as, exploitation of the material possessions of the non-Islamic people and the systemic destruction of tribal culture and government which characterized the processes of the development of society in the area, in the particular period between 1900 and 1945.

The epitome of the processes in the subordination of the non-Islamic groups and societies in S.Zaria was characteristic of the reign of a Hausa Chief, who was strangely and appropriately named from birth as "Mugunta" (a Hausa word meaning "wickedness") whom the British appointed to rule the Kagoro from 1930 until 1933 when he was deposed because he failed to produce tax rather than the nature of terror he produced in ruling over alien societies¹⁸. Smith suggests that political control by Mugunta was so repressive that he ordered everyone who brewed beer to send him two large potfuls before drinking it themselves, smoked a pipe cut from a mahogany tree, ten feet long, which became obligatory to be borne ahead of him on the shoulders of two men, so that he might smoke as he walked and forcefully remodelled the relation between chief and people on Hausa-Fulani lines in which there was a hierarchical pattern of authority¹⁹. Furthermore Mugunta introduced a series of exactions, levies, judicial miscarriages, corvee turnouts, whippings, jailings and fines: "... until the population fled from sight and earshot, whenever Magunta appeared. Some Kagoro at this time emigrated to Jemaa"²⁰.

The first Christian missionaries from Western Europe to be found among the groups and societies in S.Zaria were Mr. and Mrs Archibald of Glasgow, Scotland who were members of the SIM and succeeded in establishing a station in Kagoro in 1926 despite the opposition of the government of British administration in The North that: "the tribe was scarcely under control, and that the risk was on their own heads"²¹. Until 1945 the SIM

with the Archibalds had the 'Southern Zaria Field' almost entirely to themselves²². Smith suggests that the Archibalds wrought remarkable changes by peaceful persuasion, won a permanent place in the hearts of the Kagoro and made many converts before 1940²³. However in the period between 1930 and 1940 Christian youngmen in S.Zaria were forbidden by Mugunta to sell food to European Missionaries as well as forbidden to work for them when Mugunta ruled; and subsequently by another notorious "alien" chief from Ankwei called Imbweh who established political control over some of the S.Zaria groups and societies by traditional magico-religious techniques, when people suffered a famine from a locust invasion²⁴. Smith suggests that the Ankwei who manipulated the 'Inbweh cult' for political control, copied Hansa Chieftainship in having 'dogarai' (Native Policemen) and an intermediary as a spokesman²⁵. With that structure, it ruled effectively and exploited the people by introducing cult titles for women and youths and:

"Everyone, old and young was required to attend nightly dances at the Imbweh shrine, to bring beer, goats, chickens and dogs as tribute ... when required, women married or not were ordered to sleep with Imbweh's nominees and this license was enforced by whipping, fines or other means if necessary"²⁶.

This was particularly directed at and meant to punish Christian convents who were constantly obliged to have sexual relations as Imbweh ordered against their wishes²⁷.

Hostilities toward the Christian Missionaries existed because Mugunta in particular regarded them as possible informers on his activities to the government of British administration in The North and sought "to cow them by frequent whippings"²⁸. It was not until after 1933 that Christians in S.Zaria became free to peruse their religion in peace and thereafter conversions into Christianity increased rapidly²⁹. Smith further suggests that many of the groups and societies in S.Zaria, particularly the "pagan

Kagoro attribute the tribe's rescue to the mission"³⁰.

The social and political problems in S.Zaria however became compounded in 1933 when there was administrative reorganization affecting Hausa claims to rulership and decision making in exclusively indigenous affairs to the groups and societies in the area. In that year the government of British administration in The North sent down trained Hausa staff from Zaria emirate to guide and assist a new "pagan chief" to the Kagoro group and society in the performance of his duties³¹. Furthermore, in 1934 the groups and societies in S.Zaria became transferred from the predominantly non-Islamic Province of Plateau to Zaria, a Province dominated by Islamic leadership that was based on the emirate of Zaria with religious and political loyalty to Sokoto in identity³². In the instance of the newly developed ^{British} circumstances, the Hausa staff in the reorganized Kagoro administration manipulated the political situation to suit the diffusion of Hausa culture and the Islamic religion. This was so because the chief became dependent on them for advice and on the execution of policy decision, while for their security they enjoyed the confidence of the government of British administration in The North. This became bolstered by a superior knowledge of administrative procedures which were conducted in the Hausa Language³³. In the period between 1934 and 1945 Hausa cultural and Islamic influences that were represented by the Hausa staff in the Kagoro administration and its dependence on Zaria Emirate for departmental and treasury services, increased and permeated the "tribal" affairs of the non-Islamic groups and societies in S.Zaria³⁴. In the circumstances "tribal" chieftainships became more orderly copies of the Hausa and Islamic hierarchical model³⁵.

Although these political developments pleased the government of British administration in The North, increased numbers of Christian converts in the period between 1930 and 1945, caused social and political consciousness on the alarming prospects of losing independence and being

totally incorporated into Islam, the Hausa culture and into the Zaria Emirate under an Emir³⁶. In 1950 between one third and one quarter of the Kagoro were Christian Missionary adherents while about half of the children attended Christian missionary schools even when it was the case that previously the teaching was in Hausa until in 1950 when English became used as the language for knowledge in the Christian schools among the non-Islamic groups and societies in S.Zaria³⁷. Religious tensions therefore compounded the cultural and political problems of incorporation into The North among the non-Islamic groups and societies in S.Zaria. This was the premise from which British Provincial Officers in the period between 1940 and 1950 began to keep a close watch on the local affairs of the Kagoro group and society as a microcosm of the social and political problems of the non-Islamic groups and societies, largely due to political changes in the reinterpretation of the meaning of the policy of indirect rule as it affected the administration of the M-Belt groups and societies. The 'political monitoring' of Hausa Fulani and Islamic influences in the 'tribal' affairs of the groups and societies in S.Zaria however did not prevent increased attempts at the destruction of non-Islamic cultures. In 1934 there were efforts to enforce Islamic practices on the marriage institution of the non-Islamic groups and societies in S.Zaria³⁸. For example in that year, a Provincial Order forbade the practice of "secondary marriage" unless the runaway wife previously observed "idda", a moslem rule that required a three month continence before a divorce became final³⁹.

It was pressures from these social and political problems that people in Kagoro began to request their ablest local men, who were teachers in the Christian Missionary schools in the area to take on Native Administrative appointments as Assistant District Scribes⁴⁰. It was from local pressures affecting the majority of the non-Islamic groups and societies in S.Zaria that there was developed "The Southern Zaria Freedom Movement" with the objective of organizing a political struggle for independence from Hausa

Fulani and halting the increases of Islamic influences "because indigenes to Southern Zaria were essentially Christian and more non-Moslems and non-Christians were becoming Christians⁴¹. Smith suggests that in 1959 about 60% of the Kagoro group and society were Christians and over 80% of the school-age children went to government schools with a majority attending the schools established by Christian Missionaries⁴². In S.Zaria therefore, similar only to the political developments in Jos Division, an all embracing social and political movement which cut across "tribal" identities was began before exclusively "tribal" unions became organized. For example while the southern Zaria Freedom Movement was organized in 1944 it was not until after the 1951 elections into the NHA that the Nzit Tribal union was organized⁴³. The trans-tribal identities in the political organizations on the Plateau and S.Zaria is explained by Christianity which united the numerically small cultural groups and societies directed against Islamic and Hausa domination as well as its influences which were visible⁴⁴. Even when different "tribal" unions were organized in S.Zaria, they became politically associated and identified with the ideas of the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement, which supported the M-Belt Movement, particularly so, when it developed from the non-Moslem League (NML) to become the Middle Zone League (MZL). This was so, for example, in the experience of the Nzit Tribal Union, which joined the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement⁴⁵.

One of the earliest of the Christian teachers from the Kagoro tribe who featured in the organization of social and political movements in S.Zaria was Mallam Haruna Gwamna. Although he was trained in the government college at Toro rather than the local post-primary Christian Missionary institution, he was initially educated at the SIM Christian Primary school at Kagoro. He eventually shifted from his teaching career to become an Assistant Scribe with the NA, subsequently becoming the Chief Scribe because of the political pressures brought to bear on him by the local

people in area to represent them⁴⁶. When he became the Chief of Kagoro, he was regarded by the government of British administration in The North as a most respected Chief. While as Assistant Scribe and member of the S.Zaria Freedom Movement he stopped the manipulations of his Hausa Superior, the Chief Scribe⁴⁷. It was "pagan" priests and the majority of the non-Christians and non-Moslem population in S.Zaria however who urged for political protest which subsequently found expression and articulation in the Christian educated elements in the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement as well as other "tribal" unions. For example, Smith suggests that when the reigning non-indigenous chief to the Kagoro group and society died in 1944, it was the "pagan" priests and the "pagan" majority of the population which refused on four occasions to accept anyone but Gwamna as the new Chief of Kagoro⁴⁸. This suggests that similar to the experiences of other non-Christian and non-Moslem adherents among other M-Belt groups and societies in Benue, Plateau and Adamawa there was social and political identification with Christian educated persons rather than with Moslems in S.Zaria. It ought to be pointed out however that unlike the perceptions of socio-economic and political problems coming from the European educated and the Ex-Servicemen among other M-Belt groups and societies in S.Zaria discontent and political protest took shape from the bottom of society and got pushed upwards to find expression from among the European educated. It was from a political situation like this, that in 1945 Mallam Gwamna became appointed as a third class chief of the Kagoro group and society as representative of the non-Islamic groups and societies in S.Zaria in the NHA⁴⁹. This was in the midst of Hausa and Moslem intrigues. The intrigues produced political pressures on the government of British administration in The North to appoint a rival Christian candidate to the Kagoro Chieftainship who was sympathetic toward non-separatist tendencies from the Islamic society⁵⁰. The rival to Mallam Gwamna in the midst of the political intrigues was Mallam Gwoni whose claims to legitimate rulership of the

Kagoro group and society was based on the Mugunta Legend⁵¹.

Although the political manipulations in the rivalries between Mallam Gwamna and Mallam Gwoni in the period between 1940 and 1945 temporarily split Christians unity among the Kagoro as well as among other groups and societies in S.Zaria, in the period between 1950 and 1965 the whole of S.Zaria looked up to Mallam Gwamna as their paramount chief⁵². This was the political premise from which S.Zaria came to support the ideas of the creation of a M-Belt Region because Mallam Gwamna supported the M-Belt Movement⁵³. However in the instance of the political cleavages within Christian solidarity in S.Zaria during the period between 1945 and 1950, Mallam Gwoni seceded from the SIM which he hitherto been a member and together with a number of other converts, transferred their Christian allegiance to the RCM and moved to establish a rival Chieftaincy at Kafanchan⁵⁴. In Kafanchan, Gwoni and his political loyalists had the support of British administrative officers and was prestigiously supported by the Hausa communities over his claims to the Chieftainship of the Kagoro group and society in both Kagoro town and within Zaria Emirate⁵⁵. Subsequently when there was electoral politics in 1959 and as latterly as in 1979, patterns of political support for the ideas of the M-Belt Movement and the social and political identity it stood for reflected the splits from the local tensions which developed from the rivalries, among other causes, between Mallam Awan Haruna Gwamna and Mallam Gwoni in the period between 1940 and 1950, the latter being bolstered morally to shape political support by the large concentration of the Hausa and Moslem elements in the population of S.Zaria⁵⁶.

It has however not until 1951 that the Christian as well as other non-Islamic people of Southern Zaria became socially and politically united with a christian identity after the political split in the period between 1945 and 1950. Two factors caused the need for Christian unity to resurge after 1951. Firstly, there was rapid development of the ideas of the

non-Moslem League in a crusade for Christian representation in government decision making bodies in The North in which Christians as well as persons participating traditional African systems of belief, supported⁵⁷. Secondly, there were the 1951 indirect elections in The North, developed when the Macpherson constitution came into effect and a series of elections from village to provincial electoral colleges became held throughout Nigeria, a process which the S.Zaria districts participated⁵⁸. In the instance, the four Provincial members for Zaria elected into the House of Assembly in The North elected by the Provincial Electoral College included two Heads of NA Departments, One District Head and an Editor of a newspaper⁵⁹. All the four members representing Zaria Province in the NHA were Moslems and this outcome of the elections caused considerable discontent and political disappointment among the predominantly non-Islamic population in S.Zaria⁶⁰. This was so because, although there was a considerable number of non-Moslems in S.Zaria, they were not sufficient to outvote the Moslem representatives of Northern Zaria Province, nor to push through their representation in the midst of very little political effort to give electoral representation by the government of British administration in the non-Islamic people from the area⁶¹. The political tensions which developed in S.Zaria because of the total eclipse of non-Moslem representation to the NHA in 1951, only became allayed when the Headmaster of a SIM school at Kwoi, Mallam Dauda Kwoi, was appointed by the Lieutenant Governor of The North as 'a special member' in the House of Assembly to represent the groups and societies in Southern Zaria⁶². This means that as early as in 1951, S.Zaria was dependant for the appointment of its political leadership into some institutions of government in The North, rather than on its rational electoral choices. Smith suggests that the 1951 electoral experiences revealed the numerical political weakness of not only the non-Islamic groups and societies of S.Zaria but also among other M-Belt groups and societies in S.Bauchi and Adamawa⁶³. Significantly it was from

these political circumstances that the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement as well as the developed "tribal" unions after 1951 aligned themselves with Christians among other groups and societies in the M-Belt areas in places like Adamawa, S.Bauchi, Plateau and Benue in the Middle Zone League to demand for the creation of 'a Central Region' in The North. It was the political vigour and enthusiasm to demonstrate the protest over the Moslem domination because of their superiority of numbers in the representation of Zaria Province in the NHA, which excluded any electoral form of representation from S.Zaria Christians and non-Moslem indigenes that misled M.G. Smith to erroneously suggest that the MZL was organized under Kagoro initiative in 1950 rather than support for the organization, a political development that followed the publicity in the growth of the MZL, the parent organization in the M-Belt movement which was formed in 1949 on the Plateau by Christians.

The social and political problems in Adamawa and S.Bauchi were similar to those that the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement as well as the "tribal" unions contested. The social and political problems in Adamawa were therefore typical of those parts of the M-Belt areas, where there was drawn administrative calibre on non-Moslems by a Moslem Emirate, remained in The North until in the 1940s and the 1950s. Unlike the problems on the Plateau, which were economic and centred on land issues destroyed by tin-mining activities and the benefits of jobs going to Hausa and "alien" communities in the tin industry, rather than to the indigenes and in sharp contrast to the "tribal" nationalism of the Tiv, Idoma and Igalla in Benue that centred on modernization and its effect on the drive for political control on local affairs by the European educated in Tiv land, the problems in Adamawa and S.Bauchi were purely social and political and centred on the liberation of the non-Islamic people in the area from Fulani and Islamic rulership. There were numerous "tribal" unions in both Adamawa and Bauchi Provinces, although in the latter instance these were concentrated in S.Bauchi. The

most politically active were the Kilba State Union in Adamawa Division, the Wurkum Tribal Union in Numan Division. Within Numan Division itself, there was also the Bachama Tribal Union. The most politically active "tribal" unions in Bauchi Province before 1950 were the Pan-Jarawa and the Pan-Sayawa Leagues. In the mid-1950s the Habe Tribal Union and the Katagum Peoples Union also became organized and were politically active. Although the Habe and Katagum Unions held political sympathy for the M-Belt movements and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, they were not part of a M-Belt conception of cultural unity.

The Kilba State Union and the Wurkum Tribal Union were the most militant political movements of protest and demands for separation at the local level from Fulani and Islamic domination of political roles and rulership over the non-Islamic peoples in Adamawa. Furthermore, unlike other "tribal" unions, the Kilba State Union was the only movement among the M-Belt people which was organized to demand the creation of 'a Kilba State' exclusively for members of its group and society and which supported the M-Belt Movement. Although there was an Idoma State Union, it did not show support for the M-Belt Movement. Similar in militancy, and politically unique in the experiences of other "tribal" unions among the M-Belt people, the Wurkum Tribal Union was the first to produce mytars from a confrontation of separation from Fulani and Islamic political leadership. Another contrast that existed with the "tribal" unions in Adamawa and S.Bauchi is that although there were many Ex-Servicemen among the non-Islamci people in Adamawa, the political task of organizing particular tribes to resist Fulani and Islamic domination in political decision making was in the hands of European educated teachers and Christian trained evangelists. The Ex-Servicemen however supported the unions and were involved in political mobilization of their particular groups and societies.

The Kilba State Union or "the Kilba State Congress" was a local

political party organized in 1950 with the exclusive objective of struggling for political separation from the Fulani in Adamawa and to be constituted into a Division of its own⁶⁴. The political organization of the Kilba and their political demands set into motion similar movements among the Batta, along the northern banks of the Benue and among the Chamba, South of the river Benue⁶⁵. The first President of the Kilba State Union was Balla Yerima, a Christian trained Teacher/Evangelist, who had also served as member of the BPU executive when he worked at Bukuru⁶⁶. The central political issue which underlined the demands of the Kilba State Union was objection to Fulani rule as well as grievances over total control of decision making in the affairs of Adamawa Division which were based on the Emir in Yola⁶⁷. Although the Emir was a dominant political figure in authority the political grievances of the non-Islamic groups and societies in the Division were on the Fulani District Heads and their surrogate Village Heads. In Adamawa Division, there were thirty one District Heads alone, who were all Fulani and Moslem and were the direct appointment of the Emir in Yola⁶⁸. Although the government of British administration sought to reduce their numbers to 18, the Native Authority under the chairmanship of the Emir: "had a natural desire to maintain the petty territorial Fulani District Headships unimpaired in status"⁶⁹. In the instance of the Kilba District, the local chief was appointed by the 'Hedima' from Yola and because he was a Fulani, he was known throughout the Province as "Santuraki", the traditional Fulani title⁷⁰. Besides objecting to the Fulani title being used by the Kilba District Head in which instance the Kilba people preferred him to remain as "Til Kilba" (King of Tilba), there was also political resentment that the Fulani 'Hedima' traditionally installed the Chief of the Kilba, within the framework of the local government system that was based on the hierarchial system of the Emirate in Adamawa⁷¹. There was political resentment also that Kilba Chiefs only looked forward in the future to becoming members of the Adamawa Division NA

council rather than expressed concern for tribal unity or tribal affairs⁷², since they were depended on the approval of their appointments to the council. After 1950, for example, when there was a new successor who was barely out of his teens, it was suggested by the Council that: "his inexperience and his need for a sound grounding in District Administration makes it unwise that his appointment to the Council should be unduly hurried"⁷³. Resentment over this pattern of political control was compounded by the historically recollected fact that the Kilba did not lose political autonomy in their local affairs when there was the expansion and establishment of the Islamic society of dan Fodio in the period between 1804 and 1900. In that period the Kilba were never subdued, although they owed a loose political allegiance, with very little tribute paid to the Lamido of Adamawa, the Fulani Emir⁷⁴. In the period between 1900 and 1933, before there was political re-interpretation of the policy of Indirect Rule, the government of British administration in The North, sought to introduce and to use a uniform structure of power and authority derived from the Fulani Islamic model, on the non-Islamic people. This was so, despite at that time, incessant political complaints on the arbitrary uses and abuses of power by the Fulani on non-Moslem populations and which subordinated non-Islamic culture and when there was no tribal union or a M-Belt movement to articulate these types of grievances. Although this was so, in the period when there was increased political activity that had developed from the protests of tribal unions and their grievances, the government of British administration interpreted the issued as reflective:

"of the fears or inferiority complexes which the smaller tribes who make up the non-Moslem minority hold for the solid homogeneous ranks of the Fulani-Hausa-Kanuri-Nupe, Moslem majority ... It must be admitted that the fears and anxieties still lurk in the background of many undeveloped minds. Without doubt the main cause of apprehension is simply a matter of numbers ... In population, they vary from hundreds of thousands down to a few hundreds.

Their average numbers are and in comparison with the millions in the Fulani-Hausa-Kanuri-Nupe Moslem bloc, merely fractional. After centuries of strife and turmoil in a hostile world, it is not surprising that these tribes have been unable, in little more than a generation, to shed their atavistic fears. These lived on; and are likely to do so for some time yet, in the form of irrational suspicions"⁷⁵.

In the instance of the development of political grievances among the non-Islamic people in Adamawa Division, although religious differences underlined the cleavages between Christians and non-Moslems against Islamic dominance, these were compounded by the numerical weaknesses to create political influence in decision making processes in NA policies. The non-Islamic peoples in Adamawa Division were therefore both religious and political minorities in access to control of political power, which was dominated by a Fulani Moslem minority. In 1952, for example, while there 33753 (34.3%) Moslems in Adamawa Division out of a total population of 110030, there were 2587 (3.2%) Christians with 69690 (63.3%) people who were non-Moslem and non-Christian⁷⁶. The Christian minority in relation to the Islamic majority in the patterns of dominance in Adamawa Division is significant because in most instances, persons practising African systems of traditional beliefs and worship (the so called pagans), identified with Christians rather than with Moslems in their social and political support and attitudes to the tribal movements under the leadership of the Christian educated. The political and social circumstances of the non-Islamic people in Adamawa Division therefore are very similar to the situation in S.Zaria, where an "alien" minority population controlled political decision making over local affairs of the majority population. Although the Fulani tribe, for example, numbered less than 33% of the total population of the Province, they were about 50% of the total population in Adamawa Division⁷⁷. In the circumstances, although the Kilba State Union made the most far reaching demands of any of the "tribal" political organizations among the M-Belt

people in the sense that it wanted the creation of "a Kilba State" to constitute its own indigenes, it lacked political consistency in organizational vigour to pursue its objectives. It was suggested for example, that the leader of the "Kibal State Congress" emerges from:

"long periods of hibernation only when its leaders become aware of an impending event of political importance and feels compelled to add his voice to that of other interested parties"⁷⁸.

The numerical size of the Fulani and the inconsistent pattern of resistance, by the Kilba State Union, made the Fulani in Adamawa Division develop to become dominant in the diffusion of Islamic and Fulani culture itself as well as the domination of decision making over public affairs affecting the non-Islamic groups and societies in the area. Furthermore, this was the premise from which Adamawa became unique in the whole of The North in the useage of "Ful-Fulde", the Fulani language as the official language in the Council Chambers in Yola, rather than the usual Hausa language⁷⁹. Fulani colonization and colonialism was therefore, most vigorous in Adamawa, only comparable to S.Zaria in the experiences of the M-Belt areas. Many persons among the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa therefore came to accept "Ful-fulde" as a language besides the Hausa language, as the language of Administration while coping with their own indigenous language. Although the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa Province outnumber the "alien" Moslem population in their midst the established patterns of Fulani dominance in the period between 1804 and 1900 which were subsequently reinforced upon contact with British influences in the period between 1900 and 1940, made the non-Islamic majority politically ineffective. Although the numerous "tribal" unions, for example, as well as the officials in the government of British administration were able to mobilize their constituencies by "efficient whipping" for the 1951 indirect elections:

"In the primaries, the farmers and primitive people showed little interest (even when) their attendances were good ... (and) the elections were of intense interest to the educated, who needed no tuition on what they were all about"⁸⁰.

Furthermore, some of the remoter groups and societies in the Mumuye Hills and in the highlands of Mandara, did not understand what "representation" in Kaduna meant: "and the question was nervously asked as to what and where Kaduna was"⁸¹. In the political control of local affairs and representation of the Province on the Regional political arena, therefore, Fulani dominance crystallized into permanence in Adamawa. This was the premise from which in the period between 1951 and 1957 the Kilba State Union, as well as other "tribal" unions in both Muri and Numan Divisions of the Province supported the M-Belt movement in its phase as the NML and the MZL. In the 1956 elections, however, the Kilba State Union was affiliated to NEPU, whose support gained the party a seat in Adamawa Northwest, which was an electoral victory for Balla Yerima, the President of the Kilba State Union, mainly as an anti-establishment vote rather than a rejection of the political ideas in the creation of a M-Belt Region⁸².

While political discontent over Fulani and Islamic domination of decision making in local affairs in Adamawa Division found the most vigorous expressions in the Kilba State Union, in Muri Division it was the Wurkum Tribal Union that was concerned to organize and attract political resistance to similar problems. Wurkum was one of the physically inaccessible districts in Muri Division of Adamawa Province, inhabited by many small "tribal" groups and societies, who were previously ruled with a firm paternal hand of the Emir in Muri in the period between 1875 and 1900⁸³. In the period between 1900 and 1950, the government of British administration in The North consolidated the rule of the Emirs over the non-Islamic groups and societies that were centred on the Wurkum Districts of Muri Division. Although a new Emir was appointed in 1926⁸⁴, in 1953 he

was succeeded by his son in the Emirate Council⁸⁵. The son, who was a previous District Scribe for many years in the Wurkum areas was given the Emirship: "At the specific request of the vast majority of the Village Heads and elected members of the District Council"⁸⁶. This appointment coming from the top of society, activated political resistance and set into motion anti-Fulani, anti-Islamic campaigns over the continued domination of decision making on local affairs, spearheaded by a previously dominant Wurkum Tribal Union that had been organized in 1951⁸⁷. Although the campaign of the Union was initially directed at the Fulani and Moslems as a distinct group in the Division, it crystallized into opposition to the whole NA apparatus, where the Fulani and some of their appointed non-Islamic District Heads and councillors dominated⁸⁸. This issue explains the subsequent political affiliation of the Wurkum Tribal Union to the NEPU, a party that had avowed aims and objectives of reforming the NA system in The North because it perpetuated the existence of an autocratic and privileged class of family compact rulers⁸⁹. In 1951 when the Wurkum Tribal Union was an affiliate of the MZL it was mainly concerned to mobilize non-Islamic and non-Fulani groups and societies on anti-Fulani religious sentiments⁹⁰. Subsequently in the short period between 1952 and 1954, the Wurkum Tribal Union expressed its resistance to only Fulani domination of political roles by refusing to obey traditional Village Heads who had become instruments of the Fulani District Heads and the Emir. When the son of the Emir of Muri became appointed as District Head over the non-Islamic groups and societies centred on Wurkum the "tribal" union saw the appointment as a political issue that might win popular support from the "acquiescent-pagan masses which had hitherto remained indifferent to their activities"⁹¹. The Wurkum Tribal Union pushed further the matter to the District Officer in Muri Division and subsequently to the Resident and only got the political reply: "the Native Authority had given careful thought to the appointment and that in future, real political power could lie with the District Council and the

Outer-Council"⁹². One of the four Outer-Council members for the Wurkum District was a Christian and a high executive member of the Wurkum Tribal Union⁹³. Early in June, 1954 the reaction by the government of British administration in The North to the political demands of the non-Islamic groups and societies in the Wurkum District, caused the members of the Wurkum Tribal Union to intimidate Tax Scribes and subsequently their papers and ink used for recording paid and unpaid taxes were seized. On 30th June 1954, when the Emir, the District Officer and another British Official, W.D. Wilson went to Karim-Lamido, the District Headquarters, to seek a reduction of tensions developed from the protests of the WTU by meeting representatives from members of the different groups and societies: "they met some 300 sullen-men, armed with cudgels, knives and matchets"⁹⁴. Although the District Officer was successful in persuading them to surrender the bulk of their arms, "before they realized what was happening", as well as to allow the return of the tax records to the Emir with apologies, the 300 men warned that there might be violence if the District Head returned to rule their area and also submitted that they did not wish to see the newly appointed District Head visit the Wurkum Districts⁹⁵. Furthermore, the members of the WTU intimidated the Village Heads and some elders who wanted to attend the District Court at Karim Lamido⁹⁶. As a result of these developments, the DO revisited Karim Lamido on the 13th July, 1954 to meet the leaders of the Wurkum Tribal Union to hear the nature of their political grievances and subsequently toured the villages in the company of the Waziri and the newly appointed District Head⁹⁷. Implicit in the tour was that the problem and grievances of the WTU should continue to be "heard" rather than solved. To meet the party of the government, the WTU organized some 500 members from the non-Islamic groups and societies in Muri Division. Although the DO suggested as a conciliation, that there were to be no persecutions for the previous tax offences, when the issue of the new District Head came up and the

authorities suggested that "he be given a trail in the office", the crowd became out of hand and openly hostile⁹⁸. The small but carefully organized Police Force was ordered to disperse the crowd and a riot resulted. It was from these riots that a native of Wurkum, a former Junior Primary School Headmaster came to be appointed as the chief scribe of the NA, upon his completion of the 'District Scribe Course' at the Institute of Administration in Zaria, while the Fulani District Head left in the same year to attend the same course in the same place⁹⁹. Thereafter until 1960 British DOs and Fulani District Heads, jointly ruled the Wurkum District, with more guidance from the former than the latter, a political pattern of authority that was established by G.R. Gardner, an ADO in the Division in 1954¹⁰⁰. Although this "joint" authority pattern on the non-Islamic groups and societies and the clamp down on the leadership of the WTU temporarily silenced its political activities, sufficiently for the Resident to suggest that: "behind and around the tiny Fulani group there remained the great mass of pagans still politically asleep but already beginning to show the first stirrings of consciousness"¹⁰¹, significant reforms came to be implemented within the NAs of Adamawa and Muri Divisions as a direct consequence of the political activities of the Kilba State Union and the Wurkum Tribal Union, who were both in alliance with the MZL in that period. In Numan Division, for example, where there remained a Sole Native Authority there was reorganization of the District Council for the 1954 elections which incorporated 13 district members and 13 elected members into the Final Electoral College who were "all young, all European educated and all keen members of the Middle Zone League"¹⁰². Furthermore, a representative of the educated Christian elements became appointed as a full time councillor in the NA¹⁰³. This means that when there was increased political manipulations by the establishment to keep the Fulani as the ruling class over the non-Islamic groups and societies the "tribal" unions in the Province became increasingly united by the Christian religious

identity which also stood and served as a political identity. It was from the observations on these aspects of social and political identification that the Resident of Adamawa, for example, stated:

"when in December Numan elected a Divisional Member for the first time in history, everyone tipped a modern progressive federal councillor standing for Northern Peoples Congress. Instead, Jonah Assadugu on a straight local Middle Zone League ticket, which has little connection with the regional party policy, got in with no difficulty inspite of serious obstacles. He is an intelligent man who has shown political acumen and organizing ability; under his leadership, the local Middle Zone league could either run the Ferderation or break it"¹⁰⁴.

Although separate Divisional constituencies of electoral colleges for the 1954 elections into the Federal House of Representatives were set up for Muri and Numan with four constituency electoral colleges in Adamawa Division, there was increased political unity with the Christian religious identity which cut across these territorial divisions, among the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa Province. The political mobilization that conditioned this unity was under the educated Christian leadership which existed in the tribal unions, organizations which served as the local branches of the Middle Zone League. Christian political unity which gained the support of other non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, was given a boost before 1954 in terms of what came to be described as "the insult of 1951", when the Provincial electoral college produced five Fulani as representatives of the Province in the NHA in Kaduna, without a single representative from Numan Division. However, there was no strong "tribal" organization among the non-Islamic groups and societies beyond the Chamba Tribal Union, which was affiliated to the Kilba State Union. Only the splits between two NPC Fulani candidates in the final electoral college caused a Chamba candidate to win¹⁰⁵. The political "independence" of the Chamba candidate, however, did not last long after

his election victory because he was promptly dragged into the NPC party fold¹⁰⁶. The 1954 results in the Adamawa electoral college, however, were 75% "tribal" representation and 25% Fulani and Islamic, an exact reflection of the composition of the heterogeneity of the Province¹⁰⁷. In Muri, however, the Mumuye declined to give their "tribal" political allegiance to other non-Islamic groups, because they wanted "to let things ride till the next House of Assembly elections", a tribal political decision which caused the election victory of the son of the Emir of Muri on the NPC party identity¹⁰⁸. In contrast to the Mumuye, the Bachama collectively with an anti-Fulani, anti-Islamic and anti-establishment vote rejected a Moslem Bachama NPC candidate, who was soundly defeated by a tightly organized local MZL wing under the leadership of Jonah Assadugu, who won in the 1954 as an indigene of the non-Islamic tribes¹⁰⁹. As lately as in 1954, however, the Fulani themselves were not prepared to give electoral representation to the non-Islamic tribes in the area. In Adamawa electoral area, for example, while two electoral constituency colleges lay entirely in the Trust Territory, three were predominantly "tribal" in composition¹¹⁰. This arrangement was a grave political shock to the local NPC-Caucus, who thought they might have a single Divisional electoral college from which they planned to elect three Fulani and one "tribal" representative¹¹¹. Curiously, although the Fulani political leadership was quite shrewd in its electoral strategy it was not blinded by complete self-interest. In the circumstances, a quick survey of the constituencies convinced them that the only hope of winning outside Yola, was to sponsor "tribal" NPC candidates and the strategy worked perfectly in the constituencies north of Yola; while in Yola town areas itself, they won convincingly by electing Muhammadu Ribadu¹¹². In the Southern Trust Territory, where the NPC failed to find a "tribal" candidate, the political strategy broke down¹¹³. The Middle Zone League-Northern Elements Progressive Union, however only got three out of the thousand odd seats in the final electoral colleges of the

Province¹¹⁴.

One of the ways the government of British administration in The North sought to reduce the political influences from the activities of the "tribal" unions as well as the developed Christian Social unity of the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa which became apparent in the local organization and political support for the MZL was to restrict the operations of all expatriate Christian Missionaries. The new policy was particularly directed at the SUM. This was so because of the high proportion of SUM employers among the membership of the WTU who were convicted of leading the Wurkum riots as well as the evidence which showed that some Christian Religious Instruction (CRI) classes had also been used as political meeting places other than purposes of religious instructions¹¹⁵. The local government administration therefore introduced conditions which made it obligatory for all expatriate Christian Missionaries to get "Permits to Operate" and the NA also insisted that CRIs ought to be regularly visited by the European Christian Missionaries in charge of them to ensure that religious classes did not become political classes and meeting places¹¹⁶. This restrictive policy was made in the specific context of the political attitudes of British administrative officers in the period between 1950 and 1965 which held European Christian Missionaries in Adamawa as increasingly characterized: "by taking sides with the apparent underdogs without bothering to find out the (official) point of view"¹¹⁷. This was a conception that was developed even before Christian consciousness became a political force with anti-Islamic sentiments that were directed against control of policy and the administration of society by Fulani Moslems. It was from the political pressures brought to bear on the social and political unity in the relationship between European Christian Missionaries, Christian adherents and the Christian Missionary educated leadership in the tribal unions that the Kilba State Union, for example, on its own accord elected "A Committee

for Better Relations". This committee was entrusted with a social and political task: to investigate and if possible settle matters that appeared likely to create discord between the three rivals, Christian, Moslem and animist sections of the Community¹¹⁸, while discussions were held with the European Christian Missionaries: "to show appreciation that there could be no real progress unless all bodies (Native Authorities, Missions and Government) that influence the minds of local men work in the closest and most sympathetic cooperation"¹¹⁹. The critical political issues which developed with bitterness in the grievances of the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa were that while Islam shaped political behaviour and the selection of political roles, Christianity became restricted in its attempt to take a religious identity into the political arena. It was this political frustration that made the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, to feed in their political support to the ideas of the M-Belt movement and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, where social and religious identities might be freely allowed to be collateral in complimenting political identities, particularly, the Christian identity in the minority politics of The North.

Similar to the social and political problems which caused tensions in Adamawa and S.Zaria, the non-Islamic groups and societies in Southern Bauchi were faced with a struggle against the domination of political roles in decision making processes over their local affairs by Hausa-Fulani Moslems and variants of Islamic leadership; an issue that was central to the organization of their politics with the tribal union movements. Although the earliest "tribal" unions and the most politically active organizations in S.Bauchi were the Pan-Sayawa, Pan-Jarawa and the Habe-Fulani Tribal Party which were organized in the period between 1949 and 1952, it was in the Longuda tribal areas in the east of Tangale Waja District that on more than one occasion made representation to the government of British Administration in The North expressing political

desire over the central theme of the M-Belt movement: "to succede and join their (non-Islamic) fellow tribesmen over the provincial borders in Numan Division"¹²⁰. Furthermore, similar to the political tensions in Adamawa, political protest generated by discontent centred on Islamic political rulership over non-Islamic groups and societies. The protests were organized by the Pan-Sayawa League (PSL) and the Pan-Jarawa League (PJL) and the tensions, most often degerated into frequent revolts, sometimes violent¹²¹. Both leadership of the PSL and the PJL came from Christian Missionary trained teachers and evangelists, particularly Missionary Bodies like the SUM and the SIM. While the President of the Pan-Jarawa League until 1959 for example, was Dogon Yaro Fusare, a SIM Parishoner, the Secretary was Mallam Anyam a SUM school teacher¹²². Similarly, while the President of the Pan-Sayawa League was Gwonto Mwaru, a SUM Lay-preacher, the Secretary and chief organizers were employed as school teachers under the same Mission¹²³. Although Christians dominated the executive posts of the Pan-Jarawa and Pan-Sayawa Leagues, both groups also included non-Christians and non-Moslems in their executives and the bulk of their support came from Christians and persons practising African traditional systems of belief and worship¹²⁴. There is no evidence that suggests that Moslems supported or participated in the social and political organization of the "tribal" unions, the local political movements that were the very basic foundations from which popular consciousness about the political grievances of the M-Belt groups and societies penetrated to the individual level to become mobilized as a political force in the M-Belt Movement. In fact Crampton suggests that in some instances of culture change as a result of Islamization, there was total rejection of political and social identification with the original "tribal" group before Islamization, like the experiences of some Marghi in Adamawa, albeit Islamized groups and societies in the M-Belt areas:

"On the whole pagans in the emirates who embraced Islam also adopted the culture of the Hausa-Fulani as well, just as the early Christian Converts in Sierra Leone took European names and started to wear European clothes and the like. The Nupe terminology for conversions to Islam is 'A ze Qoizi' (They became Fulani) ... the Islamized Marghi tend to regard themselves as Fulani and identified with the Fulani rather than with pagan or Christian Marghis"¹²⁵.

In the period between 1949 and 1950, the Hill-Jarawa people who were concentrated on the rocky terrain on the fringe of the Jos Plateau and who were the main support of the Pan-Jarawa League, chafed under the autocracy of a District Head, appointed from the Royal Family of the Emir of Bauchi¹²⁶. Although the Bauchi Royal Family was established by the Gerawa tribe, a non-Fulani but Islamic people indigenous to the area, the Fulani tribe dominated in the ranks of the Bauchi nobility¹²⁷. When the Pan-Jarawa League was organized in 1949, it mounted a campaign to have an indigenous Jarawa man to substitute the appointed District Head from the Fulani in Bauchi¹³⁸. The political campaigns of the PJJ included the mobilization of Christians and non-Moslems to refuse to pay tax directly to the agent of the Emir as a demonstration of rejection to the appointment of aliens to perform political roles in the local affairs of the Jarawa, from the Emir in Bauchi¹²⁹. Whitaker suggests that it was widely believed by government in The North and the Local Authority in Bauchi that the Pan-Sayawa and the Pan-Jarawa Leagues received overt moral, organizational and financial support from different Christian Missionary Bodies which operated in S.Bauchi (SUM and SIM)¹³⁰. The more covert Christian Missionary influences on the organization of political protest on the Leagues in S.Bauchi were through the Missionary training in the methods of evangelicalism: "going out to witness among the people, meet the people and make converts". Both leagues exploited the method and combined religious activity with political campaigns against Islam in general, and particularly directed their appeals against the Islamic presence and influence on local affairs. Furthermore,

with the method, both Leagues were therefore able to penetrate to the grassroots of society where they articulated local political grievances which created unity on anti-Islamic and anti-Fulani sentiments¹³¹. The campaign of the Bauchi Hill Jarawa, organized and led by the Pan-Jarawa League with leadership that had graduated from Christian Missionary institutions, succeeded in obtaining an indigene as Chief in 1959, after ten years of political protest and struggle, which included an alliance with the M-Belt movement in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region¹³². After 1959, the indigenous Chief to the Jarawa group was in firm political control of the village Chiefs in Jarawa land¹³³, a political advantage which the European educated in the Pan-Jarawa League, subsequently under the influence of Azi Nyako, were able to use to rally total support for the ideas of the creation of a M-Belt Region, most particularly articulated in political campaigns of the 1959 elections. Furthermore, because of the political impact developed from the political protest, organized by the P.J.L, Toro District was dissolved and most of the Jarawa were constituted into "a Jarawa District unto themselves"¹³⁴. Although the Pan-Jarawa League was mainly concerned with social and political issues which were on the diffusion of the Islamic religion and the Hausa Islamic culture from Bauchi by the instrumental use of institutional channels to convert Jarawa still practising African traditional religions, there existed economic pressures on Jarawa land that were caused by tin mining activities. By 1955 the tin mining activities caused destruction to farmland, sufficiently to cause agitation from the Jarawa, Anaguta, and the Jerawa, similar to the circumstances of the Birom in Jos Division. These problems however affected most of the groups that were found on the West and South-Western parts of S.Bauchi¹³⁵. In 1955 certain areas of Jarawa and Lame Districts of S.Bauchi were defined as congested areas and it became necessary to employ an Administrative Officer as Land Officer, solely to work with the tin mining companies to reduce

tensions from the affected local communities, a development that was largely resolved using the experiences of Jos Division¹³⁶. The problem however caused some migration of the Jarawa eastwardly from the west of S. Bauchi in search of farm land. The question of land destruction as a result of Tin mining activities however was not increased by a migrant population in S. Bauchi as was the case in Jos Division. Indeed the PjL did not raise the land issue in the economic sense as was the experience of BPU in Jos Division. Although the Pan-Sayawa League was an aggregated agglomeration of the Sayawa, Longuda, Tangale-Waje, Lere and Mbula tribes etc and therefore rather differently organized and in its patterns of protest from the PjL, it more emotionally contested similar issues in S. Bauchi to the Jarawa movement which centred on political protest and a struggle against political influence of the Emir of Bauchi and his local representatives who were appointed as District Heads on decision making over local affairs¹³⁷. Some of the non-Islamic groups in the PSL being on the edges of the Emirate System - with the Emirs of Bauchi, Gombe and Muri - were more directly affected by the autocratic rule of the Emirs and in many ways were a buffer to the Jarawa people, from influences of Bauchi. The political protest of the Pan-Sagawa League (PSL) however were successful in effecting patterns of representation and reform in the district council although they did not stop the domination of political roles and decision making on the local affairs of the non-Islamic people by Hausa-Fulani and Islamic leadership. As a result of the protests, for example, in Lere District, there was instituted a system of "District-Head-in-Council" along the lines of "Emir-in-Council" which maintained effective political control of the District Head still appointed from Bauchi rather than from the council¹³⁸. Although a council was established with elected and nominated members to moderate the excesses of the District Head, the non-Islamic people remained political and religious minorities in the District Head Council, particularly the elected members

with an average ration of six to ten for the whole of Bauchi Province¹³⁹. However, this was not unique to S. Bauchi. The political problems developed from elected under-representation of the non-Islamic groups and societies into the Central District Councils were also characteristic of Adamawa with a ratio of six to nineteen, Keffi with Fourteen to Eighteen, Muri with Five to Ten, Nassarawa Ten to Twenty, Wase seven to Nine and Zaria had Six to Ten¹⁴⁰. The political protests however over these circumstances, obliged the Fulani nobility and the Emirs who ruled them to introduce elected representation more fully and rapidly, an innovation that was adamantly resisted in other plural emirates in the North like Ilorin and Zaria¹⁴¹. Although there were reforms in the circumstances of domination of the non-Islamic groups in S. Bauchi, the activities of the tribal unions maintained political resistance to manifestations of its reinstatement and particular opposition was spear-headed by Christian adherents. When upon the death of the chief of Biliri in 1951, for example, who had been the first chief in the area that owed his direct appointment to the government of British administration in the North, there was opposition championed by Christians against the eldest son to serve as successor to the throne in place of the father¹⁴². In the same year, Christian opposition to the exercise of political authority by the Fulani District Head on the non-Islamic groups and societies, centered on Lere District, stirred sufficient tensions which conditioned a political tour of Southern Bauchi areas by the Emir: "in order to establish closer relations between the District Head and the Mission"¹⁴³. A direct consequence of the tour was that two Christians became appointed to the District Council and the chief representative of the area, who was a Christian and a mixed farmer was elected to the Provincial Electoral College, apparently with Moslem support from the Lere area¹⁴⁴.

Although political problems over Islamic leadership were central to the patterns of protest that developed in S. Bauchi, these grievances were

compounded by economic inequalities between the Islamic and non-Islamic communities. In 1951, for example, economic wealth was unevenly distributed in the Tangale Waje areas:

"With the rich farmers on the borders of Kumo and Pindiga, contrasting with the poor and primitive people on the border of Adamawa. The latter produce practically no cash crops and many do casual labour in Gombe Emirate in order to pay their tax. The population of the poorer farming areas is showing a decline and there is a movement into the richer farmlands of Gombe... comparable results of mixed farming with those of Gombe farmers can hardly be expected among pagans with no knowledge of cattle management"¹⁴⁵.

It was from these under-privileged districts that there existed persistent political demands for separation from the political control of the Emir in Bauchi and to join fellow "tribes" that were essentially non-Islamic but not necessarily poor, over the border in the Numan Division of Adamawa Province¹⁴⁶. It was in the midst of the social and political domination of Hausa-Fulani and Islamic leadership over the indigenous groups and societies to S. Bauchi, compounded by severe economic inequalities with increased social consciousness produced from christian missionary activities on political issues, expressed in the "tribal" Union Movements as political organizations, that the 1951 elections were contested. Although all areas of Bauchi Province experienced what was described as their "First touch of election fever", largely due to time spent on election work and general tours undertaken to explain the procedure and political importance of the elections:

"In some areas there was but a vague idea of what it was all about and some pagans areas were disturbed by rumours that those elected would be drafted to the tin mines or the Korean war. Generally speaking in most areas, enthusiasm was high and a high percentage of the people voted"¹⁴⁷.

The "tribal" Unions with explicit social and political christian identities in S. Bauchi, however, made an insignificant impact on the outcome of the 1951 elections. This was so because there were no political campaigns on particular party lines except for the overt NPC political activities in the Azare areas¹⁴⁸. The electorate therefore voted for the local personalities rather than principles preached by the particular political organizations they claimed to belong to¹⁴⁹. The report of the Resident in Bauchi stated that the 1951 elections:

"revealed an excessive tendency toward parochialism reflecting the determination of each group to do its utmost to secure representation at the next level and in the absence of really outstanding personalities, it was inevitable that electors should vote for those whom they knew personally"¹⁵⁰.

In the instance, in an electoral college of ninety-one members for Bauchi Province, there were eighty-nine nominations to secure places for seven-men with the highest majority as representatives in the NHA. As a result of the high percentage of the nominations (97.8% of the members of the elected college nominated), 75% of the contesting candidates failed to reach double figures in the final election count¹⁵¹. Although there were common socio-political and economic problems affecting the non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Bauchi which led to the organization of the "tribal" Unions with an explicit Christian religious identity, it was the tribal identity that conditioned the political identity and this did not create much electoral impact. Furthermore, although the religious and political problems were as sharp as those in S. Zaria and Adamawa, the non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Bauchi never crystallized their christian unity into a solid electoral bloc for political action. As a result, of the seven members representing Bauchi Province into the NHA from the 1951 elections, only one was non-Fulani and non-Hausa, and although Moslem, he was sympathetic to the socio-economic and political problems in S. Bauchi. He

was Yakubu Wanka, an accountant with the Bauchi/Dass Native Treasury, who scored twenty two votes (24.2%) in an electoral college with ninety-one members¹⁵². There was however evident competition among members of the Electoral College to get elected into the NHA, with the strength of the Islamic identity producing a political hierarchy in the voting patterns for the different candidates among themselves. For example, Abubaker Tafawa Balewa, subsequently to become the Prime Minister of the Nigerian Federation in 1957, was top of the poll in the Provincial Electoral College with 53 voters, Jauro Gombe, a visiting teacher with the Gombe NA scored 31 votes, Mallam Buba, supervisor of works in Gombe NA scored 26 votes, Chiroman Bauchi, the eldest son of the Emir of Bauchi and District Head of Galambi-Kirfi scored 24 votes and Mohammadu Kabir the son of the Emir of Katagum and junior NA scribe scored 17 votes¹⁵³. In addition, Mallam Bawa was nominated by the Katagum NA into the NHA¹⁵⁴. In Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria, therefore, Islamic dominance in representative electoral processes, compounded the grievances over decision-making in the local affairs of the non-Islamic groups and societies, a process that was conditioned by numerical sizes of adherents to Islam and access to accumulated economic wealth by positions in the NAs which enhanced the status of the political personalities.

However, in the period between 1950 and 1965, socio-economic and political grievances of the M-Belt movement were the accumulated and contested issues and problems of the different M-Belt groups and societies which varied in political gravity in their local circumstances and as they were articulatedly organized by the tribal union movements. As evidence will subsequently be produced in the explanation of the variation in the decline of political support for the UMBC party and the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region, in the period between 1960 and 1965, there was overt patron-client relationship in the politics of the Saradauna with some of the political leadership in the M-Belt movement, from variations in

local problems. It was a political strategy meant to keep the North as one. In the instance of that period, the M-Belt groups and societies politically recoiled into their "tribal" identities and with those, they took up a struggle to bargain for socio-economic infrastructural facilities from the government of the NPC in the North, in order for their societies to develop. This was a tribal strategy that gained currency when the patro-client mechanism was most effective in the politics of the North, before the military intervened in Nigerian politics in January, 1966, despite previous conceptions of being non-Islamic, Christian and among the minorities, as the driving force in the political identity of the M-Belt movement. In other words, in the period between 1960 and 1965, the nature of politics in the North, albeit in Nigeria, recycled the conditions that previously caused the formation of "tribal" Unions in the period between 1940 and 1950. In the period between 1940 and 1956, the socio-economic issues among the M-Belt groups and societies were raised as local political problems. In the period after 1956, however, the political contest involving the M-Belt movement that was organized in 1949, was centered on the solutions to local socio-economic and political problems rather than a dominantly harmonious problem affecting all of the M-Belt groups and societies. At the peak of the heat of the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region (1956-1959) the socio-economic issues contested by the M-Belt movement varied, with each unique to the circumstances of the groups and societies in the M-Belt areas but with Islamic domination of political roles of decision making in both the government of the NPC at the Regional and Provincial levels of institutions being the common grievance factor which cut-across issues that were articulated. It was from a premise like that from which there was developed the anticipation that a government in a M-Belt Region, organized by its indigenes, will be directed at the solution of local problems which the existing Regional government relegated to backwaters of public policy¹⁵⁵. However, by recruiting "tribal" Unions whose existence was based

on the contest of local political issues, the M-Belt movement was to open up exit-voices within its ranks, once local problems were solved or conciliated. The political organizations in the M-Belt movement were therefore vulnerable to dislocation by the very nature of the way the movement organized-in tribal Unions to become a political force in the North and Nigeria from among the groups and societies in the M-Belt areas. In the instance, "tribal" Unions with political support for the ideas of the creation of a M-Belt Region articulated by the M-Belt movement easily organized themselves out, when local socio-economic and political interests became conciliated by the party in control of government. In the growth and development of the M-Belt movement, the fissiparous nature of the political organization in the period between 1952 and 1965 is explained by the "tribal" interests within and outside the organization, rather than the absence of a coherent political objective in the demand and political need for the creation of a M-Belt Region.

The evidence produced in this section, therefore, suggests that socio-economic and political problems of discrimination and deprivation were not only causes of tribal Unions, who fed-in their political support in identifying with the M-Belt movement. There was also the desire for a political arena, removed from the domination of majorities, where cultural minority "proto-tribal-nationalism" of the different groups might exhibit itself. In the period between 1938 and 1965, "tribal-nationalism" in the majority of instances with the M-Belt groups and societies, was fed into christian unity and produced political support for the M-Belt movement and its demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. Furthermore, to the causes of the emergence of "tribal" Unions and subsequently their support of the M-Belt movements, were deep seated anxieties which were rooted in anticipated consequences of British withdrawal from political control in the North albeit Nigeria. These anxieties were an apparent political development from the constitutional conferences, the translation of the

1951 Macpherson constitution in which electoral politics were introduced and the subsequent settlements of the 1954 federal constitution in which the North assumed more political powers and control of its wealth independently of the Nigerian Federation. There was also the 'Eight Point Programme' of the North, which was almost declaring the North as an independent 'Nation within the Nigerian Nation'. These political circumstances, in which the M-Belt and societies found themselves encapsulated in an increasingly isolated North, were further compounded by historically recollected experiences with the Islamic society of the period between 1804 and 1900 and which increasingly found expression in political rhetoric as reminders and which were correlated to the persistent humiliation and subordination of the non-Islamic people to Hausa Fulani and Islamic patterns of authority and control of society in the North. This pattern of controlling society in the M-Belt areas compounded socio-economic and political problems, particularly when the whole processes were complicated by the thrust of Hausa-Fulani and Islamic culture particularly with the penetration of the Hausa language toward the M-Belt areas, which was backed-up by the authority of British rule. The rejection of this thrust of the culture of the Hausa Fulani was a critical factor in seeking a new Region, where a different identity might thrive, an identity that might be the alternative to the dominance of the Islamic identity in the North. However, while the Hausa language served the purpose of integrating the different "tribes" in the North and a strong force in fostering the conception of the Northern identity, the same language served as a medium for the propagation of the Christian religious faith among the M-Belt groups and societies, which was the instrument for creating the conceptions of a contrary identity, the Christian M-Belt identity, poised against the Islamic conception of the Northern identity. In the growth and development of the M-Belt movement as a political force in the politics of the North and Nigeria, the differences in religious identities were

emphasized as causes of socio-economic and political discrimination and deprivation affecting the M-Belt areas. The religious identity served as a major political resource in the mobilization of political support in the demand for the creation of the M-Belt Region. However, before the political demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region was made, tribal unions among the non-Islamic people in the North, had fruitlessly contested for the control of their local socio-economic and political interests. Although some of these interests were conciliated, the majority remained unresolved issues and problems. It was because of these unresolved issues and problems that non-Islamic and Christian conceptions of the differences in identities in the North, matured the ideas for the demands for separation, through the organization of an all embracing political movement with political interests which were beyond tribal identification. The NML, for example, took over the common causes of the tribal Union movements with a unitary conception of a political identity, reflecting the solidarity of Christianity in the areas which subsequently grew and developed the separatist tendencies in some of the tribal unions, into political conceptions of a M-Belt Region.

1. The variation in the nature of socio-economic and political problems among the M-Belt people is examined with more analytical detail in subsequent chapters. The variance was one of the major causes of the volatile nature of political unity in the organization of the M-Belt people in the period between 1950 and 1965.
2. Debates in The House of Representatives, Lagos 28th March, 1955 p648.
3. Dudley 1966 p234; see also his Table 21 on Ethnic Composition of Selected Areas in Northern Nigeria, where Jos is contrasted with some other areas in The North, on p235.
4. Sklar 1963 p345.
5. Interview Discussions with Patric Dokotri, January, 1981.
6. When Patric Fom began to make political statements on the socio-economic issues and problems in Jos Division, newspaper reports which were read by his wife in Lagos, subsequently conditioned a marital reconciliation meant "to join him in the struggle against British rule in Jos Division with an anticipated hope that Patrick will soon become a big man". It ought to be accepted that there is some political sense in this development because in about the same period trends of Ghanaian politics were strongly anti-British, which culminated in independence in 1956, largely developed from the Nkrumah factor in West African politics generating anti-colonial sentiments.
7. Interview Discussions with Choji Bot, an Ex-Serviceman, January, 1981.
8. Godwin Terhema Pineh, "Stop destroying our food crops - Fulani Herdsmen", The Nigerian Voice, Makurdi, 14th April, 1983 p6.
9. Northern Region of Nigeria Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna, 1953, p59.
10. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna, 1953, p59 - p60.
11. Dudley 1968 p235.
12. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna, 1953, p60.
13. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna, 1953, p60.
14. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna, 1953, p60.
15. Whitaker 1970 p204.
16. Whitaker 1970 p204.
17. Post 1963 p80; M.G. Smith, "Kagoro Political Development", Human Organization, vol.19, 1960 p141 - p149.
18. Smith 1960 p143.
19. Smith 1960 p143.
20. Smith 1960 p143.
21. Smith 1960 p142.
22. Smith 1960 p142.
23. Smith 1960 p142.
24. Smith 1960 p144.
25. Smith 1960 p144.
26. Smith 1960 p144.
27. Smith 1960 p144.
28. Smith 1960 p144.
29. Smith 1960 p144.
30. Smith 1960 p144.
31. Smith 1960 p144.
32. Smith 1960 p144.
33. Smith 1960 p144.
34. Smith 1960 p144.
35. Smith 1960 p144.
36. Smith 1960 p144.

37. Smith 1960 p145.
38. Smith 1960 p144.
39. Smith 1960 p144.
40. Smith 1960 p144.
41. Interview Discussions with Mallam Gwamna, January, 1981.
42. Smith 1960 p147.
43. Dudley 1966 p93.
44. It ought to be borne in mind that this was the premise from which the shared nature of social and political problems existing in S.Zaria as well as on the Plateau, conditioned the admission of Bala Yerima in the 1950s from the Kilba group and society, into the executive of the BPU in Jos Division.
45. Dudley 1968 p93.
46. Smith 1960 p144.
47. Smith 1960 p144; It was difficult to press this point for further explanations of the skills and strategies Mallam Gwamna used because when I held interview discussions with him in January, 1981 he was a very old man and there were constant memory lapses during the discussion.
48. Smith 1960 p144.
49. Smith 1960 p144; for more detail discussions see Chapter 3.
50. Smith 1960 p144.
51. Smith 1960 p144.
52. Crampton 1975 p70.
53. Interview Discussions with John Smith, April 1980 as well as Interview Discussions with Mallam Gwamna January, 1981.
54. Smith 1960 p144; In the period between 1950 and 1960 however he became politically overshadowed by the created title of the Emir of Kafanchan.
55. Smith 1960 p145.
56. Electoral patterns and variations in the political support for the demands of the M-Belt movement in the 1959 elections and the ideas and conceptions of the M-Belt political identity in the 1979 elections are examined in analytical detail in chapter 5.
57. The development of the non-Moslem League (NML) is examined in detail in a subsequent chapter where the general growth of the M-Belt movement into the UMBC political party is discussed.
58. Smith 1960 p146.
59. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna, 1953, p74.
60. Ibid p74.
61. Ibid p74.
62. Ibid p74.
63. Smith 1960 p146.
64. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna, 1953, p2; Northern Region of Nigeria, Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, 1957, p59.
65. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna, 1953, p2.
66. Sklar 1963 p370.
67. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna, 1953, p2.
68. Ibid p2.
69. Ibid p3.
70. Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, 1957, p59.
71. Ibid p59.
72. Ibid p59.
73. Ibid p59.

74. Ibid p59.
75. Ibid p60.
76. Population census of The Northern Region of Nigeria, Lagos, 1952, Table 8, p32.
77. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna, 1953 p4; Population census of the Northern Region 1952, Lagos, 1952 p26.
78. Northern Region of Nigeria, Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, 1957 p59.
79. Discussions with A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, September, 1980: Kirk Greene served as a British Administrative Officer in Adamawa Division: see also his Adamawa: Past and Present, London, 1958.
80. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna 1953 p4.
81. Ibid p4.
82. Sklar 1963 p147 and p370.
83. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1954, Kaduna, 1956 p3.
84. Dudley 1968 p91.
85. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1954, Kaduna, 1956 p3.
86. Ibid p3.
87. Dudley 1968 p91.
88. Dudley 1968 p91; Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1954, 1956 p3.
89. Sawaba Declaration: Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) Declaration of Principles, Kano, 8th August, 1950.
90. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1954, 1956 p3.
91. Ibid p3.
92. Ibid p3 - p4.
93. Ibid p4.
94. Ibid p4.
95. Ibid p4.
96. Ibid p4.
97. Ibid p4.
98. Ibid p4.
99. Ibid p4.
100. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1954, 1956 p5.
101. Ibid p6.
102. Ibid p6 - p7.
103. Ibid p7.
104. Ibid p7; The Numan Federation Native Authority was organized from Five Districts that made up the previous Numan Division whose majority population was Christian and non-Moslem.
105. Ibid p7.
106. Ibid p7.
107. Ibid p7.
108. Ibid p7.
109. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1954, Kaduna, 1956, p7.
110. Ibid p7.
111. Ibid p7.
112. Ibid p7.
113. Ibid p8.
114. Ibid p8.
115. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1954, Kaduna, 1956, p10.
116. Ibid p10.
117. Ibid p10.

118. Ibid p10.
119. Ibid p10.
120. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna, 1956, p8.
121. Whitaker 1970 p204.
122. Whitaker 1970 p204n.34.
123. Whitaker 1970 p205n.34.
124. Ibid.
125. E.P.T. Crampton, Christianity in Northern Nigeria, London, 1979, p68; Kit Elliott, An African School, London 1970, p209 says the same thing of the Goemai tribe of the Lowland of Plateau Province who became Moslems. There were some young people in educational institutions whose fathers or grandfathers were classified as members of various Batta groups in Adamawa in the studies by Meek but who were calling themselves Fulani - Crampton 1979, p77n.133.
126. Whitaker 1970 p204.
127. Ibid p204.
128. Ibid p204.
129. Ibid p204.
130. Whitaker 1970 p204.
131. Ibid p204.
132. Ibid p205.
133. Ibid p205.
134. Whitaker 1970 p205.
135. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1954, Kaduna, 1956, p19.
136. Ibid p19.
137. Whitaker 1970 p204.
138. Whitaker 1970 p205.
139. Whitaker 1970 p198.
140. Whitaker 1970 p198.
141. Whitaker 1970 p198-205.
142. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna, 1953 p8.
143. Ibid p8.
144. Ibid p8.
145. Ibid p10.
146. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna, 1953 p8.
147. Ibid p11.
148. Ibid p11.
149. Ibid p11.
150. Ibid p11.
151. Ibid p12.
152. Ibid p12.
153. Ibid p12.
154. Ibid p12.
155. As it will become apparent in the analysis of problems that caused tensions and the split of BP state it was the misconception of 'solutions to local problems in which among others, it was assumed that Benue groups did not have rights to take up jobs in the institutions of Government on the Plateau; just as it was assumed that Plateau indigenes ought to restrict their roles to government institutions on the Plateau.

Additional Notes to Chapter 3

*1 The subsequent prohibition of large scale Christian Missionary activity in Muslim areas in the North, ultimately worked to the advantage of the growth of the Christian Church since the resources which would otherwise have been spent more or less fruitlessly in a vain attack on the citadels of Islam were freed to missionise the 'pagan' areas where the prospects of building up a large scale church membership were far greater and where in due course large Christian Communities in fact arose.

*2 Crampton 1975 p.151 quite explicitly states that zoning occurred among protestants and not among Catholics and the main reason was that most of the missionary societies already had an understanding that they would not enter areas where another society was already working. The RCM and various other unconventional Protestant Bodies however did not respect the principle of the community of Missions and have felt free to move and work anywhere. This evidence conforms to the experience of M.J. Dent in Benue, Bauchi and Kano.

*3 There were however significant distinctions between Catholic and Protestant Missionary work in the North and among the M-Belt groups in particular: the rather late arrival of the Catholics, their more easy going attitude in the practice of the Christian religion in some areas, e.g. tolerance of alcoholic drinking, their rather more worldly wise attitude to Islamic power - so that at first Catholics were not so predominant in M-Belt leadership and their priests were less keen on confronting Islam in a political way than were most of the protestant Missonaries like the SUM and SIM. In the end however both the Protestant stream and the Catholic stream of Christian activity are equally involved in the M-Belt movement, particularly in seeking guarantees for respect of basic human rights in the North to protect Christians.

*4 It ought to be borne in mind however that the Ningi rebel connection to the Isawa 'Christians' is quite unproven and is the idea not of Crampton, but of Adell Paton, their connection with the martyred Islamic teacher, Ibrahim in an earlier period in Kano is far better attested in the history.

*5 A fair proportion of these 24.7% of Christian teachers involved in work in the 'core of the Islamic centres' were in fact teaching the children of Southern immigrants, working in the administration, in business or in trade; and this applies even more strongly to the calculations of numbers of churches.

*6 For 'Sura' in all other sections of the thesis, read as Mahavul.

*7 Ayandele may be quite wrong on translations of the Miller version of the Hausa Bible; a new translation of an approved kind was being produced as early as 1955 by Sanderson in Katagum.

*8 By chief in this context, it is meant a chief that is independent and not simply a district head who is subject to an Emir or a British created Paramount Chief. In Bauchi, for example, there was one such chief in Dass and the others as the table scores is in reference to Tangale Waje.

*9 However, the fact that the Tiv took magical status from a title conferred by the Aku and the Jukun people who had a reputation for magical prowess does not make them subject to an oligarchy. There is no doubt however about Jukun influence on the Tiv.

*10 Until 1931 the only officers to take the Tiv language examination were education officers. Furthermore in the 1940s and 1950s MacBride was in Tiv land and was present in the 'Nyam Buan' disturbances during the period of the war of 1939-1945 and ended as Resident Benue in about 1954 when he was posted to Lokoja.

*11 It ought to be borne in mind however that Emirate status, state systems and strong headship of a community are not created western institutions but Hausa-Fulani ones, and have many parallels in Africa from periods long before European contact.

*12 With the creation of Tiv Division however, early in the 1930s by Captain Downes, all traces of subservience to the Aku Uka ceased, except for the large number of Tiv farmers (a majority of the population in Wukari Division) who had emigrated and settled there.

*13 It ought to be borne in mind that in the campaigns for the creation of the Tor Tivship, the Tiv wanted the prestige of a single Chief, of first class status. They did not want subordination on the Hausa Fulani pattern - For detailed discussion of this dual requirement of the Tiv, See Dent 1966 Chapter on the UMBC.

*14 % total labour force means % of 1930 total labour force; Similarly % on tin mining means % of total tin tonnage and value mined during the same period.

*15 All tin exports paid a royalty to the Nigerian government of about 10%, but this benefited the whole Northern region rather than the Birom people. There were also huge profits for the overseas companies.

*16 Total tin value, here means total value of tin extracted from 1903 to 1930. The reason for the very high percentage for the specific years is of course that the price was still high then, and only fell catastrophically with the slump of the post 1931 years.

*17 It ought to be borne in mind that the phenomenon of attacking a smaller local rival, rather than a larger richer exploiting agency is also common throughout many relationships, e.g. periodic anti-Asian movements in East Africa, anti-Semitism in Tzarist Russia etc.

*18 The Lere districts were however not centred around Dass, but around Lere town itself and also on Tafawa Balewa Dass, for most of the British Colonial period had an independent NA, though a very small one, using the Bauchi treasury. The Chief of Dass was never a Bauchi district head. Similarly, Tangale Waje and Dass were never subject to the Emir of Bauchi although they were a part of Bauchi Province.

*19 Gowon was referring to Officer recruitment which was skewed to the Ibo group before 1961 and then evened out by the quota policy. Recruitment of other ranks was always skewed to Northerners and needed no rectification by Northernisation policy.

*20 Among the founders of the TPU, was also Ayilla Yogh, the most important of the Tiv radicals in this period and was closely associated to Nnamdi Azikiwe, the leader of the NCNC party. Subsequently, he was also a member of the Nigerian Parliament after 1954.

*21 However, James Adzakpe was a younger man, and discrimination against him occurred under the Sardauna in the mid-1950s and not in this period.


* 22 There are many versions of this story: M.J. Dent for example suggests that his messenger alleged that the interpreter messenger at the meeting mistranslated to give Makere the victory; but these explanations are strange, the Pusu candidate was sure to win for there were more Pusu clan-heads-only Iharev Masven Nongow intermediate area, plus Turan Ugondo, Ikurav Tieu and Ikuravya clans are Chongo; thus out of 58 clan heads some 18 are Chongo and the rest Pusus. Furthermore, when M.J. Dent conducted the Deputy Tor Tivship elections by long discussions (over 40 hours) in 1958, every clanhead initially voted for his geneological candidate and only shifted ground when that candidate had been defeated.

* 23 It ought to be borne in mind however that the Igalla had an Attah for a long time. The office was not created to fulfill the aspirations of post war elite for tribal importance.

* 24 This figure in the quoted document is presumably in reference to sq. acres rather than sq. miles; 38,059 sq. miles is a larger area than the whole of Jos Division!

VOLUME II

Map 4 The Nigerian Federation
Before May 1967.



CHAPTER 4

The political growth and development of the M-Belt Movement.

"Land of our birth the Middle Belt
 Our love for thee is great and deep
 We hope to grow soon and take our place
 Like other Regions in our Nation
 Land of Mineral Resources
 Where the green, the Niger and Benue meet
 To adore Nature's Beauty and Wonder
 Bless the Region of Middle-Belt"¹

I Introduction

This chapter examines the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement in the period between 1949 and 1965. It also examines the conflicts that arose within the M-Belt Movement caused by the existing differences in socio-economic problems and the political interests of the leadership in the "tribal" Unions among the M-Belt groups and societies. The differences in socio-economic problems and the political interests of the leadership in the "tribal" Unions existing among the M-Belt groups and societies were some of the underlying factors that caused factions in the various phases of the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement from the Non-Moslem League (NML) of Northern Nigeria to the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) of Nigeria. When the M-Belt Movement grew and developed from the NML and became the UMBC under the political leadership of J.S. Tarka in 1956, with massive

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1. A proposed National Anthem for the M-Belt Region, composed by Bello Ejumá, a Yoruba from Kabba Province, first General-Secretary of NEPU in 1950, with Moses Nyam Rwang organized factions of the MZL into MBPP in 1954 as an affiliate of the NCNC party, became AG organizing secretary for Kabba Province in 1957, rejoined UMBC as Party Organizing Secretary for Jos Division in 1958; An Edition produced by Elizabeth Ivase, Commissioner for Education, Benue State, January 1981.

support from the Tiv group and society, who were the majority in numerical size in the population of the M-Belt areas, it vigorously campaigned and struggled for the creation of a M-Belt Region, meant to be a separate political unit from the Islamic society in The North and politically autonomous within the Nigerian Federation, until Benue-Plateau state was created in 1967.*1

The available literature that has been generated by both previous academic and non-academic researches on the M-Belt Movement and its demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North suggest that the analytical focus has been on its ultimate manifestation in the UMBC.¹ This has been without careful explanations of the political growth and development of the previous organizations that shaped the demands subsequently articulated by the UMBC and the nature of socio-economic and political problems and issues existing among the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1940 and 1956, which conditioned the political changes in the labels used as symbols of cohesion in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region as a unit of the Nigerian Federation. In some instances the UMBC party has been analyzed as a total M-Belt Movement,² even when it is the case that

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1. Among other books for examples, see Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation, Princeton, 1963; B.J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, London 1968; Bryan Sharwood Smith, "But Always As Friends" Northern Nigeria and the Cameroons 1921-1957, London 1969; J.I. Tseayo, Conflict and Incorporation in Nigeria: The Integration of the Tiv, Zaria 1975; M.J. Dent, "A Minority Party - The United Middle Belt Congress", 1965 p.461-507, in J.P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics, London 1965.
 2. For example, see Tseayo 1975 p.193-198

*1 See comment at the end of Chapter 4.

the parent organizations like the NML and the MZL experienced substantial changes and shifts in political identity in the demands for the creation of a separate region from the Islamic society in The North. For example, while the NML was politically articulate with the Christian religious identity, the MZL emphasized the differences in the cultural identities to the Islamic culture and the similarities of the cultural patterns among the non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas as symbols of political cohesion in a M-Belt Region even when it was the case that the leadership was still Christian in outlook and ideological emphasis. Although M.G. Smith, J.I. Tseayo and Bryan Sharwood Smith suggest that the MZL shaped the political demands of the UMBC for the creation of a M-Belt Region, the systemic forces of politics in The North and Nigeria that caused the development from the MZL to the UMBC remain unexplained.¹ Furthermore, besides brief mentions of the essentially parent organization of the M-Belt Movement, the NML of Northern Nigeria, which was a conglomeration of Christian leadership from both the "tribal" Unions and churches among the M-Belt groups and societies, has received little analytical attention as an organization that shaped the conceptions of the political identity of the M-Belt Movement in its different phases.²

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1. For examples see M.G. Smith, "Kagoro Political Development", Human Organization Vol.19 No.3 1960 p.137-149; Tseayo 1975; Sharwood Smith 1969; Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation, Princeton 1963 p.345-350.
 2. The inadequate focus of attention in the analysis of the causes of the NML, the parent organization of the M-Belt Movement has been largely due to the religious emotions which surrounded the emergence of the organization and made the political climate of earlier researchers difficult to give attention to the events surrounding its inception as a political force.

The purpose of the chapter therefore is to examine whether the diffusion of the political ideas in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, shaped by the growth and development of political support for the M-Belt Movement were caused by similar socio-economic and political problems and issues which were previously contested by "tribal" Unions as political organizations among the M-Belt groups and societies. In the period between 1949 and 1956 the increased diffusion of political ideas among the M-Belt groups and societies on the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region was caused by the development of the M-Belt Movement from the NML of Northern Nigeria to the UMBC, which became a national political force in shaping electoral patterns in the non-Islamic areas of The North when it became aligned to the AG party in 1956. When "tribal" Unions among the M-Belt groups and societies were seen to be ineffective political instruments of creating impact on government in the wider political arena in The North in the struggle to transform the structure of authority at the local level in order to solve the socio-economic and political problems of their groups and societies they gave support to the organization of a wider social and political movement to produce the initial M-Belt Movement, the Non-Moslem League. This movement was crystallized in social identity by the Christian religion, a process of crystallization which culminated in the demand for political separation for existence in a M-Belt Region in The North, autonomously independent of the Islamic society within the operations of the Federal system in Nigeria in that period.

As it has been earlier suggested the majority of the non-Islamic as well as the non-Christian population who were persons practising African traditional systems of beliefs and worship among the M-Belt groups and societies identified for social and political purposes with

Christians and Christian leadership in the "tribal" Unions rather than with Moslems and Islamic political organizations before 1954.¹ In the period between 1949 and 1956 when there was the development of the NML to become the UMBC in 1956 the socio-political and economic circumstances of persons with traditional African religious practices conditioned their political support for the M-Belt Movement. Their political support for the M-Belt Movement was also conditioned by historically recollected socio-economic and political experiences with Moslems in the cause of the expansion of the Islamic society in the period between 1804 and 1900; and their subordination to Islamic culture and authority patterns in the period between 1900 and 1940 when there was a government of British administration in The North.

The chapter also examines systematic growth and development of the M-Belt Movement, in the nature of the patterns of political support it gained which reflected the grievance over the political powerlessness of the non-Islamic groups and societies involved in the struggle to influence changes in the type of problems that seem to persist in all political systems centred on equity in the distribution of welfare amenities, the sharing of political roles and participation in decision making in The North as well as the socio-economic and political problems which develop when some groups and societies are distanced from the centres of political power in a developing country like Nigeria.

In the period between 1949 and 1956 the different political phases in the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement were characterized by the development of factional tendencies, cleavages and splits within the organizations that were the result of different perceptions of the

1. For detailed examples with discussions of how the Christian converts held "attraction power" for non-Christians and non-Moslems to become identified with them see Chapter 3 Sections III, V and VI.

nature of the political system in The North and hence different strategies of political organization to achieve objectives. It is argued that although in the period between 1949 and 1956 the mode of articulation adopted by the political leadership in the different phases of the M-Belt Movement varied greatly, suggesting that political dissonance was characteristic of the growth and development of the organization, available evidence dissolves equating political differences with an absence of clarity in the objectives of the leadership for the creation of a M-Belt Region. In other words, the fissiparous nature of the political growth and development of the M-Belt Movement from the NML to the UMBC was conditioned by the absence of a politically cohesive and committed strategy. In the instance some of the political leadership from the initial founding fathers of the Movement were easily brought into the fold of patron-client relationship with leadership in the Islamic society with the concomitant consequence of developing 'a political generation gap between the original founders of the M-Belt ideas and a new younger breed of European educated persons in the leadership. The European educated who subsequently took over the organization and leadership of the M-Belt Movement in 1956 were a more vigorous and radical set of leaders who skillfully compromised their personal gains with their orientations of the political objectives in the M-Belt Movement. Typically characteristic of the leadership of political movements among subordinated groups and societies who are entangled in a colonial relationship with a dominating group and society articulation of political grievances tend to shift from specific issues to become broadly based as the organization moves to gain support. This was the case in the development of the M-Belt Movement among the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North when it was organized as the NML to seek political participation in the quest to protect Christian interests

and subsequently expanded that interest to seek separation from the Islamic society in The North when it was the UMBC, a political process that was conditioned the prestigious notions of the practice of Federatism of Nigeria in that period. Furthermore political leadership in the developing organizations of subordinated groups and societies in an internal colonial situation become subjected to patron-client relationships, with the concomitant consequence of the factions becoming characteristic of the organization to try to meet differing political objectives.¹

Factual evidence on the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement in the period between 1949 and 1965, derive from the illuminating interview discussions held with politicians in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Benue, Plateau and S. Zaria, who participated in the different phases of the organization. Many of the twelve major political participants that were directly involved in the initial growth and development of the ideas for a M-Belt Movement and its subsequent demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North were still alive in the period of fieldwork interviews, (November 1980 - February 1981), except for three who died in the period between 1971 and 1981. The personalities and politicians involved in the M-Belt Movement who were interviewed in the period between November 1980 and February 1981 included Moses Nyam Rwang (Biom - Jos Division on the Plateau), Pastor David V. Lot (Sura - Pankshin Division on the Plateau), Jonah Assadugu (Bachama - Numan Division in Adamawa Province), Mallam Gwamna the Chief of Kagoro (S. Zaria), Azi Nyako (Jarawa - S. Bauchi in Bauchi Division), Isaac Kpum, Isaac Shaahu (Tiv - Benue Province), Gayos Gilima (Kilba - Adamawa Division in Adamawa Province), Patrick Dokotri (Biom - Jos Division on the Plateau and secretary to

1. The theoretical perspectives of groups and societies in an internal colonial situation which uses the conceptual elements derived from the classical theory of colonial relationships are examined and discussed in detail in the Introduction to the thesis.

and J.S. Tarka,
 the UMBC party) before his death in April 1980. It ought to be borne in mind however that only brief interview sessions were held with J.S. Tarka in London in March 1980. His other political intentions with the M-Belt Movement and Nigeria used as evidence in this research derived from his close personal friends like M.J. Dent, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of Keele and Tiv politicians like Isaac Kpum, Isaac Shaahu and his son, Simeon Tarka. Bitrus Rwang Pam and his father, Mallam Moses Rwang Pam, the Chief of Jos, both died in June 1969.¹ The roles they played and their political views on the M-Belt Movement and conceptions of a M-Belt Region were derived from their close associates like Moses Nyam Rwang, Dudu Dalyop and Choji Bot.

Carefully unstructured questions were asked and discussed with these political personalities. Some of these politicians kept personal records of minutes of party meetings and diaries. The personal records and diaries (in the Hausa Language) of Moses Nyam Rwang, for example, were invaluable in exploring the relationship between BPU and the NML, the initial organization that shaped the subsequent M-Belt Movement and his documents on the development of the MZL to the Middle Belt Peoples Party (MBPP), an organization that was a faction of the MZL based on his own ideas of the M-Belt struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region when he experienced political differences and difficulties with Pastor David Lot, the leader of the MZL. Although various other party documents were used in this study in the custody of politicians involved in the M-Belt Movement, the secretaries of the different phases of the organization were reluctant to provide access "because

1. Northern States: Benue-Plateau and Kano States, Vol.1 No.6, Zaria June 1969 p.10.

they were deep down in their stores". This was so for Patrick Dokotri. Dokotri as well as other M-Belt politicians however suggest that in most instances party files, documents and records of meetings in the main secretariats of the M-Belt Movement in Bukuru and Jos do not simply exist any more and nobody knows what has happened to them. This is so because the NPC government in The North in the period between 1955 and 1965 was determined to eliminate opposition parties like NEPU and the UMBC. In the instance there were always police raids on the UMBC headquarters and house of the leadership in which important papers and documents were siezed.¹ Although the "factual" evidence derived from the interview discussions with the different leaders on the causes of political factions within the political organization have conflicting accounts, these were weighted against each other to produce a balanced account of reality in the growth and development of the different phases of the M-Belt Movement. The accounts of the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement in Books, Journals, Newspaper articles and Government Reports were also used as sources of factual evidence to balance evidences derived from interview sources.²

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1. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981; For more examples, see also J.S. Tseayo, 1975 p.vii, in which it is suggested that "because the Nigerian Police were in the habit of harassing the leaders of the UMBC political party, the party never tried to keep useful records."
 2. These include: Northern Region of Nigeria, Secret Government Publication No.194: Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, December 1957, John Smith, "Twilight of Empire", Imperial College Review, London No.22 February 1981 p.1-3; John Oyinbo, Nigeria: Crisis and Beyond, London 1971; M.J. Dent, "The Military and Politics: A study of the relation between the Army and the Political Process in Nigeria" 1971 p.367-300 and "Tarka and the Tiv: A Perspective on Nigerian Federation" 1971 p.448-462 in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, Michigan 1971; Ahmadu Bello, My Life, Cambridge 1962 p.215-216; Bryan Sharwood Smith "But Always As Friends" Northern Nigeria and the Cameroons 1921-1957, London 1969 p.332-346.

The sequence in the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement and the political controversies that surrounded the factions which existed within the organization were also derived from the Legislative Debates in the NHA in Kaduna and the FHR in Lagos for the period between 1950 and 1965.¹

II The Non-Moslem League (NML) of Northern Nigeria

In the period between 1940 and 1952 the Islamic Society in The North was characterized by the development of Unions and societies as political organizations that were concerned to examine and debate political issues and the nature of political authority. They were also concerned to offer political options for their adjustment in the development of The North and Nigeria in socio-economic and political terms. Similarly in about the same period of time that there was the development of political activity in the Islamic society, although in the instance of the Tiv it was as early as in 1938, among the M-Belt groups and societies, "tribal" Unions dominated political activity and contested solutions to the state of local social, economic and welfare problems rather than those affecting the wider society of The North and Nigeria.²

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1. For examples of the controversies which provoked some of the leaders of the M-Belt Movement like Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot to give different versions of the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement from 1949 until 1955 on the floors of the NHA, see "Motion on the Creation of a M-Belt Region" Northern Regional Legislature: House of Assembly Debates, 29th February - 16th March 1956, Kaduna 1956 p.179-224; These are examined in more analytical detail in Sections III, IV, V and VI of this Chapter.
 2. For more detailed examination of the development of "tribal" Unions among the M-Belt groups and societies with examples of the socio-economic and political issues contested and the options for solutions see Chapter 3.

The Unions and societies in The North as semi-political organizations in the period between 1940 and 1950 developed into important political parties in Nigeria, although there were significant variations in the impact of their influences on the political arenas of The North and subsequently on the whole country. The variations in political influences they wielded were rooted in and caused by the political identities which became mobilized to gain support.

The Local Unions and societies as political organizations in The North, developed in the period between 1940 and 1950 because the ground was fertilized with political ideas. The political actors on the arenas also reached sufficient social and political maturity to transform and handle the organization of small unions and societies with political ideas into political parties, expanding their interests to those of the wider society of The North and Nigeria. The existence of a class of European educated persons with increased social consciousness on the patterns and shape in the causes of the transformation of society in The North was fundamental to these political developments in both the Islamic society and among the M-Belt groups and societies. Several factors suggest explanations to the causes of the political developments in The North. Among the M-Belt groups and societies for example, in that period there was a sense of general unease directed against Islamic religious and political authority, particularly that which was imposed from the period of British administration over territory that was equivocally claimed to be non-Islamic and containing the M-Belt groups and societies. In the period between 1940 and 1950, this political grievance was reinforced by an already mature modern sense of "tribal" identities among the M-Belt groups and societies distinctively different from the Hausa-Fulani Islamic patterns in

The North. As earlier suggested in a previous chapter, this was the premise from which "tribal" Unions were organized with political meaning. The "tribal" Unions were subsequently developed into separatist "Tribal-Middle-Belt-ethos" that were underlined by a current of social and political attraction toward European civilization with a Christian ideology rather than to Islam. Furthermore, generally shaping the needs for political organization among all the groups and societies in The North, in the period between 1945 and 1954 there were political changes from the Richards constitution in the constitution that was produced by Mac herson, which came into effect in 1951 in which political participation was broadened for the election of representatives into the Federal Legislative House. Previous to 1950, the elections of political representatives to the National Levislative House in Lagos was an exclusive prerogative of Emirs and Chiefs in the NHC of The North.¹ The political need for organization of political parties also arose from the impact of the political influences in the thrust of Southern Nigerian based 'Nationalist Movements' on groups and societies in The North in which some of their politicians claimed leadership for the whole of Nigeria.² This political claim caused resentments toward Southern Nigerians by Emirs and Chiefs in The North, as well as from the European educated classes in the Islamic society also in Middle Belt areas.³ Finally, another fundamental factor which explains the fertile grounds on the political arenas in The North for

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1. Dudley 1966 p.20-25
 2. Coleman 1958 p.156; p.193; Dudley 1966 p.22
 3. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.156-172

the development of political parties, although influential in the shape and pattern of politics among the M-Belt groups and societies is that in the period between 1940 and 1950, Christianity achieved organizational form as a social movement under indigenous converts as Christian leadership. This was largely due to the growing numbers in the membership of adherents to that religion which required indigenous Christian leadership over the expanded churches under European Christian Missionary religious supervision.¹ With increased socio-economic and political pressures from problems in the societies of the area the growing numbers in the Christian social movement became politicized and were sensitive toward Islamic patterns of dominance in The North. In the instance, Christian leadership transformed the religious flavours in the social movement into political forms, its first manifestations being in the NML of Northern Nigeria.²

In the instance of the development of political activities within the very boundaries of the Islamic society in centres of political and religious power and authority like Sokoto, Kano, Bauchi, Zaria and Kaduna there were developed unions and societies that were concerned with social, economic and political affairs of The North. The most important social and political organizations that had direct influence on party formations in The North were the Bauchi Improvement Union and the Youth Circle of Sokoto.^{3*} In the years between 1943 and 1944

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1. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
 2. For detailed discussions with examples of the development of Christianity as a social movement with covert political intentions among the M-Belt groups and societies, particularly those in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau, S. Zaria and in SUM centres like Ibi and Wukari, see Chapter 3 Sections II, III and IV.
 3. Sklar 1963 p.88

*11 See Comment at the end of Chapter 4.

Mallam Saadu Zungur organized the Bauchi General Improvement Union and with it tried to infuse 'Nigerian Nationalist' ideas to Moslems in Bauchi through the reformist Ahmadiyya Movement.^{1*}¹² At about the same time, Aminu Kanu and Tafawa Balewa, the subsequent Prime Minister of the Nigerian Federation in 1960 were politically active in the Bauchi Discussion Circle.² The Bauchi Discussion Circle constantly engaged British political officers in political debates and arguments with the European educated from the Islamic society over current political issues affecting The North and Nigeria.³ The majority of these European educated persons in the Islamic society were born into privileged families and nearly all were exposed to "Nationalist Thought" from Southern Nigerian origins and in England.⁴ Saadu Zungur was to later support NEPA, the parent organization from which NEPU developed.⁵ The NEPU was the political party Aminu Kano used as base, to launch political radicalism in The North. In 1945, Shehu Shagari organized the Youth Circle of Sokoto.⁶ At about the same time there was organized a Nigerian Citizens Welfare Association also in Sokoto by Mallam Mohammadu Sani Dingyadi as a political party, although it never developed to become a political force as it was overshadowed by the NPC.⁷ In 1946 the Kano based European educated persons

1. Sklar 1963 p.88-89

2. Ibid p.88

3. Ibid

4. Ibid

5. Ibid

6. Ibid

7. Ibid p.89

*12 See Comment at the end of Chapter 4.

organized the first non-localized political society in The North which they called the Northern Elements Progressive Association (NEPA).¹ In the four years of its existence (1945-1949) with Habib Raji Abdallah as its General Secretary in affiliation to the NCNC, the NEPA program emphasized political reform, economic development and equal educational opportunity for "promising Norther students".² On September 26th 1948, Dr A.R.D. Dikko, the first medical officer of "Northern Origin", a Fulani Christian trained by Walter Miller of the famous CMS Christian Missionary Centre in Wusasa, organized a political meeting of "prominent individuals" who were anxious to promote the development of The North.³ Coincidentally, a few days later in the next month on October 3rd 1948, D.A. Rafih organized the Association of Northern People of Today ("Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa A Yan").⁴ On October 12th 1948 Dr Dikko and Abubakar Iman, a Kanurin from Borno and an editor of the government owned Hausa Language Newspaper, "Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabi" (Truth is worth more than a penny) based in Zaria, organized the "Jamiyyar Jamaar Arewa" meant to be a Northern Nigeria Peoples Congress in Zaria.⁵ This suggests that the tempo of political development in Nigeria conditioned a rapid springing of organizations by different socially conscious individuals with similar political objectives for The North. When Mallam D.A. Rafih participated in the subsequent political meetings organized by Dr Dikko

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1. Sklar 1963 p.89
 2. Ibid p.90
 3. Ibid p.91
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid

and Ibrahim Imam in Zaria and Kaduna, the Northern organization, "Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa" (the Northern Nigerian Congress) subsequently the Norther People's Congress was born as the nucleus of a political party.¹ Thereafter, groups and societies in The North were sought to be organized-into the Northern political organization through political contacts with and political urges to sympathetic persons throughout the Region "to form local branches in preparation for a general meeting".² Among the Local Unions and Societies already politically active in The North and which agreed to become affiliate branches and members of the overall Northern organization were the Sokoto Youth Social Circle, the Bauchi Discussion Circles and a Citizens Association that existed in Kano.³ On June 26th 1949, the Northern Nigerian Congress held its inaugural meeting at Kaduna with over 300 delegates in attendance and officers were elected with Dr A.R.B. Dikko, a Fulani Christian as its first President.⁴ However it was not until in October 1st 1951, that it became announced that the Norther People's Congress (NPC), with '65 branches and over 6000 members", had been converted into a political party.⁵ When the NPC became a political party, A.R.B. Dikko, the Fulani Christian, and all other civil servants who held elected executive posts in the organization, were advised to resign.⁶ This opened up the political path to which the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, used to become the leader of the Northern Movement and the political party.⁷

Although in theory the 'Northern Nigerians Congress' was meant to organize all groups and societies indigenous to The North for political

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1. Sklar 1963 p.91
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid p.92
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid p.96
 6. Ibid
 7. Ibid p.96-97

purposes, the Unions and Societies that were affiliated to it and became members before its inception in 1949 were from the Islamic society, even when it was the case that "tribal" Unions and Societies were already politically active among the M-Belt groups and societies as early as in 1938. Furthermore, available evidence suggests that there was no political representation to the Kaduna meeting in 1949 from any of the "tribal" and Christian leadership among the M-Belt groups and societies. The delegations consisting of over 300 representatives were predominantly from the Islamic society in The North and from groups and societies like Fulani, Hausa (Habe), Kanuri and Nupe. Although two Christians became elected into executive posts in the organization, Dr A.R.B. Dikko as President and Mallam Julde, a Fulani Christian from French Cameroon, there was a predominance of Hausa-Fulani, Nupe and a variant of Islamic leadership from both government and NA employment as members elected into the executive posts.¹ It was not until in December 1950, when there was already a political twist in the leadership of the organization as Dr Dikko was replaced by the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello,² that Christian leadership in an already developed MZL was approached in the same year to join in the Northern Political Movement.³ This was at a meeting in Gindiri between some of the leadership of the NPC led by the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello and the political and religious leadership in the MZL led by Pastor David Lot.⁴ It was precisely the political developments that surrounded the formation of the NPC which excluded political leadership of the "tribal" Unions and Societies

1. Sklar 1963 p.92-94

2. Ibid p.94-96

3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.

4. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1983; the political and religious issues raised during the Gindiri Meeting are examined with more analytical detail in Section III of this Chapter.

among the M-Belt groups and societies that compounded grievances already in existence over the state of social, economic and political problems, held to be caused by non-participation in government institution, that there was organized the NML. In the instance the NML developed into the MZL with a demand for political separation from the Islamic society rather than integration into the NNC subsequently the NPC. This suggests that the development of "tribal" Unions among the M-Belt groups and societies into the NML was as much conditioned by the rapid development of political organizations that were dominated by leadership with an explicit Islamic identity rooted in the Islamic society in The North, as it was conditioned by the political objective to achieve organized representation and participation in the institutions of government for Christians and non-Moslems from among the M-Belt groups and societies. This was one of the political premises from which Sklar suggests that while "organized pan-tribalism has been important among certain minority peoples of the M-Belt areas only, leaders of the dominant cultural groups have espoused pan-regionalism rather than pan-tribalism".¹ For example, the evolution of the NPC took political shape from a territorial conception of a cultural identity with a traditional periphery that was underlined by the British creation of the political North but encompassed many groups and societies that were bounded by the Islamic religion and political identity. This resulted into a regionally based political party that was based on historically rooted territorial claims which were translated as a cultural political identity of The North. Although it temporarily concealed the internal political stresses toward the dominant Hausa-Fulani Islamic culture and religious identity, it was

1. Sklar 1963 p.326

persistently projected as a homogeneous identity in that political Unit of the Nigerian Federation before 1967. This was precisely what the NPC sought to achieve and maintain, not only as a political strategy in the context of overall Nigerian politics but also for political stability within a heterogeneous North when it professed political commitment to "inclusive-cultural-liberalism" which became crystallized into its motto: "One North: One People, Irrespective of Religion, Rank or Tribe".¹ Although this was so, the social and political centre of gravity of the NPC political party however remained in the Islamic society in The North and on the Islamic religious identity.²

Implicit in these political developments in The North which caused the organization of political activities in the Islamic society as well as among the M-Belt groups and societies is that while political formations in the Islamic society were conditioned by the causes of events at the national level of politics in Nigeria, the "tribal" Unions among the M-Belt groups and societies as manifestations of political activity were a function of the state of local politics, although they were also responding to the general pattern of politics at the regional level rather than national politics. Similarly in the development of the NML into the MZL (examined in chronological and analytical detail below), it was not until in 1956 when the organizations became the UMBC as representative of the M-Belt Movement that there was response to the patterns shaping national politics, particularly so in

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1. Sklar 1963 p.326
 2. The patterns of political control in the NPC methods to maintain "One North" in the period between 1955 and 1965 when there was vigorous demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region are examined in analytical details with examples in Chapter sections below

the nature of political alliances. In the instance, the UMBC Movement assumed a political status beyond the regional base of politics in The North in the politics of The Nigerian Federation. The political theme of its grievances which conditioned the political movement for separation into a M-Belt Region as a Unit of the Nigerian Federation however remained constant and centred on exclusion from participation in political roles and decision making in the institutions of government in The North, because the control of government was in the hands of politicians with an Islamic political identity.

The control of government, as suggested by the concentration of a group and society with an identifiable socio-cultural and political identity in the institutions and bureaucratic jobs of government which enhances the domination of political decision making, has been a major cause of anti-regime movements, particularly so among the excluded groups and societies in Nigeria.¹ This has been so because it is assumed that control of government is a major cause for the development of a particular area with modern European infrastructural facilities for the "tribal" constituencies of the incumbents of government.² The group(s) and society(ies) outside the political roles and decision making bodies of government institutions see themselves as victimized by the incumbents since they may be of a different group and society with a different culture.

In the period between 1930 and 1950 one of the issues that was of concern to Christian Missionary Bodies operating in The North, the

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1. For some examples of these tendencies, see Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu, Nigeria 1978 p.140-175
 2. In the period between 1950 and 1980 there existed numerous examples of civilian politicians and subsequently military politicians in the Units of the Nigerian Federation who developed "their areas" at the general expense of others. Some of these examples are discussed in Chapters 5 and the Epilogue.

majority of whom were concentrated in their activities among the M-Belt groups and societies, was the absence of Christian representation in the institutions of government and participation in the political development of the constitutional settlements in The North and Nigeria. Christian Missionaries were concerned that the absence of political representation from among the M-Belt groups and societies will lead to the domination and exploitation of the non-Islamic groups and societies, among whom their already developed socially conscious Christian communities were concentrated upon departure of British control of political power.¹

Although there was political concern, it was rooted in the perennial religious anxieties of the Christian Missionaries of the period between 1920 and 1940 in which there was a belief that the absence of Christian representation in government in The North carried with it increased potential ^{of Conversion} into Islam. In the period between 1940 and 1950 this became an even more critical religious problem when control of the institutions of government systematically fell into the hands of Islamic leadership in The North. In the period between 1938 and 1950 similar to the political anxieties expressed by Christian Missionary Bodies in The North, the developed political leadership in the "tribal" Unions among the M-Belt groups and societies became concerned over the absence of representation of their traditional leadership in the NHC.² In the same

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1. For detailed discussion and examples of the Christian Missionary concern for the M-Belt groups and societies in which they organized the M-Belt 'Christian Communities' into a social movement in the period between 1940 and 1950 through conventions, crusades and conferences of Church leadership, see Chapter 3 Sections III, IV and V.
 2. For examples and discussion of this concern see Sections V and VI of Chapter 3.

period when there was increased political activity among the M-Belt groups and societies generated by the "tribal" Unions, the domination of political roles and decision making in the institutions of government at the local level by non-indigenous Moslems were held responsible for the persistence of social and economic problems. The problem generated by the domination of the institutions of government at the local level by non-indigenous Moslems among the M-Belt groups and societies and the persistence of social and economic problems were compounded by the non-existence and unequal share of the distribution of modern European infrastructure and amenities for the development of the M-Belt areas relative to Islamic society. Furthermore in the period between 1929 and 1950 political representation to the NHC in Kaduna (initially the Northern Advisory Council) and the Nigerian Legislative Council in Lagos (subsequently replaced as the Federal House of Representatives (FHR) with elected membership in the majority of its members) were based on the ranking in political status of chiefs in The North. Since chiefs from among the M-Belt groups and societies were still to be appointed, in the period between 1930 and 1940, the political representation from the non-Islamic areas in The North was mainly by British Residents and Senior Administrative Officers in the legislative institutions of The North and Nigeria based in Kaduna and Lagos respectively. There was also representation from among the M-Belt groups and societies centred on mining and commercial interests and these representations were concerned to raise issues on legislation to do with the economy of the mining industry and the problems of law and order rather than the welfare of the majority of the indigenous population.¹

1. For detailed examples see Chapter 3 particularly Sections IV and V

However, in the period between 1940 and 1950, although a process of developing the chieftaincy institutions among the non-Islamic M-Belt groups and societies was accelerated by the appointment of indigenes as paramount chiefs in the numerically bigger groups and societies, the chiefs that were appointed by the government of British administration in The North, remained outside the chambers of the NHC. This was the general pattern until 1950 except for the Aku Uka of Wukari, Atoshi Agbumanu.¹ As early as in 1931 the Aku Uka of Wukari was appointed and considered as the political representative of the non-Islamic groups and societies from the M-Belt areas in the NHC in The North. He remained the only non-Islamic chief in the NHC until 1950. As latterly as in 1952 the non-Islamic chiefs from among the M-Belt groups and societies who were recognized by the government of British administration as well as the pseudo-elected transitional government of the NPC in The North were Ogiri Oko, the chief of Idoma, Makere Dzakpe, the Chief of the Tiv and Atoshi Agbumani, the Aku Uka of Wukari, Chief of the Jukun, all who were ranked as second-class chiefs in political status.² The chiefs of Batta, Birom and Kagoro who were also non-Moslem and were Christians, recognized in the period between 1945 and 1950, remained unranked in social and political status by the governments in The North and consequently as latterly as in 1952 they were "nominated chiefs" in political status in the NHC rather than chiefs taking up seats like others representative of a political status.

It was this subordinated pattern of representation which compounded the grievances already existing over social and economic problems among

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1. Northern Regional Council House of Chiefs Debates, Fifth Session, 18th and 20th December 1950, Kaduna 1951 p.1.
 2. Nigeria Year Book 1952, Lagos 1952 p.5-10.

the M-Belt groups and societies that control and participation in government became associated with development or underdevelopment, depending on who was the incumbent. In the instance subordinated and excluded groups and societies saw representation in the Legislative Houses and the developing bureaucratic jobs with political decision-making powers as a means for the development of their areas with social and economic infrastructural amenities derivable from government. Representation in the institutions of government also became seen as a means of influencing the distribution of government facilities as well as providing political channels through which socio-economic needs might become communicated to the appropriate authorities.

In instances where there is a significant absence of political representation and where some groups and societies are excluded from the institutions of government, political tensions are endemic of the Unit or Country. Under social and political circumstances where there is a conscious class of persons and there is an absence of repressive methods in the political control of dissenting groups and societies, the excluded organize for inclusion in the processes of governing. Sometimes they demand separation from the oppressors depending on the nature of the political system. In the majority of political instances of the phenomenon for example in Nigeria and India with astonishing parallels, the operation of a Federal political system has tended to condition the political demands for subdivision of the Federal units that separate the subordinated groups and societies from the dominant majorities either in terms of language, religion, as well as the degree of political influence for access to roles in political decision-making.¹

1. The Indian and Nigerian political parallels are examined with more analytical details below.

While Federal systems tend to condition political demands for subdivision into smaller units of the Federation in which there is devolution of political power and participation in the governing process for "minorities" Unitary political systems tend to condition total separation when dominated groups and societies activate their political grievances to contest 'nationhood' for both the dominating and the dominated.¹

Conflict research has produced both theoretical and empirical propositions to suggest that when discontent become translated into deprivation the aggrieved party(ies) organize rebellion.² Rebellion in this sense does not necessarily mean political violence by taking up arms to achieve political objectives. It can also mean the organization of an anti-regime movement based on the perception of relative deprivation when a specific identity becomes mobilized to arouse political nationalism that is directed at the achievement of an objective like total separation or subdivision of the centres of political authority by constitutional methods. Runciman has argued that the relationship between the perception of relative deprivation for political purposes and objective social conditions is variable both between different individuals and across different dimensions of deprivation.³ This suggests that the influence of the

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1. This is examined in more detail with examples in following sections when we discuss the features in the conceptions of federalism in the M-Belt Movement largely developed because of the Federal system - in comparative perspective to the experiences of other areas of the world, like the Sudan where socio-political "minorities" in similar extraordinary circumstances of the M-Belt groups and societies exist.
 2. For examples, see W.G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, London 1972; T.R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton 1970; P.A. Lupsha, "Explanations of Political Violence: Some Psychological Theories Versus Indignation" Politics and Society 1971, Fall p.88-104; See also some detailed examination of the theory of internal colonialism as a cause of the rise of separatist tendencies and the demands for subdivision into smaller political units of a Federal system like Nigeria in Chapter 1.
 3. W.R. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, London 1972; See also Keith Webb and Eric Hall, Explanation of the Rise of Political Nationalism in Scotland, Strathclyde University Papers, 1977 p.14.

objective environment like the nature of political relationships between a dominating group and society over the dominated mediates the comparative framework of the individual to perceive and act politically in circumstances of relative deprivation. This becomes a potent political force in the development of anti-regime movements when relative deprivation and political relationships in the objective environment are mediated in the context of the historical experiences as was the case with the M-Belt groups and societies. In the literature on conflict among different groups and societies in a particular political system, the widely used definition of relative deprivation has been produced by Ted R. Gurr which is "the actor's perception of the discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities".¹ Although severe definitional and operational problems have persisted in the concept of relative deprivation,² it has been generally accepted that it is a mechanism whereby dominated and exploited groups and societies become politicized.³ It ought to be borne in mind however that a wide spread sense of relative deprivation is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of political nationalism or an anti-regime movement.⁴ Any single cause of a social phenomenon only presents a very oversimplified view of extremely complex reality. This is so because the reality is an intermixing of numerous and seemingly unrelated influences that come together to produce a new phenomenon in a political movement

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1. For detailed discussions of the theoretical propositions in the work of Ted R. Gurr see Chapter 1 where plural and structural theories of conflict and relative deprivation were examined in relation to the political circumstances of the M-Belt groups and societies.
 2. Webb 1977 p.15
 3. For examples, see Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Politics, London 1975; Ian McLean, "The Rise and Fall of the Scottish National Party", Political Studies Volume 18, 1970 p.357-372.
 4. Webb 1977 p.15

at a particular point in time. For example when Christian leadership from the different "tribal" unions among the M-Belt groups and societies met to examine and organize the formation of the NML in order to ensure Christian and non-Islamic representation in the NHC and the NHA in 1949, it initially had nothing to do with historically recollected experiences of the M-Belt groups and societies with the Islamic society in the period between 1804 and 1900. It also had little to do with the sense of political disenchantment with their subordinated social and political status in the period between 1900 and 1950 when there was effective British political authority in The North. However, they subsequently took advantage of these historically recollected experiences with considerable political skills and efforts to mobilize political support when they expressed fears about the Islamic society upon anticipated British departure from political control in The North. What seemed to have happened in the period between 1950 and 1956 in the cause of the development of the NML to become the UMBC was that a number of incremental changes occurred that in conjunction led to systemic political responses within The North as a cusp is reached, conditioning changes within the organizational strategies of the Movement itself with a view such as this, the causes of the M-Belt Movement are therefore merely partial contributors to the overall events and interact systemically and on multiple levels as the organization grew and developed from the NML to the umbc participating in National politics in Nigeria. The causes in the political growth and development of the M-Belt Movement from the NML to the UMBC were generally conditioned by numerous other effects as intervening variables.

However the factual evidence collated for this study suggest that one of the major causes for the organization of the initial parent organization of the M-Belt Movement, the NML in 1949 took shape from

an accepted premise by political leadership in the "tribal" unions among the M-Belt groups and societies was that "Christians" were deprived of political representation relative to Moslems in the institutions of government in The North, particularly so in the NHA and the NHC. Previous to 1949 "tribal" unions among the M-Belt groups and societies were concerned that there existed neglect of their socio-economic problems by governments in The North and that there was domination of political roles and decision-making in local affairs by Hausa Fulani and non-indigenes to their territories. In 1949 therefore the "theory" propounded for liberation by the Christian leadership in the "tribal" unions was that collectively as Christians with non-Islamic groups and societies they might assert political power and influence to serve their interests in The North, only to the extent that the "tribes" among the M-Belt groups and societies achieve and strengthen Christian solidarity as a political identity.¹ Although this "theory" previously conditioned the organization of Christianity among the M-Belt groups and societies into a visible social movement in the period between 1940 and 1950, the strategy that became adopted in 1949 with the already mobilized Christian religious identity was that of the formation of an all Christian political movement which was named the Non-Moslem League of Northern Nigeria. The choice of "Non-Moslem" for the political movement was meant to attract support from the non-Moslem as well as non-Christian elements of the M-Belt groups and societies and to emphasize the developing Christian

1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Mallam Gwamna in the period between November 1980 and January 1981 - It is suggested by Dudu Dalyop that Mallam Rwang Pam, the Chief of Jos also held the same religious views on political matters in 1949.

identity in the population of the area.¹ This was so because with increased Europeanization of Christian converts with English civilization in particular, persons with African traditional systems of beliefs and worship, socially identified more with the Christian communities rather than with Moslems. In the period between 1950 and 1965 the census statistics for The North suggest that more non-Moslems became Christians rather than accept the Islamic religion and faith, particularly so among the M-Belt groups and societies.² It was from this premise that the political fears existing among the M-Belt groups and societies over the dominance of the Islamic society in the institutions of government became organized by Christians into the NML for the protection of the religion and the political interests of Christians and the non-Moslem population in The North. This was the case even when Christianity itself was still a very small minority religion in relation to both Islamic adherents and persons with traditional African systems of beliefs and worship among the M-Belt groups and societies, albeit in The North. For example, the numbers of Christian adherents among the M-Belt groups and societies were less than 7% of the total M-Belt population and less than 3% of the total population of The North in 1952.³ Christian leadership however attracted political support from many communities of M-Belt groups and societies that were "non-Believers" based on minority conceptions relative to the Islamic society which were bolstered by historically recollected experiences of relationships

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1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Mallam Gwamna, the Chief of Kagoro, in the period between November 1980 and February 1981.
 2. E.P.T. Crampton, "Statistics of Religious Allegiance in Nigeria: An Examination in the Light of David Barrett's Thesis", The Nigerian Christian, Lagos 1981 p.4-6; Article 2 Vol.15 No.11, November 1981 p.4-14.
 3. Crampton 1975 p.220-221

in the period of Fulani wars on their societies.¹ In the period between 1950 and 1960 the political and religious fears previously articulated both by their converts and by the European educated persons who were associated with Christianity conditioned overt resentment of Moslem attitudes toward the M-Belt groups and societies.² The Chief of Jos, for example, invariably stressed to Bryan Sharwood Smith, who was Governor of The North in the period between 1950 and 1957: "The bitterness of what the many non-Moslems felt as disdainful attitudes towards them by many Moslem chiefs and politicians" of The North.³ In the same period Sharwood Smith himself suggested that there was prejudice in the attitudes of Moslems toward the M-Belt groups and societies because "social behaviour that seemed perfectly natural to the robust and uninhibited Birom (for example) was in the eyes of the older Muslims, uncouth and ill mannered",⁴ even when it was the case that the new generation of Islamic leadership and politicians in the period between 1950 and 1960 had less exacting standards of social behaviour expectations from non-Moslems.⁵ The social and political prejudices of the Islamic society toward the M-Belt groups and societies were reduced after 1956 when Sharwood Smith persuaded the Sultan of Sokoto to pay a visit to Jos: ".. as the guest of the Chief of Birom. (although) Eyebrows were raised, the Sultan's natural charm and courtesy were proof against any possible contretemps and the Birom were delighted...

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1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assudugu, Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
 2. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.332.
 3. Ibid p.333
 4. Ibid
 5. Ibid p.334

At last they were being treated as persons of some account".¹

One of the political consequences of prejudice from the Islamic society on non-Moslems was that Christians and persons with African systems of beliefs, and worship included social discrimination of their groups and societies in their political fears upon anticipated withdrawal of British political control from government in The North.² In fact, this was the political premise from which Sharwood Smith suggested that in the period of the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement from the NML to become the UMBC under the political leadership of Joseph S. Tarka: "On the face of things they had a good case, but they spoiled it by exaggeration in order to secure support from outside the region. In this they were successful, for there were many who did not readily accept the regional government's assurance that all reasonable grievances would be remedied the "Middle-Belt" Movement owed its strength more to a mass state of mind, based on genuine fear, than to specific causes"³ When the political fears of the non-Islamic groups and societies derived from the social and political attitudes of the Islamic society toward the M-Belt groups and societies became related to existing grievances over problems among the M-Belt groups and societies there developed political arguments and persuasions centred on the theme that once the British left the political control of The North in which there was already Islamic domination of political roles and decision making in the institutions of government,⁴ the Christian

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1. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.334
 2. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and Mallam Gwamna of Kagoro, January 1981.
 3. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.333; this point is examined in more analytical detail in Sections III, IV, V and VI where we examine socio-economic and welfare deprivations in the grievances of the M-Belt groups and societies and where the grievances are brought before The Willink Commission of 1957 when politics with the M-Belt Movement in The North and Nigeria is discussed.
 4. Moslem ministers, Moslem chiefs, Moslem members of parliament in the NHA and the FHR and Moslem judges in the courts among the M-Belt groups and societies.

and other non-Moslem populations concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies might be subjected to exploitation, victimization and coercion to accept the Islamic faith.¹ The Christian Missionary converts and the European educated, who were the bulk of the nucleus of leadership of the NML suggested that there was potential for these patterns to develop into reality because the non-Moslem population among the M-Belt groups and societies were social and political minorities as much as they were religious minorities relative to the Islamic society in The North and were outside government.²

It was with this political mood on the atmosphere of politics on the arenas in The North that the Non-Moslem League (NML) of Northern Nigeria was formed on the explicit premise of Christian under-representation in the institutions of government in The North,³ particularly in the NHC which was the most powerful law making institution in The North before 1951 when the NHA assumed the political role of Legislation.⁴

1. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.333
2. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.333; Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri January 1981; In the debates in the FHR in the period between 1954 and 1958 Patrick Dokotri was to repeat the same arguments while relating developing tendencies of the NPC to eliminate opposition parties in The North, suggesting that there was need to separate the Islamic society from the M-Belt groups and societies as political units of the Nigerian Federation before independence in 1960. These points will be examined with more analytical details below.
3. Post 1963 p.79
4. Interview discussions with Mallam Aminu Kano, March 1981; he also expressed opinions suggesting that within the Islamic society itself there was political concern over the powers conferred on Emirs and Chiefs in the NHC and therefore "NEPU was a very similar version of the whole M-Belt struggle: while NEPU was concerned to adjust for vertical power relations to the Emirs, the M-Belt struggle was a struggle for horizontal adjustments in power relationships where in fact chiefs and emirs might have remained feudalistic: powerful and oppressive on their subjects as were the patterns in the Islamic society - This point is examined in more detail below where patterns of politics with the M-Belt Movement in both The North and Nigeria are discussed.

Even when the NHA became constituted as a Legislative Body for The North there was political under-representation of the M-Belt groups and societies, particularly so for the Christian, non-Christian and non-Moslem groups and societies.¹

Although the Northern Regional Council, the NHC and the NHA was created in 1946,² it was not until on January 20th 1947 that the NHA met for the first time.³ Both Houses were predominantly Islamic as much as in the membership of the unofficial side of the NHA.⁴ In the period between 1947 and 1950 the NHA consisted of elected chiefs from the NHC as members, government nominated provincial members, most of whom were "known NA officials" as well as nominated members also by the government of "special interests and representations" like the Adviser on Islamic Legal Affairs, Mining and Commercial interests.⁵ There was also initial nominated representation by the government, of Southern Nigerian Christian communities in The North, the majority of whom were concentrated on the Tin Mining Camps centred on the urban townships of Bukuru, Jos, Barkin Ladi and Gana Ropp, all in Jos Division of Plateau Province. The "initial representation of Southern Nigerian Christian Communities" in The North, became subsequently termed as the "representatives of Christian interests" in The North.⁶

It is instructive to the causes of the rapid mobilization of Christianity for political purposes among the M-Belt groups and societies that the government in The North as latterly as in 1947 was reluctant

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1. This is explicit in the figures suggested by Table 4.1 which is given analytical attention below.
 2. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.165.
 3. Ibid p.166
 4. Ibid p.165
 5. Ibid p.164-168
 6. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.

to recognize "Christianity and the Christian Communities" sufficiently to give it representation in an indigene from the area in the "new" NHA. This was so even when it was the case that the religion through the socialization processes of the Christian Missionary Bodies had institutionalized its position in society with schools, churches and social welfare projects like hospitals, dispensaries and clinics with vigorous Christian religious ideological bases.¹ While before 1945 Christianity had in fact achieved organized indigenous Church leadership which had caused the organization of "a Christian Social Movement" within the Christian Communities among the M-Belt groups and societies, in the period between 1945 and 1952 it was still largely considered in the Islamic society in The North: "As a religious phenomenon of Southern Nigerians who were in government services as well as employees of the tin mines and commercial companies".² This was the premise from which there was developed the social and religious conceptions on the identity of the groups and societies in The North suggesting that it was underlined by the Islamic religious identity. These notions were further accepted because the Islamic religious identity was given a boost by the spread of the Hausa Language among the M-Belt groups and societies as a commercial language. In the instance the assimilationist assumptions over the Islamic religion by the British officials in the government of British administration in The North in the period between 1900 and 1930 were resurrected in a belief that the non-Moslem communities were becoming Moslems rather than Christians.³ Indeed in certain provinces

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1. For more examples of the processes in the establishment of the ideological bases of Christianity among the M-Belt groups and societies, see Chapter 3 Sections III, IV and V.
 2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 3. Crampton 1981 p.4-5

of The North like Ilorin, Kabba and Niger in the period between 1940 and 1952 there is evidence to suggest that more non-Believers became Moslems.¹ However the reverse was the case for non-Christian and non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau, S. Zaria and Benue where in the period between 1940 and 1963 both the 1951 and 1961 censuses produced evidence that suggests increases in Christian converts and rapid expansion of the churches.² In the instance however the assimilationist patterns of the Islamic religion over the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North, conditioned political focus on Islamic leadership as nominated representation for some of the M-Belt groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, some parts of Benue and Plateau Provinces as well as for S. Zaria. It was from these assumptions (the assimilation of non-Moslems into the Islamic culture of the Hausa-Fulani) that in 1952 there developed overt emphasis on Islamic leadership in the selection of political representation for the M-Belt groups and societies into the legislative and governing institutions of The North and Nigeria.³ When the government in The North nominated political representation for the M-Belt groups and societies into the NHC for example, in the majority of instances, it picked on Islamic leaders in the M-Belt areas rather than Christians and non-Moslems. This was particularly so for the period between 1940 and 1950. While there were two non-Moslem chiefs as political representation from among the M-Belt groups and societies indigenous to the area in the

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1. Crampton 1981 p.4-5
 2. Crampton 1981 p.4-5; The explanatory reasons for the expansion of Christianity are produced with more detailed evidence in Sections below as well as in Chapter where the 'conversion tours' of the Sardauna in 1964 are examined in the context of the M-Belt Movement after 1960.
 3. Interview discussions with T.H. Marshall, September 1981; see also Crampton 1981 p.4.

NHC, the Aku Uka of Wukari-Atoshi Agbumanu and the Attal of Igalla, Ame Obene, there were seven Islamic chiefs who represented the remaining M-Belt groups and societies.¹ In 1952, while there were thirteen Moslem Chiefs and Emirs representing the Islamic population in the M-Belt areas from about 251,510 households, there were six indigenous Christian and non-Islamic chiefs as representatives of the non-Islamic population from about 351,588 households.² Furthermore the very first Council of Ministers proposed by the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, for The North in 1951 were all Moslems.³ In 1952 these were the Sultan of Sokoto, the Emir of Zaria, the Sardauna of Sokoto himself as Minister for Local Government and Community Development, Mallam Bello Kano, Makama of Bida and the Wali of Bornu who were subsequently assigned to the Ministries of Natural Resources, Works and Communications and Social Services.⁴

The political tendencies to nominate Islamic leadership as political representation for the M-Belt groups and societies by the government of British administration in The North set a political precedent for the subsequent ruling party, the NPC, particularly so in the period between 1955 and 1965. In the instance, for example, the choice of electoral candidates to contest elections in the constituencies in the M-Belt areas became a prerogative of Islamic leadership of the NPC even when it was the case that alliances were entered into with the objectives that indigenous leadership contest on the party labels of the NPC.⁵

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1. Northern Regional Council: House of Chiefs Debates, January 1940-December 1950, Kaduna 1952, First Pages Lists.
 2. Northern Region of Nigeria: 1952 Census Report, Kaduna 1952 p.32-33; Northern Region Legislature: House of Chiefs Debates, Kaduna, 17th January 1952 p.1-2.
 3. See Sharwood Smith 1969 p.227-228
 4. Nigeria Year Book 1952 p.5
 5. The political tensions generated by the choice of Islamic leadership from Kano, Bauchi, and Zaria as electoral candidates of the NPC Party to contest elections in the constituencies among the M-Belt groups and societies is examined with analytical detail in Sections III and IV of this Chapter 4 and 5 cf where there is a discussion of politics with the M-Belt Movement within the M-Belt groups and societies as well as in The North and Nigeria.

As suggested by the figures in Table 4.1, in 1952 when the choice of representation was taken to the electoral market place as was the instance with the indirect elections among the groups and societies in Plateau and Benue Provinces in particular, the electoral outcomes emphasized the choices of Christian representatives for the membership of the NHA rather than Islamic leadership.^{*2} For example, while fourteen Christians and non-Moslems (15.6% of the total numbers in the NHA - Table 4.1) were elected into the NHA, eleven Moslems won in some of the Provinces with the M-Belt groups and societies where there was a concentration of an Islamic population. This was particularly so for the M-Belt areas like Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria during the Indirect Elections into the NHA in 1951.¹ The political patterns of emphasis on Islamic leadership were however clearer in the instance of nominations for membership into the NHC for the political representativeness of the M-Belt groups and societies. In 1952 for example as suggested by the figures in Table 4.1, while there were thirteen Moslem chiefs (24.5% of the total numbers in the House) there were six Christian and non-Moslem chiefs (11.3% of the total numbers in the House). There was therefore a consistent pattern of emphasis on Islamic leadership for the M-Belt groups and societies even when it was the case that it contradicted the electoral patterns when politics was taken to the electorate in order to choose political representation. Table 4.1 further suggests that although political under-representation was characteristic of the membership of the legislative institutions of The North as they stood in 1952, Christians and non-Moslems were more under-represented than Moslems. This was so for non-Moslems in the

1. Northern Region of Nigeria: Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna 1953 p.1-19 and p.59-80.

*2 see comment at the end of Chapter 4.

Islamic society, Yoruba irredentist areas and among the M-Belt groups and societies in The North. For example, while Christians and non-Moslems in the Islamic society with 6% of the total household numbers in the population of The North were unrepresented, Moslems in the Yoruba irredentist areas with 1.6% of the total household numbers were given 13.2% representation in the NHC, 5.6% in the NHA and 5.7% in the FHR. Christians and non-Moslems in the Yoruba Irredentist Areas had a comparatively lesser number of membership with 1.9% in the NHC, 2.2% in the NHA and 1.4% in the FHR. In the instance of the differences in the political representation among the M-Belt groups and societies between Moslems and Christians with non-Moslems, for the NHC, while a Moslem member represented 19,000 households each "other" members represented 58,000 in a regional average of one member representing 36,000 households in The North. In electoral outcomes where Christians became voted into the NHA, the ratio of representatives to household members of Moslems were smaller and more adequate in relation to the regional average relative to that of Christians with non-Moslems among the M-Belt groups and societies. For example in an average of one member, representative of 21,000 households in the elections into the NHA in 1951 in The North, while a Moslem member represented 23,000 households, the Christian members represented 25,000 Christian and non-Moslem households.

While the block Christian vote in Plateau and Benue Provinces in the 1951 elections is equally explained by the "tribal" as by the Christian political identity the determinate outcome of the elections in those areas was also conditioned by the particular weaknesses of the indirect electoral college system in the conduct of free and fair elections. For example members of an electoral college can exploit

Table 4.1 Political and Religious representation from groups and societies of The North in the Northern House of Chiefs (NHC), the Northern House of Assembly (NHA) in Kaduna and the Federal House of Representatives (FHR) in Lagos in 1952.

Area in The North	Religious Identification	Numbers of Households in 1952	% of Total	Numbers in NHC	%	Ratio of Representation to Household Numbers	Numbers in NHA	%	Ratio of Representation to Household Numbers	Numbers in FHR	%	Ratio of Representation to Household Numbers
Islamic Society	Moslems	1,091,188	58.0	26	49.1	1 : 42,000	58	64.4	1 : 19,000	52	74.3	1 : 21,000
	Christians and others	113,994	6.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yoruba Irredentist Areas	Moslems	29,858	1.6	7	13.2	1 : 4,000	5	5.6	1 : 6,000	4	5.7	1 : 8,000
	Christians and others	44,292	2.3	1	1.9	1 : 44,000	2	2.2	1 : 22,000	1	1.4	1 : 44,000
M-Belt groups and societies	Moslems	251,510	13.4	13	24.5	1 : 19,000	11	12.2	1 : 23,000	7	10.0	1 : 36,000
	Christians and others	351,588	18.7	6	11.3	1 : 58,000	14	15.6	1 : 25,000	6	8.6	1 : 59,000
TOTAL		1,882,430	100%	53	100%	1 : 36,000	90	100%	1 : 21,000	70	100%	1 : 27,000

Sources: Nigeria Year Book 1952, A 'Daily Times' Publication, Lagos 1952 p.5-10; Northern Region Legislature: House of Chiefs Debates, First Session 4th, 8th and 17th January 1952, Kaduna 1952 p.1-2; Northern Region of Nigeria, 1952 Census Report, Kaduna 1952 p.32-33; In 1952, the population of the North was about 17,000,000, with

11,661,000 Muslims, 4,616,000 Animists and 558,000 Christians. About 3,868,245 (22.8%) of the people in the North lived in the M-Belt areas.

the system by choosing only Christians or members of their "tribes" into the Provincial College where it will become concentrated with tribal or Christian members in a determinate way to condition the outcome of the elections. This was the case with the Tiv in Benue and Christians on the Plateau in which the Provincial colleges automatically elected members with a specific political identity into the NHA to be detrimental to the representation of other "tribes" and other religious communities who equally aspired for political representation in 1951. However, besides this weakness in the Indirect Electoral College System, it ought to be borne in mind that in 1951 there existed a high degree of both mobilized Christian religious sentiments in the demands for political representation, largely because of the development of the NML into the MZL as well as mobilized "tribal" consciousness because of the political activities of the "tribal" unions and administrative political pressures to keep them maintained. The mobilized Christian religious identity for political purposes was however more vigorous and overtly expressed in the 1954 elections into the Federal House of Representatives (FHR).¹

In the perception of political discrimination against the M-Belt groups and societies, indicated by the nomination and choice of a Yoruba Christian as representative in the NHA for 'Southern Nigerian Christian Communities in The North' as well as for those among the

1. Political representation from among the M-Belt groups and societies as a result of the 1954 Indirect Elections into the FHR are examined in Sections III and IV of this Chapter where electoral successes from the political activities of the MZL and the political parties developed in the factions of the M-Belt Movement before the UMBC Movement in 1956, are brought into focus.

M-Belt groups and societies, indigenous M-Belt Christian leadership felt alienated.¹ In the period between 1947 and 1950, although Christian leadership among the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North was politically embittered by indigenous non-representation in the legislative institutions of The North,² it was the European Christian Missionary Bodies that increasingly showed concern over indigenous political dormancy in the absence of an organization of the 'Christian Communities' among the M-Belt groups and societies as a political force in The North. This was so, largely because the Missionaries themselves felt they had mismanaged the religious politics in the European education of the initial Christian leadership which caused lower educational standards of the existing Christian leadership in 1945 that was trained and educated in the period between 1920 and 1940. The nomination upon the request of the government of British administration in The North for S.O. James to represent Christianity itself was developed from the perceived relationship between European educational achievement and a committed Christian by the European Christian Missionaries for the articulation of Christian interests in the legislative institutions of The North.³

Although there was political concern over the dormancy of Christians and church leadership among the M-Belt groups and societies and over

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1. This was clear in the political mood in interview discussions with Pastor David Lot (Sura), Jonah Assadugu (Bachama), and Moses Nyam Rwang (Biom), January 1981.
 2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 3. For examples of expressed political anxieties, largely manifested in the writings of J.L. Maxwell in the period between 1945 and 1952, over the Christian Communities and in which instance the European Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and societies organized Christians by regular conventions in the development of "A Christian Social Movement", see Chapter 3 Sections III and IV.

their political exclusion from participation in the institutions of government in The North, when British administration required the nominations of potential Christian members to be chosen as representatives into the NHA in 1946 as a recommendation of the European Christian Missionary Bodies: "To represent Christians in the pagan areas" it was a non-indigene to the M-Belt groups and societies who was nominated and became accepted by the government.¹ This was the premise from which S.O. James, who worked for the ATMN Ltd. in Bukuru in 1947, although as a previous employee of the VAC Ltd. in Jos he had been accepted as a committed Christian by the European Christian Missionaries,² before he was chosen as member of the NHA.³ Upon the acceptance of S.O. James into the NHA in 1947 by Bryan Sharwood Smith the Governor of The North. he was the only indigenous Nigerian Christian in the NHA.⁴ However, although Christianity among the M-Belt groups and societies was already organized into Christian communities under indigenous church leadership and had expressed itself as a potential political movement in the form of a Christian Social Movement through conventions and Christian conferences that were held at different centres among some of the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1940 and 1952, it had to

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1. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
 2. Mainly the European Christian Missionaries who worked at the SUM and SIM headquarters in Jos.
 3. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu (Bachama), Pastor David Lot (Sura), Moses Nyam Rwang (Biom) and Barnabas Dusu (Biom), January 1981; see also Sklar 1963 p.346 n.39.
 4. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981; Rather curiously however it was only in the period between 1952 and 1965 that the name, S.O. James, began to appear in the list of "special members" in the Hansards of the NHA in The North.

await "a political space" to achieve organizational force in the shape of a political party with ideological coherence, especially if the success of the organization was to have permanence in focussing on specific grievances.

A political space* has either to occur as a result of an "accidental" political event in consequence of the interaction of the systemic forces in the system or be created by the victims (the politically aggrieved parties) of the systemic forces that condition change in the system.¹ Analytical distinction can be made between internal features that can cause "a political space" and thus an outburst of a political movement in the interests of the aggrieved (malcontents) groups and societies and systemic features that may be endemic in the political system (with plurality as much as with pluralism). Systemic features form the social and political environment within which a movement or a political party has to act at any point in time.² In the circumstances of a political movement (or party) responding to systemic features it may attempt to change the system, perhaps by resorting to terrorism to establish a new order and thus instituting a malign spiral of spasms. On the other hand it may adapt itself to the requirements of the system by demanding for political representation or subdivision and devolution of authority and decision making within the system.³ In either case the internal political adjustments of the political movement (or party) will depend upon the perception of "political reality" in the leadership group, regarding the permeability of the system, the evaluation of competing strategies in the leadership in relation to political reality,

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1. Webb and Hall 1978 p.30
 2. Ibid
 3. Ibid

*The concept of a political space has to do with a situation in which the political mood of the actors correlates with the political climate of the issues being contested, such that when they are raised there is chance to gain support in the direction of suggested solutions.

and the nature of the political clientele to whom they are ostensibly appealing.¹ The nature of the decisions taken in relation to the political problems that conditioned the organization of the movement (party) will depend upon the normative beliefs in the politics of the leadership group as well as their instrumental calculations as they relate to the fulfilment of their goals and objectives. As it will become apparent in the discussions below, in the instance of the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement from the NML to the MZL and then to become the UMBC movement in 1956, important decisions were taken by leadership of the different phases of the M-Belt movements and subsequently the UMBC movement, which were in light of the systemic features that were internal to The North and endemic in the Nigerian Federation as well as the decisions that were forced on the organizations by cleavages and splits within the general goals of the movement. To a large extent these resulted from different perceptions in the perspectives of the nature of the federal system in Nigeria and hence variation of political strategies of the leadership.

However, the political space which produced the Non-Moslem League (NML) of Northern Nigeria, in the content of already organized Christian communities on the political arena of the M-Belt areas, came in the context of an unwritten "Religious Report" that had explicit political intentions which has been attributed to S.O. James, the representative of "Christians in the pagan areas" of The North in the NHA. In 1948, after serving for about one year in the NHA, S.O. James convened a meeting in one of the Christian Missionary headquarters in Jos with representation from Christian Missionary Bodies whose religious

1. Webb and Hall 1978 p.30.

activities were concentrated on the Plateau, particularly those of the SUM and the SIM, church leaders from different Christian communities: pastors, evangelists and some elders in the church councils, Christian teachers and some ex-servicemen already politically active in the "tribal" unions and in the presence of Kwang Pam the newly appointed Chief of Jos who was seen to be a paramount chief symbolic of Christian unity on the Plateau.¹ Although this representation was centred on Plateau Christian leaders the religious and political issues brought out to the fore of the meeting concerned and were equally focussed on the political status of non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Benue Province as well as non-Moslems in distant places from Jos like Kabba and Southern Ilorin Province and the new Christian converts in the Zuru areas of Southern Sokoto Province.² These were areas where Christian Missionary activities were concentrated in The North and had already produced results by the existence of respectable Christian communities in the period between 1940 and 1950. The unwritten "Religious Report" of S.O. James suggested that: "There was Christian political under-representation in the Legislative Houses of The North in Kaduna."³There was religious discrimination⁴ in the Legislative Bills being passed in the NHC and the NHA directed against the activities and restricting European

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1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and Barnabas Dusu, January 1981; see also Sklar 1963 p.346 n.39.
 2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
 3. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu (Bachama), January 1981.
 4. Largely caused by the absence of Christian representation as Legislators in the NHC and the NHA.

Christian Missionary Bodies operating in The North, essentially concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies.¹ .. and suggested that Christians must unite or Christianity and the Church will die in Northern Nigeria".² These were the religious premises from which there was developed muscular conceptions of Christianity in the political organization of the M-Belt Movement when it developed from the NML in 1949, into the MZL in 1950 and subsequently the UMBC in 1956.

Previous to the "Religious Report" of S.O. James however there was widespread political sympathy over religious disunity largely caused by the co-existing strength of "tribal" political identities among the Christian communities of the M-Belt groups and societies. The religious disunity of the Christian communities in the M-Belt areas was always compared to the political performance of Islam in The North where in the Islamic society it always found expression in dominant political terms as an inherited and religious ideology for a cohesive society.³ In the period between 1947 and 1950 newspapers and the radio in Nigeria gave publicity to the religious calls by Francis A. Ibiam^{*3} for Christian unity and Christianity to shape the political outlook of Christian communities among the non-Islamic groups and societies in Nigeria.⁴ The religious cum political calls of Francis A. Ibiam increased and were given particular serious attention by Christian leadership among the M-Belt groups and societies

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1. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu (Biom), January 1981.
 2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 3. These perspectives are derived from interview discussions with Pastor David Lot and Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
 4. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.

*3 see Comment at the end of chapter 4.

after the widely reported but now infamous political rhetoric of A.T. Balewa¹ suggesting that: "... if the British quitted Nigeria now (1947)... the Northern people would continue their interrupted conquest to the sea", a reference to the Fulani wars of the period between 1804 and 1900 which took a religiously fanatical conquering and slave raiding cavalry to within one hundred and fifty miles of Lagos.² In the period between 1947 and 1950 both Balewa and Ibiam were members of the Nigeria Legislative Council in Lagos.³ While Balewa stood for the political and religious interests of the Islamic society, disguised as the total political interests of all the groups and societies in The North by persistently suggesting that separatist development of Federal regions of Nigeria was centralist^{*} because "the people of Nigeria themselves are historically different in their background in their religious beliefs and customs",⁴ Francis A. Ibiam became famous among the church leadership of the Christian communities in The North for his concerns on the political need for Christian unity in Nigeria.⁵ Francis A. Ibiam was to become President of the World Council of Churches, after serving as Medical Missionary and holding several high offices in the Christian Missionary World.⁶

Although Sharwood Smith suggests that a startled Federal House of Representatives listened to the political rhetorics of A.T. Balewa in March 1947: "... which left no doubts in the minds of Southern Nigerians that a supposedly "Medieval North" with ancient traditions

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1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 2. A.T, Balewa, in Nigeria Legislative Council Debates, 24th March 1947, Lagos 1947, cited in Sharwood Smith 1969 p.168.
 3. See Debates in the Legislative Council of Nigeria, 20th March 1947 to 2nd March 1950, Royal Commonwealth Society Library, London.
 4. Coleman 1958 p.320
 5. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 6. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.434.

* The separatist development of the North was suggested to be centralist in the sense that Regional unity created National unity.

and an outmoded system of government had overnight become a dynamic factor in Nigerian politics",¹ it apparently invoked historically recollected past experiences of Fulani wars of the period between 1804 and 1900 in which some groups and societies within the very political boundaries of the British created North.² The Fulani wars were characterized by the conquest and enslavement of some groups and societies in a process of political incorporation that was underlined by the Islamic religion and ideology. The socio-economic and political victims of that process of incorporation were the M-Belt groups and societies where the consequences of the Fulani wars in terms of creating conditions of undevelopment and underdevelopment only became halted with the establishment of British rule by conquest in the period between 1900 and 1950 in The North.³ The military threats in the political rhetorics of Balewa and the calls for Christian unity by Ibiam were listened to and read with study-care by both European educated church leaders as well as by Christian teachers and the ex-servicemen among the M-Belt groups and societies, particularly those centred on the Christian Missionary headquarters in Jos.⁴ In the instance, socio-religious and political fears which complimented each other in the midst of existing economic problems among the M-Belt groups and societies became translated into images of reality in which "there was necessity for political action in order not to be overwhelmed by Islamic dominance".⁵

In the period between 1940 and 1950 researched evidence suggests that the "Religious Report" of S.O. James to Christian leaders on the Plateau which expressed concern over the political exclusion of

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1. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.168.
 2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 3. For detailed discussions with examples, see Chapters 2
 4. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 5. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.

Christians from the M-Belt groups and societies in the Legislative institutions of The North and Nigeria conform to existing reality of the time. Within the Legislative institutions of The North there was virtually no indigenous Christian influence from among the M-Belt groups and societies until 1952.¹ Furthermore, political representation of The North in the Nigerian Legislative Council in Lagos was dominated by eight European educated leaders from the core of the Islamic society and the ninth, an Igbirra Moslem from the predominantly Yoruba irredentist Province of Kabba.² In the period between 1947 and 1952 for example, political representation of The North in Lagos was dominated by the Emir of Gwandu: Alhaji Yahaya, the Emir of Katsina: Alhaji Usman Nagogo, the Attah of Igbirra: Alhaji Ibrahimia, the Emir of Abuja: Alhaji Sulemanu and the five nominated from The North in the persons of Bello Kano, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa from Bauchi, Iro Katsina, Aliyu Makaman Bida and Yahaya Ilorin.³ Similarly in the instance of the suggested grievance over the discriminatory bills^{*4} being passed in the NHA and the NHC against the activities of Christian Missionaries in The North but concentrated with their headquarters in Jos with different religious centres among the M-Belt groups and societies, in the period between 1930 and 1945 and subsequently more vigorously until 1950, there was enormous political concern expressed in the NHC and the NHA over proselytization and the activities of Christian Missionaries in their social welfare institutions and Islamic households.⁴ Detailed

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1. This is clear from the list of members to the Northern Regional Council that was established in 1947.
 2. Legislative Council Debates of Nigeria, 18th March 1946 to 2nd March 1950, The Royal Commonwealth Society Library, London p.1-4; Nigeria Staff List 1945 to January 1950, The Royal Commonwealth Library, London p.IV.
 3. Ibid
 4. For examples of the political rhetorics expressing this concern and calling for government action as it related to the Islamic religion in The North, see Northern Region Legislature: House of Chiefs Debates for the period between 1940 and 1956 which were examined and discussed in Chapter 3 Sections IV, V and VI.

*4 see comment at the end of Chapter 4.

examination of the contents of the debates however suggests that the religious activities of the Christian Missionary Bodies in The North and the methods they employed were sought to be restricted and changed, rather than that detailed bills were passed on the European organizations and the Christian religion. In the majority of instances, the Emirs and Chiefs in the NHC were overtly concerned about the consequences of Christian social and welfare institutions on the Islamic communities and left the government of British administration in The North: "... to do something about it".¹ In 1947 for example, the Sultan of Sokoto reminded the government of British administration in The North: ".. that in any matter affecting our religion we are bound at once to advise the government of the seriousness of our views on this subject. We cannot pass any rules or orders that leave any question of religion in doubt... In any matter that affects our religion, the government should consult us or we should refer it to the government after all meeting together... the opinions of only a few of us (Emirs and Chiefs) are not enough".² In 1948 when there was increased concern on the issues raised by the controversial subject of "The Mission Activities" in The North, the government of British administration assured members of the NHC that ".. their representations on the subject will be conveyed

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1. That is how the Sultan of Sokoto, the Shehu of Borno, the Emirs of Bida, Zaria, Kano, Katsina, Bauchi, Lafia, Wase, Keffi and Nasarawa always ended up their speeches on the issue of the "Missions" in The North. For examples, see Northern Region Legislature: House of Chiefs Debates, January 1940 to December 1956.
 2. Northern Region Legislature: House of Chiefs Debates, Kaduna 10th February 1947 p.4.

to government... and early steps will be taken to find a solution to the problem ... (through) Residents and District Officers... The question raised by the Sultan of Sokoto in regard to the attitudes of Christian Missions to the Moslem Religion .. is a very important one and a difficult one. I assure you it will be earnestly considered and I shall myself make a point of telling the Missions what has been said".¹ In the period between 1940 and 1950 therefore political complaints and rhetoric in both the NHC and the NHA produced political pressures in developing pro-Islamic Bills in the Legislative institutions of The North.

Although this was so, the suggestion by S.O. James that "Christians must unite or else Christianity and the Church will die in Northern Nigeria" was a religious rather than a political urge. S.O. James apparently became strongly anti- the political demands of the M-Belt Movement after 1950. In 1956 he voted against the motion in the NHA which demanded the creation of a M-Melt Region as a separate unit from the Islamic society in The North within the Nigerian Federation.² The religious urge for Christians to unite suggested by S.O. James however became translated as a political call by church elders as well as the European educated persons and ex-servicemen for the formation of an all Christian political movement in the interests of Christians and the Christian religion in Northern Nigeria. After the "Religious Report" of S.O. James was discussed early in 1948, for example, European Christian Missionaries, indigenous Church leaders to some of the M-Belt groups and societies and a selected group of committed Christians from among the European educated persons and the ex-service-men among the Christian communities agreed that another meeting be

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1. Replies of The President of the House of Chiefs, Captain E.W. Thompstone and Secretary, Northern Provinces, L.H. Goble, Northern Regional Council: House of Chiefs Debates, Kaduna 5th January 1948 p.26-38
 2. The motion on the creation of a M-Belt Region is examined with more analytical detail in Section V of this Chapter where the UMBC movement is discussed.

organized by indigenous Christian Church leaders as a committee: "To examine what ought to be done about Christian under-representation in the NHC from the non-Moslem areas of Northern Nigeria".¹ It was further decided that the meeting be organized under the political auspices of the Birom Progressive Union (BPU) the "Multi-tribal" political movement of the indigenous groups and societies in Jos Division which was already active in politics and its membership included sympathetic persons from some of the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria.² This is the premise from which it has been widely and erroneously suggested that "the initiative for the organization of the NML of Northern Nigeria, subsequently the MZL was by the Birom, as protest and oppositionist groups... aided by Christian Missions, principally the Sudan Interior Mission and the Sudan United Mission".³ Before the Christian Movement was given a political label, however, the executive members of BPU were directly charged with the responsibility of the ground-work for political organization and the subsequent take-off of the Non-Moslem League (NML).

In April 1948, "the selected group of indigenous Christian leaders" from the earlier meeting convened by S.O. James in Jos agreed to meet at "Rahwol Kanang",⁴ near Bukuru township, in a "secret" house, tucked away in the rocky and hilly terrain of the area, which was owned by Moses Nyam Rwang, an ex-serviceman and active executive member of BPU politics.⁵ It is interesting and in some way religiously significant

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1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu (Bachama), Moses Nyam Rwang (Birom), Barnabas Dusu (Birom) and Pastor David Lot (Sura), January 1981.
 2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January 1981; see also Chapter 4 Section VI where the political activities of BPU as well as those of the other selected "tribal" unions as political organizations among the M-Belt groups and societies were examined.
 3. For examples, see Sklar 1963 p.345-348; Dudley 1966 p.92-93; Sharwood Smith 1969 p.333.
 4. In the Birom language this means: "the hill of discussing conclusions".
 5. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.

that the present site of the Theological College of Northern Nigeria is on the area where the house in which the very first meeting was held that developed the religious conception for political purposes of the Non-Moslem League (NML) of Northern Nigeria. This however was pure coincidence rather than a religious effort to immortalize the NML as a political organization.¹ Political and religious representation at the "Rahwol Kanang" meeting came from indigenous church leaders and elders, evangelists, teachers and ex-servicemen who were committed Christians from among the non-Islamic groups and societies in Numan in Adamawa Province, Fobur in S. Bauchi, Kagoro in S. Zaria and different Christian communities on the Plateau with all the BPU executive in attendance.²

Although there was no European Christian Missionary presence at the "Rahwol Kanang" meeting as the case was with the previous meeting held at the Christian Missionary headquarters in Jos, The Missions gave moral and indirect financial support by producing ideas on the internal decisions to construct a political organization at this formative phase of the Christian Movement. This was a crucial development because: "organizations are not spontaneously generated".³ Comparative studies of the Nationalist organizations in the United Kingdom suggest that separatist political movements like the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) in Scotland, Plaid Cymru in Wales and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) in Northern Ireland created

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1. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981. Dusu was General Secretary to the SUM Missionaries and centred at their headquarters offices in Jos in the period between 1965 and 1969 when the Theological College of Northern Nigeria was built.
 2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot and Gayos Gilima, January 1981.
 3. Ian McAllister, "Party Organization and Minority Nationalism: A comparative study in The United Kingdom", Studies in Public Policy, CSPP, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow 1979 p.1.

political impact on the central government in London to recognise their separate identities only after they possessed a cohesive party organization which caused a shift from political amateurism to professionalism with a readier commitment to electoral mobilization.¹ The M-Belt Movement similarly represents a particular example of the process of endogenous organizational change for political purposes in politics. Initially the groups and societies who subsequently supported the M-Belt Movement existed as ill-organized collections of aggrieved individuals and "tribal" unions with diffuse aims and lacking a collective political strategy on their extra-ordinarily similar circumstances.² Beginning with the NML in 1949, subsequently in the period between 1950 and 1960 endogenous change was to transform the different political organizations into electorally-oriented "political parties" within the M-Belt Movement with cohesive organization and well-defined and articulated aims even when it was the case that there were competing identities between the "tribal" and the religious political mobilization.³ The European Christian Missionaries also advised on the issues on the agenda to be discussed and suggested topics that decisions had to be taken on where there was point of agreement for

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1. McAllister 1979 p.4-26.
 2. For some analytical examples of the similar circumstances in the socio-economic and political problems of the M-Belt groups and societies and the issues raised and contested by the "tribal" unions, see Chapter 3 particularly Sections IV, V and VI.
 3. These points will be revisited and discussed in analytical detail with examples in Sections III, IV, V and VI of this Chapter where the 1954, 1956 and 1959 elections are examined.

the development of an all Christian organization for political purposes at the "Rahwol Kanang" meeting.¹ Church channels of religious communication became initially employed in circulating the political ideas of the intended Christian Movement. The SUM and the SIM for example used their religious machinery of communication to secretly coordinate information on meetings in order to enhance the travel timing and participation of different Christian representatives from Numan, Fobur, Kagoro and Panyam to Bukuru.² In the period between 1949 and 1954 both the SUM and the SIM as well as the RCM were to extend indirect financial support to the NML and the MZL by approving "leaves of absence" with full remuneration to some of its Pastors, Evangelists and Teachers like Patrick Fom (RCM), Jonah Assadugu (SIM) and Pastor David Lot (SUM) to travel for political meetings, particularly so in the formative stages of Christian Movement.³ There are however emotionally emphatic rejections to the suggestion that Christian Missionary Bodies who operated among the M-Belt groups and societies in The North produced direct financial assistance.⁴ There is no concrete evidence which suggests that the NML and MZL received cash and cheque payments from Christian Missionary Bodies in The North to assist the developing all Christian political organizations.

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu, and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 2. Ibid
 3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981 - The initial European Christian Missionary support to the NML and the MZL is discussed in more detail in the pages below.
 4. Apparently this is the widely quoted implied "fact" that one is left with from Dudley 1966 p.90-93.

The political and Christian religious leadership in the NML and MZL however admit that direct financial assistance came through cash payments to the developing Christian Movement from Southern Nigerian Christians who worked with the tin mining companies centred on Bukuru before 1950. Ibo and Yoruba political activists on the Plateau tin minesfields for example gave political support to the developing Christian movement in the form of the circulation of ideas and cash payments to the indigenous European educated Christians: "To organize a Christian political party after the "Religious Report" of S.O. James in 1948".¹ The political ideas of Southern Nigerians circulated on the Plateau suggested a Christian struggle for all of Nigeria which will ensure political representation of the M-Belt groups and societies in the Legislative institutions in Kaduna in The North and the FHR in Lagos.² The political intention in the organization of the Christian political party centred on the groups and societies in Jos was for its potential in mobilizing political support of Christians and non-Moslems in The North as members of the Nationalist Movement against British rule in Nigeria.³ It is also possible that the political gamble in the attempt to organize a Christian political party among the M-Belt groups and societies with the assistance of Southern Nigerian Nationalist Movements was based on the political need to expand and create a "Nigerian National Outlook" which previous to 1945 was a recurrent theme

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Choji Bot, Pastor David Lot and Bature Bachit, January 1981.
 2. Ibid
 3. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Bature Bachit, January 1981.

in the criticism of their representativeness of all Nigerian by the government of British administration in both Kaduna in The North and Lagos the Federal Capital.¹ However before 1950, political activists associated with "Nigerian Nationalist" organizations whose main political support was with groups and societies in Southern Nigeria, presented the movements as "Christian political parties" to church leadership and the European educated among some of the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North. This was particularly so to church leaders and the Christians who were European educated among the groups and societies on the Plateau where there was a high concentration of a non-indigenous migrant labour force from Southern Nigeria with the tin and columbite mining companies.² These increases in the development of political activity were related to the changes in the MacPherson Constitution after 1946 in which the indirect elections in The North were anticipated for 1951. It ought to be borne in mind however that the political penetration of Southern Nigeria based Nationalist movements with the Christian religious identity as a political identity was not confined to the Plateau groups and societies. As earlier suggested, during the NCNC tour of The North in 1946 Southern Nigerian political movements left behind political impact in Tiv land which influenced members of the UMBC movement in the 1950s like Isaac Kpum and Elizabeth Ivase to become politically active in the demand for the

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1. For examples of these criticism see Coleman 1958 p.150, 156, 193-194; Sharwood Smith 1969 p.173-199.
 2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Fom, January 1981.

creation of a M-Belt Region in The North. In that instance however, rather than Christianity, it was protest political identification that was mobilized based on the socio-economic and political premises of "a suffering people" under "the yoke of British colonialism" and seeking political freedom.¹ In 1965 however, in a rather "unusual political confession" S.A. Atum, the NPC elected member from Kwande in Tiv Division suggests the deployment of the same Christian religious identity for political purposes by Southern Nigerian politicians among the Tiv group and society. In that instance he told the NHA: "... I have something to say... and that is that we have very much associated ourselves with the Southern Nigerian politicians. These people have a strong belief that there would come a time when all the people whom they call the Middle-Belters would come to fight for the creation of a Middle Belt State... They suggested to us that we should make the demand on the grounds of religion... They said that if we are serious about emphasising the religious politics they would give us help of any kind. They further told us that if we agree to take this line of action the Premier of Northern Nigeria would be annoyed and then he would ask for our secession from Northern Nigeria... but all these are in vain".²

However, the previous meetings to the "Rahwol Kanang" meeting near Bukuru set a precedent for the religious and political cooperation between SIM and SUM Christian Missionaries on the Plateau, Christian leadership in the different communities among some of the M-Belt groups and societies

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1. Interview discussions with Isaac Kpum and Elizabeth Ivase, January 1981; For more details of the NCNC impact on these old-war-horses of the UMBC Movement, see Chapter 3, Sections on tribal unions.
 2. A.T. Atum (Kwande Constituency), Northern Regional Legislature: House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna 27th February 1965 p.106-107.

and the officials of the BPU executive with a developing objective of establishing an organization which might produce Christian representation in the Legislative Houses of The North and Nigeria. While admitting that there was Southern Nigerian political influences in precipitating the organization of the Christian Movement, the "Rahwol Kanang" was independently convened by indigenous Christian and BPU leadership.¹ As early as in 1948 therefore BPU became the instrumental political base to achieve the organizational goals of the anticipated Christian Movement. This was largely so in order to make European Christian Missionary involvement less visible even when it was the case that they remained closely associated and well informed about the political progress of the movement.² It ought to be borne in mind however that although Christian Missionaries laid the social and educational foundations (based on the needs of consolidating Christianity and) on which "tribal National" found expression, they were bitterly opposed to "tribal" cultural and political identities taking precedence over the Christian religious identity, particularly so when Christian solidarity was sought to be organized for political purposes. This was particularly so in the period between 1940 and 1952 when there was the political need for Christians to participate in the constitutional conferences that were

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonay Assadugu, January 1981.
 2. For examples of the contents of Christian Missionary political anxieties over Christian solidarity in the developing Christian Movement from the political reasons that were caused by the constitutional changes after 1946 and the political developments in Nigeria in the period between 1945 and 1952.

effecting changes in the centres of political decision making and the politicians in those roles. There was also concern for Christian participation in the electoral processes that were anticipated in 1951. In the instance of these political developments, the organization of Christian solidarity from among the Christian communities among the M-Belt groups and societies, assumed paramount consideration because each of the unions was based on a socio-cultural identity and was a political minority relative to the Islamic groups and societies in The North. This was considered as by the European Christian Missionaries in persuading both Church leadership and Christian leadership in the "tribal" unions because of the relationship between numbers of political supporters and political parties in shaping the outcome of elections in competitive democratic systems.¹ The political logic was that "tribal" unions organized into independent political parties among the M-Belt groups and societies contained the predominant and ubiquitous political factor militating against similar movements in other parts of the world in the sense that the organization of their political support will be affected by their minority status in numbers.² This conforms to political reality because historically, few groups and societies have been able to make the transformation from minority to majority nationalism, except the pre-First World War Irish Nationalist in the United Kingdom.³ As minorities in Northern Nigeria within the

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1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.
 2. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 3. McAllister 1979 p.2

competitive democratic system which was sought to be established after 1946 as a result of the political reforms in the Macpherson constitution, each of the M-Belt groups and societies had no prospect of winning an electoral majority and only a little chance of influencing government through the electoral processes, unless they were united by the broader Christian religious identity to increase their electoral numbers in politics.¹ This became an even more critical consideration, because there was a high concentration of Moslems in the population of some of the M-Belt groups and societies, sufficiently to submerge the "tribal" solidarity of the unions into minority status.²

In 1948 Church leaders and Christian European educated (mainly already active in the political movements of the "tribal" unions) from the SIM, SUM and RCM Christian Missionary denominations met on several occasions at "Rahwol Kanang",³ near Bukuru township, under the political auspices of the BPU.⁴ Although in a suggested list of participants at the meeting there is explicit indication that it was an essentially but not completely "a Plateau Christian affair", the political cum religious agenda explicitly concerned the issues surrounding the political

1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu and Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
2. For examples of the proportions in the concentration of Moslems among the M-Belt groups and societies in places like Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and in some parts of Plateau, sufficiently to constitute a majority in the electorate in those areas, see Chapter Sections below. The existence of this political reality as it affected the anxieties of Christian solidarity in political support for the developing M-Belt Movement before 1956 and in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North will be revisited for more analytical examination in Sections below of this Chapter.
3. Dudley 1966 p.92; Dudley however mistakenly suggests the name of the village to be "Dahwol Kanang"
4. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.

participation of Christians and non-Moslem communities among the M-Belt groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Benue, in the main stream of politics in The North.¹ The most important issues on the agenda however were the need for the organization of an all Christian political movement and the election of leadership to be entrusted with the task of conducting the political activities of the movement in a way that all Christians and non-Moslems in The North, particularly those among the M-Belt groups and societies might become aware of Christian aims and objectives for political purposes.² Representative Christian leadership from among the M-Belt groups and societies in the anticipated Christian political organization that will seek Christian membership in the NHA which might influence unfavourable legislation on the Christian religion and the activities of European Christian Missionaries were in the aims and objectives of the "Rahwol Kanang" meeting. This was the case because the religious activities of Christian Missionaries with roots in the civilization of England were seen as social forces in the development of the M-Belt groups and societies with modern European infrastructure.³ The aim of the meeting also centred on aggregating issues that affected the socio-economic and political grievances of Christian communities in The North which might be contested with the government by the organization, a process which might make their voices and opinions

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu and Choji Bot, January 1981.
 2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.

heard on the political arenas of The North and Nigeria.¹

To achieve these aims and objectives, three posts were created during the 'Rahwol Kanang' meeting for delegates to seek elections in order to serve as executive officers in the still un-named Christian Movement as President, Secretary and Treasurer.² In the elections that resulted these responsibilities fell on Pastor David Lot, Sura, from Pankshin Division as President, Moses Nyam Rwang, Birom, from Jos Division as Secretary and Bala Yerima, Kilba, from Adamawa Division and subsequently politically active in the Kilba State Movement.³ In the period between 1945 and 1950, Moses Nyam Rwang was also President of BPU. In the instance he constantly brought into the discussions of the Christian Movement examples of the issues and grievances of the groups and societies in Jos Division as the microcosm of problems that affected Christians and non-Moslems in the M-Belt areas. This was particularly so for the social and political problems that were centred on control of political authority in relation to the Islamic society as was manifest in the drive for the Hausa-Fulani domination of political roles and decision making in the NA institutions in Jos Division and the disputes developed over their claims to the chieftaincy of the Jos township.

In all the months of 1948, and the early months of 1949 there were several other private meetings of the protem-executive members of the Christian movement. This was as a collective executive as well as each executive member initiating political meetings with church leaders and

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1. Interview discussions as above.
 2. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 3. Ibid

elders and some of the Christian European educated persons indigenous to their areas. This was one of the points that was agreed on since the meeting convened in Jos by S.O. James, in order to disseminate the social and political intentions of the developing organization.¹ These meetings were meant to infuse more Christians with the ideas of the Movement and to publicize an anticipated future meeting that might have wider representative attendance from different Christian communities among the M-Belt groups and societies.² In the same period ie. 1948 to about March 1949 the Christian Movement while still in its very formative stages was severely handicapped in creating instant political impact with its religious strategies of political mobilization on a wider area on the Christian communities among the M-Belt groups and societies because it simply had no financial funds to sponsor its activities. A wider publicity of its political activities were also affected by the secretive methods with which it initially operated to gain support from committed Christian members. In the period between 1940 and 1960 the initial financial difficulties of both the religious and political leadership of the Christian Movement in 1948 and 1949 was to serve as an instrumental experience which conditioned alliances from political parties in Nigeria that were ready to be generous with funds for organization, mobilization and travel purposes.³ In the instance of the severe financial limitations with funds, the financial burden of the initial Christian Movement and the political efforts to convene meetings at Jos,

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1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
 2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 3. The alliances which the M-Belt Movements contracted after 1950, particularly with the AG in 1956 is examined with more analytical detail in Sections IV, V and VI

Bukuru and 'Rahwol Kanang' derived from individual expenses who committed their private monies for the interest of Christian action for political purposes.¹ In the periods of the meetings at Jos, Bukuru, Rahwol Kanang and subsequently at Du for example, most of the delegates put-up for their length of stay for the discussions with relations who came to work in the tin mining fields near the mining camps of the urban centres in the areas.² Since 'political labour' as well as other sources of ~~forcefully unpaid~~ labour on the tin mines fields had been recruited from different groups and societies in Adamawa, Bauchi, Zaria and Benue and from the different groups and societies on the Plateau, there was always someone who spoke the same language with a delegate to the meetings of the Christian movement and who usually provided accommodation as a relation.^{3*} Furthermore, in the instance of the financial limitations of the initial Christian movement before 1950, this problem served to condition the circulation of information on convened meetings through church channels and Christian labourers on the Mines Paddocks.⁴ The churches in turn contacted "committed Christian" leadership local to the different non-Islamic groups and societies in Plateau, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Adamawa and in certain instances delegated members of its own indigenous Church Council as

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1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 4. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, and Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981; it is interesting to note that Christian converts as labour on the tin-mines from the different M-Belt groups and societies, in the period before 1950 were used as communication channels. Pastor David Lot for example suggests that "a relation" of his who worked on the Bukuru Paddocks every two weeks in a month and returned to Panyam village on the Plateau, was a constant source of "contact and messages" between himself and Moses Nyam Rwang in the period between 1948 and 1950 when the NML was being organized.

*5 see comment at the end of chapter 4.

representation to the meetings of the Christian Movement.¹ In this way leadership in the Christian churches became politicized about the intended Christian Movement before 1949. Delegation of selected Christian leadership from the Church Councils was an already familiar religious practice among the churches in the M-Belt areas when in the period between 1940 and 1950 there were regular protestant Christian conventions and joint Christian Missionary conferences at different centres in the Christian communities in The North.² The attendances of the meetings for the intended Christian political movement seems however to have been dominated by protestant churches and followings rather than RCM adherents, although it was subsequently the case that Catholics were to be concentrated in the high ranks of political leadership in the M-Belt Movement.³ Besides the financial limitations which inhibited the publicity of the political activities in the initial organization of the Christian Movement, it was also handicapped in appealing to the existing wider Christian communities beyond those immediately associated to Plateau because of the secrecy of its operations. The second meeting of indigenous Christian leaders at "Rahwol Kanang" for example was one in a series of secret meetings. A religious and political departure from the first 1948 meeting in one

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1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January 1981; for more detailed discussions and examples of the political intentions of the Christian conventions and conferences and the political and the economic impact they created, see Chapter 3 Sections III, IV and V.
 3. Religious differences between Protestants and Catholics in the M-Belt Movement as a Christian organization are examined in more detail in Sections III, IV and V of this Chapter and subsequently where politics with the M-Belt Movement among the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North is brought into analytical focus.

of the Christian Missionary Headquarters in Jos however, was that all the subsequent meetings held at 'Rahwol Kanang' were marked by an absence of European Christian Missionary participants, although their influences remained. This was largely caused by the religious sensitivity with which the governments in The North saw European Christian Missionaries as responsible for the politicization of the non-Islamic groups and societies from the sympathy and vigour with which the Christian Missionaries themselves campaigned for the solutions of the problems of areas in which they operated.¹ When indigenous Christian leaders organized the 'Rahwol Kanang' meeting, European Christian Missionaries therefore became less visible participants in the Christian Movement for the very reasons that were centred on avoiding being seen to be overtly mixing religion with politics. In the period between 1950 and 1960 when there was increased organization in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, some European Christian Missionaries, particularly so for the RCM became reluctant to support its religious causes. This was so because there existed in that period substantial indigenous Christian converts outside the sociological territories claimed by the underlying ethos in the demands for the creation of a "Christian" M-Belt Region in The North. A "Christian" conception in the creation of a M-Belt Region might condition increased political insecurity to the Christian minorities in other parts of The North.²

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1. For some detailed discussions and examples of this point on the Christian Missionaries, see Chapter 3 Sections III and IV.
 2. Interview discussions with Father Burke, London, August 1981; The reluctance of some Christian Missionary Bodies to support the concept of a "Christian" M-Belt Region is examined in more detail *below* where representation brought before the Willink Commission in 1957 and 1958 is examined as well as the political recommendations of the Commission in terms of quaranteing Human Rights and the socio-economic and political objectives of the State are discussed.

The European Christian Missionary involvement with the religious organization developing on the Plateau however remained covert and almost exclusively limited to Protestants until Christian solidarity became illusive when the NML grew and developed into the MZL and subsequently the UMBC Movement in the midst of severe political cleavages during the period between 1952 and 1956. In the period between 1945 and 1952 however for example, Lowry J. Maxwell persistently suggested that there ought to be a strong relationship in the development of the Christian social movement and Christian action on political issues in the same political sense that Islam conditioned social and political unity over a majority of people in The North.¹ This suggests that European Christian Missionary involvement in the politics of the M-Belt Movement was greater at its first beginnings rather than later on, when in particular during the UMBC Movement, the organization acquired a political momentum of its own while it de-emphasized the religious factors in appealing for political support.²

In May 1949 however, there was a major break through in the embryonic Christian political movement among some of the M-Belt groups and societies in Adamawa, Plateau, S.Zaria and S. Bauchi. This was largely conditioned by the rapid development of an all embracing political organization for the groups and societies in The North in the short period between 1948 and 1949.³ Christian leadership among the

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1. For more detailed discussions of the religious perspectives of L.J. Maxwell over the nature and patterns of politics in The North see examples in Chapter 3 Sections III and IV where the 'Christian Social Movement' among the Christian communities of the M-Belt groups and societies was examined.
 2. This point is revisited in the sections below in this chapter where it is examined with greater analytical detail when the NML developed into the MZL and subsequently into the UMBC Movement in 1956.
 3. The development of the Northern Nigerian Congress into a political party in 1949 has been examined in previous pages above.

M-Belt groups and societies with an already developed and organized Christian Social Movement under the leadership of the churches however saw the "Jami'y yar Mutanen Arewa" (the Northern Nigerian Congress -NPC) as an Islamic political organization which was meant to serve the interests of Moslems only rather than both Moslems and non-Islamic groups and societies in The North.¹ As a direct political reaction to these political developments in The North, an urgent meeting was convened by the three-man protem-Executive of the Christian political movement at Du, a Birom village about six miles eastwardly of Bukuru township.² The Du-meeting was meant to achieve two political objectives: Elect permanent officers into the executive posts for the movement and to establish a socio-religious and political tag for the organization from a concensus of the anticipated wider representative membership attendance of the different non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas where there was Christian leadership, Churches and a community of Christians.³ The need for permanent officers and a political name for the Christian movement was conditioned by the development and subsequent declaration of the "Jami'y yar Mutanen Arewa",⁴ as a political organization before its Kaduna election meeting in June 1949.⁵ Selective and delegated Christian representation for the Du-meeting came from Numan, Fobur, Panyam, Ibi, Wukuri and Kagoro with a representative concentration of membership of the BPU Movement and their executive.⁶ The Chief of Jos, Rwang Pam, who himself

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
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 3. As (1)
 4. As (1)
 5. Sklar 1963 p.88-89
 6. As (1)

originated from Du village was in attendance to give the meeting political weight and "some prestige".¹ Political rhetoric on the relationship between Christian action in unity and political participation in the legislative institutions of The North as conditions for the formation of an active and politically visible "all Christian organization" was dominated by Jonah Assadugu, SIM Teacher/Evangelist in Gengule in Numan Division, Samson Nada, an ex-serviceman Sergeant-Major with the NA in Numan Division, Gayos Gilima, an SIM Teacher/Evangelist in Adamawa Division, Bqila Yerima, a Christian Missionary worker among the Kilba also in Adamawa Division.² Bala Yerima was also protem-Treasurer of the still un-names Christian Movement when the Du-meeting was convened in May 1949. Other Christian leadership from Plateau and Adamawa that equally featured in political rhetoric during the Du-meeting were Pastor David Lot, Sura, from Panyam village in the Plateau, already well known among the Christian communities through the Christian conventions and conferences, particularly as Commander of the SUM/SIM Boys Brigade Movement; Moses Nyam Rwang, ex-serviceman, President of BPU and protem General Secretary to the Christian representative movement; Patrick Fom, BPU Secretary, an ex-serviceman, ^{religious} Teacher/Evangelist and politically articulate being the most European educated of the Christian members in the formative stages of the all Christian Movement.³ Patrick Fom, a Catholic, benefited from European education in centres like Ibadan and Lagos where he was sent by the RCM to train as a teacher. There

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.
 2. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Samson Nada in Numan and Gayos Gilima in Lagos, January 1981.
 3. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonay Assadugu, Pastor David Lot, January 1981.

was also a political presence of many non-Islamic people at the Du-meeting as supporters and sympathisers to the Christian Movement who had travelled in "the manner of attending the usual Christian conventions" who came from different groups and societies in S. Bauchi, Plateau and S. Zaria, besides indigenous Christians from different areas of the M-Belt, as mines workers who attended from the Bukuru paddocks.¹ In all there was an estimated attendance of over 200 covenanted Christians at the Du-meeting.²

Both the objectives of the Du-meeting were achieved, to create organizational mobility for the Christian Movement in order to make the whole of the affected groups and societies socially and politically conscious of the intentions of the organization. When Patrick Fom suggested that the organization be called "the Non-Moslem Movement of Northern Nigerian Christians", the name of the organization being coined in the English language, even when it was the case that the political rhetorics during the meeting had suggested the name of the organization as "Jamiyar Krista a Arewanchin Nigeria" (the Congress of Christians in Northern Nigeria), the nucleus of a M-Belt Movement was born with total support of the representatives of non-Islamic and Christian groups and societies from Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Plateau.³ In the subsequent meetings of the elected executive after May 1949, held with private consultations with some Christian Missionary Bodies, particularly the SIM and SUM as well as with a younger generation of more advancedly educated European Christian persons, the political label of the Movement was refined to become the

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.
 2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu, and Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.

Non-Moslem League of Northern Nigeria.¹ This was largely so in order to broaden its appeals for support from persons among the M-Belt groups and societies who still participated in African systems of beliefs and traditional worshipping practices and who had been seen to be increasing in accepting identification with the social status and political leadership of Christians rather than Moslems, while the organization maintained the objective of carrying out a political struggle that might protect the interests of Christianity and Christians in The North.

In the subsequent elections that took place in May 1949, during the Du-meeting which lasted a whole weekend,² Pastor David Lot was confirmed as elected President of the Christian Movement, the NML, Moses Nyam Rwang as General-Secretary, Bala Yerima as Treasurer and Jonah Assadugu became elected into the newly created post of Travelling Field Secretary whose task was the propagation of the ideas discussed at the meeting to both Christian and non-Islamic communities among the M-Belt groups and societies and to receive financial contributions from the churches to assist the activities of the organization.³ Other members of the elected executive committee of the NML with advisory political and religious roles included, Musa Kuku, a Birom transport owner, Sukumso Bura, a Bura from Biu Division and also a transport

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu and Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
 2. The participants came on a Friday and departed on the following Sunday after attending the local SUM church service. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 3. Sklar 1963 p.346: Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.

owner, Pastor Bagaya, an Nzit from Kagoro in S. Zaria and Patrick Fom.¹ The chiefs of Jos and Kagoro, Rwang Pam and Mallam Gwamna were also elected to be Guardian-Patrons of the Christian Movement.² In the period between 1950 and 1956 however both chiefs became increasingly pressurized by the transitional government to Self-Rule and subsequently Independence which contained both NPC politicians and officers of the government of British administration in The North, to show less commitment for the M-Belt Movement since as traditional rulers they ought to be neutral with regard to religious and political matters.³ The NML fundamentally therefore was concentrated in its activities and political mobilization among non-Islamic communities in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria, Plateau with very insignificant religious and political participation of Christians from the Tiv, Idoma and Igalla groups and societies in Benue and Kabba Provinces.*6 The groups and societies in Benue and Kabba were however to join and some gave

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1. Sklar 1963 p.346; Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang: he suggests that although Patrick Fom was the most European educated and very articulate in his political rhetoric in English and Hausa, he was not elected into the executive of the NML because of his preference to be involved with the BPU and his old feeble age and health. There might also have been religious reasons for the non-election of Patrick Fom being Catholic in a largely SIM/SUM Protestant organization. The rivalries between the Catholics and Protestants in the M-Belt Movement which affected Christian solidarity in the political demands are examined with more analytical detail in Section IV of this chapter and also where politics with the M-Belt Movement is discussed.
 2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 3. Political pressures from governments in The North on some Christian chiefs among the M-Belt groups and societies

*6 see comment at the end of chapter 4.

political support and sympathy when the Christian organization developed to become the UMBC Movement which vigorously demanded the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North for socio-cultural and political minorities rather than an equivocal "Christian Region". Conceptions of the anticipated political actions in the NML Movement however included all Christian and non-Moslems and emphasized Christian political leadership which excluded Moslems.

The elected political posts into the executive of the NML Movement were non-remunerative.¹ However for example, although Jonah Assadugu, The Travelling Secretary of the Christian Movement was not remunerated by funds of the Treasurer of the organization, the Christian Missionary Bodies he served in 1949² gave indirect financial support for the NML by maintaing his nine-shillings monthly salary and gave an acknowledged permission for his absence from duty as teacher and evangelist at Gengule in Numan Division until he completed the political tours.³ The Du-meeting therefore was also to make gains in the financial contributions from the attendants in order to enable the travelling-secretary, Jonah Assadugu, to set about the task of mobilizing Christians by travelling to different Christian communities with the objective of diffusing the political ideas on the need for Christian unity in the organization.⁴ While the 1948 "Rahwol Kanang" meeting produced ten shillings as financial contributions for the activities of the Christian

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1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 2. Mainly the SIM in their Gengule Station in that instance.
 3. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.
 4. As (3)

Movement, at the inception of the NML during the Du-Meeting in 1949, the 200 attendants raised ten pounds as contributions to meet the immediate travel needs of Jonah Assadugu.¹

The political and religious objectives for the organization of the NML in May and the subsequent demands for Christian political representation in the legislative institutions of The North made in December 1949 were relatively mild and politically modest when compared to the objectives in the demands of the MZL early in 1950 which were subsequently and vigorously contested by the better organized and more articulate UMBC Movement after 1956. The NML for example only sought to achieve the political participation of Christians in the legislative institutions of The North rather than separation and constitution into separate political unit of the Nigerian Federation. The religious and political interests of the NML centred on mobilizing Christians and non-Moslems among the M-Belt groups and societies by activating the Christian religious identity for political purposes meant to achieve Christian consciousness and solidarity. It was anticipated that Christian solidarity might produce political pressures on the government of British administration in The North such that there will be Christian political representation and participation in the legislative institutions of The North, particularly in the NHA if Christians "were seen to be speaking over issues and problems with one voice".² This means that the NML Movement itself was conceived of as a political pressure group in The North rather than as a political party. This was so, even when it was the case that the NML Movement was curiously electoral in its strategies for political and religious mobilization, when there were no elections to contest and no crusades. In a rather

1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January 1971.

interesting contrast to the MZL Movement that was organized in 1950 to take over the activities of the NML and subsequently the UMBC Movement in 1956 there was little use of electoral strategy for mobilization in the 1954 Federal and the 1956 Regional elections, in the sense that there was no explicit touring political officer charged with that task. In the period between 1950 and 1956, although the post of Travelling Secretary in the NML was substituted by that of Publicity Secretary in the MZL and the UMBC, the political duties were centred on producing membership cards etc. "... rather than touring remote villages to meet the people".¹ It ought to be borne in mind however that this suggestion coming from Moses Nyam Rwang must be treated with caution. It might be a criticism of the organization of the MZL and the UMBC Movements. In the period between 1952 and 1956 Nyam Rwang was politically active in the organization of rival "Middle-Belt Parties" and affiliated these to different dominant Nigerian political parties, even when it was the case that the Nyam-Rwang-Factions maintained the same political objectives of a struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region to the more organized M-Belt Movements, the MZL and the UMBC. In 1956 however the Nyam-Rwang-Factions reconciled their political interests with the MZL to condition the development of the UMBC Movement.² The non-electoral strategies

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981; Differences in the electoral strategies of the MZL, and the UMBC are examined in more analytical details in Sections IIV, IV and V of this chapter where the politics with the M-Belt Movement are discussed.
 2. Sklar 1963 p.347; Factional tendencies to organize rival organizations and movements with the same aims and objectives to the "Main Movements" as political characteristics of the leadership of groups and societies in a situation of internal colonialism in the period between 1952 and 1956 are examined in analytical detail in Section IV of this chapter with examples from the development of Middle Belt Parties and Movements like: the Middle Belt Peoples Party (MBPP), the Benue Freedom Crusade (BFC), the Middle Belt State Party (MBSP) and the Middle Belt Congress (MBC), before their re-entry into Nigerian politics in 1956 as the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC).

of the MZL and the M-Belt Political Parties, which were emphasized in the activities of the new-post of the Publicity Secretaries, contrasted with the political impact and meaning in the tours of Jonah Assadugu which produced Christian consciousness among some of the M-Belt groups and societies. However after 1956, the UMBC Movement returned to the patterns of electoral strategies practised by the NML when both Joseph Tarka as President to the UMBC Movement and Patrick Dokotri as General Secretary were conditioned by the Willink Commission in 1957 and the on-coming 1959 general elections which determined an Independence government, to tour and mobilize all non-Islamic chiefs and communities among the M-Belt groups and societies in 1958, in support of the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North before 1960.¹ It ought to be borne in mind however that the electoral strategies of the NML which emphasized mobilization and activating the Christian religious identity were not continued after 1950 because of the failure of the Christian leadership to persuade the government of British administration and the transitional NPC leadership in The North to permit the organization to operate as a Christian political party. Furthermore as earlier suggested, the Christian religious identity as the political identity in the NML was eroded by 1950 with the resurgence of "tribal" identities as political identities among the M-Belt groups and societies which were given a boost by some of the politics of the government of British administration in The North, particularly so in the choice of representation into the NHA in the 1951 elections.²

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1. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981; The electoral strategies of the UMBC Movement in the period between 1956 and 1960, the Willink Commission of 1957 and the 1959 elections are examined in analytical detail below where politics with the M-Belt Movement is discussed.
 2. For examples of some of the policies and the strength of the resurgence of "tribal" identities in 1951, see previous discussion in the initial pages above and also Chapter 3 Sections V and VI.

However, after 1949, the NML was concerned to mobilize Christians and non-Moslem communities in order to choose only Christians in instances where there were elections into the NA, Provincial and Regional political institutions like the NHA.¹ The NML of Northern Nigeria was therefore used by indigenous Nigerian Christian leadership as the political instrument for the mobilization of Christians with the religious theme of "saving the non-Moslem" groups and societies in The North in the same religious sense that Western European Christendom set out to the 'Sudan' in Africa to liberate the "pagan souls" by mobilizing Christian action through the Missionary societies to make converts from among the groups and societies that were concentrated south and south eastwardly in the territories that became The North in Nigeria. When there was an increase in political activity in The North in the period between 1946 and 1950, caused by the direct consequences in the political changes from the Richards Constitution to the MacPherson Constitution, the Chief of Jos, Rwang Pam was used and accepted the political role to make "passionate appeals at every opportune Christian gathering" in which he called for Christian unity to translate itself into Christian political solidarity for election purposes that were anticipated in 1951.²

After the Du-meeting however the religious propagation of the political ideas of the NML were basically in the activities of its executive members. Although the executive members and other persons who attended the meeting became politically active in their local areas, there was little organization of NML branches under a centralized headquarters beyond the contacts with churches where an executive member existed.³ In fact the task of mobilizing the Christian religious identity

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1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 2. Interview discussion with Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.
 3. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.

beyond local socio-cultural boundaries largely fell on Jonah Assadugu, the Travelling Secretary of the NML, who with bicycle and Bible, occasionally travelling by train, reached church leaders and their Council of Elders among Christian communities in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Plateau where he presented the issues discussed at the Du-meeting on the political need for Christian unity and asking for support and financial contributions.¹ The Christian communities and the churches collectively gave varied sums of money as contributions for the activities of the NML,² although support was less in terms of cash payments and more in the acceptance of the political ideas of the NML. There was also generous welfare arrangements for the Travelling Secretary by the Christian communities and the churches. The dates for his arrivals at a particular centre for example were always made known in advance by announcements in the churches and elaborate plans for food and accommodation were arranged.³ Socio-religious and political support for the NML was also expressed in the organization of outward journeys of the Travelling Secretary by the different churches and Christian communities some of the M-Belt groups and societies. For example it was the churches and Christian Elders who arranged bicycles for travels between different communities in addition to the political task of convening meetings of their congregations of both Christians and "non-believers" for Jonah Assadugu to address.⁴

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1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 2. The amounts were unrecorded and are not remembered because the sums were given to the travelling secretary who used the money in the circumstances of financial emergencies that arose in the course of his travels.
 3. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 4. As (3)

In the period between May and December 1949, Assadugu visited all the major local Christian churches and communities in the territories of the M-Belt groups and societies, except those among the Tiv, Idoma and Igalla. He was expected to complete the task of his religious cum political tour in September 1949 and report the progress of experienced support in an NML executive meeting at Bukuru and Jos in the same month.¹ In September 1949 Jonah Assadugu reported to the executive of the NML at Bukuru and Jos that there was mass Christian support with enthusiasm for the political ideas of the NML. This was indicated by the social receptions, organization of his travels (by arrangement of bicycles) and the turn-out to meetings with the churches which he addressed among the Christian communities, a turn-out that included "non-Believers" among some of the M-Belt groups and societies.² This was so because Christianity already existed as a mobilized social movement in the Christian conventions and conferences and there was also the "tribal" unions who were active in articulating political and economic issues, some of whose leaders were covenanted Christians.

At the same time that Jonah Assadugu toured some of the Christian communities in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Plateau in the period between May and December 1949, the President of the NML, Pastor David Lot and the General Secretary to the organization, Moses Nyam Rwang, were politically active engaging the audiences of the Chief of Jos and Kagoro, Rwang Pam and Mallam Gwamna,³ to persuade them to urge members of the

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1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 2. As (1)
 3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.

NHC, the NHA¹ and the Governor of The North, Sir Bryan Sharwood Smith, to recruit more Christian representation in the legislative institution which will enhance the participation of Christians that might point out the political trappings of discriminatory legislation on the activities of European Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and societies and in The North in general.² The strategy to use the chiefs of Jos and Kagoro as political lobbies among top government officials and politicians in NHA created "very good friendship between them and the subsequent Governor of The North, Sir Bryan Sharwood Smith."³ In the instance the Christian anxieties over the pattern of legislation on Christianity in the NHC and NHA was impressed on the Governor of The North and the officials in the top hierarchy of politics by the government of British administration to be among the causes for the organization of the NML. The strategy however was a major cause in the development of split political images of the leadership in the NML on the target population in a specific Christian sphere of influence for the mobilization and activation of the Christian religious identity for the political purposes and conceptions of the organization in which it presented itself as representative of Christianity and Christians in provinces where there were "non-Believers" and Moslems among the groups and societies. For example, in the period between 1949 and 1952 Sharwood Smith sowed the seeds of this split political imagery of the

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1. Both chiefs were selected provincial members to the NHA as well as "nominated" chiefs into the NHC in the period between 1949 and 1952 as representatives of the "pagan areas" - Sharwood Smith 1969 p.332-335.
 2. Interview discussions with Mallam Gwamna, Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 3. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.333

relationship between Christianity and political support for the NML as an organization that also stood for "non-Believers" when on several occasions he argued and suggested to the chiefs of Jos and Kagoro as well as to some leaders of the organization like Pastor David Lot, that: "The NML as a political organization for Christians was not accounting for political realities of the area since it did not account for the interests of non-Believers and Moslems who were their brothers existing among the different groups and societies the movement suggested it represented".¹ Pastor David Lot suggests that in certain instances, political doubts were raised among some top officials in the hierarchy of the government of British administration in The North on whether "non-Believers"² might want to be represented by Christians as well as confronted by whether: "They (the leaders of the NML) would want and tolerate an organization which made equal political claims with non-Believers as leaders, to represent Christians and Moslems without political consultation".³ It ought to be borne in mind however that Sharwood Smith was concerned to avoid creating a precedent in which political differences were reinforced by religious identities in the development of political organizations in The North.⁴

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1. Interview discussions with Mallam Gwamna, Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot, January 1981; see also Sharwood Smith 1969 p.342-344.
 2. A "non-Believer" was taken to be persons practising indigenous traditional African religious beliefs and worship in which instance they were neither adherents to the Christian and Islamic religions Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 4. Interview discussions with T.H. Marshall, September 1981; for examples of expressed political concerns by Sharwood Smith on this issue in the period between 1944 and 1947 and his suggestions that politicians in The North ought to avoid "tribal, class and religious" bases by calling their organization SMAT: "Sarakuna (chiefs), Mallamai (teachers), Attajirai (educated and merchant classes), Talakawa (the peasantry)", an organization that will articulate the interests of society as a whole - see Sharwood Smith 1969 p.161-164.

The controversy that resulted from the political claims of the NML brought indigenous Christian leadership into confrontation with Bryan Sharwood Smith, the Governor of The North in the period between 1950 and 1957. While he was sympathetic to the political views held and expressed to him by Rwang Pam, Mallam Gwamna and Pastor David Lot who were concerned to achieve political representation through the NML to protect Christian interests in the institutions of government in The North,¹ when there was political demand for the creation of "a Middle Zone Region" by the subsequent organization to the NML, the MZL, Sharwood Smith saw the remaining Christian leadership as 'Political Opportunists': "... for whom the dazzling vision of a brand new region with its ministries and public boards and corporations and all that these implied in the way of power and patronage was argument enough".² The political interpretations of the anticipated intentions of the NML also compounded its problems to persist into a stable political organization with a Christian religious identity. The government in The North for example saw the NML as a political organization with European Christian missionaries as its main backbone in the background who meant to place Christian contestants in the 1951 elections that were generally anticipated as a result of the adjustments in the MacPherson constitution from that of Governor Richards in 1946.³ In the period between 1947 and 1952, while government was concerned to create a political premise from which it might achieve the political representation of "tribal" communities from among the M-Belt groups and societies in The North, the development of NML after 1949 was clearly achieving "trans-tribal" political mobilization with the Christian religious identity to achieve political representation which were underlined by the political polarities between Islam and Christianity

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1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 2. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.343-344.
 3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Barnabas Dusu and Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.

in The North. The political and social theme of a Christian crusade against Islam in The North permeated the whole development of political movements among the M-Belt groups and societies even when it was the case that "tribal" interests superceded religious political goals before their demands consolidated and persisted within the UMBC Movement after 1956.¹ In the instance some of the "tribal" leaders with initial political loyalties to the executive leadership of the NML accepted the political prescription of the government as early as in 1950 that the NML was better organized at the level of "tribal" loyalties rather than on the wider Christian religious identity in a non-Moslem movement which stood as representative of the assumed "Christian tribes".² In 1950 Sharwood Smith himself became impatiently blunt with the NML and told some of its executive members that "a Non-Moslem League was an offensive political label for the organization of political interests in The North and the leadership ought to produce a new tag for the movement".³ Sharwood Smith also impressed on the leadership of the NML through the chiefs, Rwang Pam for Jos on the Plateau and Mallam Gwamna for Kgoro in S. Zaria and Pastor David Lot as representative of church leadership that political consciousness was better organized through "tribal" channels in the different unions as political parties rather than in the NML as a Christian political party.⁴ There were also political pressures on the leadership of the NML in which there was developed the administrative policy that the 1951 elections be contested through the channels of the "tribal" unions to produce representatives rather than the NML as a political

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1. The political crystalization of "tribal" and Christian religious interests in the UMBC movement are examined in more analytical detail in Sections III, IV, V and VI of this Chapter.
 2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 3. As (2)
 4. Interview discussions with Mallam Gwamna and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.

party producing representative Christians for elections into the Provincial Colleges. As a collateral example in the development of political parties in the Islamic society for participation in politics in The North and Nigeria, the NPC and NEPU (subsequently pressurized by the NAs) experienced less direct pressures and political manipulations to create cleavages in their organizations from the government of British administration in The North.*⁷ For example in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Sokoto and Zaria Provinces, the 1951 Elections were contested by politicians who were Moslems on the party political labels of the NPC and NEPU.¹ The consequence was that political fragmentation rather than unity became the characteristic of political development in the politics of The North among the M-Belt groups and societies. This was so because of the "tribal" element which was given emphasis as the level of political participation for the M-Belt groups and societies in the politics of The North. This situation was contra-destructive to the development of an all embracing political organization in the Islamic society, the NPC and NEPU with leadership whose political centre of gravity was in the Islamic society. While a dominant and autonomous political organization developed in the Islamic society, a dependant and fragmented pattern in the development of political organization became characteristic of the M-Belt groups and societies, a pattern that was increasingly subjected to political interference by governments in The North. In the period between 1956 and 1966 there was increased interference in the political patterns of participation among the M-Belt groups and societies with concomitant

1. For examples, see Northern Region of Nigeria: Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna 1953.

*⁷ See Comment at the end of Chapter 4.

increases in the dependence of their leadership to politicians with political objectives that emphasized Islamic leadership.¹

However, as a result of the political position taken by the government of British administration in The North on the NML, the Christian political leadership saw itself in dual political capacities. While admitting their political identity in the NML as representative of Christian interests the pressures produced from government "advice" and politicians with "Northern interests" conditioned their interactions as "tribal" leaders with Christian interests.² In other words, when Christian mobilization had activated political consciousness among the M-Belt groups and societies it was only permitted to find a stable political expression through the channels of the "tribal" political machinery. This was dominated by the leadership that was developed from the Christian communities as the self-accredited representative of Christians and "non-Believers" among the M-Belt groups and societies.³ The consequence of the dual role of representing Christianity and the "tribes" in the leadership of the NML showed itself in the schisms that characterized the development of the M-Belt Movement from the NML into the MZL, particularly so for its

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1. Interference in political participation of the M-Belt groups and societies by the transition government of British administration and the subsequent NPC government in the period between 1956 and 1966 is examined in more analytical detail in Chapters 6 and 7 where the Willink Commission and patron-client relationships in the patterns of politics with the M-Belt Movement are brought into focus in this study.
 2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 3. As (2)

development into the UMBC in the period between 1952 and 1956. In that period for example a major consequence of the dual roles of leadership in the MZL was that members who lost political posts contested for the all embracing executive of the movement, simply took away with them their "tribal" followings and organized a new movement with a "tribal" rather than a Christian base. In the instance the rival organization to the MZL was given political recognition and encouraged by governments in The North. While the political leadership in NML still maintained the objective of political representation for Christians, the alternative "tribal" bases of the variants to the NML became preoccupied with a struggle to solve socio-economic and welfare issues of deprivation from both the regional government and its organizations in the Provincial and Divisional NA administrations of the M-Belt groups and societies. However some of the recalcitrant political leadership of the NML and subsequently the MZL organizations in the developing M-Belt Movement seem to suggest the argument that the splits in their Christian loyalty to that religious and political identity in the initial period which activated previous political roles in the "tribal" unions was not necessarily fragmentation of Christian solidarity and the political interests it supported. It was rather "a sharing of responsibilities" on the issues that involved the political struggle of the M-Belt groups and societies: "While the NML and the MZL struggled for the cause of justice to all Christians, the "tribal" unions struggled for social and economic problems, unique to the different Christian communities among the "tribes" in the M-Belt areas",^{1*8}

1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Dudu Dalyop, January 1981.

*8 see comment at the end of Chapter 4

The NML however essentially developed as a political organization conceived by Christian leadership as a pressure group that was based on local issues affecting mainly the non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas. These were related to the local conception of politics and society in The North rather than the developing Nigerian political state. They were centred on the political controversy between the dominance of the Islamic religion in the political process and the subordination of Christianity, particularly so on the participation of Christians in the legislative institutions of The North. The Christian minority in the politics and society of The North in 1950 gained support for their political appeals to the different groups and societies in the M-Belt areas because their demands were related and became reinforced by the state of socio-economic and political grievances already being contested for solutions by the "tribal" unions. The NML was to develop into a movement with a cuase for the creation of a separate region within the Nigerian Federation, even when it was the case that Federalism itself was not a political practice until in 1954. The NML however did not achieve the political goal of producing pressure on the government of British administration in The North, sufficiently to give representation to the minority religion in order that Christian interests might be protected. For example there was no Christian that was appointed into the NHA as a result of the demands of the NML until in 1955 when there were other M-Belt political organizations and the systemic forces in the politics of The North had produced other demands and organizations that overtook the exclusively Christian Movement.¹ This was so because

1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981; this point will also become apparent when we examine the development of the MZL and Middle Belt Political Parties in the period between 1952 and 1956 which culminated in the more permanent UMBC Movement in 1956 in Sections III, IV, V and VI in this Chapter.

the government insisted on "tribal" political representation rather than Christian representation from the different non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas. The NML was however successful in bringing to the fore of politics in The North, the political scope of a Christian Movement and the content of its political demands from among previously assumed dormant political groups and societies. By the end of 1950 the NML had succeeded in raising Christian political consciousness into one unity and had used it to present its grievances and demands for solutions to the highest political personalities in the government of British administration in The North. Although this was so the demanded solutions were listened to rather than acted upon to dissolve political discontent. The NML had also created a political premise for its anticipated political action which was meant to organize-in political support for Christian representation into the NHA without an alternative option of political action in the case of that objective failing. In 1951 the NML had completely failed to pressurize the government of British administration to nominate indigenous Christians from the M-Belt groups and societies into the NHA. Instead it was completely pressurized by the government to de-emphasize Christianity in the Movement by changing the political label into the Middle Zone League.¹ In June 1951 the NML ceased to exist when the MZL with a newly elected leadership took over the political ideas of the Christian Movement.² The NML however had achieved a huge success on mobilizing

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 2. As (1)

and creating Christian political consciousness which suggested that the different "tribal" groups and societies in the M-Belt areas were "one Christian tribe". This political mood however initially crystallized into concrete reality from impact with the ideas of the NML on the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau and S. Zaria while similarly excluded Christian groups and societies from the mainstream of politics in The North like the Tiv, Jukun, Idoma and Igalla among others did not participate in the NML except for a few Tiv Evangelists in Ibi where there was a strong SUM station. Other than circulating the religious and political ideas that Christians were organizing themselves in order to ensure Christian representation in the legislative institutions of The North which was political action against the dominance of Moslems by using orthodox Christian methods in the rhetorics of: "Krista ku tashi" (Christians arise), the NML and the leadership were lonely voices in the political wilderness of the M-Belt groups and societies and the maturing political arena of The North. They were not considered as a serious political force beyond the groups and societies where there were Christian communities centred on a church. In this respect the NML might be seen in the Biblical role of 'John the Baptist' to the later advent of the MZL and the UMBC in the political sense that it was a potent force in politics rather than an electoral campaigner and manipulator.

The political imprint of the NML as a potent force in politics in The North was largely achieved through the inspired religious publicity and propaganda it received in the initiated methods of Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot in the period between 1949 and 1951. Jonah Assadugu, with Bible and bicycle, travelled to mobilize and activate the Christian religious identity among the communities in Adamawa, S. Bauchi S. Zaria and Plateau.¹ Moses Nyam Rwang, perhaps the most emotionally

1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.

angry and politically disturbed over issues surrounding the organization of the NML in its leadership, used the Bible and his military decorations (*medals*) attained from military service in the Second World War to suggest that they were respectively "Heavenly and Earthly Certificates" to fight for the cause of Christian freedom and justice for the M-Belt groups and societies and therefore calling for support.¹ Pastor David Lot, Commander of the SUM/SIM Boy's Brigade (BB) on the Plateau, used the movement to travel extensively among Christian communities by marching young men through villages and towns on the Plateau with political and religious messages that called for a relationship between Christian unity and the political solidarity of the non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas.² The BB Movement always produced tremendous political impact since people came out to listen and watch the parade on the different "political Sundays" wherever a team camped.³ This was the extra-political dimension to Christian mobilization by the NML which shaped and prepared public opinion among some of the M-Belt groups and societies to support Christians in the 1951 elections and the subsequent political demands for Christians and non-Moslems to be arranged into a separate Region in The North as a different political unit from the Islamic society within the Nigerian Federation, an idea that had gained political currency with the MZL movement as early as in 1951. The political issue of demanding the creation of "a Region for Christians" did not arise with the essentially Christian organization of the NML. The issue of a region for Christians and non-

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.
 2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 3. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.

Moslem groups and societies within the very leadership of the NML awaited another 'political space' which was produced by Bello Dandogo. In the period between 1947 and 1951, Bello Dandogo was a privately nominated political representative as member from Kano Province in the NHA,¹ and was one of the most politically articulate in the rhetorics on the floors of the NHA and the FHR.² In 1950 however, Bello Dandogo put forward a private members motion before the NHA suggesting the exclusion of European Christian Missionary activities among all the groups and societies in The North.^{3*} A beleaguered NML with a weakened ideological base of cohesion centred on the mobilized Christian religious identity and solidarity, because the government insisted on giving only "tribal" rather than Christian representation to the NHA was given a cause to reorganize with new political momentum in the midst of pressures to change its political label into something less religiously overt. It is to the circumstances surrounding the motion of Bello Dandogo, the political pressures to change the label of the NML into "something else" in order for the movement to be accepted as a political party in The North and the political demands accompanying these issues that we now turn to, which conditioned the development of the Middle Zone League (MZL) and the subsequent first emergence of the political ideas for the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North in the period between 1950 and 1954.

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1. Sklar 1963 p.346
 2. For examples of the Language content and nature of the issues Dandogo raised and articulated in the NHA and the FHR in that period, see Northern Legislature: Northern House of Assembly (Advisory Council) Debates, Lagos 1947-1952.
 3. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981; Sklar 1963 p.346; while Sklar suggests the date of the critical motion to be 1949 and uses the word "restrict Christian Missionaries" in The North (It ought to be borne in mind that Christian Missionary activities were already restricted activities before 1950). Interview discussions and the dairy dates of Jonah Assadugu suggest that the motion was made in 1950 and it was meant to "exclude/expel" Christian Missionaries from The North.

*10 see comment at the end of Chapter 4.

III The Middle Zone League (MZL)

The Middle Zone League of 1950¹ as a political organisation among the M-Belt groups and societies was conditioned by the political outgrowth of the socio-religious grievances in the NML that was organized in 1949. Although the political label of the Christian Movement was changed from the Non-Moslem League to become the Middle Zone League, the political actors and the socio-religious grievances which the NML contested remained an issue in the MZL for maintaining the objective of mobilizing Christian solidarity for the political purposes in The North. This section examines the socio-economic causes and political circumstances of the M-Belt groups and societies under Christian political leadership in the development of the Non-Moslem League (NML) Movement of 1949 which became the Middle Zone League (MZL) in 1950. The section also examines the expansion of socio-economic and welfare demands as political interests in the growth and development of the MZL that were articulated by the leadership which were different from those in the Non-Moslem League Movement.

The MZL Movement maintained the same social and political support from Christian Communities among the M-Belt groups and societies until "tribal" tendencies in the already mobilized Christian political identity of the NML caused factions to develop within the organization after 1952. Previous to 1952 however when there began a vigorous demand by the MZL, there still remained in the perception of the Christian leadership of the Movement the notion that political representation

1. K.W.J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: Politics and Administration in a Developing Political System, Oxford 1963 p.78-81; M.G. Smith, "Kagoro Political Development" in Human Organization, Vol.19, 1960 p.146; Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation, Princeton 1963 p.346.

conditioned the favourable distribution and allocation of modern infrastructural amenities for European patterns of developing their societies. This political perception persisted collaterally to the objective purposes of the Movement that were centred on safe-guarding against anti-Christian Bills in the Legislative institutions of The North. In the period between 1940 and 1950, European Christian Missionaries increasingly demonstrated that they were the visible instruments in the development of the non-Islamic M-Belt groups and societies. When indigenous Christian political representation was denied in response to the demands of the NML and when there was a motion in the NHA to expel European Christian Missionaries from The North who were concentrated and critical to the development of the M-Belt groups and societies, the political consequence produced by that motion was the instant demand by the MZL for separation from the Islamic society in The North and the constitution of the non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas into a "Middle Zone Region".

However, when there developed the demands for the creation of a "Middle Zone Region" in 1950, "tribal" factions, with socio-cultural and political roots in the "tribal" Union Movements and whose Christian religious identities became fed into the political support for the organization of the MZL, surfaced to subsequently reduce the impact of the mobilized political influences of the Christian religious identity previously developed in the NML Movement. In the period between 1950 and 1956 the MZL expanded the political arenas of Christian mobilization for its political support in The North and developed as the second phase of The M-Belt Movement. It also developed to be an organized political party with well defined and articulate political objectives. As an organized political party its main interests were focused on the political mobilization

of Christians, based on the same strategies of the NML in order to contest the 1951 elections in The North for the choice of membership into the Northern House of Assembly (NHA). At its inception in 1950 it demonstrated very little concern with national politics in Nigeria even when it was the case that the shape and pattern of politics on that arena produced influences on its political demands and development as a political party. In the period between 1952 and 1958 Christian solidarity of the "tribes" among the M-Belt groups and societies as political support for the MZL Movement was further eroded in its political activities by the development of numerous factions within its organizational ranks. These factions were differently organized as "Middle Belt Political Parties", with each directing its political appeal to different sections of the M-Belt groups and societies. Some of the M-Belt political party movements, like the Benue Freedom Crusade (BFC) which was organized in 1958 with covert NCNC political encouragement through H.O. Abaagu¹ were developed among the M-Belt groups and societies as independent organizations from the MZL and the UMBC Movement.² The "M-Belt Political Parties" however maintained the same aims and objectives as the MZL. These were centred on the political struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North which might enclose non-Moslems as political minorities in a political and administrative unit of the Nigerian Federation. The NML Movement therefore developed to become the MZL political party, organized among other causes, for the explicit demands for the creation of a

1. Post 1963 p.84

2. The political factions in the M-Belt Movement for the period between 1950 and 1960 are examined in detail in Section IV of this Chapter where the "Middle Belt Political Parties" are brought into analytical focus.

M-Belt Region.¹

In a situation of internal colonialism, particularly so in instances where subordination of political and cultural minorities is buttressed by administrative and political measures which are meant to consolidate the political power roles and interests of an existing ruling class of the dominant group and society within national boundaries (State, Region, Country) and where the peripheral groups and societies have attained a measure of organized political consciousness as a force in politics, a political and religious movement as a pressure group, as was the NML, gets pushed to become a separatist movement.² In the instance of The North, which was a dominant political unit in the Nigerian Federation and for a very long time until in 1967, was conceived to be "a nation-state" within a nation in the developing Nigerian political state by both Islamic leadership and the government of British administration,³ there was the consolidation of political power roles in the interests of an existing ruling class. This was an advantage directed to the social and political benefit of the Hausa-Fulani Islamic rulers and numerous

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1. It ought to be borne in mind however that the MZL in 1950 demanded the creation of a "Middle Zone Region" before the same demand was renamed in 1953 as a "Middle Belt Region" within the Nigerian Federation. In the same year a faction of the MZL renamed the demand as a "Middle Belt State". This is examined in more detail in Section IV of this Chapter.
 2. For more detailed discussions of the theory of internal colonialism with comparative examples of the historical experiences of political and socio-cultural minorities in different parts of the world with similar circumstances to those of the M-Belt groups and societies, see *Introduction*.
 3. For examples of the conceptions of The North as a distinct political and religious nation within Nigeria, see Chapter 2 Sections III, IV and VI; see also A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, This is Northern Nigeria: Background to an Invitation, Kaduna 1955; Social and Economic Progress in the Northern Region of Nigeria, Northern Regional Information Service, Kaduna, 14th December 1955; R.W. Baxter, Our North: The Story of Northern Nigeria in its Self-Government Year 1959, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Kaduna 1959.

other variants of Islamic leadership among groups and societies like the Kanuri, Nupe, Islamic Yoruba Communities in Ilorin in the period between 1900 and 1950 when there was British political control of Nigeria.¹ The political consolidation of roles and interests in the power structure in The North for an existing ruling class, while the organized political consciousness among the subordinated political minorities in the peripheral territories was undermined, a process that was buttressed by administrative and political measures, conditioned the initial development of the demands for the creation of a "Middle Zone Region" by the NML in 1950.

The idea of a "Middle Zone" as a concept in the description of certain territories in The North, albeit Nigerian territories, in which there were existing socio-cultural and political characteristics held by the government of British administration to be different from those of the Islamic society was not conditioned by the emergence of a political organization for the areas. The sociological and political application of the concept predates the advent of the MZL upon the subsequent political pressures on the NML as a Christian movement to change a political label which emphasized an overt religious identity for political purposes in the short period of its existence between 1948 and 1950. In the 1931 Nigerian Census Report for example, many of the M-Belt groups and societies in The North were distinctively scored as belonging to the language group of a "Middle Zone" Region.² Among the linguistic categories suggested as belonging to the "Middle Zone" Region, mainly found in the territories of The North in Nigeria were: the Afo, Afudu, Arago, Bangi, Boritsu,

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1. British rule and the social and political subordination of the non-Islamic groups and societies has been examined in some detail in Chapter 2 in particular see Sections II, III, IV and V for analytical examples.
 2. Talbot 1969 p.136-137

Kagoro, Burum, Kaje, Dakakari (Chilila), Dukawa, Katab, Gungawa, Gurmawa, Jaba (Ham), Kamberi, Ninzam, Kamuku, Chawai, Koro, and Kurama which were concentrated in the territories of Southern Zaria; Munshi (Tivi), Bassa (Kaduna) and Shingini which were concentrated in the territories centred on the Benue River; Yergam, Yeskwa, Zumper (Mbarike), Anaguta, Barawa, Berom (Forum), Buji, Buli, Butawa, Dingi, Fachara (Teria), Ganawuri (Jal), Gbaiyawa, Geji (Gezawa), Guram, Ikulu, Irigwe, Kwol, Jaku, Kadunu, Kentu, Kibollo, Kitimi, Kolu, Kopti, Kudawa, Kurmi, Pai, Paiem, Piti, Pongo, Riban, Rishuma, Rukuba, Rumaiya and Zar which were concentrated in the territories of Plateau Province; Hill Jarawa, Jere, Jimi, Kadara, Peda, Kaibu, Kaleri, Kare, Kikurku, Kinuku, Ngwoi, Ningi, Nungu which were concentrated in the territories of Southern Bauchi; Kitimi, Mama, Moroa, Sigidawa, Srubu, Taura, Zul, Chamba, Daka, Chamba-laego, Fali Kugama, Vere, Vomni which were concentrated in the non-Islamic and non-Fulani territories of Adamawa.¹ It is possible therefore to suggest that given the European Christian Missionary conversance with literature on the historical accounts and characteristics of the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North and their close social and political association with the Christian Movements among the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1940 and 1952,² when political and administrative pressures conditioned a change of political label for the Christian Movement, the "Middle-Zone" as a sociological category became easily transcribed as a substitution

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1. Talbot 1969 p.137
 2. For examples of the indicators of European Christian Missionary close association with Christian political ideas in the social and political movements among the M-Belt groups and societies in that period, see Chapter 3 Sections III and IV.

of political label to the Non-Moslem League of Northern Nigeria.

In December 1949 however the NML arrived at a point where it had nowhere to go for the solutions of its religious and political grievances in the context of politics within The North. This was so inspite of the impressive outline of political organization it had developed for the activation of the Christian political identity and its frantic religious mobilization of Christian communities for political purposes. The organization of the NML and the Christian propaganda it had so brilliantly mobilized in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and some parts of the Plateau and S. Zaria was undermined by the government in The North. So also were the well spent energies of Jonah Assadugu who had travelled extensively among some of the Christian communities in the M-Belt areas. Although public opinion and Christian religious feelings on political issues in The North aroused among the Christians and non-Islamic communities remained, they were effectively deflected and redirected back into the churches rather than filtering into electoral patterns. The government in The North refused the election of representatives into the NHA on the political identity of a Christian religious movement.*⁹ However, instead of legislating against the organization of religious political parties which might have automatically affected the Christian movement the government of British administration in The North insisted that the anticipated 1951 elections into the NHA be contested in "tribal" political parties rather than by that phase of the M-Belt Movement, even when it was the case that the "tribes" considered themselves as Christians.¹ The political attitudes of the government of British

1. For some examples of the internal religious conceptions from the "tribes" among the M-Belt groups and societies seeing themselves as Christians, see Chapter 3 Sections II, III, IV and V.

*⁹ see comment at the end of Chapter 4.

administration in The North on the organization of political parties with exquisite religious identities, particularly as was typified by the Governor, Bryan Sharwood-Smith for most of the period between 1950 and 1958¹ effectively undermined the political appeals of the NML with the "tribal" political sentiments that also undercut the Christian political sentiments which were the very base of mobilized support in the NML Movement. The NML ended its activities as a political pressure group in the interest of Christianity in December 1949 without contesting any elections and without achieving its objectives of getting representation for the Christian communities among the M-Belt groups and societies into the NHA with an explicit Christian political identity. The ideas of the NML held by its leadership on the relationship between Christianity, political mobilization of Christians and non-Moslems and the representation for the M-Belt groups and societies in the legislative institutions of The North and Nigeria persisted until 1951. They were however a political parcel of the MZL on its inception as a political movement early in 1950. It was the task of the MZL to achieve some of the social and political aims and objectives of the NML.

The Middle Zone League was the Non-Moslem League under a different political label. This was so because the MZL maintained the struggle began by NML in terms of political ideas, conceptions of the political arena for its activities, the characteristic of the leadership maintained in the Movement and the target population from where it sought to make appeals for support by activating the Christian religious identity. The critical difference however was that in the period

1. Sharwood-Smith 1969 p;163; John P. Mackintosh (Ed), Nigerian Government and Politics, London 1966 p.33

between 1950 and 1954 the MZL increased the list of political demands over the socio-economic and welfare grievances as well as broadening its base of support from among some of the M-Belt groups and societies. For example, while the NML concentrated its political activities among Christian communities on the Plateau with some representation from only a few of the non-Islamic groups and societies centred on Numan in Adamawa, Fobur in Southern Bauchi and Kagoro in Southern Zaria, in its phase as the MZL in 1952 the M-Belt Movement expanded its influences and intensified its activities on groups and societies in Southern Zaria when Kafanchan and Kagoro became important meeting centres for executive members and followers of the organization. It was when there was a MZL Movement that there was gradual political shift from the Plateau, southwardly to S. Zaria and subsequently to Benue Province when in 1953 Tiv leadership in the TPU became aware that there was a political organization which was struggling for the interests of Christians and non-Moslems who were political minorities in The North.¹ Subsequently in 1956 the centre of political gravity of the M-Belt Movement, after its turbulent period as variations of the MZL in the "Middle Belt Political Parties" shifted more southwardly again to become concentrated among the Tiv group and society in Benue Province in terms of political leadership and electoral support. This was so, even when it was the case that as latterly as in 1955 politics had not penetrated to the masses of the Tiv people except for a tiny fraction of the European educated in the TPU.² The European educated from the Tiv

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1. Interview discussions with Ajiva Aji, and Isaac Kpum, January 1981.
 2. M.J. Dent, "A Minority Party: The UMBC" in John P. Mackintosh (Ed), Nigerian Government and Politics, London 1966 p.467; Justin I. Tseayo, Conflict and Incorporation in Nigeria: The Integration of the Tiv, Zaria, Nigeria 1975 p.194.

group and society were however able to shape the election of all nine Tiv members in the NHA from the Benue Provincial Electoral College although the Tiv composed only half the population of the Province,¹ independently of the political influences from the MZL Movement.²

When the MZL was organized in 1950 the religious ideas of the NML, centred on the struggle to achieve the representation of members from among the M-Belt groups and societies with a Christian religious identity in the Legislative Institutions of The North, became filtered into more political channels. The concentration of rhetorical protest and the articulation of political grievances in the MZL became centred on socio-economic and welfare issues, rather than the pure religious rhetoric over Christian representation in the NHA as was previously the case with the NML Movement. In the instance, the MZL Movement became characterized by a systematic process of political mobilization which took out the Christian religion as a political identity and replaced it with the same socio-economic and political grievances which had been issues that crystallized cultural identities in the "tribal" Union Movements among the M-Belt groups and societies. It was from these changes in political emphasis, among other causes, that the MZL Movement became more of a political rather than a religious organization although with concomitant increases in factionalism based on "tribal" and territorial conceptions of political identities developing within the organization.

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1. Dent 1966 p.467
 2. For examples of the political influences in the activities of the TPU, see detailed discussions of "tribal" Union Movements among the M-Belt groups and societies for the period between 1940 and 1950 in Chapter 3 Section VI.

As earlier suggested, for very many different reasons, some of which are the task of this section of the study to examine and unravel, the MZL expanded from the political need for Christian representation in the legislative institutions of The North to demanding for political separation from the Islamic society and the constitution of Christian with non-Islamic communities into a "Middle Zone Region" within the Nigerian Federation. However, there were similar religious and political circumstances which previously had conditioned the organization of the NML that operated again to produce political stress on Christians who activated support for the MZL based on the existing mobilized religious political identity of the NML in the demands for separation from the Islamic society in The North. The activating political situation was based on another "Religious Report" in December 1949 that was produced by S.O. James, the Yoruba Christian in the NHA and representative to the non-Islamic and Christian communities as well as Southern Nigerian Christian communities in The North. The second "Religious Report" from the NHA by S.O. James at a meeting of Christian leaders in Jos in the Christmas of 1949.¹ The bulk of the Christian leadership who attended the Jos meeting in December 1949 were from the then beleaguered NML Movement.² In that meeting S.O. James reported to the Christian leaders in Jos that a motion had been moved by Mallam Bello Dandogo,³ a private member of the NHA from Kano who suggested that: "European Christian Missionary activities in The North be suspended... the

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1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 3. Post 1963 p.79-80; Sklar 1963 p.346; Smith 1960 p.146.

Missions be asked to pack up and go home from the territories of The North... because the religious activities of the European Christian Missionaries caused religious confusion ... which in turn caused disaffection between the "tribes" of The North".¹ Implicit in this religious development in the political rhetorics in the NHA is a suggested indicator of the social and political impact of mobilized Christian solidarity from the political activities of the NML which Islamic leadership in The North began to contest. It was however the religious and political meaning given to the Dandogo motion that was to set the pattern in the protest over socio-economic and welfare deprivation and the political demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region by the MZL, the M-Belt Political Parties and by the more politically organized UMBC Movement, particularly so when it aligned itself with the Southern Nigerian based Action Group (AG) Party. In the subsequent political development of the MZL among the M-Belt groups and societies, political controversy was centred on the political implications of the Bello Dandogo-Motion. The issue that subsequently shaped the fears of Christian political leadership, with the Bello Dandogo-Motion as background, was the anticipated religious consequences of British withdrawal from the control of political power in The North and Nigeria in the period between 1950 and 1960, given the emerging dominance of Islamic leadership in the institutions of government. It was the general political belief among indigenous Christian leadership and the European educated from the M-Belt groups and societies that once political control of the institutions of society was in the hands of Islamic leadership, in a North dominated by Moslem Ministers and Moslem chiefs, the Christian and non-Islamic communities will be

1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.

exploited, victimized by differences in religious faith and discriminated against because they were political and religious minorities.¹

S.O. James also suggested and explained to Christian leaders how all the Moslem members of the NHA who were associated with the NPC political organization, including the Sardauna of Sokoto, supported Bello Dandogo and the motion to exclude the activities of European Christian Missionaries in the social and religious development of The North.² The Sardauna of Sokoto at that time had come to the fore of politics as the unquestioned leader of The North.³ According to the "Religious Report" by S.O. James, although he was "a lone Christian voice" in the NHA with no mandate from either the Christian communities, the NML Movement and the European Christian Missionary Bodies in The North: "He opposed the motion and no-one listened to his reasons except the Governor, Bryan Sharwood-Smith who encouraged him to talk in the debate".⁴ In the subsequent debate on the motion, the report by S.O. James suggests that he argued the motion as anti-Christian in the cause of Christianity in The North and Nigeria and was prepared to sacrifice all he had since: "He was born a Christian, had lived as a Christian, will die a Christian and will resurrect as a Christian".⁵

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1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981; see also Sharwood Smith 1969 p.332-333.
 2. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
 3. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.227.
 4. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 5. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu,

In the second "Religious Report" of S.O. James, it has been further suggested that as a consequence of his protest arguments over the motion, the government of British administration in The North, for the first time took sides with Christianity and privately reprimanded the Sarkats of Sokoto, the then obvious leader of The North, for allowing Islamic members in the NHA, to push through the debate on the Bello Dandogo motion and for their unparliamentary behaviour when S.O. James spoke¹. This was so, because the European Christian Missionary Bodies in The North produced certain welfare services that were in the benefit of both Moslems in the core of the Islamic centres of religious power and politics and to non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas from the activities of their social and welfare institutions:

"Where upon and within the very Houses of the NHA and the NHC, some British officials pointed out that the "special-glasses" for the eyes of some Moslem members and Emirs came from Christian Mission Hospitals, particularly the services of the SIM Hospital in Kano"².

Early in January, 1950, a meeting of Christian Leaders was arranged to take place in Jos, with the objective of deciding on religious and political issues and problems that became necessitated by the same second "Religious Report" of S.O. James³. The new situation also conditioned the reactivation of the controversy over the lingering political and administrative pressures on the name, Non-Moslem League (NML), as a political label in the same sense of a name for a political party. As earlier on noted this controversy had forced the activities of the Christian Movement into a virtual halt. Later in January 1950 however, Christian Leaders who were already politically active in their identification with the NML movement again met at Kafanchan⁴. In that instance they further deliberated over Christian political action on the Bello Dandogo motion which had increased social and religious fears in the minds of Christians about the potential

expulsion of European Christian Missionaries from The North and the political pressures on the NML Movement to change its political label. It was at the Kafanchan meeting that Christian Leadership in the NML sought to create a broader representative conception of the non-Moslem groups and societies in the territories of The North which subsequently produced a new name for the Christian Movement⁵. Contrary to what has been widely quoted from R.L. Sklar and K.W.J. Post suggesting that the NML was organized in 1950 and became associated with an independently organized MZL in 1951⁶, these organizations are in fact inseparable political movements in the sense that the former developed to become the latter⁷.

The European Christian Missionary influences with their detail knowledge about different categorization of non-Islamic territories as a distinct region within The North⁸, Yoruba and Ibo Christian influences, on some of the European educated executive members of the NML, particularly those centred on the Jos Plateau Tin mines fields and those in Kafanchan⁹, combined to condition the change of political label from the Non-Moslem League to the Middle-Zone League in March, 1950¹⁰.

It ought to be borne in mind however that the development of Southern Nigerian nationalist influences on politics in The North in the period between 1945 and 1955, which subsequently conditioned political alliances of the NCNC and with the AG in 1956 in particular, with some of the "Middle Belt Political Parties" was caused by variation in the political interests of the leadership of the "tribal" unions in the movements rather than collateral political interests that fussed and political knowledge of The North which explained the nature of conflict between the Islamic society and the M-Belt groups and societies. In that period the leadership in the "Middle Belt Political Parties" became concerned to raise distinct local issues and problems in Southern Nigerian nationalist newspapers, the British press based in London and on the floors of the FHR. For example, this was so for the issues of the BPU movement which centred on the "Sabon

Zawan Scheme" that affected groups and societies in Jos Division. In that instance, Patrick Dokotry, among others, blew them open to the world by sending photos reflecting the poverty of the groups and societies affected by the "Zawan Scheme", photos of the already planted barred-wires of the "experimental European colony" in Gyel village to the West African Pilot in Accra, Ghana, the Northern Star in Kano and the London Times and with the suggested newspaper caption of "Another South Africa in Nigeria"¹¹. The effect of the publicity given to some of the social and economic problems affecting non-Islamic communities in The North was the instant "leap-frog" political support in 1955 for the causes of the BPU, NML, MZL and subsequently the UMBC movement for the creation of a M-Belt Region which Southern Nigerian politicians exploited to gain wider support from the minorities in The North but with little understanding of the deep rooted nature of internal colonial relationships which shaped conflict in the area. As it will be subsequently argued¹², while the M-Belt groups and societies rejected the nature of the exploitative relationships with the dominant Islamic society in The North, they strongly accepted being Northern as a subnational political identity in the politics of Nigeria and directed this against the intrusion of socio-economic competition of the more educated Southern Nigerians in their midst. In the period between 1950 and 1965 the perception of the socio-economic competition that was faced with the more educated and commercially skilled Southern Nigerians among the M-Belt groups and societies felt by leadership of the M-Belt Movements in many respects explains the volatility of political alliances between Southern Nigeria based political parties like the AG and the NCNC and the dominant party of The North the NPC, even when it was the case that the UMBC movement culminated in an alliance with the Northern Progressive Front (NPF) for the 1964 elections in Nigeria¹³.

It was, however, from the publicity given to the socio-economic and political problems of some of the M-Belt groups and societies that the

attention of Southern Nigerian politicians became focussed on non-Islamic groups and societies that were seeking separation in The North, particularly so for those whose leadership claimed the Christian socio-political identity. In the period between 1945 and 1960, Southern Nigerian politicians had very little knowledge of the socio-economic and political problems that shaped conflict between groups and societies in The North¹⁴. J.S. Tarka for example suggests that in aligning the UMBC with the AG in the 1957 alliance, the joint leadership was unnecessarily afraid (upon subsequent reflections) of the powers and political authority of the Emirs and Chiefs mainly from the assumptions of Southern Nigerian politicians who controlled the nature of the alliance, until in the political turmoil of 1966 and 1967 when they, the opposition politicians in The North strongly influenced the shape of public opinion and decision making over the course of events in The North and Nigeria with the Emirs remaining only in advisory roles¹⁵. Furthermore some top officials in the government of British administration in The North who sat in the hearings of the Willink Commission in 1957, suggest that Elizabeth Ivase, the only female person from the M-Belt areas, who testified in support of the ideas for the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North demonstrated more social and political knowledge of The North when compared to Yoruba Lawyers that had come from the Western Region to represent the interests of the UMBC movement and had been sent to The North by the AG¹⁶.

When the interests that were articulated by the NML movement for the political representation of Christians with non-Islamic Communities experienced political and administrative pressures from the government of British administration, particularly so in respect to the change of its political label constitute Christians as a ruling class in a separate M-Belt Region in The North as a unit of the Nigerian Federation which will be separated from the Islamic society. This was within content of the specific interests that centered on the religious and political sense that

suggest there were parallels in their demands with Islamic leadership ruling over the majority of the Moslem population, albeit the M-Belt groups and societies in The North. In the whole of the period between 1950 and 1952 however the political momentum in the demands of the NML movement weakened, largely from the pressures placed on it to change its political tag. There was also the political emphasis by the government of British administration in The North on "tribal" identities as political identities within the developing Christian movement that became the MZL which further eroded the political vigour of the movement. In the instance Christian solidarity for political purposes among the non-Islamic M-Belt groups and societies needed another issue of controversy in the socio-religious politics of The North for the issue of separation from the Islamic society to become translated into an organizational form and to gain another momentum in the MZL. As it has been earlier suggested, the new political label "the Middle Zone League" itself had been largely caused by political and administrative pressures of the government of British administration in The North. These pressures were meant to discourage Christian leadership from activating religious identities and the socio-political grievances of Christian communities for political purposes in The North.

Although the NML movement had organized and appealed to a stronger conception of a political identity in the mobilization of Christians and the non-Islamic communities among the M-Belt groups and societies because there was an easily identifiable population that was Christian and also a type that practiced varied traditional forms of African religious systems of beliefs and worships and therefore were non-Moslem in socio-religious and political identity, the organization was forced to use a weak conception of political identity when it took on the "new" label as "the Middle Zone League" (MZL). This was so because social and political identification with a "zone" for political purposes was a vague conception and became as hopeless as a definition of the claimed socio-religious and

cultural areas where the political problems of the non-Moslem population existed in The North and which were contested by the NML. For very many different reasons however, some of which are the task of this section of the study to examine, the MZL ended up organizing - in, the interests that previously existed in the NML movement and expanded those by suggesting the need for Christian political representation in The North to include the demands for political separation from the Islamic society as well as the constitution of all non-Islamic groups and societies into a "Middle-Zone Region" within the Nigerian Federation. It is from these promises that it is argued that the movement for political separation rather than participation and the subsequent demands to constitute the non-Islamic groups and societies into a M-Belt Region, particularly so for those in the politically defined M-Belt areas, as the objective characteristic of the MZL movement was conditioned by the Bello Dandogo motion in the NHA which urged for the exclusion of the activities of European Christian Missionaries from The North. Although this is so, the prestige of the "Big-Region" syndrome of Nigerian Federalism in the period between 1950 and 1965 also conditioned the vast territorial claims in the political demands of the MZL¹⁷. This claim further confused the nature of the problems of the non-Islamic groups and societies and the search by the MZL for political solutions to the problems of minorities in The North and in the Nigerian Federation¹⁸. It is further argued that when Christianity was de-emphasized in the grievances of the M-Belt Movement in its development from the NML to become the MZL, the issues contested in the demands for separation from the Islamic became centred on socio-political and economic discrimination as well as deprivation over the distribution of economic and welfare infrastructure by the governments in The North until 1967. These issues became reinforced by the grievance of deprivation in political representation and participation in decision-making roles within the institutions of government in The North and those closer to the ordinary

people at the grassroots, in the Provincial and Native Authority Administrations (NAs) among the M-Belt groups and societies.

After the 1950 Christian leaders meeting at Kafanchan, who were previously associated with the NML movement and after they had agreed to change the name of the NML to become the MZL movement, there was an established mood for the political mobilization of Christians as well as non-Islamic Communities in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau and S. Zaria¹⁹. At a subsequent meeting in Jos, elections into the executive posts of the MZL took place. During the same meeting in Jos, the Township of Bukuru was chosen to be where the structural headquarters of the MZL party will exist²⁰. It ought to be borne in mind that in the period between 1950 and 1954 there were constant and regular meetings of the leaders of the M-Belt Movement in its phase as the MZL, in Jos rather than at Bukuru until 1956. These meetings at Jos shaped the establishment of the UMBC headquarters in Jos.

The controversy between the leadership of the NML and the government of British administration in The North, over the change of political label for the essentially Christian movements and the insistence of the administration that the 1951 elections be contested on "tribal" political identities rather than with religious labels initially caused the MZL to carry on its political activities with a dual status in its roles. While the social as well as the political Christian identity, already mobilized and actively inherited from the NML movement, for example, conditioned the continuity of a religious identity on the MZL, "tribal" identities persistently wore down the cohesion of Christian consciousness in the movement. The "tribal" identities were maintained on the insistence of government in The North and this was experienced through political and administrative pressures on the leadership. This greatly affected the organization of the MZL and initially reduced its impact on the targetted population for political mobilization. As it will become apparent in the

discussions below, "tribal" identities created factions and a lack of cohesion in the MZL movement in the period between 1952 and 1956. Among other causal factors however as from March, 1950, the controversy with the administration in The North, caused leaders of the MZL to demand the creation of a Middle Zone Region, separated from the Islamic society: "since Christians in The North were not free to express Christian sentiments in a Moslem dominated Region"²¹. Although this development indicates the genesis of the demand for the creation of a Region in The North as a unit of the Nigerian Federation the organization of the MZL movement was initially and explicitly aimed to achieve the political mobilization of Christians and non-Moslems to contest with Moslems in the election of Christians into the NHA in the 1951 elections. In other words, the aims and objectives of the NML movement did not initially change with the change of political label to become the MZL. There was also however another underlying intention in the development of the NML to become the MZL which centred on the organization of Christians in the same political sense that Moslems had made formations to be in the majority support for the NPC and NEPU in The North²². Furthermore, in the early 1950s there were strong northern desires, mainly expressed by leadership of the Islamic society in the NPC to pull out The North from the evolving Nigerian Federation²³. The Christian leaders in the MZL were prepared to organize in order to halt this tendency that was developing among Islamic politicians in The North²⁴. This suggests that the strength of the Northern Identity which had roots in the Islamic society in that period and which produced northern separatist tendencies had the unintended consequence of activating M-Belt separatism from the Islamic society in The North, a cause that was championed by European educated Christians in the M-Belt areas. The support that was subsequently given to the ideas on the creation of a Middle-Zone-Region and the Middle-Belt Region from specific areas, revealed the extent to which religious identities corresponded with the geographical

location and identity of the M-Belt Movement in the religious bi-polarity of politics in The North in the period between 1950 and 1960. The groups and societies that gave their political support for the Middle-Zone and the M-Belt Region, for example, were Christians and non-Moslems, who were concentrated to the south and south-eastern parts of the Islamic society in The North. These were also the areas, where European Christian Missionary activities in The North were more successful in producing a European educated elite and had consolidated Christian churches and leadership before 1950²⁵.

In the March 1950 elections into the executive posts of the MZL movement, however, there was a virtual retention of the previous NML leadership with no one as yet in political positions from Benue Province. Thus Pastor David Lot (Sura) became President, Moses Nyam Rwang (Biom) became Vice-President, Secretary-General and Treasurer, Jonah Assaduga (Bachama) was Field-Secretary, Bala Yerima (Kilba - Adamawa) was also Field-Secretary and Publicity-Officer²⁶. In the previous executive of the NML movement, however, Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang had jointly held the post of President in addition to Nyam Rwang being the Treasurer of the movement²⁷. A source of conflict from this arrangement among the leadership was centred on the combination of these executive positions by one individual. One such conflict developed from the fact that Moses Nyam Rwang was given about six hundred pounds to pay rents on MZL headquarters at Bukuru and subsequently to build permanent building structures as headquarters for the party organization in the same town from the funds²⁸. Early in 1951, just when the MZL was consolidating its party structure and organizational form to contest the 1951/52 elections it was faced with crisis within the executive. The crisis centred on the mismanagement of the £600.00 by one of its members, Moses Nyam Rwang. It has been suggested that Nyam Rwang used the funds entrusted to him to hire his personal houses for both the NML and the MZL temporary headquarters²⁹. Furthermore when the

permanent buildings were erected for MZL headquarters through contracts that were personally awarded by Nyam Rwang, the other executive members alleged he had embezzled the money and produced sub-standard buildings: "not worth the value of money he had been given"³⁰. It was from this crisis that Nyam Rwang developed animosity toward the organization of the MZL movement and became increasingly distanced from the rest of the MZL executive which culminated into his total exclusion from the subsequent meetings of the movement that were held at Kagoro, Jos, Kafanchan, Bukuru, Minna, Ilorin as well as Lafia in anticipation of the 1951 elections³¹. Furthermore, it was this crisis that conditioned a permanent personality clash with difficulties of cooperation between Rwang and Lot who eventually claimed to be both Presidents of the MZL movement and for Rwang to organize the Middle Belt Peoples Party (MBPP), all with the ostensible goal of the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North³².

Although cash donations given to the MZL caused problems of unity and factionalism within the leadership of the movement, the political goals of the different factions remained unaltered in context of the objective for the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North. Indeed the sources of the funding remained fairly broad based and constant, sufficiently for political support to persist for the different groups to achieve political mobilization of some of the M-Belt groups and societies. The major sources of the MZL funds albeit the factions that developed, came from sales of party membership cards, different christian missionary lump-sum donations, particularly the Protestant Missionary Bodies (SIM and SUM³³. There were also personal individual donations who were either wealthy Yoruba or Ibo, who had made their wealth from the Tin Mines Fields and held sympathies for the social and political cause of the MZL movement. One such individual for example was Churchill Menta, a Warriman from the Delta areas of the former Western Region of Nigeria and who belonged to the Mid-Western State Movement contesting, in that Region³⁴, the creation of a Mid-Western State.

Churchill Menta also owned a private Tin Mining company in Jos³⁵.

As earlier mentioned, the change of political label, for the essentially Christian movement, the NML to become MZL, had come about largely because it was contested and rejected by the government of British administration in the North. Analytically however, although "Middle-Zone" was accepted in the sense that it was more of a geographical rather than a political category to evoke emotional attachment for party loyalty, none of the leadership in the MZL movement was particularly worried on the government pressures to change. The explanation for the situation was aptly summarized in the words of Jonah Assadugu who suggested that this was so"because we knew who we were ... and where we were to be found ... and what our interests were ... what was wrong with the matter if they wanted us to have a different name from being a Non-Moslem League?!"³⁶. Pastor David Lot however suggests that Ibo and Yoruba friends on the Tin-Mines fields near Jos and who held sympathies for the socio-economic and political problems faced by the groups and societies in S.Zaria, S.Banchi and Plateau urged them to replace the name NML with the MZL³⁷. This suggestion was based on the assumption that most of the non-Islamic groups and societies found in The North were geographically concentrated in a "Middle-Zone" of Nigeria and sandwiched with Islamic populations in territories to the north and the rest of Nigeria to the south. The obvious attribute to Ibo and Yoruba suggestions of the name "Middle-Zone" League to replace the NML reflects the initial NCNC and AG political interests to influence anti-Islamic political movements that were rapidly developing as political forces in the M-Belt areas. This was in context of the dominant position of the NPC party which Southern Nigerian based political parties sought to counter. It cannot therefore be assumed that it was political friendship and sympathies in a vacuum without specific political interests³⁸. Whatever was the nature and origins of the name, MZL, by the end of 1951 and with the outcome of the 1952 elections, the leadership,

followers and supporters of the MZL movement agreed to belong to one common front in the Houses of Assembly³⁹. The common front was meant to be a continuity of the religious and socio-political identity already established by the NML which it was hoped will bolster the demands of the MZL for the creation of a Middle-Zone Region, separated from the Islamic Society in The North⁴⁰. This was the basic contention, since each of the elected members contested the elections on different "tribal" identities which in some instances were constituencies, from which they made their entries into the NHA in Kaduna and the FHR in Lagos rather than on the support and sponsorship of the MZL. The social and political leadership of MZL which found entry into the NHA and the FHR in 1952 were six in number and came mainly from Tangale Waje in S.Banchi, Plateau and S.Zaria. Dudley however suggests that the MZL with its affiliates won about twelve seats in the 1951 elections even when it was the case that they were won by people who contested the electors as members of one particular ("tribal") union or the other⁴¹. This figure is rather high and misleading for the MZL and its territorial spread of support in 1952 because it takes account of Tiv members from Benne Province as well as members from Kabba and Ilorin who were christians but only remotely connected and unaware of the activities of the MZL at that time. It was only after 1952 when the NHA met that the Moslem majority in the NPC conditioned the awareness of the Tiv, Kabba and Ilorin members to the MZL struggle⁴².

The MZL leadership that was elected from the NHA into the FHR in Lagos included Pastor David Lot who was sura and Michael Audu Buba, a Catholic in religious identity, who was from the Ankwei tribe, both persons from Pankshin Division on the Plateau⁴³. It also included sympathetic individuals to the socio-economic and political problems existing in S. Bauchi, like Yakubu Wanka, who was a close associate of Azi Nyako - the pan-Jarawa leader, although Wanka himself was never associated with any phase of the M-Belt movement. Unlike Pastor David Lot who was President of the MZL,

Michael Audu Buba was however not committed to the ideas of the MZL, although from time to time he expressed political sympathy for the cause of the movement⁴⁴. The MZL leaders elected into the NHA included Pastor David Lot, Sura from Pankshin Division in Plateau, Moses Nyam Rwang, Birom from Jos Division also in Plateau, Patrick Fom, Birom and a coopted member of the MZL executive from Jos Division on the Plateau, Anta Ninzam, from Ninzam, at that time S.Zaria was still with Plateau Province⁴⁵. Others elected into the NHA and who held sympathies for the MZL movement and party without political commitment to its ideas and objectives included Yakubu Wanka, Banchi and Michael Andu Buba, an Ankwei from Pankshin Division in Plateau Province⁴⁶. This suggests that the initial struggle by the MZL for the Middle-Zone Region subsequently to be the struggle for the M-Belt Region in the period between 1952 and 1954 was essentially focussed on Adamawa, particularly in the Numan areas, S.Bauchi, Plateau and S.Zaria. Furthermore, a close examination of most of the leadership of the MZL who won elections into the Legislative Houses in Nigeria in 1952 shows that it was very much a Plateau affair. All the five members of the NHA from Plateau in 1952 were Christians, indigenous to their constituencies with a high degree of political consciousness which transcended the numerous Plateau "tribal" boundaries and which was in the specific context of the Christian religious identity⁴⁷. This situation on the Plateau contrasts sharply with the political situation in Benue Province. The Tiv for example voted in all the eight members for Benue Province into the NHA at Kaduna and three of these gained seats in the FHR in Lagos in 1952⁴⁸. In the early 1950s until about 1954, members of the TPU, the "tribal" organization which produced political leadership in Tivland and who subsequently became members of the NHA and the FHR some were affiliated to the NCNC and the majority to the NPC⁴⁹. In that period also, the ideas of the NML and the MZL in its demand for the creation of a separate region from the Islamic society in The North had not yet filtered down to the Tiv group and

society⁵⁰. Indeed in 1951, organized political parties beyond the TPU had nothing to do with the elections of Tiv members into the NHA and the FHR, as was the case generally with most of the other M-Belt groups and societies, except for the Idoma who were evidently affiliated to NEPU through the IHRU but lost the elections, largely due to their own schisms and Tiv solidarity⁵¹. Similarly in 1951, the situation in Ilorin and Kabba area contrasted with the political mood of on the one hand that in Benue Province and on the other that in Plateau, S.Zaria and S.Bauchi. In Ilorin for example, although the members elected into the NHA in aKaduna and subsequently the FHR in Lagos were NPC, with increased tempo in the activities of the AG after 1954, the ITP party became sponsored to advocate for the ideas of Yoruba Unity for a merger with the then Western Region of Nigeria⁵². These irredentist feelings dating from 1948, were to continue into the run-up for the 1959 elections in Nigeria⁵³. After 1954 therefore there existed clear indicators which suggested that the M-Belt Movement in its phase as the MZL and Yoruba sympathies and support from Kabba and Ilorin might part ways. This was so in the sense that irredentism was quite a different political phenomenon from the demands for political constitution into a separate region (the Middle-Zone-Region) from the Islamic society in The North as a unit of the Nigerian federation which was the issue being advocated and in the objectives of the MZL. Yoruba irredentism in itself served to defeat the very conception of a Middle-Zone-Region since it advocated a merger with the Western Region rather than an autonomous unit. This was unlike the case with the demands of the M-Belt movements.

Although the leadership in the MZL had agreed to the "tribal" formula of representation insisted upon by the government of British administration in The North for the contest of the 1951/52 elections, those of them that gained entry into the NHA, organized to form a common front under the leadership of Pastor David Lot in that Assembly⁵⁴. Their objectives were to

press for equality for all groups and societies and for Christian freedom of expression and organization in The North⁵⁵. They also agreed to have "one voice" in the discussion of issues, both inside and outside the NHA, surrounding the demands for the creation of a Middle-Zone-Region⁵⁶. One consequence from this political development and the strategy of the MZL front in the NHA was that their political activity became restricted to the issues raised in the Assembly which they perceived to affect them rather than raising specific issues themselves. It took, for example, over five years (1951-1956) for leadership of the M-Belt movement from its phase as the MZL and subsequently the UMBC, to raise the issue of the creation of a M-Belt Region in a motion on the floor of the NHA⁵⁷. Even when this was the case the motion was not raised by any of the UMBC leadership in the NHA but by Ibrahim Imam from Bornu⁵⁸. Indeed Ibrahim Imam himself wanted to withdraw the motion under circumstances that may be described as suspicious political manipulations⁵⁹.

However, once the leadership of the MZL movement was outside parliament although the executive still met from time to time, their members usually went back to their different "tribal" constituencies in the very nature of the politics of parliamentarians with constituency support⁶⁰. This weakened support for the MZL movement at the grassroots level because "tribal" identification of the leadership in the NHA began to overtake the religious identification of being Christian and non-Moslem or persons practising traditional African systems of beliefs and worship. Furthermore the executive members became increasingly detached from each other because their contact depended on when the NHA in Kaduna met for their meetings as leaders of the MZL to also take place⁶¹. In essence however, while in the NHA, the members of the MZL made efforts to raise the grievances and problems which affected the generality of the M-Belt groups and societies⁶².

Another factor that weakened the MZL front in the NHA was the

attention its members gave to "tribal" and provincial identities in the demands for the distribution of socio-economic and welfare infrastructure and amenities for development. As earlier suggested, only a few of the MZL leadership raised issues on the needs for roads, hospitals and schools etc. on an overall basis of the development that might affect all of the M-Belt groups and societies on a comparative level to the Islamic society in the period between 1952 and 1956 in the NHA. In that period, the task almost entirely fell on Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Fom, who used the Plateau indicators of under development to suggest that they equally applied to all of the M-Belt areas⁶³. This contrasted rather sharply with what other members of the NHA from Plateau, Benue, Kabba and Ilorin (if at all these last two areas are considered to represent M-Belt sentiments) who before 1956 argued that the M-Belt people and areas were developed proportionate: "... to the rest of the people of The North"⁶⁴. While Ahman Pategi (Member, Ilorin Province) for example suggested that the under development of the M-Belt areas was due to the unreasonable requests of the people of the area, for Benjamin Akija (Member, Benue Province), the areas were not rich enough to maintain a road network and least of all, sufficiently developed to become a state and therefore must look up to the Government of The North; in a similar vein, for George Ohikere (Member Kabba Province), the development of every part of The North cannot take place simultaneously for the M-Belt areas to be developed and even:

".. When we get that Middle Belt Region, would there be no criticism? ... If one asks any of these politicians who preach such idealism (on the creation of a M-Belt Region) one will get the answer - no development. Whose fault is it when there are four Ministers from the Middle Belt in the Executive Council and when there are representatives from all sections of the people in this House and when the present Government is so pliable as to make such arrangements to allow every particular area a council or something that is peculiar to their own way of living or custom? If there is no development why not ask in this House or bring

a motion?⁶⁵

It is however quite instructive to note that even within the MZL leadership, in the period between 1951 and 1956, there was strong attachment to the Northern Identity, even when it was the case that they sought for separation from the Islamic society. All the opposition elements to the Government of The North before 1956, who were in the MZL and the UMBC as well as other members in the NHA from the M-Belt areas acknowledged that they were Northerners and had the indigenous right to demand from the government what other Northerners whom they represented required⁶⁶.

Finally another factor which weakened the MZL and created factions within the movement when the demand for the creation of a Middle Zone Region was echoed in 1952 was the categorization of the leadership into two types: Responsible and Irresponsible, by both British officials and NPC leadership in the government of The North⁶⁷. NHA members and individuals who were outside the Assembly and who were rhetorical and politically articulate as well as committed to the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region were classed as irresponsible and actually scorned with laughter in the NHA when making their points in debates, while MZL and UMBC leaders who were concerned with their "tribal", Provincial and Northern interests were termed responsible, listened to and applauded in their rhetorics in the NHA⁶⁸. This situation was very contributive to the premise from which patron-client political relationships were developed in the period between 1952 and 1956 between the NPC leadership and some of the leadership of the M-Belt Movement as well as with other members of the NHA who expressed sympathies toward the ideas of the creation of a M-Belt Region. Such persons included Pastor David Lot, George Ohikere, Haruna Dauda Kwoi, P.C. Okpanachi, Michael Audu Buba, who gained acceptance over other M-Belt politicians in the NHA before the eyes of the Administration in The North. Within the ranks of the M-Belt leadership, however, when it was in its phase as the MZL, Pastor David Lot was singled out as responsible while

Patrick Fom, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu, who was outside the NHA, were persistently termed as irresponsible⁶⁹. One outcome of a situation like that was the development of severe jealousies, accusations and factions within the MZL leadership, not only within the NHA but also these found their way to the press and also at the different meetings that were held to seek for ways to create unity within the movement, which culminated in the formation of the UMBC in 1956. Furthermore, the recriminations caused some members of the MZL leadership like Pastor David Lot to loose commitment to the causes and ideas of the creation of a M-Belt Region; while to others like Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Patrick Fom there was the impetus for new organizational forms to handle the struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region. Indeed, when the MZL movement was organized in 1950, Pastor David Lot advocated a policy for the party to struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region before 1956⁷⁰. In 1954 and 1956 when he was Minister without Portfolio in the NPC government in The North his position completely changed when he argued:

"... My people are not ready for a separate region now ... (because) It is the policy of the government to give almost complete autonomy to the Provinces. This will give each Province an opportunity to look after its own interests and progress at its own speed. Until this new idea is tried, the creation of a new region is unnecessary ... we shall continue to work under the present constitutional arrangements until it becomes necessary to have a region of our own ..."⁷¹.

The general situation of tension and the laxity in commitment for the idea of the creation of a M-Belt Region within the leadership of the MZL movement, dating from 1952 became compounded by the wide publicity in the press and ridicule in the NHA suffered by Moses Nyam Rwang, who had been accused of embezzling funds that were meant for the building of permanent headquarters at Bukuru for the MZL⁷². It was against this background that another MZL meeting, wider in scope of participation and territorial

representation than previous ones, was convened at Kagoro in December, 1952⁷³. Among other things, the meeting was meant to resolve the tensions that had developed within the MZL leadership, to discuss the need for expanding its support base beyond Adamawa, S.Bauchi, Plateau and S.Zaria and also to seek the inclusion of Benue Province as well as the support of Christians and non-Islamic leadership in Kabba and Ilorin but not necessarily for inclusion in a M-Belt Region⁷⁴.

The December 1952 general meeting, which was termed conference of the MZL movement at Kagoro, brought essentially Christian leadership and European-Christian educated representatives from Adamawa, S.Bauchi, Plateau, S.Zaria, Benue, Kabba and Ilorin⁷⁵. This conference was in essence the first full-blown general meeting of representatives from the majority of the minority groups and societies of all the M-Belt areas. According to M.G. Smith, while the first Kagoro meeting, which inaugurated the MZL movement brought together delegates from "ninety eight pagan tribes", the second conference in the same Christian Missionary Station drew an even larger attendance⁷⁶. Many of the delegates were new faces, younger and more educated than the war-horses of the NML and the MZL itself⁷⁷. Prominent among the new and younger more educated faces who were to become active and committed in propagating the ideas for the creation of a M-Belt Region were Bello Ijumu (an Igbirra from Kabba), Josiah Olawoyin (a Yoruba from Ilorin), Patrick Dokotri (a Birom from Plateau), Isaac Kpum (a Tiv from Benue), Dauda Kwoi (a Kaje from S.Zaria and a special member in the NHA) and Azi Nyako (a Jarawa from S.Banchi)⁷⁸. It was this broad based representativeness in the delegates from among most of the M-Belt groups and societies as well as other minorities in The North that there was a shift from the main objectives of the Kagoro meeting, which was meant to reduce tensions within the MZL leadership, to an initial emphasis at the opening of the beginning of the conference, that among other things, there ought to be the election of new officers for the movement before other

issues were discussed⁷⁹. This initial emphasis on the election of a new executive at the Kagoro meeting may however be attributed to the specific contents of the tensions that existed between Pastor David Lot, the President of the MZL and Moses Nyam Rwang, the Secretary-General of the Movement and also Vice-President. Although the chief of Kagoro Mallam Gwamna attended the conference and made efforts to resolve the tensions between Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang, their tempers were deep seated and much too complex for a settlement, particularly so when Lot insisted that Rwang must make refunds of the money that was given to him to build the MZL headquarters at Bukuru⁸⁰. It was against this background that elections were held at the Kagoro meeting to establish the new executive. Moses Nyam Rwang was the only MZL leader who was voted out of his post as General Secretary and Treasurer as well as losing the post of Vice-President⁸¹. In fact the post of Vice-President in the MZL movement was abolished at the Kagoro meeting. The other members of the previous MZL executive maintained their posts, although certain positions of responsibilities were combined by some of the executive members. Thus, for example, Pastor David Lot was re-elected as President, Jonah Assadugu became General-Secretary as well as Field-Secretary, Bala Yerima was elected Treasurer and Chief-Publicity Secretary⁸². Other elected positions were Deputies of Publicity and these were on a representative basis from the zoned non-Islamic communities of the M-Belt groups and societies such as Benue, S.Bauchi, S.Zaria, Adamawa, Plateau, Ilorin and Kabba. The Deputies of Publicity were entrusted with propagating and selling the ideas of the creation of a M-Belt Region to "tribal" union movements and people at the grassroots level⁸³. These included Gayos Gilima for Adamawa, Azi Nyako for S.Bauchi, Patrick Dokotri for Jos Division, Isaac Kpum for the Tiv areas, Bello Ijumu for Kabba Province and Josiah Olawoyin for Ilorin areas⁸⁴.

Although the structure of the new executive temporarily stabilized the

MZL movement, one detrimental development that resulted from the Kagoro conference was the stormy tensions with bitter recriminations, delegates witnessed and the political intrigue which both the executive and those outside it, deployed in lobbying the new entrants into the movement. Moses Nyam Rwang, for example, publicly castigated Pastor David Lot as an extortionist religious Minister, incompetent and loosing grip with the spirit and tempo of the MZL movement and the demand for a M-Belt Region⁸⁵. Furthermore, Rwang threatened (a threat that subsequently became translated into reality in 1954) to organize a new political movement to struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region, since it had become impossible to belong to the same camp with Pastor David Lot⁸⁶. He claimed to have already gained the support of new entrants into the M-Belt Movement; among others, like Bello Ijumu, Isaac Kpum and Josiah Olawoyin, whom he claimed were prepared to work hand in hand with him⁸⁷. It ought to be borne in mind that these three newly elected Deputies of Publicity for the MZL were either associated with the AG or the NCNC and were already very active in local politics before 1952. Their entry into MZL in 1952 prepared the way for the initial political affiliations of the MBPP, which Rwang subsequently organized in March, 1954, to the NCNC, the MBSP to which he belonged to, also in 1954 and which was affiliated to the AG, until it became the UMBPP and the MBC of 1955 which urshured in the UMBC in 1956 and the UMBC-AG alliance of 1957.

After December, 1952, the M-Belt movement in its phase as the MZL party remained alive only in the rhetorics of politicians to the press when they gave accounts of the leadership crisis that took place during the Kagoro meeting⁸⁸. It virtually ceased to be politically active on a common front in the NHA⁸⁹ and was increasingly failing in creating any organized political impact on society in The North by mobilizing its targeted population to gain support for the causes of the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region⁹⁰. In the period between 1952 and 1955, each of the rival

movements that developed from the Kagoro conference gave conflicting accounts of the points of disagreement on the Lot-Rwang problem, the formation of a new executive without Rwang and the political threat by Rwang to organize a new movement with the same goals as the MZL. This was the premise from which the Nigerian Citizen rushed into print by calling the whole M-Belt Movement and its ideas for the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North a movement as a conception of confused and irresponsible politicians⁹¹. Although most of the leadership knew that the political vigour of the MZL movement declined with the kagoro meeting, the ideas of the creation of a M-Belt Region for Christian and non-Islamic communities in the North spread wider than before. Both the NML and the MZL movements had previously concentrated their political activities on the rather narrow and less populated confines of Plateau, Adamawa, S.Zaria and S.Bauchi. Indeed, it was Isaac Kpum, one of the new entrants into the M-Belt Movement in 1952, who subsequently "imported" the ideas of a M-Belt Movement to the European educated in the TPU and the Tiv people, a group and society that was to be the main instrument in maintaining the vigour of the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, until 1967 when states were created as more units of the Nigerian Federation⁹².

One of the outstanding achievements of the MZL movement however, was that it had so achieved sufficient organizational form by 1952 that it brought in many of the representatives of Christian and non-Moslem Communities that were affected by the socio-economic and political grievances previously articulated by the "tribal" unions to a common discussion forum, even when it was the case that the new entrants into the movement also witnessed severe factionalism and a lack of cohesion, afflicting the leadership of an organization they had held great hopes of for their liberation. The factional tendencies that were developed and became manifested at the MZL conference at Kagoro, did not, however, discourage the spread of the ideas for the creation of a M-Belt Region

among the new entrants into the Movement. Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Dokotri, for example, constantly met with Martin Achihiya Abuul in Jos, who was a Tiv man and son of the great Chief Abuul of Ukan and encouraged him to spread the ideas for the creation of a M-Belt Region in Benne Province, particularly among the Tiv group and society so that the movement gains a wider geographical spread of support and strength of population⁹³. The Tiv people were easily the most numerous in population size when compared to other non-Islamic "tribes" of the M-Belt areas and as early as in 1938, they had organized a "tribal" union movement which was effecting political development of the area⁹⁴. Besides the numerical strength of population the Tiv were expected to produce for the M-Belt Movement, their support was crucial in terms of what both Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Dokotri described as "the Tiv-Character" which contained elements of a determined commitment until the objective was achieved, no matter the odds⁹⁵.

However, after the Kagoro Conference in December 1952, Nyam Rwang at first sought solace by concentrating his time on the political activities of BPU and on the politically oriented electoral activities of the Birom Tribal Party (BTP) under the leadership of Patrick Dokotri who was President. As members of the NHA, Nyam Rwang and Patrick Fom became the spokesmen of the BTP in the Assembly and raised issues that concerned the problems created on agricultural land by tin mining companies on the Jos Plateau⁹⁶. Besides this preoccupation with local political commitments, Nyam Rwang also spent most of 1953 in travelling extensively and these took him to Numan, Yola, Fobur, Minna, Kagoro, Kafanchan, Makurdi, Kabba, Ilorin and Okene⁹⁷. Obviously from the trend of subsequent events and political group formations, this was also the time he used to organize support to create the MBPP in March 1954, with the objective of struggling for the creation of a M-Belt Region. This was particularly so because in 1953, the existing leadership of what remained of the MZL movement, resolved upon a policy of cooperation with the government in The North and entered into an

alliance with the NPC party⁹⁸. This suggests that Nyam Rwang interpreted the new policy of the MZL movement under Pastor David Lot and the negotiated alliance with the NPC party, as having reached a dead end in the struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region. Early in 1954, the M-Belt political movements were in the news all over again, with the announcements that Moses Nyam Rwang with the support of Bello Ijumu (an Igbirra from Kabba Province and the first General Secretary of NEPU), and E.G. Gundu (a NCNC Tiv MP in the NHA from Benue Province and one of the founders of the TPU and who became President of the new party) had organized a new party which they called the Middle Belt Peoples Party (MBPP)⁹⁹. The ostensible objective of the MBPP was to disassociate itself from the MZL because it felt betrayed and to continue the struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region, separated from the Islamic society in The North¹⁰⁰. This development came at a time when the MZL movement had barely recuperated from the factional tendencies which affected its previous leadership at the Kagoro conference of 1952 and was only beginning to settle-down into its new alliance and cooperation policy with the NPC party and government of The North. With this development also, the MZL movement under Pastor David Lot never picked up any substantial support from most of the M-Belt groups and societies. Indeed it became narrowed and only enjoyed half-hearted support from Jos Division, S.Zaria, S.Bauchi and sections of the non-Islamic communities outside Numan and Adamawa Province¹⁰¹. The bulk of its political support came from Pankshin, Shendam and Adamawa, particularly centred in the Numan Federation¹⁰². In the period between 1954 and 1956, another factor that further eroded the popularity and political support of the MZL was the constant defections of the leadership which shuffled between the MZL and the MBPP as well as some of its leaderships solid confinement of their activities within the "tribal" union movements with claims of individual "tribes" that they represented the struggle for the M-Belt Region. This was the case, for example, with Patrick Fom, Moses Nyam

Rwang and Patrick Dokotri in the BTP, although in reality they were engaged in mobilizing a conglomerate of support from the different "tribes" in Jos Division. Despite the unsettling crisis of the MZL movement, with the older leadership factionalized into different camps, it never lost bearing of the initial objective of the need for the creation of a M-Belt Region. It however tenaciously kept to itself the prerogative of being the accredited representatives and spokesmen of the whole of the M-Belt groups and societies even when it was the case that it was slowly losing its positions and support as leaders to a younger, energetic and more educated generation, whom it had sponsored as Deputies of Publicity at the Kagoro meeting in 1952.

The MZL movement was however the political organization among the M-Belt groups and societies that set the tone of the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North. Despite its factions riddled leadership in the cause of organizing its demands on the system, in its development, it left for its successor organizations a functional secretariat headquarters at Bukuru near Jos. Although the leadership factionalized the objective was maintained. In one respect this was due to the encouraging political response of its expanded membership with a wider territorial spread, even when it was the case that the factions revealed how the leadership was itself dissatisfied with its reasons for commitment on the political strategy and the existing state of affairs in its organizational structure in mobilizing the targeted population to fulfil the objective of the creation of a Region for Christians and non-Moslems in The North. Furthermore, it was the MZL party that first successfully mobilized electoral support in 1951, to gain representation in the NHA in 1952 and to subsequently create political impact in that Assembly. This was particularly the case for the population and representation from Adamawa, S.Bauchi, S.Zaria and Plateau. Members of the MZL party in the NHA were able to raise issues that reflected the fears and grievances of other

non-Islamic communities in The North. In this instance also, government was for the first time made aware from the rhetorics on the very floor of the NHA of the desires and demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region which would include socio-religious and political minorities in The North. Furthermore, the insistence of the older leadership of the MZL to recruit into the M-Belt Movement, a much younger generation, as Deputies of Publicity, who were more educated and much more dynamic, indicated how the MZL movement responded to the challenging and changing circumstances of the Nigerian political arena, which required a lot of energy and enlightened educational skills to revamp a floundering political organization. Disappointing as it was in the end, because the initial leadership split, the MZL conference at Kagoro marked a turning point for the political recruitment of a new energetic generation of younger-men, more educated and much more broad-minded about the nature and real direction of the forces shaping the political events in Nigeria than were the previous generation of older leaders. The new generation was less thorough in outlook on the Christian practices. Essentially they were politicians with a religious oriented platform rather than Christendom in politics. It was this younger generation in the MZL that eventually took over the management and leadership of the M-Belt Movement, and not only did they vigorously contest for the creation of a M-Belt Region with government and the NPC party in the North, but they also took the issue to the national political arena in the Federal House of Representatives (FHR) in Lagos. More fundamental however, the Kagoro conference of the MZL, witnessed a shift in the committed support base of the movement, from the groups and societies on the higher planes of Plateau, S.Bauchi and Adamawa to the lower Southern parts of the M-Belt areas which included S.Zaria and subsequently the Benue valley among the Tiv, where it settled down under the leadership of J.S. Tarka and with political support from the Yoruba irredentist areas of Ilorin and Kabba Province. However, the southern lower parts of the M-Belt

areas, particularly Tiv country, did not assume political control and leadership of the M-Belt Movement until the MZL, the MBPP and the other numerous factions had resolved their political differences to become the UMBC in 1956 under the leadership of Joseph Tarka. In the period between 1954 and 1956, however, the M-Belt Movement in its phase as the MZL party witnessed its greatest political turmoil. This virtually drowned it as a force in politics in The North when the rival MBPP set about mobilizing the non-Islamic and Christian communities for political support, although it continued to exist until after 1956 and was finally eclipsed by the UMBC in 1957 when Pastor David Lot retired from active politics¹⁰³. Political mobilization by the MBPP in that period was meant to create cohesive support of the Christian and non-Islamic communities in the M-Belt areas for another set of elections into the FHR in Lagos in 1954 and the NHA in Kaduna in 1956. It also had the objective of intensifying the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region before the London constitutional conference that was expected to resolve the date for self-government in The North and the Independence of Nigeria.

The MBPP became an active phase of the M-Belt Movement in 1954 and was organized by Moses Nyam Rwang as a direct result of the controvercies and leadership problems which grew into the open after the MZL-Kagoro meeting of December, 1952 and from the political consequences of the MZL-alliance with the NPC party in 1953, an alliance that was entered into in the light of a new policy of cooperation with the government in The North by some of the leaders of the MZL¹⁰⁴. There has been some confusion and muddle of dates in the explanations of the growth and development of the M-Belt movements in their phases as the MZL to become the UMBC in the period between 1952 and 1956. This study attempts to correlate the sequences of the dates with the events that conditioned changes of organization in the movements as basis for correction. The confusion of the dates, however, largely arises from dating the threats which Nyam Rwang produced at the

Kagoro meeting of December, 1952 and to his wide travels for the series of meetings he organized in 1953 in anticipation of the formation of the MBPP rather than its actual date of take off. The inaccurate dates also have roots in previous researches which have explained the MBPP as a direct consequence of the clash between Lot and Rwang, without taking into account the political meaning that was given to the MZL-NPC alliance and the MZL policy of cooperation with government in The North which was shaped in 1953. It was only after the alliance had become clear in political terms and the 1954 elections were being anticipated for December of that year, that the MBPP assumed an organizational political structure after March, 1954¹⁰⁵.

The Middle Belt Peoples Party (MBPP, 1954), which developed to become the Middle Belt State Party (MBSP, 1955), and subsequently the United Middle Belt State Peoples Party (UMBSPP, 1955), and the Middle Belt Congress (MBC, 1955), were the shortest lived phases of the M-Belt Movement of all the previous political organizations of the Christian and non-Islamic communities in The North, before the advent of the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) in 1956. The UMBC was a formation of all these factional political parties which broke off from the MZL and eventually brought in the MZL party as well. In the whole of the Nigerian political arena, there has hardly been any political movement which exhibited as many factions and remained constantly under the shadow of factionalism as the M-Belt Movement. Yet it succeeded in coming together in unity with the objective of achieving its goals, managed to bring in even more other sub-tribal factions and groups within the M-Belt areas, as well as others, well outside its political interests. Some of these included the Benue Freedom Crusade (BFC), the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement (SZFM), the Middle Belt Democratic Party (MBDP) which was led by Malomo Babatunde and focussed on the Offa-Yorubas, the Katagum Peoples Union (KPU), which was rather curiously referred to in the NHA as "the Katagum Middle Belt

Movement" by Josiah Olawoyin and the Habe-Fulani Tribal Union (HFTU), sometimes referred to as the Habe-Fulani Peoples Party (HFPP)¹⁰⁶. All these political developments took place within a very short period of five years (1955 to 1960). Although the formation of the UMBC subsequently stabilized political unity and organization of the M-Belt movement after 1956, there were still factions and defections toward the NPC party in The North and toward Southern Nigerian based political parties (the AG and the NCNC). These developments were largely due to the political vigour of some of the "tribal" unions who attempted to superimpose their identities over that of the M-Belt Movement and as a result of their failure, they became political clients to the NPC in order to bargain for socio-economic and welfare amenities for their areas. This was so for the Idoma State Union, the Igbirra Tribal Union as well as the Birom Tribal Party when Bitrus Rwang Pam, the son to the Chief of Jos became its secretary in 1954¹⁰⁷. The politician who set into motion the factional tendencies which afflicted all the phases of the M-Belt Movement was Moses Nyam Rwang, who organized the MBPP in 1954 and who himself became a client of the NPC in 1959 in the vain hope of shaping the Chieftancy of Jos into the family dynasty of Moses Rwang Pam from the Birom village of Du¹⁰⁸.

Moses Nyam Rwang and his supporters who were previously in the MZL organized the MBPP in 1954 with the intentions of having a more dynamic political version of a movement with the initial goals of the MZL party for the M-Belt groups and societies¹⁰⁹. The MBPP was also meant to contrast the articulation of objectives and political strategy of the MZL group that was still under the leadership of Pastor David Lot and which had grown cold feet over the causes for the demand of the creation of a M-Belt Region¹¹⁰. The organization of the MBPP was also conditioned by the bitterness Moses Nyam Rwang felt over the political and personality clash with Pastor David Lot which was made worse by allegations of embezzlement of MZL funds. He also particularly believed that the Lot-group had lost the motivating

political momentum in the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region and a scape-goat (himself) had to be found to explain the loss, a view that was shared by many others, including Balla Yerima, Anta Hamza, Patrice Dokotri and Patrick Fom¹¹¹. These others, as much as it was the case that they belonged to different camps, they still had sympathy for the causes of the MZL and the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region. On several occasions in the period between 1954 and 1956, for example, Pastor David Lot was asked whether he had ceased to be a Minister of Religion in preference for a Minister of Politics in the House of Assembly (NHA)¹¹². Obviously, this was in reference to the motivating Christian religious force and identity, which was in the minority and concentrated in the M-Belt areas. Although the period between 1954 and 1956, Pastor David Lot was still widely regarded as the main spokesman and the driving force of the M-Belt Movement, the organizational growth and development of the MBPP under Moses Nyam Rwang in the end proved more fundamental in the processes that maintained the political persistence of the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region¹¹³.

The political support that was given to the MBPP initially came mainly from BPU and BTP as well as from numerous tribal unions in the heterogeneous area of Jos Division¹¹⁴. This support may be explained by the local sentiments attached to Moses Nyam Rwang as being "son of the soil" and the fact that he circulated more easily among the groups and societies in Jos Division more than any of his other distant colleagues (Assadugu and Lot in particular), rather than any new message he might have preached on the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region for Christians and non-Moslems in The North. This is so because the image of a Region (for Christians and non-Moslems on the Plateau in particular) was at that time already firmly rooted in the leadership of Pastor David Lot. The political activities and the ideas of Moses Nyam Rwang were however well received and given support in Benue, particularly among the Tiv, Kabba, Ilorin and subsequently those

ideas developed by the leaders with the alliance between the UMBC and the AG in 1957 (then under the leadership of Joseph Tarka). The M-Belt Movement also enjoyed support from the rather bizzare Katagum Peoples Union (KPU), the Habe-Fulani Peoples Party (HFPP) which became the Habe Tribal Party (HTP) under Ibrahim Dimis in 1957 as well as from the earlier organized Bornu Youth Movement (BYM) with Ibrahim Imam as Patron¹¹⁵. In that instance, while the HFPP advocated for either a separate Habe Division within Bauchi Province or the separation of the Southern districts of Bauchi from the rest of that emirate and their inclusion in the proposed M-Belt Region¹¹⁶, the BYM had a party policy which suggested the creation of a North Eastern Region in The North to comprise of Bornu, Adamawa, Bauchi and Plateau Provinces, excluding some of the core M-Belt areas like S.Zaria and Benue Province¹¹⁷. The creation of a North Eastern state, however, was certainly not what the M-Belt Movement was all about since it would have enclosed a dominant Islamic "tribal" group and society, the Kanuri in particular and would have taken along with it, numerous Christian and non-Islamic minority "tribes" as well as excluding the Tiv in Benue and S.Zaria, even when it was the case that aggrieved and vocal agitators for the political division of The North were included in the proposed Region, from Adamawa, S.Bauchi and Plateau.

For the coordination of its political activities as from 1954, the MBPP used the BPU and BTP headquarters at Bukuru as a secretariat¹¹⁸. This shows how closely associated, the MBPP movement was to the Birom political leadership in the BPU and BTP and to that group and society in general. The Birom were the numerically dominant group and society in Jos Division and in most instances shaped the nature of political influence on other minority groups in the area. The MBPP headquarters were however shifted to Jos in the same year and stayed there until in 1956, when the UMBC occupied the buildings as headquarters after the numerous factions of the M-Belt movement became united under the leadership of Joseph Tarka¹¹⁹. The UMBC

headquarters were however very much unsettled in one place after 1958 and were moved from one house to the other of the leadership, because the NPC government, through the NPC controlled Jos NA revoked the rights to use the buildings since the party (UMBC) had not processed its Certificate of Occupancy (C. of O.) - one of the many strategies the NPC employed to incapacitate the political activities of the UMBC. The MZL party secretariat, however, remained at its headquarters in Bukuru and its political activities were mainly confined to Plateau Province, except for Jos Division where there was ambivalent support¹²⁰. In Adamawa, Jonah Assadugu with some of the elected Deputies of Publicity from that area, as well as with the different leaders of the non-Islamic, but essentially Christian "tribal" unions, maintained an almost independent M-Belt Movement with the banner of the MZL, although they were still sentimentally and emotionally attached to the MBPP and the leadership of Pastor David Lot¹²¹. The Adamawa, group under the leadership of Jonah Assadugu therefore never associated itself with the Katagum union, which was NEPU and the Habe-Fulani unions under Ibrahim Dimis even though it maintained some political links with the AG¹²².

The first organized meeting of the MBPP with individuals who had broken off from the MZL party took place in Ilorin in July, 1954 under the protem-Chairmanship of Moses Nyam Rwang as the co-ordinating leader of the new party¹²³. Although the news had circulated that a faction of the MZL party had organized itself into a new party as a result of political differences and financial misunderstandings among the leadership during the December 1952 meeting at Kagoro, it was not until the July 1954 meeting at Ilorin that the MBPP announced itself as a political party to contest elections into the FHR in Lagos and avowed itself to continue the struggle for the demand, until a M-Belt Region was created in The North¹²⁴. At that inaugural meeting, the objectives of the MBPP included: the unity and progress of the people of the M-Belt areas, the demand for the creation of

a separate M-Belt Region (state) from the Islamic society in The North with its House of Assembly and a House of Chiefs, agitate for self-government in or before 1956¹²⁵, oppose the NPC "Eight Point Programme" that called for the abolition of legislative and executive bodies at the centre and for the reorganization of Nigeria as a loose federation of autonomous regions¹²⁶, and support a Nigerian Federation with a strong central government to control the Regions¹²⁷. Coleman further adds that these objectives of the MBPP were identical to NEPU and NCNC aims. In other words, the MBPP had some political influences of the NEPU (in opposition in The North) and NCNC (the NEPU ally in Southern Nigeria). This suggested affiliation with NEPU and NCNC was however repudiated by the President of the MBPP¹²⁸.

At the Ilorin meeting in 1954 the party structure initially consisted of only three posts: The President was E.G. Abuul, the General Secretary was Moses Nyam Rwang and the Publicity Secretary, was Bello Ijumu¹²⁹. Before the elections in December, 1954, numerous other meetings of the MBPP were held at Jos, Minna, Lafia, Kafanchan and Kagoro and these were attended by some of the new entrants into the M-Belt Movement, most of whom were primary school teachers working for Christian Missionary Bodies in the rural, rather than urban environments¹³⁰. These meetings were meant to bring MBPP members to a common forum to discuss the approaching elections and the strategy to be followed for political mobilization¹³¹. As expected, the political leadership of the MZL party under Pastor David Lot was excluded from such meetings, as well as those individuals who had expressed ambivalent sentiments over an alliance with the NPC and support for the MBPP, like Patric Dokotri, Danda Kwoi, Balla Yerima and Auta Hamza¹³². Although no clear cut and permanent leadership surfaced from the MBPP movement for the M-Belt groups and societies, there was constant political cooperation between Gundu, Rwang and Ijumu who stood like a triumvirate of authority in the party. Within this authority however there were different perceptions of M-Belt political needs over who to best align with for the

1954 elections into the FHR in Lagos. While Moses Nyam Rwang (Biom from Jos Division) and E.G. Gundu (Tiv from Tiv Division) favoured an alliance with the NCNC, the latter having had his disillusionment with the NPC, Bello Ijumu (Igbirra from Kabba Province) who was increasingly coming under the influence of Josiah Olawoyin (Yoruba from Offa) favoured an alliance with the AG¹³³. It was also at about this time (1954) that the AG through Bello Ijumu and Josiah Olawoyin were systematically influencing Isaac Kpum and had in fact offered to him as well as to Kundu Swem the posts of Secretaries of the party in Tiv Division¹³⁴. It ought to be borne in mind, however, that most Tiv members in the NHA before 1956, joined the NPC after the 1951 elections and only Ayila Yough and E.G. Gundu, as well as the majority of the Tiv intelligentsia were attracted to the NCNC¹³⁵.

In the 1954 elections into the FHR in Lagos, even when the MBPP had not consolidated its support base, when compared to the MZL party, both parties fielded and won the elections from their different areas of strength¹³⁶. As much as the elected members had some M-Belt political sentiments, the outcome was based on ethnically oriented votes in support of a particular candidate that were anti-Islamic and directed at Hausa-Fulani over local issues, rather than unequivocal issues raised on the creation of a M-Belt Region or the socio-economic and welfare deprivation from the government in The North that affected the M-Belt groups and societies and to contest the electorate with the NPC party on such matters. Jos Division, where Patric Dokotri won the 1954 elections into the FHR in Lagos for example was based on BPU and BPT support¹³⁷. Jonah Assadugu, for another example, who won the 1954 elections from Numan Federation did so on purely anti-Fulani, anti-Islamic political feelings, what the Provincial Report for that year in Adamawa described as an election in which:

" ... Numan, still smarting from the insult of 1951, when the Provincial College elected five Fulani but no one from Numan ... Jonah Assadugu, on a straight local Middle Zone League ticket (which has little connection with the regional party policy) got in with no difficulty ... under his leadership the local Middle Zone League could either run the (Numan) Federation or break it ... "138.

In the specific context of the movements for the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North, however, the 1954 elections into the FHR were significant in the sense that both the MZL and the MBPP succeeded in standing behind two dynamic young men to the centre of political power in Nigeria. These were Joseph Tarka who won in Jemgba and Patrici Dokotri, who won in Jos Division; both men were to benefit from an experienced and older stalwart support of the M-Belt Movements in the person of Jonah Assadugu from Numan¹³⁹. In all, the M-Belt movements won a total of five seats to the FHR in Lagos in 1954, even though some of them were in alliance with the NPC party, all of them felt some sympathy for the political causes for the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region¹⁴⁰. In the 1954 elections the NPC won a majority of seats (79) whose numbers were increased by the alliance with the MZL party (2 seats), the Idoma State Union Party (2 seats), the Igbirra Tribal Union (1 seat) and subsequently from all the candidates who won four seats as independents of any other party¹⁴¹. The only reinforcing seat in the numbers in support of the M-Belt Movement in the 1954 elections came from the Ilorin areas where the AG won, but then, the support was only in principle since the area was Yoruba irredentist rather than for inclusion in the anticipated M-Belt Region¹⁴².

Although both the MZL and MBPP won some seats from the M-Belt areas in the 1954 elections, they still had grave dissatisfaction about their electoral performances, the state of their party strength from among the M-Belt groups and societies and in particular the MZL alliance that had been entered into with the NPC party, in which the NPC had emphasized the concept of "One North" in order to win the elections, rather than accept the M-Belt politicians on equal terms with Moslem politicians in the north. Jonah Assadugu, for example, suggests that contrary to the Ministerial power sharing and other political patronage posts among other things, between the NPC and the MZL, which had conditioned the alliance, Pastor David Lot was only given a Ministerial post without a portfolio while his close associate at that time, Patrick Dokotri was taken away from the arena of politics in both the north and the M-Belt areas to become a Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Minister of Land, Mines and Labour¹⁴³. It was against this background of the political developments affecting the leadership of the M-Belt movements as from 1954 that in the period between 10th June and August 1955 that there were negotiations to amalgamate and merge the MBPP and the MZL party into a common front in order to contest elections, particularly so with the 1956 elections into the NHA in mind, as well as to increase the unity of the struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region¹⁴⁴. Although the dates suggested by these authors (Post, Sklar, Dudley etc.) on the negotiations to reconcile and merge the MBPP and the MZL with each other, conflict, my own evidence on the dating, comes from the dates given by the M-Belt politicians in debates in the NHA and the FHR. From these sources, it is clear that 1955, after the 1954 elections, was the year in which there were attempts to unite the M-Belt parties into another common front of the M-Belt Movement. The political effort rather unfortunately, culminated in the November 1955 into reciprocal expulsions of the MBPP and the MZL leadership in Ilorin. Furthermore, 1955 was certainly not the year in which the UMBC was

organized under the leadership of Joseph Tarka as suggested by Sklar, Post and Dudley who have been widely quoted and the tendency has been to reinforce an inaccuracy¹⁴⁵. While there were moves to create unity in the M-Belt Movements by merging the MBPP and MZL as well as their affiliated "tribal" Unions into a common front, the NPC government in The North gave political appointments to Pastor David Lot and Patrick Dokotri.

Lot became a Minister without portfolio in the Northern Region Government and his close associate and second in command in the MZL Leadership, Patrick Dokotri, became a Parliamentary Secretary at a Ministry in the Federal Government. This development again created dissenting voices within the negotiation process which were aimed at uniting the MBPP and the MZL to become one political organization for the M-Belt groups and societies in The North. The negotiations however did not break down. In August, 1955, during the MBPP conference at Jos, a committee comprising the members of the MBPP and the MZL was formed to examine the question of merging both parties¹⁴⁶. In the same August, 1955, the two parties also agreed that the name of the new party, from the merger of the MBPP and the MZL was to be the Middle Belt Congress (MBC)¹⁴⁷. It ought to be borne in mind that before the political name of the M-Belt organization, United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), was in use, the MBPP developed to become the Middle Belt State Party (MBSP), then to United Middle Belt State Peoples Party (UMBSPP), and then to the rather elitist Middle Belt Congress (MBC), all under the political mechanization of Moses Nyam Rwang until the different factions, including the MZL party, united to become the UMBC in 1956 under the leadership of Joseph Tarka¹⁴⁸. However, through the persuasive efforts of Bello Ijumu, the various factions of the M-Belt movements agreed that a joint conference of the MZL and MBPP be held at Ilorin in the period between, 17th and 19th November, 1955¹⁴⁹.

In the period between 17th and 19th November, 1955 therefore, the executive members of the MBPP and the MZL party with their delegates

assembled in Ilorin. Although they agreed on a merger of the parties, the question of leadership and strategy to fulfil the creation of a M-Belt Region still remained a thorny issue in the organizational development of the M-Belt Movement.

As Coleman has observed this organizational development of the M-Belt Movement, reflected two initial stands that had grown as early as 1952 in the political orientation of the leadership:

"One leaning toward accommodation to and integration with the Muslim North and the other toward the creation of a separate Middle Belt Region as a means of undermining the traditional domination of the Fulani-Gida and the potential domination of the numerically superior Fulani-Hausa"¹⁵⁰.

In the instance, the NPC exploited the circumstances by dividing an otherwise cohesive movement and sought to encourage and establish an alliance with the integrationist wing - that is, the Pastor David Lot - faction of the M-Belt Movement. While NEPU with the assistance of the NCNC and subsequently the AG as well, endeavoured to work with the separatist wing under the leadership of Bello Ijemu and Moses Nyam Rwang and eventually under Joseph Tarka and Patrick Dokotri after 1956¹⁵¹. It was, however, from these premises that the M-Belt Movements, albeit the leadership and followers entered into the arena of national politics and as there was ever increasing involvement with elections and representative delegations to constitutional settlements, the M-Belt political leaders found themselves at the centre of a political tug of war, between the dominant Nigerian political parties - the NPC (in the north), the AG (in the west) and the NCNC (in the east). In 1957 they eventually settled down into a fairly stable alliance with the AG, until 1964, when they realigned themselves and organized into the Northern Progressive Front (NPF) jointly with NEPU¹⁵².

The meeting of Ilorin in November, 1955, did not go well for Pastor

David Lot. According to Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot was expelled from the coalition of the MBPP and the MZL party, a union which they suggested its name to be the United Middle Belt Congress Party¹⁵³. However, a different version of what happened at Ilorin during the meeting, suggests that after Pastor David Lot and his group had been persuaded that both the MZL and the MBPP were to give way to the UMBC and that fresh elections should take place into posts of the new organization and having been assured of maintaining leadership, he found himself voted-out¹⁵⁴. This was so, because of his stand on the NPC alliance and insistence on a policy of cooperation with the government of the NPC in The North which he argued as justified in order to protect The North from the increasing political influence of the AG, began firstly in the Ilorin areas and then into the core M-Belt areas of Plateau, Benue and S. Zaria¹⁵⁵. In the place of Pastor David Lot, as President of an organization in which he was seen as the spokesman of the M-Belt Movement, Moses Nyam Rwang became President, Jonah Assadugu was elected General- Secretary, although he saw the election as essentially that into the MBPP, a party label which he kept through 1956 until the 1959 elections despite the intermediate names of the M-Belt Movement such as the MBSP, the UMBSPP, the MBC and the all embracing organization, the UMBC¹⁵⁶. A new entrant into the executive of the M-Belt movement at the Ilorin meeting was Bello Ijumu who was elected as Publicity Secretary, previously a Deputy of Publicity in the MZL and Publicity Officer in the MBPP¹⁵⁷. The MZL leadership under Pastor David Lot and its delegates at the Ilorin conference however did not take kindly to this out-maneuvering which took place during the elections. Their delegates therefore called their leadership and followers into a different meeting in the same Ilorin arena of November, 1955, reinstated Pastor David Lot as President of the MZL with Balla Yerima and Dauda Kwoi maintained in their former positions in that party and also voted over-whelmingly in support of a motion which denounced Moses Nyam Rwang as President of the newly agreed

UMBC movement or any other subsequent party or faction in the M-Belt Movements¹⁵⁸. In other words, the MZL as a faction of the proposed UMBC took a position of non-compromise with any other composite movement of the M-Belt groups and societies in which Moses Nyam Rwang was leader or associated himself with. The Ilorin meeting however marked the decline of Moses Nyam Rwang from being active at the centre of political events in the M-Belt movement as he became systematically eclipsed by a more educated, dedicated and politically able to reconcile factions within the organization, such as Patrick Dokotri and Joseph Tarka. Although the Ilorin meeting of the MBPP and the MZL party in November, 1955, was meant to reconcile the two parties, existing as factions of the M-Belt Movement, both ended up giving reciprocal expulsions to each other and maintaining their previous political organizations, independent in policies and political identity¹⁵⁹. While the MZL saw itself as Northern Christians within context of religious tolerance in The North and therefore, did not wish to polarize the region on Christian - Moslem lines, but rather wished to cooperate with the NPC government that was anti- Southern Nigeria, the MBPP also saw itself as northern Christians as well, who shared a minorities status along with other non-Islamic cultural systems and who ought to be constituted into a separated "Northern Region" (M-Belt Region) from the Islamic Society as a unit of the Nigerian Federation. The leadership and followership of both parties saw themselves as northerners. The initial logic of this political position of the MBPP, on the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region, was that there were also two separate regions in Southern Nigeria and the North, too, ought to have two¹⁶⁰.

Despite the unintended consequence on the outcome of the Ilorin meeting, there were far reaching political influences that were gained and which resulted from the joint sessions of the different groups in the MBPP and the MZL. This was particularly the case from the presence of and participation of the more modern educated elements of the M-Belt groups and

societies, who were mostly equipped with modern occupational skills in status and who, therefore carried with them to their different areas the ideas for the creation of a M-Belt Region¹⁶¹. Another important source of political influence that developed from the Ilorin meeting in terms of the diffusion of the ideas on the M-Belt Region was in the Tiv - delegation which came with E. G. Gundu, Isaac Kpum and H. O. Abaagu¹⁶². H. O. Abaagu, however, subsequently went into alliance with the NCNC in 1958 and organized the Benue Freedom Crusade, even when he previously served as party manager as well as being the protem President of the UMBC¹⁶³. Abaagu, however, changed and turned to become NPC before the 1959 elections, contested the elections of that year but lost his deposit¹⁶⁴. This development, like many others within the leadership of the M-Belt movements, suggests that before the advent of J. S. Tarka in 1956, severe problems of committed leadership was a major impediment in the articulation of the demands for the creation of the M-Belt Region, rather than, that of a defined objective and the grievances on existing socio-economic and political problems affecting the non-Islamic communities, even when it was the case that most of the M-Belt groups and societies had become politically involved.

The Tiv group and society, however, effectively entered with their support and became politically involved in the M-Belt movements through the MBPP and particularly so only after the political developments from the November, 1955 Ilorin Conference, when the movements were still clouded with the problems of leadership and the strategy for the fulfillment of the creation of a M-Belt Region. In the period between 1950 and 1956, however, most Tiv politicians from the "tribal" base of support, the TPU, were either sympathetic to NPC or NCNC. Dent, for example, suggests that during the period, once Tiv members were elected they joined the NPC and only two radical ones (E. G. Gundu and Ayila Yough) joined the NCNC¹⁶⁵. The AG only began to influence Tiv political leadership in the TPU in 1954. Although

party political differences existed among Tiv members in the NHA, they always agreed to take a stand on an issue under debate. In March, 1956 for example, some of the Tiv members in the NHA were so ultra-NPC and pro-North that they opposed the motion on the creation of a M-Belt Region. This is explicit in the speech of Benjamin Akiga in the NHA in 1956:

"I rise to oppose this motion. Not only myself but all the members from Benue Province will oppose this motion. We the people of the Middle Belt - I personally was born in the Middle Belt - are not at all dissatisfied with the administration. We enjoy it. We get a fair share in proportion to the rest of the people of The North. We do not get everything but the same applies to every other part of the Northern Region. There is no reason for me to bring a Motion to divide the North and thus weaken this strong region. This question of separation of the Middle Belt from the rest of the Northern Region is just political talk"¹⁶⁶.

However, in the period between 1950 and 1960, subsequent Tiv political support for the NPC and the NCNC withered out with the years. This was so for the NPC because the party, through the Tiv NA, subjected and oppressed the Tiv in subordinate positions, as early as in the period when there was Hausa government messengers¹⁶⁷. In the instance of the NCNC, Tiv anxieties were centered on whether that party (dominated by Ibo and based in the heart of Iboland) had the capacity to protect their farm lands which Ibos from the Eastern Region:

".....were already nibbling industriously on their Southern borders and who would, they (the Tiv) were convinced, absorb them piecemeal if given a chance"¹⁶⁸.

It was for such economic reasons, which were interwoven into the socio-religious and political problems in the north, that the M-Belt movement found its most solid support among the Tiv, rather than the group aligning itself with either the NCNC or the NPC. Indeed, the Tiv were also

suspect of the NPC despite its policies of Northern inclusiveness and anti-southern Nigerian stands, because of a different kind of threat when the Tiv experienced economic pressures of competitions from the Hausa migrant population, particularly in the township of Makurdi¹⁶⁹.

In the particular period between 1952 and 1956, albeit before 1960 when the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region gained support among the Tiv, the NPC lost a life chance of bringing-in the Tiv into successful incorporation with the party through the European educated Tiv who might have build up support among the group and society, through giving the local leadership government patronage posts in Kaduna. In the general suspicion of the loyalty of the Tiv political leadership in the NHA, the NPC refused to give them any Ministerial position and to promote their political careers from which to consolidate their support in the area¹⁷⁰. While the Idoma, Igala and Jukun (Kwararafa), who were in the numerical minority as far as shaping the outcomes of elections are concerned in Benue Province, were given Ministerial representation in the Northern Executive Council, there was no Tiv leadership that was considered, despite their numerical strength¹⁷¹. The suspicious neglect of the Tiv, seems to have taken roots from the colonial period, during which time, the Tiv group and society was seen to be ungovernable and difficult to control in a working relationship because of their excessive independence of mind, action and in the words of Sharwood Smith: "fiercely individualistic in outlook", except when threatened by outside interference in their internal affairs do their activate their strong "tribal" consciousness and identity¹⁷².

It was against that background that the majority of the more educated Tiv, who were both inside and outside the NPC party converted in bulk through their leadership in the TPU to give their political support to the MBPP after November, 1955¹⁷³. The political appeal to the more educated classes among the M-Belt groups and societies that was developed by the MBPP was not however confined to the Tiv alone. Infact it was in the

general pattern of political development effecting change on most of the M-Belt areas after 1955. This contrasted rather sharply with the static political posture of the MZL party, whose appeal did not expand very much beyond a literate church following and leadership. The more educated elements in the MBPP who subsequently constituted the bed-rock of leadership in the UMBC did not constitute the core-leadership directing the movement until after 1956. When they gave their support to the MBPP, however, their political involvement only succeeded in making the M-Belt movement more articulate, more dynamic and radical in the reforms they demanded and their opposition to the NPC party and generally to the Islamic society in the North. The new entrants also assumed an uncompromising political position on the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region and produced a Middle Belt Anthem in anticipation of the region. It was the political thrust of one of these new entrants into the movement (Bello Ijumu), for example, that an Anthem for the M-Belt Region became produced which was circulated during the Ilorin meeting in 1955 and found its way to become widely taught to school children in the M-Belt areas¹⁷⁴, The Anthem emphasized the creation of a M-Belt Region which would be: "A Region like other Regions" in the Nigerian Federation¹⁷⁵.

Although the production of an M-Belt Anthem on the party platform of the MBPP suggests a more dynamic and "nationalistic" commitment to the ideas of an independent M-Belt Region, separated from the Islamic leadership and society in the North, the leadership of the MBPP was still interested to bring in the MZL in order to widen its territorial base of support. In that respect, despite the failure of the Ilorin meeting in November, 1955 efforts still continued, to reconcile the different factions of the M-Belt movement, particularly the MBPP and MZL, through the sole political efforts of Bello Ijumu¹⁷⁶. The issue of the need to merge both parties became even more pressing because of the coming 1956 elections. When these efforts were on, however, some of the executive members of both

the MBPP and the MZL, apparently were still inclined to cooperate with the Regional government and the dominant party, the NPC, in the North and wished to enter into an alliance¹⁷⁷. This was the case with E. G. Gundu, who had been protem - President of the MBPP and who joined Pastor David Lot and Patrick Dokotri who had accepted, in late 1955, political appointments in the Regional and Federal governments respectively¹⁷⁸. Thus late in 1955, the M-Belt movements through the MZL, entered into another formal alliance with the NPC party and this time with the assistance of E. G. Gundu in the MBPP and the TPU approved of the alliance¹⁷⁹. When this political move, became public knowledge, the General-Secretary of the MBPP, Moses Nyam Rwang and the Publicity-Secretary of the MBPP, Bello Ijumu, opposed the alliance and dissented to organize an opposition party which they called the Middle Belt State Party (MBSP)¹⁸⁰. The aims and objectives of the MBSP remained quite unchanged from those of the MBPP which Gundu attempted to moderate into the NPC party through Pastor David Lot and Patrick Dokotri. The MBSP, however, in addition, opposed any alliance with the AG to fit with the NPC opposition to southern Nigerian political involvement with opposition groups in the North¹⁸¹. The problems of the M-Belt Movement therefore remained perennially, those of leadership as well as political strategy to contest elections and to achieve more membership in the legislative houses to produce pressure for the creation of a M-Belt Region.

In another meeting at Ilorin in March, 1956, the new opposition party (MSBP) to the MZL and the MBPP, elected H. O. Abaagu (Tiv) as President, Abdul Ado Ibrahim (an Igbirra)¹⁸², as General Secretary, Bello Ijumu (Igbirra and former Secretary-General of the MBPP) as Publicity-Secretary and Jonah Assadugu (Bachama from Numan Division) as Field-Secretary¹⁸³. Moses Nyam Rwang himself was part of the executive as general coordinator of the political activities of the MBSP¹⁸⁴. All these political developments, factional as they were, point to the significant degree to which Tiv political leadership began to feature and shaped the directions

of the M-Belt movement after November, 1955. In both factions of the M-Belt movement outside the MZL, for example, Tiv were Presidents: E. G. Gundu (MBPP) and H. O. Abaagu (MSBP). Furthermore, E. G. Gundu, a Tiv, was the sole political influence that shaped the alliance of the MBPP with the MZL into the NPC early in 1956.

The dissent between the different factions of the M-Belt movements (MZL, MBPP and MBSP) in 1955, however, did not last long, before there were fresh efforts to reconcile the different groups into a common front in the specific interest of fielding candidates for the 1956 elections and representation for the May and June 1957 constitutional Conference in London. In the 1957 conference, however, Joseph S. Tarka was the UMBC sole representative, while Patrick Dokotri also UMBC but went to London as Chief-Advisor to the UMBC¹⁸⁵. Previously, the leadership in the M-Belt Movements was not given serious political attention in terms of representation and participation at the earlier Constitutional Conferences of the early 1950s, until the MZL party achieved some organization structure and created impact on the electorate and on the floor of the NHA, particularly so when it demanded the creation of a Middle-Zone-Region in the North in 1952. Even when it had created political impact in the North and effort was made to co-opt the leadership into the NPC, as was the case in the MZL-NPC alliance after 1952 and was given representation, non-Islamic leadership was subjected to intimidation and threats of being excluded from open participation in instances where it was suspected that it was not going to tow the dominant party policy. When Pastor David Lot, for example, attended the 1954 Constitutional Conference in London he points out that he was completely overwhelmed by specific instructions to adhere to the NPC policy of "One North" right from Kaduna and subsequently on the train, NPC delegates will not give him a chance to sleep to rest during the long journey to Lagos¹⁸⁶. He was so silenced by the NPC party touts that he failed to raise any issues on the creation of the Middle-Zone-Region¹⁸⁷.

Furthermore, during subsequent constitutional conference trips to Lagos and Ibadan in the period between 1955 and 1956, he was subjected to intimidation by some of the NPC delegates to ensure that he towed NPC party positions in the discussions. In one instance, for example, the NPC leadership was so distrustful of his loyalty that they went to the extreme of stopping the train in the night, right in the middle of the Niger Bridge on its way to Lagos, to cross-check, among others, the political stands of individual delegates: whether they were for "One North" or against - simply to know that the North was going to the South with one voice¹⁸⁸.

It was however another political controversy between the NPC and the MZL, that brought together the MZL, the MBPP and the MBSP in search for political unity for the struggle in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, rather than any resolved differences on the thorny problem of leadership and political strategy. The controversy centered on the conditions, both parties agreed to adhere to in the MBPP/MZL-NPC alliance for the fielding of candidates to contest in the 1956 elections into the NHA in Kaduna. As earlier promised out, a few weeks before the 1956 Regional elections in the North, Pastor David Lot and Patrick Dokotri resigned from government political appointments in Kaduna and Lagos, respectively. Thereafter, they became the very instruments in causing the collapse of the MZL and NPC alliance, arguing that it had not been helpful for the cause of the M-Belt Movement and the struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region¹⁸⁹. At about the same time, the TPU also terminated its alliance with the NPC which it had sponsored in 1955 through E. G. Gundu in the MBPP movement¹⁹⁰. Sklar suggests that from these developments, some eleven members in the NHA who were associated with one or the other of the factions in the developing UMBC movement, organized "a Unity Meeting"¹⁹¹. This Unity Meeting resulted into the formation of the United Middle Belt State Peoples Party (UMBSPP) early in 1956 which brought into a common political camp, some of the leadership in the MZL, MBPP and the MBSP¹⁹². At

a subsequent meeting in Lafia, before the May, 1956 meeting at Kafanchan, the UMBSPP elected H. O. Abaagu as Protem-President and Patrick Dokotri, also as Protem-Secretary General¹⁹³.

The break-up of the MBPP/MZL-NPC alliance before the 1956 elections was however another failure in the political effort to establish a working relationship with the NPC government in the North. In all the effort to develop a working relationship between the NPC and factions in the M-Belt movement, right from the time of the MZL through to the UMBC, the alliances only held on for a while, when the NPC dictated the conditions in the particular context of southern Nigerian domination of the North, rather than coming from the political exigencies of the M-Belt Movements in the rather similar circumstances of resisting domination from the Islamic Society in the North. Moses Nyam Rwang, for example, succinctly expressed this political mood in debating the M-Belt Motion in the NHA in 1956:

".....the people of the Middle Belt have strong support for this motion to create a Middle Belt Region the United Middle Belt Congress is simply supporting the creation of a Middle Belt Region since the party in power asked for the division of Nigeria into three regions at the London Conference in 1953, they must now agree to this Motion of dividing the Northern Region into two. They state (in London) they were afraid of Southern domination. We now say that we are afraid of domination of our brothers by people from the far North"¹⁹⁴.

However, before the elections in 1956, two members of the MZL in the FHR in Lagos (Jonah Assadugu and Patrick Dokotri) contacted the NPC in the hope of securing an alliance for more members of that party to gain entry, on behalf of the M-Belt Movements, into the NHA¹⁹⁵. Earlier before the organization of the UMBSPP, both Assadugu and Dokotri apparently had discussed their political intentions on the proposed alliance with the NPC with Joseph Tarka in Lagos, a situation which was marked by the entry of the political influences of Tarka into the M-Belt Movement¹⁹⁶. Tarka, it is

said, objected to the alliance, suggesting that before any agreement could be made, the UMBC as representative of the M-Belt movements ought to get the NPC to commit itself to the creation of a M-Belt Region, and ensure that UMBC representation was made to the 1956/57 constitutional conference in London. He also reechoed a third condition, which had influenced the resignation of Pastor David Lot and Patrick Dokotri from government political appointments - that the NPC should not field candidates to contest the same constituencies with the UMBC party¹⁹⁷. Just before the 1956 elections, the NPC was accused of breaking its promise, not to challenge either UMBC or MZL candidates, particularly so, in the constituencies in the M-Belt areas, an accusation that broke the alliance and created a premise for solid support for Tarka to subsequently press for the new state, even when some of the MZL leadership led by Pastor David Lot, returned to cooperation with the NPC¹⁹⁸. An MZL Manifesto, for example, released before the 1956 elections severely conflicted with the UMBC version on the conditions for the alliance with the NPC on the same elections. In the Manifesto the MZL suggested that while unity was sought of all the components and factions that were in the UMBC, there should be no affiliation with other parties and that those who were members of other political parties were to resign their membership¹⁹⁹ and that although a new Region was desirable, it was not practicable in 1956 and that the party representatives in the NHA were adequate to protect the interests of the M-Belt groups and societies in the North²⁰⁰. Pastor David Lot strongly reechoed these positions when he opposed the Motion on the creation of a M-Belt Region, tabled by Ibrahim Imam in the NHA on 6th March, 1956²⁰¹.

The contradictory manifesto, which the MZL produced under the leadership of Pastor David Lot cost the M-Belt Movement split support from the electorate in the 1956 elections into the NHA. Both factions contested the elections under their different party labels: the MZL and the MBPP²⁰². Despite the political moves early in 1956 to affiliate the two parties into

the suggested name of the UMBC as a M-Belt Front for the 1956 elections, in certain instances, the MZL and the MBPP fielded candidates to contest over electoral support in the same constituencies. In Jos Divison (Jos Rural Constituency), for example, Moses Nyam Rwang (Biom from Du-village and MBPP) contested with and was defeated by Bitrus Rwang Pam (Biom from Du-village and MZL), the son of the paramount Chief of Jos²⁰³. Obviously, a political situation like this is explained by the differences in party commitment on the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region as against cooperation with the NPC government in the North which conditioned intra-"tribal" opposition in the M-Belt Movement. In the 1956 elections, however, the NPC won over one hundred seats into the NHA, in addition to seven other seats won by Independent candidates that were allied to the NPC²⁰⁴. Most of the Seven Independent candidates were from Idoma, Igala and Igbirra, whose factional "tribal" Unions contested the elections between themselves without party affiliations and on each count the victorious group, joined the NPC to bargain their support for the share of distribution of socio-economic and welfare resources to their areas. In particular, this was the case with the Igbirra Tribal Union in which intra-tribal differences created a unique situation for the NPC to support a catholic leadership faction of the "tribal" Union Movement in preference to support for a Moslem majority²⁰⁵. The rival wings of the UMBC (the MZL and the MBPP) won a total of eleven seats²⁰⁶. These included six for the MBPP out of which five came from the Tiv areas and one from Pankshin East on the Plateau which was won by Gabriel Wuyep (a Yergam)²⁰⁷. The MZL won five seats, out of which, two were from S. Zaria (Zaria S. E. and Zaria S. W.), two from Plateau (Jos Rural and Pankshin West) and one seat from Adamawa (Numan Divison)²⁰⁸. From the forty three seats in the constituencies of the M-Belt areas, the NPC won twenty eight (65.1%), while groups with the political identity of the M-Belt Movements (i.e. the rival factions of the UMBC - the MZL and the MBPP) won only about 28% of the

seats. However, the results of the 1956 elections demonstrated a political shift in the commitments for the creation of a M-Belt Region, among the M-Belt groups and societies. While political support and commitment was previously centered on the Plateau, it moved southwardly to become concentrated in Benue Province, particularly among the Tiv through the MBPP, who became the back-bone of the party. This is apparent in the results of the 1956 elections into the NHA in which the MZL won a total of five seats from widely distributed pockets of support in Adamawa (Numan), Plateau (Jos Rural and Pankshin East) and the two S. Zaria constituencies, when compared to the five seats, all among the Tiv group and society in Benue Province. To a large extent, this shift in political support and commitment, is explained by the half-hearted support of the MZL politicians who were concentrated on the plateau and who maintained an ambivalent policy of cooperation with the NPC party and government in the North as against the uncompromising position of the MBPP over the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region which was inherited by the UMBC in 1956 and found solid support among the Tiv. Although the 1956 elections into the NHA show a remarkable political development in support for the parties of the M-Belt Movement over the 1951 elections (as well as over the 1954 elections into the FHR in Lagos), given that there was a wider geographical spread in the distribution of declared electoral support in the political identification with the ideas of the M-Belt Movement, the election was characterized by increased christian support for the NPC party from both Plateau and Benue Provinces, the core socio-religious and political areas of the M-Belt groups and societies. On the Plateau, for example, christian adherents like Michael Audu Buba (an Ankwei from Lowland Division) and Jatau Gwani (a Katab from Jemaa), were NPC, while in Benue, all the Idoma in the NHA who joined the NPC after the elections were christians like Jallo Tanko Yusufu who won in Wukari and who in the 1960s was Secretary-General of the Northern Christian Association (NCA)²⁰⁹. The NCA in the Northern Region of

Nigeria was an Association of Christians, indigenous to the North and its objective purposes included: The glorification of God; To openly proclaim Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour; To safeguard the christian religious interests of persons, churches and institutions and to bring to the attention of all concerned, the fact that the christian religion was a native and integral part of the life of Northern Nigeria²¹⁰. The NCA had objectives which were similar to those of the NML, the parent body of the M-Belt movements that was organized in 1949. The critical difference, however, was that by 1960, the NCA saw itself as sub-Northern in political identity in christian religious terms, unlike the NML which maintained features of a total political identity, contesting the socio-economic and political dominance of Islam in the North.

In the 1956, as well as other subsequent elections, however, christian political support increased for the NPC party, without any similar Moslem support for the M-Belt Movements, even when some Moslems had grown socio-economic and political roots by their long period of residence among some of the M-Belt groups and societies. Significantly, it was after 1956, that the M-Belt Movement began to lose its christian religious identity in the emphasis of the struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region as each group began to emphasize local socio-economic and political problems within the all embracing movement for a M-Belt Region. Furthermore, after the 1956 elections, Pastor David Lot, on his own account, retreated from active participation in shaping the cause of events in the M-Belt Movement, in order to give the UMBC a lesser christian religious emphasis for its political purposes²¹¹. With the advent of the leadership of Joseph Tarka in the UMBC, the issue and problems of political minorities in the North, became central in the M-Belt Movement rather than that of religious minorities which were in the emphasis of the NML and the MZL party. This was the base from which Tarka ultimately tied the fate of the M-Belt groups and societies to other minorities in the developing Nigerian Federation,

where in each Region, in the Three-Region-Federation, a concentration of minority cultural systems existed in the south and south-eastern fringes with a dominant "tribal" group and society controlling social and economic activities and in particular, in control of political power²¹². The religious element in the M-Belt Movement in the demands for a separate Region from the Islamic Society in the North, unlike in the South of Nigeria, where the social and political minorities were basically of the same religion as the majority tribes, from where, because of tribal hegemony they wanted to be separated. The shift in the emphasis of issues in the causes of the M-Belt movement, from the purely religious identity, to a political form of minorities identity in terms of access to power was critical in gaining the support of Southern Nigerian minorities during the crisis months, after July, 1966 when the Nigerian Federation was threatened with disintegration and the minorities managed to hold the system together, culminating into the state creation exercise in May, 1967²¹³.

However, the ambivalent political position of Pastor David Lot in the MZL and subsequently in the UMBSPP and the UMBC, caused a political ginger group to develop in the M-Belt Movement in order to work toward political compromises. The ginger group consisted of the more educated elements from among the M-Belt groups and societies and who felt some political sympathy for the causes of M-Belt Movement and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the North²¹⁴. The ginger groups within the different factions of the M-Belt Movement subsequently called themselves the Middle Belt Congress (MBC) and among other things, recruited people from different areas of the M-Belt, to circulate party material with strongly worded grievances on the differences between the Islamic areas in the North and the non-Islamic areas of the M-Belt, over the concentration of socio-economic and welfare infrastructure as well as complaints about the lack of respect for the non-Islamic chieftancy institution²¹⁵. It was the MBC under the collective leadership of its members that was most effective,

in the period before May 1956, in organizing meetings in Kagoro to discuss the Unity of the Congress with Pastor David Lot; At Lafia with the leadership of the MBPP and at Kafanchan with the MBSP²¹⁶. In 1956, although it was clear that the centre of gravity of the M-Belt Movement had shifted from the Plateau, southwardly to the lower Benue Valley with political support from among the Tiv group and society, Kagoro, Lafia and Kafanchan were regular meeting places of the MBC and subsequently the UMBC, because they were centrally located and well served by a communications net work such that delegates could easily come from Numan, S. Banchi, S. Zaria, Plateau, Benue, Kabba and Ilorin by car, train and even bicycle²¹⁷. The MBC was about the last organization that served as a screening house, to weed out non-committed membership of the M-Belt Movements in preparation for the inauguration of the UMBC in May, 1956. There were three problem areas in the organization of an all embracing M-Belt Movement, which the MBC identified; the political unity of the different factions for the movement to maintain solidarity and continuity in its policies; finance to enhance political mobilization and to contest elections by effective and genuine alliances in order to meet its objectives; and of course, the perennial problem of effective leadership that can maintain a balance of interests for all of the M-Belt groups and societies²¹⁸. These problems were examined and discussed by members of the MBC, at its, very last meeting in April, 1956 at Lafia, before the advent of the UMBC in May of the same year²¹⁹. The Lafia meeting was convened through the efforts of H. O. Abaagu, where suggested heuristic solutions were proposed²²⁰. To meet its financial problems, a section of the leadership in the MBC was asked to meet AG leadership in Ibadan in the specific context of responding to AG attempts to persuade some Tiv politicians (i.e. Isaac Kpum) to serve as agents as early as in 1952, while another, went to solicit an alliance with the NEPU and NCNC²²¹. On the problem of political leadership, the MBC meeting resolved that a dominant "tribe" from the M-Belt groups and societies

should produce the President of the M-Belt movement, so that at the very least, strong "tribal" support can sustain and stabilize the movement and the Tiv group and society was chosen to fulfill this political exigency, because of the weight of their members and their characteristic solidarity that could not be contested by the other smaller groups and societies in the M-Belt areas²²². To create unity within the different groups and societies in the M-Belt areas, it was suggested that a non-compromise-stand on the issue of creating a M-Belt Region will be pursued and that an elected leadership will tour all of the affected areas to mobilize political support from minority groups and societies who might be Christians and persons with African traditional systems of belief and worship and appeals for support were also to be made to resident Moslems among the M-Belt groups and societies²²³. In addition to outlined political strategy, the MBC agreed on an exclusive date for a conference of all the factions in the M-Belt Movement, where the proposals might be examined and discussed, elections for a new executive to be held, which would once and for all resolve the claims by Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot to be the Presidents of the UMBC²²⁴ and the new executive be entrusted with the task of implementing the policies²²⁵. The date for the meeting was fixed for May, 1956 and the venue was suggested to be Kafanchan. At the same meeting in Lafia in April 1956, the MBC formally converted its name to become the United Middle Belt Congress and summoned the Kafanchan meeting under that political label. One of the developments on some of the issues and decisions taken by the MBC at the Lafia meeting was the rejection of the Hausa Language, which was the common language in the North, but was less understood by the Tiv, diffused from the Islamic society to the M-Belt areas, to be used in taking down minutes of meetings during UMBC deliberations and in its place the English language was chosen as a preference²²⁶. While in one sense, this might be interpreted as a rejection of Hausaization which was Northernization and to some, Islamization, it

more fundamentally served as an effective strategy and weapon that instantly excluded the older-war-horses of the M-Belt Movement like Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu from being secretaries to the movement, because they were inadequate in the uses of the English language. The issue, however, remained controversial because UMBC rallies were in either Hausa or the local language of the audience rather than English and only minutes of the executive-meetings were taken down in English²²⁷. Indeed, most of the written communication between the top M-Belt leadership which was sent to local leadership at the "tribal" union levels of organization were either in Hausa or the local languages²²⁸. In Plateau, Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and some parts of Northern Benue Province, the Hausa language was used extensively in political communication. In these areas there was a large Hausa-Fulani Islamic population which had influenced the social and political norms of behaviour of the local people such as in areas of attitudes to authority and respect for law and order, even when it was the case that there was hostility toward the Hausa-Fulani Islamic groups and societies in general. In Jos Division, for example, the Hausa migrant population, which settled in the area as labour for the tin mines fields, created sufficient anxieties in 1956 for the Birom and other smaller non-Islamic groups and societies to swing in support for the MBC, a departure from their previous ambivalent political position that had divided their votes between the NPC and the MBPP/MZL alliance and their support for the UMBSPP. In 1956, the year which marked the entry of Bitrus Rwang Pam, the son of the Chief of Jos into the NHA, the Hausa-Birom tensions had been heightened by: I. Hausa claims to the cheiftancy of Jos²²⁹; II. An enquiry, conducted by an NPC official before the SDO, into the conduct of affairs by the Chief of Jos; and III. The alleged imprisonment of persons with traditional practices of African Systems of beliefs and worship in Bauchi (S. Bauchi in particular) for refusing to accept a Hausa-man (Moslem) as their chief²³⁰. Through the

political pressures of Bitrus Rwang Pam, who at that time had become Secretary General to BPU, Divisional Secretary to the Jos NA and also General-Secretary of the MZL-UMBC under the leadership of Pastor David Lot, there was the final break in the alliance between the MZL and the NPC party before the 1956 elections into the NHA²³¹. It was because of tensions like these that the Hausa in Jos maintained distinct political identity among the local population, with which they mobilized themselves to increase opposition on the creation of a M-Belt Region, even though their stand contravened NEPU/NCNC policy which were their parties. In the debates on the Middle Belt Motion in 1956, for example, Alhaji Alin Iliya, a special member in the NHA representing Hausa elements on the Plateau said:

"I rise to oppose the Motion for the creation of a Middle Belt Region. All the Hausa elements in the Plateau Province, whom I am specially representing, do not support the Motion and are not in favour of it. The member from the Plateau, who spoke in favour of the Motion was not sent by anybody from the Plateau Province: he only brought his own views. He has himself been expelled from his party"²³².

At about the middle of 1956, although almost all the political leadership among the M-Belt groups and societies had come under the influence of the UMBSPP and its elitist wing, the MBC, in anticipation of the inauguration of the UMBC, in the organization of a single all embracing party of the M-Belt Movement for the creation of the M-Belt Region, in the period between 1956 and 1960, two factions still developed within the leadership and the UMBC organization. The central discordant political issues were focussed on who to choose as an ally for the 1956 elections in the North and who to join sides with on the National political arena for the Constitutional Conference in London in 1957²³³.

Firstly, at the opening meeting of the UMBC at Kafanchan in May, 1956, some members of the UMBSPP, predominantly, those from the MBSP (Rwang and Ijumu in particular) who had approached the AG for funds and an alliance,

were accused of "subversive action" against the party²³⁴. Moses Nyam Rwang and Bello Ijumu consequently walked out of the meeting, taking with them their supporters, a political action which cost them expulsions from the UMBC movement²³⁵ and in reaction they resurrected the MBSP and indeed it survived to contest two constituencies in Tiv Division (Gaav-Shangev Tiev and Kunav) in the 1959 elections, but failed to win any seats²³⁶. The resurrected MBSP was joined by Achiga Abuul after he experienced political frustration at the UMBC conference at Kafanchan in 1956, where Joseph Tarka was elected as President of the UMBC²³⁷. After 1959 the MBSP declined in political function and by 1961 its political activities were untraceable and the party ceased to exist because some of its members withdrew from party politics, while others joined the NPC²³⁸. The systematic decline of the MBSP in the period between 1956 and 1958 also marked the exit of Moses Nyam Rwang from the centre of the M-Belt movement. When he joined the NPC in 1959, he discredited himself by contradicting his previous beliefs and public statements in saying that he did so:

"...because it (the NPC) is the only stable political party in the country catering for the common man"²³⁹.

However, Moses Nyam Rwang remained curiously one of the most visionary leaders in the M-Belt Movement as early as in the days of his political involvement with the NML and the MZL and subsequently with the MBPP, the MBSP, until the inception of the UMBC in 1956, on the future potential of the minorities in the North to create the M-Belt Region. He was always rhetorically prophetic in persisting to warn his colleagues in the NHA about future reversed roles in decision making processes which will be created by a fortuitous event and which will tilt the political advantages to the minorities in the North and thereafter, a M-Belt Region will be created, a view that was always shared by Ibrahim Imam in the NHA from Bornu²⁴⁰. In the debate on the Motion for the creation of a M-Belt Region in March,

1956, for example, Moses Nyam Rwang pointed out:

"...As I have already said sometime ago in the House, the party in power (the NPC) will in future be a very pitiful party..."

Those so called small political parties of

"...unscrupulous politicians will one day be so strong as to capture the Government of this Region... I will like to point out to the NPC members of this House that the Middle Belt Region will not be created by the NPC..... the NPC must know that we are not demanding support from that party... Our own party was set up for the declared purpose of setting up a separate region for the Middle Belt.... The Middle Belt Region is already a foregone conclusion, for it is not going to be created by those people who are in this House. I say this because I know that this House will be dissolved in due course, and that will be the pitiful end of those members who refuse to support this motion"²⁴¹.

The second discordant political issue that affected the organization of the UMBC in the period between 1956 and 1960 centered on who to join sides with on the National political arena for the London Constitutional Conference in 1957. After the inaugural meeting of the UMBC in 1956 the party entered into an alliance with the AG, apparently, the AG having made contacts as early as 1952 and in this instance also made offers of financial and organizational support and also promised to raise the issue of the creation of a M-Belt Region in the North in the remaining constitutional talks in the settlements of self-Government in the North and Independence for Nigeria before 1959 and 1960²⁴². The persuasive political efforts of the AG centered on the ideas that it wanted the M-Belt groups and societies to be:

"...free from the reactionary rule of the Fulani clique...(and) their area constituted into a new region or state. The new state will have its own House of Assembly and House of Chiefs. It will have its own Governor. It will have its own Premier who will be a Middle Belt man. It will have its Ministers who will be Middle Belters. It will have its own Chiefs and Assembly men who will all be Middle Belters. No Westerner or Yoruba men will contest elections to the Middle Belt State Legislature"²⁴³.

Obviously this political propagander of the AG influenced some of the politicians of the M-Belt areas and the glamour of power seem to be enjoyed at Kaduna created similar images for a new Region and this found its way into the attitudes of some leadership of the M-Belt Movement, sufficiently for Bryan Sharwood Smith to reduce the causes of the movement and the majority of the leadership, to very simplistic terms as:

"....opportunist ... for whom the dazzling vision of a brand new region, with its Ministries and Public Boards and Corporation and all that these implied in the way of power and patronage was argument enough.... (while) the main issue was fundamentally one of confidence between Muslim and non-Muslim"²⁴⁴.

However, the UMBC in return for the AG patronage on the struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region was to acknowledge and give political support to the demands of the AG-ITP alliance for the merging of some Divisions in Kabba and Ilorin with substantial Yoruba House-holds which were christian in religious identity with the Yoruba dominated Western Region of Nigeria, where the Northern Yoruba will be freed:

"...from the oppressive yoke of their fulani rulers by having them regrouped with the Yorubas of the Western Region. They wish to be ruled from Ibadan rather than from Kaduna. They like to attend legislatures where their own language (Yoruba) is spoken rather than those in which a foreign language (Hausa) is spoken. They desire to have... the same Legislatures with those having the same origin, the same tradition, the same culture and the same

language with them"²⁴⁵.

In a subsequent AG publication in 1959, Awolowo was very blunt on the Ilorin - Kabba merger with the Western Region of Nigeria:

"...If the Middle Belt State is created, the merging of Ilorin - Kabba Divisions with the Western Region is ipso factor a foregone conclusion"²⁴⁶.

The Ilorin - Kabba merger with the Western Region had been a long standing political issue before the M-Belt movement came to the arena of Nigerian politics. The government of British administration in Nigeria, however consistently resisted demands for the revision of the conquered boundaries by the Fulani between the North and West as early as in 1904, 1917 by Lugard and subsequently in 1936 right through to the Macphersons Review of the Boundary Issues in 1952 in which he preserved the status quo ante; but this was never accepted by Awolowo, albeit any Yoruba in the AG²⁴⁷. However, through the persuasive efforts of Joseph Tarka, who had been chosen by the AG as one of its representatives to the London 1957 talks, most of the Tiv UMBC/TPU members accepted these conditions of the AG, except H. O. Abaagu, who opposed any move to merge Ilorin and Kabba with the Western Region of Nigeria²⁴⁸. This opposition by Abaagu, temporarily split the UMBC/TPU wing of the M-Belt Movement in Tiv Division and ended with Abaagu organizing the Benue Freedom Crusade (BFC) in May, 1958 and aligned the movement with the NCNC until 1959 when it switched its support to the NPC²⁴⁹. The political objective of the BFC were not very clear and indeed were not spelt out in terms beyond that of a protest movement over the Ilorin - Kabba irrendentist feelings which remained within its divisional organizational structure of the UMBC/TPU among the Tiv. Similar to the resurrected MBSP under Moses Nyam Rwang and Bello Ijumu, the BFC of Abaagu had a very short life span and its leader with most of his supporters joined the NPC early in 1959 and their Benue protest identity,

directed at the M-Belt identity in the UMBC became submerged by Northern socio-religious and political identity of the NPC party²⁵⁰. Except for these two factional developments in the UMBC (the resurrected MBSP and the BFC), after 1956 the M-Belt Movement, in the period between 1956 and 1960 enjoyed stable political support, the bulk of which came from Christians and non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and most particularly Plateau and Benue predominantly from sections of the Birom, totally from the Jarawa that were centered around the Christian missionary centre of Fobur and solidly among the Tiv. According to Dudley, the Idomas, Igbirras, Igalas and Jukuns, who were under the patronage of their respective chiefs found it convenient to support the NPC rather than the UMBC²⁵¹. It was from political premises like these which prompted Auta Anzah Ninzam, a member from the Plateau in the NHA, to suggest that in the demands for the M-Belt Region:

"...to be frank, it is only the two Provinces of Benue and Plateau which could constitute this so-called Middle Belt Region... (since) some of these rebels now reside in Benue"²⁵²,

because of the intensity of the UMBC political activities in those areas after 1956, an observation which was complimented by the ridicule of Abutu Obekpa an Idoma elected member of the NHA from Benue Province, who also pointed out that:

"....the party (UMBC) now confines itself only to Plateau Province. The so-called Middle Belt Congress should be known as the Plateau Middle Belt Congress.... under the leadership of Pastor David Lot as Prime Minister of Plateau..... Patrick Fom as Deputy-Premier, and Moses Nyam Rwang as Secretary or Minister"²⁵³.

It is to the development of political cohesion and the tactics adopted for political mobilization in the M-Belt Movement after the Kafanchan meeting in May, 1956 which was achieved when the UMBC party came under the

leadership of Joseph Tarka, that we now turn to, in the focus of our analysis. It ought to be borne in mind, however, that Joseph Tarka had been an elected member of the FHR as early as in 1954 and had shared ideas on the creation of a M-Belt Region with Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot and Patrick Dokotri, who were also elected members in Lagos. The cohesion and political mobilization, took on a different pattern, after the turbulent and rather zig-zag path to unity, with the formation of an all inclusive front by the M-Belt groups and societies, through the activities of the UMBC movement as a political party in the demands for the creation of an alternative Northern Region, the M-Belt Region in the North, within the Nigerian Federation.

IV. The United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC).

The politics and political organization of the M-Belt Movement in its phase as the UMBC party was the politics of alliance formation for financial resources to support the organization of political mobilization of the M-Belt groups and societies on the issue and ideas of the creation of a M-Belt Region in the North. This development was in sharp contrast to the previous phases of the M-Belt movement in which politics was very much that of organized protest over religious differences and the control of the government apparatus by Islamic leadership that had ramification on the interpretation of the law and the unequal distribution of socio-economic and welfare resources and infrastructure. The assumption of politics that had created instability in the previous movements and some incoherence in the use of resources, centered on representation and participation in the institutions of government and society in the North, which the leadership in the M-Belt movement, took as adequate in order to bring about infrastructure for modern development to their areas. However, while the UMBC emphasized the politics of mass mobilization after 1956, particularly

so among the Tiv, it also used almost all of the grievances which its preceding political organizations, like the NML, the MZL and the MBPP had used, to prop-up political support from the ordinary people among the M-Belt groups and societies, in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. As it will become apparent below, variation in political strategy was so, because different images of the problems of the M-Belt areas existed and these centered on issues that were unique to a particular area. Furthermore, the issues had their different patterns in appealing for political support in the search for solutions. As it has been earlier pointed out, in the period between 1952 and 1956, some of the M-Belt leadership saw the solutions to their socio-economic and political problems through the maintainance of the boundaries of One North in context of the Northern Identity, while to others, the viable option to a solution was in the creation of a M-Belt Region. It was the acknowledged variation on the M-Belt issues that conditioned differences in the strategies that were deployed by the leadership in its initial thrust for political mobilization in the period between 1956 and 1958. In 1959, however, the fundamental issue of the M-Belt Movement, the creation of a M-Belt Region, was taken to the electoral market place of the M-Belt groups and societies during the campaigns for the elections into the FHR in Lagos. The issue of the creation of a M-Belt Region was also taken to the electoral markets place in the M-Belt areas in the specific context of the consequences of Self-Government for the North and Independence for Nigeria. This section examines the political development and impact of the M-Belt Movement in its phase as the UMBC, it being the highest mainfestation of the demands and support for the creation of the M-Belt Region in the North and Nigerian politics. The section also examines the extent and how the M-Belt leadership coped with government pressures and the strategies of the NPC party, to contain the demands and the political paths the movement followed until the approximate of the M-Belt Region was achieved in May, 1967, in

totally different political circumstances under the military administration of General Yakubu Gowon. The Nigerian Federal Elections of 1959 are, however, given a critical analytical focus, to test the political identity the UMBC in the M-Belt Movement under the leadership of Joseph Tarka and the Tiv maintained in the context of the political instruments used in mobilizing support for the creation of a M-Belt Region.

The organization of the political activities of the UMBC were began at Kafanchan in 1956²⁵⁴. In May, 1956, the protein- President of the UMBSPP, H. O. Abaagu and its Secretary, Patrick Dokotri as well as the bulk of the members of the elitist MBC, convened a meeting at Kafanchan²⁵⁵. The purpose of the meeting was to elect a new executive for the UMBC, which will stand uncontested as a representative body to speak on the interest of the M-Belt groups and societies, particularly on the issue of demanding the creation of a M-Belt Region and in the negotiations of alliances with political parties of its independent choice in Nigeria. The Kafanchan meeting was also quite subjectively meant to elect as President of the UMBC a Tiv person, in the over all interest of the M-Belt movement and its struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region. The Tiv people, it was argued at the Lafia meeting in April 1956, deserved and ought to be given the leadership of the movement because of their numerical strength. The weight of the numbers of their members would be able to keep the movement in a stable political position and direction of interest against collective defections by neighbouring tribes or any other M-Belt people, when they support the party in mass²⁵⁶. In addition to their numerical strength, some of the leadership of the M-Belt Movement suggested that the Tiv ought to be given the Presidency of the UMBC because of what they curiously perceived and described as the uniqueness of "the Tiv-character", which the movement needed in order to achieve the objective of the the creation of a M-Belt Region. The Tiv people, it was argued by non-Tiv, do not give up a struggle once they have taken sides until the objectives is achieved²⁵⁷. In other

words, the Kafanchan meeting was a conscious political effort to bring the Tiv group and society into the centre and the main stream of the M-Belt movement²⁵⁸. A new Executive was elected which was fairly representative of the M-Belt groups and societies with the Presidency and Secretaryship located to persons from among the core of the M-Belt people in Plateau (Biom) and Benue (Tiv). From the outcome of the election of a new executive, however, it was clear that leadership of the movement passed to the control and direction of a new breed of persons, the more European educated class, who had been to colleges and secondary schools. The meeting also chose Jos, on the Plateau, as its central headquarters.

The highly significant, although controversial outcome of the meeting however was in the election of Joseph Tarka as the President of the UMBC party. It is not clear to what extent J. S. Tarka had been previously involved in M-Belt movements, like the MZL, MBPP and MBSP or even the elitist MBC, in terms of regular attendance of meetings and political contributions of ideas before the Kafanchan meeting and his election as President. His political inclinations before 1954 were toward the NCNC which had attracted some of the radical elements among the educated Tiv, but there was no real following among the people because the NCNC was regarded as an Ibo organization and the Tiv feared Ibo competition and Ibo incursion on their land from the southern parts of Tiv land²⁵⁹. It is however clear that Tarka had indicated political sympathies for the ideas and causes of the M-Belt movement and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region before 1956, although he had not party political affiliations²⁶⁰. There is, however, evidence which shows that Joseph Tarka had been politically involved before 1954 and had gained from that, experience in political organization. He had also attained some radical political consciousness from his teachers while a student in Bauchi, notably from Aminu Kano and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa who taught him at the Bauchi Teachers College where Tarka graduated as a Rural Science

teacher²⁶¹. While at Bauchi Teachers College he organized a student protest group which demonstrated against the school authorities over sanitation and feeding conditions in the hostels²⁶². Furthermore, the involvement of Joseph Tarka in political activities in Benue Province, although local in political shape, were sufficient background experience for becoming the leader of an organization and movement such as the UMBC party and these were some of the factors taken into consideration by Partick Dokotri who was disappointed at the election of Abuul and thought there were better Tiv persons for the post. J. S. Tarka, for example had been General-Secretary of the Benue State Peoples Party (BSPP) in 1955, a political wing of the MBSP an organization from which Abaagu developed his ideas of the Benue Freedom Crusade (BFC) in 1958²⁶³. Furthermore, besides his teaching job as a grade two Rural Science teacher, he had been Secretary-General of the Tiv-NA staff union when he won the elections into the FHR in Lagos in 1954²⁶⁴. Tarka had won that election with the support of the TPU, at that time, the most influential political organization in Tiv Division²⁶⁵, and had represented the TPU to the convened meeting of the UMBSPP and MBC at Kafanchan in 1956²⁶⁶. In that respect and capacity, it is clear that Joseph Tarka was at Kafanchan as a participant to support other more influential Tiv candidates in the Presidency which had been unequivocally reserved for the Tiv, rather than a political hopeful with Tiv support. Indeed in 1956, there were much more powerful and influential Tiv politicians, than Joseph Tarka in the delegation of the BSPP to Kafanchan. There was, for example, Ugor Iwoor, a building contractor and motor transport owner, although not well educated, was the most influential person in the politics of Tiv Division and who had been President, of the TPU since 1949²⁶⁷. The political influence of Iwoor in Tiv Division was considerable because he had financially supported many Tiv parliamentarians in previous elections to the NHA and the FHR and could therefore influence particular candidates²⁶⁸. Furthermore, there was also Achiga Abuul, the explicit Tiv

candidate for the UMBC Presidency, whom Ugor Iwoor supported with finance and lorries to transport supporters to Kafanchan and Isaac Kpum, who infact, was the most widely travelled and had been the most politically active Tiv person before 1956 in the cause of the MBPP, the MBSP, the UMBSPP, the MBC and as the political agent in Benue Province for the AG party²⁶⁹. In the period between 1952 and 1956, Isaac Kpum, more than any Tiv leader single-handedly and with fanatical commitment, politicized some European educated Tiv youngmen and women with ideas on the struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region and urged them to support the M-Belt movement²⁷⁰. Furthermore, it was Isaac Kpum who taught his school children and Tiv village associates, the M-belt Anthem, among whom, was Elizabeth Ivase, in anticipation for the creation of the M-Belt Region²⁷¹.

Despite all these strong and influential political "opponents" from the Tiv group and soceity, however, Joseph Tarka emerged in the 1956 elections of the UMBC executive, as President of the M-Belt movement. Other contestants for the post of Presidency were, surprisingly, in the context of the Lafia agreement that a Tiv person be President: Jonah Assadugu (Bachama, MP in the FHR from Numan Division), H. O. Abaagu (a Tiv MP in the FHR) and Achiga Abuul (a Tiv contractor and bussinessman)²⁷². All of the contestants for the UMBC Presidency in 1956, including Joseph Tarka were members of the FHR in Lagos, having been elected in the 1954 elections, except for Achiga Abuul who was in private bussiness as contractor²⁷³. Besides being outside the main stream of politics before 1956, Abuul was also the most relatively low in educational standard when compared to the other three contestants to the Presidency of the UMBC party²⁷⁴.

There are conflicting accounts of the elections of th Presidency and on what happened at Kafanchan which cost Abuul the Presidency to the advantage of Joseph Tarka. These have varied from a direct election contest between Tarka and Abuul, in which Tarka won to a quiet-room-corner-decision

in which the Tiv delegates chose Tarka to be the President with subsequent endorsement by the conference; and of course the version which suggests: "Dokotri made Tarka President of the UMBC"²⁷⁵. According to Patrick Dokotri, who became Secretary-General of the UMBC as a result of the same elections, the candidate that was collectively presented by the Tiv was Achiga Abuul and who had ensured his election victory by bringing to Kafanchan, lorry-loads of his supporters from a broad-spectrum of Tiv society. The numerical strength of the supporters for Abuul alone overwhelmed other contestants for the Presidency. The other contestants in the first round of the elections included Jonah Assadugu and H. O. Abaagu who were subsequently joined in the second round by J. S. Tarka²⁷⁶. In the first round of the election, however, Achiga Abuul totally won the Presidency by an undisputed majority. As normal conference practice required, the elected President addresses the delegates. Achiga Abuul, who was neither fluent in the English language nor could speak the Hausa language, insisted on addressing the delegates in the Tiv language, without appreciating the problems of the Secretary who had to take down minutes and other delegates who did not understand the Tiv language. Although there was an overwhelming presence of the Tiv people at the Kafanchan meeting, a fact which marked their emerging influence in the M-Belt movement, delegates came from other M-Belt groups and societies who did not understand the Tiv language and more significantly, the elected secretary of the UMBC party was Birom and needed to understand the language of the political discourse in order to take down minutes of the conference. Furthermore, the speech of Abuul in the Tiv language might have contravened the Lafia agreement of the elitist MBC decision for English to be the language of political discourse and for minutes of meetings to be taken down in English. Patrick Dokotri, the General-Secretary to the Conference therefore protested over the address being given in the Tiv language and opted to resign his post rather than "serve under an illiterate President"²⁷⁷. In the instance, the Tiv

then decided to put forward, H. O. Abaagu, who declined to take the offer on the grounds that Abuul had been "democratically elected"²⁷⁸. It was in the intervening confusion that the Tiv got together, nominated J. S. Tarka, the literate person Dokotri required, while other non-Tiv delegates persuaded Jonah Assadugu to withdraw his candidature. The singular act by Patrick Dokotri shaped the political fortunes and career of Joseph Tarka, frustrated Abuul, but, effectively brought in the Tiv people into the centre-stage of the M-Belt struggle and the whole political momentum of the movement was given a new and vigorous sense of direction in the demand for the creation of the M-Belt Region. However, the Kafanchan meeting produced for both Joseph Tarka and Patrick Dokotri, a political experience that was complemented by their previous exchange of ideas on the M-Belt movement while as resident politicians in Lagos which they exploited to work closely with each other in the cause of the struggle for the creation of the M-Belt Region. Mutual political cooperation existed between Tarka and Dokotri in the period between 1956 and 1962, despite the ambivalence in political allegiance previously exhibited by the latter, in which he wished to see a certain degree of political consensus of the UMBC with the NPC party and government in the North. In that period, however, both Tarka and Dokotri solidly supported the creation of the M-Belt Region. Indeed, much of the reported political activity of the M-Belt movement in the same period centered on the activities of the two personalities in their engagement in political mobilization of the M-Belt groups and societies over the issues the 1957 commission on minorities was investigating, attendance of constitutional conferences in London, negotiations of alliances and subsequently, the campaigns for the 1959 elections²⁷⁹. Dokotri was instrumentally contributive in persuading J. S. Tarka on the UMBC-AG alliance. This might not have been unconnected to his attendance at secondary schools in Ibadan and Benin where he had built up friendship with some of the Yoruba²⁸⁰. Indeed, it has been suggested that Awolowo preferred

Dokotri to be President of the UMBC and leading figure in the M-Belt movement, rather than Joseph Tarka, were it not for the critical electoral advantage that was rooted in the numerical strength of the Tiv which far exceeded that of any other M-Belt group and society²⁸¹. In the eyes of chief Obafemi Awolowo, Patrick Dokotri was much more a loyal client than the challenging and independent personality in the leadership of Joseph Tarka.

Besides the election of J. S. Tarka as President of the UMBC and Patrick Dokotri as its Secretary-General, Isaac Kpum was also elected in 1956 as Financial Secretary of the party, a post he combined with that of the Editorship of the Middle-Belt Herald based in headquarters at Jos²⁸². Strictly speaking these were the three functionally occupied posts in the UMBC executive. These were however complemented by the elections of Divisional Organizing Secretaries from the Divisions among the Provincial administration that existed in the M-Belt areas and where there were elements of UMBC political support²⁸³. This organizational structure of the UMBC became tied up to the organization of the AG after January, 1957 when a formal alliance was agreed upon. In the instance, additional to the post of President, Secretary-General, Financial Secretary and the Divisional Organizing Secretaries, the UMBC executive consisted of elected members, two each from Tiv, Idoma and Birom and one member each from any of the other non-Islamic M-Belt tribes who wanted to be involved in the policy formation and decision making of the movement²⁸⁴. Subsequently when the movement gained the support of and entered into alliance with other parties in the North associated with the AG, some members of the UMBC-AG-BYM alliance suggested in 1961 that the organization of the alliance be zoned, such that a 'Far North' and a 'Lower North' executive exist. The structure of the Lower-North executive however remained that of the UMBC structure, previously reorganized by Joseph Tarka, until in 1963 when the UMBC broke off with the AG and became the NPF in alliance with the NEPU²⁸⁵. It ought

to be borne in mind, however, that before the demands for a Kano State and a Borno State became political issues which reinforced the realignment of the UMBC into the NPF, the aims and objectives of both the NEPU and the BYM were contradistinctive to those of the UMBC. The political aims and objectives of the NEPU and BYM were meant for reform on the Northern Identity and particularly centered on the reforms of the NA systems in the North²⁸⁶. These goals, as such, were not as revolutionary as those of the UMBC, which were on the subdivision of the North, such that an independent and autonomous M-Belt Region will exist, separated from control of Islamic leadership but within the Nigerian Federation, which obviously would have ruptured the Northern Identity. In 1957 however NEPU party policy was clearly pro-UMBC and at the London Conference Aminu Kano clearly stated:

"It was essential that the Northern Region should be broken down into smaller units. For instance, the Middle Belt had a claim to a separate regional status"²⁸⁷.

However, after the alliance with the AG in 1957, the political aims and objectives of the UMBC remained the same as those of the previous organizations of the M-Belt movement. These were imbedded and given a new impetus in the immediate alliance the UMBC entered into the AG which included the creation of a M-Belt Region with the motto: "freedom for all, life more abundant for us (in) a Middle Belt state"²⁸⁸.

With the election of Joseph Tarka, as President of the UMBC and Patrick Dokotri as its Secretary-General the M-Belt movement assumed a completely different political posture and strategy. Not only did it expand its focus of political rhetoric from religious issues to socio-economic grievances, but also significantly expanded its arena of political activity from the NHA in Kaduna to the FHR in Lagos in raising the need for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the North²⁸⁹. In 1957, for example, Patrick Dokotri presented the needs for political preparedness against 1959, having

in mind the London Constitutional Conference in May 1957, Northern Self-Government and the 1959 elections into the FHR and pointed out:

"...It is the policy of the United Middle Belt Congress that we will welcome Self-Government of the Federation and the Regions only when adequate safeguards have been made for the minorities... We want Self-Government that will provide adequate safeguard to secure the basic human rights for individuals and bodies to practice and propagate their religions without undue restraint... If regional Self-Government will mean that those in authority will be placed in a position to trample on the rights of minorities, as happened in the Sudan (Republic), it will be very necessary to remove such dangers and threat... The British must not allow our three giants (Northern, Western and Eastern Regions in the Nigerian Federation) to play the game alone... We attach certain conditions to the attainment of Self-Government... The country should have been broken up into more states... Adequate safeguards are made in the constitution to protect minorities and basic human rights... In December 1958 there should be a constituent Assembly to consolidate the constitution and finally Self-Government and Independence... Self-Government will not mean what we all wish it to be, until the various agitations and aspirations of people have been taken into consideration"²⁹⁰.

It is significant to note that these statements were made before the Minorities Commission, headed by Sir Henry Willink, was set up in the same year (1957) and that from its findings, most of its conclusions and recommendations in 1958 were similar to the conditions of Independence in the policies of the UMBC as put forward by Patrick Dokotri, except of course, the "break up" of the Federation²⁹¹. This political position in the rhetoric of Dokotri however was very much the policy of the AG after the UMBC-AG alliance, and its thrust to become a nation-wide party by winning the political support of opposition groups in the East and the North. For this purpose, the AG was prepared to rely not only upon its efficient organization and ample finance:

"...but also upon a strong appeal to tribal discontent among the minority peoples of the Regions... (furthermore) the AG could point to a record of social welfare policies in the Western Region to back up its promise of 'Life more abundant' the driving force behind its appeal at the local level among the minority tribes"²⁹².

Although the appeal and support subsequently given to the UMBC was a boost to the struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region, it was also an evocation of the cruder and more divisive elements of tribal politics which was calculated to cause extreme distrust between the UMBC and the Regional government in the North²⁹³. Patrick Dokotri, for example, highlighted this resultant extreme distrust at result of AG ideas toward the NPC government in the North, when he pointed out:

"...We (the UMBC) will welcome Self-Government only when a central state is carved out of the present Northern Region and as long as the rights of the minorities are at stake, we are convinced that it will be impossible for the sectional groups now agitating for the creation of more states, particularly the central-state, to be given consideration by those in power in the Regions"²⁹⁴.

In other words, Dokotri was arguing that if the political demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region failed, there might be severe social-welfare and economic reprisals on the leadership of the UMBC as well as on groups and societies who gave their political support to the demands, as indeed it eventually happened, among others, the Tiv people in the period between 1960 and 1965. In that period retributive measures in the distribution of socio-economic and political benefits compounded the problems of the underdevelopment of the M-Belt areas with modern infrastructure, relative to the Islamic society in the North. In the M-Belt areas there was a correlation between support for the NPC party in government in the North with allocatable resources which became directed to where the support was gained, such that there existed enclaves of "developed" areas relative to

other parts of the M-Belt. Socio-economic and welfare infrastructure for Benue Province, for example, was concentrated in Idoma Division where there was strong support for the NPC when compare to Tiv Division where there was solid UMBC support and some hostility toward the NPC government in the North.

The socio-economic and welfare deprivation as much as the political grievances among the M-Belt people, held against the Islamic society and leadership of the NPC part were at the heart of the matter in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region re-invigorated in 1956 when Joseph Tarka assumed leadership of the UMBC. There were also strong cases over religious discrimination, particularly so over inequality before the laws in Northern Nigeria in the application of Moslem Law. These issues however were only the rudimentary aspects of the existing reality that contrasted with what was basic in the Islamic society as against the M-Belt areas and which crystallized into support for the UMBC-AG alliance in the appeal and promise for adjustment for "Freedom for all and Life more abundant for us in a Middle Belt State". In 1956 the socio-economic and political grievances of the M-Belt people were well summarized by Moses Nyam Rwang (elected Member into the NHA form Jos Division on the Plateau), when explaining to the members of the NHA why there was a political need for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the North:

"...the United Middle Belt Congress is supporting the creation of a Middle Belt Region... (because) the NPC, the party in power asked for the division of Nigeria into three regions at the London Conference in 1953... They stated that they were afraid of Southern (Nigerian) domination. We now say that we are afraid of domination of our brothers by people from the far North. Our purpose for (demanding) a separate Region of the Middle Belt was (because) the Northern Region was too vast... the Middle Belt (as a result) has not been greatly developed. There are no fine roads, no electrical supply and there is no water supply... in Jos the electric power and water supply have not been provided for the

indigenous people... They were provided because of the tin in the area and Europeans residing in the area... Makurdi is the headquarters of Benue Province... with no electrical supply in the place... the women usually rise at about four in the morning to get water from the river. At Kabba you get a lorry once a week in order to travel to other places. This is because the roads are not good. In Ilorin in 1955 no amenities in the town. There is no place to go and get water. In the town of Ilorin, there is only one road that is tarred and the width of that road is not more than five feet. Now, I turn to education in the Middle Belt. We have only one school and that is Keffi Secondary School... One Trade Centre at Bukuru... Another at Vom for training Veterinary Officers; but in Zaria alone, there are innumerable schools... established with the funds of the Northern Region. There are about ten schools in Zaria Province and about five in Kano. These schools have not been set up with Provincial funds but with Regional funds... turning to health. We have no hospitals in the Middle Belt... only one big hospital at Jos; the one at Barkin Ladi was built for European miners living in the area... there is another at Pankshin... Dispensaries in the area (Shendam and Kafanchan) cannot be regarded as hospitals... turning to the status of Chiefs in the Middle Belt which is different from the status of Chiefs from the far North. In Yauri, District Officers salute the Emir. In the Middle Belt we find that the chiefs are not respected by the District Officers. If a chief is taking his meal the District Officer may come and say he wants to see the chief and the chief must leave his meal and go and see the District Officer... although he may be much older than the District Officer, as well as being a chief. When we examine the salaries of the chiefs in the Middle Belt we find that many of the chiefs, the taxes of whose areas are many thousands of pounds, live without any salaries and there are some places where District Heads are only paid about thirty shillings and as for that thirty shillings, there are places where an ordinary (tin mining) labourer would earn more than that. And that is how the chiefs in the Middle Belt are being treated while the chiefs in the other parts of the region are given about \$2,000 a year... These are the reasons which have led us to set up the political party known as the United Middle Belt Congress and that is why we say we should like a separate Region for ourselves now".

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This particular catalogue of socio-economic and political grievances as the causes for the M-Belt Movements and its demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region were strongly repudiated by NPC politicians and NPC surrogates from the M-Belt areas in the NHA and these repudiations subsequently found their way into the submission of the NPC government in the North in 1957. In the instance, the NPC government made a careful break down of the grievances in terms of the distribution of allocatable resources to show, who was getting what and where government projects were located. These were statistically manipulated to show that the M-Belt groups and societies were getting more than a fair share of government resources in relation to the concentration of the population in the area. Furthermore, the figures were skewed through defining the M-Belt problem as existing in the whole area comprising the geographical middle of the Nigeria Federation. However, educational and medical expenditure grants to Christian Missionary institutions in the M-Belt areas were disproportionate to those of any other areas in the North. This was so because government gave these grants from public funds for the purposes of assisting Christian Missionaries in their social and welfare work and many primary and post-primary institutions as well as Dispensaries, Maternity Clinic and Hospitals were more concentrated in the M-Belt areas than in the Islamic areas. In the period between 1952 and 1957, for example, Capital and Recurrent Grants for medical and health services alone, given to Benue (14.5%) and Plateau (15.8%), totalled 29.3% for a population that was 14.0% of the North as against 8.9% that went to Kano with a population that was 20.1% of the total North²⁹⁶. The government in the North also exploited the inadequate familiarity of knowledge on local circumstances of the members of the Commission. The chairman, Sir Henry Willink had been a Minister in the wartime British Cabinet and then became the Head of Magdalene College at Cambridge University; Philip Mason, who wrote most of the report, was Director of Race Relations Institute in London; of the remaining two

members: One, Gordon Hadow had been in the Indian Civil Service and the other, the only one with West African experience, J. B. Shearer had been Deputy-Governor in Ghana (the former Gold-Coast)²⁹⁷. It was therefore suggested to the Commission by the government in the North:

"Charges of discrimination in economic development and the provision of social services have been shown not merely to be unfounded but generally the reverse of the truth... the question which the Regional Government has to answer is not why these suspicions exist but whether they have any justification infact. In the material field the charges of discrimination have been shown to be completely baseless. Far from being less developed, either in natural resources or social services, the minority areas of the Middle Belt have actually been much more favourably treated than those of the Moslem North. In staff, in grants, in institutions, in communications, in virtually every branch of official activity, the minorities have received from the Regional Government not less but more than due to them had the division been based on population, derivation of revenue or any strictly material principle"²⁹⁸.

On the surface of the submission it would appear that government in the North had made a judicious case of its M-Belt problem. Beneath the evidence the government produced however the wrong indicators were used to measure completely different phenomenon on different areas. On closer examination of the "facts" on what was presented as the areas of the M-Belt problem as against the areas claimed by the M-Belt movement (i.e. the UMBC) for the proposed M-Belt Region, there is an obvious falsification in the analysis of the evidence collated for the submission. The explanation to this will become apparent in the next few pages below. In additon, the fact that justice/injustice is a difficult concept to measure, particularly so in the application of Islamic law in the nature of dispensing judgement and which was unaccounted for in the submission of the NPC government and the issue was played down as area of legal reform. Yet, this issue ambivalently held by the NPC leadership and government in the North and which brought to the

fore the religious anxieties of christians and non-Moslems among the M-Belt groups and societies, particularly over discrimination that was rampant in the 1950s at the grassroots in the application of Islamic law. Furthermore, the government in the North in its submissions was particular on the geographical definition of the M-Belt areas to avoid where the problems existed, although it was aware that the problems of politics in some Divisions in Ilorin and Kabba were on Yoruba irredentism and not a political parcel of the M-Belt Region. Indeed, the government in the North pointed out these differences in its problems with Yoruba irredentism and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in its submission which it argued against the merger of Ilorin Emirate and Kabba Division with the Western Region. Curiously, however, the government in the North went ahead to include Ilorin and Kabba in the break down of statistical material on the allocation of deriveable resources as those of the M-Belt people. The submission of the government in the North further compounded the issues on the M-Belt Region before the Commission on Minorities by suggesting that the government of the East might also want a revision of boundaries such that the Tiv, Idoma, Igala and Jukun will be included in the Eastern Region of Nigeria²⁹⁹. The problem with the submission however was that the government of the North fallaciously defined the socio-political and cultural areas of the M-Belt groups and societies in the demand for the M-Belt Region:

"...to comprise the whole of Ilorin, Kabba, Benue and Plateau Provinces, the southern parts of Bauchi and Zaria Provinces, the whole of Niger Province except for the area north of Kontagora and the whole of Numan Division of Adamawa together with the Districts of Muri and Wurkum in the same Division of the same Province"³⁰⁰.

Apparently, this was also the area defined by the UMBC and claimed for inclusion in the proposed M-Belt Region at the London Constitutional

Conference in the period between May and June, 1957³⁰¹. While explanatory reasons have been suggested on why Ilorin and Kabba was not part of the M-Belt problem and was therefore outside the conception of the M-Belt Region, Niger Province is also outside this conception, because it formed part of "the Northern System" with the Nupe tribe who were Moslems and developed a centralized Islamic kingdom in political authority and was subsequently tied to Sokoto in religious authority and political power before the British creation of the North in 1900³⁰².

When Ilorin, Kabba and Niger Provinces are removed from the tabulations and statistical break-downs of the Memorandum of the government in the North to the Commission on Minorities on the distribution of benefits to the M-Belt areas, a glaring picture of deprivation emerges on the non-Islamic people that were centered on Numan Division, Muri Division - north of the river Gongola, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and in particular on the core M-Belt people in Plateau and Benue Provinces. An analytical list of suggested indicators derived from the Memorandum of the Northern government and the explanatory reasons given by Moses Nyam Rwang as the causes for the demands of the UMBC in the NHA have been used to produce the statistical figures in Table 4.2. These stand as measures of socio-economic and political deprivations of the M-Belt areas relative to the Islamic society in the North. These indicators also examine justification for the rhetoric of the M-Belt movement on their situation of discrimination and deprivation which caused underdevelopment and therefore the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, separated from the Islamic society where development as equal partners in the Nigerian Federation might take place. The years between 1952 and 1960 are particularly chosen for illustrative purposes in Table 4.2 because: of the census data of 1952, the M-Belt motion of 1956, the London Constitutional Conference in 1957 where the issue of the M-Belt Region was raised, the critical alliance of the UMBC with the AG in 1957 and the inquiry and findings of the Commission on Minorities in 1958 and

Table 4.2. Selected Socio-Economic and Political Indicators in the grievances of the M-Belt groups and Societies as they related to the Islamic Society in the North in the 1950s and 1960s

Area and Province in the North	Basic Data 1952-1958					Rep in Government 1956-1957							Distribution of Social Amenities and Benefits 1956					Econ-Infra and Benefits 1957			Social Welfare and Econ Amenities 1965						
	1952 Pop	Prop M-to NM	% Pop North	% OER Rev from Prov 56	% Re-current Govt Grants 1957/58	Exec	PSC		NAA		Xtians		Classes H of C		Primary + Sec Schools	Scholarships 1957	Medicare Govt	Xtians	Pipe Bone Water Centre	Road Mileage TAT	Other	Market Project Loans to MAI	Govt Hospital	Rest Pri Educ Govt	Indust Location		
Islamic groups and Societies	Sokoto	2680333	9:1	15.9	13.1	10.3	3	18	14	23		3		83	11	25	52 (336beds)	10	2	120		50000	4	5	4		
	Katsina	1483400	19:1	8.8	10.2	7.3	3	18	20	14		1		56	6	28	31 (226 beds)	5	1	54	75	11000	2	4	1		
	Kano	3396350	21:1	20.1	21.9	9.5	3	25	15	23		1		78	14	47	39 (469 beds)	14 (85 beds)	5	140	212.5	30000	7	8	3	15	
	Bornu	1595708	4:1	8.5	8.6	11.4	2	20	22	13		2		82	28	41	41 (214 beds)	8 (46 beds)		49	89.5	80000	5	4	2	4	
	Yola	779052	2:1	5.0	3.7	4.4	1			6		1		44	66		28 (151 beds)		2		13	12500	2	3	1		
	Zaria	805095	2:1	5.1	3.8	6.0				6		1		71	83		42 (221 beds)		2	40	96		1	9	3	1	
	Bauchi	1423825	6:1	6.3	6.1	9.9	1			8		3		100	42	28	56 (259 beds)		2	53			3	4	1		
	Niger	715728	7:1	4.3	2.7	7.8	1			6		2	3	1	79	50	44	63 (222 beds)	11 (68 beds)	2		432	55000	4	4	3	
	Kad CT	44000		0.3											2	3		2 (239 beds)		1		30	37550	2	2	5	14
Total	12943491	9:1	74.3	70.1	66.6	14	81	71	100		14	3	1	595	303	213	354 (2337 beds)	48 (199 beds)	17	456	948	276050	30	43	19	38	
M-Belt Groups and Societies	Berue	1468229	1:9	8.7	6.2	8.1	2	27	4	2	8	1	5	58	299	43	53 (166 beds)	18 (177 beds)	4		329	38000	4	3	10		
	Plateau	891386	1:5	5.3	16.0	8.0	1	24	1	2	3	2	2	53	233	36	52 (399 beds)	18 (368 beds)	1	29	65	55000	7	1	10	2	
	Nwan	121404	1:2	1.1	0.7	1.0					1			1	11	17	28	20 (224 beds)				9500				4	
	Muri-NR	240790	1:4	1.6		0.9								1	1							6400	2	1	1		
	Bauchi	458052	1:2	2.0	2.0	0.8				1				1	15	29		15									1
	Szaria	64946	1:4	0.3	0.3	0.9								1	3	9	46	46	11	1			5300				6
Total	3264298	1:4	18.8	25.2	19.7	3	51	5	6	14	1	9	7	146	624	153	105 (565 beds)	82 (849 beds)	6	29	394	114200	13	7	31	2	
Yoruba Irred. Groups and Societies	Ilorun	830595	2:1	3.0	1.7	5.5	1	45	10	3	2	1	2	49	153	123	40 (198 beds)	9	1	18.5	280	38000	2	2	11	5	
	Kaduna	633909	1:4	3.9	3.0	8.2	2	35	14	2	4	3	1	90	146	152	41 (214 beds)	7 (62 beds)	4			16430	3	4	13		
	Total	1194504	1:2	6.9	4.7	13.7	3	80	24	5	6	1	5	1	139	299	275	81 (412 beds)	16 (62 beds)	5	18.5	280	54430	5	6	24	5
Total North	17402293	2:1	100	111488520	6991335	20	212	100	111	20	16	17	9	880	1226	641	540 (3314 beds)	146 (1110 beds)	28	503.5	1621	2445280	48	56	74	45	

Sources: Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, December 1957, p.20-21, p.31-34, Appendix A-0, p.63-108, Appendix X, p.147-148; Federal Legislature, House of Representatives, Debates, Lagos, 29th March 1955, p.69; Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly, Debates, Kaduna, 1956, p.xi-xiv; Nigeria Year Book 1952, Lagos, p.9-10; Nigeria 1955, London, 1955, p.208-210; NN Local Government Year Book, 1965, p.13-17; Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly, Debates, Kaduna, March 1965, p.225, October 1965, p.519

Keys: M to NM = Muslims to Non-Muslims (Xtians and Pagans); EXEC = Executive Council of the North; PSC-J/S = Public Service Commission-Junior/Senior Staff in Govt Service; H of C = House of Chiefs; Medicare = Medical Institutions: Hospitals, Dispensaries and Maternity Clinics; TAT = Trunk 'A' Tarmacked Roads; NA = Native Authority; VA = Voluntary Agencies (Xtian Missions + only two schools of the Ibo State Union Movement in Kano and Kafanchan); Muri-NR = Muri-North of River Gongola; KadCT = Kaduna Capital Territory

the concomitant extensive mobilization of the M-Belt people on support for the UMBC before the Commission in 1958, an appeal for political support which centered on socio-economic and political grievances of discrimination and deprivation as well as the issue of the creation of the M-Belt Region which combined all the above in the campaigns of the 1959 elections. The year 1965 is included in the analysis of Table 4.2 to indicate the state of deprivation in the grievances of the M-Belt Movement before the military intervention in 1966 which led to the creation of BP state, an approximate fulfillment of the M-Belt Region.

The statistical figures in Table 4.2 indicate that there was unequal representation in government, in the distribution of social welfare amenities and some economic infrastructure among the groups and societies in the North, which produced aggrieved feelings among the non-Islamic communities of the M-Belt areas when their situation is compared to the concentration of amenities in the Islamic areas. Although more people were concentrated in the Islamic society in the North the disproportionate concentration of government resources in the development of Ilorin and Kabba, when compared to the M-Belt areas with more people suggests that political policy rather than rational policy determined the distribution and allocation of resources by the NPC government in the North. It is possible therefore to suggest from the patterns of figures in Table 4.2 that the NPC government in the North gave attention to allocate resources to Kabba and Ilorin in order to stem down the tide of Yoruba irredentism, a more severe political problem threatening the maintenance of the Northern Identity than the threat of the creation of an "alternative Northern Identity" in a M-Belt Region. In other words, the M-Belt areas might well have been sacrificed in the allocation and distribution of resources in the North, because of that political interest, a situation which only served to increase the vigour of demand for the creation of the M-Belt Region separated from the political and religious control of Islamic leadership.

This explanation does not however take away the exigency of political support enjoyed by the NPC party and government in the North from certain elements in Ilorin and Kabba. Indeed the NPC enjoyed more electoral support from those areas than it did the M-Belt areas, particularly from the Igalla and Igbirra tribal unions who exhibited intra-tribal electoral competition and each tribe that won joined the NPC party and were rewarded by being represented in government to produce some Christian elements in the executive council of the North. In all other aspects of representation in government in the North, however, there was a disproportionate concentration of Moslems to Christians. Furthermore, while Moslems could represent Christians in the NHA from among the core of some of the M-Belt groups and societies, Table 4-2 suggests a significant absence in Christian representation of Moslems in the central Islamic areas of religious authority like Sokoto, Katsina, Kano and Borno. However, the table also shows that as late as 1957 and 1965 Christian Missionary Bodies, remained as the sole agents of development in the M-Belt areas by their provision of social and welfare institutions. Furthermore, as late as 1965, Industrial development in the North was concentrated in the Islamic Society, mainly in Kano and Kaduna, with only two established industries by the government in the whole of the M-Belt areas located in Jos in Plateau Province and these produced grammophone records and ply-wood furniture material³⁰³. There was therefore an obvious premise for the M-Belt people to feel alienated and neglected in social and economic development which were initiated by government in the North, given the contrasting evidence in the North in Table 4-2 as against what was produced in the submission to the Minorities Commission. Indeed, it was the Yoruba irredentist areas in the North that got far more than their fair share of allocatable resources from the government, since they only had 6.9% of the total population of the North, contributed about 4.7% derivable government revenue in 1956 and got more in terms of representation in government, distributed social amenities and

economic infrastructure when compared to the M-Belt people with 18.8% of the total population in the North and contributing about 25.% of the revenue of the government in the North.

After 1956 therefore the issues that were raised by the UMBC party in both the NHA and the FHR focussed on deprivation in social welfare, economic and political grievances which were interpreted as a policy of discrimination on the minorities in the North who were mostly non-Moslems in a region where the government was controlled and dominated by Islamic leadership. The emphasis on social welfare and economic issues after 1956 was also characterized by a shift in de-emphasizing religious grievances in the M-Belt movement which became relegated to the background of issues raised in the causes for the creation of a M-Belt Region. It was against the background of these political developments within the UMBC that Ibrahim Imam tabled the motion on the creation of the M-Belt Region:

"In order to be in keeping with the principle of federation and to maintain a smoother administration in the Northern Region; be it resolved, that the creation of a Middle Belt Region, comprising Niger, Ilorin, Kabba, Benue and Plateau Provinces, with parts of Southern Adamawa and Zaria be placed on the agenda for the 1956 Constitutional Conference"³⁰⁴.

As it is explicit in the Motion, there was no direct demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region, although the Motion was vigorously and emotionally debated as if the Region was demanded instantly³⁰⁵.

Furthermore, before the debate, Ibrahim Imam, on his own, desparately sought to withdraw the Motion because:

"it may have a sort of adverse effect on the Constitutional Conference to be held in London"³⁰⁶.

A Parliamentary regulations, however, was enforced, whereby the Motion had to be debated and NPC members in the NHA opposed the Motion with a tirade of personal attacks and exposition which were directed, not only on Ibrahim

Imam but on all persons associated in one way or the other to the UMBC and the previous M-Belt movements, including Pastor David Lot, who at that time was a member of the Government Bench³⁰⁷. As it is indicated by the figures in Table 4.3, the voting pattern defeating the Motion was not a surprise since it was strongly opposed and that, with other considerations dictated the votes of many members who were indigneous to the M-Belt areas. Rather curious, however, the Motion was particularly opposed by Pastor David Lot who saw it as mischievous, frivolous and a political plot:

"by certain unscrupulous political renegades who wished to exploit the imagination of the people in the M-Belt areas"³⁰⁸.

Lot further argued to suggest that the Motion was not related to the socio-economic and political forces that were dictating the demands for the separation of the M-Belt people for constitution into a M-Belt Region in the North, such as: religious affiliations and discriminatory deprivation, which according to him had become secondary and absolute in the unity of the M-Belt³⁰⁹. More fundamental, however, Pastor David Lot opposed the Motion because as leader of the M-Belt Movement, Imam had devised the Motion without a proper mandate from either the UMBC or the people of the M-Belt areas:

"and as the accredited representative of the people in the House... my people are not ready for a separate region at present. We shall continue to work under the present constitutional arrangements... until it becomes necessary to have a region of our own and when the time comes we shall not wait for a Kanuri man to force us into it. We shall make the Motion ourselves... we subscribe to the common maxim 'Unity in Diversity'³¹⁰.

Surprisingly, while half-heartedly supporting Ibrahim Imam, Patrick Fom, similar to Pastor Lot, accused Imam of raising the Motion without a mandate and without adequate consultation with all the UMBC officials. The only

strong support for the Motion came from Moses Nyam Rwang. It is not clear who sponsored the Motion through Ibrahim Imam or as he was in 1956, acting independently on the Northern political arena with no party political identity. Although Imam seemed to have been on his own, he obviously was at that time under the influence of the AG and that of J. S. Tarka in context of the specific AG interests of building up alliances with opposition forces in the North. Patrick Fom succinctly summarizes the political effort of Imam on the M-Belt issue by analogizing him to the familiar Biblical story as a man who:

"sympathises with the people of the Middle Belt. The people of the Middle Belt are just like a man who saw his brother lying in the road without giving help... Ibrahim Imam, though not from the M-Belt is giving help to that brother who is lying down... he did it on the terms of 'Charity to your neighbour'"³¹¹.

Table 4.3 on the votes on the Motion for the creation of a M-Belt Region shows rather contradictory voting patterns by the majority of members from the M-Belt areas in the NHA, despite the existing UMBC influences in 1956. Almost all the members indigenous to the M-Belt areas, except for Moses Nyam Rwang, either voted against the Motion or abstained. Perhaps the biggest contradiction came firstly from S. O. James who abstained³¹². He was a Yoruba, chosen as the special christian member in the NHA from the Plateau, representing christian communities from Southern Nigeria and who had strongly contributed to activating the social and political forces, particularly the christian religious identity, which led to the initial organization of the M-Belt Movement - the NML, before 1950. Secondly, Pastor David Lot, who was the first President of the NML and the MZL and who in 1952 had demanded the creation of a Middle Zone Region before 1956, not only opposed the Motion in the debates, but voted against the creation of the M-Belt Region. A number of reasons explaining the voting patterns in Table 4.3 therefore suggest themselves. The Idoma

Table 4.3
The Vote in 1956 in the NHA on the Motion for
the Creation of a M-Belt Region in the North.

Area in the North	Political Identity	Religious Identity	Votes on the Motion			Total
			Yes	No	Abst.	
Islamic Areas	NPC NEPU Independ.	Moslems	1	32	1	34
Benue	UMBC	Moslem Xtian		5		10
	NPC	Moslems Xtian		2 3		
	Others	Moslems/ Xhan				
Plateau	UMBC	Moslems Xtian	1	3	1	11
	NPC	Moslems Xtian		1 1		
	Others	Moslems/ Xhan		1	3	
Adawawa: Numan & Muri - NR	UMBC	Moslems Xtian		1		2
	NPC	Moslems Xtian		1		
	Others	Moslems/ Xhan				
S. Bauchi	UMBC	Moslems Xhan				3
	NPC	Moslems Xhan		2		
	Others	Moslems/ Xhan		1		
S. Zaria	UMBC	Moslems Xtian		3		3
	NPC	Moslems Xhan				
	Others	Moslems/ Xhan				
Yoruba Irredentist Areas: Ilorin & Kabba	ITP/AG	Moslems Xtian		1 2		12
	NPC	Moslems Xtian		4 4		
	Others	Moslems/ Xhan		1		
Total Votes		Moslems	1	46	1	48
		Xtian	1	22	4	27
		Total	2	68	5	75

Sources: Northern Regional Legislatue, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 6th March, 1956 p222-224; Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region, Kaduna, 1957 p72.

members, for example, who were voted into the NHA on the tickets of the IHRU, joined the NPC party and therefore voted in line with the NPC policy of "One North". Furthermore there were a number of Moslems in the NHA, as representatives of some of the M-Belt people on the Plateau and in the northern parts of Benue Province who voted in line with a party that identified with the Islamic religious identity in the Northern Identity and were against the creation of a M-Belt Region where Christians and non-Moslems might be dominant. More fundamental however, although there were UMBC members in the NHA, party identification was still affected by the factional tendencies and the leadership tussle was still unresolved such that they could not vote in support of the Motion. Indeed, it was not until after May, 1956 that party political identity began to permeate popular consciousness in both the representatives and mass following of the UMBC organization when J. S. Tarka became President of the movement, particularly so for the Tiv people. In other words, unlike in previous organizations of the M-Belt movement, when J. S. Tarka took over the leadership of the UMBC party, social and political support was also party political identification, a goal that was achieved through party control of membership and political mobilization. The vote on the Motion in 1956 was also not reflective of the religious affiliations of the members from the M-Belt areas, just as it did not show party political identification. For the majority of members in the NHA, it was solidly pro-North in political identity, which cut across party and religious identification. Ibrahim Imam (Moslem and BYM) and Moses Nyam Rwang (Christian and UMBC), the only two members of the NHA to vote in support of the Motion had to a large extent, fallen out with the Northern establishment and with their local party as their political base of support in the Constituencies. Moses Nyam Rwang, for example, lost the December 1956 Regional elections to Bitrus Rwang Pam, both of whom contested with the UMBC party political label and identity. The 1956 vote on the M-Belt Motion however was about the last

political effort beyond rhetorics in the NHA on the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, except for the threat by Isaac Shaahu a Tiv member in the NHA in 1965 suggesting that since Tiv Division was increasingly being rejected in Northern Nigeria the Tiv might secede from the Region and the Nigerian Federation as a whole, to declare an Independent Republic of Tiv land³¹³. The members of the UMBC party who gained entry into the NHA after the election of J. S. Tarka as President of the UMBC in May 1956 and after the Regional elections in December 1956, however, maintained an effective opposition front in the Assembly in the North, remained critical of NPC policy on the M-Belt Region and constantly re-echoed the socio-economic and political grievances on the deprivations of the M-Belt areas³¹⁴. The issue of the creation of a M-Belt Region in the period between 1956 and 1965 was characterized by a shift in the emphasis of the political arena from the Northern House of Assembly (NHA) to the Federal House of Representative (FHR), where J. S. Tarka, Patick Dokotri and Jonah Assadugu within the AG policy, sought the subdivision of the Nigerian Federation and produced political pressures in alliance with other Nigerian minorities agitators outside the North at Constitutional Conferences in London, Lagos and Ibadan.

After his election as President of the UMBC and leader of the M-Belt movement, however, Joseph Tarka appears to have gone to see the President-General of the NCNC party, Nnamdi Azikiwe in Enugu, in search for assistance in building up a Middle Belt political party³¹⁵. Azikiwe however referred him to his lieutenants and Tarka made no progress with them, so he went to Ibadan, also seeking and obtaining financial assistance from chief Awolowo and the AG, a political interest that the AG had been anxious to achieve since 1952, when it made effort to penetrate Tiv politics through Isaac Kpum and had him as paid AG secretary for Tiv Division³¹⁶. That J. S. Tarka went to Enugu and Ibadan rather than to Kaduna in solicitating for political support on an issue that affected the subdivision of the North in

the Nigerian Federation created bitterness with the Islamic and NPC leadership in Kaduna and this developed beyond political differences with disquieting proportions until 1966. After that period Joseph Tarka was seen to be an enemy of the North, particularly so when he was also the leader of a political organization with anti-Islamic religious sentiments. Furthermore, the NPC party leadership itself had wished that the leaders of the M-Belt Movement go to them for consultations. It was a recurrent political assumption of the NPC leadership to wish to listen to the "complaints" of the political movements in the M-Belt areas and to assure them of help³¹⁷. In January, 1957, the newly elected executive of the UMBC, convened a conference at Lafia to ratify the alliance that had resulted from the efforts of J. S. Tarka who had gone out of the Region to search for assistance from the AG³¹⁸. The meeting at Lafia, also experienced the political reprimand of Bello Ijumu and Moses Nyam Rwang who previously had entered into negotiations of the alliance with the AG on behalf of the UMBC without authorization. Subsequently however both men were brought into the political activities of the alliance: Bello Ijumu, who had favoured an alliance with the AG was assigned as the UMBC-AG Organizing-Secretary for Kabba Province, while Moses Nyam Rwang who favoured an alliance with the NCNC also became Organizing-Secretary of the alliance for Jos Division in 1959³¹⁸. Before the 1959 elections however Nyam Rwang joined the NPC along with Bitrus Rwang Pam, a new entrant into the UMBC from the MZL leadership after the 1956 elections³²⁰. This re-alignment of the Birom political leadership, significantly excluded Patick Dokotri and the re-alignment was a direct response to the pressures from the government in the North on the chieftancy of Jos in which the Hausa migrant population came up with the issue again to be resolved before Independence³²¹. The move by some of the Birom leadership to take sides with the Northern establishment was therefore to safeguard the chieftancy of Jos under the British appointed Rwang Pam and a political strategy to make it a dynasty of that family from

the Birom village of Du where the Rwang Pam family as well as Moses Nyam Rwang came from. The NPC was itself very keen to do this and Bitrus Rwang Pam, the son to the Chief of Jos, saw the advantages of this and towed the NPC line, a political approach to the chieftancy issue in Birom politics that was opposed by Patick Dokotri. This rift in Birom politics affected political support of the tribe, for the UMBC party and the for the creation of a M-Belt Region, political issues that were contested at electoral levels in the 1959 elections³²².

However, by the decisive political reprimand of non-committed members of the UMBC movement, who had a record of changing their political identities, like Bello Ijumu and Moses Nyam Rwang, the newly elected executive, under the leadership of J. S. Tarka were able to keep the organization on a steadier political cause after 1956 on the struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region. This was within the agreed provision of the Lafia meeting in January 1957 which suggested that alliances were a prerogative of the executive to negotiate with any party within and outside the North³²³. Any dissenters and revisionists to the ideas of the movement on a negotiated alliance were free to go their political path. On 6th March 1957, a formal accord was signed between the AG and the UMBC and was announced in October of the same year and it was also agreed that party publicity material was to be produced in the joint name of the Alliance and that the Palm Tree, popular among the Yoruba and the Tiv was to be the symbol of the alliance, to enhance the identification of the party with illiterate voters. After the accord therefore the Alliance produced Membership Cards with the Motto: Freedom for all; Life more abundant; For us a Middle Belt State³²⁴. The provisions of the accord, were further ratified at the Minna Conference of both the AG and the UMBC parties in May 1958, in which the strategies for political mobilization and the fielding of candidates for the 1959 elections were discussed as issues following from a previous outlined document (in English and Hausa) on the political

meaning of the Alliance that was produced in February, 1958³²⁵. The UMBC-AG alliance met again in Jos in September 1958, mainly in response to the outcome of the London Constitutional Conference on the Report and reinstated its commitment for the creation of a M-Belt Region, albeit other Minorities Regions that were being demanded at that time, COR and MWS:

"to ensure that the minority ethnic groups in the country do not continue to live in awful dread of their majority ethnic neighbours as they do at present... and where the minority ethnic groups (will) enjoy equality of status and human respect vis-a-vis the majority groups and where there is freedom for all and life more abundant irrespective of religion, political beliefs and social standing"³²⁶.

Although the UMBC became a formal political party in Nigerian politics after May 1956 with the election of Joseph Tarka as President, party organization was not structured until late in 1958³²⁷. By this time the party was committed to campaigning for electoral support in alliance with the AG party, all over the M-Belt areas and also in support of the AG over the rest of the North and after the AG found it possible to generously provide the UMBC with financial aid³²⁸. It was, however, not merely a question of committed financial expenditure and money that produced political support for the alliance from the UMBC. The AG party politically desired the creation of a M-Belt Region. Furthermore, it was also the readiness of the AG party and leadership to provide organization personnel and material equipment which was complemented by financial commitments that combined to produce the capacity for mass politicization of the non-Islamic people in the M-Belt areas through the UMBC and the leadership of Joseph Tarka. Indeed, the AG was not covert in its willingness to disburse resources for the alliance and for the political activities of the UMBC:

"The reason for this was the fact that the UMBC was a local party which was being opposed by the powerful NPC party that ruled the North. The only course open to the UMBC was to form an alliance with a national party that had sympathy with it in its aspirations. That national party happened to be the Action Group of Nigeria.... because of the political experience and resources of the Action Group, the organization of the AG/UMBC Alliance throughout the Middle Belt area is assured; and the chances of future election victories are greatly increased"³²⁹.

The alliance subsequently contested the 1959 elections and won twenty five seats in the M-Belt areas³³⁰. In the conduct of its political activities in the period between 1956 and 1958 and subsequently on political mobilization for the 1959 elections the AG disbursed over \$50,000 to the UMBC party as organizational expenses in the M-Belt areas³³¹, spent \$100,000 on behalf of the UMBC-AG alliance in the 1961 Regional elections, its expenditure on the UMBC in 1961 alone was over \$20,000³³². It was partly because of diminishing financial returns from the AG after 1961 that the alliance grew cold feet and caused the UMBC to realign itself with the NEPU to form the NPF in 1963 for the 1964 general elections. The NPF alliance, however, was not the only instance in which the UMBC aligned itself with fellow opposition parties in the North. In 1956, for example, there was close association in friendship between Ibrahim Imam and Joseph Tarka At that time Imam had broken his political ties with the NPC despite his pro-Northern rhetoric at the London Conference and the earlier 'Eight Point Programme' of the NPC which had been submitted in his name³³³. Furthermore, when in 1956, he tabled the Motion on the M-Belt Region in the NHA, that political act, distanced him from the Northern establishment and brought him closer to the UMBC and AG leadership. The climax of this political development was that in June 1958, Imam and the BYM severed political relations with the NEPU-NCNC parties, previously supporting him in his political rummage and entered into a new pact with the AG-UMBC organization in the North. Among the reasons given by Imam and the BYM leadership for the re-alignment were:

"The alleged intent of the NCNC to effect an alliance with the NPC (which subsequently proved to be correct), the failure of the NCNC to assist minority elements in the North during the presence in Nigeria of the Commission of Inquiry into Minority fears, alleged in order to appease the NPC, and the unequivocal support of the Action Group for the creation of a Bornu State"³³⁴.

Furthermore, Ibrahim Imam, himself, had grown ambitious and did not feel he was getting enough independent political support from his association with the NCNC through the NEPU. Ibrahim Imam did not feel he could fill-up a position in NEPU and NCNC, equal to his status as a former General-Secretary of the NPC and the Grand-Patron of BYM, the Kanuri tribal union movement³³⁵. In particular, he needed money and was unable to get this directly from the NCNC, the ally of NEPU³³⁶. This political support from BYM and the UMBC for the AG party caused sufficient anxiety for the NPC government in the North to react in order to contain the demands for the political division of the North in the policies of the AG, particularly the issue of the creation of a M-Belt Region.

Political reactions, by the NPC party and government in the North to stem down the tide of increased political activities and support for the ideas of the M-Belt movement and demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region predates the setting up of a Commission that was appointed in 1957 to inquire into the fears of Minorities in Nigeria and the means of allaying them. The pattern of political reaction in the period between 1950 and 1965 was conditioned by conceptions of the North as 'a Nation within the Nigerian Nation' with a distinct socio-religious and political identity and a political system of its own such that a contesting identity as that of the M-Belt was not tolerable. This political conception of the North however did not emerge in the 1950s. Evidence of the historical evolution of the North within the Nigerian Federation before 1950 suggest that British officials set a precedent in the conception of the North as a distinct political entity. As lately as 1955, however, when there was

already organized political demand by the MZL and the emerging UMBC party for the creation of a separate Region from the Islamic Society in the North, Bryan Sharwood-Smith, the Governor still impressed on elected members of the NHA: "the Northern ship of state is now on course... and gathering speed"³³⁷. In the specific context to preserve the Region as a single political unit, the NPC leadership constantly initiated conciliatory and extremely friendly efforts to compromise the interests of "One North" with political organizations in the M-Belt areas who sought separation³³⁸. In 1951 the MZL attracted sufficient political attention of the NPC leadership in the North and they organized a meeting between the Sardauna and the executive of the MZL at Gindiri. In that meeting:

"The NPC leadership and the Sardauna, wanted to hear what worried Christians in the North and how the aims of the new Christian organization (the MZL), differed from Northern interest which were articulated by the NPC"³³⁹.

The subsequent tempo of political development in the North and Nigeria in general precluded further contact political meetings between the two groups as was agreed upon in Gindiri. However, political identities in the shape of specific interests, in the 'Far North' - which was Islamic and the M-Belt areas - which was non-Islamic and increasingly Christianized, crystallized and polarized political group formations into their geo-political areas. While the MZL in that instance became preoccupied with the articulation of the interests of Christian communities as well as those of non-Islamic communities in the M-Belt areas, the NPC was occupied with the overall interests of the North on the Nigerian political arena, with the centre of political gravity increasingly shifting to the Islamic society. The political means of containing the M-Belt movement and its demands for the subdivision of the North, therefore, took on an institutional form whereby, Commissions were appointed (Hudson in 1956 and Willink in 1957) and patron-client mechanism became used in the practice of

politics to manipulate out some of the M-Belt politicians in the UMBC. The M-Belt movement was therefore subjected to institutional political control and depended in many respects to political parties that were in power or closer to the corridors of power either at the Regional levels or nationally. There were also political efforts to coopt some leadership of the M-Belt movement into the NPC party. Pastor David Lot, for example, experienced these tendencies when he was given a government job in the North and included as a Northerner in the NPC delegation to constitutional conferences that were going on at the time.

These initial political reactions to the M-Belt problem by the NPC government in the North were not very successful. Although inclusion into NPC delegations and government in the North meant participation in the main stream of political development in the North and Nigeria, some of the M-Belt leadership continued to function with dual political roles and identities. While they were Northerners in the NPC delegations and government in the North, they remained politically active at local levels in the cause of the M-Belt movements. In the period between 1952 and 1956, for example, the MZL party continued to preoccupy itself with mobilizing political support exclusively from Christians and non-Moslems, over elections (1952, 1954 and 1956) and activating anti-Islamic as well as anti-migrant Hausa sentiments on the local population among some of the M-Belt people. This was the case, despite the existence of its factional tendencies and the participation of some of its leadership in the NPC government in the North. As a direct result of these political activities local protests erupted in some areas of the M-Belt, which indicated the extent of achieved mobilization on the ideas of the creation of a M-Belt Region and which activated local political feelings that created a political mood of disaffection toward Moslems and migrant Hausa people involved in local political affairs. These developments happened in the period between 1952 and 1956 and with such spontaneity that the government

of British administration and the NPC party in the North increasingly found difficult to ignore³⁴⁰. In Adamawa, for example, support for the ideas of the M-Belt movement was so overzealously expressed that it produced the first martyrs of the M-Belt movement during the Wurkum riots of 13th July 1954³⁴¹. The causes of the Wurkum riots centered on anti-Fulani campaigns and protests. These were organized by the Wurkum Tribal Union (WTU), which was politically affiliated to the MZL party. The WTU consisted of over 800 exclusively christian male members and had SUM Christian Religious Instructors, teachers and other employees as officials of the organized village branches of the union. The protest campaigns were activated by resentment to the appointment of a Fulani District Head and his chosen associate village heads. The protests were also over resentment at some traditional religious practices, which found expression in mocking the "Dodo" processions (a traditional invocation of ancestral spirits of elders who were dead, as a symbol of authority), refused to pay tax to the Fulani District Head who insisted that his villages heads perform the ritual and also other socio-economic and political issues touching on religious sentiments that surfaced during the campaigns for the 1954 elections which the administration termed: "the spreaching of false rumours about the elections"³⁴². The WTU increased its protests on these issues and over the newly appointed Fulani District Head in particular, by intimidating the Tax Scribes and effectively excluded them from visiting certain villages in the cause of tax collection. On occasions when the Tax Scribes ventured to those areas, their papers and ink were seized by members of the WTU. At a meeting of the Emir, the DO with about 500 members of the WTU to resolves the issues and tensions:

"the crowd became out of hand and openly hostile when it was proposed that the new District Head be given a trial... three shots were fired at the knees of the ringleaders, causing 3 casualties, one of whom died later. The intensity of the fighting can be judged by

the fact that the rioters... evacuated their three casualties and continued fighting against baton charges... 49 of the ringleaders (a regretablely high proportion being Sudan United Mission evangelists and teachers) were sentenced by the Magistrate Grade I to terms of imprisonment up to 4 years; 342 others pleaded guilty before the District Court on circuit and recieved fines ranging from 5s to 30s"³⁴³.

In 1954 in S. Zaria and in particular in the Kagoro NA areas, where the SIM concentrated its socio-religious and welfare activities and institution, the MZL sufficiently mobilized christians and non-Moslems communities, that it brought the NA council to a head - on collusion course with the government of British administration in Kaduna and the Emir of Zaria through its surrogate Emir in Jemaa. Using a crisis that had developed from 1951 and which was ressurected, the tribal council was influenced by leaders of the MZL and demanded the transfer of Kagoro NA to Plateau Province, a demand which was carried further by a threat to withhold tax payment unless this was done³⁴⁴. A violent situation was averted in the same year, when Kagoro NA was merged with others in Southern Zaria where non-Islamic communities existed and were in the majority and transferred to Plateau Province as Jemaa Federation Native Authority. In 1954, in Jos township areas, there were riots and clashes between, on the one hand, the Birom and the Hausa over the chieftancy of Jos and the Hausa - Fulani instigation of the Rukuba tribe, whose substantial members were Moslems to break-away from the Jos NA and on the other hand, Birom and Hausa joined their grievances and clashed with the Ibos, over the allocation of plots in the metropolis and market stalls in the Jos main market³⁴⁵.


Initially, the government in the North and the political leadership of the NPC party did not interpret these developments in relation to the political activities of the M-Belt movement, in its phase as the MZL and the mobilized sentiments in the demands for the creation of a Region in the North, which will separate a Moslem majority, from christians and non-Islamic communities, as well as a wish to dismantle the whole structure

of Hausa-Fulani and Islamic rulership which affected most severely the "pagans" in the M-Belt areas. British residents in the Provinces where Christians and "pagan" majorities existed in the population and where anxieties were most acute from the apprehension of Self-Government in the North - that is, the withdrawal of British protection and administration - would mean the domination and ill-treatment at the hands of Moslem leadership, explained away violent political trends in the M-Belt areas as "little events" invigorated:

"by pagan, educated youngmen from Christian Missionary institutions, who do not want to pay respect to their chiefs or pay taxes to their Fulani overlords... and these youngmen have little support among the bulk of the local populace... given the speed with which the situations returned to normality"³⁴⁶.

In certain instances at the institutional level, the government of British administration and the NPC leadership in the North, dismissed demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region and the Ilorin-Kabba merger with the Western Region of Nigeria, as rumours. In 1950, for example, the government told the Emirs in the NHC that the demand to organize the Provinces of Kabba, Ilorin, Benue and Plateau into a separate Region in the North "was an incorrect rumour"³⁴⁷. In the period between 1950 and 1956, however, the chiefs of the North continued to press for explanations on how the government was reacting and containing the demands of the M-Belt movement and the more religious and politically sensitive issue of the boundary dispute between the North and the Western Region of Nigeria, until in December, 1956, when on their own account, they flared up a debate on the issue. This outburst was when it had become apparent that a Motion on the M-Belt Region had been made in the NHA and with increased AG political activities in the Ilorin and Kabba areas they were apprehensive as to whether the Yoruba populated divisions in the North might go to the Western Region. When there was a debate on Yoruba irredentism in Northern Nigeria there were unequivocal conclusions on the issue suggesting that:

Map 5. Provincial Structure of the North in 1960.



"Ilorin was part of Northern Region before the coming of the British... The chiefs would never agree to let an inch of Ilorin to be cut off and merged with the West. Let whoever wants that come out openly and lay his gauntlet. The causes that made Ilorin a part of the North are still there, nothing has changed... any group of people who do not like to remain can pack up and leave... not an inch of the land itself will go anywhere else... Land is not usually taken away from people by mere talk. Land is taken away by force and not by talk... every chief in the whole Region is prepared to help in the event of any trouble as we use to do in old days"³⁴⁸.

V. The Hudson Report in the North and the Willink Commission on Minorities Fears in Nigeria.

In 1955, largely from the increased tensions caused by the political growth and development of the M-Belt Movements and the articulation of the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region with the increasing involvement of the AG in Kabba and Ilorin as well as with the MBSP, there were propositions for Provincialization in the North. The propositions suggested the reallocation of some powers of the Regional government to the Provinces and the ideas of the propositions were strongly supported by the Premier of the North Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto³⁴⁹. The idea seemed at that time, among top government officials to be one way to reassure the Northern Minorities and thereby cut the ground out from under threatening separatist organizations of the non-Islamic M-Belt people³⁵⁰. The conception of Provincialization was however tantamount to a proposal to create a Federal System, in one Region, within the Nigerian Federation and the plan was enthusiastically referred to within official circles in Kaduna as "the twelve pillars policy"³⁵¹. In 1956, R. S. Hudson of the colonial office in London was assigned to draw up detailed proposals for Provincialization in the North; the submissions subsequently became known as the Hudson Report³⁵². In 1957, the government

in the North hurried the Provincialization scheme, to give aboost to its political image on showing concern and commitment in solving the M-Belt problem, because demands were going to be made on the creation of a M-Belt Region in the North and the issue debated³⁵³. At the conference, the delegates representing the North publicly committed themselves to Constitute Provincial Administration in each of the Northern Provinces and requested that the Constitution be amended to allow for implimentation³⁵⁴. The Constitutional Conference of May to June 1957 in London, as well as, the Commission on Minorities which the conference set up in September 1957 were apprised of the work of Hudson³⁵⁵. The Hudson Report therefore influences the decision of the Commission on Minorities not to recommend the creation of a M-Belt Region or any other alternative form of greater authority for the M-Belt areas in the North, when compared to its treatment of minorities issues in the East and the Western Regions of Nigeria. Two months after the Commission on Minorities produced it Report, the government in the North shelved the ideas in the propositions by the Hudson Report and explained to the Resumed Conference in London:

"the Northern Government had not so far found it possible to establish Provincial Administration in the form for which permissive provision was made in the Constitution"³⁵⁶.

After 1957, the ideas of creating Provincial Administrations along the lines laid down in the Hudson Report were dropped and the Report itself was filed and shelved, but kept resurfacing each time there were political pressures to break-up the North into more Federal Units. Significantly in the months of the Nigerian crisis following from the January 1966 coup and leading to the political events that caused the creation of states in May 1967, the Hudson Report was again brought out for reconsideration and implimentation by both politicians and top government officials in Kaduna, although General Yakubu Gowon had made it clear that more states were going

to be created as Federal units within the Nigerian Federation³⁵⁷. The fate of the Hudson Report was therefore to a very large extent, a function of the political strategy of government in the North over the M-Belt problem. The government held out Provincialization as a counter to the separatist, but once the crisis represented by the investigations of the Commission on Minorities and other related pressures on the M-Belt movement, like the delay of independence for the creation of more states had subsided, the government in the North found it convenient to withdraw implementing the proposals in the Hudson Report³⁵⁸. The government and the NPC party in the North found converts, from among the leadership of the M-Belt Movement, to the ideas in the proposals and some who believed that the Hudson recommendations were an alternative to the creation of a M-Belt Region. Pastor David Lot in 1956 for example, argued against the creation of a M-Belt Region:

"Since it is the policy of the Government to give almost complete autonomy to the Provinces. This will give each Province an opportunity to look after its own interests and progress at its own speed. Until this new idea is tried, the creation of a new Region at present is unnecessary³⁵⁹".

The Hudson Report and its recommendation were strongly rejected by the M-Belt politicians in the UMBC and the AG parties and subsequently the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Minorities eclipsed its political objectives.

In November, 1957, for example, southern Nigerian based intellectuals associated with the AG and Chief Awolowo, pointed out that the political scheme of provincialization was:

"an integral part of local Government and therefore the creations of the Regional Governments, which has a right to make and unmake them. They (the Provincial Authorities) cannot provide the psychological satisfaction which autonomous units will give those Northerners who advocate more states. It may merely help to establish a situation which is superficially stable, but within which there is latent discontent, thus generating pathological tensions which corrode the body politic"³⁶⁰.

The Committee also argued against the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region/State, albeit the MWS and COR state: because it will merely separate out the minority groups from the major ethnic ones and advocated that the existing Provinces in Nigeria were the most conducive long term solutions to the minority problems³⁶¹.

However, the institutional political efforts by the government of British administration and the NPC party in The North, which were influenced from London, Lagos and Kaduna and which were meant to stem down the tide in the growth and development of political support for the M-Belt movement, were nowhere more expressive than in the appointment and subsequent report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the fears of minorities and the means of allaying them as well as in the submission from the NPC government in The North to the Commission under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Willink³⁶². The recommendations of the Commission on Minorities, just like the propositions of the Hudson Report were perhaps the most overt political manifestation of institutional response and initiative by both British and NPC leaders to do something on the M-Belt problem or at least demonstrate that something else could be done, rather than the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North, while at the same time maintaining a posture of no commitment on changing the status quo over conceptions of The North

as a single political unit of the Nigerian Federation.

The Commission was appointed by the British government through Alan Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the colonies in September, 1957 and consisted of Henry Willink (Chairman), Gordon Hadow, Philip Mason and J.B. Shearer as members³⁶³. It arrived in Nigeria on the 23rd November, 1957, and between that date and 12th April, 1958, it held public settings and had private meetings and discussions in each Region, in Lagos and in the Southern Cameroons with representatitons of governments, political organizations and individuals representative of specific interests³⁶⁴. The terms of reference of the Commission included:

"To ascertain the facts about the fears of minorities in any part of Nigeria and to propose means of allaying those fears whether well or ill founded. To advice what safeguards should be included for this purpose in the constitution of Nigeria. If, but only if, no other solution seems to the Commission to meet the case, then as a last resort to make detailed recommendations for the creation of one or more new states and in that case: to specify the precise area to be included in such state or states; to recommend the Governmental and administrative structure most appropriate for it; to assess whether any state recommended would be viable from an economic and administrative point of view and what the effect of its creation would be on the Region or Regions from which it would be created and on the Federation. To report its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of State for the colonies"³⁶⁵.

In the period between November 1957 and April 1958, the UMBC and specific individuals, organizations and tribal unions associated with its interests from among the M-Belt groups and societies appeared and made representation before the Commission, arguing for the creation of a M-Belt Region and in certain instances, against the creation of a M-Belt Region³⁶⁶. The Commission submitted its report and findings on 30th July, 1958.

It was however against the background knowledge of the intended visit and tours of the Commission on Minorities to centres like Kaduna, Zaria,

Jos, Bauchi, Makurdi, Yola and Kafanchan, among other centres in The North, that the UMBC executive decided to organize their own tours too, to effect more political mobilization of the whole of the M-Belt groups and societies, as well as, other non-Islamic communities in The North. Furthermore, the tours of the UMBC Executive in 1957, were also meant to create awareness and political support for the issues to be raised before the Commission, on the socio-economic and political grievances of the M-Belt areas and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. Although all the executive members of the UMBC movement were involved in the process of mobilization, the tours of the whole M-Belt areas were done by Joseph Tarka (President of the UMBC) and Patrick Dokotri (the Secretary-General of the UMBC), largely using initially allocated funds from the UMBC-AG alliance. In the period between November, 1957 and April, 1958, Joseph Tarka and Patrick Dokotri, travelled extensively in the M-Belt areas and in particular visited influential chiefs in the area, like the Tor Tiv, the Bwong Gwom Jos, the Ochi Idoma, as well as other non-Islamic chiefs in Pankshin, Shendam, Bauchi, Wukari and Numan areas, to persuade them to support the ideas for the creation of a M-Belt Region before the Minorities Commission. During the tours by Tarka and Dokotri, there were also numerous public rallies in the urban and semi-urban centres of the M-Belt areas. Apart from the increased political consciousness which these tours created on the purposes of the Commission on Minorities, from the rallies and the consultations with chiefs and community leaders, there was also an element of cementing the unity of the M-Belt groups and societies. Government in The North and the NPC party were alarmed by the achieved political mobilization in support of the ideas of the M-Belt movement and its demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region and pro-statu quo forces organized opposition from within the indigenes of the M-Belt areas to testify against the creation of a M-Belt Region which the Commission admitted to suggest that: "one witness expressed the view succinctly in the statement that he

preferred the Fulani because they were further away", rather than be in a state which the Tiv would be the dominant element³⁶⁷. The Commission however, discovered that strong political support existed:

"In Plateau Province, the Birom are strongly in favour ... In Southern Bauchi we heard of support for the proposed state from the Jarawa District; in Adamawa support appeared to be practically confined to the Numan Division. Benue Province ... from its total population of 1468000, 765000 are Tiv, a tribe who are generally in favour of the state and indeed share with the Birom the distinction of leading the movement ... The seven Southern districts of Zaria ... usually ruled by Fulani District Heads have never been completely absorbed into the Northern system, which they regard with some fear and apprehension; this area is a stronghold of the M-Belt movement ... Thus if the whole long and sprawling area which is included in the proposals for the Middle Belt area is considered, we believe that support would be strong in Jos Division ... the Tiv area, the Numan Division of Adamawa, in Southern Zaria and in Pankshin West. Opinion is divided in the Lafia Division, Akwanga and Lowland Divisions"³⁶⁸.

Socio-religious and political support for the creation of a M-Belt Region before the Commission was explained by frictions between the Biroms and the immigrants from other tribes who had come into Jos, a town that developed rapidly as a result of the tin mines; in Adamawa, because of traditional resistance to Fulani conquest and independent outlook from the Fulani group; in Benue, among the Tiv by distinction of leading the movement and their size; and in Southern Zaria, because of Fulani District Heads and the failure to accept absorption into the Northern System³⁶⁹. Opposition to the creation of a M-Belt Region was explained by non-indigenous anxieties over the emergence of Birom influence and domination over local affairs in Jos and indigenous as well as non-indigenous anxieties over the Tiv as a dominating element in the anticipated new region. The Commission however, also noted the sprawling nature of the Region claimed by the M-Belt movement, the fear of Moslem religious and political intolerance and was in

the view of the Commission that they were externally induced by European Christian Missionaries and political and social interests outside Northern Region³⁷⁰. The Commission however, suggested an identifiable total of about seventy two "fears and grievances" that were brought before it by M-Belt representative and other special interests in the causes of the creation of a M-Belt Region and representatives of Christian Missionary Bodies, who were concerned over constitutional safe-guards on basic human rights, liberties and freedom³⁷¹.

An analysis of these "fears and grievances", demonstrate the social and political identity which dominated the uniform concern in the representation from among the M-Belt groups and societies in the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region. Furthermore, by examining the Report of the Commission, it is possible to categorize nine different types of fears and grievances, which were at the root of the polarized socio-religious identities on political dissent in the unity of The North and the tensions between the Islamic society and the non-Islamic M-Belt groups and societies³⁷². The nine fears and grievances centred on a swing back toward Islamic conservatism and the autocratic rule of Emirs to religious intolerance with concomitant negative consequences on how far they might be able to influence the distribution of socio-economic, welfare and political benefits to their areas. As they are carefully sub-headed in the Report of the Commission, the nine fears and grievances included: issues on traditional rulers, socio-ethnic discrimination on persons outside the Northern System in the Northern Public Service Commission, uncertainty over repression on Christians and non-Moslems upon British departure, lack of political influences/powerlessness because of numerical size, NA appointments at the local levels of administration, neglect in development and the allocation of resources to increase wealth and the conduct of foreign policy in favour of the dominant religion in The North rather than the national interests of Nigeria³⁷³. Under these general categories, a

number of specific complains are also identifiable in the Report of the Commission which give a total of one hundred and twenty five indicators of fears and grievances. A further examination reveal that a rough estimate of about 72 (57.6%) of the fears and grievances analyzed by the Commission directly affected the M-Belt areas of Benue, Plateau, S.Zaria, S.Bauchi and Numan; 36 (28.8%) affected the non M-Belt areas of Kabba, Ilorin and parts of Niger Province; and 17 (13.6%) affected the Islamic society itself, as particularly was the case with issues raised by NEPU and BYM and these centered on personal freedoms and liberties, which were problems of politics that were also shared and shown in support of the UMBC party in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region³⁷⁴. Table 4.4 further breaks down the nine categorized fears and grievances suggested by the Report on the frequency of a number of specific indicators, to produce the total of seventy two that affected non-Islamic groups and societies in Numan, S. Bauchi, Plateau, Benue and S. Zaria; For example, this is based from a category like social fears and grievances on tribal discrimination, in which case the indicators counted might be: contemptuous expressions in calling non-Islamic persons names, rejection to the observance of Purdah, prohibition of alcoholic consumption, refusal to eat with non-Moslems etc³⁷⁵. Table 4.4 therefore suggests a number of conclusions: Contrary to the emphasis of the government in the North, in its submission to the Commission on Minorities on issues of discriminatory deprivation in social and economic infrasturcture and welfare benefits as a major grievance of the M-Belt movement and which it went into great pains and details to disprove, the critical grievances of the non-Islamic people centered on Moslem law and religious intolerance, which affected everyday existence. This does not, however, mean that there was equitable distribution of socio-economic and welfare infrastructure for evenly increasing wealth among all the groups and societies in the North; as illustrated by the figures in Table 4.2. Indeed, Bryan Sharwood-Smith, one of the Governors of

Table 4. 4

Fears and Grievances of the M-Belt groups and societies
in the Report of the Commission on Minorities in The North in 1959

Type of fear and Grievance	Frequency of indicators	%total indicators
Moslem Law	19	26.4
Religious intolerance by government and NPC Party	19	26.4
Traditional Rulers	12	16.7
Socio-tribal discrimination	7	9.7
Uncertainty on British Departure	5	6.9
Political powerlessness	5	6.9
Native Authorities	3	4.2
Neglect over Development	1	1.4
Conduct of Foreign Policy	1	1.4
TOTAL	72	100.0

Source: Nigeria: Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the fears of minorities and the means of allaying them, London, 1958, p57 - p70.

the North that served for a long period of time admitted for example, that despite increased prosperity in the Region as a result of the great things the Sardauna did, the Tiv did not benefit much³⁷⁶. Table 4.4 also suggests that by the very nature of fears and grievances the Commission acknowledged, the M-Belt groups and societies testified with political claims of a Christian and non-Islamic religious identity. The frequency of their complaints all touched on M-Belt antipathies toward Islam, institutions of society which were associated with Islam and Islamic attitudes and practices. Indeed, the only female person to give evidence in support of demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, Elizabeth Ivase, suggests that she was as much a representative of Tiv women as she was of Christianity and Christian women in general against the fear of Moslem rule in the North with practices of Purdah which inhibited the educational development of women and young girls³⁷⁷. Elizabeth Ivase testified before the commission when she was still at Sacred Hearts College at Kaduna and she was also General-Secretary of the Tiv Christian Women Association³⁷⁸. She very much impressed the members of the Commission by her knowledgeable arguments on the M-Belt problems in the North, far exceeding the Yoruba lawyers who had been expensively sent from Ibadan in defence of the M-Belt movement³⁷⁹. However, although she had a strong political identity of the UMBC party and its demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region through Isaac Kpum, she did not independently appear before the Commission without the political influences of Joseph Tarka as well as those of her teacher, Isaac Kpum, who encouraged and sponsored her³⁸⁰.

Although there is abundant evidence both in the Report and outside it, to suggest a genuine need for the separation of the M-Belt groups and societies from the Islamic society in the North, to constitute another unit of the Nigerian Federation the recommendations of the Commission strongly suggested the preservation of the British created unit of the North within the Nigerian Federation. Rather contradictory to the strong historical

perspective that was taken as the reasons for the maintenance of the socio-religious and political unity of the North, the Commission endorsed the arguments of the government which suggested that the M-Belt people were very functional entities to the Islamic society:

"The North would be seriously affected by its loss. Many from the M-Belt area were in service in the rest of the Region, and might on the one hand, be reluctant to leave their present service, while on the other they would leave the rump of the North without experienced officials... we require strong evidence of popular support for a separate state to make it worthy of consideration... the UMBC do not indicate very settled convictions"³⁸¹.

Although the Commission used these arguments, which were largely presented by the NPC party and the government in the North, to dismiss the demand for the creation of the M-Belt Region, it was this seeming cultural division of labour in which the non-Islamic M-Belt people occupied subordinate functional roles, mainly in the professional classes, rather than in policy administration and political decision making roles, that there was resentment on and bitterness which conditioned the demands for separation and constitution into a M-Belt Region. The circumstance were particularly seen to have ramification on when and who gets what and why, in the equation of distributing and allocating deriveable socio-economic and welfare benefits from the government of the day. Indeed, Table 4.8 shows, that the senior top posts in the public service of the North went to persons from the core of the Islamic society and this was compounded by the fact that many of the chiefs from the M-Belt areas, were second class in status and were not Hausa-Fulani-Kanuri-Nupe, whose chiefs were predominantly first class in status in the NHC. Furthermore, the first class chiefs were concentrated in the Islamic groups and societies that made up the Northern System³⁸².

In anycase, using a number of arguments that reinforced the British

government opposition to fragmentation of the existing Federal arrangements of three regional units in general and yet with one, outsized in territory, population, plurality and with a unique religious cleavage between Moslems and non-Moslems - Christians and pagans, which territorially polarized the North, the Commission on Minorities put forward alternatives that excluded the creation of a M-Belt Region. These arguments revolved on the earlier British government propositions that suggested it would not consider the creation of more than one new state and that the Regions had to be big to be viable:

"the United Kingdom Government would have to take into account the effect of the establishedment of any such new states on the existing Regions in the Federation and on the Federation as a whole
... (and) would also have to be satisfied by the Commission that any such new state would be viable from both the economic and administrative points of view, since it was the view of the United Kingdom Government that administrative and other practical reasons would inevitably limit most severely the possibility of further sub-division of Nigeria into states modelled on the present Regional system... while the creation of even one more state in any Region would create an administrative problem of the first order, the creation of more than one such state in any Region could not at present be contemplated"³⁸³.

This became the official British government position and political attitude to the issue of state creation in Nigeria and particularly directed to the Commission on Minorities, even when it was the case that the Secretary of State acknowledged that: the discussions about the creation of new states had led to expressions of fear that went beyond normal political differences³⁸⁴.

Subsequently in its Report in July, 1958, the Commission on Minorities endorsed an already existing posture of the British government on the issue of the creation of more states and the doubts about the sizes of the states

and the potential to be viable as units in relation to the already existing and established units and pointed out:

"some years ago, before the relations between the Federation and the Regions had crystallized, it was possible to conceive a larger number of states with smaller powers, but a new state created today would have to compete with the existing Regions and the cost... would be high. This consideration, when combined with the difficulty of finding a clean boundary, was in each particular case to our minds decisive"³⁸⁵.

A major conclusion of the Commission was that while there remained a body of genuine fears, the creation of separate states would not provide a remedy for the fears expressed. The Commission placed in the forefront of its recommendation to meet this situation suggestions of comprehensive provisions in the Constitution concerning human rights and the maintainance of a single Police Force for the whole of Nigeria, with arrangements to enable the Regional Governments participate in the management of the Force³⁸⁶. The Secretary of State for the colonies, further pegged down the chances for the creation of States in Nigeria by arguing that since delegates to the Constitutional Conference were one in pressing for a grant of independence in 1960, the additional request for the creation of more units of the Federation was not compatible:

"If the United Kingdom were asked after the elections next year by majority opinion in Nigeria to provide for the creation of new states forthwith, he could not regard it as consonant with his responsibilities to transfer power in 1960 while small new Governments, lacking experience, trained staff and a proper framework of administration were yet established. Furthermore, according to the Minorities Commission, the case for new states was weakest in the Northern Region... it was unlikely that such a demand would make possible the creation of a coherent new state in any area of the North which could hope to stand with full Regional status. If therefore new states were created in the southern part of

Nigeria alone, this would bring about still greater imbalance in the Federation, with an overwhelmingly powerful North facing four or five smaller states in the South"³⁸⁷.

In the circumstances, the Secretary of State to the colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, left the Nigerian delegates with two choices:

"on the one hand to abandon the request for independence in 1960 and instead to put the question of new states to the test at the next election or at a series of plebiscites next year; on the other hand to accept that if there was to be early independence, no new states could be created either now or as a result of next year's elections, so that the present structure of the Federation would continue in existence at least until after the strains of independence had been taken"³⁸⁸.

The representatives of the interests of the Nigerian minorities movements were so disappointed by these developments that they could only make a recorded political regret. However, all these different stands on the political controversy on the issue of the creation of more states in Nigeria reinforced the arguments of the government of British administration and the NPC party in the North, against the creation of the M-Belt Region as it is clearly suggested in the submission it made to the Minorities Commission when it stated:

"The Northern Region as it is today is the product of geography, history and the character of its people. Geography has combined in these latitudes to produce a people who, though in many ways diverse, are nevertheless capable of unity, and history, long before the advent of the British, has been busy with the process of unification... For generations Kanuri have been spreading all over the Fulani Empire. More recently, Fulani herdsmen have moved with their cattle into the Jos and Mambilla Plateau... in every corner of the Region, the Hausa tongue unobtrusively advances its frontiers... in outlook, in interests, in values, in culture, in modes of life, there is much more to identify than to distinguish the people of the North... it is during the last decade, with the

introduction of representative Legislatures and the creation of a Regional Government, that the growth of this new spirit has been most spectacular. In a continent whose curse has been fragmentation, unity is a precious quality, not to be lightly tampered with. The overwhelming majority of the people are vehemently opposed to the creation of a new Region or any revision of Regional boundaries. The Regional Government shares their feelings... takes its stand unequivocally upon the contention that fragmentation and boundary revision are justified neither by history, nor by ethnology, nor by any past record of oppression and discrimination, nor by the wishes of any substantial parts of the population, nor by any combination of these factors whatsoever... the solution to the problem of Minorities must be found by entrenching safeguards for them in the Constitution and above all by cultivating in every part of Nigeria the spirit of liberty, tolerance and respect for law which alone, in the long run, can guarantee the rights of the weak against the strong:

"Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; a house divided against a house falleth"³⁹⁰.

In dismissing the prospects for the creation of the M-Belt Region, on top of the arguments in opposition to political fragmentation, the Commission pointed out that the area in demand was long and sprawling and would be difficult to practically administer³⁹¹. The Commission accepted and predicted that at Independence the sincerity in the views of the NPC government in the North on political and religious tolerance would be sound because of the conviction in the growth of importance of the Nigerian Federation, with Regional bases of political unity, which were bound to occur after Independence. The political circumstances of the Federal balance of power were, for example, going to reinforce the ideals of tolerance expressed by the NPC party and accepted by the Commission since the NPC political interests would be to obtain every seat they could get in the Regional and National Legislatures. It was argued that this political strategy was unlikely to be effective with the alienation of outlying areas to the dominant Islamic society in the North. Furthermore, the Commission

believed that the political strategy of winning the votes of the minorities constituted a better safeguard for the position of the minorities rather than the creation of a separate M-Belt Region³⁹². In the subsequent practice of politics after the Report of the Commission on Minorities, however, the majority groups in each of the Nigerian Regions infact found it easier to coerce their minorities into political support rather than to canvass for their votes and to conciliate them. In 1962, Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto who was Premier in the North described the Commission on Minorities as the most embarrassing body of investigation set up by the British government that ever visited the North:

"This wandered round the country listening to scores upon scores of people who thought their area should be carved out of the Region... claiming they did not get a fair deal from the party in power in the Region. There were three groups which made the most noise... the third was the group advocating the so-called 'Middle-Belt' - along slice of the country running along both sides of the Rivers Niger and Benue, with an extension to cover the Plateau and Southern Zaria... there was nothing to show that the various people making up this group would agree amongst each other, if they found themselves involved in a new Region: it would be only further fragmentation soon after such an arrangement had been made... further, the people of the area had much greater advantage than the people of the four extreme Northern Provinces: in schools, in hospitals, in roads and other amenities the riverine people were well ahead of the semi-desert people and having the greater proportion of educated people, the numbers of their men and women who are in Government Service now is greatly in excess of those from other areas: this means that in a few years, they will inevitably hold positions in this Region... I am forced to the conclusion that there is nothing in it beyond the personal aggrandisement of its leaders and a desire to embrass us. It is abundantly clear that the whole movement is inspired by our political opponents, who are doing their utmost to destroy the Northern Region and so reduce its membership in the House of Representatives. It must never be forgotten that almost the whole of the Region as it is today and a great deal outside it, was ruled by my

great-great-grandfather's family through their
lieutenants or by the great Shehus of Bornu:
the only important exception is the Tiv area
South of the Benue River... The Commission
agreed that the North should be left as it was.
They did not accept the proposals put forward
to constitute a Middle Belt Region and were
against any interference with its boundaries...
since then (1958) the whole agitation has died
away into a few infrequent ramblings on the
horizons of the Tiv Division and the Birom
Country on the High Plateau"³⁹³.

In many respects the demands of the M-Belt movement for a M-Belt Region were a rejection of the political conceptions of the North as an inheritance from dan Fodio. The M-Belt politicians also resented the historical recollections and reminders of the colonial expansion of the Islamic society in the period of dan Fodio and after which were constant in the statements of the Sardauna. In terms of the Western European modernization sectors, which the Sardauna also made reference to, it is clear that he was alarmed by the educational development of the non-Islamic groups in the North, particularly those in the M-Belt areas, and its relationship to jobs in government. The potential of reverse domination of the jobs in government with ramifications on the allocation of scarce resources on the Islamic society by the M-Belt groups in the future years because of their monopoly of education was therefore foreseen and had to be checked by political instruments which Islamic leadership controlled. The demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region were therefore also caused by the anxieties over their rapid modernization and educational development which was checked by the Sardauna. However, as J. P. Mackintosh suggests, it is quite apparent, from the statements of the Secretary to the Colonies over the issue of the subdivision of the North in particular and Nigeria in general during the 1957 and the subsequent resumed constitutional Conference in 1958 and also in the report of the Commission on Minorities and the submission of the government in the North, the British were interested in the group that took over control of political power in the

North as well as over all of Nigeria and as such were equally playing politics in Nigerian politics with the political groups in the North, as much as the major organized political group (the NPC) itself was involved in manoeuvring its political advantage and manipulating political opponents in southern Nigeria in order to maintain the political unity of the North to dominate the Nigerian political arena³⁹⁴. The need and strong desire for the creation of more states/regions in Nigeria and in particular in the North were reduced by the stonger nationalist sentiments to first achieve Independence and then to hope to resolve the political issue of state creation. In 1958, the two delegates that represented the M-Belt areas in the AG delegation, were persuaded by Mallam Aminu Kano and others who suggested that the issue of state creation could be resolved and sorted out upon the achievement of independence since it was an internal domestic matter³⁹⁵. Aminu Kano, like most of the other political interests at the conference as well as the interests of the government of British administration in the North, initially considered that political solutions to the separatist tendencies of the M-Belt groups and societies were better in constitutional safeguards that removed fears and grievances. Removing a fear by Constitutional safeguards, statements of policy and promises of sincere implementation in the context of practical reality was, however, not the same thing as removing a socio-religious and political identity which was in the very nature of the problem of the M-Belt groups and societies and what the M-Belt movement was all about.

As early as in 1954 and in the particular period between 1956 and 1960, however, Regional interests dominated and dictated the political strategy of the NPC party and the government of British administration in the North and this took precedence over the national considerations of Nigeria. This was the political policy that the NPC subsequently followed until 1966 and the policy conditioned non-interference in the matters of other Regions on an equal basis of autonomy, as if it were a distinct

country on its own, just as it abhorred other regions interfering in "things Northern", political relationships and interaction within one country which James O'Connell described as "international relations without safeguards"³⁹⁶. The NPC at that time, was a collection of Northern notables predominantly from the Islamic society, satisfied with the establishment in the North and ready to maintain the status quo and was rigorously protective of itself from southern Nigerian domination³⁹⁷. It was this group and the interests behind it, that seven out of nine Tiv members in the NHA initially joined in politics before 1956³⁹⁸. The political position of the NPC party is more properly understood and explained by the conception of Federalism in Nigeria of both the NPC leadership, which was Islamic and the government of British administration in the North and this centered on the political efforts meant to preserve a specific identity, whose roots were shaped by the Fulani Empire and was glorified by its successes of political incorporation of the majority of groups and societies in Nigerian politics, rather than pure electoral advantages of the North which guaranteed democratic domination. To achieve these ends, the NPC party and government in the North responded by reforms, to remove some of the grievances and fears that were echoed by the M-Belt politicians, before Northern Self-Government and the Federal elections of 1959. This was particularly so for the much dreaded aspects of Muslim law and its application on which some of the non-Islamic M-Belt people were most affected and over which Christian religious bodies expressed the greatest anxieties³⁹⁹. Previously, there existed instances of discrimination and injustice, which Christians and non-Moslems feared it might continue after the British handed over political control to the NPC party whose political leadership was predominantly Islamic. The scales were therefore more weighted in favour of Muslims and against those of any other faith in the North. For instance:

"The testimony of a male Muslim is held to carry more weight than that of a Christian or a pagan of any woman, whatever her faith. To Muslims, their law was a familiar thing, to non-Muslims it was unknown and therefore to be feared... but direct interference with Muslim law by persons of another faith... was an attack on Islam itself"⁴⁰⁰.

Furthermore, under Muslim criminal law, there were a number of distinctions drawn between Muslims, Christians and non-Muslims:

"In case of murder (where the most extreme provocation is irrelevant), the penalty awarded depends upon whether the relatives of the victim demand the killer's life, require blood money, or choose to let him go. But the relative of a pagan can never demand the life of a Muslim killer and can demand only one-fifteenth of the blood money that would be due had a Muslim been killed. The status of Christians is half-way between pagans and Muslims"⁴⁰¹.

The reforms were effected as a direct consequence of development from the recommendations of the Commission on Minorities and the increased tide of the UMBC party in highlighting on-going religious intolerance and discrimination in the application of the law in the North, in the FHR in Lagos⁴⁰². The modernizing reforms, however, were implemented after a Panel of Jurists had made investigations and reported to government in the North, in the period between 28th August and September 10th, 1958 and were clearly meant to repudiate the allegations of the UMBC and to stem down its tide of political and religious support in the cause of the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the North. Furthermore, a criminal code was introduced to replace Muslim criminal law as a procedural code to replace Islamic criminal procedure. These reforms were personally handled by T. H. Marshall, who was a Q.C. and Attorney-General in the North and J. N. D. Anderson, a Professor of Oriental Law and Director of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in the University of London⁴⁰³.

The effect of the reforms in the tripartite legal system that existed

in the North was that it loosened support for the UMBC party, among non-Islamic communities that were on the edges of Islam and where Christian communities were not strong. Previously, non-Muslims identified vigorously with the M-Belt movement when the UMBC made Islamic law and its application, an issue showing discrimination and injustice on non-Islamic people in the North. The decline of support for the UMBC party because of the legal reforms showed up significantly in the share of votes for the UMBC-AG alliance in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and some parts of Plateau where there was a high percentage concentration of Muslims in the population. However, the general decline of support for the UMBC party before the 1959 elections was apparent, among other areas, in Muri areas north of the river Gongola, Wukari, Nassarawa Eggon, Keffi, Jema'a Federation, Wamba, Wase, Kanam, Mangu and also with the Fyem people around Gindiri. Political and religious opposition by some of the leaders of the M-Belt movement toward the NPC party and government in the North on the issue of Muslim Law and its application also became less vigorous. As a result the ground was prepared for some of the UMBC leaders on the Plateau and in S. Zaria, to identify with government and the NPC party in the North as political clients:

"Since things were changing for the common-man, particularly for people at the grassroots level, who were most affected by Muslim law and its application, an issue that had served as direct evidence on the M-Belt groups and societies as premises of inequality before the law with discrimination and injustice which produced causes for the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, separated from the Islamic society in the North"⁴⁰⁴.

The reforms in the North were institutionalized just before 1959 when the Penal Code Law was substituted for the unjust aspects in the application of Muslim and customary law and by 1961 it became applicable in the Alkali and Native Courts⁴⁰⁵. However, the introduction of the Penal Code was 'a

straw-man' because in 1958, Muslim Law in the North ceased to be repressive on a significant majority of the non-Muslim population. It was only in a few instances that there existed friction which brought Christians and non-Muslims into direct confrontation with Moslems which were contested in the Courts. These were mainly in the rural areas where the British legal system and supervision was distant and therefore made the Native Courts stronger.

The demands of the M-Belt groups and societies in the M-Belt Movement for the creation of a M-Belt Region were however further dismissed by the Commission on Minorities because it felt that Regions in the Nigerian Federation had to have socially and politically meaningful sentiments, attached to the territorial unit and not simply just a matter of viability in resources if they were to survive in the system and contribute to nation-building in Nigeria. The Commission therefore emphasized regionalism of the North, that had the built-in sentiments of an Islamic socio-religious and Hausa linguistic identity, which was generally accepted as the political identity of the North. To give a boost to this argument it was emphasized that the M-Belt areas consisted of disparate "pagan-tribes", constantly quarelling among themselves with no common sentiment that binds them together because the groups were always jealous and hated each other and therefore there would be no common factor to cement unity in the M-Belt Region as a political identity. By argueing that sentiments ought to exist in a Region of a Federation in order for the unit to hold together, the Commission endorsed the argument in the submission by government in the North which had underlined its position by references to the sentimental attachment of the Sardauna and leadership in the Islamic Society - to the historically recollected experiences of political incorporation processes that took place before the British creation of the North in the period of the Hausa Kings, the Jukun (Kwararafa) Empire and more significantly the Fulani ruled Islamic Empire of dan Fodio and the Kingdom of Bornu with a

proud scholarship in Islamic culture and identity and an abhorance to westernized culture of the South of Nigeria which was increasingly gripping the M-Belt groups and societies⁴⁰⁶. Behind the refusal to recommend the creation of a M-Belt Region in 1958 was also the fact that members of the Commission on minorities were influenced by notions of Federal Systems and Federalism in British experiences outside West Africa. These centered on conceptions of Federations with big units in the system and the ideas were dominant in the movement of political thought among high British officials in London in the 1950s. The members of the Commission therefore had a background knowledge of the political efforts to establish and maintain the central African Federations and there was political interest to apply the scheme to Northern Nigeria along with other units in Nigeria⁴⁰⁷. The insistence of the Commission to maintain the North as a single unit is therefore also explained by the intervening influences of these thought patterns. In many respects, it is this image of the "big-Regions" as Federal units in Nigeria, rather brilliantly maintained by Lord Alan Boyd that had the consequence of a persisting definition of an amorphous area claimed by the M-Belt Movement as the M-Belt Region which was used to defeat the claims of the UMBC by both the NPC government in the North and the Commission on Minorities. Furthermore these notions left behind a psychology of 'big-Regions' as prestigious units of the Nigerian Federation, which never really departed from the minds of some M-Belt politicians like Joseph Tarka. In the creation of BP state, for example, which excluded alot of strong supporters of the M-Belt Region, Joseph Tarka anticipated that groups in S. Zaria, S. Bauchi, some parts of Kabba with the Igalla and the Numan areas will agitate for inclusion into the BP state for a more reflective M-Belt Region to emerge⁴⁰⁸. As much as this can be interpreted as a political drive to enclose the supporters of the M-Belt Movement excluded from the creation of BP state, with the assumed concomitant advantage of electoral support, it can equally be seen within

the general conception of the big-Region influences and images of Nigerian politics of the period between 1952 and 1967. However, the emphasis by Lord Alan Boyd that the Nigerian Federation had to have big units to be viable and to sustain themselves was fallacious in the light of subsequent political developments in Nigeria in 1967 and 1976 when there was subdivision of the big units and smaller Regions/States emerged and had and still have sentimental attachments to their existing boundaries.

The Commission on Minorities however was explicitly anti-M-Belt on a number of indicators. On a comparative basis to its handling of other Nigerian minorities demands for the creation of separate Regions from dominant "tribes" closest to them in southern Nigeria, for example, there were pseudo-Regional devolutionary proposals recommended for minorities in the Western Region and Eastern Regions for the reestablishment of "Special Development Areas" with no such recommendations for the M-Belt groups and societies in the North, despite the stonger social and religious emotions expressed on the creation of the M-Belt Region. Its skepticism over political support for the creation of a M-Belt Region might well have been disproved in a referendum as was the case with that of the Mid-West in 1963 where there was almost total electoral support for a separate region from Western Nigeria. In 1958, particularly after Joseph Tarka and Patrick Dokotri had completed their tours to mobilize political support on the issues to be presented before the Commission on Minorities and after the report had been submitted there was positive popular consciousness on the creation of a M-Belt Region in all of the M-Belt areas. However, the Commission, generally underestimated the strength of separatist sentiments in the population at the grassroots of the areas where the movements operated. In the particular instance of the M-Belt groups and societies, political sentiments were greatly concealed, partly because of the rampant use of repressive methods through the NA system and because of assumptions that overt political expressions of M-Belt sentiments might make worse, the

already existing conditions of deprivation in the distribution of amenities and benefits from the government of the day. In other words, political leadership among the M-Belt groups and societies in the M-Belt movement was caught up in the contradictory circumstances in which they demand separation from the existing government in the North and at the same time looked-up to that government and demanded for the allocation of the scarce resources of society. There was an apparent lack of allocatable scarce resources among the M-Belt groups and societies, where the political leadership and followers combined in the electoral processes to show opposition to the NPC party, government in the North and political clients in the particular society. The Tiv, for example, when compared to the Idoma in Benue, were among the most deprived groups and societies in the M-Belt areas, as were the Montol to the Ankwei in Lowland Division on the Plateau.

After the 1959 elections and by 1961, the political cohesion the M-Belt groups and societies had achieved through the M-Belt Movements in the decade of its political activity, particularly in its phase as the UMBC under the leadership of Joseph Tarka it was destabilized by the NPC through the successful building of patron-client relationships and its operational mechanisms on the politics of the North. Although patron-client relationships were strongly detested by some of the M-Belt groups and societies, particularly of the Tiv people it worked to the benefit of the NPC in Numan, S. Zaria and Plateau areas where the M-Belt Movement arose, and had its greatest success among the Idoma and Igalla. These intruding strategies in the handling of the M-Belt movement in the 1960s weakened the political organization, an institutional approach to the problem that had been set by the Commission on Minorities. This, it had done by carefully treating and reducing the movement into a pressure group that was in search of reforms of existing fears and grievances rather than as a political party with a specific objective and mobilizing an almost nationalistic identity to contest the nation-hood of Northern Nigeria within the Nigerian

Federation. This revisionist tendency of the Commission on Minorities in Nigeria did not take into account the changes in the political growth and development within the movement itself as a political party, particularly after 1956 and thus in 1958 it dismissed the UMBC on the issue of the M-Belt Region as having inadequately settled convictions on the creation of another Federal Unit of Nigeria in the North. The Commission in very subtle ways ended up emphasizing the effects of political events outside the conceptions of the movement and its demands for a M-Belt Region. The UMBC was however a political party with a definite organizational structure and objective which it mobilized support for and was an independent cause of some of its own successes, particularly when there was effective political direction and leadership under Joseph Tarka who combined political pressure, style and rhetoric in the mobilization of the followership that went far beyond the demands for reforms in the North. Before 1960 effective mobilization of the M-Belt groups and societies in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region caused changes in the conduct of government affairs and politics of the NPC party in the North. There was for example means of discovering the problems of M-Belt groups through a commission of inquiry and an attempt was made to include some of the leadership, thought of, not as equal partners but as clients in the affairs of the North. They, however, remained outside the main stream of politics because they were tied in specific ways, as clients in the NPC leadership who produced patronage since they controlled government.

The system of patron-client relationship and its mechanism for control in the politics of the North was developed for the purpose of the crucial 1959 elections, the philosophy of one North, irrespective of tribe, race and religion. In other words patron-client relationships between the NPC party and selected M-Belt political leadership which survived until 1965 predated the 1959 elections in the North. Northernization policy was ofcourse tied up to patron-client relationships in the politics of the North and this was

a fundamental political strategy for the 1959 elections and to neutralize the the strong alliance that the UMBC had developed with the AG as from January 1957.

The UMBC-AG alliance in the period between 1956 and 1961 was perhaps the most critical political act which altered the growth and development of the M-Belt movement in its demands for the creation of the M-Belt Region. Although the UMBC entered the alliance because it found the AG committed to policies for the subdivision of the Nigerian Federation, it was AG financial and organizational assistance which conditioned the alliance and which produced increased political vigour in the political activity and mobilization for support for the creation of a M-Belt Region. When Tarka built up support of the UMBC and was equipped with AG money he set about the processes of mobilizing the masses in Tiv Division and subsequently with Patrick Dokotri, the whole of the M-Belt group and societies. The first step that Joseph Tarka seemed to have taken was to make a sub-alliance within the UMBC-AG framework, with Ugor Iwoo the President of Tiv Progressive Union⁴⁰⁹. Ugor Iwoo the President of the TPU, though of limited education was a respected Tiv elder who wielded considerable local political influence; but at that time was short of funds and found the AG finance through Joseph Tarka as welcome as the political alliance⁴¹⁰. In 1957 therefore he united the TPU with the UMBC and in turn this entered an alliance with the AG and thus formed a structure in three tiers: TPU/UMBC/AG⁴¹¹. This became generally, the structure of political organization of the alliance among the M-Belt groups and societies before March 1961 when the UMBC made efforts to assume its posture as an independent party in an attempt to resist being swallowed up by the AG at the time of the 1959 elections when it was proposed that all supporters of the alliance should be known only as AG members and the alliance was to campaign under the 'Palm Tree' symbol⁴¹². Aided by the AG however, Joseph Tarka used his great charismatic powers and political rhetoric in order to

gain support for the UMBC and the idea of the creation of a M-Belt Region. He told the Tiv the good things that would come to them, when he obtained the creation of a M-Belt state:

"No longer would they be denied the benefits of the buildings and institutions which existed in the big centers of the North, in Kano, Zaria and Kaduna. No longer would they be looked down upon by the Hausa. Education and development would proceed far faster than at present. In the new Middle Belt the Tiv would be the dominant tribe and fulfill their tribal aspirations and create a kind of kingdom of heaven on earth conceived in material terms"⁴¹³.

Besides this direct appeals to the masses of the Tiv, based on visionary promises, Tarka also consolidated his political role by winning the Tiv chiefs to his side from whom he enjoyed sympathy for his plans for a M-Belt Region, but kept them out of politics⁴¹⁴. In the period between 1957 and 1959 in order to gain electoral support for the UMBC, Tarka mobilized the Tiv by deliberately playing upon themes which appealed to tribal loyalty, to tribal distrust of other neighbouring tribes, particularly the Hausa, to religious prejudice toward Islam, to historically recollected events of the past Fulani wars of slave-catching and raids and crowned that with the existing circumstance of cheating by the NPC government in the North and persecution by its linkages in the NA apparatus⁴¹⁵. M. J. Dent for example further suggests that in the UMBC political rallies, the audience would be asked:

"Ungu Tiv shin Ungu Uke? (are you Tiv or are you Hausa?). At once, the audience would reply that they were Tiv and would be told that the NPC was a Hausa party and that the UMBC was their own party. The speakers would say that since the Tiv were not Muslims and ate pig they could not have anything to do with the Northern Region, which was Muslim dominated. It was insinuated into the minds of the audience that to continue to remain in the Northern Region was eventually to be forced to become Muslim"⁴¹⁶.

To reinforce the rhetorics in the political rallies, the UMBC in Tiv land produced derigratory political songs on the NPC party, Moslems in their midsts and their Tiv political clients in the Division^{416b}. The songs and the political propaganda were diffused and their influence was taken to the furthest corners of the bush all over Tiv land by paid party secretaries and agents⁴¹⁷. The songs in particular were stereotype phrases of Tiv prejudices on the Hausas and the Islamic religion and opposed their practices in Tiv land as well as requesting permission from their leaders to deal with these enemies⁴¹⁸. This propaganda appeal was backed-up by a liberal distribution of AG money by Tarka in the form of hospitality, presents to elders and help to various people in paying school fees and other dues⁴¹⁹. By the 1959 elections the effects of these propropaganda methods as a political strategy were so profound that the UMBC had established a firm support of ninety per cent of the Tiv people:

"and for the first time had introduced politics to the masses. The name of Tarka, who before 1956 had been in no way outstanding, had become a household word among the young and old, literate and illiterate, even though many of them had never seen him"⁴²⁰.

In contrast to the build-up of support in the tribal political strategy in the method and scope of political mobilization employed by the UMBC through Joseph Tarka in Tiv land, on the Plateau, in Adamawa and S. Zaria formal political meetings and rallies still brought together different tribes under the same religious conceptions of the M-Belt Christian identity and which also highlighted socio-economic and political problems of deprivation and discrimination with the promises of adjusting for the inequalities in a M-Belt Region where the good things of life would be obtained faster. The political manifestation of the UMBC-AG alliance was visible in the readily available party propaganda material which was translated into the Hausa language, the motorcars, the motor-bikes and the

bicycles with which party officials and loyalists were freely given for their political activities. Furthermore, on the Plateau particularly in Jos Division among the the Birom, leaders like Patrick Dokotri, unlike Joseph Tarka did not establish reliable working political relationships with their own tribal union movements albeit with those in other smaller tribes and their relationships with traditional leaders were far from cordial. Both Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Dokotri at one time or the other quarrelled with the family of Moses Rwang Pam, the Chief of Jos and his son Bitrus⁴²¹. Furthermore, the tribal strategy in political mobilization was difficult to achieve because almost all the tribal union movements on the Plateau did not consist of one cultural group and society on a clear cut basis as was the TPU. There was nothing Birom, for example, about the BPU and the BTP which consisted of numerous other tribes to be found in the Division and as such political meetings and rallies were held in the Hausa language. The socio-economic and welfare issues which Tarka translated for the masses of the Tiv in the processes of political mobilization were however collateral with the issue that worried the "tribal" unions in Adamawa, Plateau, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria, which the MZL had previously made familiar to the M-Belt groups and societies in those areas. It is however clear that Joseph Tarka brought in the Tiv by mobilizing them on that common platform of similarly deprived and aggrieved people in support of the causes for the creation of a M-Belt Region. Collective tribal consciousness in the political mobilization on the other M-Belt groups and societies went nowhere near, as far as what Joseph Tarka did with the Tiv, except for the brief spasms in S. Bauchi, where Azi Nyako, a very close associate of Tarka invoked similar images to create anti-Hausa Fulani sentiments among the Jarawa in 1960 and 1964 sufficiently for them to resort to violence against the Nigeria Police Force which virtually excluded any NPC influence in the Fobur area in 1964.

Apart from the UMBC-AG alliance which produced funds for

organizational mobility, organizational personnel and equipment in support of political mobilization for the 1959 elections in particular, the UMBC also made effort to influence trade union movements in support for the creation of a M-Belt Region and to vote for the alliance in the 1959 elections. This was particularly the case with the Mines Unions that existed on the tin fields of the Jos Plateau. It is therefore critical to the understanding of support for the M-Belt movement in Jos Division on the Plateau and the explanation of the votes in that area during the 1959 elections to examine the political forces that interplayed to influence the development of the Mines Unions. This is so because the minesworkers, right from the 1940s formed the main, effectively mobilized social group in Jos Division and their wage earning existence under European management and the indigenous capitalist state system of Nigeria temporarily made them devoid of tribal acrimony⁴²². How the mineworkers in Jos Division voted, because of the numbers of their members, determined the outcome of any elections in the Division. The organized form of the Tin Mines Workers Unions were begun in Bukuru in 1949, the same year that the parent organization of the M-Belt Movement, the NML was organized. The issue that led to the organization of the first Tin Mines Workers Union in January 1949, the Nigerian African Minesworkers Union (NAMU) were, however, much more structured as class issues within the tin mining industry, rather than the socio-religious and political problems that surrounded the organization of Christians in the NML. However it was an internal conflict within NAMU over wages that split their organization and brought in the politics of the North and the M-Belt movement into the conduct of Union affairs⁴²³. The Mining Industry on the Plateau was dominated by four European companies out of fifty three registered companies: the Amalgamated Tin Mines of Nigeria (ATMN) which was the largest and employed 35% of the total labour force, Bisichi Tin Company, the Ex-Lands Nigeria Limited and the Gold and Base Metal Mines of Nigeria which combined, employed another 20% of the labour force⁴²⁴. Labour

on the mines, particularly with the ATMN Ltd., existed on roughly two grades: skilled workers which consisted of southern Nigerians, the majority of whom were Ibo and unskilled labourers, made up of Ibo as well as some Birom and other persons from the M-Belt tribes, but predominantly Hausa migrants from the Islamic society in the North⁴²⁵. To this cultural division of labour, which corresponded to the class divisions based on earned wages between skilled and unskilled workers, all under European management, became added in the 1950s, party political divisions into the NPC, NEPU and the UMBC⁴²⁶. When these differences surfaced, the NPC party overtly exploited the divisions in the Unions in order to weaken support for the UMBC and to swing the votes of the opposition Unions to its side, since initially, the alien population in the ATMU Union in Jos Division supported and had encouraged the idea of the creation of a "Middle-Zone Region" when there was a MZL party. Political divisions in the Tin Mines Unions began in late 1949 when NAMU skilled workers organized a strike to demand for higher wages for all categories of tin minesworkers in Nigeria⁴²⁷. In the final negotiations to end the strike however the skilled workers came out with a better bargain than the general mass of the labourers. Since there was a cultural division of labour between the skilled and unskilled workers, the Hausa treasurer of NAMU, Isa Haruna, criticized the Union on the ground that it was southern or rather, Ibo dominated and resigned his post⁴²⁸. Indeed, Audu dan Ladi, a close associate of Isa Haruna who organized the Northern Minesworkers Union (NMW), subsequently wrote a personal letter to the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello who was the Premier of the North, on the political state of the Plateau Mines Unions and referred to the President of NAMU as "this Ibo" in Hausa⁴²⁹. At the end of it all, the strike was interpreted as an attempt by the Ibo to obtain better working conditions for themselves alone⁴³⁰. This had taken place within NAMU with the majority of members as ATMN workers. The crisis caused a split in NAMU, which resulted into the

organization of an alternative union, the ATMN - African Workers Union (AWU) in April, 1952⁴³¹. However, both NAMU and AWU had Presidents that were non-Northern. A further political crisis was introduced in the Mineworkers Union Movements when its southern Nigerian leadership encouraged members to vote non-Northern tickets in the urban elections in Jos Division where NEPU had strong political influences⁴³². It was with this background that the NMU was organized in August 1954 by Isa Haruna and Audu dan Ladi, directly involving itself in politics and took sides with the NPC party whose policy of Northernization was already developed⁴³³. In 1956, the tribal nature of NMU reflected complete Northernization which was in line with the policy of restricted membership of the Union to Northerners and as NPC party policy required: 70% Hausa, 14% Birom and 11% other tribes of the North⁴³⁴. In 1957, NMU opposed attempts to merge into a single body all the existing Unions on the Tin Mines fields in Jos Division⁴³⁵. This increased pressures on Northerners in NAMU and AWU to join NMU and by 1960, 95% of NMU members were Hausas⁴³⁶. Furthermore, the whole executive members of NMU consisted of persons who were either Hausa or Fulani and held posts in the Provincial organizational structure of the NPC party⁴³⁷. With the increases in the division of the Unions on political and tribal lines - NAMU and AWU for Ibos or more correctly non-Northern tribes and connected to Southern Nigerian based political organizations, particularly the Ibo dominated NCNC, NMU for the Hausas and overtly associated with the NPC and NEPU - and each Union apparently oriented toward securing better working conditions and projects for its supporters, the Birom with the encouragement and assistance of the UMBC-AG alliance and who were fully aware of the domination of Hausa-Fulani in the affairs of NMU and their political loyalty to the NPC or NEPU, broke-off from NMU in 1957 organized the Birom Minesworkers Union (BMU) in 1958⁴³⁸. In April 1959, with the 1959 Federal elections in mind, the BMU converted its name to become the Middle Belt Minesworkers Union (MBMU), giving rise to very

strong and sinister protestations from the NMU to government in the North:

"There is no M-Belt Region for a Middle Belt
Minesworkers Union to exist"⁴³⁹.

With the increased political influence of the UMBC, the MBMU was able to maintain itself independently of other Union pressures and produced local support in the 1959 elections. The NEPU however won the election in Jos township constituency largely because of NAMU and NMU support and campaign influences. After the 1959 elections the composition of the Unions reflected the tribal composition of the main groups employed on the tin-mines that were centered around Bukuru township: NMU 65% of the workers, NAMU/AWU 30% and MBMU 5%⁴⁴⁰. In 1961 the NMU and the AWU(ATMN), united and became Nigerian Workers Union (NWU) but split again into AWU and NWU in 1964 giving way to a union of NMU and MBMU - an uneasy Union that was largely conditioned by the UMBC - NEPU alliance in the NPF. By 1965 however government in the North had brought sufficient pressure on the Tin companies to recognize only two trade unions, the NMU and the MBMU and this effectively neutralized the existence of the MBMU and its overt political activities in support for the UMBC and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region⁴⁴¹. The MBMU however covertly maintained its identity under the NMU until 1966 and with strong feelings against the domination of posts in the ATMN by NWU members on the mine fields who were mainly Ibo they were easily mobilized in May and September, 1966 to participate in the brutal killings of Ibos and 'Easterners' living in Bukuru, Ray-Field, Barkin Ladi, Gana Ropp, Kurra Falls, Dorowa Babuje and Bisichi⁴⁴². Before May, 1967, as a direct consequence of the Ibo exodus to the Eastern Region of Nigeria, which created vacuum in the top management positions of the tin mining companies, virtually all the top posts in the ATMN which had Ibos, became occupied by either NMU or MBMU officials⁴⁴³

The UMBC-AG alliance however wasted funds and energy in the

organization of rival mineworkers Unions in Jos Division, resources that might well have been concentrated on particular tribal mobilization as was the case with the Tiv. One political consequence of this misdirection of funds was that Patrick Dokotri lost his seat in the 1959 elections to the President of NMU in Jos South Constituency⁴⁴⁴. The AG-UMBC involvement with the mineworkers Unions further brought to it disfavour from both the NPC and the NEPU who in that period were strongly concerned about Northern Nigerian interests. It was against this background that the NPC party in particular sought the destruction of the AG party. In seeking to destroy the AG however, the NPC was directly destroying the UMBC movement. Indeed, as it is the case with separatist movements in most parts of the world, where the political demands threatened the political positions of the dominant groups, institutional pressure is brought to bear on it and to create fissiparousness and factions. The development of the M-Belt movement and its efforts to organize into itself political support from the trade Unions in Jos Division was characterized by factions and pressures which indicated how far the government in the North was prepared to use different means and methods to destabilize and destroy support for any party or political group that stood in opposition of Northern Unity. This was particularly so for the MBMU which was forced to function under the NMU.

Politicians of the M-Belt movement seem to have aligned themselves to nearly all the Nigerian parties and to any organization or political group that showed indication of support for the creation of the M-Belt Region. In the period between 1950 and 1965, the movement in its different phases aligned itself to the NPC, AG and the NEPU-NCNC parties⁴⁴⁵. The UMBC also aligned itself to BYM and ITP, both groups associated with the AG, in that southern Nigerian party effort to penetrate into the electorate in the North. Complementing the generous financial and moral support for the UMBC and other political groups in the North to fulfill local aspirations however were needs to gain support for Yoruba irredentist interests for the

establishment of a pan-Yoruba Region in Nigeria as well as the hope of winning seats in the minorities areas in sufficient numbers to produce AG control of the Nigerian Federation. The party political reactions of the NPC which controlled the government in the North to the AG strategy, dating from the UMBC-AG alliance was that of repulsion and the UMBC party under Joseph Tarka was increasingly seen as an AG-surrogate. With increased tightening of the AG control of its party structure and organization of other groups associated to it, which almost swallowed the UMBC, tensions developed and the UMBC retorted after 1961, to a Northern base and aligned itself with the NEPU to contest the 1964 elections. At a critical level, however, the M-Belt movement as political organization, itself was a combination of alliances of different tribes and Christian oriented "tribal" Unions and parties who had the common aim and objective of struggling for the creation of a M-Belt Region. The political leadership in the tribal Unions and parties carried with them tribal identities into the UMBC, while at the same time acknowledging a common Christian religious identity for the struggle for separation from the Islamic society and constitution into a M-Belt Region in the North. The political loyalties of the leadership in the M-Belt movement therefore on several occasions, conflicted between loyalty to the tribal identity and the different elements of the mobilized M-Belt identity: Whether this was in terms of its religious conceptions as Christians/non-Moslems or minority tribes as non-Hausa-Fulani-Nupe-Kanuri, the Islamic numerical majorities in the North. This conflict of loyalty to the two broad types of identities in the M-Belt movement created perennial cleavages in the political organization and made the different tribes vulnerable to manipulations by the NPC party in the North such that support from some groups was volatile and in some instances effectively neutralized. In the period between 1956 and 1965 however there was more political cohesion in the organization of the M-Belt movement when it was in its phase as the UMBC party under the leadership of

Joseph Tarka. This cohesion was given a boost in the status of the party and its political demands when it also expanded and shifted its arena of politics from the North to the Federal centre when there was an alliance with the AG.

There were three deriveable patterns of the alliances of the M-Belt movement in its different phases in the period between 1951 and 1967. Firstly, there existed internally conceived political alliances explicitly responding to the strength of the British created Northern identity in Nigerian politics which in effect was traceable within the separatist M-Belt movement itself. The MZL-NPC alliance from 1952-1954, for example, fits into this category, although it was not a total alliance because some of its leadership wished to organize outside NPC political control for the creation of a M-Belt Region as against those who wished to work within the NPC to gain the experience of the working of government which will be beneficial in the instance of the creation of the M-Belt Region. Secondly, there existed externally conceived alliances with parties whose political bases were outside the North. The UMBC-AG alliance in 1956 was of this nature. This brought the UMBC into the mainstream of national politics and widened its scope of publicity by the attention that was given to it by a nationally circulated press, particularly that controlled by the AG. Thirdly, there existed alliances for the UMBC with other opposition parties in the North and who were associated to political parties whose base of support was outside the North, independently of the political interests of the UMBC-AG alliance. This nature of alliance was with political groups that included the LNY/ITP, BYM, HFTP and NEPU, who had political sympathy and understanding of the need for the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region and these they correlated with their own demands for reform of the political system in the North. These allies did not require any mergers of their political parties or organizations in the alliances, since political identities were separately maintained. Furthermore, in this pattern of

alliance, although the groups had come together in a common political front, local leaders in the alliance contested elections with their previous party labels unchanged except in the unique case of Ibrahim Imam, a Kanuri from Borno who contested the Regional elections in 1961 in Jemgbar, a Tiv constituency where he was a non-independence and won under the UMBC party label and with support and influence from Joseph Tarka. Underlining this pattern of alliances within the North however was a common desire by all the political groups for reforms of the NA system to take place in the North and the subdivision of the Region into smaller units of the Nigerian Federation. The BYM, for example, which was organized in 1954 with the objective of struggling for the creation of a North Eastern state to comprise of Borno, Adamawa, Bauchi and Plateau Provinces, although it was sympathetic to the UMBC, did not enter into a formal alliance with it until in 1958. Even when it did, the BYM remained more of an independent organization within the AG party which had financed its activities to the tune of \$12000, rather than as an ally of the UMBC. Similarly the HFPP which was organized by Ibrahim Dimis in 1957, following its de-alignment from the NEPU-NCNC alliance, entered an alliance with the UMBC via the AG and expressed sentiments and desires for S. Bauchi to be included in a M-Belt Region only in the instance where the authorities failed to create a Habe Division, separated from the Bauchi Emirate. Another significant political group with southern Nigerian political connections, which the UMBC associated itself to, was the LNY/ITP. This was organized by Josiah Olowoyin, a Yoruba in Ilorin Province. Although politically sympathetic to the UMBC movement and objectives, its explicit aims were irredentist dreams in the merger of some Yoruba populated divisions in Ilorin and Kabba toward a pan-Yoruba Western Region of Nigeria. This was a political interest independently maintained in the instance of the creation of a M-Belt Region. Furthermore, although members of the LNY/ITP party belonged to some of the factions during the development of the M-Belt movement before 1956,

it was not until there had been a formal ITP-AG alliance and the subsequent UMBC-AG alliance in 1957 that Yoruba organizations had the shared political identity with the UMBC party. Strickly speaking, therefore the ITP had independent political interests that were not directly tied up to the UMBC party and the general problems of the demands of the M-Belt people for the creation of a M-Belt Region.

By 1958, however all the political parties and groups in opposition to the NPC party and government in the North that were of any consequence, were affiliated with one or the other of the two major political parties that were outside the North, in Southern Nigeria: For example, UMBC was allied to and financed by the AG and NEPU to and partly financed by the NCNC. Thus, for examples, the NCNC was allied to NEPU, BFC and MBSP in Tiv areas and Southern Zaria; the AG was allied to UMBC in the majority of the M-Belt areas, BYM in Borno, HFPP in S. Bauchi, ITP in Ilorin, as well as, some independent candidates in Adamawa and Kabba. These political formations were made in preparation for the contest of issues in the 1959 elections and the specific party political policies and positions on the reasons and commitment for the creation states/regions in the re-arrangement of the Nigerian Federation⁴⁴⁶. In the development of the campaigns toward the 1959 elections which were based on these political formations, three patterns of leadership dominated the political arena in the North, as they appealed for political support from the electorate: there was Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, with the conservative NPC party of the Northern establishment; Amina Kano with populism in the NEPU party espousing northern radicalism to "all sons and daughters of Northern Nigeria" and directed against the establishment and what the party pointed out as "the family compact rule and rulers" in the NA system in the North; and populist Joseph Tarka with the UMBC vigorously pushing the issue of separation of the M-Belt people from the leadership of the Islamic society, the rump of the establishment forces in political control in the North.

VI The 1959 Elections in the North.

The greatest electoral test of the UMBC-AG alliance over political claims on support for the ideas of demands for the creation of the M-Belt Region came in the 1959 elections. The elections in themselves represented the highest water mark of electoral political support for the UMBC-AG alliance in the North. In the M-Belt areas, for example, the alliance won twenty four seats out of the allocated forty three, with a total share of 364213 votes which were 45.9% of the total votes cast in the area during the 1959 elections. This compares with the minorities votes in the other two regions (East and West) in support of the demands for the creation of more states in their areas within the Nigerian Federation; For example, of the total of eighty five seats in the minority areas all over Nigeria, the dominant political parties in favour of the creation of new states⁴⁴⁷ won fifty one seats, largely from the votes of minorities.

However, in the 1959 elections for representation into the FHR in Lagos, there were clear trends of electoral support for the UMBC party in alliance with the AG and the votes also reflected political support for the ideas of the creation of the M-Belt Region. These ideas were particularly articulated by the UMBC and the AG in the 1959 elections. In examining the results of the 1959 elections, there is therefore focus of analysis on whether they expressed M-Belt support, both in terms of the purely political support for the UMBC as a party and as they expressed the Christian religious identity of the M-Belt movement as well as in the conception of different tribal identities as a political identity within the UMBC party. The analysis of the 1959 elections further seek to highlight the political differences with any of the other elections on the manipulation of a political identity for a specific cause between the Islamic society and the non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt movement in the North. The elections are therefore examined and analyzed as

the fundamental indicator of the peak of M-Belt political consciousness and as their voting patterns were affected by initial expressions of "tribal nationalism". The elections are also examined in the ways they reflected the organizational effectiveness of the UMBC party and the aligned tribal Unions within it, in the overall Nigerian political identity, which caused it to act in concert with other Nigerian 'minorities interests' that the AG ambitiously coordinated to control political power in the Federation. This was the basis from which the AG party and leadership, for example, gave the UMBC generous financial support and assisting organizational personale. However, the political assistance from the AG, was also based on the images of the future that were presented to the electorate in the 1959 elections in the North which contrasted with those of the other contesting parties and their conceptions of the balance of political power in the Nigerian Federation. Thus, for example, for the 1959 elections, the political resistance of Southern Nigerian domination (mostly quoted as Ibo and Yoruba) of the North was articulated by the NPC as the political issue over the rejection of the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region and the insistence on the preservation of political unity of the North as one entity in the Nigerian Federation. To encourage this, the NPC had developed a policy of Northernization, which in some instances translated into Hausaization and Islamization and this was meant to crystallize the unity of the North and neutralize the separation of the M-Belt movement that was articulated by the UMBC as well as isolating itself from the diffusion of southern Nigerian political influences in the North. The political position of the NPC party for the 1959 elections therefore stood against the subdivision of the North and against the issue of S. Nigerian domination because of their monopoly of Western European skills of modernization, an issue that appealed to all sections and tribes in most areas of the North. Indeed in the period of the campaigns for the 1959 elections, there were propaganda efforts to neutralize the claims of the UMBC party for a

distinct political identity from that of the North by constant references in the NPC government press to: "Ilorin Northerners", "Okene Northerners", "Kano Northerners", "Jos Northerners", "Makurdi Northerners" and "Idoma Northerners" etc.⁴⁴⁸. This pattern of appeal, was particularly directed to areas where there was some organized form of protest and opposition to the NPC party and the conception of the Northern Identity. In contrast to the NPC party position and propaganda, the NEPU in alliance with the NCNC for the 1959 elections articulated as a political issue, the oppressive nature of the NA system and stood for the reform of the system in the whole of the North and did not reject either Northernization or the political conceptions of the Northern Identity. The NEPU shared this political position with the UMBC party. However, the UMBC party, in alliance with the AG presented to the electorate in the North, particularly to that of the M-Belt areas, the issue of the domination of the tribal minorities by the majority tribes who consisted of the Hausa-Fulani, Kanuri and Nupe and this was made dramatic by the polarities between tribes with Christians and non-Moslems and the unity of Moslems in themselves in the North. There was therefore the need to protect the socio-economic and political minorities who were Christians with many non-Moslems as brothers, in the creation of a M-Belt in the North. The UMBC campaigns in the 1959 elections, therefore centered on the problems of politics, some, historically recollected, which affected the tribal and Christian religious minorities as well as others who were non-Islamic in the North and envisaged their solutions in the creation of a M-Belt Region as a unit of the Nigerian Federation.

Table 4.5 , shows the distribution of electoral support for the UMBC-AG alliance, which contested the 1959 elections specifically using the creation of the M-Belt Region as the political issue in the non-Islamic areas of the North. The intension to make the creation of states a political issue in the 1959 elections was apparent in statements of chief Awolowo, the leader of the UMBC-AG alliance, in 1958 and from the political

Table 4.5

Percentage Distribution of UMBC and NEPU Votes by Provinces in the M-Belt Areas in the North During the 1959 Federal Elections.

Provincial Area	Total Votes Cast	UMBC AG Votes	NEPU NCNC Votes	% UMBC-AG Votes	% NEPU-NCNC Votes	% Opposition Votes
Benue	320 699	178 912	28 576	55.8	8.9	64.7
Plateau	159 906	70 392	25 940	44.0	16.2	60.2
Southern Zaria	75 401	29 870	10 765	39.6	14.3	53.9
Southern Bouchi	51 127	19 187	8 478	37.5	16.6	54.1
Adamawa	185 817	65 852	25 815	35.4	13.9	49.3
TOTAL	793 050	364 213	99 574	45.9	12.6	58.5

Source: K. W. J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: Politics and Administration in a Developing System, Oxford, 1963, Appendix D p451-474.

controversy that surrounded the interpretations of the 1958 London Constitutional Conference between the AG and the NCNC party. As a result chief Awolowo, clearly made it public that he would make the question of creating new states before October 1, 1960, an issue to be contested in the Federal elections of 1959. This was against the background of NPC-NCNC propaganda suggesting that: "those who vote for the creation of states would in effect, be voting for the postponement of Independence"⁴⁴⁹. As suggested by the figures in Table 4.5, electoral political support for the alliance in the 1959 elections, came mostly from Benue Province, when other areas of the M-Belt are compared and support decreased toward M-Belt areas that were on the edges of Islam, where there were powerful Emirs and District Heads in places like Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria as well as some parts of the Plateau. Thus, the UMBC-AG percentage share of the total votes cast were 55.8% in Benue, 44.0% in Plateau, 39.6% in S. Zaria, 37.5% in S. Bauchi, 35.4% in Adamawa and with 364,213 (45.9%) share of a total of 793,050 votes in the M-Belt areas. However, it is not only the vote for the UMBC party that indicates opposition to the NPC party in the M-Belt areas and support for the creation of the M-Belt Region. People who did not cast their votes for the NPC party as well as the UMBC-AG alliance were also politically saying something a rejection of the Northern System, a rejection of the NPC party and policies, protest over subordination on social and political status as much as it might have been a display of cultural voting behaviour, anti-Islamic sentiments and the Christian religious identity. These were issues that were interwoven in the matrix of factors that might explain the electoral rejection of the NPC party in Benue where it scored 35.3% of a total of 320,699 of the votes cast, the lowest in the whole of the M-Belt areas. As will become apparent below, the vote for the NPC is not that of the dominant tribe in Benue Province itself but rather of the Idoma, Jukun and Hausa-Fulani Islamic elements that were concentrated in Northern Benue and the Wukari areas. However the

total opposition votes in the M-Belt areas therefore are politically significant and indicate support for the demands for reforming and altering the political arena as were articulated by the UMBC and the NEPU parties. The figures in Table 4.5 therefore also suggest opposition to the Northern establishment as represented by the NPC party which was against the creation of a M-Belt Region in the North. This opposition was a gain strongest in electoral expression in Benue where a percentage total vote of 64.7% was cast for the UMBC and the NEPU, regressing in other M-Belt area with the weakest percentage in Adamawa with 49.3%. The M-Belt areas produced about 58.5% of the total electoral votes in opposition to the NPC, out of a total of 793,050 votes cast. This means that the NPC scored less than 50% of the votes in the M-Belt areas in the 1959 elections.

In examining tribal electoral support for the UMBC party in the 1959 elections, the figures in Table 4.6 suggest that almost all of the Tiv votes were cast for the UMBC-AG alliance. In the seven Tiv constituencies in the 1959 elections, the electorate voted 86.9% of their political support for the alliance, with only 9.6% for the NPC party. Indeed the Tiv vote alone constituted about 38.0% of manifested electoral political support for the UMBC-AG alliance, of the total votes cast for the alliance in the 1959 elections⁴⁵⁰. This means that the Tiv electoral support as expressed in the 1959 elections for Joseph Tarka and the UMBC party in the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region was politically unique in the sense that total tribal identity was also a political identity, only comparable to the Chamba tribe in Adamawa with 68.6% expressed electoral support for the UMBC-AG alliance. Furthermore, the strong Tiv support for the alliance is also explained by the very presence of Joseph Tarka as the leader of the UMBC in the same sense that the Sura showed strong support for the UMBC, because they associated one of their members, Pastor David Lot, with the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. Indeed Tseayo suggests that the UMBC was presented to the masses of the Tiv by local

leaders, as a Tiv political party: "being Tiv was synonymous with being UMBC"⁴⁵¹. On the Plateau, strong electoral support for the UMBC-AG alliance came from the Sura with 63.6%, Angas with 58.1% and the Ankwei with 56.9%. Both the Sura and Angas vote are explained by the political identification they held for the UMBC party from the previous influences of Pastor David Lot in the MZL. The Ankwei vote for the UMBC was more of an internal tribal protest against Michael Audu Buba, whose association with the NPC as a client of the Sardauna was locally detested. The Birom in Jos Division, who shared with the Tiv, the leadership of the M-Belt movement in the UMBC party, might have had their electoral support skewed by the presence of migrants in their midst who voted for the alliance and for other parties. However before the 1959 elections, Birom political support for the UMBC party had declined because the leadership was split. Most of the leadership joined the NPC and took with them their loyal supporters. While Patrick Dokotri remained in the UMBC, for example, the more populous Birom villages of Du, Vwang and Forum had become NPC members under the influence of Bitrus Rwang Pam and Moses Nyam Rwang. The figures in Table 4.6 also show that there was strong political support for the political ideas of the UMBC-AG alliance from the electorate in S. Zaria where the Katab tribe for example voted 58.7% of their support for the alliance, However, both the Bachama and Jarawa whose tribal unions and local leaders like Jonah Assadugu and Azi Nyako were politically active in supporting the UMBC party and the ideas of the M-Belt movement show low electoral support for the UMBC-AG alliance. This was not a rejection of the ideas on the creation of a M-Belt Region; rather the voting pattern is explained by the presence of indigenous tribesmen who competed the elections as independent candidates with the support of the NPC party and who ended up joining the NPC. It may also as well be explained by the general characteristics in Nigerian politics in which an illiterate electorate simply fails to assume a political identity and votes for the party in government, largely through

Table 4.6

Part Territorial Distribution in the Estimates of Tribal
Electoral Support and Opposition for the UMBC in the Demand for the
Creation of a M-Belt Region During the 1959 Elections.

Area and Tribe in the M-Belt		Total Votes Cast	%UMBC-AG Share	%NPC Share	%NEPU and Independents
	Tiv	159 356	86.9	9.6	3.5
Benue	Jukun	35 689	57.0*	35.1	7.9
	Idoma	62 899	23.0	54.8	22.2
	Others	62 355	36.5	43.3	20.2
	Sura	23 256	63.6	32.6	3.8
Plateau	Angas	17 976	58.1	38.5	3.4
	Ankwei	27 088	56.9	29.4	13.7
	Biom**	65 355	32.2	40.7	27.1
	Others	16 973	32.7	34.3	33.0
Southern	Katab	14 997	58.7	27.5	138
Zaria	Others	60 406	45.6	23.0	31.4
Areas with					
Southern	Jarawa	33 365	30.0	59.1	10.9
Bauchi	(SE + SW)				
	Others	17 762	51.6	18.4	30.0
	Chamba	14 846	68.6	24.3	7.1
Adamawa	Bachama	20 347	32.8	27.7	39.5
	Others	150 624	30.9	50.2	18.9
TOTAL			45.9	41.6	12.6
		793 050	364 213	329 116	99 574

Sources: K. W. J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: Politics and Administration in a Developing System, Oxford, 1963 Appendix D p451-474.

Key

* - The 57.0% vote refers to the total population of Wukari Constituency of more than half of whom were Tiv farmers who migrated over the border from Tiv land.

** - This statistic is rather misleading without an explanation: All the Birom Constituencies had a significant concentration of Hausa Fulani Moslems, Yorubas and Ibos, beside the concentration of other Nigerian tribes, who had been particularly attracted to settle in the area as Labour on the Tin Mines and whose camps existed in almost all the Birom villages. The low showing of electoral support for the UMBC is therefore most likely skewed.

the influences of District Heads and Emirs. In all, however, from the voting patterns suggested by the figures in Table 4.6 and 4.7, it may be taken that more people in the electorate and more minority tribes in the M-Belt areas supported the creation of a M-Belt Region. About 45.9% of the M-Belt electorate voted in support of the UMBC-AG alliance, a movement that was politically committed to the creation of a M-Belt Region. However, there was a substantial number of people and a few of the non-Islamic tribes who also opposed the political idea of the creation of the M-Belt Region, by voting for a party that did not wish to even entertain the idea. The statistical figure of 41.6% of the M-Belt electorate who voted for the NPC party may be taken to have voted against the creation of a M-Belt Region. The strongest manifestation of this came from S. Bauchi and Idoma areas, whose electorate voted about 59.1% and 54.8% for the NPC party respectively of the total votes cast in their areas.

Although the voting patterns in the M-Belt areas and other parts of the North were influenced by tribal identities which subsequently, in certain instances, became fed into a particular party political identity, they also reflect party political identification that was shaped by religious identification. The figures in Table 4.7 show how the votes for the NPC and the UMBC-AG alliance were either massive in support of the NPC or split and shared with the alliance, depending on the numerical concentration of Muslims in a particular area of the North when compared to areas where the numerical strength of Muslims declined and became mixed with Christians and non-Islamic elements in the population. Where there was a high concentration of Muslims in the population in the North, the NPC consistently scored a high share of the votes. Table 4.7, for example, shows that in Kano, where there was 98.0% Muslims in a population of 3,396,350, the NPC won 77.0% of the total votes cast when compared to Niger Province where Muslims consisted of 44.1% members in a population of 715,728 with the NPC gaining 67.9% of the votes in the total electorate.

Table 4.7

Political and Religious identification in the voting
patterns during the 1959 Elections in The North

AREA IN THE NORTH		POLITICAL IDENTITY & %PARTY SHARE OF VOTES IN 1959				RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND %POPULATION IN 1952			
		Total				Total			
		Votes*	(a)	(b)	(c)	Pop*	(d)	(e)	(f)
Central	Kano	705547	77.0	3.5	19.4	3396350	98.0	0.4	1.6
To The	Katsina	309922	61.4	11.3	27.3	1483400	95.2	0.3	4.5
Islamic	Sokoto	490730	73.5	5.2	5.9	2680333	94.0	0.5	5.5
Society	Borno	315865	77.3	9.2	10.0	1595708	83.5	0.6	15.9
	Niger	149497	67.9	8.1	23.3	715728	44.1	3.0	52.9
Central	Bauchi	239304	56.6	13.9	29.5	1423825	74.1	1.6	24.3
To the	Zaria	169501	33.5	24.5	33.9	805095	61.4	7.8	30.8
M-Belt	Adamawa	176734	45.7	34.3	20.0	1181024	30.1	3.2	66.7
Groups	Plateau	159906	37.5	44.0	18.5	891386	24.1	12.9	63.0
	Benue	320699	23.1	55.8	13.0	1468229	10.6	6.9	82.5
Central to Yoruba									
Irredentist	Ilorin	95114	44.8	39.4	3.6	530595	62.6	6.0	31.4
Areas	Kabba	140462	28.3	6.8	64.9	663909	22.4	18.5	59.1
Total		3126050	61.7	17.7	20.7	16835000	69.3	3.3	27.4

Key: (a) = NPC (b) = UMBC-AG (c) = NEPU and Others
(d) = Moslems (e) Christians (f) Other Religions

Sources: K.W.J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: Politics and Administration in a Developing System, Oxford, 1963, Appedix D p451 - p474; S.B. Chambers, The Report on the 1952 Census of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, 1952, p32; E.P.T. Crampton, Christianity in Northern Nigeria, II Edition, 1975 p209; Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, December 1957 p147.

* Excludes Sardauna Province because of their absence in the 1952 census for a correlation of the breakdowns on Religious identification.

This contrasted with the NPC electoral performance in areas where there was a higher concentration of Christians and non-Moslems. In Benue Province, for example, where there was the highest percentage of non-Moslems in the North (82.5%) and some Christians (6.9%) in a population of 1,468,229 the NPC party gained the lowest share of the electorate for the whole of the North - 23.1%. Muslims constituted about 10.6% of the total population of Benue Province in 1952. The UMBC-AG alliance on similar lines of religious identification, performed well, where there was a concentration of Christians and non-Moslems (other religions, like the variety of African systems of traditional beliefs and worship) in the population surpassing Muslim elements. Benue Province again reflects this trend in the voting pattern. Furthermore in Plateau, where 63.0% was non Muslims and 12.9% Christian in a population of 891,386 with Muslims consisting 24.1% of that total, the UMBC-AG alliance scored 44.0% of the electorate as against 37.5% that was scored by the NPC. Similarly in Kabba Province, although outside the conceptions of the M-Belt movement, the vote for alternative parties, which were mostly tribal group formations under Christian political leadership, other than the NPC and the UMBC, reflects the intervening influences of religious identification in the voting patterns. However, the electorate in Kabba voted for their tribal unions: Igalla and Igbirra rather than NEPU in the share of 64.9% of the electoral vote as indicated in Table 4.7 . Kabba Province itself had the highest Christian concentration in its population (18.5%) in The North and this was given a boost in its tribal identification by a respectable non-Moslem percentage share of the population (59.1%). The tribes in Kabba Province were, however, not pro-UMBC in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, although the Igalla wished to be merged with BP state in 1967 and with Benue in 1976.

Although the leadership of the UMBC-AG alliance did not overtly make religion an issue in the 1959 elections, the voting patterns clearly suggest there were conceptions in which the very political issue of the creation of the M-Belt Region was seen in Christian religious terms, since the demands for the region were deemed as separation from Muslims in The North, an overtly religious expression of a political interest and identity which influenced political behaviour. Thus without the concentration of Muslims in their midst, Table 4.7 suggests that collectively with a minorities religious identity, the M-Belt people were flatly voting with a religious identity directed against Moslems, when non-Muslim and christian identification is accounted for, as was particularly the case with the Tiv, where very few Moslems existed. Furthermore, there is a correlation between increases in the percentage of Christian population in the Provinces in The North and the percentage share of UMBC-AG votes from the Islamic society toward the M-Belt areas. In Kano, for example, where there was a 0.4% Christian concentration in the population the UMBC-AG alliance scored a 3.5% share of the electoral votes, the lowest in the whole region, while on the Plateau where there were 12.9% of Christians in the population, the UMBC-AG alliance scored was 44.0% of the total electoral vote.

However if one compares the election in minority areas in the other two Regions (Calabar Ogoja and Rivers) COR provinces, where the AG supported a demand for a separate state for non-Ibo peoples or the Mid-West where the NCNC supported the demand for a separate state for non-Yoruba people, one finds an inherent electoral support, although there was no extent of religious differences involving the percentage of the votes cast for parties supporting state creation, which was higher than that in the M-Belt areas. One might have expected religious differences to have produced a greater polarity of voting behaviour on the M-Belt groups and societies since religion in whatever colouring: "is an issue that does not permit bargaining or even dispute about the authorities of this world"⁴⁵².

Religion, as the Irish experience in British politics suggests, has enormous potential in crystallizing into a political identity that does not get easily resolved. This however was only slightly the case with Christianity in the M-Belt areas and rather more rigorously so with the Islamic religion among the dominant groups in The North. Table 4.8 suggests there was more electoral political cohesion among southern Nigerian minorities movements for separation from their dominant neighbours, than was the case in The North during the 1959 elections. The Mid-Western State Movement (MSM) which begun to exert political influence in 1952, much later than the M-Belt movement, for example, won 57.7% of the votes in an electorate of 501598 and 80.0% of the seats in a total of 15 in the areas it claimed for the creation of a state. Similarly the COR movement which was also only effective in 1954, again much later than the M-Belt movement performed better in the 1959 elections than the UMBC party. The COR movement won 52.6% of the votes cast in an electorate of 824230 and 55.6% of seats in a total of 27 in the areas it claimed for the creation of a state. In the M-Belt areas, however, the UMBC party won only 45.9% of the total votes cast and 55.8% of the allocated seats and this was in some of the core areas of the non-Islamic groups and societies rather than in the areas it claimed for the creation of the M-Belt Region which included Yoruba irredentist areas and strong holds of Islam like Niger Province. An important factor that explains the rather lower electoral performance of the UMBC party when compared to other Nigerian minorities movements for the creation of states (the COR and the MSM), is the mere geographical size of the M-Belt areas in The North. COR and MSM in southern Nigeria, coped with relatively smaller areas in the organization of their movements and campaigns when compared to the territorial size of the M-Belt areas. For example, the M-Belt areas of Adamawa, Benue and Plateau Provinces, covered some 73530 sq. Mls. of land area (about 26.1% of the land area in the North), the whole of the COR areas covered about 20737 sq. Mls. (70.3% of

Table 4.8

The vote of minorities in the 1959 elections expressive
of electoral support for the creation of states in Nigeria

Minorities Area in Nigeria	Votes Cast	Number of seats	Pro-State Creation Votes*	Number of seats won*	%Votes	%Seats
M-West Areas in the Western Region	501598	15	289453	12	57.7	80.0
COR Areas in the Eastern Region	824230	27	433412	15	52.6	55.6
M-Belt Areas in The North	793050	43	364213	24	45.9	55.8
Total	2118878	85	1087078	51	51.3	60.0

Source: K.W.J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: Politics and
Administration in a Developing System, Oxford, 1963, Appendix D p451 - p474.

*Votes and seats for UMBC-AG in The North; NCNC-MSM in the West; AG-COR and NDC
in the East.

the Eastern Region) and the Mid-West only 14922 sq. M|s. (32.9% of the Western Region⁴⁵³. Geographical distances and financial resources were strong inhibiting factors to monopolize the electorate and shape the outcome of the 1959 elections in the M-Belt areas, particularly so, with the poor standards of communications in the M-Belt areas in that period. Furthermore, the M-Belt movement did not have ready financial resources for the organization of an overall M-Belt party until after 1956, when Joseph Tarka negotiated an alliance with the AG party and leadership and only in January, 1957, barely two years before the 1959 elections, did AG funds become available in practical terms for the organization of the political activities of the UMBC⁴⁵⁴. Thus the imminence of the 1959 elections meant very little could be done besides the employment of an army of conversers as organizing secretaries and polling agents⁴⁵⁵. As much as the issue of state creation met the political needs of the UMBC party and the M-Belt groups and societies in The North as well as other Nigerian minorities movements and conditioned political support for the AG, the political strategy of the AG leadership in supporting the minorities movements was meant to gain political advantage over the dominant electoral political position of the NPC in Nigerian Politics. Two fundamental reasons therefore explained the UMBC-AG alliance in the particular period between 1957 and 1959 for the elections: AG had an avowed ideology to respect the self-determination of minorities in their struggle to obtain a unit of their own in the Nigerian Federation and therefore had both privately and publicly committed its political rhetoric for the territorial rearrangement of Nigeria, in which a M-Belt Region will be curved out of the North; secondly the UMBC vote in the alliance, was meant to suggest political identification of the electorate of the M-Belt areas with the AG party rather than with the UMBC party in the struggle for control of political power in the federation. An AG victory in the 1959 elections was therefore meant to serve twin political purposes: to condition the fulfillment of

"the M-Belt dream" of a Region separated from the Islamic society in The North and give the AG political control of federal power.

From the point of view of the AG party, however, the alliance with the UMBC was purely a tactical one. Chief Awolowo, for example informed the Nigerian Federal electoral commission that all votes and candidates counted under 'the Palm Tree Symbol' were to be considered as Action Group, thus absorbing the political identity of the UMBC party into the monolithic AG party which he controlled directly⁴⁵⁶. Chief Awolowo and the AG leadership regarded the UMBC as more controlled by themselves rather than by Joseph Tarka and others in the alliance and indeed this explains the confusion in the party labels that were used in the M-Belt areas in 1959 in which some areas were voting AG, while others as UMBC-AG and MBSP etc., rather than the agreed common party label of UMBC-AG⁴⁵⁷.

However, in assessing votes apparent for the idea of the creation of a M-Belt state, one must allow for the element of support for the government in power in the NPC votes. Nowhere outside Tiv land, did the NPC party win less than 20% in the constituencies in The North. Furthermore, the subsequent Mid-Western example shows that the NCNC vote of 57.0% in the 1959 elections was increased to 582077 affirmative votes to 7218 negative votes favouring the creation of the Mid-Western State with 98.8% in the 1963 Referendum for the creation of the state⁴⁵⁸. It is not unreasonable therefore, to conclude that the 45.9% vote for the UMBC-Ag alliance in the M-Belt areas in the 1959 elections might have substantially increased to well over the constitutionally required level of at least 60%⁴⁵⁹, had the inhabitants of the M-Belt areas ever been offered a plebiscite to approve the creation of the new state.

Nevertheless, the electoral vote in the 1959 elections showed political support for the alliance from among the M-Belt areas. After 1959 however, there was increasing decline of support for the UMBC and the AG parties in the subsequent elections of 1961 and 1964. On the surface, this

electoral decline can easily be taken to mean that there was also decline for the political support of the ideas for the creation of the M-Belt Region. However, the leadership of Joseph Tarka and the political support of the Tiv people, complemented with some support coming from S.Zaria, Plateau, S.Bauchi, Numan and Gwoza areas in Adamawa, continued to maintain the interests of the creation of a M-Belt Region, despite reduced AG support and the political impact of the effectiveness of the NPC party in The North in suppressing the UMBC party by using different political mechanisms, until the army came to control government and politics in Nigeria in 1966. The AG, therefore, did not remain "a father-like-figure" in the politics of the leadership of Joseph Tarka and other UMBC party leaders as was put in the 1959 elections. Indeed, the UMBC-AG alliance in itself, came third in the electoral contest in the 1959 elections, with the NPC and the NCNC parties coming first and second respectively in the electoral performance and thus forming the coalition government at Independence in 1960. From that time onwards, UMBC support began to ebb, all over the M-Belt areas, including the strong hold of the M-Belt movement in Tiv Division. Many members of the UMBC in the NHA and the FHR joined the NPC party after the 1961 elections. By 1965 only four members and one Kanuri UMBC member effectively represented UMBC interests in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. These included: J.A. Amaichigh (Ukum-Shitire), Isaac Shaahu (Gaav Shangev Tiev), Ibrahim Imam (Jemgbar), Julius Ayua (Ihare/Masev) and Hong U. Uyeh (Kunav)⁴⁶⁰ Furthermore, of the forty eight members of the NHA, elected from M-Belt constituencies only five were UMBC party members against forty three others who were either NPC members or had become pro-Northern in their political statements and activities on issues in the debates⁴⁶¹. Ibrahim Iman, for example, had by 1965 become very pro-NPC and Northern in his statements, deeply sympathetic to the causes of Northern unity in the Nigerian federation and was full of praise for Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, who was Premier of the

Region⁴⁶². Similar to the composition of the NHA, in FHR in 1965, of the 48 members in Parliament as representatives from constituencies in the M-Belt areas, with twenty six of them adherents of the Christian religion, there were only about ten who politically identified with the UMBC party⁴⁶³. The party realignment of some of the supporters of the M-Belt movement from UMBC to the NPC party was so spontaneous that it is sometimes difficult to explain adequately; for example, J.T. Orodi, the brother-in-law of Tarka and the newly elected member into the FHR in Lagos from Ukum-Shirtere in Tiv Division, 'crossed the carpet' to become NPC within a week of winning the election on a UMBC ticket⁴⁶⁴.

Barely one year before the military coups of 1966 however support for the ideas of the creation of a M-Belt Region was so split in Tiv land that S.A. Atum, for example, suggested that the Tiv were slowly and systematically becoming NPC and pro-North:

"We have very much associated ourselves with the southern politicians. These people have a strong belief that there would come a time when all the people whom they call the Middle Belters would come to fight for the creation of the Middle Belt state. They suggested to us that we should make this demand on grounds of religion ... they say that if we are serious about emphasizing the religious politics, they would give us help of any kind. They further told us that if we agree to take this line of action (the Sardauna) would be annoyed and then he would ask for our succession from the Northern Nigeria, but this was in vain ... The Tiv people have lost hope in the United Middle Belt congress. We (the NPC) have already won three safe seats from the United Middle Belt Congress in Tiv Division and time will come when the whole seats will be cleared by the Northern Peoples Congress ... Everyone knows that the agitation for the creation of the Middle Belt is now a dead issue"⁴⁶⁵.

Far from this assumed political exposition, there was still strong Tiv opposition to the Northern establishment in the NPC party and support for the UMBC, to the extent that secession was put forward as an option in the

solution of the political problems in Tiv Division, albeit in other M-Belt areas. Isaac Shaahu suggested that since there were failures of law and order in Tiv Division:

"initiated by the Regional Government, controlled by the Northern Peoples Congress, because the NPC thought that it would not get a single seat in Tiv Division as the opposition party in the area is a stumbling block to their victory ... the only course we can take now since we are not wanted in the North, is to pull out of the North and the federation as a whole. We shall be a sovereign state. We shall be joining nobody (the Eastern Region). We are 1200 000 in population bigger than the Gambia and Mauritania and we have the manpower and every other thing ... if Tiv Division is going to be split into smaller Native Authorities, why can't you do the same to the 30 000 000 people of this Region. The Tiv are one. The trouble in Tiv is internal, created by you because you do not want justice to prevail ... the Tiv will pull out of the Federation if they are divided"⁴⁶⁶.

This extremely threatening demand by Isaac Shaahu was, however as a result of spontaneous 'political pressures in the air' in the NHA rather than serious political party policy of the UMBC or even representative of the Tiv tribal union movement (TPU). Before the end of 1965, two other developments further reduced the vigour of the UMBC members in both the NHA, Kaduna and the FHR in Lagos, who were still in opposition to the NPC party and demanding the creation of the M-Belt Region. Firstly, the reports which were constantly referred to in the NHA in 1965 and the personal experiences of the FHR members and Civil Servants of Northern origins in Lagos, suggesting that Northerners of all shades of opinion in religion and politics, whether they were Christians or Moslems and whether they were NPC, NEPU or UMBC:

"When once you are seen in the Northern attire you become a victim irrespective of your party affiliation ... some are intimidated, beaten, locked up and goaled, because some of the

policemen have UPGA inclination ... some Northerners are even killed. Some members of Parliament molested and even their cars thrown at with stones ... civil servants of Northern origins are asking for transfer back to Kaduna ... because UPGA deceives the public that the troubles (in Nigeria) are between the North and South ... our lorries have been shot at with guns, once they see that the lorries carry plate numbers KA, KC, BE etc. Our convoy of lorries from Kano had to pass through Ijebu area during the day because they will never be allowed to pass free at night ... Northerners are being booed whenever they see them in Northern costume; not only booing of the man inside the car as the case may be, they have to call the names of Sir Ahmadu Bello and Tafawa Balewa ... (saying) go back to your Region, this is not your Region. We (in the North) have to take courage"⁴⁶⁷.

The second major factor that caused the decline of M-Belt movement and support^{for} the UMBC party was the enactment of the Penal Code (Amendment) Law 1965, which effectively clumped down the political activities of opposition forces in The North in general, but most particularly, those of the NEPU and the UMBC parties. The Penal Code Law stated that no public gathering ought to consist of more than three or four people without permission and a section of the law stated: "it also covers abuse or bad language directed from such an abuser to a group of persons or class of persons"⁴⁶⁸. However, the reports on the troubles experienced by Northerners in Lagos and Western Nigeria, caused bitter political resentments, because as much as they were social and political they also concerned economic needs and interests of Northern politicians who were businessmen and who had lost some of their merchandise. As a result there was resurgence of the Northern identity in both NPC and NPF (NEPU/UMBC) members in the NHA. While this was the case in 1965, the Penal Code Law created severe political constipation in the practice of politics in The North with the Northern identity. The Penal Code Law became the political instrument that destroyed popular consciousness on the remaining political force of the UMBC and the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region, because it stopped the opposition from

organizing for political purposes and campaigning, by the very nature of its provisions which cut off freedom of speech, freedom of movement to associate with others etc. As a direct result of this law, many Tiv politicians as well as others politically sympathetic to the cause of the UMBC party in Plateau, S.Bauchi and Numan were put in jail or under political trails, when there was the military coup of 15th January 1966. However in 1965 the NPC government admitted that the problems of the political unity of the North remained unsettled largely because the situation in Tiv Division, ^{which} occassionally flaired up into rioting, destruction of life and property; and the political unrest in the affairs of Jos NA, directly involving the Birom which led the government to appoint a sole commissioner⁴⁶⁹. The political effects of these developments were that the ideas of the M-Belt Movement and the UMBC party were virtually driven to remain only in the hearts of men with very little visible political expression of their existence, except in small underground circles and apparently by both the clients of the NPC as well as the stalwalks of the UMBC movement. In Tiv land the hidden quarrel between Joseph Tarka and Tor Tiv had been dramatically ended in a public reconcilliation two weeks before the 1966, January coup. Furthermore the political dependence of Joseph Tarka upon Chief Awolowo who had been in prison since 1962 was greatly reduced and his previous relations with NPC parliamentarians had become quite close. The ground was therefore prepared for his reapproachment with the NPC and NEPU in a common Northern Front after the January coup⁴⁷⁰.

The development and patterns of the alliances of the UMBC party, with other opposition parties to the NPC suggest that in the growth and development of the M-Belt movements, as much as they generated a lot of political attention from the government, the consistency of the demands right from 1950, independently created new political interests and demands from other dissatisfied groups in The North over the existing political

arrangements. Thus, for example, the political interests in the demands of the BYM, HFPP, ITP and those of the subsequent development of the KPP within the organizational structure of NEPU, are as much explained by the influences of the demands of the UMBC as by the peculiar circumstances of the political and socio-economic conditions which caused the development of subnational consciousness on some of the groups in The North. Although the activities of the M-Belt Movement were essentially based in The North and directed against the NPC party and government in the Region, it sought from Southern Nigerian based political parties and other opposition groups within The North, political support to achieve its goals with an overall emphasis on the political re-arrangement of the Nigerian Federation for national stability. Indeed, it was this outward looking conception of Federalism in the political thought of the leadership in the UMBC that contributed to the organization of the conditions of the Alliance with the AG to contest the 1959 Federal elections and the 1961 Regional elections and which subsequently influenced the realignment of the movement to join the two broadly based political groups (NPF and UPGA) that emerged on the Nigerian political arena to contest the 1964 and 1965 Federal and Regional elections respectively. In both instances of political association with the NPF and UPGA, the specific interest of the UMBC was to ensure the creation of a M-Belt Region. Both the NPF and the UPGA had a commitment to the creation of more states in Nigeria and the M-Belt State in particular. As much as this was meant to adjust for an unbalanced Federation, it was also an electoral strategy to neutralize the dominance of the NPC. In the NPF manifesto for the 1964 elections, for example, it was unequivocally stated that:

"The Northern Progressive Front shall see to it immediately we come to power measures are taken to revise our constitution so as to ensure ... (that) more states are created after ascertaining the views of the inhabitants of the area concerned. This is to ensure stability

and lasting unity for the Federation"⁴⁷¹.

The NPF which was formed in 1963 was clearly an alliance of fellow opponents of the Northern establishment but with significant ideological differences in the NEPU and UMBC. Both parties in the NPF however aimed for a radical revolution which could alter the existing state of political arrangements in The North. The radicalism of NEPU contained 'Socialist Thinking' and was directed at reforming the NA system in The North without fundamentally departing from the territorial conception, albeit other elements of the Northern Identity, while the UMBC envisaged a total rapture in the Northern identity in the creation of an alternative North in a M-Belt Region both in different ways remaining very committed to maintaining a variant of the Northern Identity and northern interests in the Nigerian polity. NEPU accused the NPC of destroying The North because its political power base was founded on feudal roots and on first and last defence of property and privilege and rear-guard action against equality, entrenched over the years by the family compact rule and rulers, the undemocratic electoral college system and the evil of the 10% nomination⁴⁷². NEPU found its main political support from among the 'Talakawa' which it defined as "the simple people of Nigeria": the teachers, the clerks, the petty traders, the farm peasants, the lorry drivers, the truck pusher, the women and the ex-servicemen etc"⁴⁷³. The party advocated the introduction of political democracy (for example, giving the people what they want which was an anti-thesis to the chief giving commands on what the people want. This fitted very much to M-Belt ethos who were not used to centralized authority patterns) which will dismantle feudal political control in The North⁴⁷⁴. The socialist flavour of the language of the NEPU reflects their militant radicalism. For NEPU, for example, the political struggle in The North was a class struggle:

"Owing to the family compact rule of the so called Native Administration in their present autocratic form ... this unscrupulous and vicious system of administration by the family compact rulers and which has been established and fully supported by the British Imperialist Government ... there is today in our society an antagonism of interest, manifesting itself as a class struggle, between the members of that vicious circle of Native Administration on the one hand and the ordinary 'Talakawa' on the other ... this antagonism can be abolished only by the emancipation of the Talakawa from the domination of these privileged few by the reform of the present autocratic political institutions ... this emancipation must be the work of the Talakawa themselves ... the Talakawa must organize consciously and politically for the conquest of Government ... both nationally and locally ... in order that this machinery of Government ... may be converted from an instrument of oppression into the agent of emancipation, and the overthrow of Bureaucracy and autocratic privilege ... all political parties are but the expression of class interest, and as the interest of the Talakawa is diametrically opposed to the interest of all sections of the master class ... the party seeking must naturally be hostile to the party of the oppressors. The Northern Elements Progressive Union of Northern Nigeria ... being the only political party of the Talakawa enters the field of political action determined to reduce to nonentity any party of hypocrites and traitors ... calls upon all the sons and daughters of Northern Nigeria to muster under its banner to end ... this vicious system of administration which deprives them of the fruits of their labour and POVERTY may give place to COMFORT, PRIVELEGE to EQUALITY and political, economic and social SLAVERY to FREEDOM"⁴⁷⁵.

The radicalism of the UMBC also contained 'Socialist Thinking' in the sense that it had avowed commitment of defending the poor and the oppressed. What therefore joined the UMBC and NEPU in the NPF was a common hostility toward the NPC and the Northern establishment which manifested these characteristic and advantages, particularly in the period between 1960 and 1965. The UMBC therefore directed its organization of politics at the destruction and alteration of the political power base of the Northern establishment manifested in the NPC by its demand for the creation of a

M-Belt Region as a means of liberation. One of its committed pledges within the NPF alliance was a stated belief in socialism: "I acknowledge the arrangement and conduct of affairs of the land for the benefit of the 'Talakawa': the simple people of Nigeria"⁴⁷⁶. Thus the demand for state creation by the UMBC became connected to a radical progressive cause both in terms of the content of the NPF program whose contents were directed at the twin-goal of revolutionary transformation and reform of the NA system, the power base of the northern establishment and the NPC party. The UMBC-NEPU alliance in the NPF subsequently developed its influence into the Nigerian political arena and joined forces with the AG and the NCNC and their allies to assume the name, United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). Among others, the stated objectives of the UPGA were that once elected to control political power in the Federation:

"An UPGA Government will minimise minorities as much as administrative efficiency will permit ... perform a once-for-all exercise to settle the question of states for all time ... (by) breaking up the federation into such number of states as will ensure national unity and progress. A Middle Belt state, a Kano state, a Calabar state and all other states for whose creation there is popular demand in the areas concerned will be created SIMULTANEOUSLY and in conformity with the principles of national unity, economic viability and economic progress. The Alliance Government will set up without delay a constituent Assembly to create new states"⁴⁷⁷.

Despite this alliance, however, it was clear that the NPF by its name alone stood for the interests of The North foremost and then those of the Nigerian Federation. In addition to the territorially defined interest in the label of the party, for example, the NPF manifesto made a clear pledge to the Northern electorate for the 1964 elections:

"To protect the interest of the people of the North and ensure that Northern Nigeria's due share in the national cake is always given to its people. To draw up special training schemes for training northerners in various fields ... with a view to obtaining necessary personnel from the North in all branches of the federal government set up. To extend federal institutions of higher learning such as univeristy, teaching, hospitals etc., to the Regions ... and to establish industrial projects in places like Kano, Plateau and Sokoto, where none at present exist. To put into effect immediately our plans for the indigenous Northern Traders for their full participation in our economic life. To restore individual liberty, re-establish the rule of the law, respect for human dignity and fundamental human rights to every inhabitant of the North and the federation. The party stands for freedom, justice, democracy and prosperity for the common people"⁴⁷⁸.

The political association of the UMBC with NEPU in the NPF alliance, is explained by the withering away of the AG alliance with the UMBC because funds ceased to be forth coming to the UMBC after the 1961 regional elections, the subsequent AG crisis in 1962 in which many UMBC politicians were tried in court and Awolowo ended up jailed for treason. The NPF alliance was also conditioned by the UMBC effort to wriggle itself out of increasing pressures to assume total identification with the AG, a situation which might have caused the party to loose its political identity to the AG and for Joseph Tarka to become a total client of Awolowo and the AG leadership. Indeed it became apparent that with the enormous increase of the political influence of Joseph Tarka in the period between 1956 and 1962 there was little political sense in resisting patron-client relationships with the NPC in The North, only to end up being a client of the AG from Ibadan and a different region. However, the alliance of the northern opposition parties as equals in the NPF to Southern Nigerian political parties, is explained by the consistent inclusion of the issue of the creation of a M-Belt Region in the manifesto of the AG as well as by the re-alignment of the NPC party with the United Peoples Party (UPP) which

became the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) under Samuel Akintola and subsequently the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), the political rival to the UPGA, in the 1964 elections.

The volatile nature of the alliances of the M-Belt movement in the period between 1952 and 1965 are explained by a number of factors. In many respects this was due to the composition of the leadership in the organization which came from different tribal backgrounds; how the leadership had cultivated itself from different factions in the movement rather than as a spontaneous group that emerged and organized itself with continuity in holding its leadership posts; and the state of local political issues affecting the different tribal representatives in the M-Belt movement. Thus, for example, when tensions between Birom and Hausa surfaced in Jos onto the local political arena, there was division between the NPC and the Birom, with consequent support for the UMBC from the Birom. In certain instances, when some Birom had derivable political interests from the NPC government in The North like creating a Rwang Pam dynasty on the chieftaincy of Jos, they joined the NPC, while those in protest remained in the UMBC. This was a recurrent situation in Birom politics, although not unique to them since many other M-Belt groups shuttled their political support between the NPC and the UMBC for similar reasons. However most of the leaders all shared a communality of identity in the M-Belt movement which had roots in the christian religion and which was the initial driving force that brought together local leaders as social and political minorities in The North. Political cleavages in the M-Belt movement which also conditioned changes in alliances are also explained by personality clashes and recollected histories of local acrimonies between neighbouring groups. Furthermore, the interpersonal relationships in the evaluation of the different leaders of the tribal unions and parties in the organization of the M-Belt movement which had no indigenous patron or coherent party policy and machinery to which members could be accountable

compounded the problems of leadership and the difference in party political policies remained unsolved. These tendencies resulted into constantly changing strategies and political alliances. Despite these organizational defects, the sentiments and dreams of the M-Belt movement survived until 1966 when the military intervened in Nigerian politics and were to influence the cause for the eventual subdivision of the country into more units of the federation in 1967. This suggests that the aims and objectives of the M-Belt Movement never really changed. What seemed to have consistently changed was label, strategy, direction of appeal and leadership of the organization until 1956 when Joseph Tarka and the Tiv took over the organization and leadership of the M-Belt Movement with over 90% of the Tiv support. These developments in the M-Belt movement however provided stop gaps for political reflections in which some of the leaders not only narrowed the areas claimed by the founding fathers of the M-Belt movement but also expanded the conceptions of Northern minorities on the practice of Nigerian Federalism to include other Nigerian cultural minorities in the context of the Nigerian national identity, and how the nation might develop with stability when there are smaller units in the Federation. However, in its growth and development, the M-Belt movement exhibited political characteristics which indicate a number of elements in the political behaviour patterns of movements and organizations reacting in circumstances of colonialism, which in this instance is internal colonialism within the British created borders of The North: the movement which starts off very well with coherent unity from a mobilized political identity, soon becomes characterized by factional tendencies despite avowed commitments to the aims and objectives by the leadership; the factions are largely developed from the penetration and influence on the activities of the movement by forces of the establishment; where a Messiah like figure does not emerge to take over leadership and sufficiently influence revisionists within the initial aims and objectives of the movement, the

factions soon give way to the antics of scrupulous leaders who exploit the internal divisions among themselves to make personal advancement as they become functional middle-men in the cause of the establishment. The majority of the middle-men from among the M-Belt people existed dependently on the groups in control of political power and government in The North. For those that functioned to neutralize the M-Belt movement, particularly the UMBC, they were tied in unequal relationships as clients to the Islamic politicians in the NPC and government in The North, as the grand-patrons.

The fundamental political mechanism besides the use of the repressive instruments of the government in The North, like the courts, the prisons, the NA administration, the police and the army, which was the main anchorage in holding and maintaining The North as one political unit in the Nigerian Federation was in the useage of patron-client relationships in the conduct of politics of The North to handle the M-Belt problem.

Patron-client relationships in themselves are often apparently inadequate in the practise of politics. The deployment of the mechanism becomes critical in a plural society as The North and particularly so where there are disparties in the public policy priorities of the leadership which was from different socio-religious and cultural backgrounds as well as unequal access to decision making and the control of economic wealth from the historical evolution of the particular society whereby some of the leadership was given advantages over others. Although with endemic inequality, patron-client relationship in politics tend to hold a diverse society together and minimize conflict. The assumed tendency is directed toward integration, particularly so when the geographical size of the territory is vast as The North was, as a unit of the Nigerian Federation since the relationship is emphatic of an existing subordinate (the client) to a superordinate (the patron) who are 'like-minded' on issues affecting their society. The relationship also emphasizes working together toward each others interests: the periphery person (the client) is instrumental in

producing political support for the centre (the patron) and the centre reciprocates by meeting certain inputs from the periphery and also produces certain services. The success for such a relationship to benefit the total society is however depended on the role the individual decides to perform as the functional client. The client can fulfill pro-status quo objectives or set out a role in which he defines the needs of his tribal people or the people he represents and uses his unique advantages of being close to political decision making to bargain from the government, the distribution of amenities to his area⁴⁷⁹. The critical factor in the smooth operation of patron-client relationship in the functioning of the components however is whether the objectives in the relationship are imposed from above or conciliated as equals. Thus, it is possible for example for clients to perpetuate conflict and political resistance to integration among the people they represent when their roles are parasitic and nefarious on the patrons as well as being non-representative by picking on the wrong personality to the detriment of the group and society they claim to represent⁴⁸⁰. Objectively however, clients usually can be instrumental in resolving parochial images in the divisions of society at the lower levels and can be concerned to solve problems at the local levels and thus decongest the central leadership particularly so where the patron is an independent arbitrator. In The North albeit in the practice of Nigerian politics political clients usually assumed local leadership as maximizers of government benefits to their areas, since they bargain for the equitable distribution and share of scarce resources to their areas while they canvas support for the ruling party or stand as the nerve of the community as opinion leaders to produce support and explanations of a government.

The patron-client relationships that characterized the politics of The North in the period between 1959 and 1965, managed to hold that unit of the Nigerian Federation as one political entity, despite the existence of political tensions, dating from 1950, which had resulted into the

organization of a M-Belt movement and the demands for the subdivision of The North into a M-Belt Region, a Borno State and Kano State. In the instance of Kano in 1963, the Emir had been humiliated, having challenged the authority of the Sardauna. The Emir was probed and exposed in the Muffet Commission and subsequently deposed and exiled. These political events cut off the discipline of Kano as effective actor in the Islamic fold under Sokoto in The North. Subsequently the resentment over the treatment of the Emir by the Sardauna compounded the political tensions between the NEPU and the NPC, and found expression in the organization of demands for the creation of a Kano state by the KPP. In consequence there was political support of the causes for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the NPF. However, in the early 1950s some M-Belt political and religious leaders became clients of the NPC party and leadership and were given posts of responsibility in the NPC governments in The North and at the Federal Centre of power. Patron-client mechanisms in the relationships between the NPC and the M-Belt movement were therefore responsible for the decline of political opposition in The North in general. More specifically, the patron-client relationships were responsible for the decline of political support for the M-Belt movement in the period between 1960 and 1965. In that period the NPC party and leadership successfully built up patron-client relationships with some leaders of the M-Belt movement on the Plateau, S.Bauchi, Numan areas and in S.Zaria as well as in Benue among the Idoma and the Jukun of Wukari. They were, however, less successful in establishing clientage among leaders of the M-Belt movement in Tiv land, where they ended up recruiting unpopular local persons as clients and most of the popular Tiv leadership under Joseph Tarka was not penetratable.

The building up of clients from among the M-Belt groups and societies and the effective role of the grand patron relationship was to a large extent the function of the charismatic leadership of Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto. His charismatic qualities as a leader were acknowledged

to be powerful, not only in the Islamic society and the M-Belt areas in The North, but also in other Regions of Nigeria as well as in other parts of the world, particularly in the Arab countries and the Middle East where Islam was strong. In The North, the charismatic leadership of the Sardauna was complimented by his personal human qualities: He was a tall man who dwarfed others in height and body build; and by nature, a very generous man. He gave friends, close associates and of course his clients generous gifts: gowns, money, watches and entertained lavishly. The need for patron-client relationships arose out of the need to bring into the main stream of the affairs of The North, political leadership from among the non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas, in support of the causes of consolidating the Northern identity which was in the philosophy of the NPC party that was dominated by leadership from the Islamic centres of religious power in The North. There was also the need to maintain The North as one Region to serve as an effective homogeneous bloc solidly poised against electoral political competition with Southern Nigerian based political parties for control of political power in the Federation and who were increasingly gaining grounds in political support in The North. Although there was some success in the establishment of political clients from among the M-Belt movement as well as from other opposition groups in The North, the increased recourse to use of suppressive political methods to protect the clients suggest that the Sardauna, the grand patron of the relationships chose the wrong clients from the M-Belt areas, Borno and Kano, where there were overt demands for the subdivision of The North in the period between 1960 and 1965. The suppression of rival political leadership who contested with the clients of the NPC party in the exercise of local political influence in the M-Belt areas, where the UMBC party actively operated, was rampant in the 1961 (Regional) and 1964 (Federal) elections. Suppression of opposition leadership was also rampant in Borno where there was the BYM, which was previously in the NPC, but subsequently

changed and aligned itself with the UMBC and the AG. In Kano, the strong seat of the radical NEPU opposition party, the NPC also used suppressive political methods⁴⁸¹. In 1965 alone, for example, there were over 500 Tiv people as political prisoners who were in jail as a result of the 1964 riots in Tiv land and whose political identity was that of the UMBC party⁴⁸². In the two post-independence elections in The North it was not only a question of neutralizing political opposition leaders and some of the members of their political organizations by putting them into prisons, but the NPC methods of suppression also involved the intimidation of the electorate in the particular areas where it was assumed, anti-NPC sentiments were strongest. However political thugs were used by all political parties to intimidate the electorate. In Benue Province, for example, supporters of the NPC party by the 'Young Pioneers' of Joseph Tarka just as the supporters of the UMBC party were similarly tackled by the 'Youth Brigade' of the Sardauna⁴⁸³. However, political thugs of the NPC, who carried out intimidation on UMBC party supporters, were usually protected by sections of the arms of the law enforcement agencies: the police and the courts, whose agents were in support of the party in government. The extra legal methods that were employed by the NPC party and its supporters in the electoral processes were meant to ensure total victory in the elections in The North. The use of patron-client mechanisms and the methods of protecting the clients by the government of the NPC, virtually drove the M-Belt movement underground in its political activities as well as expressions of sentiments for the organization, except for Tiv-land where in reaction to the circumstances, there were riots and political unease over the creation of the M-Belt Region until 1966 when the Nigerian Army intervened in Nigerian Politics. One consequence of the establishment of patron-client relationships with some of the leadership of the non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas, was a resultant dependency on the authority of the Sardauna, whose clients managed the M-Belt areas on behalf

of the Islamic society and within the overall interests of The North. The client became tied in this relationship by underlining Islamic ethos and Hausa culture in their social and political behaviour in the name of the preservation of the Northern Identity. Furthermore, the style and pattern of recruiting the political clientele and their subsequent political and social behaviour upon recruitment which in most instances was characterized by despising UMBC leaders, indicated the gradualist processes by which patron-client relationships were increasingly translating themselves into Islamization and these were complimented by enormous material rewards. The Sardauna always hand picked the clients himself from the M-Belt groups and societies. The choice of client was based on the strength of local opinions on the particular individual which were passed on to him by planted observers in the Islamic communities among the M-Belt areas and in some instances, by pro-status-quo Administrative Officers (the Residents, DOs and ADOs) who served in areas where a client was required. Particularly implemented in seeking support for the NPC was the creation of the institution of the Provincial Commissioner with the overtly political role of heading the Provincial Administration and subsequently took over more of the roles of the colonial Residents as they existed before Independence in 1960.

In addition to the patron-client relationships in the practice of politics in The North, which were used to check political opposition in the M-Belt areas and to neutralize the leadership of the UMBC, who were demanding the creation of a M-Belt Region, there was developed a policy of Northernization by the NPC party in control of government in The North in the period between 1952 and 1956. This policy was vigourously implemented in the period between 1956 and 1965 and it negatively affected the M-Belt groups and societies who still held sentiments for the UMBC, particularly so, after the attainment of self-government by The North and the Federal elections of 1959. However, the policy surfaced into the political arena

with the increased political influence of the NPC party in the 1952 elections and the political power of the government in The North, after the Regionalization of wealth in 1954⁴⁸⁴. Thereafter, the party formalized the policy into a declared political philosophy of the leadership and followers of the NPC. The roots of the policy of Northernization were shaped by the "Nigerianization" of the civil service, particularly in the period between 1954 and 1955⁴⁸⁵. Nigerianization had developed from the political pressures of Southern Nigerian based political parties, who pressed for the wholesale replacement throughout the country of British officials by Nigerians⁴⁸⁶. The NPC party and political leadership in The North however claimed: Nigerianization would mean "Southernization" and they would have none of it⁴⁸⁷. In reaction therefore, the Northern leadership insisted that in The North:

"in future, posts requiring no particular qualification must be the exclusive preserve of their own people (Northerners). Other posts requiring special qualifications must only be filled from outside when no Northerner in any way suitable was available and any importations must, come from Britain or from other foreign countries, for they would in due course return to their homeland. Only if there was no alternative source of supply would they be recruited from the Eastern or Western Regions"⁴⁸⁸.

Before the policy was defined, Northernization created confusion and both backbench members in the NHA and other influential political personalities produced pressures on Ministers: To replace "alien" civil servants, wholesale from an apparently inexhaustive though purely hypothetical pool of "deserving Northerners"⁴⁸⁹, until the Sardauna made the policy clearer in 1954:

"Nearly every week I get over 100 applications from Northerners for employment ... people think being a Northerner is the only qualification required ... These letters mostly

come from people with Elementary IV qualifications, asking either for senior service posts or Chief Clerks jobs in the Administration. May I warn members that being a Northerner is not a qualification. Many people have taken it for granted that so long as I am a Northerner I must be given the privilege of being a Northerner. If he is a genuine Northerner, let him prove that he is the type of person who has come forward to work for the people and not for himself"⁴⁹⁰.

This conception of the "genuine Northerner" introduced a lot of suspicion on the whole policy of Northernization among the M-Belt groups and societies. Indeed, the majority of people with Elementary IV Primary School Certificates and above in The North according to the 1952 census were from Plateau, Numan S.Zaria, Benue, Kabba and Ilorin areas and were produced from Christian Missionary Institutions⁴⁹¹. The philosophy of the NPC party was that of the preservation of The North and this was strongly reflected in its Motto in the Constitution and Rulers: One North, One People, Irrespective of Religion, Rank or Tribe. Furthermore, among other objectives and requirements of membership, the NPC party was committed:

"To inculcate in the minds of the Northerners a genuine love for the Northern Region and all that is Northern and a special reverence for Religion, Laws and Order and the preservation of good customs and traditions and the feeling that the sorrow of one Northerner shall be the sorrow of all and that the happiness of one is also the happiness of all ... membership (of the party) is open to all people of Northern Nigerian decent irrespective of creed, rank or tribe and members shall submit to Party discipline and loyalty and accept the leadership of the NPC"⁴⁹².

Thereafter the policy was redefined consistently in terms of jobs and other Northern interests as a whole on the Nigerian political arena. In 1956, for example, according to Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of The North, Northernization policy meant: "the filling of posts in this our Regional Public Service by the sons and daughters of the North, duly qualified by

education, training, experience and intelligence"⁴⁹³. The policy was initially pushed so hard that it produced enormous increases in the jobs that Northerners gained with the Regional government within a very short period of time; for example, while in 1952, there were 1,633 Northerners in the Junior Posts of the Public Service and twenty five in the Senior Posts, by 1956 there were 2356 Northerners in the Junior Posts, an increase of 48% and sixty two in the Senior Posts, an increase of 148%⁴⁹⁴. In 1958, the policy was such a political issue largely from the leakage of top government secrets on the submission of the Government of The North to the Commission on Minorities that the Sardauna suggested to members of the NHA: "The policy of Northernization is more or less like our pillows .. each one of us sleeps on it and gets up on it"⁴⁹⁵. As lately as in 1965, Northernization was expanded in definition by Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of The North to mean a situation whereby the government in The North:

"can Northernize everything in the North ... since it happens in the East and West and throughout the Federation. Northernization does not mean the clerks in the office. A Northern Doctor, Engineer and Planning Officers are parts of what we call Northernization. Not only this but I would want to see that our market stalls are being held and run by Northerners. I would like to see that whenever any of us want to build a house and in whatever remote corner it may be, the labourers and the supervisors be Northerners. That in actual fact, Northernization does not just stop in the office of the Government or the Native Authority"⁵⁰⁰.

Symbolically, Northernization was also strongly associated with the mode of dressing in the Hausa-Fulani Islamic culture in The North and any person(s) who dressed otherwise were regarded as outsiders: S.A. Atum, for example, a Tiv member and christian, who cross-carpeted to become NPC, accused UMBC members in the NHA thus:

"It is quite clear from the dresses worn by these United Middle Belt Congress members in this chamber that they have excluded themselves from us. They are in English dress while we are in National Costumes⁵⁰¹, which we are so proud of. They are wearing this type of dress purposely in order to enter into any village and kill people"⁵⁰².

The political instruments that were used to translate the policy of Northernization into reality and into acceptance as the Northern Identity was in the building up of patron-client relationships who in turn were Hausanized and sometimes Islamized. There were also generous material rewards to individuals who responded positively to the acceptance of the Northern Identity and with the support of their tribal groups and societies they also gained shares of social-welfare, economic and political benefits from the NPC government. Northernization policy however was largely responsible for causing the reinvigouration of Hausaization and Islamization. In the period between 1961 and 1965 for example, proficiency in the Hausa language became a measure for screening for "genuine-northerners" and for a successful career in the Northern Civil Service. Furthermore, being Moslem fitted with the social and political culture of The North and was also a boost to new opportunities with greater material rewards and money. This became apparent in context of the Islamic 'conversion tours' of Ahmadu Bello, the Sarkin Sokoto, in the period between 1964 and 1965. Among the non-Islamic M-Belt groups and societies and in particular, among the Christian Communities on the Plateau, Numan areas in Adamawa, S.Bauchi, and S.Zaria, these political developments in context of the campaigns for the 1964 Federal elections and the 1965 Regional elections, were religious developments by the use of government power, to complete the Islamic eclipse of The North and making Northern Nigeria 'an Islamic State' while increasing Islamic influences within the Nigerian Federation. Although there were ambivalent reactions from the M-Belt groups and societies to these political developments, they

systematically wore down political support for the UMBC party, whose electoral victories became narrowed to Tiv land. In Benue and Plateau Provinces, where there was a core concentration of the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North for example, actual votes as a % of Registered votes for the UMBC party declined from 51.1% in 1959 to 38.3% in 1961 in Benue and from 39.2% in 1959 to 21.1% in 1961 in Plateau⁵⁰³. In all of the other M-Belt areas and the Yoruba irredentist areas of Kabba and Ilorin, there were substantial decreases in votes for the UMBC party in the 1961 elections within the average decrease of 6.1% for the whole of the Northern Region⁵⁰⁴. Subsequently in the 1964 federal elections, there was a decrease of about 21.8% in the votes cast in support of opposition groups in the NPF, when compared to their political performance in similar elections in 1959⁵⁰⁵. In the midst of declining political support for the UMBC party the reactions to the political antics of the NPC party by some of the M-Belt groups and societies included organized riots - as was the case with the Tiv in 1960/61 and 1964/65. The 1964 riots in Tiv land, being far more bloodier than those of 1960; clashes and skirmishes between members of different political parties - as was the case with the NPC, mainly consisting of Hausa migrant workers and traders against the UMBC, consisting of Birom, indigenous to Vom in November/December 1964; and the tribal revolt of the Jarawa against the NPC in 1964 centred on Fobur. However, while the Tiv riots of 1960/61 had been over resentment on the failure to create the M-Belt Region as well as over the increased oppression in the NPC policies in the government of The North acting through the Chief of Tiv and the NA apparatus in which the Tiv were coerced into supporting the NPC as against the UMBC/AG alliance, the 1964/65 riots were ostensibly against the political behaviour of NPC clients in Tiv land, who victimized the NA staff sympathetic to the UMBC, arrested and intimidated party political opponents and the dismissal of some tax collectors⁵⁰⁶. There was also resentment over attempts by government in The

North to plant NPC surrogates to dominate the Provincial Council for Benue and the Tiv Advisory Council⁵⁰⁷. In both instances of the 1960 and 1964 disturbances however, the Tiv were reacting against the imposition of NPC political authority and the abuse of power that was exercised by NPC clients in Tiv land and of course the activation of this political consciousness by the UMBC party⁵⁰⁸. A much more broadly based reaction to the political developments that affected the Christian religious identity among the M-Belt groups and societies, which criss-crossed tribal political identities in context of Northernization policy, the processes of Hausaization and Islamization in the building of patron-client relationships with some selected M-Belt Leaders, was the Northernization of M-Belt Christian organization. The collective Christian reaction expressed itself in the formation of the Northern Christian Association (NCA) of Nigeria in 1964⁵⁰⁹. The NCA was supported by the different European Christian Missionary Bodies in The North. The organization of the Association however was in direct response to the anxieties that were caused by the Islamic Religious posture that were assumed by the Sarkin Sokoto. A part from his socio-religious and political roots in Sokoto, as a direct descendant from Dan Fodio, the Sarkin Sokoto visited holy places in Saudi Arabia and made rather more frequent pilgrimages to Mecca than usual, was instrumental in getting grants of money for Islamic work in The North (mainly for the building of prestigious memorial Mosques and the purchase and circulation of Islamic literature) from wealthy Arabs, was Vice-President of the World Islamic Congress and began religious campaign tours which were given great publicity on the numbers of conversions he achieved each day⁵¹⁰. The publicity given to the tours created false images when it was suggested that "pagan" communities converted wholesale to Islam and the non-Christian population was being increasingly Islamized⁵¹¹. The new converts were encouraged to maintain the Islamic faith by instant cash payments, given cows, blankets, foodstuff, as well as cash donations to

errect Mosques, by the Sardauna and members of his enormous entourage. The anxieties created by the Islamic postures and conversion tours of the Sardauna, were not only restricted to christians in The North. In January, 1964, M.Tijanai Gago Ali, the Secretary in the Central office of the NEPU party in Jos, whose support came from Moslems, was obliged to advise the Sardauna:

"To stop speaking as 'the voice of Islam' in Nigeria, because he was the Premier of The North and not the Chief Imam ... To conduct himself like Aminu Kano, who goes outside Nigeria, only with the permission of the Federal Government of Nigeria ... and that if the Premier was not ready to listen to advice, he should resign as Premier of the North to become the Chief Imam of Nigeria ... soonest he does that, then will he be in line with his great-great grandfather, the Shehu - Usman dan Fodio"⁵¹².

Among other reasons, the NCA was formed to watch over the interests of Christians in The North irrespective of their tribe, party or denomination^{512b}. The Association was also meant:

"To safeguard the Christian religious interest of persons, churches and institutions. To bring to the attention of all concerned the fact that the Christian religion is a native and integral part of the life of Northern Nigeria"⁵¹³.

The headquarters of the NCA was at Kaduna, the seat of the NPC government and capital of The North, a political and religious decision that was made to distant the Association from any suspicion of European Christian Missionary influences, were its location to be in Jos⁵¹⁴. The President of the Association was Joly Tanko Yusufu, who was a prominent top member of the NPC party and also provincial commissioner for Benue⁵¹⁵. In his capacity as President of the NCA, he tried to allay the anxieties of Christians in The North with an article in the leading newspaper, the Nigerian Citizen in November 1965⁵¹⁶. Furthermore, he frequently denied in

public that there was any intolerance in the Northern Government and his committee in the NCA always investigated cases of alleged religious and political intolerance in The North and always urged Christians to evangelise without fear⁵¹⁷.

Although the NCA used a geographical conception of identity which made it very Northern in political identity its major roles were centred on the Christian religion rather than the politics of the M-Belt movement in The North. It however symbolically represented religious pluralism in the Northern Identity and support for the NPC party. The NCA was subsequently used to score political goals against alleged Islamic domination and Islamic intolerance of non-Islamic faiths in government and society in The North. This became particularly the case when the NCA was politically involved in defussing tensions between Christian and Moslem institutions that were generated by Northernization in which certain elements of implementing the policy contained Hausaization and Islamization. Furthermore, the NCA did not have a political role in the UMBC movement and infact, did not influence or create any religious political impact on the causes of the M-Belt movement and the organization of demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. If anything else, by the very nature of the political identity of the President, Jallo Tanko Yusufu, who was NPC, the NCA stood for One North in conforming to the philosophy of the NPC and was against the creation of a M-Belt Region. Mallam Jallo Tanko Yusufu was infact accused by Isaac Shaahu, a Tiv member in the NHA for master minding the Tiv riots of 1964:

"The 1963 troubles were introduced by the Commissioner. He planned, organized promoted and also supervised (the troubles). In the samev 1963, it was Tanko Yusufu who led the Northern Peoples Congress lecture in Gboko (in which) he instructed Clan Heads, District Heads, Chiefs and everybody (that was NPC) to start oppression on United Middle Congress Supporters ... He forgot one important thing; that Clan Heads and Members of the judiciary

are not supposed to take part in Politics"⁵¹⁸.

Since 1964 the NCA has remained articulately religious and maintained its avowed interests over the protection of Northern Christians. It was the organization that laid the foundation for the "New Life for All" Protestant Christian movement which after 1965 was vigorously involved in Christian revivalist crusades on the Plateau and in S.Zaria and subsequently expanded these to other M-Belt areas. The crusades were the direct reaction to the assumed productive results of the conversion tours of the Sardauna, in the expansion of Islam in The North. In 1965, in particular, the 'New Life for All' campaigns involved evangelisation on a large scale and the participation of indigenous Christians not previously involved in it⁵¹⁹. 30,000 attended weekly classes and there were 700 prayer groups in Plateau and S.Zaria alone⁵²⁰. Most of these participants were however from the reserves of the unemployed Primary School leavers. The figures for unemployment for this category of persons were unusually high in S.Zaria and Plateau, most of whom had passed from Christian Missionary Primary Schools⁵²¹. The response to the 'New Life for All' campaign however demonstrated that in reaction to the conversion tours, the church was concerned not only with the calling of individuals, but entire communities which had been systematically visited. The largest crowd ever to gather was at the massive Ahmadu Bello Sports Stadium at Kaduna at the final rally of a week long campaign in the town in 1965 which Christians from all over The North participated⁵²². However the NCA movement was not intended to be political, but it ended up having an important political effect in solidifying the cause of identities of the non-Muslim North. In a sense, it was a political surrogate to replace dwindling UMBC oriented political support.

By 1966 the power of the Sardauna over The North was personalized and appeared to be irremovable by political means. He personified what the Hausa termed as "Ikko" or "prestigious power" and apparently his power,

albeit conceptions of power in Nigerian politics, had an inherent attractiveness. By 1966 also, the M-Belt movement had been gradually reduced in its strength except in four constituencies in Tiv land where elections were still won by the opposition force. The NPC had consistently won elections in The North as a result of defections by members of the UMBC party who joined the NPC and by the blatant election rigging that were particularly characteristic of the 1964 elections. The effects of these political developments were that the desire for the creation of a M-Belt Region was driven underground rather than extinguished. It was only revived in the two coups of January and July 1966 and from the acceptance of power by a man of M-Belt origins, dedicated to preserving the Nigerian Federation by creating more states and thus deciding to break up The North.

Notes to Chapter 4

1. Interview Discussions with JOnah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot, January 1981. It was suggested to me during the interview discussions that the reprimands on the Sardauna were at a joint meeting of NPC and NML leaders with officials of the government of British administration in Kaduna.
2. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January, 1981: This rhetoric was in the Hausa Language, mixed with the English Language. The translation in the above quoted words are therefore mine.
3. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
4. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
5. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
6. See R.L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, Princeton, 1963P; Post 1963, p.79.
7. This became apparent in my Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu Moses Nyam Rwang and in particular with Pastor David Lot who was President General of both the NML and MZL; but see also Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation or the Race - The Politics of Independence, London, 1965, p90 - p91.
8. Interview Discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January, 1981.
9. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
10. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, January, 1981; See also Jan Harm Boer, Missionary Messengers of Liberation in a colonial context: A case study of the Sudan United Mission, Amsterdam, 1979, p336.
11. Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotry, January, 1981; For more analytical detail of the "Saban Zawan" issue, see Chapter 3, Sections VI where the activities and issues focussed upon by the "Tribal" Union movements were examined.
12. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
13. The political alliances of the M-Belt movements particularly that between the UMBC and the AG in 1956 and with the NPF for the 1964 elections are examined in more analytical details with examples in Sections IV, V and VI of this Chapter.
14. Supervisory Discussions with M.J. Dent, 1980-83; See also John P. MacKintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics, London, 1965, particularly his discussions of "Electoral Trends and the Tendency to a One Party System", in Chapter 12.
15. Discussions with M.J. Dent, 1980-1983.
16. This point is discussed more, when the Willink Commission is examined in greater analytical detail in Chapter 4 as it related to the causes and demands of the M-Belt movement for the creation of a M-Belt Region and the practice of Nigerian Federalism before independence in 1960.
17. Sharwood-Smith, 1969, p333.
18. The "Big Region" syndrome which conditioned the claims of the MZL and the UMBC to suggest that the M-Belt Region was the geographical "Middle Zone" of Nigeria is examined in more analytical detail in Chapters 5 and 6 where Politics with the M-Belt Movement in The North and Nigeria is discussed.
19. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Azi Nyako, Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
20. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
21. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.

22. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
23. This was a consequence of the disagreements on the constitutional settlements at the Ibadan conference in 1952/53; See for example, the full text of the Northern "Eight-Point Programme" in Ahmadu Bello, My Life, London, 1962, p143-144.
24. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
25. For a more detailed analytical discussion of these points, see Chapter 2 Sections II and III.
26. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
27. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
28. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
29. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
30. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981; Moses Nyam Rwang however maintains that the funds were given to him when he was Treasurer and Pastor Lot was President of the MZL movement and further suggests that the structures he built as MZL headquarters were standard buildings; and that the lots of money he is alleged to have had at the time and build personal houses, was from his Army pension benefits.
31. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lotot, January, 1981.
32. The factional tendencies which weakened the cohesion of the M-Belt Movement in the period between 1951 and 1956 are examined in Section IV of this chapter where the M-Belt Political Parties for the creation of a M-Belt Region are brought into analytical focus.
33. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot, January, 1981; See also Dudley, 1968, p92 - 93.
34. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981.
35. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
36. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
37. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
38. This point will be revisited in Section VI of this chapter, where the political alliances of the UMBC, particularly that with the AG after 1956, are brought into analytical focus.
39. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot,, January, 1981.
40. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot, January, 1981; See also Post 1963, p81, and Dudley, 1968, p93.
41. Dudley, 1968, p93.
42. Dudley, 1968, p93; Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang, Isaac Kpum and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
43. Nigeria Year Book, Lagos, 1952, p7.
44. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
45. Nigeria Year Book, Lagos, 1952, p8 - p9; Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
46. Nigeria Year Book, Lagos, 1952, p8 - p9; Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
47. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981; See also, Nigeria Year Book, Lagos, 1952, p9 and Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna, 1953 p59 - p60: where it is suggested that "even in remote villages (of the Plateau the people) had quite a good idea of

what it (the election) was all about ... and the stronger groups of tribal delegates did not use their strength to sweep the board: in the results there were representatives from four of the five divisions.

48. Nigeria Year Book, Lagos, 1952, p7 - p8.
49. Discussions with M.J. Dent in the period between January 1980 - September 1983.
50. Interview Discussions with Ajiva Aji and Isaac Kpum, January, 1981.
51. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna, 1953, p14 - p15.
52. Post, 1963, p84 - p88.
53. The Yoruba irredentist feelings as they affected the M-Belt Movement and its alliance with the AG are examined in detail in Section V and VI of this chapter.
54. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981.
55. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981.
56. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981.
57. In examining the Northern House of Assembly Debates for the period between 1952 and 1956, there is no trace of a motion on the creation of a M-Belt Region until in the fifth session of 6th March 1956, when Ibrahim Imam from Borno later a leader of opposition in The North tabled one before the House under circumstances which he described as "opposing forces in the House" and had previously wished to withdraw the motion because it ... "may have a sort of adverse effect on the constitutional conference to be held in London".
58. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 6th March, 1956, p176 - 178.
59. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 6th March, 1956, p176 - 178; If the NPC politicians in the NHA had not insisted, the motion on the creation of a M-Belt Region might not have been tabled and debated at all. For examples of the controversy and the political mood inside the NHA which led to debating the motion on the creation of a M-Belt Region, see Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 6th March, 1956, p176 - p178.
60. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, and Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981.
61. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
62. For examples of the type of issues raised that focussed on and concerned the conceptions of deprivation and discrimination of the Northern Government on the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1950 and 1956, see the rather extended speech of Moses Nyam Rwang who summarized the problems raised in the NHA in the period between 1952 and 1956 in Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 6th March, 1956, p197 - p203.
63. For examples, see Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna 1952 - 1956.
64. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 1956, p18.
65. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 1956, p184 - p194.
66. For examples, see the parliamentary speeches in the Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, of Pastor David Lot, Dauda Kwoi, Ibrahim Imam, Fate Dass, Benjamin Akiga, Patrick Fom, George Ohikere, Moses Rwang, Jauro Gombe, Auta Anzah and P.C. Okpanachi, during the period between 1952 and 1956, particularly

- those of 1956 when the MZL and the UMBC brought the issue of the creation of a M-Belt Region before the NHA and in the midst of its factional tendencies.
67. Bryan Sharwood Smith, "But Always As Friends", Northern Nigeria and the Cameroons 1921 - 1957, London, 1969, p133 - p139; see also Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, for the period between 1952 and 1956.
 68. For examples, see Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 1956, particularly p197 where it is suggested that "There was considerable disturbance in the House" when Moses Nyam Rwang made his speech on the motion for the creation of a M-Belt Region. This was equally so for Ibrahim Imam and Patrick Fom whenever they spoke - see for examples, p178 - p197 of the same Hansard material.
 69. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Alexander Fom and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
 70. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January, 1981; See also Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 1956, p202.
 71. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 1956, p186 - p187.
 72. For an example of the reflections on this financial misunderstanding in the NHA, see the speech by Anta Anzah, elected Member from Plateau Province in Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 1956, p204.
 73. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot and Isaac Kpum, January, 1981; See also M.G. Smith, "Kagoro Political Development", Human Organization, vol.19, 1960, p146; One should not however confuse this meeting with that of December, 1950, to suggest that it was the formation of the MZL - rather it was another meeting that took place at Kagoro in December, 1952, during which there was reorganization of the leadership in an already existing MZL movement.
 74. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot, Patrick Fom, Patrick Dokotri and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
 75. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981.
 76. Smith, 1960, p146.
 77. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri and Isaac Kpum, January, 1981.
 78. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu and Gayos, Gilima, January, 1981 who were central to the organization of the Kagoro meeting and all attended.
 79. Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981.
 80. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Mallam Gwamna, the Chief of Kagoro, January, 1981.
 81. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
 82. Interview Discussions with Pastor David lot, Jonah Assadugu and Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981.
 83. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Patrick Dokotri and Isaac Kpum, January, 1981.
 84. Interview Discussions with Azi Nyako, Patrick Dokotri, Isaac Kpum, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
 85. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981.
 86. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
 87. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Isaac Kpum, Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot and Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981; Isaac

- Kpum however suggests that the claim of their support by Rwang was so because they gave him a sympathetic audience in the hope of resolving the leadership crisis of the MZL rather than support to form a new political party.
88. Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotri and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
 89. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981.
 90. Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotri, Jonah Assadugu and Barnabas Dusu, January, 1981.
 91. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981; See also, Sharwood Smith, 1969, p343 - p344; and also The Nigerian Citizen, Kaduna, 1953, January copies; Most of the issues for that month carried reports of the crisis of the MZL that took place during the Kagoro meeting of December, 1952.
 92. Interview Discussions with Isaac Kpum and Ajiva Aji, January, 1981.
 93. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri and Ajiva Aji, January, 1981; Ajiva Aji suggests that he was one of the first few Tiv people who attended the very first meeting at Gboko, called to discuss the news and ideas Abuul brought from Jos on whether the Tiv people should join the Christian and non-Islamic movement as was advocated by Patrick Dokotri and Moses Nyam Rwang; It ought to be borne in mind however that although Isaac Kpum attended the Kagoro meeting he narrowed the circulation of ideas on the M-Belt Movement to the Christian European educated, who were mostly teachers, unlike Abuul who circulated within a wider cross section of Tiv society as a contractor with the NA.
 94. J.I. Tseayo, Conflict and Incorporation in Nigeria: The Integration of the Tiv, Zaria, 1975, p179.
 95. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri and Barnabas Dusu, January, 1981; Barnabas Dusu was a District Office in Tiv Division in the period between 1969 and 1972.
 96. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981; see also, Bill Freund, Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines, London, 1981, p163 - p164.
 97. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981.
 98. Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation, Princeton, 1963, p346.
 99. Sklar, 1963, p346, Tseayo, 1975, p195.
 100. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981; See also Sklar 1963, p346.
 101. Sklar 1963, p346.
 102. Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotir, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
 103. Post 1963, p82.
 104. Most of previous research on the MBPP, however, rather controversially asserts that the party surfaced in July 1953 - For example see Coleman 1958 p336; Post 1963 p80; Sklar 1963 p346 and Dudley 1968, p94. Moses Nyam Rwang however suggests that the party was begun and assumed organizational form in March, 1954, after the whole of 1953 had been spent on underground work for the form of the party. All the underground work was surprisingly unknown to most of the leadership in the MZL part, except perhaps Jonah Assadugu - Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981.
 105. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981.
 106. For examples, see the detail discussions of these movements and factions in Post, 1963, p80 - p83; Sklar 1963, p347 - p348; Dudley 1968, p94 - p96 and p113.
 107. Sklar 1963, p35 - p37; Dudley 1968, p96; This point is examined in more detail below, when individual "tribal" support for the MZL and the M-Belt Movement in its phase as the UMBC is brought into

- analytical focus.
108. This point will become apparent in the discussion below when the analysis is focussed on the nature of issues that shaped patron-client political relationships in politics within The North.
 109. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981.
 110. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Alexander Fom and Patrick Fom, January, 1981.
 111. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu, Patrick Dokotri, and Patrick Fom, January, 1981.
 112. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Fom and Pastor David Lot, January, 1981; See also Northern Region Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, March 1956, p189 and p205.
 113. As lately as in March, 1956, for example, both Lot and Rwang were confronted by members of the NHA (mostly NPC) as to "who is leader of the MZL and the UMBC in the M-Belt Movements and the right to make demands for the people of the area for the creation of a M-Belt Region - See: Northern Region Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 1956, p202 - This point will be discussed in more detail below.
 114. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri, Patrick Fom and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
 115. Sklar 1963 p340 and p371.
 116. Sklar 1963 p371.
 117. Sklar 1963 p340; Rather ironically on this proposed Region which was articulated by Ibrahim Imam and which excluded Benue Province is that he ended up taking political refuge among the Tiv, where Tarka had offered him a place in his own area of Jemgbar and even with Tarka's support won elections there with a majority of over 30,000, the largest in The North and thus becoming the first Nigerian to win elections from a non-tribal constituency base - For a more detailed discussion, see M.J. Dent, "A Minority Party - The United Middle Belt Congress", in J.P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics, London, 1966, p.505.
 118. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981.
 119. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
 120. Dudley 1963, p112n.78, however, suggests that the MZL headquarters were moved from Bukuru to Jos in July 1954. This is incorrect as far as my interview evidence goes, because it was only when the MZL was merged with other M-Belt political parties to become the UMBC that their headquarters in Bukuru ceased to function. The suggested date by Dudley may well be part of the muddle in dating the movement of the MBPP headquarters from Bukuru to Jos after July, 1954.
 121. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu and Gayos Gilima, January, 1981; see also, Sklar 1963 p348, for a crude breakdown of Christian domination of the "tribal" union movements associated with the MZL in Adamawa, particularly in Numan Division.
 122. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Gayos Gilima and Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981.
 123. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Fom, Patrick Dokotri and Isaac Kpum, January, 1981; see also, Sklar 1963 p347 - p348; Post 1963 p80 - p83 and Dudley 1968 p94 - p96.
 124. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu, Isaac Kpum and Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981; See also, Dudley 1968 p113n.82.
 125. Coleman 1958 p366.
 126. Sklar 1963 p339
 127. Coleman 1958 p367.
 128. Dudley 1968 p113n.83.

129. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Fom, January 1981.
130. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981.
131. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Fom and Isaac Kpum, January, 1981.
132. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Fom, January, 1981.
133. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Isaac Kpum, January, 1981; These initial differences within the MBPP under Gundu, on who to align with for the 1954 elections, ought not be confused with similar differences in the experience of the MBSP under Abaagu (Tiv) over the 1956 elections when Moses Nyam Rwang (Biom), E.G. Gundu (Tiv) Bello Ijumu (Igbirra), Akase Dowgo (Tiv) and Ewoicho Omakwu (Idoma) went to contact the AG, while Abaagu as temporary Chairman made representation to the NEPU/NCNC - Dudley, 1968, p96.
134. Discussions with M.J. Dent, 1980 -1984; also see a mild reference to the AG search for an alliance with the M-Belt movements from as early as in 1954 in, Post 1963 p81.
135. Discussions with M.J. Dent, 1980 - 1984; see also, Tseyo 1975 p194.
136. It must be remembered that all these elections were indirect, so that influence at the final stage had to be brought to bear only on a relatively small group of people.
137. Post 1963 p80.
138. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Report, 1954, Kaduna, 1956, p7.
139. Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotri, and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981; see also, Post 1963 p80 - p81; Sklar 1963 p347.
140. Post 1963, p80; Dudley 1968, p95; Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
141. Sklar 1963, p35-37.
142. Sklar 1963, p35-37; Post 1963 p84-88.
143. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981; See also Post 1963 p81.
144. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot, January 1981; See also Sklar 1963 p346-347; Post 1963 p81; Dudley 1968 p94-95.
145. What appears to be the correct dates and which correlate with the subsequent sequence of political events that conditioned changes in organization of the M-Belt Movements can be found in, Northern Region Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, 1956 p201, where the date for the Ilorin Conference was given as 17th to 19th Novemebr, 1955. This was confirmed in my interview discussions, among others, with Rwang, Dokotri, Lot, Assadugu and Kpum.
146. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu and Patrick Dokotri, January 1981; See also, Sklar 1963 p347; Dudley 1968 p94-95.
147. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri, Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January, 1981; See also Dudley 1968 p95.
148. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot, Patrick Dokotri and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981; Post 1963 p84 - This point will also become, clearer in our discussion below.
149. Northern Region Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, 1956 p201; Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu and Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981; See also Sklar 1963 p347; Dudley 1963 p94-95.
150. Coleman 1958 p367.
151. Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotri, Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981; See also, Coleman 1963

- p367.
152. The party realignments of the M-Belt movements is examined in more analytical detail below when the patterns of alliances of the UMBC is discussed.
 153. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981; See also Northern Region Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, 1956 p201.
 154. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981. See also Dudley, 1968 p113n.91.
 155. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, Patrick Dokotri, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
 156. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot and Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
 157. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu, Patrick Dokotri and Isaac Kpum, January 1981; See also Sklar 1963 p346-347.
 158. For examples of reflective rhetorics on what happened at the Ilorin meeting, see Northern Region Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Katuna, 1956 p201-202.
 159. Sklar 1963 p347.
 160. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot, Patrick Dokotri, Patrick Fom and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981; See Region Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, March, 1956, p178-206.
 161. It is quite interesting to note that after November, 1955, most of the individuals who were at the centre of the M-Belt movement were teacher-trained from either Government institutions or European Christian Missionary Schools/Colleges: i.e. Jonah Assadugu, Azi Nyako, Dauda Kwoi, Patrick Dokotri, Bello Ijumu, Isaac Kpum and Joseph Tarka.
 162. Interview Discussions with Issac Kpum, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
 163. Sklar 1963 p347; Tseayo 1975 p113.
 164. Post, 1963 p84.
 165. M. J. Dent, "A Minority Party - The UMBC" in J. P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics, 1966 p468; See also Tseayo 1975 p194; also see a very pro-NPC speech by Benjamin Akiga in, Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, March 1956 p184-185.
 166. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, March 1956 p184-185.
 167. Dent 1966 p472-485; Dent 1971 p454-455.
 168. Sharwood - Smith, 1969 p342.
 169. Sharwood - Smith, 1969 p342; For a more analytical discussion of the socio-economic and political problems of the M-Belt groups and societies, see chapter 3, where the social foundations and political origins of the M-Belt movements were examined.
 170. Discussions with M. J. Dent, 1980-1984; See also, M. J. Dent, "A Minority Party - The UMBC", in J. P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics, 1966 p461-507.
 171. Dudley 1968 p203; Dent 1966 p461-507; See also the break-down of ministerial posts for 1957 in Ahmadu Bello, My Life, London, 1962 p209; Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna 1957 p20 and Appendix E p73 and The Nigerian Citizen (Self-Government Souvenir Edition), No. 711, Kaduna, Saturday, March 14th, 1959 p1-2 and p31-32.
 172. Bryan Sharwood - Smith, "But Always As Friends" Northern Nigeria and the Cameroons, 1921-1957, London, 1969 p342.
 173. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Isaac Kpum, Ajiva Aji and Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981; See also Dent 1966 p475; and Tseayo 1975 p149.
 174. At least, one of those involved in the teaching of this Anthem was Isaac Kpum and one of the pupils was Miss Elizabeth A. Ulla (now Mrs Elizabeth A. Ivase), who became politically involved in the M-Belt

- movement by becoming Secretary of the Tiv Christian Women Association (TCWA) and was the only female in the North to give evidence before the Willink Commission in 1957 in support of the creation of a M-Belt Region - This point will be examined in more detail below.
175. The recollected Anthem for the M-Belt Region by Elizabeth Ivase and produced by Bello Ijumu from Kabba, is at the beginning of this chapter.
 176. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu, Isaac Kpum and Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981.
 177. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot, Isaac Kpum and Patrick Dokotri, January 1983; See also Sklar 1963 p347.
 178. Sklar 1963 p347; Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Isaac Kpum, January, 1981.
 179. Sklar, 1963 p347; It ought to be borne in mind that in the period between 1954 and 1956, before the inauguration of the UMBC, the names of the M-Belt political parties (MZL and MBPP) were used interchangeably with the UMBC, the suggested label of the anticipated merging of the two parties for a common front of the M-Belt Movement. This confusion is quite apparent in both previous research works i.e. Coleman 1958, Sklar 1963, Post 1963, Dudley 1968, Tseyayo 1975 etc. as well as in Debates by some members in the Legislature Houses in Kaduna and Lagos.
 180. Interview Discussion with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Issac Kpum, January 1981; See also Sklar 1963 p347.
 181. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January 1981; See also Post 1963 p88.
 182. He was a former President of the NPC-Youth Association and the only Moslem to have occupied a position of responsibility in all of the M-Belt Movements - Sklar 1963 p347.
 183. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu, and Isaac Kpum, January 1981; See also Sklar 1963 p347.
 184. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.
 185. Report By The Nigeria Constitutional Conference - Held in London May and June, 1957, HM cmd. 207, London July, 1957 p34-36.
 186. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
 187. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
 188. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
 189. Sklar 1963 p347.
 190. Sklar 1963 p347.
 191. Sklar 1963 p347.
 192. Interview Discussions with, Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri, Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot and Isaac Kpum, January 1981.
 193. Sklar 1963 p347; The date of this Lafia meeting which Sklar gives as January, 1957 is controversial and inaccurate as far as discussions with some of the participants are concerned - the alternative proposals of alliances with non-Northern parties were considered earlier in Lafia in which Nyam Rwang and Bello Ijumu were expelled and this was before the election of Joseph Tarka as President of the UMBC - see also Dudley, 1968 p97.
 194. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, March, 1956 p203.
 195. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot and Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981; see also Dudley 1968 p95.
 196. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981.
 197. Sklar 1963 p347; Schwarz 1965 p91; Dudley 1968 p95 and p113n. 89; see also, Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying them: The Report, Colonial Office HM cmd 505 London 1958 p57; It is interesting to note that these conditions

- were almost a test of the NPC and when that party rejected the conditions, the same conditions were accepted by AG, thus the acceptance of AG-UMBC alliance and the Manifesto of May, 1957 - This point will be revisited in more analytical detail below.
198. The outcome of the 1956 elections into the NHA in Kaduna is given analytical detail below.
 199. Dudley 1968 p95.
 200. Schwarz 1965 p91.
 201. For examples of the rather extended and ambivalent rhetoric in the debate, see Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 29th February - 16th March, 1956 p189-192.
 202. Post 1963 p81.
 203. Post 1963 p81.
 204. Coleman 1958 p393-395.
 205. Sklar 1963 p349; This point will be revisited when the 1959 elections are brought into analytical focus in section IV of this chapter.
 206. Post 1963 p81; Coleman 1958 p393-395.
 207. Post 1963 p81.
 208. Post 1963 p81.
 209. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, August, 1956, pxi-xiv.
 210. Northern Christian Association: Membership Card, No. 10669 nd., p4.
 211. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, January, 1981; See also Post 1963 p82.
 212. For examples, see Frederick Schwarz, Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation or the Race - The Politics of Independence, London 1965 p83-100. In the Eastern Region with a predominantly Ibo population, there was the Calabar, Ogoja and Rivers State Movement (COR State Movement); In the West, with the Yoruba, there was the Mid-Western State Movement as well as the Lagos State Movement; and of course in the Northern Region, there was the M-Belt Movement - All of these political movements advocated for their separate Regions from the dominant groups and societies as units of the Nigerian Federation before independence - See Map in Schwarz 1965 p86.
 213. This point will be revisited in the discussions below and subsequently in the next chapter, where the May, 1967 sub-division of the Nigerian Federation is brought into the analytical focus of the study.
 214. Interview Discussions with Azi Nyako, Patrick Dokotri, Isaac Shaahu, Alexander Fom and Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
 215. For examples, See the speech by Abutu Obekpa; Elected Member, Benue Province in Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates; Kaduna, 6th March, 1956 p214; The speech was more of a hostile report of the political activities of UMBC-AG agents than a parliamentary speech.
 216. Post 1963 p81; Dudley 1968 p97; The authors give indication of the place of meetings while the intentions and date derive from my interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu, and Isaac Kpum, January 1981.
 217. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
 218. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri, Pastor David Lot and Isaac Kpum, January, 1981.
 219. Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotri, Pastor David Lot, Isaac Kpum and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 220. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri, Isaac Kpum and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
 221. Sklar 1963 p81; Post 1963 p347; Dudley 1968 p96-97.
 222. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu, Patrick Dokotri and Isaac Kpum, January, 1981; See also

- Dudley 1968 p97.
223. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu, Patrick Dokotri and Isaac Kpum, January, 1981.
 224. For examples, see Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 6th March, 1956 p189-208, where there was controversy on the leadership of the UMBC and both men claimed to be Presidents of the movement before members of the NHA in the debate on the Middle Belt Motion.
 225. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu, Partick Dokotri and Isaac Kpum, January, 1981.
 226. Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotri, Moses Nyam Rwang, Isaac Kpum, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981; This was the very elitist outlook in the nature of the individual members that were in the fore-front of the MBC, which subsequently conditioned Partick Dokotri to refuse to serve under Achiga Abuul and calling Abuul "an illiterate", Abuul had been democratically elected as President of the UMBC during the 1956 conference - See Dudley 1968 p97; This point will be discussed in more analytical detail below.
 227. Interview Discussions with Partick Dokotri, Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
 228. Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotri, Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
 229. The Chief of Jos, before 1947 had been a Hausa-man and the Chief of Bukuru, since the 1930s has remained a Hausa.
 230. Dudley 1968 p96.
 231. Dudley 1968 p96.
 232. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, March, 1956 p213.
 233. Interview Discussion with Partick Dokotri, Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu and Isaac Kpum, January 1981.
 234. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri, Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu and Isaac Kpum, January 1981; See also Dudley 1968 p97.
 235. Dudley 1968 p97.
 236. Post 1963 Appendix D, p451-474; Dudley 1968 p97.
 237. Dudley 1968 p97; The political circumstances of the frustration experienced by Abuul are discussed below.
 238. Dudley 1968 p97.
 239. Dudley 1968 p98.
 240. For examples of these forays into the future by Moses Nyam Rwang and Ibrahim Imam, see Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna 1956 p203-22; It ought to be borne in mind however that Walter Miller earlier in the 1930s and 1940s had predicted that christian minorities in the North were going to be the hope of Nigeria by the influence they will exert - This has been discussed in Chapter 3 sections II and III.
 241. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, March, 1956 p202-203.
 242. Dent 1966 p467-473; Dudley 1968 p97; Coleman 1958 p366-368; See also Action Group 14 - Points Programme: Statements at Press Conference by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Ibadan, 4th June, 1959 p20; AG/UMBC Alliance: Its Meaning, Ibadan, 14th February, 1958 p5-8.
 243. AG/UMBC Alliance: Its Meaning, Ibadan, 14th February, 1958 p7.
 244. Sharwood Smith 1969 p343-344.
 245. UMBC/AG Alliance: its Meaning, Ibadan, 1958 p6-7.
 246. Action Group 14 - Point Programme, Statements at Press Conference by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Ibadan, 4th June, 1959 p20.
 247. For a more detail discussion of the historical nature of the political problem in Ilorin and Kabba, which was central to the shape and nature of the socio-economic and political problems of the M-Belt

- groups and societies, see C. I. Whitake, The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946-1966, Princeton, 1970 p121-174.
248. Dudley 1968 p97; for a list of the representatives to the London Conference in London, see Report of the Nigeria Constitutional Conference, held in London in May and June, 1957, London, July, 1957 p34-37.
 249. Dudley 1968 p97; Sklar 1963 p347-348.
 250. Dudley 1968 p97; Interview Discussions with Isaac Kpum, Isaac Shaahu and Aper Aku, January, 1981.
 251. Dudley 1968 p98.
 252. A curiously prophetic conclusion in the light of subsequent political developments which resulted into the creation of Benue-Plateau State when there was subdivision of the Nigerian Federation into twelve states in 1967.
 253. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, March, 1956 p211-214.
 254. It ought to be borne in mind that dates and places given in previous researches on the organization and political development of the M-Belt movement tend to vary with my own dates and indicated places of meetings; For example, Sklar 1963 p347, dates the organization of the UMBC in Lafia to January, 1957; Dent 1966 p469 gives the same place and dates it as 1955; Post 1963 p81-82 Alvin Magid 1971 p353-354 suggests that the UMBC was organized in June, 1955 and Joseph Tarka elected as its President in January, 1957; Dudley 1968 p97, tows the line of the same dates and places with Post and Sklar. I have maintained my own evidence on the dates and places which derive from interview discussions with some of the leadership and which I also correlated with the dates, events and some of their rhetorics in the NHA and the FHR on the political development and organization of the M-Belt Movements.
 255. Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotri, Isaac Kpum, Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu and Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.
 256. Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotri, Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu and Isaac Kpum, January, 1981.
 257. For examples, see discussions of Tiv situations collective consciousness and political action in Dent 1966 p461-507.
 258. Apparently, Kafanchan and not Lafia was deliberately chosen for this grand meeting so that there might be ease to travel cheaply by rail and by road. Both rail and road network radiated to the North, West and East of Kafanchan - Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981.
 259. Dent 1966 p468-469.
 260. M. J. Dent, "A Minority Party - The UMBC" in John P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics, London, 1966 p468; Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot and Patrick Dokotri in January 1981 suggest they had elaborate discussions with Joseph Tarka on the struggle of the M-Belt movement in its phase as the MZL in Lagos in the period between 1954 and 1956 before his election as President of the UMBC.
 261. Discussions with M. J. Dent, 1980-84; Interview Discussions with Isaac Kpum Aper Aku and Envandega Jibo, January 1981; See also Iyorwuese Hagher, "The Political Legacy of J. S. Tarka to Nigeria" in Simon Shango (Ed.), Tributes to a Great Leader: J. S. Tarks, Enugu, 1982 p79.
 262. Interview Discussions with Isaac Kpum and Aper Aku, January 1981.
 263. Sklar 1963 p374; Interview Discussions with Isaac Kpum, Issac Shaahu, Aper Aku, Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 264. Dent 1966 p468.

265. Sklar 1963 p374.
266. Interview Discussions with Isaac Kpum, Jonah Assadugu and Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981.
267. Sklar 1963 p375.
268. Sklar 1963 p375.
269. Sklar 1963 p435; Interview Discussions with Isaac Kpum, January 1981.
270. Interview Discussions with Elizabeth Ivase, January, 1981.
271. Interview Discussions with Elizabeth Ivase, January, 1981.
272. Dent 1966 p469; Dudley 1968 p97; Tseyo 1975 p113.
273. Nigeria 1955, London 1958 p206-207; Dent 1966 p469.
274. Dent 1966 p469.
275. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot, Isaac Kpum, Aper Aku and Patrick
276. Dudley 1963 p97.
277. Dudley 1968 p97; Dent 1966 p469.
278. Dudley 1968 p97.
279. For examples, see the Middle Belt Herald, copies for the period between January 1958 and December 1961 - Jos Mesuem Library and Arewa House Kaduna.
280. Post 1963 p81.
281. Discussions with M. J. Dent, 1980-84.
282. Dudley 1968 p97 and p183-185.
283. Dudley 1968 p183-185.
284. Dudley 1968 p195.
285. Dudley 1968 p195; This point is revisited below, when the patterns in the alliances of the UMBC with the NEPU and other political groups in the North are brought into analytical focus.
286. Sklar 1963 p348-349.
287. For an early exposition of NEPU policy on the creation of the M-Belt Region see Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, December, 1957 p16.
288. UMBC/AG Alliance (Abutar A. G. da UMBC), Rahama, Membership Card, December 1957 - Front Page; Abutar AG da UMBC- Bayaninta - AG/UMBC Alliance: Its Meaning, Ibadan, 1958 p5-8.
289. For example of this development see Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna 1956-1960; Nigeria: Federal House of Representative Debates, Lagos, 1954-1959.
290. Nigeria Debates Independence: the Debate on Self-Government in the Federal House of Representatives, Lagos, 26th March, 1957 p33-34.
291. The Willink Commission is give analytical focus below.
292. Dent 1966 p469.
293. Dent 1966 p469.
294. Nigeria Debates Independence, The Debate on Self-Government in the Federal House of Representatives, Lagos, 26th March, 1956 p33-34.
295. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, March 1956, p197-203.
296. Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, December 1957 p31.
297. Schwarz 1965 p93; Philip Mason, "Prospects of Permanance", West Africa, 22nd November 1958 p115.
298. Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, December 1957 p48 and p60-61.
299. Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, December 1957 p49-57.
300. Ibid p46-47.
301. Ibid p47.
302. For examples, see Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, December 1957 p59, where the "Northern System" is suggested to be made up of "the

- solid homogeneous ranks of the Fulani - Hausa - Kanuri - Nupe - Moslem majority" in the North; see also Appendix II of this thesis for a more vigorous definition of the M-Belt areas with indigenous non-Islamic groups and societies and some explanatory reasons on why Niger Province and the Nupe ought to be outside the claims and conceptions of a M-Belt Region and Society.
303. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, March 1965 p225.
 304. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 6th March, 1956 p179.
 305. For examples of the rather bizzare and ridiculous speeches by members who opposed the Motion in the NHA, see Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 6th March, 1956 p179-224.
 306. Ibid p179.
 307. Ibid p179-224.
 308. Ibid p189-191.
 309. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 1956 p189-191.
 310. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, March, 1956 p189-192.
 311. Ibid p195.
 312. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 6th March, 1956 p222-224.
 313. This threat of secession by Isaac Shaahu is examined in more analytical detail below.
 314. For examples, see Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna (Arewa House), for the period between January 1957 and October 1965.
 315. M. J. Dent, "A Minority Party - The United Middle Belt Congress" in J. P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics, London 1966 p469.
 316. Dent 1966 p169.
 317. Dudley 1968 p113; Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu and Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981.
 318. Dent 1966 p469.
 319. Sklar 1963 p347.
 320. Sklar 1963 p374.
 321. Dudley 1968 p96.
 322. The 1959 elections are examined with some analytical detail below.
 323. Dudley 1968 p184; p195n. 63.
 324. UMBC/AG Alliance (Abukar A. G. da UMBC) - Rahama, Ibadan 1957 - front page.
 325. AG/UMBC Alliance: Its Meaning, the Action Group Bereau of Information Ibadan, 14th February, 1958 p5-8.
 326. A Presidential Address, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, The Emergency Congress of the Action Group in Kano, Friday, 12th December, 1958 p12-13; The 1958 Report of the Commission on Minorities which was bitterly attacked by the AG at its Conference in Jos in September 1958 is examined below.
 327. Dudley 1968 p183.
 328. Dudley 1968 p183.
 329. AG - UMBC Alliance: Its Meaning, The Action Group Bureau of Information, Ibadan, 14th February, 1958 p6.
 330. The 1959 elections are analyzed below, in terms of support for the UMBC demands for the creaton of a M-Belt Region and the ethnic support from the M-Belt people for the M-Belt Region as reflected in the election votes.
 331. Sklar 1963 p435.
 332. Dudley 1968 p195.
 333. Sklar 1963 p399-340; Dudley 1968 p111n. 60.
 334. Sklar 1963 p341.

335. Sklar 1963 p321 and p339.
336. Post 1963 p89.
337. Northern Region: Address by Sir Bryan Sharwood-Smith to the Northern House of Assembly, 2nd March, 1952 p2.
338. During interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu in January 1981, it was suggested that there was harmonious social relationships between the NPC and the M-Belt leadership which degerated with the increasing transfer of power from the British to Islamic leadership in the NPC: "They use to come to talk to us, but later changed and asked us to go and talk to them".
339. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
340. C. S. Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946-1966, Princeton 1970 p115-116.
341. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1954, Kaduna, 1956 p4.
342. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1954, Kaduna 1956 p3.
343. Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1954, Kaduna, 1956 p4.
344. M. G. Smith, "Kagoro Political Development", Human Organization, Vol. 19, 1960 p147.
345. Dudley 1968 p96; Paul Logams, Birom Integration into Nigeria, B.Sc Dissertation ABU Zaria 1975 p68.
346. Whitaker 1970 p116; Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1954 - Reports on Adamawa Bauchi, Plateau, Benue and Zaria.
347. Northern Regional Council, House of Chiefs Debates 1950, Kaduna, 21 August 1956 p6-7.
348. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Chiefs Debates, Kaduna, 17th - 18th December 1956 p9-12.
349. Whitaker 1970 p116.
350. Whitaker 1970 p116.
351. Whitaker 1970 p116; Sir Bryan Sharwood-Smith, "But Always as Friends" Northern Nigeria and the Cameroons, 1921 - 1957, London, 1969 p347-355.
352. Whitaker 1970 p117; see also, R. S. Hudson, Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Authorities: Report by the Commissioner, London, January, 1957.
353. Whitaker 1970 p116.
354. Ibid p116.
355. Ibid p117.
356. Whitaker 1970 p117.
357. Sharwood-Smith 1969 p401; Interview Discussions with K. Panter-Brick, Kirk-Greene and David Muffet, Septemeber, 1980.
358. Whitaker 1970 p117; It ought to be borne in mind that this is one interpretation of politics with the Hudson Report after 1956, which does not take account of the other major objectives in the proposals for Provincialization in the North - For examples of other political objectives of the Hudson Report, see Whitaker 1970 p115-119; R. S. Hudson, Northern Region o Nigeria, Provincial Authorities: Report of the Commissioner, London/Kaduna, January, 1957 p1-56.
359. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 6th March, 1956 p191.
360. The Case for More States: Memorandum submitted to the Minorities Commission The Citizen Committee for Independence, Publication No.2, Lagos November 1957, p3.
361. Ibid, pii, p1 - p6.
362. For examples, see Nigeria: Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the fears of Minorities and the means of allaying them - presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Colonial Office, London, July 1958 piii, Memorandum to the Minorities

- Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, December 1957, p1 - p21 and p46 - p63.
363. Nigeria: Report of the Commission Appointed to enquire into the fears of Minorities and the Means of allaying them, London, 1958 piii.
364. Ibid, piii.
365. Ibid, piii.
366. Alvin Magid, "Minority Politics in Northern Nigeria: The case of the Idoma Hope Rising Union", in R. Melson and H. Wolpe (Eds), Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, Michigan, 1971 p342 - p367; Tseyayo 1975 p112 - p113; See also The Hudson Report, 1957 p112 - p113 - Patric Dokotri, Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Pastor David Lot suggest that most of the people who made submissions to the Hudson Commission in 1956, also made submissions to the Commission on Minorities in 1957.
367. Nigeria: Report of the Commission on Minorities, 1958, p72.
368. Nigeria: Report of the Commission on Minorities, 1958, p72.
369. Ibid p72 - p73.
370. Ibid p72 - p73.
371. Ibid p71.
372. for examples see Ibid p57 - p70.
373. Nigeria: Report of the Commission Appointed to enquire into the fears of Minorities and the Means of allaying them, London, 1958, p57 - p70.
374. These estimates derive from correlating the issues raised in the grievances of the M-Belt areas suggested during my field-work and identified indicators on these grievances in the Report of the Commission.
375. Nigeria: Report of the Commission on Minorities, London 1958 p57-70.
376. Sharwood-Smith 1969 p400.
377. Interview Discussion with Elizabeth Ivase, January, 1981.
378. Interview Discussions with Elizabeth Ivase, January, 1981; Tseyayo 1975 p114-115.
379. Discussion with M. J. Dent, 1980-1984.
380. Interview Discussion with Elizabeth Ivase, Isaac Kpum and Patric Dokotri, January 1981; See also Tseyayo 1975 p114-115.
381. Nigeria: Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying Them, London, 1958 p72.
382. Nigeria: Report of the Commission on Minorities, 1958 p52-58; Patric Dokotri suggests that there was such a selective preference for persons from the groups that made up the 'Northern System' in terms of appointment into top jobs, with no other skills in Western European modernization beyond being able to say "Hello - Goodmorning" in the English language - as a demonstration that they are fitted with skills for the modernizing Northern bureaucracy - Interview Discussions with Patric Dokotri, January 1981.
383. Report by the Nigeria Constitutional Conference, London, July 1957 p14.
384. Ibid p25.
385. Nigeria: Report of the Commission on Minorities, 1958 p87.
386. Report by the Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference, London, November, 1958 p21.
387. Report by the Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference, London, 1958 p22.
388. Report by the Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference, London, November 1958 p22.
389. Ibid p22.
390. Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, December 1957 p61-62.
391. Ibid p72.
392. Ibid p73.

393. Ahmadu Bello, My Life, Cambridge, 1962 p215-216; Emphasis are mine.
394. John P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics, London, 1966 p32-33; For examples, see Report by the Nigeria Constitutional Conference, London, July 1957; Report by the Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference, London, November 1958; Nigeria: Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying Them, London, July 1958; Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna December 1957.
395. Interview Discussions with Mallam Aminu Kano and Patrick Dokotri, October 1981.
396. James O'Connell, "Authority and Community in Nigeria", in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe (Eds), Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, Michigan, 1971 p634-637; See also Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu, 1978 p176-205.
397. Dent 1971 p450.
398. Dent 1971 p450.
399. Bryan Sharwood-Smith, "But Always As Friends": Northern Nigeria and the Cameroons, 1921-1957, London, 1969 p369-373.
400. Ibid p335 and p369-373.
401. Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation or the Race - The Politics of Independence, London, 1965 p49.
402. Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981; See also his speeches in the FHR Debates, Lagos - in the period between July, 1957 and November, 1958.
403. J. N. D. Anderson, "Conflict of Laws in Northern Nigeria: A New Start", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 8, July 1959 p442-456; J. N. D. Anderson, "Return Visit to Nigeria: Judicial and Legal Development in Northern Region", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, June, 1963 p282-294; See also a NEPU political attack on the NPC party and government in the North, for giving emphasis on the status of swearing by the Koran in "Matsayin Ransuwa, Tilas ga addinin Musulunch"; (the Status of Swearing as Compulsory to the Practice of the Islamic Religion), NEPU Information Office, Kano, 1963.
404. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
405. Interview Discussions with T. H. Marshall, September 1982; See also Anderson 1959 p442.
406. The Commission was however quite futuristic on disunity among the non-Islamic groups in the North given the subsequent political development in a state like BP which consisted of the core M-Belt groups and societies where in the period between 1968 and 1975 "tribal" and provincial tensions between the Plateau groups and those from Benue, particularly in Jos, the BP state capital led to the split of the state in 1976; Although in the period between 1976 and 1979 the groups and societies in Benue and Plateau states, temporarily united under a common religious and social identity in the anti-Sharia movement in 1977 and 1978 in the M-Belt areas the earlier socio-economic and political tensions generated in BP state, influenced and explain the variations of electoral behaviour during the 1979 elections when compared to the voting patterns exhibited in the two provinces albeit in other M-Belt areas, two decades earlier in the 1959 elections. These points are revisited and examined in more detail in the next chapter where variations in the political identity of the M-Belt Movement are brought into analytical focus.
407. Discussions with Professor David Muffet, September 1981.
408. Discussions with M. J. Dent 1980-1984.
409. Dent 1966 p469.
410. Dent 1966 p470.
411. Dent 1966 p470.

412. Dent 1966 p470; Dudley 1968 p183.
413. Dent 1966 p470.
414. Dent 1966 p471.
415. Dent 1966 p471; Tseayo 1975 p112-116 and p147-171.
416. Dent 1966 p471.
- 416b. Tseayo 1975 p147-171.
417. Dent 1966 p470; Tseayo 1975 p147-171.
418. For examples of the UMBC political songs directed against the NPC party in particular see Tseayo 1975 p147-171.
419. Dent 1966 p470.
420. Dent 1966 p470.
421. Post 1963 p81-82.
422. Bill Freud, Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines, London 1981 p174-200.
423. For examples see Freund 1981 p174-200.
424. Dudley 1968 p239.
425. Dudley 1968 p239; P. Logams, Birom Integration into Nigeria, B.Sc Dissertation in Politics, Zaria 1975 p81.
426. Dudley 1968 p239.
427. Dudley 1968 p239.
428. Dudley 1968 p239.
429. Freund 1981 p199.
430. Dudley 1968 p239.
431. Dudley 1968 p239.
432. Dudley 1968 p239.
433. Dudley 1968 p240.
434. Dudley 1968 p240.
435. Dudley 1968 p240.
436. Dudley 1968 p240.
437. Dudley 1968 p258.
438. Dudley 1968 p240; Logams 1975 p81.
439. Dudley 1968 p240; Logams 1975 p81.
440. Dudley 1968 p240.
441. Sklar 1963 p338.
442. Logams 1975 p114.
443. Logams 1975 p115.
444. Post 1963 p368; It ought to be borne in mind however, that the issue of chieftancy of Jos in Birom politics also alienated political support for Dokotri in that election because he opposed its institutionalization on the Rwang Pam family; So it was not just the question of insufficient AG funds as against massive injection of NPC funds to the Plateau Tin Mines Unions - there existed unresolved local political grievances against Dokotri which cost him some Birom votes.
445. The NEPU-UMBC alliance which produced the NPF and subsequently the UPGA in 1964 is examined below.
446. The political issues presented and contested in the 1959 elections and the results are analyzed below.
447. AG in the North with the UMBC party; AG in the East with the COR movement; NCNC in the West with MSM.
448. For examples, see The Nigerian Citizen, Kaduna. Copies for the period between 1958 and 1961 passim.
449. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Presidential Address Delivered at the Emergency Congress of the Action Group in Kano, 12th December, 1958 p5.
450. Computed from the total of seven Tiv constituencies in the 1959 elections from Post 1963, Appendix D p453-45.
451. J. I. Tseayo, Conflict and Incorporation in Nigeria: The Integration of the Tiv, Zaria, 1975 p149.
452. Richard Rose, "The UK as a Multi-National State", Occasional Papers,

- University of Strathclyde-Centre for the Study of Public Policy, No. 6 1969, p21.
453. The Case for More States: Memorandum Submitted to the Minorities Commission by the Citizens Committee for Independence, Lagos, 1957 p11.
454. Dudley 1968 p183.
455. Ibid p183.
456. Discussions with M.J. Dent, 1980-1984.
457. For some examples see K.W.J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959 : Politics and Administration in a Developing Political System, Oxford 1963, p451 - p474.
458. Computed from figures in West Africa (London) July 27th 1963; Cited in S. Egite Oyovbaire, Federalism in Nigeria with Particular Reference to the Mid-Western State : 1966 - 1975, Unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Government, University of Manchester, July 1976 p80.
459. Report by the Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference held in London in September and October, 1958, London November 1958 p24.
460. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, October 1965, p67 - p70 and p533 - p536.
461. Ibid p67 - p70.
462. Ibid p680.
463. Federal House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates, Lagos, February 1965 p9 - p13; Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu - Indeed he suggests there were about 8 who identified with the UMBC or AG.
464. Discussions with M.J. Dent, 1980 - 1984.
465. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, February 1965 p106 - p107.
466. Ibid 1965 p69.
467. Ibid 1965 p353 - p355; It is very significant to note that Ibrahim Imam was strongly contributive in these political rhetorics on the debate on the plight of Northerners in Lagos and Western Nigeria that was set into motion by Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto.
468. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 20th October 1965, p533 - p536.
469. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, First Volume of Session 1965 - 1966, Kaduna, February 1965 p1.
470. M.J. Dent, "Senator J.S. Tarka : Introduction to memorial volume" in Simon Shango, Tributes To A Great Leader : J.S. Tarka, Enugu 1982 p1 - p41.
471. Northern Progressive Front, 1964 Federal Election Manifesto, Kano 1964 p14.
472. Peter Worsley, The Third World, London, 1967 p144 - p145.
473. Worsley 1967 p144.
474. Interview Discussions with Aminu Kano, London 1982.
475. SAWABA Declaration of Principles, Northern Elements Progressive Union, 8th August, 1950 - Poster.
476. United Middle Belt Congress (NPF) of Nigeria, Membership Card no. 994, Lagos, March 1964 - This I believe. No. 5 - Backpage, translated from the Hausa Language statement: "Na amince da shiriyayen tafiyad da al'muran Kasa sabo da anfanin talakawa".
477. The Manifesto of UPGA (United Progressive Grand Alliance) for the 1964 Federal Election, Lagos, 1964, p16.
478. Northern Progressive Front, 1964 Election Manifesto, Kano, 1964, p15.
479. Dent 1976 p962.
480. Dent 1976 p962.
481. For example of these political antics of the NPC, see Dudley 1968 p264 - p266.
482. M.J. Dent, "Tarka: Tiv background and the dynamics of Nigerian

- leadership", Unpublished Seminar Paper. Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London 1968; Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960 - 1967, Cambridge, 1971 p270.
483. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna 25th February 1965 p43.
484. Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu, 1978 p176 - p195.
485. Bryan Sharwood Smith, "But Always as Friends", Northern Nigeria and the Cameroons, 1921 - 1957, London 1969, p295.
486. Ibid p295.
487. Ibid p295.
488. Ibid p295 - p296.
489. Ibid p296.
490. Ahmadu Bello, My Life, Cambridge, 1962 p164 - p165.
491. S.B. Chambers, The Report on the 1952 Census of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna July 1952 p30.
492. The Constitution and Rules, Northern Peoples Congress (SALAMA), Kaduna, October, 1948, p1 - p17.
493. Bello 1962, p186.
494. Ibid p186.
495. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 11th December, 1958, p912.
500. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 1965, p111 - p112.
501. Any other dress besides the suit, with shirt and tie and sometimes the type of shoes that are European manufactured in style.
502. Ibid p107.
503. Dudley 1968 p168.
504. Ibid p168.
505. Dudley 1968 p267.
506. M.J. Dent, "A Minority Party - The United Middle Belt Congress", in J.P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics, London 1966, p506; J.I. Tseayo, Conflict and Incorporation in Nigeria: The Integration of the Tiv, Zaria 1975 p220.
507. Dent 1966 p506.
508. Northern Nigeria: A White Paper on the Governments Policy for the Rehabilitation of the Tiv Native Authority, Kaduna, 1965 p11.
509. E.P.T. Crampton, Christianity in Northern Nigeria, Zaria, 1976, p96.
510. Ibid p95 - p96.
511. Ibid p96.
512. The Middle Belt Herald, Jos, 13th January, 1964 p3.
- 512b. Crampton 1975 p96.
513. Northern Christian Association, Membership Card, No. 10669, n.d., Backpage.
514. Ibid Backpage; Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
515. Crampton 1975 p96.
516. Ibid 1975 p96.
517. Ibid p96.
518. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 26th February 1965 p67.
519. Crampton 1975 p207.
520. Crampton 1975 p207.
521. Interview Discussions with John Smith London, Summer 1982.
522. Crampton 1975 p207.

Additional Notes to Chapter 4

* 1 The North became a dominant political unit in 1954. This was from the agreement that the North should have 50% of the seats in the Federal Parliament and the subsequent agreement that representation should be based on population thus giving the North 56% of the representation according to the census of 1952 and later 54% according to the 1963 census.

* 2 The Provincial electoral colleges as used in the elections, worked on a winner takes all basis, enabling a group with a bare majority to get all the Provincial seats by use of a block vote.

* 3 Although Francis Ibiem became famous among Church leadership of the Christian communities in the North, he was not a Northerner but an Easterner and was later to become one of the leaders of the East at the time of secession.

* 4 The pro-Islamic Bills were essentially in reference to legislation on the restrictions of Christian missionary religious activities in the Islamic centres of power and religious activities in the North. Subsequently in the late 1940s and in the 1950s there were suggestions for the exclusion of Christian Missionaries from Northern Nigeria.

* 5 Political labour on the tin mines fields suggests government recruited labour through the Chiefs which at times was forceful recruitment but the labourers got fixed wages. Forced labour on the tin mines however was greatly reduced with the end of the war.

* 6 Among the Igbirra, there existed two tribal parties. These contested elections against each other, but whoever won, joined the NPC party in control of government in the North. Such a pattern of controlled tribalism was clearly more acceptable to the champions of Northern unity than were the pan-tribal non-Muslim and Christian identity of the NML and UMBC.

* 7 This maybe a serious understatement, since the British administration did not pressurise the NPC. The British administration and the NPC of course were hand in glove for most of the early period; and indeed, the administration assisted the NPC in its early period fairly directly; for instance the Northern 8-point programme plan of a confederal Nigeria advanced in 1953 was drafted in the office of POL.I or II (political secretaries in the regional government in Kaduna).

* 8 The descriptions of the way the NML and the MZL handled the problems of tribal cleavages and the extent to which they preserved a tribal and Provincial balance in their office holders is examined in the relevant sections below.

* 9 However, the government could hardly be expected to give explicit "religious representation", since it held, like the NPC party, to the view of 'One North' regardless of religion, while the Muslims, although dominant in legislature were not specifically represented as Muslims but rather territorially representative, as chiefs or elected members from certain areas, who saw themselves as Northerners.


* 10 The dan Dogo motion is untraceable in the Hansard material of the period between 1947 and 1952 when it is suggested as having been made in the NHA. Some of the rather lengthy speeches made by dan Dogo however are conspicuously missing in the sequence of available Hansard in Kaduna and other archives. There is no doubt that the motion had to do with the exclusion of European Christian Missionaries from operating in the North.

It was however a back-bench motion and not a government affair. Its political importance and impact therefore might have been more symbolic rather than in terms of actual legislative effect although it also produced unanticipated political reaction from among Christians in the NML and the MZL.

* 11 There is evidence to suggest that the Northern Awakening, apart from NEPU, became primarily a movement of Regional separatism directed to protection against a supposed threat of being over-run by Southerners. This in turn provoked M-Belt separatism, inspired by the fear of being dominated by Northern Muslims, as became apparent in the development of the M-Belt Movement after 1953. This was strongly expressed in the speech in March 1956 by Moses Nyam Rwang - analyzed below.

* 12 It must be noted, as observed by Sklar, that Sa'ad Zungur devoted a lot of his time in Lagos to nationalist politics and to the reformist Ahmadiyya movement, which he tried unsuccessfully to introduce among Muslims of Bauchi. He was a critic and an intellectual much at odds with Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. He did not succeed in making Bauchi or other Northerners, Ahmadiyyas, for they are pious and traditional Muslims of the Kadriya or Tijaniya Brotherhood, nor was he 'nationalistic' in the sense of dedication to the Nigerian nation, rather they concentrated on a Northern Regional awakening and expression of Regional identity. In the end Saadu Zungur himself succumbed to this Regional separation as can be seen in contrast to that of Shehu Shagari praising Nigeria as a whole.

Map 6.
 The 12 State Structure of the Nigerian Federation
 in 1967.



Chapter 5. Political influences of the M-Belt Movement under Military Governments in Nigeria which developed from the Coups d'etat of January and July 1966 and the creation of Benue-Plateau (BP) state.

"You all know... (that) God in his power has entrusted the responsibility of this country of ours, Nigeria, into the hands of another Northerner... which is a responsibility that cannot be taken lightly"¹.

I. Introduction.

At the beginning of 1966 it was apparent on the Nigerian political arena that what kept the North together as a political unit in the Federation, was the combination of persuasion, coercion and the charismatic leadership in the very political personality and style in the practice of politics of Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, who was Premier of the North. Ahmadu Bello generated what became termed as "the fear of the Sardauna": His ('IKKO'). This political situation in the North was sought to be extended to Western Region of Nigeria through the alliance between the North and Western Nigeria in the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). The alliance consisted of the NPC and NNDP, a faction that had developed from the AG party under the leadership of Samuel Akintola². Other members in the Alliance included the Mid-Western Democratic Front (MDF), Niger Delta Congress (NDC), Dynamic Party (DP), Republican Party (RP) and the Lagos State United Front (LSUF), all based in southern Nigeria³. The NNA was under the leadership of Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the North and Samuel Akintola, whose party had won the 1964 elections under very suspicious conditions in the Western Region. He took control of political power in the midst of protest and violence which was perpetrated by the AG party supporters in the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA)⁴. Joseph Tarka and the UMBC party at this time were aligned to the NPF in the UPGA and the AG was systematically being destroyed by the NPC in the Western Region of Nigeria. Indeed, by the end of 1965, the NPC party in the North was the

centre of political power in that alliance with southern Nigerian factions who had broken off from the NCNC and AG and it also exerted direct political influence on other smaller political groups that were in opposition to the dominant parties in southern Nigeria like MDF, NDC, DP, RP and the LSUF⁵. While in the period between 1952 and 1962, the recurrent political complaint on the Nigerian arena had been over Southern Nigerian domination of the North, the political alignments of 1964 and as they stood just before the January 1966 coup d'etat threatened some southern Nigerian political groups sufficiently to suggest that the NPC leadership were trying to dominate the south in order: "to dip the Koran into the sea"⁶. The political developments affecting the Western Region, were closely watched by Ibo politicians and it was believed that after dealing with the West, the Sardauna would turn on the Eastern Region. The Sardauna was already giving moral and financial assistance to the Niger Delta Congress (NDC), a minorities movement with strong anti-Ibo sentiments on the hope for the creation of a Rivers Region. When Ironsi became President of the Federation Military Government of Nigeria, Isaac Boro based in Yenagoa, on behalf of his people took up arms and declared the Niger-Delta rivers areas of the Eastern Region an Independent State⁷. From this political background, we can see that a great deal of power was concentrated in the NPC party in the North with the Sardauna and with his death there was a leadership vacuum which in due course, caused it to fall apart.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the political influences of what remained as the force of the M-Belt Movement in its terminal phase as the UMBC party in the period of the Coups d'etat in 1966 and on the causes of political events in that period which led to the creation of states in 1967, particularly in the context of the leadership vacuum in the North from the death of Ahmadu Bello, the Premier. The chapter also examines the political circumstances and conceptions of the political identity which led to the creation of Benue and Plateau (BP) state, a minorities state that

was created, among others, from the state creation exercise on 27th May, 1967.

II. The January and July 1966 Coup d'etat in Nigeria.

The first ever military coup d'etat in Nigeria took place on 15th January, 1966⁸. One consequence of the January coup was that it introduced a new era in Nigerian politics. Of far reaching political consequences on the Nigerian polity however was the blood bath which characterized the Coup and which caused the deaths of a number of important civilian and military leaders, among whom, was Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto. The death of the Sardauna and the leadership vacuum it created in the North came about because Major Chukwma Nzeogwu with a unit of the Nigerian Army consisting of about thirty-six armed-men, attacked the residence of the Premier as one of the planned military cum political acts that were organized to overthrow the governments of the Nigerian Federation⁹. The plan to overthrow the Nigerian governments by military force was hatched by Army Officers most of whom were Majors in rank and from among the dominant groups and societies of S. Nigerian origins and led by an Ibo, Major Ifeajuna¹⁰. Furthermore all the eight ring leaders in the political plot, who were also members of a wider "inner circle" of an estimated group of about 150 officers and other ranks involved in the plan and execution of the coup d'etat in January 1966, were Ibos¹¹. These included: Majors Chukwumah Nzeogwu, Onwuategu, Okoro, Akagha, Ifeajuna, Okafor, Annuforo and Captain Nwobosi¹². This group of majors expected military support from other Ibo majors and officers of the Nigerian Army upon successful execution of the coup on a purely tribal identity rather than on the Nigerian identity¹³. This was based on the concentration of Ibos in that rank in the Nigerian Army. For example of the thirty officers in the Nigerian Army with the ranks of Majors in 1965, twenty-two (69%) were Ibo Majors¹⁴. However, under the leadership of Major Nzeogwu, who led the operations, the group successfully established

political control over the North, by removing the government with the killing of the Premier, Ahmadu Bello, two of his wives and a soldier of the attacking Platoon who at the last moment desisted and was shot dead by Nzeogwu¹⁵. Others killed in the coup operations in Kaduna included the Commander of the 1st Brigade, Brigadier Ademulegun and his wife, Colonel Shodeinde, who was second in command to an Indian at the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA)¹⁶. In the military operations that took over the government of the Sardauna in the North, most of the men under the command of Nzeogwu were Northerners, most probably men of M-Belt origins. This was unlike the operations in Lagos, the west and the mid-west where the men used by the Coup leaders were southerners, with the preponderant majority being Ibos¹⁷. In using Northerners to kill the Sardauna and overthrow the NPC government in the North it is not clear whether Nzeogwu, who was Ibo told the men that the plot included the murders of the top command of the Army, including the elimination of well beloved and admired Northern officers of the Nigerian Army including Brigadier Zakari Mai Malari, Colonel Kur Mohammed, Lt. Colonel Abogo Largema and Lt. Colonel James Yakubu Pam as well as Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon (who narrowly escaped death) and the Yoruba officers like Brigadier S. Ademulegun and Colonel R. Shodeinde¹⁸. Obviously in the instance, it is unlikely the men would have fallen in with the plot of Nzeogwu and the other Majors. Furthermore, the claims of Nzeogwu that Hassan Katsina supported this coup is a bogus claim, because Nzeogwu spoke to him almost as a threat and more significantly, Nzeogwu had a gun in his hand when he faced Hassan with the option of support or opposition, to the Coup d'etat¹⁹. In all, about twenty-seven people were known to have been killed in the coup of January, 1966²⁰. These included: four out of five Senior Northern Officers, the fifth (Gowon) just managed to escape death; two out of six Senior Yoruba Officers from the Western Region; and one out of ten Senior Ibo Army Officers who was accidentally killed. The Coup, however, represented a victory for nationalism over regionalism:

Typologically, for example, the Ibo Junior Officers, personified by the young Major C. K. Nzeogwu, who killed the Northern Premier, reincarnated the radical Zikists of the later 1940s who had been frustrated by the growth of regionalism and the conditions of bourgeois nationalism²¹. The Majors aimed at destroying the authority of the old, conservative order and to put an end to the political dominance of the North in the Nigerian Federation. In the process, the most important event in the subsequent moulding of a hostile political mood in attitudes toward the alleged 'January Revolution' in the North and the Ironsi-Regime in Lagos included the deaths of the Prime Minister, Abukakar Tafawa Balewa, a Gerawa Muslim from south-eastern parts of Bauchi; the Premier of the North, Ahmadu Bello a Fulani from Sokoto and four out of five Senior Army Officers of Northern origins in the Nigerian Army: Mai Malari, Mohammed and Largema, Kanuri Muslims from Borno and Pam, a Christian Birom from Jos in the M-Belt areas who strongly identified with the causes of the North through the influences of Sharwood-Smith whom he served as ADC²². The political and military focus of the Coup of January 1966 was therefore clearly directed at eliminating both military and political leadership of the North, while others that were killed were seen to be sympathetic toward Northern interests and in one way or the other gaining from the Northern political control of the Nigerian Federation. This was so because the political and military leadership from the East and in particular, that which was Ibo was not eliminated in the January Coup except for Lt. Colonel Unegbe who was accidentally killed²³. Muslims and Christians therefore experienced losses and felt threatened and in both the Islamic society and among the M-Belt areas, there was grief over the deaths of three Muslim officers and one Christian. Although Lt. Colonel Pam had commanded the troops who put down the revolt in Tiv land it did not alienate the Tiv from maintaining the deep respect they held for Northern Officers in the Army and indeed the Tiv themselves, of whom there was a great many in the Army spoke well of the soldiers during the riots²⁴.

It was the Mobile Police Units the Tiv hated and despised for brutality, most of whom were Ibos. The great significance in the elimination of Northern leaders however was in the ways the deaths fostered a Northern attitude and political identity from all sections of the North. The whole Region was brought together in common grief: "all could mourn the Prime minister, (Abubaker Tafawa Balewa), even if few tears were shed for the Sardauna"²⁵.

The political objective of the Coup d'etat of January, 1966 was meant:

"to establish a strong united and prosperous nations, free from corruption and internal strife... (achieve) national integration, supreme justice, general security and properties recovery... freedom from fear or other forms of oppression, freedom from general inefficiency and freedom to live and strive (reach the sky) in every field of human endeavour both nationally and internationally. We promise that you will no more be ashamed to say that you are Nigerian... we have set for ourselves the job of establishing a prosperous nation and achieving solidarity"²⁶.

Although the 'Manifesto' of Nzeogwu and other Majors in the broadcast to the North in the name of 'a revolutionary council' echoed the general problems of political disintegration that were affecting nation-building processes in Nigeria he subsequently refined these broad objectives and suggested that they did not wish to establish a Unitary Government:

"we wanted a strong centre. We wanted to cut the country to small pieces making the centre inevitably strong"²⁷.

However, from the tribal nature of the coup and the path of subsequent political developments after 15th January and the tribal affiliation of the above quoted sources to Chief Awolowo, Dudley suggests that the accounts on the political program of Nzeogwu ought to be treated with caution²⁸. The initial reactions to the January 1966 Coup d'etat in the North and among

Northern Army Officers in Lagos was that of shock and disbelief²⁹. Infact, many of the Northern Army Officers in Lagos, Ikeja, Apapa and Ibadan were ignorant and uncertain about what happened, although their bitterness was instantly built up by the distress at the loss of their Battallion Commanders and other Senior Northern Army Officers of the Nigerian Army³⁰. In Ibadan, where the commanding officer (CO) had been colonel Largema, the troops shot dead an Ibo Major and displayed utter disloyalty to Major Nzefili, an Ibo who was second in command and had taken charge of the 4th Battalion until he was driven away by the NCOs demanding an explanation of the whereabouts Largema³¹. The NCOs of the 4th Battalion, the majority of whom were Tiv as well as the other rank and file demanded that a Northerner be sent as their CO and remained disloyal to all Southern Nigerian Military Officers until Colonel Joe Akahan, a Tiv from The North was sent from Lagos to take charge of restoring discipline³². Almost similar to the reactions of the majority of the Northern Army Officers, the reaction of the Northern political classes in Lagos, was that of disbelief. Unlike the soldiers however, the Northern political classes were in disarray and some of them left Lagos for The North and in Kaduna some escaped to their constituencies³³.

However, the January coup by Nzeogwu was unlikely to result into the subdivision of the Nigerian Federation such that a M-Belt Region might have been created. The Military regime of Nzeogwu in The North itself was short lived for any clear cut political program to emerge. It collapsed after two days, when Nzeogwu went down to Lagos to surrender on specific terms to Ironsi. The collapse of political control by Nzeogwu in The North was caused by failure of the other Majors in Lagos to take control of political power, despite the killings. Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, who had just returned from England and who narrowly escaped death in the coup d'etat of the Ibo Majors, foiled the whole operations in Lagos and arrested some of those involved³⁴. This he did by mobilizing some officers, particularly

Northern officers of the federal guards, and putting himself at the head of the ranks and Northern NCOs who had already begun to act and with these soldiers, he was able to rally pockets of loyal troops from the various units in Lagos behind the legitimate command of the Nigerian GOC, although General Ironsi who held that command post initially was nowhere to be found³⁵. Furthermore, in order to neutralize the coup d'etat of the Majors, Gowon went into full battle-gear and led a convoy of armoured vehicles:

"manned by fierce looking soldiers and assured (Northern civil servants and politicians in Lagos) that troops loyal to government would crush the rebellion and flush out the coup plotters and executors ... the GOC of the Army was nowhere to be found to alert the troops and seek their cooperation in crushing the rebellion"³⁶.

The activities of Gowon with officers and men of the Federal Guard Troops therefore turned the tide against the insurgents in Lagos and Ironsi assumed overall command. After Gowon had warned Ojukwu to desist from supporting the dissident troops in The North with the 5th Battalion in Kano Nzeagwu found himself isolated in Kaduna and ended up pledging allegiance to Ironsi³⁷. The coup d'etat of the Majors therefore failed and with that failure there seems to have taken place 'a coup within a coup' which brought Ironsi, an Ibo as Head of the Federation Military government in Nigeria on 17th January 1966³⁸. The coup of Nzeogwu and the Majors essentially was a political development that would have subordinated The North and further treated the M-Belt problems and demands as non-issues, given the emphasis of Nigerian nationalism in its objectives and course of subsequent developments as well as the dominance of achieving the goals through the nationalism of a dominant tribe, the Ibos, in the process. What had begun as political acts of Majors of the Nigerian Army to reform the system ended up very much as a process of tribal domination of the Nigerian political arena, which became characteristic of the Ironsi-Regime.

Although the Northern Army Officers, NCOs and their men who formed the bulk of the Nigerian army rank-and-file, largely M-Belt, were loyal to the command of Ironsi because of the persuasion of their brother-officers, there were severe tensions existing between them and non-Northern Army personnel, particularly those in Lagos, Ikeja Ibadan and Abeokuta³⁹. The subsequent reaction of M-Belt interests within the Nigerian Army rank-and-file took the form of a collective Northern interest in reaction to the deaths that were caused to Northern officers, rather than to the Sardauna and Tafawa Balewa and rather than in sympathy to the deaths of other civilian political leaders. It was after the Northern identity had been used in reaction to the events of January and to the subsequent governance of Ironsi which led to the July 1966 Coup in the cause of Northern secession that M-Belt interest began to penetrate popular consciousness of the Army rank and file in the interest of a M-Belt Region through the activities and political influences of J. S. Tarka on Akahan and other soldiers. However in reaction to what happened in the January Coup d'etat, Northern NCOs in the 4th Battalion, many of whom were Tiv, shot dead the Ibo Officer who had come to take over as commanding officer⁴⁰. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions in Enugu, Lagos (Apapa) and Ikeja respectively had a concentration of Northern NCOs with a mixture of men in the rank and file from the different Nigerian tribes. In general the officer corp of the Nigerian army was dominated by persons from Southern Nigerian groups; for example 60 out of 81 of the Nigerian officers were Ibos, ten Yorubas and eleven Northerners, four of whom were murdered in January 1966⁴¹. The mixed concentration of Nigerian tribes in the army locations in the country however varied with their situation in Ibadan. The 4th Battalion in Ibadan was dominated by Tiv NCOs and the other rank and file came predominantly from the M-Belt areas with a huge concentration of the Tiv people in the fighting units⁴². It was against this background of unease with an underlining political mood of suspicion of Ibo dominance in

the Nigerian Army that the Ironsi Regime began to perform the functions of government on the 16th January 1966⁴³.

In the first major statement of J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi to Nigerians as Head of the Federation Military Government and supreme commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces, he directed his Internal Affairs policy to neutralizing political hopes on the subdivisions of the country and threatened minorities movements for the creation of more states as well as the Western region of Nigeria, where there were disorders largely caused by a political party that had aspirations for the creation of Regions in the minorities areas. On 16th January, for example, Aguiyi-Ironsi announced the determination of the Federation Military Government:

"to suppress the disorders ... in the Tiv area of the Northern Region ... it will declare Martial law in any area of the Federation in which disturbances continue; it is its intention to maintain law and order in the Federation until such a time as a new constitution for the Federation is brought into being"⁴⁴.

In this major statement of Internal policy, Ironsi did not indicate what he was going to do about the political problems of the M-Belt Region and in particular, Tiv political prisoners who were still in jail over the causes of the UMBC party for the creation of the Region in The North. In any case the Tiv disorders had ceased, six months before the coup d'etat of January 1966. The Ironsi-Regime therefore, right from the start, relegated the minorities in The North and Eastern Region into non-issues, the majority of whom formed the backbone of the rank-and-file of the Nigerian Army, particularly those of the M-Belt areas whose Kith and kin were political prisoners in jail. M.J. Dent estimates that there were over 500 Tiv political prisoners in prison as a result of the 1964 disturbances in Tiv land and Ironsi did not agree they were political prisoners⁴⁵. Joseph Tarka in particular had two interviews at his own request with Aguiyi-Ironsi in

which he was completely unsuccessful in persuading the General that it was the moment to release Tiv political prisoners and create the M-Belt Region⁴⁶. Tarka was sent away from Lagos in rather humiliating circumstances and some of the Ibo advisers around Ironsi apparently tried to offer him some kind of financial grant to set up as a businessman. He refused to be bought and to be organized-out of politics in this way. Ironsi therefore lost the opportunity of winning Tiv political alliance and instead further alienated them by allowing the circulation of a map showing the frontiers of the Eastern Region advanced to the Benue River. When Professor James O'Connell warned him of the political dangers of discontent among the Tiv soldiers he changed discussion of the subject matter to the fanaticism of the Tijaniyya in Kano⁴⁷. The decision to ignore Joseph Tarka and the minorities in The North from which he could have driven an early political wedge between the M-Belt and the Islamic society in The North was to cause his overthrow and cost him his life because it was the impressive unity of the M-Belt with the other Northern officers and men that was instrumental in the success of the July 1966 coup.

With the increasing interpretation of the January 15th coup d'etat as an Ibo tribal plot to dominate Nigeria, there was a considerable increase in the growth of anti-Ironsi political sentiments in most parts of Nigeria and more seriously, among soldiers of Northern origin within the Army⁴⁸. In The North the ordinary man in the street had apparently become increasingly irritated by the reaction of the Ibos to the coup. Ibo market traders, often mocked their northern customers, pointing out that their former 'master' the Sardauna was dead and openly displayed and sold in their shops the pictures of Major Nzeogwu as a 'hero' of a New Nigeria⁴⁹. Furthermore, picture of Nzeogwu with one foot over the corpse of the Sardauna, symbolic of the downfall of The North and the ascendancy of the Ibos and the Eastern Region in the Nigerian Federation were also on sale in markets⁵⁰. There were also many recorded songs portraying Northerners in very derogatory

light, the sale of some of these were later forbidden and banned from transmission in Radio and TV stations. To compound the tensions, the June 1966 issue of Drum Magazine with a wide readership in Nigeria and other African countries, was curiously in circulation in May and contained an article entitled 'Sir Ahmadu rose in his shrouds and spoke from the dead' and accompanied by a faked picture in which a prone Sardauna, robed in white lay upon a bed flanked by Coz Idapo although himself not an Ibo, but the columnist. He was a southern Nigerian 'radical' and the Drum Magazine picture showed him backed by a huge crowd⁵¹. The photograph did not only offend Muslims but the article also contained alleged "confessions" by the Sardauna in which there was mention of: "the foolish belief that I was the Othman dan Fodio of modern times"⁵². This social and political humiliation was on all sections of The North (Moslem and Christian-Islamic society and M-Belt groups and societies - Hausa and non-Hausa etc.) and those who may never have felt much allegiance to either the Sardauna or the NPC, like UMBC party loyalists Northernized on their own, because they did not relish being sneered at by Southerners, particularly manifested in Ibo attitudes after the coup⁵³. When these events and other petty humiliations were reported to the Attorney-General of the Federation, Gabriel Onyinke, an Ibo: "He dismissed them as harmless practical jokes and refused to take any action"⁵⁴. These social relations crystallized Northern unity against obviously conceived outsiders and the Northern identity temporarily submerged any conceptions of a M-Belt identity and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. In the circumstances, the M-Belt areas saw their political fate intimately tied to the Northern identity in the politics of the Nigerian Federation.

However in terms of the political demands for the creation of more states as units of the Nigerian Federation, it is significant that the most serious organized anti-Ironsi political act came from the minorities area of the Niger-Delta rivers. There, Isaac Boro, an Ijaw, indigenous to the

area and a former President of the Students Union of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka with a few supporters took up in arms:

"in the name of the peoples of the delta area proclaimed that section of the region an 'independent state'. This revolt posed an immediate threat to the government of the Eastern Region and of the Federations as a whole ... It had to be crushed, but with the difficulty of communication and transport in the area, this was no mean task. Not until some four weeks later, after the employment of a battalion of troops, supported by a large contingent of Police, was the new regime (of Ironsi) capable of restoring order and re-establishing federal control in the area"⁵⁵.

The political interpretation that was given to the conduct of the Military operations to crush the quasi-Military revolt of Isaac Boro, by the Niger-Delta people was that of invigorated Ibo domination over the minorities, particularly to protect the local resentments over Ibo domination of economic life and colonization of PortHarcourt⁵⁶. This interpretation was given dramatic political meaning with Ibos in Executive capacity in both Enugun and Lagos and the Battalion having come down from Enugu.

Although Ironsi appeared to be the 'supreme' authority in Lagos, he allowed the Regions to operate independently. In some instances the Regions within a very short period of time were operating much more vigorously in legitimate authority than the governments the military overthrew, almost like countries unto themselves⁵⁷. In The North for example, where there was demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region, among other causes, against the political authority of the Emirs, the Military government brought back the Emirs to control local political power, in some instances with political status not dissimilar to that of the old sole NAs⁵⁸. This, among other explanatory reasons, was meant to create support for the Regime, the Islamic society having experienced the most severe leadership losses from the January coup in the deaths of Ahmadu Bello, Tafawa Balewa, Mai Malari,

Kur Mohammed and Largema. The political emphasis in conciliating the Islamic society in The North by the Ironsi-Regime only served to further alienate M-Belt aspirations because the trends reinforced the problems they had organized the UMBC party in search for their solutions by the demand of a M-Belt Region. Furthermore to maintainance of the status quo, Ironsi allowed the Eastern Region to unilaterally demand Foreign Aid investment and in the West there were administrative changes by the creation of eight 'provinces' to replace the existing six without comparable changes occurring elsewhere⁵⁹. Much more serious, however the Ironsi-Regime did nothing about Northern Civil servants, together with a majority of Western Region Civil servants, to build up a Federalist lobby with the political impressions that all of the North was politically united with sentiments toward that political direction in the organization of the Nigerian Nation⁶⁰. On 18th January 1966, Ironsi appointed Governors for the Regions of the existing Nigerian Federation: Hassan Katsina (Muslim and Hausa-Fulani) for The North, Fajuyi (Christian and Yoruba) for the West, Ojukwu (Christian and Ibo) for the East and David Ejoor (Christian and Edo) for the Mid-West⁶¹. With the appointment of Military Governors to the Regions, it could be said that this political act marked the final collapse of the first Republic in Nigeria and the formal take over of political power and government by the Military under Ironsi⁶². The political act however gave more strength to the conception in the political belief that the North was still intact in the appointment of Hassan Katsina, the son to the Emir of Katsina as the Governor. Besides the initial mainainance of The North as an integral political unit, therefore Ironsi was also seen by M-Belt politicians like Joseph Tarka, to be maintaining a pro-status quo position in the claims of the rulership of the North to be a prerogative of the Islamic Society. Thus, for example, although Hassan Katsina was not the only senior military officer of Northern origin and was junior to Gowon, he was made Governor of the North. Furthermore, Aguiyi-Ironsi made special effort to make peace

with the Sultan of Sokoto, premier-chief of the North and a Kinsmen of the Sardauna, Ahmadu Bello. The Sultan was invited to Lagos and was accorded every honour by Ironsi including giving him a present of a silver kettle for prayer⁶³. These developments also increased the suspicions by the political leadership of the M-Belt Movement in its 'silent' phase under military rule and which still aspired for the creation of the M-Belt Region, as it increasingly became aware that there were no political benefits to be derived from the Ironsi-Regime.

When these suspicious political developments built up, 'the problem of the Majors' had not yet found its way directly into the Nigerian political arena. When this happened, it seriously threatened the whole command structure of the Nigerian Army. This was so because, initially both Northern Army Officers and the rank and file in the first week of the coup had been urged to exercise restraint from unleashing military retribution on equal measures against Ibo and other southern Nigerian officers, to revenge the murders of Northern Officers, on condition that those who led the January coup which brought Ironsi into power were to be punished and that Ironsi, himself ought to explain why, after telling soldiers that the coup had failed: "instead of restoring power to legitimate government, he had asked for power to be mandated over to him"⁶⁴. Apparent in this new movement of thought among Northern soldiers, was the consciousness that the January Coup was a political plot to destroy the hegemony of the North and to alter the power base, which will give Ibos and southern Nigerian groups political advantage. The Northern troops were kept loyal to Ironsi by Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, in the midst of humiliatory manipulation and distrust coming from fellow Ibo and Southern Nigerian Officers to the extent that the authorities had some of the Northern Officers monitored and their telephones offensively tapped⁶⁵. Despite these apparent provocation, 'the problem of the January Majors' remained foremost in the minds of Northern Officers and in the rank and file. In the light of existing controversy on

the issue in Nigeria, the problem centered on whether the January Coup plotters were to be regarded as rebellious troops, who had murdered their officers and therefore liable to be court-martialled and face a sentence which carried a death penalty⁶⁶. These developments, independently of the deaths of Northern officers in the January Coup, systematically on their own account, built up a feeling of Northern solidarity among the soldiers from tribal groups in the North and created a military sub-culture within the Nigerian Army - "Yan Arewa - Yan Gida" literally translating itself into social and political relations of trust and safety: "Northern sons - sons from home". The options on the political opinions which Ironsi faced, on what to do with the 'January Majors' were divided within both the Military and more importantly in the light of subsequent events, among the civil population almost exactly on the party political divisions that existed on the Nigerian political arena before the Coup d'etat. Northern opinions, for example, particularly among soldiers that were from the M-Belt, suggested that the plotters should stand trial, not only because they thought Military laws demanded this, but also to maintain discipline on which the hierarchy of command of the Army depended; In the West and in the top hierarchy of the Army including the majority of Senior Ibo officers, it was maintained that the leaders of the Coup should be released from detention and if not reinstated into their respective offices, should at the worst be dismissed from the Army - this view was apparently shared by the influential southern Nigerian intellectual community that was centered at Ibadan University who infact stated:

"we should not in any event allow them to be used as scapegoats to appease the fears and sentiments of certain groups".

To Ibos in the East and those who were in other parts of Nigeria as well as the majority of Ibo junior army officers and Southern Nigerian 'radicals', the coup plotters were 'heroes' whose trial and possible execution would

alienate support and good will from many Nigerians, which the regime needed⁶⁷. Ironsi however was a personality who believed that "things" left alone would "right themselves" and preferred to leave matters as they were: "The leaders of the coup were kept in detention and continued to receive their full salaries and other entitlements"⁶⁸. When it was decided by the Supreme Military Council that the 'January Majors' were to be tried, Ironsi kept postponing the date of trial despite constant reminders by Gowon who was in the Council and the disaffection that was growing on the particular issue, both within the Army and among the civil population in the North⁶⁹. In the end, among other causes, the solution lay on the organized section that controlled the monopoly of force and violence in the Army and the readiness and timing to use it. This came in the July Counter - Coup d'etat that was organized by officers and men of the Nigerian Army of Northern Origins, after they had become disillusioned by the policies and political direction of the Ironsi-Regime.

The most critical and of far reaching political consequence in the policies and political direction of the Ironsi-Regime which unfolded a clear pattern of Ibo and Southern Nigerian political intrigues and manipulations to dominate Nigeria and which further alienated both Northern and M-Belt interests, was in the enactment of Decree No. 34 of 24th May, 1966. The Decree was pushed through the Supreme Military Council (SMC) by Ironsi as a partail enforcement of the recommendations of Francis Nwokedi. Nwokedi had recommended the total merging of all Regional Officers in a Unified Federal Service of the ranks of Executive Officer and above into the Federal Civil Service. The Decree appeared as a forced intention of the plan which would have resulted in massive Ibo domination of the Northern Civil Service. The Unification Decree, as it became known, among other provisions, stated:

"Subject to the provisions of this Decree, Nigeria shall on 24th May, 1966, cease to be a Federation and shall accordingly as from that day be a Republic, by the name of Republic of Nigeria, consisting of the territory, which immediately before that day was comprised in the Federation... As from the appointed day, all offices in the Service of the Republic in a Civil Service capacity shall be offices in a single service to be known as the National Public Service; and accordingly all persons who immediately before that day are members of the public Service of a Region shall on that day become members of the National Public Service"⁷⁰.

Decree No. 34 therefore struck a direct blow at the developing Northern territorial conception of political identity which served instrumental purposes in Nigerian politics, apparently, constantly used by persons who were Muslims and Christians from both the Islamic and M-Belt areas in the North. The Decree provincialized Nigeria and centralized political power and decision making in Lagos. Initially Hassan Katsina appeared to support the abrogation of Northernization policy and only became alarmed at its social and political consequences when there was a huge flow of applications from Ibos and other Southern Nigerian groups for jobs in the Northern Civil Service, where it was alleged there was a lack of qualified expertise with Western European modernizing skills. Hassan Katsina had encouraged the tendency when he stated in a broadcast to the people of the North:

"We believe whenever people have to live together, there must be a spirit of give and take. It is for this reason that the Unification Decree was introduced. Its aim is to treat all Nigerians alike"⁷¹.

Gowon too, seemed to have been manipulated into giving tacit support to the Decree within the Supreme Military Council, by the very personalized nature of political decision on the issue⁷², although he strongly warned Ironsi against certain provisions of the Decree, particularly the abolition of the

Regions, which an already aggrieved North might not accept⁷³. It is therefore, not unreasonable to suggest that the reservations of Gowon who was a member of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) was in itself opposition to Decree No. 34. This subsequently found expression in the mystifying language of Hassan Katsina, another Northern Member of the SMC, on the coming announcement of the Decree, in which he was quoted as saying "in a few days the egg would be broken"⁷⁴ and the strong language used by Ironsi which was clearly meant to suppress opposition in the announcement of Decree No. 34:

"I want to leave no doubt in the mind of anybody, that the provisions of this decree will certainly be enforced. This is a Military Regime and soldiers do not allow themselves to be diverted from or obstructed in the fulfilment of their objectives. With us the objectives will be pursued with supreme determination and vigour"⁷⁵.

With Decree No. 34 Ironsi and a powerful Ibo lobby, stood solidly against Northernization and the creation of the M-Belt Region. In fact, after the statement of policy of the new regime on 21st February 1966, Ironsi was against Federalism in Nigeria and was anti-regionalism, directed at its practice in the North by the Sardauna. As far as the creation of the M-Belt Region was therefore an issue, which the Tiv riots represented before the Coup d'etat, Ironsi simply did not understand their causes and saw them as irrelevant and unnecessary arson. He threatened the Tiv with severe reprisals, although Tiv soldiers in Nigerian Army were sympathetic to the causes of the UMBC party⁷⁶. Some of the Tiv soldiers in the Nigerian Army rank-and-file had in fact been supporters and mobilizing agents of the UMBC party at the grassroots level under the leadership of Joseph Tarka before they joined the Army. Some Tiv joined the Army after 1960 because of the political and economic difficulties at home. Most of those who joined the Army in the rank-and-file had been toughened when they were either in the

Sardauna Youth Brigade or in the Young Pioneers of Joseph Tarka and had been strong admirers of Military activity on the political riots in Tiv land during the operations of the Nigerian Army in 1964⁷⁷.

The Ironsi Regime therefore set about creating a Unitary Government in the country when infact the majority of opinion in the minorities area was demanding subdivision of the Federation. In other words, the Military government was ignorant of the critical political needs and the problems in the country which had caused stagnation in the political performance of the civilian regime. Thus, for example, Ironsi made the Tiv riots an issue in his very first statement of internal domestic policy when the riots had on their own ceased to be a threat to internal security in the North, largely, from the dramatic reconciliation between Joseph Tarka and the Tor Tiv before the end of December 1965 and the death of the Sardauna in January 1966 removed support for the NPC clients in Tivland and the Tiv therefore looked forward to reforms and the creation of the M-Belt Region with the control of government by the military⁷⁸.

Decree No. 34 however was made even more politically suspicious because of the way it had been formulated under great secrecy by southern Nigerian advisers who surrounded Ironsi: A tightly knitted group, combining the interests of Ibo intellecutals, Civil Servants and Army Officers whose political opinions on Nigeria, filtered through spokesmen like Christopher Okigbo, Francis Nwokedi and Ojukwu, to Ironsi⁷⁹. This group was insensitive to opinions and interests from other parts of the country and made access to Ironsi, difficult for other tribes, while Ibos had ease in seeing Ironsi on the political policies for Nigeria⁸⁰. The Ironsi-Regime therefore made serious political mistakes by cutting itself off from political advice that might have assisted it in judging the political mood of opinion from other parts of the country, a mistake whose lesson Gowon was quick to learn after the July 1966 Coup d'etat. Subsequently after the creation of states in May 1967, he brought in some civilian politicians into his cabinet, each from

the twelve states of the rearranged Federation, whose varied opinions were vital in maintaining political stability of the Nigerian nation as it successfully fought the Civil War. The 'Special Group' of Ibo advisers Ironsi surrounded himself with, as from March 1966, in men like Francis Nwokedi, Gabriel Onyinke, Pius Okigbo, J. C. Edozie at Ibadan, Dr Eke of Nsukka and the late Christopher Okigbo, increasingly misled him with a southern Nigerian stereotype attitude in dealing with the North as a monolithic traditional and static area centered on Sokoto and unbroken by modernization⁸¹. Another unfortunate feature of the Unification Decree was in the proposition to have Military-Prefects as the administrators in the Provinces, a process which Ironsi himself described would make real the true national political identity:

"by removing the last vestiges of the intense regionalism of the recent past and to produce that cohesion in the government structure which is so necessary in achieving and maintaining the paramount objective... namely national unity"⁸².

To adjust for the process of implementing Decree No. 34, there was to be the rotation of existing Military Governors, a process that was going to take away Hassan Katsina from the North and most probably brought in an Ibo or Yoruba to rule over the North. Given the dominance of Ibo as officers in the Nigerian Army with the ranks of Majors and above - the category of officers from which the Military-Prefects might have come from and the promotion of eighteen Ibo majors to the ranks of Lt. Colonels in the same period, this was taken as another measure in establishing Ibo dominance, particularly over the North⁸³. To further compound the tense political atmosphere of suspicion in the North, which the 'May Decision' had generated over apparent Ibo advancement of personal as well as the collective group interest, there was the interwoven issue of the incautious withdrawal from W. Germany and subsequent dismissal on 'educational

grounds' of some Nigerian Air Force cadets of Northern origin, the majority of whom were from the M-Belt areas, although some had completed about one and half to two years service and reportedly coping with the training⁸⁴. However, the crux of the matter over resentment to Decree No. 34 in the North was in the way it set out to restructure Civil Servants from the Northern Public Service to the bottom of the proposed National Public Service, relative to the advantages it produced to Ibos from the Eastern Civil Service as well as to those already in the Federal Service in the recommendations of Nwokedi. Decree No. 34, however, only applied to a handful of superscale officers, but the Northern fear was that it was only a first installment of the policy and would subsequently apply to the whole 'Senior Service' of Executive Officers and above. The most influential class, in terms of political consciousness and modernization, in the North in that period, were the Civil Servants because they were closest to the corridors of political and economic power. An act which upset this class in the Unification programme of Ironsi, came from a colleague of Nwokedi and a fellow Ibo, the Permanent Secretary (PS) of the Military of Establishment in Lagos. The PS drew up a staff list of those affected by certain provisions of Decree No. 34 and placed them in order of Seniority by salary and date of appointment of the salary group⁸⁵. However, the manipulative aspect that embittered the Northerners, was that while permanent secretaries in the North had lower salaries, largely because of frugality and the continued presence of expatriates than elsewhere, their opposite numbers in the Federal and Regional Service, the Eastern Service in particular paid highest⁸⁶. Seniority was to be judged by salaries and salaries in the East were on the whole higher than in the North. The result of this exercise was that an Ibo, the Chief Secretary of the Eastern Region Service, headed the combined list placed above even the head of the Federal Service and Northerners who were permanent secretaries with just as much experience or more experience than their Ibo or Southern counter-parts,

found themselves well down the list⁸⁷. This important service-issue distorted the Unification exercise out of all political proportions in the North. A memorandum submitted to Hassan Katsina by Adamu Fika the Secretary of the Northern Civil Service Union circulated among Senior Civil Service Colleagues, summarized the Northern political mood on the Unification Decree No. 34:

"Federalism was introduced in the country gradually over a period of about ten years. But we are now being asked to go back to a unitary form of Government within three months, unconditionally and without proper safeguard for or the consent of the majority of the people... The fact is that the feelings of the great majority of the people are not known and are not considered. It is either taken for granted by the top Civilian advisers of the Federal Military Government that the opinions expressed by Lagos Newspaper-men reflect the majority opinion in the country or they are taking advantage of their position to impose their will on the people... the great majority of the people in the country are opposed to the idea of indiscriminate unification and return to a complete unitary form of Government, but they cannot express their opposition in writing or otherwise owing to lack of education"⁸⁸.

As aptly summarized by Mallam Fika, it was the lack of expression of political opinion in the North, and the inability for the northerners to find appropriate channels of expressing their political grievances that the Ironsi-Regime rather curiously interpreted the "wait and see" attitude of the North as political conformity toward the violent change of leadership in Nigeria and the rapidly developed policies of Unification embedded in Decree No. 34. However, most of the Northern opinion on the Regime and the Unification Decree was built rather secretly and the rest of opinions on the January Coup and 'Ibo-plans' were shrouded with rumours. This made it difficult for Ironsi to know exactly what the North was up to, although there were correct intelligence reports from Kano, Zaria and Kaduna that Northern political leaders had closed their ranks and were holding regular

meetings in Kaduna, Zaria, Jos and Kano⁸⁹. It is not clear whether this mystification of the political mood in the North toward the Ironsi Regime was a deliberate political act. However it was from these regular meetings that political "tasks" came to be shared which were meant to activate the Northern political identity to influence all classes in the North: The radical elements - Aminu Kano and Joseph Tarka, were to influence the Army, Imam and Makama, the traditional rulers, through whom the grassroots were to be penetrated with the NA apparatus and the Civil Service Unions were to influence opinion among the students of Ahmadu Bello University and the mass media in Kaduna: the New Nigerian, 'Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo' (Truth is worth more than a penny) and Radio-Televeion Kaduna, corporations that were owned by the regional government⁹⁰. The 'Gang of Four' was formed almost immediately it was apparent that the January Coup and that the military and political murders reflected a political bias, which gave Ibos and the South political dominance of the country and they started to scheme the overthrow of Ironsi⁹¹. However, the assumption by all Northerners of a common threat of Ibo domination as a result of the January Coup, brought together previous opponents. Aminu Kano, for example, was former leader of a radical Muslim opposition group to the Northern establishment and J. S. Tarka, leader of M-Belt separatist movement to the Northern establishment as well, but made common cause with the Northern establishment in opposition to the government of Ironsi. Under civilian rule the two leaders had been in alliance with southern Nigerian based political parties, the NCNC and the AG respectively. Under the Military rule of Ironsi however they changed to Northern solidarity because of the specific content of the political meaning of Decree No. 34 as it affected their previous political interests.

It was against the background of manipulation of political interests with Decree No. 34 by Ibos and Southern Nigerian groups, seeking to dominate Nigeria that reaction to the Ironsi-Regime is to be understood from both the Islamic and the M-Belt areas in the North, where there were

already in existence, whipped-up Northern sentiments, although they remained for a long time seemingly suppressed. There was political response to the sentiments because all sections of the North saw themselves as the underdogs in the Unification processes that were set into motion in May 1966. In particular the Ironsi-Regime did not analyze the interwoven political identities within the North in Nigerian politics. It in fact failed to bargain and compromise with the apparent maturity of the idea that it was expected of its reforms to create a M-Belt Region and neglected to destroy the political networks of the overthrown civilian regime in the North, particularly the NPC. This was largely due to the failure of Ironsi to see a distinction in social and political identities between the Islamic Society in the North and the M-Belt groups and societies in which case there was also the failure to realize the interlocking of the M-Belt identity with the Northern identity when it came to issues of southern Nigerian political control of the national government, largely because of the unequal diffusion of Western European influences of modernization in Nigeria. Thus as it became apparent after the January Coup and the events surrounding Decree No. 34, when the M-Belt people rejected the Islamic society in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, they were not rejecting the political conception of being Northern in identity. Indeed, this was little understood in the interplay of political forces and identities that were already actively at work after the January Coup and which became related in the organized response to Decree No. 34 and aimed at an overall drive of mobilization in protection of Northern interests and within that conception, also, there was the protection of M-Belt interests. When Ironsi had snubbed the political advances of Joseph Tarka and Aminu Kano for reform and subdivision of at least the North, after the January Coup, he had simply thrown them back to organize Northern unity in a political vacuum of leadership. By April 1966, all Northern politicians irrespective of previous political identity had closed ranks and met each

other regularly, to discuss what was to be done on the political state of affairs in the country as their development affected the North⁹². These included Makaman Bida (NPC), Ibrahim Imam (BYM/AG), Aminu Kano (NEPU/NPF) and Joseph Tarka (UMBC/NPF)⁹³. Also in April, 1966 there was political resurgence of the Northern identity among Senior Civil Servants in Kaduna under the organization of Adamu Fika, whose pro-Federation political opinion on Nigeria found expression in the *New Nigerian* and the *Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo*⁹⁴. On the 19th April, 1966, for example, Suleiman Tarkuma of Radio Television Kaduna, wrote an extremely provocative pro-Northern article for the *New Nigerian* under the title 'Federation is Good for Nigeria' in which he argued:

"No-one has been bold enough to point out the demerits of the manner of the change (from civilian to the military government). The attitude of silence and indifference to what is happening in the country on the part of the indigenous sons of the North is neither born out of fear nor is it born out of lack of views to present... it is partly born out of shock. The shock that even if the Military regime demanded the lives of those politicians who allegedly spoiled this country, how could such a bloody consequence be restricted to a particular part of the country? The shock that never in the history of Military Coups had it occurred that the lives of innocent army leaders (from a particular part of a country) should also be claimed along with those of the politicians... Those shocks are some of the reasons that kept us quiet, not to mention the mad rush of application letters for jobs pouring into the North from other parts of the country... a Nigerian Unitary government does not necessarily unite the people of Nigeria. Especially the events that led to the introduction of that desired unitary government. I could advise the breaking of the Federation... The Federation may be modified, but it must remain... we are bound to wait and see"⁹⁵.

Similarly, Ibrahim Imam, a former radical opponent of the NPC party, for example, produced lengthly and well argued cases for Federalism in Nigeria, which the *New Nigerian* serialized in four articles in mid-May 1966⁹⁶. These

outbursts were meant to discourage the implementation of the recommendations of the Nwokedi Commission on Unification⁹⁷. Before 24th May 1966, therefore, a very clear pro-Federal Northern position was already well articulated by a cohesive Northern group, whose response in opposition to the Ironsi-Regime had caused the neutralization of political and socio-cultural differences in the North. The political issue on the conception of cohesion in the resurgence of the Northern identity was clear cut: domination of the North by more educated southerners, orchestrated by an Ibo controlled government. This meant the fear that educationally advanced southern groups will occupy occupational roles in the institutions of government and society in the North to the detriment of indigenes of the North.

Thus, four days after Decree No.34 was announced the first political reaction to the issue of domination apparent in the provisions, came from a demonstration on 28th and 29th May 1966, by students of the Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, a substantial number of whom came from the more educationally advanced M-Belt tribes, who had been influenced by the civil servants from Kaduna⁹⁸. The civil servants brought and invoked sharp images to focus in the contrasts of advantages between Northernization policy and the unification policy of Decree No.34, particularly as it affected those of them that had administrative career prospects in the Northern civil service. Distinction is however, pertinent among students of Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), Zaria. The university has two campuses in Zaria: the Kongo campus located near Zaria city and between it there was the 'Sabon Gari' and then, the Samaru campus, which was isolated on the Funtua road to Katsina. The Kongo campus had the facilities of Law and Administration and trained a substantial number of indigenes who were on In-service Administrative Courses on the Northern civil service sponsorship as well as undergraduates who were mainly Northerners. It was the Kongo campus which effectively began the demonstrations in May 1966, marching from the main

street of Zaria city toward 'Sabon Gari' and chanting 'Araba - Aware' (Division - Separation). The Samaru campus, however, was where the main Faculties of the University were: Engineering, Pharmacy, Veterinary Medicine, Arts and Social Sciences, Education etc. Only a few Northern students were to be found on the Samaru Campus and it was predominantly Ibo and Yoruba in both staff and students in 1966. The few Northern students mostly from the M-Belt areas at the Samuru campus, joined the demonstration of the Kongo campus on 29th May 1966. The demonstrations which began peacefully degenerated into a riot⁹⁹. This was so, because the students were joined in the protest by segments of the lowest stratum of society who seized on it as an opportunity to vent their own grievances against the humiliations of the previous months before May¹⁰⁰, and significantly they carried in the streets of Zaria, banners which proclaimed 'Araba - Aware', other than just chanting the slogan¹⁰¹. When the political mood of the demonstration developed into rioting, Ibo men were attacked, their property destroyed and as much as between 400 and 500 were killed in centres like Zaria, Kaduna, Kano, Funtua, Gusau and Bauchi town where NPC support had been strongest before the January coup d'etat¹⁰². In the May 1966 riots, besides the involvement of students from the M-Belt areas in ABU, Zaria, there was no particularly manifest M-Belt mass resentment to Decree No.34 and to Ibos and to demands of "Araba-Aware" and no concomitant killing of Ibos in townships like Jos, Bukuru, Makurdi, Yola and the sub-urban areas of Gboko, Oturkpo, Kafanchan, Kagoro, Numan, Biliri, Barkin Ladi, Pankshin, Shendam, Lafia, Keffi and Katsina Ala etc.¹⁰³.

The initial Northern reaction to Decree No.34 in the 'May riots' seemed to have been a political message of discontent to the Ironsi-Regime on the political mood in The North. This was in context of the specific demands, like those of Federation, with The North still intact or its subdivision in which a M-Belt Region was to be created. Indeed this was demonstrated in the political solidarity of The North, in which 'a Gang of

four' prominent Northern politicians: Makama, Imam, Aminu and Tarka, appeared on the arena to calm down the riots, protests and prevent the killing of Ibos. The group jointly toured the main towns and cities of The North as its leaders. According to Aminu Kano, they virtually undermined the authority of Hassan Katsina, the seeming surrogate of the Ironsi-Regime in The North. However Hassan Katsina later was ambivalent in his support to the Ironsi Regime and there is also evidence that he tacitly encouraged Northern renaissance. Behind this demonstrated rejection of Decree No.34 in May 1966, by the Northern intelligentsia (the civil servants and the students in particular), the Northern masses who had joined the students to riot and the demonstrated unity of The North in the realignment of party political leadership into a collective Northern cohort, there was a remaining last option - that of overthrowing the Ironsi-Regime itself if Decree No.34 was not dropped. The Northern politicians rather curiously thought they could do so with ease¹⁰⁴. They set about to overthrow the Ironsi-Regime by mobilizing Northern soldiers with the still impending issue of what was to be done about inaction on the 'January Majors', After 30th May 1966, there was political calm in The North and in June, Ironsi invigorated government determination to implement Decree No.34¹⁰⁵. The same month, however, was used by Northern politicians to influence the Army "to do something" on the one-sidedness of the deaths of officers and politicians during the January coup and on why those involved had not been tried. The Northern politicians were also actively creating the image that the Ironsi-Regime with the unitary scheme was imposing the will of a few on the majority of the Nigerian population, to create a political atmosphere for the Northern coup, by openly advocating for Federalism for Nigeria through the New Nigerian¹⁰⁶. Ironsi, however persisted with the policy of unification. These political developments in The North showed clearly a rejection to Unification and a preference for federation. They culminated in the July coup that was staged by Northern officers and men of the

Nigerian Army, the majority of whom came from the M-Belt areas. They acted however within context of an activated Northern political identity.

Whatever the real Nationalist motives of the January coup-makers, the Unification Decree left a wide spread belief among the Northern elite, politicians who influenced Northern soldiers in the Nigerian Army and the mass of the population in The North, that there had been an Ibo plot. This belief was encouraged by the failure of Ironsi to prosecute the conspirators of January, an issue that remained alive until the Northern rank and file had taken retribution on Ibo officers in the July coup.

The pressures to effect the July 1966 coup d'etat by Northern Officers were militarily induced as well as politically. Militarily, both the Northern officers in the Nigerian Army and particularly, the rank and file had been very uneasy since the January coup d'etat. The officers were under pressure to act in revenge on Ibo officers, who had caused the deaths of their much loved and admired officers and were abused by Northern ranks as cowards for their inactivity. The rage and bitterness over the deaths of Senior Army officers of The North, whom the Northern rank and file regarded as heroes because of their Military experience was compounded by suspicions that there was going to be "a second Ibo coup d'etat" to complete the annihilation of Northern Military officers in order that the top command structure properly came under Ibo military leadership¹⁰⁷. This was made apparent by the existing regional imbalance in the Army as a result of the January deaths and the Military promotions that took place in April 1966. However Muhammed Shuwa and Murtala Mohammed enjoyed accelerated promotions from captains to Lt. Colonels, which indicated there was a deliberate attempt at regional balancing designed to placate the North, particularly so when both officers were from the core areas of the Islamic society¹⁰⁸. The changes that were salient in the eyes of the junior Northern Officers and NCOs were on the gross overall changes toward greater Ibo numerical dominance at the higher levels¹⁰⁹, particularly the alterations which were

thought of as a symbolic deprivation for the Northerners as a "tribe". This impression was heightened by the fact that most of the new postings put Ibo officers into command assignments rather than into staff or specialist positions. In the Army for example, the commanders of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Battalions, the 2nd Brigade, the Abeokuta garrison, the Zaria Military Depot, the Nigerian Military Training college and one of the two RECCE squadrons were all Ibo, leaving only the 4th (with Joe Akahan) and 5th (with Mohammed Shuwa) Battalions in Ibadan and Kano respectively and the 1st Brigade in the commands of non-Ibos¹¹⁰. In March, 1966 Ibo Army Officers held ten of the thirteen unit command positions, whereas in January, barely three months earlier, they held only five out of twelve¹¹¹. The conspicuous position of the Ibo officers in the command structure of the Nigerian Army therefore fitted the perceptions of The North on the new political positions, namely the loss of political power and leadership which the Ibos in the East had gained. These circumstances were made worse by the widely publicized incidents at the Army and Air Force recruiting centres at Zaria and Kaduna where it was felt that Northerners no longer had a fair chance in the recruitments into the Nigerian armed forces¹¹². Military and political considerations therefore combined to make the issue of Ibo and southern Nigerian domination more threatening on The North, particularly on the grim prospects of what Ibos can and might do with their effective control of Nigeria in the light of existing trends of policies. In an effort to adjust for the existing circumstances by using military action, the method that produced Ibo and southern Nigerian advantages, the rank and file from the tribes in The North were enraged that their officers had let them down by allowing the January coup d'etat to occur and not at once take swift action to avenge it¹¹³. What alarmed the Northern combatant officers even more was that the Northern riflemen threatened and were prepared to effect a coup d'etat themselves in which they would deal with both Northern and Southern Army officers¹¹⁴. When it is accounted for the

fact that about two thirds of the rank and file in all the Battalions of the Nigerian Army, was M-Belt, it is not unreasonable to suggest that these pressures were essentially M-Belt pressures on Northern officers, again the majority of whom came from the M-Belt areas¹¹⁵. In Lagos, Apapa, Ikeja, Abeokuta and most particularly Ibadan, where there was a concentration of Northern soldiers, the rank and file were "rolling on the ground in sorrow" when they heard the death of Abogo Largema and Kur Mohammed who were both previous COs in the 4th Battalion at Ibadan¹¹⁶. Before impact with British influences, all the M-Belt groups, traditionally mourned their dead in this manner, even when new funeral ceremonies through the influence of Islam and Christianity had affected them. In other words, these soldiers were from among the M-Belt groups and societies. Furthermore, this felt identity on the death of Army officers, conditioned the fact that the soldiers were ready to obey orders only when Lt. Colonel Joseph Akahan, a Tiv Northerner from the M-Belt areas who understood their feelings of sorrow was appointed as the new CO to the 4th Battalion in Ibadan¹¹⁷.

There were also direct political pressures on the Northern officers which came from their relations and politicians in the North, to interpret the January coup d'etat in wider political terms rather than just the overthrow of a corrupt government which had resulted into the deaths of fellow Northern Officers. This line of persuasion was made credible in the context of Ibo political behaviour after the January coup and the political interests surrounding Decree No.34. Northern officers like Murtala Mohammed were relations of NPC politicians and businessmen like Inuwa Wada who was ready to use his personal wealth in order to increase his support in the Military¹¹⁸. Furthermore, in the period between January and the July 1966 coup d'etat, Joseph Tarka became close to Joe Akahan a fellow Tiv and from the discussions of the issue of the creation of the M-Belt Region and the state of politics in the country in general Akahan was able to introduce Tarka to General Gowon¹¹⁹. Other officers that were close in their

relations to top Northern politicians were also put under pressure "to do something" to retrieve the honour of The North - "Mutunci", which had been "eaten up" in the January coup d'etat¹²⁰. Furthermore, among the civil population of The North, there was hatred and derision that was directed at the Northern Army Officers. The civilian population was so hostile to Northern soldiers on the particular issue of overthrowing the Ironsi-Regime, to the extent that some top Northern public officers refused to socialize with the army officers and there were suggestions that parents of the wives' to the officers were to be pressurized to encourage their daughters to desert the soldier-husbands because they were cowards for failing to restore the honour ("mutinci") of the Northern people¹²¹. It was the combination of these pressures on Northern soldiers that produced the military action to overthrow the Ironsi-Regime during the Night of 28th July 1966.

However, it ought to be borne in mind that when Gowon, with the assistance of other Northern officers and men foiled the January coup they were indirectly effecting a coup themselves because they had the Army under control and Yakubu Gowon subsequently persuaded the soldiers to give their allegiance to Aguiyi-Ironsi and after restraining them from taking instant revenge on Ibo officers. Since Gowon and Northern officers could rally round the Army behind the command of Ironsi they equally could deploy the same capacity against him and that was exactly what happened after the regime committed political blunders. However, the overthrow of the Ironsi regime had to wait for both military and political timing if the need arose. This came when the Ironsi-Regime had demonstrated almost total incapacity to respond to the political inputs of the system and an increase of rumours about Ibo plans to eliminate all non-Ibos of age five and above to create a situation for the "Iboization" of Nigeria. The events that led to the overthrow of the Ironsi-Regime began with an argument in the officers-mess at Abeokuta in which two particular Northern officers,

Captains M. Remawa and D. Bali opposed disarming troops because of rumours of a coup. The rumours had heightened tensions between Northern and Ibo officers in the Garrison. The argument ended with the exchange of gun-fire and in the mutiny that resulted only Ibo officers were killed. This event in Abeokuta caused a chain reaction of military activity in Ikeja, Apapa, Lagos and very critically at Ibadan where Ironsi was on a visit and where he was captured by Northern troops and executed. Thereafter, a Northern officer travelled by road from Ibadan in the night to activate the coup in Kaduna¹²². The July 1966 coup was, therefore a series of poorly coordinated military operations. Unlike January 1966 when the plans for the coup had been put into operation simultaneously in Kaduna, Ibadan and Lagos, which suggest a high degree of planning and coordination, the July rebellion exhibited every sign of a lack of formal plan. However, the intention to overthrow Ironsi was by this time general among Northern officers, but the time and place may have been accidentally activated. This may be explained by the initial political differences in the identity within Northern troops themselves. Political identification with The North within the Army was initially not uniform among Northern soldiers, because many of the non-Islamic soldiers particularly the Tiv from the M-Belt areas, were as hostile to the political dominance of the Sardauna and the Northern Islamic elite as they were to Ibos and other Southern Nigerian groups in Nigerian politics¹²³. The abduction of General Aguiyi-Ironsi was, however carefully planned in conjunction with the 4th Battalion in Ibadan, where there was a Northern CO, Joe Akahan, who was Tiv and where there was also a predominance of the rank and file of the Army from The North, the majority of whom were Tiv¹²⁴. Joe Akahan was to freely deploy his troops in the July coup d'etat and further spoke out openly in support of the coup, suggesting that "Northern troops had their orders"¹²⁵, and congratulated the performance of his troops in capturing Ironsi as an end to "bloodshed, since events had now balanced out"¹²⁶. The success of the July coup

therefore is explained by the tie of tribal loyalties to acceptable military commanders and these combined to produce military action with the Northern political identity against a regime that alienated The North, particularly the Tiv and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt region. In the 4th Battalion in Ibadan, for example, reason and commitment to a political identity correlated with the occupants of the command structure, which enabled effective military action in the overthrow of the Ironsi-Regime. The July coup d'etat resulted in the deaths of General Ironsi (Ibo) and Colonel Fajuyi (Yoruba), the Military Governor of the Western Region¹²⁷. The coup also halted the unification drive of the military government. The victims of the coup d'etat were mainly Ibo Nigerian Army officers and men: of the 39 officers killed in the coup 27 were Ibo and of the 171 other ranks and file of the Army that also died, 154 were Ibos from the Eastern Region, besides Midwestern Ibos who also got killed in the coup¹²⁸.

The July 1966 coup d'etat was almost in all cases in the different units of the Nigerian army, carried out by men of the other ranks and file who were led by NCOs of Northern origin. In certain instances, the NCOs temporarily took over command from the commissioned officers. However, many of the commissioned officers of Northern origins, feeling militarily and politically aggrieved themselves, assisted in the coordination of the coup although some of them assisted fellow Ibo officers to escape death in the hands of the Northern rank and file in Ikeja, Apapa, Lagos, Ibadan, Kaduna and particularly in the 5th Battalion in Kano¹²⁹. It was, however Ibadan, Lagos, Abeokuta and Ikeja that were the focus of military activities in the July coup and the events in these centres activated the coup in Kaduna, Zaria and Kano. In Ibadan, the whole operation was under the leadership of Major Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma, a Christian Jukun who organized the neutralization of Ironsi¹³⁰. Also in Ibadan, Lt. Colonel Joseph Akahan, a Christian Tiv produced military support for the operations of the coup and

the overall coordination of officers and men as the CO of the 4th Battalion¹³¹. In Lagos, the coup was effected by almost all Northern officers, the key figures being Murtala Mohammed, a Hausa Muslim from Kano, Martin Adamu, an Ankwei Christian from the Plateau, S. Alao, a Christian Yoruba from Ilorin and Baba Usman. These officers commanded Northern units to take control of the LGO-Apapa and also ceased control of Ikeja. Lt. colonel (later general) Yakubu Gowon coordinated the military activities of the coup d'etat to overthrow the Ironsi-regime, from the central operations room at Army Headquarters in Apapa, where he was able to telephone through to Major (later General) Yakubu Danjuma: "To arrest the Supreme Commander ... but please make sure there is no bloodshed. We have had enough bloodshed. When you have done it ring me"¹³².

However, the July 1966 coup was planned by all officers of Northern origin, although ostensibly executed by M-Belt officers whose tribal origin correlated with that of the majority rank and file of the military units where, besides the use of the English language they easily understood each other with the Hausa language and these factors complemented obedience in the hierarchy of military command. These characteristics were particularly the case with the notorious 4th Battalion in Ibadan, where there was a near perfect "tribal" correlation between the top command structure and the NCOs and others in the ranks and file, many of whom were Tiv people and the Northern dominance of the 4th Battalion was given a boost by the existence of other non-Southern tribes in the Battalion. The ease with which Aguiyi-Ironsi was captured in Ibadan is explained by the loyalty which these characteristics produced within the Northern identity. In the processes of the coup, Ibos and other non-Northern tribes in the 4th Battalion were easily neutralized or disarmed. The officers of M-Belt origins who were directly involved in the July 1966 coup included: In Ibadan there was the active involvement of Joe Akahan (Tiv), Yakubu Danjuma (Jukun), William Walbe (Angas), Jeremiah Useini (Yergam), Ibrahim Bako

(Rukuba) and Onoja (Igalla); In Ikeja, Lagos(Yaba) and Apapa, there was active involvement of Yakubu Gowon (Angas - who became Head of State after the coup), P.C. Tarfa (Nupe), Martin Adamu (Ankwei), Paul Dickson (Idoma), Ochefu (Idoma), Joe Garba (Yergam), Clement Humbe (Tiv) and S. Agara (Tiv); In Abeokuta there was the active involvement of D. Bali; In Kaduna, M-Belt officers involved in the July coup included: B. J. Dimka (Angas), M. Wushishi (Bassange) and Nasco (Bassange)¹³³. Other Northern Army Officers from the Islamic society who were centrally involved in the July coup included: Murtala Mohammed (Hausa from Kano), Isa Bukur (Kanuri), Ibrahim Taiwo (Yoruba from Ilorin), Hassan Katsina (Hausa-Fulani from Katsina), Abba Kyari (Kanuri), Mohammed Shuwa (Kanuri) and Gora (Hausa from Kano)¹³⁴. However, of the 126 officers and men of the Nigerian Army from The North who were named by the Eastern Nigerian Region Government as the core participants in the July coup, about 70% of their total names were Christian and relate to have come from among the M-Belt groups¹³⁵. Furthermore, of the 52 commissioned officers of Northern origins that were central to the execution of the coup, about 58% were M-Belt officers¹³⁶. Most of these officers played important roles in the subsequent coups d'etat in Nigerian politics: Garba (Yergam), helped to announce the success of the 1975 coup against Gowon (Angas) to put the Murtala (Hausa) - Obasanjo (Yoruba) - Regime into power; in 1976 - B.S. Dimka (Angas), led an abortive coup that attempted the overthrow the above regime; in 1983 - Sani Abacha (Kanuri), announced the coup which brought the present Buhari (Hausa Fulani) Regime into power. However, it is from perceptions in the concentration of M-Belt officers and men in the ranks and file of the Nigerian Army in 1966 that James O'Connell suggests that Gowon was put into power by M-Belt NCOs and soldiers¹³⁷. The coup was however staged by the majority of the officers and men from the M-Belt groups initially with an explicit Northern political identity. In that period M-Belt political interests had not manifested themselves on the centre-stage to be

influential on the political area. The military action which the soldiers from the M-Belt groups took centred on the controversies surrounding the murders of their fellow officers, as much as, they were Northerners and officers of the Nigerian Army. The major cause of the coup d'etat in July however had been over inaction of Ironsi to deal with the January plotters. Thus, the very first words of Yakubu Danjunia upon the arrest of Aguiyi-Ironsi reflected the issue in the Government Guest House in Ibadan:

"You are under arrest. You organized the killing of our brother officers in January and you have done nothing to bring the so called dissident elements to justice because you were part and parcel of the whole thing ... You have been fooling us. I ran around risking my neck trying to calm the ranks and in February you told us that they would be tried. This is July and nothing has been done"¹³⁸.

There is, however, no doubt that there were political interests in the July 1966 coup, particularly in respect to how the Northern identity had been used in mobilizing reaction to Decree No.34, which was seen to give to Ibo and Southern Nigerian groups, advantages in the domination of political control of Nigeria and The North. The crunch of the political identity that had been used to overthrow the Ironsi-Regime came to a head when the success of the coup d'etat began to translate itself into the political objectives of the planners. Almost immediately the objectives of the coup became apparent, variation developed within the Northern political identity which became based on previous political lines in Nigerian politics before 15th January: some politicians and Army officers from the Islamic North maintained the principles of the NPC party while some, the pro-federation stand of the NPF alliance as was previously expressed by the UMBC party which stood for the interests of the non-Islamic groups and societies. This variation initially expressed itself over the choice of a leader for the soldiers who had overthrown the government of Ironsi, a choice that as would become apparent was conditioned by the balance of force in the

military control of soldiers with the monopoly of the instruments of coercion. It was this stalemate after the coup d'etat that was to condition the path toward either the secession of the North or the processes for the restoration of the Nigerian Federation after the unitary efforts of the government of Aguiyi-Ironsi. In the period between 15th January and July 1966, politicians from both the Islamic and M-Belt areas in the North had common cause to stand together in political opposition to the government of Ironsi, essentially, because of its location of political power among Ibos and other southern Nigerian groups. However when the overthrow of the Ironsi-Regime was successful, differences in political identity began to assert themselves between the Muslim majority and the minorities of the M-Belt areas, who were in control of the Army after July 1966 and these differences in The North began to be used for political purposes.

The January coup d'etat therefore had the demonstrative effect on M-Belt soldiers in the Nigerian Army in the sense that it effected a value change toward political relationships with the dominant groups in The North, largely derived from the way the Ibos had used force to overturn the system to its own advantages and reversed roles such that Ibos were more effective in participating in political decision making, particularly in policy areas where they were previously excluded. These perspectives of political power relationships which enjoyed the backing of military force however built up gradually among military and political leadership from among the M-Belt groups. Firstly, there was a collective identification with Northern interests and later, the M-Belt interests found expression within the context of the Northern identity in the demands for the subdivision of the Nigerian Federation in which the creation of a M-Belt Region was given support. The political processes in which there was this shift in identity from the Northern to the M-Belt, among the M-Belt leadership cut through the main currents of the unsettling events that determined the fate of the Nigerian Federation after the July 1966 coup

d'etat. These events included: I. The critical decision on the choice of who was to be leader, after the coup, in which case a pro-Federalist Military officer emerged in the person of Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon as the leader of Nigeria. Gowon was in this case the most senior Northern Army officer. II. The controversy on the secession of The North in which again with the influences of a reluctant M-Belt to go into secession with The North while still aspiring for the creation of the M-Belt Region, produced the options on Federating the North in a modified Nigeria. III. The Ad Hoc constitutional conference in which M-Belt pressures on the collective Northern position influenced the support for the creation of more units as states of the Nigerian Federation and IV. The subsequent Ibo led threat of secession in the Eastern Region of Nigeria, carrying along with it the unwilling oil rich minorities of COR movements which created the political atmosphere for the creation of a twelve state structure of the Nigerian Federation by General Yakubu Gowon on 27th May 1967. These main currents of political developments in the period between July 1966 and May 1967 and whose outcomes were determined by the nature and shape of M-Belt influences, particularly that in the remaining force of the UMBC party are briefly examined below until the creation of states on 27th May 1967 in which Benue-Plateau state was created among others.

Although the coup d'etat of July 1966 was successful in overthrowing the Ironsi-Regime and creating relief because retaliatory military measures were taken on Ibo Army officers and men in a way similar to how Northern officers had been killed in the January coup a leader for the new Nigerian Military regime did not emerge until two days after the coup. Thus, for example, although by the 29th July, political power was already firmly re-established by force in the hands of Northerners, it was not until on 1st August 1966 that General (at that time Lt. Colonel) Yakubu Gowon emerged as Head of the Nigerian armed forces. This was so, because contradictions developed in the initial objectives of the coup d'etat.

Gowon, having been in Lagos as Chief of Army Staff when the coup occurred and had been sent by Brigadier Ogundipe (the next ranking officer to Ironsi) to deal with the "rebels" at Ikeja went and found himself in the middle of the contradiction. On the one hand, there were officers who saw the Northern coup d'etat as a retaliatory measure against Ibos and Southern Nigerian officers and once the military measure was taken, it would be followed up by the breakup of the Federation, in which case The North would become an independent autonomous unit and exist as country of itself. The majority of Muslim officers of Northern origins, under the leadership of Lt. Colonel Murtala Mohammed, saw the July coup d'etat in these terms. Not only did this group send their families to The North, but also advised Northern Civil servants and others of Northern origin residing in Lagos to leave before a dateline. Many Northern civil servants actually left Lagos and were temporarily settled in Ilorin and Kaduna as well as other Northern towns on the edges of the border with Western Nigeria. Furthermore, a VC10 plane of the British Airways was detained by Northern officers at Ikeja Airport in order to air-lift the remaining families of the soldiers of Northern origins to Kano. Although almost all Northern soldiers were involved in this exercise, the group which ostensibly wished to cause the secession of The North was more under the leadership of Murtala Mohammed and Martin Adamu¹³⁹. On the other hand, within the general political mood of Northern secession after the July coup d'etat there was the group of Northern officers most of whom came from the M-Belt groups and societies who were opposed to the break up of the Nigerian Federation: "because their oath of commission into the Army was on allegiance to protect the territorial integrity of the country"¹⁴⁰. Yakubu Gowon, who articulated these views at the meeting of Northern officers in Dodon Barracks, subsequently assumed the leadership of the group. The M-Belt officers who shared the same views with him, in the rather lively political debate that took place in Dodon Barracks, included Joe Akahan, Yakubu

Danjuma and Joseph Garba as well as several other subalterns of Northern origins from the Brigade of Guards in Lagos and others who had come down from Ibadan¹⁴¹. As much as this group also saw the coup d'etat in terms of retribution on the pains and losses caused by the January 15th coup it wished to see Nigerians negotiate their political existence after the 'January Majors' and their associates had been punished. Only when there was no solution to the unity of the existing units in the federation in the light of existing political experiences, was there to be some kind of confederal arrangement or total disintegration.

The delay that surrounded the assumption of leadership of Nigeria by any single Northerner or group of Northerners after 29th July 1966, when it was apparent that the government of Ironsi had been overthrown was largely caused by the variations of the political intentions of these two groups and at the same time, because each of the groups had not established loyalty over the rank and file to its side. The rank and file remained in a mutinous state with gross indiscipline in the Army, long after the overthrow of the Ironsi-Regime to the extent that the Provost Marshall Major Ekanem was shot dead on 1st August when apparently on an errand for Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, himself¹⁴². Furthermore the Northern soldiers had also created a situation in which they would not obey orders from any Southern Nigerian Army officers and were opposed to a Southerner being the Head of a Military government. After the overthrow of the Ironsi-Regime for example, the next highest ranking officer of the Nigerian Army, who attempted to take control of the Armed forces was Brigadier Ogundipe¹⁴³. He was subsequently forced into resignation and on 31st August, 1966, left Nigeria to seek refuge in England when he discovered that the Nigerian crisis had created a perfect correlation between the Northern political identity and the Command - Compliance Structure of the Nigerian Army: Northern ranks and file in the Nigerian Army only obeyed orders from Northern officers. It remained therefore for Northern troops to choose a

Head of State for Nigeria, although they were bent on packing up and returning to the North. It would appear that the choice was to be either Lt. Colonel Murtala Mohammed who had been very active in coordinating the coup in Ikeja and Lagos areas and had rallied troops behind him with the assistance of Majors Baba Usman, S. A. Alao (HQ. NAF) and Captain Isa Bukar or Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon who had similarly coordinated the coup and kept in touch with the progress of events in the military units both in Lagos area and more distant areas like, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Kaduna, Kano and Enugu, as the Chief of Army Staff and the most Senior Northern Army Officer. It was apparent after the July coup d'etat that besides the important consideration of military seniority over Murtala Mohammed, Gowon had more officers and men under his influence to command, than was the case with Murtala Mohammed. His influence was particularly significant with officers and men of the Federal Guard troops and in the 4th Battalion in Ibadan, consisting of M-Belt men in the ranks and file, under Joe Akahan and Yakubu Danjuma, whom he had ordered from Lagos to capture and neutralize Ironsi and Fajuyi¹⁴⁴. Furthermore, it may not be unreasonable to assume that Gowon himself as Chief of Army Staff in the short period between January and July 1966, had developed skills and knowledge of "coup matters", having controlled the findings and the report of the enquiry on the January coup d'etat staged by 'Ibo Majors'.

However, Gowon became leader after Brigadier Ogundipe ordered him to approach the "rebellious" troops at Ikeja, to find out the exact nature of their grievances and report back to him¹⁴⁵. When Gowon arrived at Ikeja with these orders, the soldiers siezed him and virtually "arrested" him for two reasons: As the most Senior Northern Army Officer, they wanted him to take over the command of an Army that was predominantly Northern and once he became Commander of the most powerful instrument of coercion in Nigeria, they wanted him to be their spokesman, ostensibly in the interest of the declaration of secession of the North. Initially, Gowon was sympathetic to

Northern soldiers at Ikeja and appears to have supported their reasons and commitment to the causes of ideas of Northern secession. He, however, refrained from endorsing them in the strong terms that Murtala Mohammed already did, who infact had assumed leadership of the rebels at Ikeja, before Gowon arrived¹⁴⁶. In the period between 29th and 31st July 1966, when the Northern Civil Servants pressurized Gowon to take over military and political leadership, he was concerned to do so only after Northern soldiers had been persuaded to drop their propositions of Northern secession and political intentions of breaking up The Federation¹⁴⁷. This became particularly crucial to him in the context of the challenge and rivalry over leadership which had developed from Lt. Colonel Murtala Mohammed¹⁴⁸. It was based on this problem and the demands of Northern Civil Servants to have more discussions with the soldiers that the negotiations moved from Ikeja to Dodon Barracks. The new demands were also intended to establish a more broadly based Northern decision by seeking the opinions of Northern Army Officers and Civil Servants who had converged on Kaduna under the leadership of Hassan Katsina¹⁴⁹. In Lagos the political position of Gowon on the preservation of the Nigerian Federation was complemented by the support of some eight Northern Civil Servants who were largely organized by Sule Katagum (Hausa Fulani) the Chairman of the Nigerian Public Service Commission and Mr Atta (an Igbirra), the Federal Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Finance. There was also support for the preservation of the Federation after the July coup from Kam Salem (a Kanuri), who was the acting Inspector General of Police, Justice Bello (a Hausa Fulani), a Northern Judge of the Supreme Court, M. D. Yusufu (Hausa Fulani), Head of the Special Branch, Nigeria Police. The Gowon-Military-Group of Northern Officers which was already supported by the Northern Civil Servants in Lagos also gained support from Adetokumboh Ademola (Yoruba), the Chief Justice of the Federation, as well as some, other Southern Nigerian Civil Servants, predominantly from the Mid-Western

Region, a minorities area whose independent authority from the Western Region was achieved barely three years before the coup d'etat since it was created as a unit of the Federation in 1963.

For a number of political reasons before the Dodon Barracks meeting however Lt. Colonel (later General) Yakubu Gowon clearly emerged as the spokesman and the critical factor among the Northern Army Officers on the political interestss surrounding the preservation of the Nigerian Federation.

Although not yet quite clear in the extent of influence as a political force in the negotiations that took place in Dodon Barracks on the fate of the Nigerian Federation there were differences among Northern Soldiers in loyalties to Gowon and Murtala Mohammed. These differences had roots in the conception of the political and social meaning given by the troops to "Yan-Arewa-Yan Gida" (Northern Sons-Home Sons). On the one hand, all Northern Soldiers shared the sentiments of being Northern ("Yan Arewa") and on the other hand, within that conception and significantly distinctive in terms of military loyalties, soldiers from the M-Belt areas saw each other as "Yan Gida", not hostile to Muslims, but with sufficient coherence that it constituted a sub-group culture within the Northern identity. The conception however assumed a distinction in social and political identity which placed Gowon (Christian Angas from a minorities area) in a position of advantage over Murtala Mohammed (Muslim Hausa from a majorities area), by producing loyalties from both sides of an aggrieved North with the minorities dominating and controlling the instruments of coercion after July 1966. In the controversies surrounding the negotiations on the political objectives of the July coup d'etat and after Gowon became Head of State, social conceptions of "Yan-Gida" increasingly assumed subtle political distinctions in the patterns of identification among soldiers from the M-Belt groups, the majority of whom were Christians. This increasingly contrasted with and eroded assumptions of the monolithicism

in the concept of "Yan Arewa" (Northern Sons). This, however, did not destroy identification with that conception. In July 1966, "Yan Arewa" fundamentally referred to Northerners and the Northern identity in general terms, while "Yan Gida" (Home sons) became used by M-Belt soldiers in reference to themselves within the Nigerian Army. Thus, for example, while Gowon openly asserted to be "another Northerner", who has taken over control of political power of Nigeria, M-Belt officers and men, saw him first and foremost as their own man: "Dan Gida" (Home son) as well as "Dan Arewa" (Northern son). In the July coup d'etat, however, Gowon was clearly concerned over Northern interests rather than M-Belt or other Nigerian minority interests and indeed the Nigerian national identity seemed to have been submerged by the Northern identity until in September 1966, when he shifted political emphasis from regional to National solidarity in emphasis of preservation of the Nigerian Federation. In the instance, Gowon openly made statements on the creation of states as a means of preserving the Federation and the interests in the creation of a M-Belt Region were reinvigorated. Gowon himself admitted that he was "another Northerner" but in an important sense it was the soldiers who imposed the identity on him. To restore discipline in the Army, therefore, Gowon accepted the image of the Northern identity and in very subtle ways the M-Belt minorities identity and the soldiers were loyal to him as he himself acknowledged:

"Those soldiers were very loyal to me... but it was military discipline and loyalty rather than 'a Middle Belt tribal identity' or 'a Northern Identity'¹⁵⁰.

Gowon is very ambivalent on the political identities he manipulated in July 1966 until he had stabilized the Nigerian Federation by the clear cut policy of State creation. If, as he suggests, for example, the soldiers were loyal to him because of military discipline outside the context of a specific identity, then any other military officer might have been able to exercise

authority in the military hierarchy to stop the 4th Battalion and other Northern troops in Ibadan and Lagos areas, from the killings of non-Northerners that resulted from the July coup d'etat. The conceptions of both "Yan Arewa" and "Yan Gida" produced fanatical loyalty among the soldiers for Gowon, not only as a Head of State of Nigeria, but in the very nature of his person as an individual, right from the critical moments at Dodon Barracks in July 1966 and through the Civil War until his overthrow in July 1975. However, by May 1967, when Gowon created states in Nigeria, Lt. Colonel Murtala Mohammed had lost much of his support in the Army by the polarity of identities within the Northern troops. This was largely so, because the M-Belt officers and men in particular, were not prepared to countenance any challenge to the leadership of Gowon¹⁵¹. Furthermore, many M-Belt soldiers did not take it lightly, when Murtala Mohammed unsuccessfully challenged the appointment of Joe Akahan, as Chief of Army Staff, seemingly based on the ideas that, since the Head of State and Supreme Commander of the Army, Gowon, came from the M-Belt areas, the Chief of Staff, ought to come from soldiers from the Islamic Society in the North. However, a purely political reason which caused Murtala Mohammed to lose military support from the Northern troops, was that while he eventually supported a strong Federation behind the scenes at the Ad Hoc Conferences in 1966, he failed to show great enthusiasm for the ideas of the creation of new states in which a M-Belt Region was anticipated¹⁵².

The concept of "Yan Gida" was a prerogative that was preciously nurtured by soldiers of the Federal Brigade of Guards, Lagos, after July 1966, until it was politically misused in 1976 by Lt. Colonel B. S. Dimka in an attempted coup d'etat that caused the death of Murtala Mohammed and the executions of over thirty officers and men of the Nigerian Army, most of them from the M-Belt areas. This resulted into a very large scale re-organization of the Nigerian Army to the extent that all the Units consisted of a "mixture" of the Nigerian tribes such that it is difficult

for a specific group identity to develop within the ranks beyond that of a military formation. In very many ways, besides the overt mention of name, therefore, the Dimka abortive coup d'etat was based on military loyalties that were held for Yakubu Gowon and the supposed political coherence within the Nigerian Army which the "Yan-Gida" concept had developed and was assumed to have achieved coherence for political action,

In July 1966, however, the main concern of the Northern Civil Servants that were still in Lagos and the few Southern Nigerian groups who still believed in the existence of the Federation, was to persuade Gowon against the secession of the North. In the process, they highlighted the socio-economic and political disadvantages of secession for the North. The British High Commissioner and the American Ambassador in Lagos, who attended the meetings at Dodon Barracks, in conjunction with expatriate officers (mainly British) in the North who were clearly influencing the military officers and Civil Servants in Kaduna, also advised Gowon against the secession of the North. The Northern officers discussing the fate of the Nigerian Federation at Dodon Barracks, Lagos were in constant telephone contact with the Kaduna group. The group, which was based at the official residence of the Military Governor at Kaduna among others, consisted of Hassan Katsina (Hausa Fulani Muslim), Abba Kyari (Kanuri Muslim), A. R. Alabi (Muslim Mid-Westerner), B. S. Dimka (Angas Christian), Sani Abacha (Kanuri Muslim), M. I. Wnshishi (Bassange Christian) Mohammed Shuwa (Kanuri Muslim and CO of 5th Battalion in Kano) as well as top Civil Servants among whom was Joly Tanko Yusufu (a Jukun Christian and President of the NCA). Similar to the group in Lagos, some military officers and a few Civil Servants insisted on the dissolution of the Federation¹⁵³. The majority of the Civil Servants including Joly Tanko Yusufu however opposed dissolution of the Nigerian Federation¹⁵⁴. The opposition group was of the view that since the North had secured military and political control of the government in Lagos:

"it should not hand over on a platter of gold to other people. The least that could be done was to keep (the Federation), and if necessary preside over its liquidation"¹⁵⁵.

The Kaduna group, similar to the ranks and file in Lagos, insisted on a Northerner being the Head of State and Supreme Commander, an issue on which they could not compromise. It was this group that highlighted the grim point on Northern secession, suggesting that it might produce an opportunity for a Southern Nigerian Army Officer to assume control of the government of the Federation as Head of State of Nigeria and invite foreign troops in the name of a rebellion, to crush Northern troops¹⁵⁶. This line of persuasion was made credible by references to Brigadier Ogiendipe (before he left for England on 31st July 1966), the next Army Officer in rank to Ironsi, who was possibly looking for such opportunity¹⁵⁷. After the assumption of power by Gowon, Ogiendipe travelled 'incognito' on a passenger boat to London and subsequently took-up the position of Nigerian High Commissioner. It was these arguments that persuaded the pro-secessionist forces to rally support around Yakubu Gowon and stopped the declaration of secession with a rather poorly modified original draft of the speech by Northern Civil Servants in Lagos¹⁵⁸. Underlying the hesitations of Northerners to declare secession and in the political calculations that were too open to contemplate, however, was the fundamental fact of a pro-Federation Lt. Colonel (later General) Yakubu Gowon at the head of a political army, whose members were from the M-Belt, an area in itself that was a microcosm of the socio-political and economic tensions of the Nigerian Federation. Gowon and many other Northerners: both Military and Civil Officers and indeed most people with any knowledge of the North, knew very well the centrifugal forces within the North itself. Once the troops carried out their threat to withdraw from Lagos and Southern Nigeria, there might be nothing left to hold these forces in check, particularly so in the way the soldiers were already politicized on issues on Nigerian

politics¹⁵⁹. It was from political considerations like these that Gowon made up his mind to accede to the demand of the bureaucrats if and only if the men could be persuaded to desist from their position of breaking up the Federation by secession of the north¹⁶⁰. Late on the 31st July 1966 after Northern soldiers had forced Brigadier Ogendipe to resign and had taken a ship to England, Gowon finally made up his mind to assume the leadership of the nation and the Army in which the political nature of the soldiers he inherited was fundamental in shaping the decision on interests to preserve the Federation of Nigeria¹⁶¹. On 1st August 1966, Gowon told Nigerians in a broadcast as Head of State and Supreme Commander:

"the basis for trust and confidence in our unitary system of government has been unable to stand the test of time... suffice to say that putting all considerations to test, political, economic as well as social, the basis of unity is not there, or is so badly rocked not only once but several times... we should review the issue of our national standing and see if we can help the country from drifting away into utter destruction... a decree will soon be issued to lay a sound foundation of this objective... I shall do all I can to return to civil rule as soon as it can be arranged. I also intend to pursue most vigourously the question of the release of political prisoners"¹⁶².

In this maiden broadcast therefore Gowon committed himself to conciliate three basic interests that almost instantly reduced the high political temperature in the country: preservation of the Federation for all Nigerians centred on a collective review of political arrangements; the release of political prisoners affecting the Yoruba and Mid-Western leadership whose Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Antony Enahoro were still in prison; and most particularly he was conciliating Tarka, the UMBC party and Tiv soldiers in the Nigerian Army whose associates were in prison, an issue that Ironsi failed to exploit when he was in power. The Tiv who comprised some 20% of rifle-men of the Nigerian army, supported Yakubu Gowon and

emerged as a most important element in the political process¹⁶³.

After 1st August 1966, when it became apparent that Gowon had established political control, events moved rapidly for the restoration of the Federation and the promised review of the constitution. On 3rd August 1966, he ordered the release of Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Enahoro, which was followed with the release of Michael Okpara from detention on 4th August¹⁶⁴. After appeasing the South, he shifted to the North, where on the 17th August 1966, he ordered the release of Tiv political prisoners, who took part in the Tiv riots of 1964 and had been in prison since that time¹⁶⁵. The offences of the political prisoners were in most instances tied to the political interests of the demands for a Federal system for Nigeria, in which the existing Regions were to be subdivided into smaller units. This was particularly so for the Tiv political prisoners in the North, where the Tiv riots were connected to the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region that was articulated by the UMBC party under the leadership of Joseph Tarka. More significant for the direction of political developments of Nigeria to re-Federation, however, on 31st August 1966, Gowon signed Decree No. 59 which restored the Federal system of government with four Regions.

III. The Ad Hoc Constitutional Conferences of 1966 and the creation of States on 27th May, 1967.

The month of September 1966, opened up with the politics of re-arranging the Nigerian Federation, which Gowon earlier indicated on 8th August, 1966 would be by a Constitutional Review Assembly. The Assembly was meant to make political recommendations that were suitable for the plural system of Nigeria in a forum with delegates representative of opinions from the previously existing regions before the coup d'etat of January 15th and Decree No. 34 of the Ironsi Regime¹⁶⁶.

The more direct political influences of the M-Belt movement were apparent in the political developments after the July coup d'etat. These centered on the political pressures produced on both the 'Leaders of thought' movement in the North and officers and men of the Nigerian Army from among the M-Belt groups, particularly those of them that were Tiv. The M-Belt politicians having given support to the cause of the Northern identity were admitted into the central arena of political power in the North, where they renewed the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region. After the establishment of authority by Gowon and the provisions of Decree No. 59, a series of political opinion circles developed in all the units of the Nigerian Federation which were known as Regional "Leaders of thought" which met from time to time to discuss the 1966 Nigerian crisis in each of the Regional capitals: Kaduna in the North, Enugu in the East and Ibadan in the West¹⁶⁷. In the period between January and August 1966 and before the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conferences were began in Lagos, Northern politician's had built up themselves into an over all 'Common Front' which was easily converted into the Northern 'Leaders of thought' movement, largely developed from the sharp polarity produced by the killings of January and the political meaning of Decree No. 34 in context of socio-economic and political interests of the North. As early as in April 1966, for example, Joseph Tarka, Aminu Kano and Maitama Sule of the old NPC party met in Kano considering that they faced a common threat of Ibo tribal domination over Nigeria¹⁶⁸. Indeed, because of the political association of Tarka with these politicians and largely deriving from the assumptions in the political parrarels of the Tiv riots, after the May 1966 riots, in which some Ibos were killed in the North, Ironsi thought of detaining him on the mistaken information that he was in some way responsible, while infact, Tarka and the Tor Tiv kept the peace in Gboko and Makurdi¹⁶⁹. However, in August 1966, Tarka was called to constitute one of the members of the 'Leaders of thought' Conference at Kaduna and there, he soon found

political support from his former opponents and persecutors from the M-Belt areas¹⁷⁰. These opponents of Joseph Tarka had functioned, before January 15th, as political clients of the Sardauna and such, stood for the preservation of "One North" as against the creation of a M-Belt Region. With the leadership vacuum that the death of the Sardauna created, there was re-alignment of support toward Joseph Tarka in the cause of a M-Belt Region,. Both Orodi (a Tiv brother-in-law and Joly Tanko Yusufu (a Jukun and the former NPC Provincial Commissioner for Benue) supported him in asking for the creation of states in the North as part of the political strategy in the preservation of the Nigerian Federation¹⁷¹. The proposals of Tarka for the creation of states in Nigeria, including the subdivision of the North put to Northern Leaders of thought in Kaduna, were subsequently accepted and from within that Assembly, Tarka was chosen as one of the three Northern delegates to go to the Ad Hoc Conference in Lagos with Aminu Kano as adviser¹⁷². The choice of Joseph Tarka was due to both military and civilian political pressures and support¹⁷³. The military pressures, for example, were sufficiently profound for the Northern leaders of thought at one stage demanded from Army headquarters in Lagos the tribal break-down of Northern officers and men in the Nigerian Army, only to discover that the bulk of the rifle-men came from groups in the M-Belt areas, particularly from among the Tiv; and those that came from outside the M-Belt areas were Zuru Christians from the southern parts of Sokoto. It was further pointed out at the Northern Leaders of thought meetings at Kaduna, that Officers and men of the Nigerian Army, mainly those of them from the M-Belt areas, supported the political ideas of Joseph Tarka for the creation of a M-Belt Region or State and the subdivision of the existing Regions into smaller units of the Nigerian Federation¹⁷⁵. Within the North, therefore, altruistic political demands by leadership of the UMBC party for the creation of a M-Belt Region, were complemented by military demands and support.

When the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference assembled in Lagos on 12th September 1966, the Northern delegation consisted of Kashim Ibrahim (the leader of the delegation and a Muslim Kanuri NPC), Buba Ardo (Fulani Muslim NPC), J. S. Tarka (a Tiv Christian and former UMBC party leader) and Aminu Kano (Hausa Fulani Muslim and leader of the radical NEPU party, as adviser to the delegates)¹⁷⁶. Other delegates that were in Lagos in September 1966 for the Ad Hoc Conference included: the Western Region - Chief Awolowo, Dr. Oluwusamia and O. Akinfosile; the Mid-Western Region - Chief Enahoro, Onyia and Dr. Odie; the Eastern Region - Dr. Eni Njoku, Mojekwu and Edem; the Lagos Federal Territory - T. O. Elias and L. Jakande¹⁷⁷. In an address to the delegates on 12th September, 1966, Gowon indicated his intentions to maintain the Federation of Nigeria and with a covert principle for its subdivision into smaller units when he states:

"We must not minimize the advantages that will derive from our remaining together as one strong political and economic entity... we can find ways and means of eliminating fear and restoring trust and confidence as well as mutual love and respect among our people... consider and recommend in broad outlines the form of political association which the country should adopt in future... discounting the tendencies to extreme unification that a country as big as Nigeria and comprising such diversity of tribes and cultures cannot be administered successfully under a unitarian form of Government... It is very clear to me that it will be economically and politically suicidal to harbour any idea of a complete break-up of the Federation. Therefore, we seem to be left with the alternative of (among others)... the distribution of powers as between the regional Governments and the central government; the territorial division of the country... Two things for the present exercise I feel should be ruled out viz: complete break-up; a unitary form of Government"¹⁷⁸.

As a political strategy in the context of the uncertainties on the survival of the Nigerian Federation, which were prevailing in 1966, none of the existing Nigerian Regions, except for the Mid-Western Region, seemed to

have had a committed stable policy on the creation of more states and to wish to implement the policy guide-lines in the speech of Gowon.

The Mid-Western position in the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference was dominated by the political views of the non-Ibo educated elite in the Region. These views were organized under the leadership and articulation of Chief Enahoro, who was advised by Dr. Billy Dudley, at that time a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Ibadan. The Mid-West, like their counter parts in the North were aware of the centrifugal forces, inherent in the Region. They were also conscious of the threat which would be posed by their neighbours, particularly the East, with 16% of its Ibo speaking members in the Mid-West and the West with a substantial Yoruba population in Akoko-Edo areas of the Region¹⁷⁹. In the specific content of these threats therefore the Mid-West depended for their 'survival' on the continuance of the Nigerian Federation, right from the start of the conference until the Ad Hoc meetings were suspended indefinitely. This position was succinctly put by its leading spokesmen, Chief Enahoro:

"I would like to open, as I would close, that the Mid-Western Nigerian delegation believe that the answer to Nigeria's problems lie in a Federation (belief in a Federation of Nigeria); not withstanding the situation which has emerged or which appears to be emerging at this conference in the last few days. We do not abandon that stand. We believe in a Federation and we do not think that because we cannot have a strong Federation, we cannot, therefore, have a Federation at all"¹⁸⁰.

Unlike the Mid-West, the political position of the Western Region during the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conferences was guided by the historical demands that all Yoruba should enjoy a monopoly of power in "territory" they claimed to be theirs. As a strategy, therefore, just before the Ad Hoc Conference, the Western Chiefs and Leaders of thought elected Chief Awolowo as 'Leader of the Yorubas' in all of Nigeria¹⁸¹. Within the pan-Yoruba political interests, however, there were people who wanted to see Lagos

created into a state within the framework of a reconstituted and restructured Federal system, but were not importantly influential in the dominant trend of opinion in the West among the Yoruba. The West and delegates from Lagos, therefore, advocated a confederal arrangement in preference to the existing state but were willing to negotiate a possible future state in which:

"What is now the Federation of Nigeria should become a 'Commonwealth of Nigeria' comprising the existing Regions and such other regions as may be subsequently created, with Lagos forming part of the present Western Nigeria"¹⁸².

The most extreme position was taken by the Ibo speaking peoples of the Eastern Region, largely from the strong influence of Ibo dons at the University of Ibadan, under the direction and organization of Professor Modebe, who became personal adviser to Ojukwu¹⁸³. Although the initial demands of the Ibo intelligentsia was secession, because of the murders of Ironsi and Ibo Army officers and men and the May 1966 killings of many Ibos in the North, as well as, the recriminations which accompanied their loss of political power at the centre of the Nigerian Federation, it was subsequently moderated into a confederal preference. This was clearly put by its Chief spokesman, Professor Eni Njoku: "the sort of association we envisage is therefore one which will be very loose indeed"¹⁸⁴. Based on their bitter political feelings therefore, the Ibo made a huge political leap from a Unitary System, they wished for Nigeria to a Confederal system and subsequently attempted secession with the Eastern Region. Within the Ibo led political position of the Eastern Region in the Ad Hoc Conference, however, there were strong demands for the creation of states in the south and south-eastern parts of Ibo land where there were socio-economic and political minorities. After 27th May 1967, a number of political leaders from the minorities areas in the East managed to escape and found their way to Lagos, where they became a strong pressure group with the Federal

Government. The strong demands for the creation of states came from both the minorities areas of Calabar-Ogoja and the Rivers areas (COR) and were articulated within the Nigerian army by Lt. Colonel Ekpo, the Military Secretary to the SMC¹⁸⁵. Furthermore, during the Ad Hoc Conference, there was strong lobbying for the creation of states for the COR areas, which resulted into a set of memoranda being sent to the Conference by the Rivers Natural Rulers of Eastern Nigeria, the Calabar-Ogoja Community, by E. O. Eyo and others of Calabar Province and by a Mr M. A. McElfie of Lagos University¹⁸⁶. All these demanded the political subdivision of the East as units of the Nigerian Federation, such that non-Ibos are separated from the dominant Ibo position in the Region.

At the Conference, there was a strange volte-face by the Northern delegation. It brought forward confederal proposals as a form of political association for the persistence of Nigeria as a country, modelled on the East African Common Services Organization¹⁸⁷. This was so, despite the initial political assurances of the 'Northern Leaders of Thought' to Joseph Tarka, that a Federation with a strong centre was to be negotiated during the Conference in Lagos. The volte-face apparently came about because just before the Conference Ojukwu telephoned Hassan Katsina to ask him to keep the states issue out of the Conference¹⁸⁸. However, this was also the political position of the powerful Northern figures, who did not wish to see the dismemberment of the Region, rather than the influence of Ojukwu on Hassan Katsina. Although Joseph Tarka, as the leader and spokesman of the demands of the creation of states to benefit Northern minorities, was personally hostile to the new proposals, for unclear reasons, he subscribed to the Northern political propositions that were taken to Lagos from Kaduna¹⁸⁹. Isaac Kpum, an independently minded politician and a strong supporter of Joseph Tarka on the political ideas of the UMBC party, also added his voice in support for the creation of states and suggesting that there should be no sell-out.

However, when the talks began in Lagos, a military pressure group of some officers and men in the Nigerian army from the M-Belt areas, was organized to contest the political issue of the creation of states in the North, albeit in Nigeria and for Federation with a strong political centre. This group was led by formidable military figures like the Tiv Lt. Ichovo¹⁹⁰. The main link between the political and military pressure group within the Nigerian army that had developed in Lagos during the Ad Hoc Conference and Gowon as Head of State and the SMC, was in two senior Northern army officers from the M-Belt areas: Joe Akahan (a Tiv Christian) and Yakubu Danjuma (a Jukun Christian)¹⁹¹. The political interests of the group of M-Belt officers and men, who were daily gaining in the realization of their new position of power, were to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the Northern stand in the Ad Hoc Conference and sponsor the production of a new document, which forced the Northern delegation to change its position from confederation to one of maintenance of Federal power and the creation of more Regions/States¹⁹². Colonel Murtala Mohammed, who had been the advocate of the breaking away of the North in the July 1966 coup d'etat, was instructed in September, to tell the Northern delegation that the army did not accept confederalism¹⁹³. The Northern delegation, therefore, changed its views and submitted another memorandum in which there was provision for the creation of states. This provision was suggested through the Chairman of the Northern delegation to Lagos, Kashim Ibrahim, who stated:

"My delegation is convinced that Nigeria should not be allowed to disintegrate... The Conference may wish to note that this represents a modification of our stand as indicated in the original memo... To embody the right of secession of any part of this country from the rest is to invite a break-up of the country. Accordingly, the relevant section in our memo is, therefore, withdrawn. In order to allay the fears of domination by sections of the country, the principle of creation of states must be agreed. A system of ascertaining

the wishes of the people of areas where demands for creation of states have been made should be devised and these wishes should be ascertained and states created in the areas concerned before the administration of this country is returned to civilian hands. In this connection my delegation recommends very strongly that a machinery should be adopted in the light of present Nigerian circumstances for ascertaining the demands for the creation of more states"¹⁹⁴.

It would seem that political leadership of the North, which came from the Islamic society was displeased by the military pressures from the M-Belt areas that had caused modification of the political position on the issue of state creation. The systematic massacres of Ibos in September and October 1966 that followed may be seen as mobilized Northern mass protest at the loss of political control over the direction of political development by leadership of the Islamic society in the North, which disrupted the Ad Hoc Conference. By the very nature of the spread of the violence, they were organized and meant to demonstrate a falsified unity of the North as still capable of acting as one in its interests. The organization and funds for the massacres were provided by a combination of the former politicians and traditionalists, most of whom had connections with Northern merchants, who resented Ibo competition and thought that in terms of the new political scheme of things, this competition would grow more intense¹⁹⁵. In all the urban centres of the North, Ibos were summarily killed by some indigenes of the North. The number of Ibo persons killed is estimated variously as up to 10,000, besides other persons of Eastern Nigerian origins¹⁹⁶. However, during the civil war, the 'Biafran authorities' claimed that as many as 30,000 Ibos had been killed in the North. A reasonable estimate is put at eight hundred Ibos perishing in the first round of killings in May and as many as six to eight thousands in September 1966¹⁹⁷. The killings were not spontaneous, since infact they had their activating forces of thugs, mostly Hausa Fulani Muslims, who travelled and carried wild rumours on the issues affecting Nigerian

politics at that time, which threatened Northern interests. There were rumours, for example, that war, was to be fought between the rest of the country and the East in which Ibos will get military support from Israel and the USA; that Ibos in the North had poisoned the water supplies and had prepared to blow-up important buildings in the North and Nigeria; that Northern traders had been killed at Onitsha, Aba and Owerri; that Tiv students at the University of Nsukka had had their eyes gouged out; that J.C. Obande (an Idoma) had been killed at Enugu; that a train coach load of Birom dead from the East stood at Bukuru Station¹⁹⁸. The rumours most of them untrue, produced strong anti-Ibo sentiments and with these, people acted and collectively killed Ibos. The killings began slowly and accompanied by looting of Ibo property in Kaduna, Minna, Makurdi, Jos and Gboko earlier in September 1966, gathered a terrible momentum and ended in a final blood bath in Kano on October, 1, with the unruly participation of the 1st Battalion units, which were previously stationed at Enugu¹⁹⁹. One of the explanations of the participation of men of the 1st Battalion, suggests that they were urged by other troops of the 5th Battalion and politicians "to do something" for the North, since they had done nothing in the January and July 1966 coups d'etat²⁰⁰. In the period between 28th and 30th September 1966, the whole of the North was ablaze and the fires were directed at the Ibos. The killings sporadically continued on the Plateau as in other parts of the North, until January, 1967 when dead bodies could still be seen by the main roads.

After the September 1966 massacres of the Ibo tribe in the North and the break-down of the Ad Hoc Conference, the Federal Government and colonel Yakubu Gowon seemed to seek to resolve the conflicts in the country through a compromise approach to politics, a procedure which infact Gowon not only consistently followed but which also seems to have suited his nature and temperament. Indeed, at a personal level, and right from July 1966, Gowon was all along in favour of a federalist position and of the creation of

more Regions/States²⁰¹. Thus, when he adjourned the Ad Hoc conference indefinitely in September after the departure of the Eastern delegation, he made it clear in mid-October 1966 that: "Nigeria shall continue as a political entity with the central authority having all the paraphernalia of an effective government"²⁰². On 30th November 1966, he further made a Radio Broadcast announcing that his long term aim was the preservation of "One Nigerian Army and One Country"²⁰³; that he envisaged a constitutional solution to the political problems of Nigeria, which would include the creation of at least eight and not more than fourteen new states or regions; that he would set up a new Constituent Assembly and that he would have the Assembly discuss a prepared draft of the constitution on federal lines, rather than allowing it to formulate its own proposals²⁰⁴. In this firmer new political initiative which was largely in response to Army and Civil Service pressures Gowon backed the policy out-line with a threat: "If circumstances compel me to preserve the integrity of Nigeria by force, I shall do my duty by my country"²⁰⁵. In the new policy of restructuring the Nigerian Federation, Gowon further made the issue of State creation obvious, when he indicated that no single Region was to be in a dominant political position, relative to other units in territorial and population size²⁰⁶.

By the end of 1966, therefore, the outlined policies of Gowon, satisfied the political demands of minorities and the organizational pressures from the military. The policy on state creation, however, did not find its way into the agenda for discussions at Aburi in Ghana, where the Supreme Military council met on 4th-5th January 1967²⁰⁷. This is explained by the fact that Aburi was seen by Gowon, as well as by other members of the SMC, except Ojukwu, as a military rather than a political arena, where purely military matters that had caused the political problems in Nigerian politics, might be discussed in order to restore a unified command structure in the Nigerian Army. It was after the Aburi experience that the

question of the location of political and military authority had to be resolved in the exercise of power by Gowon if he was to maintain the Federation. Thus the experience of Aburi, revealed that the fate of the Nigerian Federation was intimately tied up to the issue of the creation of states in order to maintain the Federation and to undermine the secessionist stand of Ojukwu. The SMC-Aburi meeting and its aftermath was, however, an important stop-gap in the political search to restore the Federal system of Government in Nigeria and the consolidation of the demands for the creation of states as more units of the Federation. The Aburi document itself, contained internal inconsistencies; on the one hand, they were confederal settlements, while on the other, they appeared to advocate going back to the Federal balance as on 14th January 1966, before the coup d'etat.

In the period between January and April 1967, when political controversy on the interpretations of the Aburi agreements ensued and became public knowledge, there began intensive underground manoeuvring and realignments of previous political positions and interests that characterized the Ad Hoc Conference. The political realignments were meant to create an atmosphere for the preservation of the federation and the creation of states. This political activity was undertaken by leaders of the former political parties: UMBC, AG, NPC and NEPU. The realignment of these political forces were particularly meant to persuade the Northern leaders from the Islamic society that subdivision of the North was not necessarily the destruction of the political North, but rather, a socio-economic expedience to accelerate development²⁰⁸. It was in this period that political maps, suggesting varying federal units to consist the new Nigerian Federation were in wide circulation²⁰⁹. Thus political leaders of the 'old' North, like Aminu Kano, increasingly saw the rationale and were also willing to acquiesce in the subdivision of the North. Politicians from Kano in particular, one of the riches Provinces in the North, were

prepared to agree to the creation of new states because of an existing Kano state tradition and also because it was widely felt that the Islamic Provinces paid an undue proportion of the costs of the Northern Region in relation to the benefits, in terms of jobs, University places, educational expenditure and the like, mainly because of their educational backwardness relative to some of the M-Belt areas²¹⁰. Diplomatic activity, however, proved much more fundamental to changing the political attitudes of the core of Northern Islamic leadership to the ideas of subdividing the North into more units of the Nigerian Federation. After the failure of the Ad Hoc constitutional conferences in Lagos, for example, further conferences of Emirs, chiefs and 'Northern Leaders of Thought' took place in Kaduna. It was from one of these meetings that J.S. Tarka, Aminu Kano and Makaman Bida, were asked to tour the North to demonstrate their unity as representatives of the three political forces, previously in conflict-UMBC, NEPU and NPC²¹¹. It was from these experiences of joint political tasks in the interest of the whole North that a deep trust and friendship developed between Tarka and Makama and for Tarka from the Northern establishment, which made the previous hatred by the Kaduna based NPC, seem all the more gratuitous²¹². Tarka used the political intimacy to persuade Northern leaders to create states in the North and Nigeria. One political lesson that was apparent in these developments, which Tarka learnt very quickly was that to achieve the dream of the M-Belt Region, it was not simply a question of obtaining M-Belt political support and the influence of M-Belt officers and men in the Nigerian Army. Equally important, was to gain the political support of politicians outside the immediate interests of the M-Belt people, particularly from the Islamic leadership, who curiously had claims of rulership on land and people of all of the North. After making the political ideas of subdivision of the North acceptable to the Northern elite, Joseph Tarka sought to influence the Eastern Region with the same political arguments, until he was rebuffed²¹³. Subsequently he was

strategically afraid, that to go to the East again, would expose him to political suspicion and danger from both sides²¹⁴.

In the period between October 1966 and May 1967, however, Joseph was successful in establishing trans-Regional political alliances from the North, with the Mid-Western Region. The alliance with the Mid-West was ostensibly aimed at producing support for the demands for the creation of more states and a M-Belt state/region as a unit of the Nigerian Federation. In that period, Joseph Tarka and Chief Enahoro emerged as the two leading proponents of the Federal cause, advising Gowon to take a firm line over the defence of the powers of the Federal government²¹⁵. The prominent political roles of Joseph Tarka from the M-Belt and Chief Enahoro from the Mid-West, in that period, increased minorities pressures on the dominant tribes and general political opinion in the country, on the political shape of the Nigerian political arena. These political pressures largely derived from the behind the scene bloodless battles on the creation of states and which had included pressures that the names of state Governors and state capitals be named and made public²¹⁶. These pressures were sufficiently overwhelming that a conference of the North 'Leaders of Thought' at the end of January 1967, recommended that Nigeria be divided into eleven to thirteen regions, as against the propositions of Gowon, suggesting between eight to fourteen states, earlier in December 1966²¹⁷. Subsequently in May 1967, a joint Assembly of Emirs, Chiefs and 'Leaders of Thought' of the North, passed a resolution in support of the creation of new states, whether or not they were created in other regions of Nigeria²¹⁸. In the same meeting, the leaders of important political opinion in the North, proclaimed itself to be in favour of federation with a strong political centre²¹⁹.

After January 1967, therefore and with the political controversies surrounding the location of authority in Nigeria, it was left to Gowon to produce a decisive initiative on resolving the fate of the Nigerian

Federation, within context of the creation of states and the drift of the Eastern Region into secession. The creation of new Regions or states was however not a practical proposition unless some kind of effective centre could be ensured from which authority could be generated. The demands for the creation of states had been resurfaced by a particular combination of circumstances, at a time of waning influence for the old-styled politicians, who preferred confederation or the secession of the North, if the region as a whole could not be certain of controlling the country, as in the days of the NPC hegemony. In the period between January and April 1967, an apparent hurdle that Gowon had to surmount was one in the North, from the influences of NPC old warhorses, on Hassan Katsina, who had surrounded him. When it became apparent, for example, that the political options on the Nigerian crisis of 1966 had been narrowed to the creation of states, Hassan Katsina began to systematically re-create the image of "One North" by openly activating a Northern political identity within and outside the Nigerian army. On 24th December 1966, he referred to the 3rd Battalion in Abeokuta, as 'Northern troops' as well as 'Nigerian troops' and it was not clear which of these identities had the prevailing loyalty in the circumstances²²⁰. Subsequently in 1967, he addressed the 4th Battalion in Ibadan as Northern troops and talked of them as Northerners who had been very loyal on Yorubaland and to colonel Robert Adebayo, the Military Governor of the West:

"These men are human beings. The mere fact that they are in Khaki does not mean that they have no feelings and no souls. They have been under strain for almost 18 months now ... These men are first-class soldiers and have their pride. The Governor, as you know paid them glowing tribute several weeks ago for their loyalty and excellent service during the many years they have been stationed in Ibadan and Abeokuta"²²¹.

On the anniversary of the first coup d'etat in January, 1967, he wrongly eulogised the late Sardauna of Sokoto as being "to Northern Nigeria what Gandhi was to India"²²². Furthermore, Hassan Katsina also resuscitated the Northern Nigerian Self-Development Fund, into which donations poured in, as a sign of renascent regional loyalties²²³. At the same time, he quietly allowed the committee on Provincial Authorities to cease meetings²²⁴; but this might have been accidental. In the past the plan for Provincial Authorities had been held as a protection against state creation.

With these new developments in the Hausa-Fulani dominated North, the Ibo-East still unconciliated and the Yoruba-West increasingly detaching itself from the Federal cause and authority, Gowon responded by depending on support from the Nigerian army, the M-Belt minorities who were acting in concert with Southern Nigerian political minorities (from the Mid-West and COR) people in organizing political opinion for the creation of states. In the period between January and April 1967, Gowon was engaged in a vigorous political offensive, designed to secure the loyalty to the Federation of as many of the Nigerian tribes and groups as he could muster²²⁵. Of the M-Belt groups that responded to the political offensive of Gowon, the students of Ahmadu Bello University were the most active in designing the proposed M-Belt Region/State²²⁶. While the majority of the M-Belt students strictly saw the composition of the M-Belt Region/State to consist of Benue, Plateau, S.Zaria, S.Bauchi and including Numan and Yola areas, a few from the Plateau areas were against the inclusion of Benue in the proposed creation affecting the M-Belt areas²²⁷. This was so because while Plateau, S.Bauchi, S.Zaria, Numan and the Yola areas with the Jukun were seen to be balanced in educational development and as political minorities in numerical size, it was perceived that Idoma and Tiv might introduce an imbalance and therefore dominate in the new federal unit in the M-Belt areas²²⁸. The political leadership from the non-Benue areas however had crystallized their support behind Joseph Tarka, which in most instances was

seen to be support for Gowon. This developed from their regular meetings with Joseph Tarka in Jos, which included among others, Bitrus Rwang Pam (Biom), Jonah Assadugu (Bachama), Azi Nyako (Jarawa), Joly Tanko Yusufu (Jukun), Pastor David Lot (Sura), Wilson Onazi (Idoma) and Isaac Shaahu. By this time the politics of localism and the 'son of the soil' appeal had strongly began to replace the M-Belt minorities political and Christian religious identity. It was, however, this group that had organized the visit to Lagos in September 1966 to "greet" Gowon and to express Northern Christian support for his government. The delegation included the chiefs of Jos and Kagoro, who were both symbols of Christian unity in the M-Belt areas.

On the 25th May 1967, plans were announced to withdraw all Northern troops from the West, in response to both political and military pressures from Chief Awolowo and Colonel Adebayo and to be redeployed to Lagos and the Northern boundary at Jebba and Ilorin before the end of May²²⁹. Implicit in these manoeuvres was a move to threaten the West, if it fell out of step with the creation of states, which was apparently going to be effected given the Eastern Region determination to secede. The redeployment of troops from the West, also had the effect of reinforcing troops already loyal to Gowon in Lagos, to support, if the need arose, the political exercise of the creation of states. On 27th May 1967, Gowon announced the plan for the creation of states, which himself and both civilian and military collaborates had been planning in secret for some time. He declared a state of emergency all over Nigeria, repealed Aburi Decree No. 8 and replaced it with Decree No. 13. These political acts abolished the existing Regions and replaced them with a twelve state structure of the Nigerian Federation²³⁰. In the National broadcast announcing the new rearranged territorial political units of the Nigerian Federation, Gowon was aware of the potential of resistance from all the Regions, particularly from the East, where a declaration of secession followed the creation of

states. Thus to give reason and commitment to the exercise, Gowon pointed out:

"It is my fervent hope that the existing Regional authorities will ensure the smoothest possible establishment of the new states. It is also my hope that the need to use force to support any new state will not arise. I am, however ready to protect any citizen of this country who are subjected to intimidation or violence in the course of establishment of these new states"²³¹.

The outcome of the political exercise was that six new states were created out of the old Northern Region and three out of the old East. Of the six created in the North, one comprised of Benue-Plateau (BP) state with its capital in Jos, from the merging of the Provinces of Benue and Plateau. Benue-Plateau state significantly excluded powerful Fulani Islamic Emirs. The Hausa-Fulani Islamic Emirs and Chiefs that were included in Benue-Plateau State were second class in political status and controlled relatively small areas of authority. In a subsequent reform of the Native Authority system after 1st October 1968, Joseph Gomwalk graded three Chiefs as first class, all non-Muslims: Chief of Jos and Ochi Idoma, the Tor Tiv having been First Class in status since 1956, eight as second class; five as third class; four as fourth class and the rest as fifth class Chiefs in status²³². The first class chiefs, the Aku Uka of Wukari and one Muslim Chief, the Emir of Wase Alhaji Abdullahi Maikano, constituted the Benue-Plateau State Council of Chiefs, which was made up of the Tor Tiv, Gondo Aluor (Chairman), the Aku Uka of Wukari, Adi Bvewi, the Bwong Gwom-Chief of Jos, Rwang Pam and the Ochi Idoma, Abraham Ukpabi²³³. Another state created in the North affecting M-Belt interests was North-Eastern, which enclosed the demanded M-Belt areas of Southern Bauchi, Numan and Adamawa, with its capital firstly at Bauchi, but later changed to Maiduguri. These M-Belt areas were enclosed together with the powerful traditional Islamic authority in the Emirs of Bauchi, Yola, Gombe, Dikwa

and the Shehu of Borno. There was also the creation of a North-central state, with the capital firstly at Zaria, but later changed to Kaduna, the seat of the old NPC government. The state included the M-Belt areas of Southern Zaria. Rather interestingly, in all the states that contained the M-Belt territories that were excluded from Benue-Plateau state, like North-Eastern and North-Central states, the concept of Justice, also became included in their mottos on the Armorial Bearings of the states. M-Belt groups like the Igalla and Bassange in Kabba Province were uncomfortably enclosed in the Central-West State, with its capital in Ilorin. The name of the state was however later changed to Kwara State (the Hausa name for the River Niger: "Rafin Kwara") to give it a Northern element in political identity and to under-cut Yoruba irredentism. The state contained a majority of Yorubas and Igbirras with a dominant Islamic population under the traditionally powerful Emir of Ilorin.

An explanation of the rather rigid and neatly created boundaries of the twelve state structure, is that the territories which became enclosed in any particular state followed as much as possible Provincial boundaries. This was done, partly to ensure a continuous collection of statistical data and partly because of administrative needs²³⁴. The boundaries were however not arrived at by arbitrary drawing. The number of states to be created in the North was to a large extent, dictated by the number to be created in the South. Gowon wished to politically deemphasize the intention to detach Lagos areas from the West by giving it a separate state²³⁵. Since the Mid-West had already been created, Lagos plus the former Western Region produced three states in that area of Nigeria. A similar number was needed in the Eastern Region, both to balance the three in the former West and to enable two minorities states to be created among non-Ibo Easterners. Apparently, the Rivers- Calabar and Ogoja Provinces, did not agree with each other to create one single COR state in the East²³⁶. To make an attractive political offer in order to win the support of the Eastern

minorities, without which it would have been difficult to win the civil war, Gowon therefore had to create two non-Ibo states: the South-Eastern and Rivers States²³⁷. Thus Gowon had to create six states in the South, and this required six in the North as well, to preserve the political balance in the Nigerian Federation. The Northern States were also the outcome of consultations between Federal Civil Servants and various interest groups in the North. The political boundaries and nature of the states in the North, for example, came from decisions made by politicians and other interests in the Islamic and M-Belt areas themselves²³⁸. However, all the territories to be included in the different states had been decided upon before the Supreme Military Council met in April 1967²³⁹. Although this was so, Gowon was extremely secretive on which states were to be finally announced because of rampant leakage of classified information, to Ojukwu in the East and was also uncertain about the political reaction of Hassan Katsina, who was increasingly under the influence of NPC politicians²⁴⁰.

However, the creation of BP state in the old North, satisfied the demands of the political soldiers and the civilian population that had electorally supported the UMBC party. Gowon had also sought to secure loyalty to the Federation from the East with the creation of two minorities states in that Region: the South-Eastern state with its capital in Calabar and the Rivers State with its capital at Port-Harcourt. The aim of these creations were not only political in the need for subdivision to balance the Federation, but also to detach the socio-economic and political loyalties of the minorities from the causes of the Ibo-led secession in the Eastern Region. The minorities from Calabar, Oga and Rivers areas, already existed in Lagos in the Nigerian Army and these were supplemented by a large number of recruits fleeing from the East to join up to fight for the liberation of their areas, particularly people from the Rivers State²⁴¹. There were also a number of politicians from the minorities areas in exile in Lagos, who already surrounded Major U.J. Esuene, the appointed

Governor of South-Eastern State and Lt. A. Diете-Spiff of Rivers State, lobbying for political posts in the new states, while they awaited the liberation of their states from Biafran troops. The political support that Gowon won in these areas was later to be crucial in the success of the Federal military offensive in Ogoja, Calabar and Port-Harcourt and other areas of the Rivers, during the Civil War. Furthermore, the adherence of the Western Region had to be secured and this necessitated the wooing of Chief Awolowo and Colonel Adebayo²⁴². Lt. Colonel Gowon, therefore, did not cut into the power base of Chief Awolowo, in the same political sense, he divided up the North and the East, except for the small portions of the West that became Lagos State. Rather interestingly however, Gowon suggests he would not have cut the North into six if the Sardauna had remained alive as Awolowo did, in the West. He would have just "dealt" with Ojukwu and the Eastern Region²⁴³. In any case Gowon saw the subdivision of the North into more Federal units of Nigeria as the creation of "Six Norths" rather than the political division of "One North", a premise from which increased socio-economic development, might take place, which indeed, it did²⁴⁴. The political master-stroke of Gowon in stabilizing Federation in Nigerian Politics after 27th May 1967, was to invite Chief Awolowo on 3rd June 1967 to become Vice-Chairman of the Federal Executive Council and then to make him Commissioner for Finance²⁴⁵. This political act associated Chief Awolowo and the West, closely with the military regime as its most senior Yoruba civilian participant in the Federal cause²⁴⁶. To further strengthen loyalty to the Federation of Nigeria and broaden the base of consensus, Gowon appointed eleven more political civilians, one from each state of the Federation, as members of the Federal Executive Council of twelve and this produced more legitimacy. This political strategy was of crucial importance because it realigned the Eastern minorities by associating some of their leaders like Arikpo and Wenike Briggs with the Federal cause²⁴⁷. Gowon also recruited and used the political skills and experiences of leaders in the

Federal Executive Council²⁴⁸. The appointment of Chief Enahoro was particularly strategic, because it helped to secure the loyalty of the Mid-West to the Federal cause, instead of being only half-heartedly in support. Its political identification with the Nigerian Federation, however became uncontested with the experiences it had of the Ibo supported invasion of Biafra in August 1967²⁴⁹.

In the whole of the processes of the political developments after the July coup d'etat, Gowon opposed secession of both the North and the East for the preservation of the Nigerian Federation. Yet, he had clearly stood for and represented the Northern political identity. Within less than a year, however, he was knocking down the very territorial basis of the existence of the Northern identity in response to the political needs of the Nigerian minorities when he sought to preserve the Nigerian National identity, particularly the minorities of the M-Belt areas (many in the army he used to fight and win the Civil War) and the COR areas (all of whom were threatened by secession). The paramount Nigerian political identity largely derived from his having been indoctrinated as a Nigerian army officer. In this, he was supported by the forceful political position of the Mid-West, other minorities areas and by the army whose majority of the rank and file members came from the M-Belt groups: the Tiv, Jukun, Bachama, Birom, Angas (Gowon's tribe) and Idoma who comprised the bulk of the rank- and file soldiery both in the colonial and after the colonial period. Benue-Plateau state emerged in the state creation exercise by Gowon in 1967 to enclose the majority of the minorities in the North who also dominated in the rank-and-file soldiery of the Nigerian army. This military factor alone, besides the political influences of Joseph Tarka increased political leverage that became exercised by minorities at the expense of Hausa-Fulani, Ibo and Yoruba, in both the previous regional and the new national political arena in Nigeria. The microcosm of Nigerian Nationalism in the "nationalism" of Benue-Plateau state and the Mid-Western State, for

example, replaced the tribal-nationalism (tribalism) of the Ibo, Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba over Nigeria. The fundamental political consequence is that it reduced the influence of the major tribes on Nigerian politics and communalism became replaced by consensus building and corruption as the principal driving motor behind Nigerian politics and coups d'etat.

The creation of Benue-Plateau state in May 1967, however, was not purely a military judgement in the heat of the Nigerian crisis. It was also a political judgement foreshadowed in an exposition as early as 1956. In that year, Auta Hamza, an elected member of the NHA from Plateau pointed out:

"To be frank, it is only the two Provinces of Benue and Plateau which could constitute this so called Middle Belt Region ... because some of these (Northern) rebels now reside in Benue"²⁵⁰.

In the context of Nigerian politics after May 1967, therefore, Benue-Plateau State as a political unit of the Nigerian Federation assumed the status as the epitome of the fulfillment of the dreamed M-Belt Region. Although it did not include M-Belt areas like S.Bauchi, S.Zaria and the Numan and Chamba areas of Adamawa, where there was strong UMBC support as against equally strong NPC sentiments, it was expected that a greater M-Belt Region might emerge with the restoration of civilian rule by 1970 as promised by Gowon. J.S. Tarka, for example, expected that with subsequent political development, demands would come from these areas for inclusion into Benue-Plateau state, in which case the state would expand to enclose the core M-Belt areas (Benue, Plateau S.Zaria, S.Bauchi and Adamawa) where the socio-economic and political problems of colonial relationships had caused the organization of the M-Belt Movement. Indeed, in the period of political consultations earlier in 1967 for the creation of States in the North and after the emergence of Benue-Plateau state as the approximate of the M-Belt Region, there were intensively written political pleas and

memoranda to the SMC and personally to General Yakubu Gowon, for the inclusion of Southern Zaria, Southern Bauchi and the Igalla/Bassange groups into Benue-Plateau State, immediately after the state creation exercise in May 1967²⁵². The Igalla submission was signed by 176 representatives of the tribe and argued the wish to be merged with BP state: "because those groups were their kith and kin"²⁵³. In Southern Zaria, the submission suggested they desired separation from the Islamic society in North-Central State: "because the non-Islamic groups and societies were administratively worse than black Africans in Rhodesia today"²⁵⁴. In Southern Bauchi, the submissions from the Lere Districts argued the demands for political separation and the merger with Benue-Plateau State:

"because of the existence of waves of persecution directed against the people of Lere District ... subjection to police brutality and economic exploitation for decades and the situation does not show any sign of improvement ... subjection to segregation of the most painful type .. suffered political and Muslim religious provocations. We therefore have been wrongly politically grouped (in the North-Eastern State) ... We are forced to request the Head of State to excise Lere District from the State and merge it with the Benue-Plateau State, where our fellow "arnas" (pagans), the Angasawa, the Surawa, the Pyemawa, the Jarawa and the rest of them will welcome us as equals"²⁵⁵.

However, in 1968 BP state settled down into political existence as a unit of a restructured Nigerian Federation. Joseph Gomwalk (a Christian Angas, a young University Graduate and a Chief Superintendent of Police) was the Governor. He had jurisdiction over 41,744 sq. mls. in area of land in the North, a population of about 4,009,408 (1963 census) and about 7.0% share of the National revenue. The population of Benue-Plateau State, its territorial size and the share of revenue guaranteed to the state from the Central Government was not disproportionate to other units of the Nigerian Federation²⁵⁶. The physical and independent existence of Benue-Plateau (BP)

state was established on the 1st April 1968, although its legal existence started from 27th May 1967²⁵⁷. The first political act in 1967 when BP state assumed legal existence was the appointment of commissioners²⁵⁸. Thereafter, there was the physical movements of administrative and personnel from Kaduna to Jos²⁵⁹. When these movements were completed and there was the creation of twelve Ministries, with Commissioners as their political heads, the administration of the state settled down to face the problems of governance.

Government therefore, began to function in BP state, after April 1968, when Gomwalk appointed twelve Portfolio Commissioners, in a cabinet of fifteen members, including himself: ten of these had M-Belt sentiments, were indigenous to the tribal groups of the area and were Christians; one NEPU Hausa-Muslim Member, two NPC Hausa-Fulani Muslims, former NPC members; and two officers of the Nigerian armed forces, which was obligatory to have in the new state cabinets: Adamu Suleiman (Hausa-Fulani and Muslim police officer - later substituted with L.C. Meme) and Major Yakubu S.Adejo (an Igalla Christian army officer)²⁶⁰. Joly Tanko Yusufu, a strong advocate of the creation of states and supporter of Joseph Tarka after July 1966, was appointed Chairman of the newly organized BP state Public Service Commission: Gomwalk had a high opinion of his sincerity, seemingly rooted in commitment to Christian ethics. However, Pastor David Lot, the first President of the M-Belt Movement which first demanded the creation of a M-Belt Region in the North, Moses Nyam Rwang, also one of the founding Fathers of the M-Belt movement, and Michael Audu Buba (a former Minister with the NPC government in Kaduna) were significantly excluded from the politics of Benue-Plateau state, for very unclear reasons. The exclusion of Patrict Dokotri, another old UMBC war-horse, was explained by the conditions of his medical health which had made him obsessively religious, since 1963, after the Awolowo trial.

The cabinet under Joseph Gomwalk, chose a deliberate combination of

words: "Liberty and Justice", as the motto on its Code of Arms for Benue-Plateau State, which reflected the social origins and political foundations of the struggle of the M-Belt Movement for the creation of a M-Belt Region²⁶¹. Liberty, was representative of the Christian religious theme and its influences on the identity of the M-Belt areas and the UMBC party and also to immortalize the impact of European Christian Missionary work in the area; Justice, was meant to emphasize the purely political philosophy in the theme of the M-Belt struggle and to stand for its decade and seven years of political struggle in the demand for separation from the Islamic society, particularly in its political phase as the UMBC party. With these arrangements Joseph Gomwalk began to effect political and administrative reforms that were seemingly anti-North and they demonstrated a new found political freedom which systematically detached the state and alienated some Islamic groups within the state, from the rest of the Northern political identity. In 1968, Gomwalk, for example, effected administrative reforms in Benue-Plateau state, which included the abolition of the Chief-in-Council system and replacing it with the Chief-and-Council; on 1st June, he abolished the post of Senior Councillor; on 1st October 1968, he also abolished Provincial administration and replaced it with ten Divisions with DOs, directly under the Office of the Governor; In the same month he renamed "Native Authorities" as "Local Administrations" because the previous title: "derives from a colonial past ... with all the derogatory connotations attached to it"²⁶². Gomwalk subsequently created a Benue-Plateau state Council of Chiefs which included four Christians and one Muslim Emir²⁶³. This produced an instant political outcry from Muslims in the state and in the rest of the North, that BP state discriminated against Muslims in its institutions of legislative opinion²⁶⁴. Furthermore, Joseph Gomwalk dealigned Benue-Plateau state from the North by increasing interacting with the Mid-Western State, another minorities state in the South of Nigeria. One of the most controversial educational cum political

schemes which Gomwalk undertook was the exchange programme of secondary school students, between Benue-Plateau state and the Mid-Western Government. Apparently, this was in the midst of great political caution by the Interim Common Services Agency (ICSA) to preserve the Northern political identity in the equal distribution of assets and wealth of the former NPC government in the North to the new states created from the 'old' region. When Gomwalk continued with his 'reformist nationalism' in Benue-Plateau State, which demonstrated a new found freedom from the dominance and control of the area by the Islamic society, he became a problem child in the North. The Northern Islamic elite grew weary of him. They siezed on every opportunity to create political problems of unity in BP state. In 1969, the problems of internal divisions within Benue-Plateau State, caused by political groups both inside and outside the state created a situation in which Gomwalk had to warn:

"enemies of states' creation have taken advantage of the misfortune of tribalism and are trying to cause confusion in our midst. While entreating you to cooperate, I would like to warn that I will not spare any trouble-maker or saboteur. Such people will be identified and severely dealt with ... I urge everyone to think first as a Nigerian and second as a citizen of Benue-Plateau state to build a prosperous Benue-Plateau State of Nigeria where Liberty and Justice abound"²⁶⁵.

However, after seventeen years of political struggle (1950-1967), to achieve the approximate of the M-Belt Region in the creation of Benue-Plateau State, it took less than a decade (1968-1976) for the M-Belt minorities to show that they were politically incompatible in living together in the demanded unit of their own. Tribal and Provincial political identities resurged and submerged the conceptions of the M-Belt political identity in Benue-Plateau State.

The creation of States, therefore took effect from 1st April 1968, and the Governors assumed powers. The polarity of power around the state

Governments enabled them quickly to become the foci for new loyalties as well as effective administrative units. The sense of the Northern political identity was, therefore, reduced, but not entirely extinguished from the State creation exercise. The sense of the M-Belt political identity received at the same time, its fulfillment and its eclipse. In terms of the provisions of the 1952 census figures, Benue-Plateau state comprised only about 49.5% of the population of the areas claimed for the creation of the M-Belt Region²⁶⁶. However, in terms of other identities that were used in the mobilization of political support for the M-Belt movement, Benue-Plateau state comprised 63.5% of Christians in the M-Belt areas, 57.0% of Christians and non-Muslims and 16.5% of the Muslim population in the M-Belt areas²⁶⁷. Furthermore, in terms of electoral support in the 1959 elections, the UMBC party scored about 68.5% of the M-Belt votes in territories that became enclosed as Benue-Plateau State²⁶⁸. As BP state was seen to fail to become the nucleus for the M-Belt Region, which Joseph Tarka had hoped for and as its aimed unity came under threat from increasing rivalries of Benue and Plateau provinces, the sense of a M-Belt Regional unity became increasingly overlaid with local loyalties to smaller units.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. General (then as Lieutenant-Colonel) Yakubu Gowon Special Broadcast to Northern Troops in Nigeria, Lagos, September 1966; cited in West Africa, London, 16th December, 1966 p1411.
2. Nigerian National Alliance (NNA): Federal Election Manifesto, Kaduna, 1964 p1-15.
3. Ibid p1.
4. The True Results of the Western Nigeria Parliamentary Elections. Held on Monday October 11th 1965, Central Intelligence Organization of the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), Ibadan 27th October 1965 p7-16; the Post-script suggested, that 80% of the people of Western Nigeria regard Alhaji Adegbenro as their legal Premier and Akintola and his NPC-NNDP clique as pretenders and usurpers:

"They will soon be ousted by the combined onslaught and will of the people of Western Nigeria. Mass revolt, arson, looting and killing are now the order of the day throughout Western Nigeria, in protest against the illegal NNDP regime".

5. NNA Manifesto, 1964 p1.
6. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna October, 1965 p678.
7. B. J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria, Ibadan 1973 p115; John (Smith) Oyinbo, Nigeria: Crisis and Beyond, London 1971 p33; Luckham 1971 p19.
8. A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook 1966-1969, Vol. I January 1966 - July 1967, London, 1971 p32 and p125.
9. Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-1967, Cambridge 1971 p23.
10. Dudley 1973 p102.
11. Ibid p102.
12. Dudley 1973 p102.
13. Interview Discussion with General Yakubu Gowon May 1982.
14. Dudley 1973 p102.
15. Dudley 1973 p105.
16. Ibid p105.
17. Ibid p105.
18. Ibid p105.
19. Luckham 1971 p23.
20. Dudley 1973 p105.
21. William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa. London, 1984 p161-173.
22. John (Smith) Oyinbo, Nigeria: Crisis and Beyond, London, 1971 p49; Bryan Sharwood-Smith, "But Always As Friends" Northern Nigeria and the Cameroons, 1921-1957, London 1969 p49.
23. Dudley 1973 p105.
24. (Smith) Oyinbo 1971 p49.
25. Ibid p49.
26. Kirk Greene 1969 p125-126.
27. Kirk Greene 1969 p140.
28. Dudley 1973 p113n.8; Infact Dudley stops short of discounting the whole evidence, because of their pro- Awolowo political stands and in anycase, Provincialization with an Executive President is not Federalism on the Unitary colonial model and indeed Ironsi subsequently set about, implementing what Nzeogwo advocated.
29. Barrett 1979 p35-44; Kurfi 1983 p23-41.

31. Dudley 1973 p105.
32. Discussions with M.J. Dent, 1980-1984.
33. Kurfi 1983 p23-p41; (Smith) Oyinbo 1971 p36-p50.
34. Dudley 1973 p104; Luckham 1971 p22.
35. M.J. Dent, "The Military and Politics: A study of the relations between the Army and the political process in Nigeria 1966 - 1967", in K. Kirkwood (ed), African Affairs, No.3 St. Anthony's Papers No.21, Oxford, Oxford University Press 1969 - The activities of Gowon and the Federal Guard troops in turning the tide against the insurgent Majors are treated in detail by M.J. Dent in his book draft on the Nigerian crisis of 1966; see also M.J. Dent, "The Military and the Politicians", in K. Panter-Brick (ed) Nigerian Politics and Military Rule, London, 1970; Luckham 1971 p22.
36. Ahmadu Kurfi, The Nigerian General Elections: 1959 and 1979 and the aftermath, Lagos 1983 p30.
37. Luckham 1971 p24; Dudley 1973 p106.
38. Dudley 1973 p106 cites The New Nigerian of 17th January, 1966; Kirk-Greene 1969 p129 - p130.
39. Lindsay Barrett, Danjuma: The Making of a General, Enugu, 1980 p45-p56.
40. St. John de Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War, London, 1972 p93.
41. W.F. Gutteridge, The Military in African Politics, London 1969 p19.
42. Luckham 1971 p77 - p79.
43. Kirk Greene 1969 p127 - p129.
44. Kirk Greene 1969 p129.
45. M.J. Dent, "Tarka: Tiv background and the dynamics of Nigerian leadership", Unpublished seminar paper (London: Institute of C-Wealth Studies 1968).
46. M. J. Dent, "Tarka and the Tiv: A Perspective on Nigerian Federation", in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe (Eds), Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, Michigan, 1971 p456.
47. Ibid p456-p457.
48. Dent 1971 p457.
49. (Smith) Oyinbo 1971 p55.
50. Dudley 1973 p131.
51. (Smith) Oyinbo 1971 p56.
52. Ibid p56.
53. Ibid p56.
54. Dudley 1973 p131.
55. Dudley 1973 p114.
56. Interview Discussions with Isaac Komuko, July 1982.
57. Kirk-Greene 1969 p164.
58. Kirk-Greene 1969 p164.
59. Ibid p164.
60. Ibid p164.
61. Ibid p476.
62. Dudley 1973 p106.
63. (Smith) Oyinbo 1971 p46 - p47; Discussions with M.J. Dent, 1980-1984.
64. Barrett 1979 p42 - p43.
65. Barrett 1979 p46.
66. Dudley 1973 p114.
67. Dudley 1973 p114; Kirk Greene 1971 p164; Kurfi 1983 p33 - p34.
68. Dudley 1973 p114 - p115.
69. Luckham 1971 passim; Dudley 1973 passim, Barret 1979 passim.
70. Kirk Greene 1971 p169 - p173.
71. Kirk Greene 1971 p178.
72. Dudley 1973 p118.
73. Interview Discussions with General Yakubu Gowon, May 1982.
74. Dudley 1973 p124.
75. Kirk Greene 1971 p174 - p176.

76. Discussions with M.J. Dent 1980 - 1984; Interview Discussions with Ajiva Aji and Isaac Kpum, January 1981.
77. Interview Discussions with Ajiva Aji and Isaac Kpum, January 1981.
78. Discussions with M.J. Dent, 1980 - 1984; (Smith) Oyinbo 1971 p42.
79. Dudley 1973 p119; (Smith) Oyinbo 1971 p53 - p55.
80. Dudley 1973 p119.
81. Luckham 1971 p269; Dudley 1973 p119 - has an account of Ibo attitudes which contested the preference of Professor Ishaya Audu to that of Edozie as Vice Chancello of Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria. In fact very many Southern Nigerian intellectuals saw and still see Northerners as incapable of holding top university posts albeit admitted into university. The troubles in Jos University over their Ibo Vice-Chancellor in the 1970s were reputed to be reminiscent of those in ABU in 1966 over the appointment of Ishaya Audu.
82. Kirk-Greene 1971 p174 - p176.
83. Dudley 1973 p119.
84. Dudley 1973 p119; Barrett 1979 p37.
85. £2496 or above in an Administrative class of 158 indigenes to The North in 1966 - (Smith) Oyinbo, 1971 p54 - p55.
86. Ibid 1971 p55.
87. Ibid 1971 p55.
88. Secret Memorandum on the Public Services and Training by Adamu M. Fika, Kaduna, April 1966 p3.
89. Luckham 1971 p277.
90. (Smith) Oyinbo 1971 p58 - p60; Luckham 1971 p270; Interview Discussions with John Smith and Aminu Kano Spring 1982.
91. Interview Discussions with Mallam Aminu Kano, Spring 1982.
92. Luckham 1971 p270.
93. Luckham 1971 p269 - p270.
94. Interview Discussions with John Smith, Spring 1982.
95. Kirk-Greene 1971 p162 - p164.
96. Luckham 1971 p270.
97. Luckham 1971 p270.
98. Dudley 1973 p130.
99. Dudley 1973 p130.
100. Dudley 1973 p132.
101. Luckham 1971 p272.
102. Ibid p272 - p273.
103. (Smith) Oyinbo 1971 p57.
104. Interview Discussions with Mallam Aminu Kano, Spring 1982.
105. For examples, see Telegram from: Secretary to the Military Governor Kaduna, DTO 281 415/5. To: All Provincial Secretaries, NIGPOL 'B' ops Lagos. Jos, 30th May 1966.
106. Luckham 1971 p270
107. Kurfi 1983 p40; Dudley 1973 p135.
108. Luckham 1971 p57.
109. Ibid p57.
110. Dudley 1973 p135.
111. Luckham 1971 p57 - p58.
112. Kurfi 1983 p34.
113. Kurfi 1983 p40.
114. Kurfi 1983 p40.
115. Luckham 1971 p181; see also Kirk-Greene 1969 p399 - p401.
116. Ibid 1971 p51.
117. Luckham 1971 p51.
118. M.J. Dent, "The Military and Politicians, "in S.K. Panter-Brick (Ed), Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: prelude to the civil war, London, 1970, passim.
119. Interview Discussions with General Yakubu Gowon, May 1981; This political link was to prove vital in the political manoeuvring that


- took place before the creation of states in May 1967.
120. Kurfi 1983 p40.
 121. Kurfi 1983 p40.
 122. Luckham 1971 p64.
 123. Luckham 1971 p58.
 124. Dent 1970 passim.
 125. Ibid 1970 passim.
 126. January 15th: Before and After 1966 Nigerian Crisis, vol.7 Enugu 1966 p48.
 127. Kirk-Greene vol.II 1971 p476.
 128. Luckham 1971 p76.
 129. Dudley 1973 p138.
 130. Barret 1979 p52 - p53.
 131. M.J. Dent's manuscript on the Nigerian crisis, Chapter 5, 'The July Coup'.
 132. Barrett 1979 p53.
 133. January 15th: Before and After 1966 Nigerian Crisis, Vol.7, Enugu 1966 p75 - p81.
 134. Ibid 1966 p75 - p81.
 135. Ibid 1966 p75 - p81.
 136. Ibid 1966 p75 - p81.
 137. James O'Connell, "Authority and the Community in Nigeria", in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe (Eds), Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, Michigan 1971 p646.
 138. Barrett 1979 p55.
 139. Luckham 1971 p67.
 140. Interview Discussions with General Yakubu Gowon, May 1982.
 141. Discussions with M.J. Dent 1980-1984; see also Luckham 1971 p67.
 142. Luckham 1971 p69.
 143. Dudley 1973 p138.
 144. Barrett 1979 p52-56.
 145. Dudley 1973 p139-140; Luckham 1971 p65-67; January 15th: Before and After, 1966 Nigeria Crisis, Vol. 7, Enugu 1966 p59-62.
 146. Dudley 1973 p140; Kurfi 1983 p38-39 Luckham 1971 p66-67; January 15th: Before and After, 1966 Nigeria Crisis, Enugu, 1966 p49-50. This Biafran document further suggests that "Gowon hoisted and flew in front of the 2nd Battalion Headquarters at Ikeja, the secessionist red, yellow, black, green and Khaki flag of the "Republic of the North" from the end of July to the end of August".
 147. Dudley 1973 p140.
 148. Dudley 1973 p140.
 149. Kurfi 1983 p38-39.
 150. Interview Discussions with General Yakubu Gowon, May 1981.
 151. Discussions with M. J. Dent, 1980-1984.
 152. Luckham 1971 p315.
 153. Kurfi 1983 p39.
 154. Discussions with M. J. Dent, 1980-1984.
 155. Kurfi 1983 p39.
 156. Ibid 1983 p39.
 157. Ibid 1983 p39.
 158. Dudley 1973 p141-142; Kurfi 1983 p39.
 159. Discussions with M. J. Dent 1980-1984; Dudley 1973 p140.
 160. Dudley 1973 p140.
 161. Ibid 1973 p140.
 162. A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook 1966-1969 Vol. I, January 1966 - July 1967, London 1971 p197.
 163. M. J. Dent, "Tarka and the Tiv: A Perspective on Nigerian Federation", in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, Michigan, 1971 p457.

164. Kirk-Greene Vol. II 1971 p477.
165. Ibid 1971 p477.
166. A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook 1966 - 1970, Vol. II July 1967 - January 1970, London, 1971 p207.
167. M. J. Dent, "Tarka and the Tiv: A Perspective on Nigerian Federation", in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe (Eds.), Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, Michigan, 1971 p457.
168. Ibid 1971 p457.
169. Ibid 1971 p457.
170. Ibid 1971 p457.
171. Ibid 1971 p457.
172. Ibid 1971 p457; See also Federal Republic of Nigeria: Memoranda submitted by the Delegates to the Ad Hoc Conference on Constitutional Proposals for Nigeria, Lagos, December, 1967 passim.
173. Dent 1971 p457.
174. Interview Discussions with John Wash Pam, January 1981; John Wash Pam was the Secretary to the Assembly of Northern Leaders of Thought in Kaduna in August 1966 and thereafter until the Ad Hoc Conference collapsed in November.
175. Ibid, January 1981.
176. Federal Republic of Nigeria: Memoranda submitted by the Delegates to the Ad Hoc Conference on Constitutional Proposals for Nigeria, Lagos, December 1967, passim.
177. Luckham 1971 p313.
178. Kirk-Greene 1971 p216-219.
179. Dudley 1973 p146.
180. Chief A. Enahoro, Verbatim Report, 14th September 1966 p14; cited in Dudley 1973 p155.
181. Dudley 1973 p148.
182. Dudley 1973 p154.
183. Dudley 1973 p148.
184. Dudley 1973 p154.
185. Luckham 1973 p313.
186. Dudley 1973 p153.
187. Federal Republic of Nigeria: Memoranda Submitted by the Delegations to the Ad Hoc Conference on Constitutional Proposals for Nigeria, Lagos, December 1967 p5-20.
188. Dent 1971 p457.
189. Ibid 1971 p457.
190. Ibid 1971 p458.
191. John (Smith) Oyinbo, Nigeria: Crisis and Beyond, London, 1971 p64.
192. Dent 1971 p458; (Smith) Oyinbo 1971 p64.
193. Dent 1971 p458.
194. Federal Republic of Nigeria: Memoranda submitted by the Delegations to the Ad Hoc Conference on Constitutional Proposals for Nigeria, Lagos, December 1967 p17.
195. James O'Connell, "Authority and Community in Nigeria" in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe (Eds.), Nigeria: Modernization and the politics of Communalism, Michigan, 1971 p650.
196. Luckham 1971 p309.
197. O'Connell 1971 p650.
198. (Smith) Oyinbo 1971 p72-p75.
199. Ibid 1971 p73.
200. Discussions with M.J. Dent, 1980-1984.
201. Interview Discussions with General Yakubu Gowon, May 1982.
202. West African Magazine, London, 15th October 1966 p1195.
203. Text of Broadcast in New Nigerian, Kaduna, 1st December 1966; cited in Luckham 1971 p316.
204. Ibid 1971 p316.

205. Ibid 1971 p316.
206. West Africa Magazine, London, 10th December 1966 p1417.
207. For example, see Nigerian crisis: The meeting of the Supreme Military Council, Held at Aburi, Accra-Ghana, 4th-5th January 1967, vol. 6, Enugu, 1967.
208. Luckham 1971 p326; Interview Discussions with John Smith, Spring 1982.
209. Discussions with M.J. Dent, 1980-1984.
210. Luckham 1971 p326 n.3.
211. Dent 1971 p458.
212. Ibid 1971 p458.
213. Ibid 1971 p458.
214. Ibid 1971 p459.
215. Ibid 1971 p459.
216. Ibid 1971 p459.
217. Luckham 1971 p327.
218. Ibid 1971 p327.
219. Ibid 1971 p327.
220. Luckham 1971 p316.
221. Kirk-Greene Vol. I 1971 p425-p427.
222. New Nigerian, Kaduna, 16th January 1967.
223. Luckham 1971 p327.
224. Ibid 1971 p327.
225. Ibid 1971 p322.
226. Interview Discussions with George Hoomkwap, January 1981.
227. Ibid January 1981.
228. Ibid January 1981.
229. Luckham 1971 p323.
230. Kirk-Greene vol. II 1971 p478.
231. Lt. Colonel Yakubu Broadcast to the Nation, Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos 27th May 1967.
232. Features on Benue-Plateau State, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Information, Jos, No. 2, 7th December 1970 p28-p35.
233. Features on Northern States: Benue-Plateau and Kano States, Vol. 1, No. 6, June 1969 p17.
234. Dudley 1973 p190.
235. Discussions with M.J. Dent 1980-1984.
236. ibid 1980-1984.
237. Ibid 1980-1984.
238. Dudley 1973 p190.
239. Ibid 1973 p191.
240. Interview Discussions with General Yakubu Gowon, May 1982; Gowon suggests that he was so secretive with the document that he kept them in his chestpockets close to his heart, for about two weeks before the announcement even when he went to the toilet!
241. Luckham 1971 p323.
242. Ibid 1971 p323.
243. Interview Discussions with General Yakubu Gowon, May 1982.
244. Ibid May 1982.
245. Luckham 1971 p323.
246. Ibid 1971 p323.
247. Ibid 1971 p323.
248. Ibid 1971 p323.
249. Ibid 1971 p323.
250. Auta Anzah Ninzam (from Jemaa Federation), Elected Member from Plateau Province in opposing the "Motion on the M-Belt Region" - Northern Regional Legislaure, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 6th March, 1956 p211.
251. Discussions with M.J. Dentv 1980-1984.
252. For examples, see Letters and Memorandum demanding for the regrouping

- of Southern Zaria, Southern Bauchi and the Igalla Community, to the Head of the Federal Military Government - Major General Yakubu Gowon; Chairman of the Administrative Council of the Northern States - Colonel Hassan Usman Katsina and all members of the Federal Executive Council, dating 7th July, 13th December 1967 and 30th January 1968.
253. Ibid July 1967.
254. Ibid July 1967.
255. Submission by Lere District students in Ahmadu Bello University and Abdullahi Bayero College, Zaria and Kano, 21st May 1974, p1-p2.
256. Dudley 1973 p191.
257. Benue-Plateau State of Nigeria: Bringing the Government closer to the People, Zaria, June 1969 p35.
258. Ibid June 1969 p35.
259. Ibid June 1969 p35.
260. Northern States: Benue-Plateau and Kano States, vol. I No. 6, Kano, June 1969 p17; Facts and Figures about Benue-Plateau State of Nigeria, Jos 1972 p25-p32.
261. Interview Discussions with Isaac Shaahu, January 1981.
262. Features on Northern States: Benue-Plateau and Kano States, vol. I No. 6, Kano June 1969 p16.
263. Ibid June 1969 p17.
264. Ibid June 1969 p16.
265. Benue-Plateau State of Nigeria: Bringing the Government closer to the people, Jos, June 1969 p37-p38.
266. Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, December 1957 p63.
267. Ibid 1957 p63.
268. K.W.J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: Politics and Administration in a Developing Political System, Oxford 1963 p451-p465.

Map 7. The 19 State Structure of the Nigerian Federation since 1976 showing M-Belt areas.



Epilogue.

In the period between July 1968 and April 1976, Benue-Plateau state carried a status in political identity as a minorities state in the North and in the Nigerian Federation. This was seen to have been achieved through the political organization of the M-Belt movements, particularly in the conceptions of the political struggles of the UMBC party under the leadership of Joseph Tarka, who was appointed to the Federal Executive Council in May 1967 and continued to be an influential figure in the Federal Government under General Yakubu Gowon. However, although the political boundaries of BP state did not correspond to the areas demanded by the M-Belt movement in the struggles of the minorities political organization in the particular period between 1949 and 1967 in the North, there are a number of socio-political indicators to consider the Federal Unit as the approximate of the dreamed M-Belt Region in political identity in Nigerian politics.

Firstly, it enclosed the tribes and the political groups on the Plateau, who on the one hand, introduced the organization of political demands for separation from the Islamic Society and the concept of the M-Belt Region; and on the other hand, the tribes and political groups in Benue Province, who vigorously maintained the political interests of the demands and the concept of the M-Belt Region, until its approximate objectives were fulfilled in the creation of Benue-Plateau State. Secondly the tribes enclosed in BP state constituted a colony of minorities in culture, wealth and access to previous political power in the North and Nigeria. Thirdly, the composition of the first cabinet of Joseph Gomwalk comprised influential UMBC party politicians, like Isaac Shaahu (Tiv from Benue), Bitrus Rwang Pam (Birom from Plateau) and those politicians of other political parties, whom Tarka had won over to support the subdivision of the North after July 1966. The first cabinet, significantly excluded

persons who had been outright in rejecting the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, like the veteran NPC politician Micheal Audu Buba from Shendam on the Plateau. Fourthly, the image of BP state at the National level, was also significant in the political conceptions of the state as the fulfillment of the M-Belt Region. At the Federal level, Joseph Tarka was appointed as the political representative to the Federal Executive Council of BP state and indeed, he stood as the voice of minorities political opinion from the North in the twelve-man Cabinet of General Yakubu Gowon. The government of Gowon selected political individuals, one from each of the new states based upon the merits of their previous performances to reflect a broadly based tribal and community political opinion, predating the entry of the army in Nigerian politics and after. Fifthly, the political appointments in 1967 and 1968 in both BP state and representative of its interests at the National level, took account of individuals, who were politically sympathetic to the cause of the M-Belt Region before January and after July 1966. The initial emphasis of Joseph Gomwalk however was to work with the opposition politicians, indigenous to BP state, who had been in the NPF which consisted of the UMBC and NEPU parties. This subsequently changed and after 1970, he increasingly relied on the political opinions and advice of former NPC politicians like Vincent Ojirne (Tiv), Chia Surma (Tiv), Yahaya Sabo (Hausa), Wilson Onazi (Idoma, Mohammed Wada (Hausa) and dropped Isaac Shaahu (Tiv) from the BP state Executive Council. However, Joseph Gomwalk himself saw Benue-Plateau (BP) state as the fulfillment of the M-Belt Region:

"This state was born out as a result of one of the measures required to bring greater social justice to the people of this country... (and) the desire for a state of our own had been agitating the minds of our people for sometime"¹.

Furthermore, the reforms of the Local Government System and the administration of Justice in the state which Gomwalk effected in 1968, touched directly on the grievances which the M-Belt movement articulated in the demands for separation from the Islamic society in the North². Gomwalk, adjusted for the unequal political status of Chiefs in BP state. Before 1967, there was only one first class Chief, the Tor Tiv, 8 second class Chiefs including the Emir of Wase and 10 third class Chiefs from the areas enclosed by BP state. In 1968, BP state had three first class Chiefs and the Chiefs of Sura-Pyem and Angas were upgraded from 3rd to 2nd class in status and Gomwalk down-graded the Emir of Wase to 3rd class in status³. In 1969, Gomwalk also created a BP State Marketing Board and thus detaching the economic activities of many farmers and the Hausa middle-men from the control of the Northern Nigerian Marketing Board, although the state had little produce for the role of the Board, except for Soya-Beans from among the Tiv. The whole philosophy of political and economic reforms effected by Gomwalk seemed to be strongly tied to a desire to demonstrate the independence of the state from the North and to serve as a form of "a quiet-Revolution" which had taken place against the leadership of the Islamic Society⁴. Benue-Plateau State, therefore, carried on the tradition of the M-Belt struggle. By this, it created a political consciousness in which Muslim interests in BP state were placed in the reverse role as minorities, in the same sense that the non-Islamic M-Belt groups existed in the wider society of the North before 1967.

Apparently, there was a break-down of the ideas of the M-Belt political identity in the conceptions of BP State as a M-Belt Region, by the very success of the destruction of dominance on the M-Belt areas by the Hausa-Fulani Islamic group. Within the very political conceptions of BP state as a M-Belt Region, however, competing socio-economic and political interests began to manifest themselves and produced socio-political tensions that subsequently caused the separation of the state into Benue

and Plateau States. The tensions that developed in Benue-Plateau state were a microcosm of the North-South divisions in Nigerian politics, but with significant reverse variations of the socio-economic and political problems. There existed social and economic inequalities on the territories and among the groups that comprised the state. While the Benue groups, the Tiv and the Idoma in particular, were numerical majorities in the state, their dominance was complemented by a higher educational development, when compared to the miniature Plateau groups which were not as educationally advanced; For example, the Tiv (with 174) and Idoma (with 155) areas alone had a total of 327 Primary Schools as against 190 that were to be found in Jos (with 101), Pankshin (with 54) and Shendam (with 35), similarly organized tribal areas of the Plateau⁵. Futhermore, of the twenty eight Secondary Schools in the State in 1969 with a total enrollment of 5,955 students, 46.4% of the schools and 43.7% of the enrolled students were from among the Tiv and Idoma alone, while Jos, Pankshin and Shendam Divisions had 39.3% share of the schools and 38.9% of the enrolled students in the state⁶. The advantages in the educational development of the Benue groups were that there was a progression in their domination of bureaucratic jobs in both the public and private sectors of the state, which were concentrated in Jos, the BP state capital. In particular, this made the presence of the Tiv and the Idoma very visible among the Plateau groups, without similarly compartive developments taking place in Benue. However, while groups from Benue, the southern parts of the state were educationally advanced and therefore dominated jobs in government, Plateau, which constituted the Northern parts of the state had the advantages of having an already established social welfare and economic infrasturcture which was developed before 1967. While Plateau, for example, had a well established electricity supply by NESCO Ltd., producing about 18,000 kilowatts from the hydro-dams at Kurra-falls, Benue towns like Makurdi and Oturkpo, still depended on Nigerian Railway Corporation station-generating-plants for

electricity supplies^{7a}. Furthermore, of the 17 hospitals in BP state, 11 were on the Plateau, with 5 in Jos town alone, when compared to six that were widely dispersed in the Benue areas^{7b}. How to reconcile these images of deprivation was a major policy issue which the government and administration of Joseph Gomwalk in BP state struggled with and bungled and totally failed to resolve, until it was removed from office in 1975 in the military coup d'etat that also removed Gowon as Head of State of Nigeria.

To compound problems in BP state on these images of deprivation, the Gomwalk-Administration developed a quota system of benefits in its educational policy equally allocated to the Divisions in the state in which "educationally underdeveloped and catchment areas" were given the same attention in educational development and scholarship awards as the "educationally developed areas". In terms of University scholarship awards, for example, if each Division in the state had about 100 scholarship awards and Idoma Division produced 200 candidates it could never exceed its quota, even if Jos or Pankshin Divisions produced only 20 students to take up their allocated awards, the situation being rationalized, as funds allocated for the remaining 80 places can be used for the development of the Divisions in other ways. The 'quota system' in the educational policy of Gomwalk benefitted the educational development of the Plateau groups without an equal economic policy to balance for the felt deprivation in the Benue areas of the state. This meant that the educational development of the Benue groups was being deliberately slowed down until the Plateau groups caught-up. The policy recieved the most severe criticism from the Tiv and the Idoma as it was seen to discriminate on the more educationally developed Benue groups. However, it was not dropped. The image of Joseph Gomwalk, an Angas from the Plateau, seen to be systematically creating advantages for the Plateau groups, therefore, crystallized into opposition from the Benue groups.

In barely two years from its creation Benue-Plateau State was

therefore faced with tribal divisions which polarized the state on the political lines of the abolished Provinces, in which, on the one hand, the groups on the Plateau united to grumble and expose the domination of the Idoma and Tiv on the Plateau and on the other, the Benue groups openly began to point to the lopsidedness of the government in the administration of the state with bad socio-economic and political policies. In May 1969, Joseph Gomwalk acknowledged the existence of ethnic political tensions in BP State to a convened meeting of representatives of the various groups in which he states:

"since the creation of States we have passed through very difficult times in this state in the sphere of co-existence. Our problems are in no way unique. Every state in Nigeria has its own ethnic or sectional problems. It is unfortunate that the newspapers have blown up our own problems out of all proportions... let me say outright that Benue-Plateau State has come to stay. It belongs to all of us. No single ethnic group has a monopoly of the state"^{8a}.

The problems affecting the unity of the state were, however, identified by Gomwalk as rooted in the enemies of state creation (members of the Northern Islamic establishment, both within and outside the state), who used the New Nigeria to make issues graver than they were and this led to the subsequent establishment of the BP state government owned Nigerian Standard. The problems of political unity in the state also had roots in rumours in which, for example, the establishment of the Jos Metropolitan Development Board (JMDB) was interpreted by its definition of the urban development area of authority to mean that the Jos NA had been abolished and that the Birom and other tribes in Jos were to be driven out of their land for government development purposes^{8b}. Other problems in BP state included distrust for non-tribal Commissioners and Civil Servants and an absence of social integration in Jos itself among the Civil Servants in the State Capital⁹.

Although there was consensus on the need to reduce fears resulting from mutual tribal suspicions the problems persisted and found expressions on issues that crystallized the conceptions of political identities within the state and also generated sympathies on the lines of the already polarized state into the Provincial identities of Benue and Plateau. Firstly, there was the issue between Morgan Ogbole (an Idoma) and the Jos Divisional Students Association in which the death of a Birom man from a motor road accident caused by a car driven by Idomas became a politicized issue in which an Idoma judge from Benue was seen to exercise a tribal bias when he acquitted fellow Idomas. The Jos Students Association obtained financial support to pursue the case from top individuals in the state who were determined to established that the judgement was tribally influenced and therefore unjust. Secondly, there was the case of Andrew Obeya, who was Secretary to the Military Governor and Head of BP State Civil Service, involving a sexual scandal with the wife of a junior Civil Servant in the State, Bala Abashe. A purely private problem was allowed by the government to systematically find its way into a public political and social arena, again with financial and moral encouragement to Bala Abashe from top officials in BP state government, whose origins were from the Plateau. The case polarized BP state on Christian religious lines, in which the traditional values of promiscuity were brought forward in the case to explain the sexual indulgence of an Idoma man on a Plateau married lady.

These were further presented by the press as fundamentally clashing with the Christian ethics predominating on the Plateau which contrasted with traditional values of the Benue groups. When Obeya was forced to resign his post as Secretary to the Military Governor and and transferred his State Civil Service career to the Federal Service, congratulatory messages were sent out to Gomwalk from Plateau tribal unions and others for accepting the resignation and exit of Obeya without hesitation. Thirdly and most critical in increasing tribal tensions and the credibility of the

persistence of BP state was the denunciation of Joseph Gomwalk (an Angas-Plateau man) for corrupt practices, by Aper Aku (a Tiv Benue man) in a series of affidavits, sworn at a High Court of Justice. What was significant and was the cause of increased political tensions between Plateau and Benue was not that Gomwalk was being accused by a Tiv; but that Tiv Civil Servants had used their positions to filter out top government secrets to Aper Aku, to bring down a Plateau man. This was clear from the detailed nature of the affidavits. This was given credence by the fact that Aper Aku worked in Kaduna rather than Jos or any other place in the state which might have enabled him access to government files and other contract files.

At the Federal level, Joseph Tarka was also denounced by Godwin Dabo (a fellow Tiv) for corruption. Many Tiv responded to the circumstance by suggesting that Gomwalk had encouraged Dabo to do this, although Joseph Tarka himself believed that Chief Awolowo was behind the allegations of Godwin Daboh¹⁰. Relations between Gomwalk and Tarka in themselves had been far from cordial. Infact, they had become bitter soon after the creation of BP state. In almost every one of the 12 states, there was considerable rivalry between the Military Governor and the Civilian Federal Commissioner from the state. However, Tarka had seen Benue-Plateau State, not as a stage towards further subdivision, but as a nuclues to which he hoped that other M-Belt peoples would later adhere. Benue and Plateau were two of the major parts of the old M-Belt force. If they quarrelled, this was a betrayal of all his hopes for M-Belt people and for Nigeria, for Joseph Tarka believed in the building up of political unities and not in their distruction by "son of the soil" politics¹¹. Joseph Tarka, however, witnessed the tragedy of the break up of the unity of Benue-Plateau state. Not only did Benue and Plateau fight out their battle day by day in the Executive Council meetings and elsewhere, but Joseph Tarka himself, much against his will was drawn into the battle¹². Gomwalk, who had started as one of the greatest, the

most brilliant and the most pure and dedicated of the Governors, fell under the influence of Okon and others in Jos in the politics of contract awards and the shares of the kick-backs which promptly spoilt his Government and administration. The relation between Joseph Tarka as Federal Commissioner and Joseph Gomwalk as Governor of BP state, therefore, deteriorated¹³. The relationship is never easy and political tensions between Governors and Ministers from the same state are in some instances, almost as bad under the second Republic as they were under the Military.

One of the issues on which the dispute between Joseph Tarka and Gomwalk centred was the delicate one of the plan by Gomwalk (which were supported by Paul Unongo, a former assistant of Tarka, who turned against him and sought to replace him), to divide Tiv Division into three¹⁴. The unity of Tiv Division had been a cherished heritage of the last thirty five years, ever since the Patriarchal District Officer, Captain Downes had founded Gboko at its centre to be the Capital and focus of Tiv Unity¹⁵. The issue was a complicated one and as so often in Nigeria, great issues of administration were inter-twined with issues of power politics. Joseph Tarka saw the change as more than just an administrative change, he suspected (and with justification) that part of the motive was political - the desire to undermine his base in Tiv Division¹⁶. What Joseph Tarka failed to realise was that even if Tiv was divided into fifty divisions it would still give him overwhelming loyalty and more development might have taken place.

However, the problems of politics and the elusive political unity in BP state was not simply a question of the quarrells over deprivations of one kind or the other in socio-economic and welfare development between the Plateau and Benue groups: Idoma and Tiv and the Plateau groups. When Gomwalk established the BP State Bus Corporation in 1970, he touched directly on economic interest areas that were monopolized by the Hausa Islamic Communities in the state. In 1970, he also passed an Edict,

restricting the movement of foodstuff from the state, another economic business areas that hit hardest on the Hausa-Fulani Islamic traders who had the monopoly as middle-men in the yam trade from Benue and the potatoe from the Plateau, to distant urban centres like Kano, Zaria and Kaduna and Lagos. Although the majority of the Hausa traders were non-indigenes to Benue-Plateau (BP) State, there was a substantial concentration of Muslims that were sandwiched between Plateau and Benue that were found in areas like Doma, Wamba, Keffi, Lafia, Toto, Awe, Nassarawa, Obi and Akwanga, who were equally affected by the Edict on the movement of foodstuff. Many of them migrated to Bauchi, Zaria and Kaduna in protest. It was the former group, however, concentrated in Jos and Bukuru, whose economic interests were most severely threatened by the Edict and who were referred to by Gomwalk as:

"elements from outside the state (who) pose as if they were friends of one of the other of our many ethnic groups in this state"¹⁷.

This group also took and reported their problems to political leadership in Kano, Zaria and Kaduna and also reported some of their difficulties in BP state to the New Nigerian, which took an interest in critically analyzing them in its reports¹⁸.

In the period between October and December 1974, it was apparent that BP state could never hold together as the epitome of the M-Belt Region and as a political unit of the Nigerian Federation. Four political advertisements appeared in the daily newspaper, the New Nigerian, advocating for the division of Benue-Plateau State into: Plateau, Benue and Nassarawa States¹⁹. Furthermore, the political tensions that existed in Jos had been increased by the affidavits that were sworn against Joseph Gomwalk by Aper Aku. These were already seriously threatening the break-down of law and order in the state capital. There were also a series of letters and written petitions from very many different political groups which were in

wide circulation in the state capital, alleging hideous misconduct and malpractices by Commissioners and Civil Servants from particular tribes. Some of the letters and written petitions threatened to take reprisals on the Tiv and Idoma Civil Servants for making available details about the alleged corrupt practices of Joseph Gomwalk. In Jos one of such letters in circulation and addressed to J. O. Orshi (a Tiv), Solicitor-General and Permanent Secretary in the Benue-Plateau state Ministry of Justice stated:

"Better warn your people. The Tiv people and the Idoma cannot continue to dominate us. You cannot! You are all the same. Tell your people (Tivs and Idomas) that what happened to the Ibos, will soon happen to them. You know...ARABA!!"²⁰.

The letters and written petitions that circulated in 1974, also contained the basic theme of disillusionment with Benue-Plateau State and desire for the dismemberment of the State into Benue and Plateau States "because it had been an unholy-alliance".

However, within Plateau itself, some of the tribal political groups accused Joseph Gomwalk of concentrating development in Pankshin, which had suddenly been transformed "overnight" from a Rest-House-Station to a bustling town with social and welfare institutions as well as modern infrastructure including an automatic telephone system connected to Jos and other parts of the Federation. This alienated many of the Plateau groups, like the Ankwei and the Yergam, when they compared the slow pace of development in the towns that served as their Divisional headquarters. In Jos Division, the Birom and other tribes were aggrieved and economically threatened by the ten-mile land radius of authority given to the Jos Metropolitan Development Board (JMDB) for the development of "a greater Jos Urban Area" and felt embittered that most of the modern infrastructure in Jos and Bukuru townships were of little benefit to the local population. Clearly, therefore, localism replaced regionalism as tribal identities

became more significant in the development of the conceptions of the political identity of the M-Belt movement, particularly when the approximate of the region was achieved in the existence of Benue-Plateau State. Now that the M-Belt groups had freed themselves from a common experience of subjugation in a Muslim dominated North, they fell out among themselves in Tribal, Provincial and personal rivalries.

Although conceptions of the political unity of the M-Belt groups as personified by the existence of Benue-Plateau State, were very badly shaken by the serious allegations of corrupt practices made in 1974, firstly, against Joseph Tarka (a Tiv Federal Commissioner and representative of BP State in Lagos) by Godwin Daboh (a fellow Tiv man) on the national arena of politics and subsequently followed by those of Aper Aku (a Tiv) denouncing Joseph Gomwalk (an Angas and Governor of BP state), the state as a unit persisted for another year. Gomwalk made a desperate effort to revive the political unity of the state by references to the causes for the creation of BP State and to the socio-economic and political developments that had taken place since 1967 as well as the great potential that its persistence as one entity held for the future²¹.

The bloodless coup d'etat of 29th July 1975, which overthrew the government of General Yakubu Gowon and which removed Joseph Gomwalk as Governor of Benue-Plateau State, signaled the final collapse of the state. This was so because the new regime under Murtala Mohammed was committed to the creation of more states in the midst of intensified demands that dated from 1974 and which directly affected the existence of Benue-Plateau State as a unit of the Nigerian Federation²². In direct response to the demands for the creation of more states in the Federation, the new Military Regime appointed a panel of five members under the chairman of the Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Ayo Irikefe on 7th August 1975²³. With the inauguration of the Irikefe Panel on the creation of more states in Nigeria, there was increased vigour in the organization of demands for the

division of Benue-Plateau State. The main proponents of the creation of a Benue State came from the Idoma and Igalla intelligentsia, while the generality of the Tiv remained neutral. The main proponents in the demands for the creation of a Plateau State came from the Plateau students at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, the Plateau Civil Servants, Businessmen and some Plateau Chiefs, particularly the Chief of Jos, Dr. Fom Bot²⁵. In a personally written submission to the Panel, the Chief of Jos on behalf of the traditional rulers on the Plateau and the people of the Plateau demanded the creation of a Plateau State because:

"When in 1967 our Plateau Province was merged with the then Benue Province to form one state, we were outrightly repulsive. For eight years the Benue-Plateau State has been struggling to stabilize (itself). Our assessment is that the experiment has failed to justify its existence... we (on the Plateau) have suffered moral insults, generating from disagreeable cultures. We have failed to appreciate each others' cultural peculiarities... The historical and socio-cultural differences between the Plateau tribes and those of the Tiv and Idoma in Benue have inevitably generated suspicion, witch-hunting, blackmailing, fear and disunity. We deplore this development and appeal for separation. Numerically, the Tiv alone are more populous than the over forty tribes of the Plateau put together. We believe that in a parliamentary democracy, the ultimate system of government for this country, the Tiv and Idoma will totally outnumber our small tribes in the ballot-box"²⁶.

This speech was partly based on the calculation that because of the size of the Tiv electorate, when electoral politics were re-established in Nigeria, the Tiv in BP State will determine the outcome of any elections in the State. The more pathetic aspects of the address of the Chief is that it revealed the extent to which the conceptions of the political identity of the M-Belt had shrunk to the British created Provinces of the Plateau and Benue. Similar cultural differences were used in the 1950s and early 1960s to demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region and for separation from the

Islamic Society in the North. The Birom Chief (the Chief of Jos) knew very well that there were as many cultural differences between the Birom and the Tiv/Idoma of Benue as there were between the Birom and the Jarawa in Southern Bauchi, whose inclusion he demanded into Plateau and later quarrelled bitterly with, because after settling down in Plateau State, they promptly claimed the ownership of Jos in 1980²⁷.

However, the main proponents of demanding the retention of Benue-Plateau State in 1974 in its existing form, came from Lafia and Nassarawa 'Leaders of Thought' and the majority of the Tiv intelligentsia who argued that the problems of Benue-Plateau State: "were the problems of a bad government rather than the problems of politics"²⁸. Judging from the existing political mood in the different groups in Benue-Plateau State in the period between October 1974 and February 1976, it was only the Tiv people who remained in advocate of the preservation of BP state as a unit of the Nigerian Federation within the specific content of the political identity that it was a state that represented the struggle of the UMBC party, previously supported by both Benue and Plateau people²⁹. However, the demands for the dissolution of BP State and the political feelings from the Plateau groups which these had generated, were too strong to be ignored by the Panel and the new Military Government of Murtala Mohammed³⁰. At Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, for example, where the Benue-Plateau Students Association earlier met in April 1975 to decide on what advice was to be collectively given, as a non-partisan body in the controversies, to the government on the contesting issues of preservation of Benue-Plateau State or its subdivision into Benue and Plateau State, the meeting ended up polarizing the students into Provincial Students Associations and also resulted into files of the record of activities of the BP State Students Association being torn to pieces in a fracas. When the Irikefe Panel submitted its report to General Murtala Mohammed in December 1975, it was obvious that BP State had collapsed, because the activities of the State

Government, for the next three months, except for the functions of Law and Order came to a stand still in the Ministries and Corporations, as Civil Servants awaited the announcement of the creation of Benue and Plateau States.

On February 13th, 1976, however, there was an attempted coup d'etat to overthrow the new Military-Regime of General Murtala Mohammed. The Coup was announced by Lt. Colonel B. S. Dimka (an Angas) and succeeded in assassinating the Head of State, Murtala Mohammed, but did not remove the new government from office. The regime that overthrew Gowon continued with the political program for the restoration of Civilian rule in Nigeria, under the leadership of Lt. General Obasanjo, a program that included the creation of more states and restoration of Civilian rule in Nigeria. By the end of February 1966, most of the abortive coup-makers had been arrested and their tribal origins revealed that the officers and men of the Nigerian army who planned and executed the coup came from Plateau, Southern Zaria and Adamawa (subsequently Gongola state), significantly excluding the Tiv, the Idoma and the Jukun, but with a few from the Islamic Society in the North, the West and one from the Mid-West. In the subsequent executions that took place in Lagos, of the 38 persons found guilty after the military trials, 22 persons came from the Plateau, 6 from Southern Zaria, 4 from Adamawa, 3 from the Islamic Society in the North, 2 Yorubas and one Mid-Westerner. The political outcry over the executions of the officers and men was tremendous from the top to the bottom of society on the Plateau. This had ramification on political behaviour in the subsequently created new unit of the Nigerian Federation of Plateau State. The grief on the loses, initially isolated Plateau politically, from the rest of the North and from among the M-Belt groups in the rapid pace of the processes to restore Nigeria to Civilian Government, as it sought solance in its loses by mobilizing the Christian identity in mourning the dead and consoling the bereaved. Plateau was to emphasize the activated Christian religious

identity of this period in the campaigns of the 1979 elections as the political identity of the State, sometimes quite overtly, as for instance, in the liberating theme of the NPP party, from Hausa-Fulani and Islamic control and domination of the North and the State in particular. It was widely believed on the Plateau, that the Islamic Society in the North had used the coup to break-down Christian influence in the institutions of Society in Nigeria by the hurried execution of some M-Belt officers and that the Benue groups had betrayed the Christian and minorities identity in the political identity of the M-Belt groups by failing to support the coup.

However, the officers and men of the Nigerian army from the Plateau who planned the coup, contrasted the trends of political opinion of the students, Civil Servants, the businessmen and the traditional rulers from the Plateau, in effecting a coup d'etat that was meant to restore Nigeria into a twelve state structure in which Benue-Plateau State was to be re-established as a unit of the Nigeria Federation. One of the objectives of the abortive coup makers was to bring back Gowon, with the former military Governors in power, ruling over Nigeria³¹. The deposed military Governor of BP State was an active participant of the coup and was one of those executed in Lagos on 25th May 1976³². The coup of 13th February 1976, was however a Plateau affair and did not have the participation and support of the Tiv, Idoma and Jukuns, whose members were equally strategic in the Nigerian army. This suggests that the coup itself was planned without accounting for or misjudging the strength of political opinion and the political mood in the M-Belt areas, particularly in BP State.

On April 1, 1976, the final break-up of BP State was formalized, when the new states in the M-Belt areas, albeit others in the Nigerian Federation, began to function as autonomous units of the Federation, with Plateau, Benue and Gongola States, sharing out the territory and people that previously comprised Benue-Plateau State³³. In the 1976 state creation exercise, there was effort to make the Nigerian Federal units more equal in

size and in some cases entities hitherto regarded as sacrosanct were divided³⁴. In the M-Belt areas, the flag-bearing emirate of Bauchi, for instance, lost its non-Muslim districts of Jarawa to Plateau State, but this was balanced by the creation of Bauchi itself, as State a Capital³⁵. The government, however, ignored the firm political demands of the Tor Tiv that if Plateau groups rejected the existence of Benue-Plateau State as a unit of the Nigerian Federation because of the Tiv and Idoma in Benue and demanded a separate Plateau State, then that State should not on no account take away any bit of the former Benue Province³⁶. However, based on the political demands of Lafia and Nassarawa 'Leaders of Thought' in these Divisions, they were attached to Plateau State; and Wukari Division with the Jukun and about 50% of the population being Tiv was attached to the new Gongola State³⁷. In compensation, however, the Igalla and Bassange parts of Kwara, were excised and joined to the new Benue State whose capital was situated in Makurdi on Tiv land³⁸.

With these new political arrangements of 1976, the territorial conceptions of the approximate of the M-Belt Region, epitomized in Benue-Plateau State ended tragically with the M-Belt political identity inanimated until the Sharia controversy of 1978. Some of the most severe quarrels in Nigerian politics ensued between the Benue and the Plateau groups, as Tiv and Idoma Civil Servants left Jos to the new State Capitals of Makurdi and Yola. It was not uncommon to hear references being made to Jos as a "sho-sho" Capital by the departing Benue groups, just as the Tiv and Idoma were in turn referred to as "munchi" and "okpoto" respectively, rather curiously the Hausa language derogatory names for these non-Islamic groups (Biom, Tiv and Idoma respectively) of the M-Belt areas besides the general name of "arna" (pagans) for all of them. Some civil servants from among the Benue groups left Jos with keys to offices of the Ministries and Government Houses they previously occupied, as well as with files of the Government of BP state, allegedly to create frustrating conditions for the

Government of Plateau state³⁹.

A number of factors, therefore, combined to destroy the political conceptions and existence of BP state as the territorial nucleus of a M-Belt Region: the political infiltration of external dominant tribal group and Islamic religious interests (Hausa-Fulani of the Northern establishment) on the politics of the state which produced tensions and clashes between the Plateau groups and the Tiv and Idoma; the absence of socio-economic and political policies to maintain and conciliate the different tribal elite interests within the M-Belt political identity in BP state, which led to political tensions over the share of contracts and subsequently led to corruption, personified in the allegations of Godwin Daboh on Joseph Tarka and Aper Aku on Joseph Gomwalk; the Dimka coup d'etat and the subsequent executions which increased localism in the regionalism of the political identity of the M-Belt movement, as it alienated and politically isolated Plateau state. In that respect, many of the M-Belt minorities in S.Zaria, S.Bauchi and Adamawa (Gongola state) also felt that the Idoma and Tiv elite did not sympathize with the fall of Gowon, the Dimka coup and the subsequent execution of men and officers from the Plateau and those of other M-Belt areas, since they did not join the coup nor condemn the hurried executions. Seemingly, therefore, there was widespread belief from within and outside the M-Belt areas that the political influences and identity of the minorities in the North had come to an end, since the different groups mutually suspected each other and there was a premise for perpetual future political quarrels.

It was against this background that constitutional processes toward the transfer of political power from the military to civilians continued after the creation of states in April 1976⁴⁰. These processes included the appointment of 50 distinguished and accomplished Nigerians from various walks of life in September 1976 to constitute the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) and the inauguration of an indirectly elected constituent

Assembly (CA), which considered the draft constitution on 31st August 1977, comprising of 223 members⁴¹. Of the 50 CDC members, 5 were Christians from the M-Belt areas and held sentimental attachments to the social and religious identity of the M-Belt groups and societies. These were: C.S. Abashiya (Hausa Christian from Wusasa), M.S. Angulu (Bassange), P.R. Belabo (Tiv), D.D. Dimka (Angas) and G.P. Unongo (Tiv)⁴². The CDC submitted its report on 14th September 1977 and the CA had its inaugural meeting on 6th October 1977⁴³. Of the 49 indirectly elected members of the CA, from the elections of 31st August 1977, in the states with M-Belt groups, 23 were Christians and the rest Muslims: 2 out of 10 from Bauchi, 3 out of 10 from Kaduna, 3 out of 10 from Gongola, 9 out of 10 from Benue and 6 out of 9 from Plateau⁴⁴. Joseph Tarka, although elected from Jemgbar, was disqualified from participation in the CA by the Military Government with whom he was not in favour. He was disqualified because of non-payment of certain outstanding taxes. This saved him from taking sides in the Sharia controversy. He was in fact distanced from the issues by his stay in London. However, unlike the membership of the CA, Christians from the North (M-Belt Areas) were hopelessly outnumbered in the CDC and were manipulated out of certain Committees of the body. This explains the initial inclusion of the provisions on the Sharia in the draft constitution⁴⁵. When Christopher Abashiya, one of the Northern Christian members of the CDC, made his views known to the public on the inclusion of the Sharia in the draft, he was promptly removed from his job as Director of the Polytechnic in Kaduna, established by the former NPC government in the North. However unlike the other states in the North, which contained some of the M-Belt groups (Kaduna, Bauchi and Gongola) groups in the former territories that comprised Benue-Plateau state produced CA members, the majority of whom identified with the Christian religious identity: out of a total of 19 elected representatives in the CA from the two states of Benue and Plateau, 15 were Christians with only 4 Muslims, 1 from Benue and 3 from Plateau⁴⁶.

In addition, there was also the nomination by the Government, of Professor J.I. Tseayo, a Tiv man with a Christian identity, to be one of the special members of the CA⁴⁷. It was this group that organized social and political support which combined with Southern Christian support, produced the rejection of the establishment in the Nigerian constitution of the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal, both from within the CA and from all of the M-Belt areas. The Sharia controversy produced a temporary flash of political unity and Christian religious solidarity against the Islamic society in the North, despite the tragic collapse of BP state.

The proceedings of the CA were more controversial than those of the CDC. They produced some painful drama, perhaps because the majority of the members were elected, even if indirectly and therefore, were more certain of their mandate and also because everybody was imbued with the apparent finality of the decisions to be taken then. Despite the fact that Muslims inhabited half of the Federation and over half of the total population of Nigeria, they were a minority in the CA, due largely because the members were elected from the Local Government areas. One of the most heated and controversial debates was over the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal. The opposition to the Sharia courts was spearheaded by Christian members in the Assembly, particularly those from Benue and Plateau States, under the organized articulation of their chief spokesman, Paul Unongo. This group became known as the anti-Sharia group because they were against the specific provision of section 184 on the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal. The draft constitution had provided, in that section for a Sharia court of Appeal:

"which shall have jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court of Law in Nigeria, to hear and determine appeals from the Sharia Court of Appeal of a state ... and in Section 179(c) that ... The Federal Sharia Court of Appeal shall consist of a Grand Mufti, a Deputy Grand Mufti and such number of Muftis not being less than three"⁴⁸.

Its appellate jurisdiction on matters of Islamic Personal Law were exactly as provided for in the Constitution of Northern Nigeria of 1963, Section 53 (a) to (e)⁴⁹. The difference this time was that, whereas the Sharia Court of Appeal in 1963 was a regional (state) court, in the draft, it was to become a Federal institution, presumably because whereas before, there was only one region involved, in 1978 there were many states. It was this exposition of the correlation between the previous Islamic Laws of Northern Nigeria and the provisions of the draft constitution on the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal that produced prompt hostilities by the anti-Sharia group, largely from the findings of Christopher Abashiya⁵⁰. The Constituent Assembly rejected these two principal provisions regarding the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal and other consequential provisions⁵¹. A sixteen-man sub-Committee headed by Chief Simeon Adebó, further recommended a compromise provision suggesting that there should be a single federal court of appeal which was to be duly constituted if, in the case of appeals from the Sharia Court of Appeal of a state, it consists of not less than three justices of the Federal Court of Appeal "learned" rather than "versed" in Islamic Personal Law⁵². In the case of appeals from the Customary Courts of Appeal of a state a similar provision was made, thus giving Customary Law and Courts the same Constitutional status as Sharia Law⁵³.

However, the real bone of contention in the Sharia controversy, which produced a dramatic walk-out and boycott of the proceedings of the Assembly from 6th-24th April 1978 by the pro-Sharia group, the Northern Muslim members of the CA, was whether the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal would be constituted by judges manifestly more competent in Islamic Personal Law than the Grand Khadis and Khadis whose decisions would be reviewed hence the provisions of Section 179(c) in the draft constitution⁵⁴. The pro-Sharia group, comprising all Muslims from both the Islamic society and the M-Belt areas in the North, saw this as the crux of the matter on the Sharia controversy, all other considerations being extraneous. The

anti-Sharia group on the other hand argued variously:

"that Islamic Personal Law was discriminatory against non-Muslims and should not be elevated to Federal status; that only a Muslim could become a judge in the Sharia Court; it discriminated against women and thus ran counter to the political objective of equality and that if a parallel Federal Sharia Court of Appeal were granted now, it would amount to sanctioning two separate national systems of Law and the 'Logical progression' in the future, would be the creation of a Federal Supreme Sharia Court"⁵⁵.

The Sharia controversy was regarded as one of principle, by both sides in the religious divide on the issue. Infact, it did not amount to a large breach of legal cases but there was Christian apprehension and they reacted to the provisions on Islamic law in the draft Constitution symbolically. The most vociferous and unyielding of the anti-Sharia group were those from Benue and Plateau states. This was so, because they were non-Muslims in the majority and from previous social and political experiences, the majority of their people chafed in the past and were persecuted under the political abuses of Islamic Laws in the system in the North. Indeed, one of the strongest factors which caused an earlier generation of Christian politicians to organize and demand the creation of a M-Belt Region, separated from the Islamic society, as a unit of the Nigerian Federation in the North, was over the fear that Muslim Law would be extended and applied on non-Muslims and Christians when the 'Christian' British administration departed and political control passed onto the Muslim majority. Similar anxieties were expressed within the context of a Nigerian Army departing from control of politics, the majority of whom were Christians from the M-Belt areas.

The Christian population on the Plateau in particular and among its Christian members in the Constituent Assembly (CA), had strong political and religious feelings against the Sharia provisions in the draft

Constitution. This was so, because there was an increase in the political influences of the Hausa-Fulani Islamic communities in their areas after 1976. The administrations of Governor Abdullahi (a Hausa-Fulani Muslim) in BP state (before April 1976) and subsequently that of Daniel Suleiman (a Christian Jukun) in Plateau State for example, alienated Christians in the state in three ways: There was political effort to revert the emphasis of Joseph Gompwalk on the "Christian Minorities Nationalism" in BP state in which there had been covert Christian religious interests in making key political appointments, by refocussing appointments on Muslims who were minorities in the State from Wase, Lafia, Keffi, Nassarawa and Kanam; there was also the incautious take over of Christian Missionary Social and Welfare Institutions, mainly hospitals and schools, which had a concomitant decline in moral and education-standards in the institutions; and finally on the Plateau, there was the enactment of the "Twenty Years Indigenization Edict" in which anybody who showed evidence of having lived on the Plateau for twenty consecutive years, qualified as an indigene of the state. The Edict was manipulated to enhance the share of benefits of only the migrant Muslim population in Plateau state. It was however subsequently repealed by the Plateau state civilian government under Solomon Lar, because it was only unique to Plateau and no similar arrangements for non-indigenes existed in other states of the Federation. Furthermore, this was so because so strong is the conception of "Son of the soil" sentiment in Nigerian politics that the Plateau elite felt threatened with submergence by surrendering such rights.

The Sharia controversy was therefore not only over religion, custom or "a way of life"; it involved all of these and was also primarily a political issue. Similar to the causes of Christian solidarity in the 1950s and 1960s, it effectively brought to the fore of Nigerian politics, the Christian religious identity in the North and the fears of non-Islamic groups in the M-Belt areas, although Christianity among "Northerners" was

suspected by many Southern Nigerian CA members⁵⁶. The critical difference with the earlier period however was that in 1978 the issue of Islamic Law was being contested on the national arena rather than in a regional one with an overtly Christian religious identity by a more socially mobilized and more educated political group from the M-Belt areas. In the heat of the Sharia controversy, it was suggested by some of the members of the anti-Sharia group that "a Federal Canon Court of Appeal" be included in the constitution to balance the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal⁵⁷.

However, in 1978 the Sharia controversy portended far reaching consequences if an amicable solution was not found as 92 members of the pro-Sharia group, boycotted the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly⁵⁸. The Nigerian Head of State, General Obasanjo had to intervene to try to conciliate the contesting groups on the Sharia issue which had openly polarized only the North into two religious and political camps: the Islamic society and the M-Belt areas. He appealed to the Muslims to return to the Assembly and they agreed. Furthermore on 19th April 1978, the Head of State, with members of the SMC met the Constituent Assembly (CA) in an informal session and cautioned them against any course of action which could threaten the stability of the country⁵⁹. Although the pro-Sharia group returned to the CA on 24th April 1978, they subsequently disassociated themselves from the specific compromise on the issue provided for in Chapter seven of the Constitution and threatened to reopen the issue at the appropriate time⁶⁰. The activated Christian religious identity on all of the M-Belt groups and societies in Adamawa (Gongola State), S.Bauchi, Plateau, S.Zaria and Benue, which produced the most vocal opposition through Professor Tseayo, Paul Unongo and Mvandege Jibo with support from Southern Nigerian Christians, was successful in stopping the Sharia Law over Nigeria. The unity and sense of political power of the M-Belt identity however, remained illusive in the light of political development that followed the acceptance of the draft Constitution. When

the ban on political activities was lifted in Nigeria on 21st September 1978 and the Constituent Assembly formally dissolved, local issues and political interests in the M-Belt states resurged and took precedence in the determination of political alignments that shaped political party formations for the 1979 elections. The provisions of the Electoral Decree of 1977, further prevented the organization of an exclusively M-Belt political party, because the new political parties had to have a National character and not ethnic, religious or parochial outlooks⁶¹.

The anti-Sharia movement, had looked-up to Joseph Tarka for leadership in the organization and direction of political alignments in the M-Belt areas⁶². He, however, was more interested in building up national coalitions, because in 1978, it seemed possible that he might become the NPN Presidential candidate⁶³. Furthermore, he had remained in London throughout the Sharia controversy in the Constituent Assembly, the period when the M-Belt groups were aligning themselves in political formations. However, the overt religious identities manifested in the Sharia controversy were submerged in the processes of coalition building before party formations. The political parties in themselves were only allowed to form after the preamble of the constitution. Overt appeal to religious identities in the organization of political parties were against the preamble in the Constitution. Tarka had also dealigned himself from former political associates, particularly those under the leadership of Chief Awolowo and gloried in the careful building up of friendships among notables all over Nigeria who became the political foundation of the NPN⁶⁴. The bulk of the M-Belt minorities political leadership therefore joined the Northern based PRP under Aminu Kano and the GNPP under Ibrahim Waziri, the alternative political parties to the NPN, except for Plateau State which was out of step with the rest of the North, by joining the NPP under the leadership of the Ibo with Azikiwe as Presidential Candidate after the splits with Ibrahim Waziri⁶⁵. Indeed, the party support and subsequent

votes of the other M-Belt minorities outside Benue state were protest votes rather than rejection of the NPN party and these went against Tarka⁶⁶. In the elections in 1979, half the Tiv and Idoma intelligentsia were against Tarka and the NPN party in Benue, although the loyalty of the mass of the people to Tarka and the NPN remained quite profound and produced the largest percentage majority to the NPN party, of any state in Nigeria: 76.4% in the Presidential elections results for Shehu Shagari⁶⁷. In Plateau itself the turn-out and the votes cast in the Governatorial elections were more than those in the Presidential Elections: 585 588 as against 548 405⁶⁸. Furthermore, Plateau produced 70.4% of its votes for Solomon Lar, a Plateau man, the NPP Governatorial candidate and cast only 49.2% for Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Ibo who was the Presidential candidate of the NPP party. This means that Plateau was voting for its "son of the soil" rather than for the NPP party and Azikiwe.

In the period between 1978 and the elections of 1979, however, the Christian religious and minorities political identity of the M-Belt groups which had been activated in the Sharia controversy was submerged by local sentiments existing in the five states that contained the M-Belt groups: Gongola, Bauchi, Plateau, Kaduna and Benue. In Plateau, Gongola and S.Zaria, the issue of Hausa-Fulani Islamic domination persisted and the executions of army officers from these areas, as a result of the abortive Dimka coup d'etat assumed salience in 1979 as a political issue which conditioned the rejection of the NPN party (seen to be the symbol of Hausa-Fulani domination) and the UPN (a Yoruba party)⁶⁹. As an alternative therefore, there was political alignment of Gongola to the Maiduguri based Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP) under the leadership of Ibrahim Waziri, of Southern Zaria to the Kano based Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) under the leadership of Aminu Kano and of Plateau to the Enugu based Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) under the leadership of Nnamdi Azikiwe. In Benue, the commanding political influence of Joseph Tarka, as one of the founders of

the NPN and the lessons of previous experiences in opposition politics to the dominant party, shaped support for the NPN party. Both Benue and Plateau states, who had led the anti-Sharia crusade and activated the Christian religious identity among the M-Belt groups in the North, ended up assuming different political identities in the 1979 elections. This was barely two years after having solidly stood together with religious and political unity to oppose and stop the Sharia over Nigeria. In 1979, the M-Belt identity was fragmented into five political party identities, with only Plateau State in the NPP still maintaining the tradition of the Christian religious identity and the liberating theme from the Islamic society, in politics with the M-Belt movement in the North and Nigeria. Only scattered political support for christian solidarity and the liberating theme of the NPP on the Plateau, came from Numan, Southern Bauchi (South West and South Eastern parts of Bauchi Division but mainly the Tangale Waja and Lere areas), Southern Zaria and Benue State.

Table E.1 suggests that in the M-Belt areas the votes cast for the five different political parties were as follows: the NPN had 49.3% of the M-Belt vote, NPP 19.0%, GNPP 15.9%, UPN 10.5% and the PRP 5.2%. The highest vote for the NPN in the M-Belt areas came from Benue with 76.4% which was also the highest vote in support of the NPN when all states of the Federation are compared. The lowest vote for the NPN in the M-Belt areas came from Southern Bauchi with 28.9%. The NPP party which made political effort to symbolize the interests of the minorities in the North had its highest share of votes on the Plateau, with 49.2% and the weakest support from Gongola with 4.4%. In all of the M-Belt areas, the NPN scored substantial votes in the Presidential elections. This suggests that the votes for other parties were essentially votes in protest, rather than a rejection of the NPN. The votes for the NPN party, a party that strongly represented the symbol of the Northern political identity, however, regressed from areas where Hausa-Fulani domination was less visible (ie.

Table E.1

The M-Belt Vote in the Presidential Election of 1979

M-Belt Area	Votes Cast	NPN	% Share	NPP	% Share	GNPP	% Share	UPN	% Share	PRP	% Share
Benue	538879	411648	76.4	63097	11.7	42993	7.97	13864	2.6	7277	1.4
Southern											
Bauchi	272254	150003	55.1	39964	14.7	43844	16.1	13139	4.8	25304	9.3
Gongola	739138	327057	51.2	27856	4.4	217914	34.1	138561	21.7	27750	4.3
Plateau	548405	190458	34.7	269666	49.2	37400	6.8	29029	5.3	21852	3.98
Southern											
Zaria	218722	63190	28.9	40475	18.5	27318	12.5	49764	22.8	37975	17.4
Total	2317398	1142356	49.3	441058	19.0	369469	15.9	244357	10.5	120158	5.2

Sources: The General Elections 1979: Report by Federal Electoral Commission, Lagos, 1979 p8 - p470; Ahmadu Kurfi, The Nigerian General Elections: 1959 and 1979 and aftermath, Lagos, 1983 p273.

Benue), toward areas where its most visible forms were still an issue to contest (ie. Southern Zaria, Plateau and Gongola); the most agitated group in southern Bauchi the Jarawa, having been conciliated by their merger into Plateau. The outstanding electoral performance of the NPN party in the M-Belt areas is explained by the 'Band-Wagon Effect' which was national in the light of other elections and minorities like the Tiv made their political calculations and identified with the NPN. However, given that the NPN had its strongest support from a minorities area (Benue), largely from the political power of Joseph Tarka, the NPN won the election on the strength of minorities votes. More fundamental in the interplay of political identities in the 1979 elections, the figures in Table E.1 show how very much the M-Belt areas still held sentiments for the Northern identity which caused the NPN to win the elections in the M-Belt areas with the NPP coming second. It was only in the isolated case of the Plateau that the NPN lost to the NPP party. Table E.1 however shows the extent to which political behaviour in the M-Belt areas contrasted with conceptions of the solidarity of the M-Belt political and Christian religious identity.

To compound the problems of a fragmented M-Belt political conception of unity in different states with different political party identities, there was developed a curious political demand for the dismemberment of Plateau State. Politics within Plateau State and its image on the national arena had continued on the traditions of one element of the identity of the M-Belt movement: a blend of Christian religious identity on the shape and nature of the tribal and political minorities identity of non-Islamic groups. In the predominantly Islamic parts of the State, particularly those within but sandwiched between Benue State, there was demand for the creation of "a middle belt state" in 1981. In contrast to the Christian religious identity of the fundamental M-Belt movement of the period between 1950 and 1967, Muslims in the southern parts of the state were actually "hijacking" the political label and sought to turn the religious concept on

the heads of the Christian politicians in Plateau state by simplifying the political meaning of the wider Middle Belt concept to refer to a Muslim minorities "middle belt state" in the Southern parts of Plateau. The Muslim minorities in Plateau state were demanding a "middle belt state:

"based purely on a desire to give deprived people of the area, the right and opportunity to be masters of their own destiny and develop their long neglected and deprived area ... and not on sentiments or the desire to satisfy any particular tribal or sectional groups"⁷⁰.

In 1982 the movement suggested that the creation of the "middle belt state" was demanded in order to immortalize Joseph Tarka who died earlier in 1980; but most probably to win over the support of the Tiv in Benue and their large concentration who had migrated a long time ago to Lafia, Nassarawa and Doma areas. However, the military coup d'etat of December 1983, overtook the demands and in anycase it was a conceptual abuse and the demands were bogus because there was strong opposition by the many Christians and non-Muslims in the areas. The new state itself might have simply duplicated the problems of plural politics of the M-Belt areas - an incessant regression from regionalism to localism. Indeed in almost every one of the 19 states of the Federation there was found a vociferous demand for the creation of a new state in 1982, based on "Son of the soil" politics of coalition, regardless of previously existing Regional identities, until the establishment of military rule in 1983. After the coup the 'State Creation Movements' ended and the military ordered all their assets to be confiscated.

Although the M-Belt identity seems to be quite fluid and illusive in maintaining political unity over the groups who had claims to it, the political identity assumed a crucial role in always resurfacing to balance the centrifugal Northern forces in Nigerian politics within the federal system. Sometimes this balance is purely religious in which the M-Belt

Christian religious identity wedges the fears of Islamic hegemony over the Nigerian Federation by Southern Nigerian groups; when this happens the M-Belt groups exhibit the Christian religious identity and point to the Tiv, Idoma, Jukun, Bachama, Kaje, Birom, Angas, Sura etc. to suggest that not everyone in the North is Muslim and in the dominant political majority tribal group. Sometimes the whole of the North is referred to as Hausa-Fulani and to have its centre of political and religious gravity in Sokoto. This was particularly critical in the period of the civil war when Gowon and the majority of the soldiers who fought in the civil war and whose majority came from the M-Belt areas were readily used as references to defuse the claims by Ojukwu that the Muslim North was destroying Ibo led "Christian-Biafra". Furthermore, after the 1979 election results in which Shehu Shagari won the Presidency and Chief Awolowo lost, Ishaya Audu (a Wusasa Christian) was appointed Foreign Minister and Samuel Mafuyai (a Challa Christian from Plateau), Aviation Minister. This defused Yoruba propaganda which was spearheaded by the Tribune group of newspapers suggesting that a feudalistic Islamic North of the old NPC party of the Sardauna was extending its sway over the rest of Nigeria. Largely because of the socio-religious and political identity of the M-Belt groups which was distinct from the Islamic society in the North, once the national government in Nigeria is controlled by Muslims, political caution is exercised to structure appointments reflecting the M-Belt factor in Nigerian politics. This is usually used to counter southern Nigerian stereotype fears over a monolithic Islamic North dominating the Federation. There is, therefore, still in the Nigerian political arena recognizable M-Belt character, which with other minority groups in the south, shapes the political calculations of dominant groups wishing to capture power. Ironically, due to the split in the Muslim North leadership, between Shehu Shagari (NPN) Waziri Ibrahim (GNPP) and Aminu Kano (PRP), the NPN won at least as high a percentage share of votes in the majority areas as its

votes in the minorities areas in the North. The interplay of the M-Belt political identity is between the different big cultural and religious groups as a political bridgehead. However, although successful in balancing the political power struggles in Nigerian politics between the dominant cultural groups, it has completely failed to achieve a territorial unity of its own, where the political identity might have crystallized over an area, in the same sense of the Northern identity. The curious fact about the M-Belt identity in both its political and religious dimensions is that it never gets mobilized until there are overt threats of a developing Islamic hegemony in the North and Nigeria. This makes the M-Belt identity a constellation of identity that is latent, more religious than political. Yet it is from the political arena that the religious always gets activated. Thus, for example, the great anti-corruption crusader became corrupted in office as Governor of Benue State, his activities having destroyed Gomwalk, increased the tensions that led to the final collapse of the Gowon-Regime as well as BP state. Yet, in 1981, it was the same Aper Aku in conjuncture with Solomon Lar that remembered Gowon as "a Middle-Belter" and jointly demanded his repeal from being a wanted man, following from the events that surrounded the abortive Dimka Coup d'etat in 1976.

However, the M-Belt identity has remained very crucial in the political processes of both military and civilian governments in Nigeria, where their balance of support is still very crucial for success. It is because the M-Belt military factor is still very strong in the Nigerian army, for example, that has ensured that their share of government patronage is disproportionate to those of other Nigerian groups after the coup d'etat of 31st December 1983, which brought the Buhari Regime into power. Thus, for example, from one M-Belt tribe alone, the military factor conditioned the appointments of Brigadier Jerry Huseine (Yergam) as Governor of Bendel State, Domkat Bali (Yergam), Minister of Defence,

Group-Captain Bernard Banfa (Yergam), Director of Nigerian Airways, and retired Major-General Joseph Garba (Yergam) as the Nigerian UN permanent representative. Given the socio-political and military scope of the M-Belt groups, the identity is still very much alive and like a sleeping giant, it awaits to be awakened by the tremours of the directions of political development in Nigeria. Although the territorial conceptions of the M-Belt political identity as one single unit have been permanently smashed, the process also served to remove the socio-economic fears that threatened the identity, but did not disperse its political and religious conceptions. The identity is thus overlaid by sentiments of localism (son of the soil-ism), but remains potent and has potential force in the state Government in the M-Belt areas. Like many other religious forces in politics in other parts of the world, the Christian religious identity of the M-Belt is powerful, although submerged, because the political system frowns on religious political organization. It however remains the nerves of Nigerian politics. It is also the muscles in the body of politic of Nigeria.

Notes to Epilogue

1. Broadcast Speech to Benue-Plateau State Citizens, Ministry of Information, Jos, 1st October 1970.
2. For some examples, see Fact and Figures about Benue-Plateau State of Nigeria, Ministry of Information and Internal Affairs, Jos, 1972 p45; Features on Northern States: Benue-Plateau and Kano States, Kano, June 1969 p16.
3. Facts and Figures about Benue-Plateau State of Nigeria, Ministry of Information and Internal Affairs, Jos, 1972 p45.
4. Edward Baum, "Recent Administrative Reform in Local Government in Northern Nigeria", Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 7 No. 1, October 1972 p75.
5. Features on Northern States: Benue-Plateau and Kano States, Vol. I No. 6, Kano, June 1969 p20.
6. Benue-Plateau State of Nigeria: Statistical Yearbook 1969, Jos, 1969 p66.
- 7a Features on Northern States: Benue-Plateau and Kano States, Vol. I, No. 6, Kano, June 1969 p19.
- 7b Ibid June 1969 p19.
- 8a The Speech Delivered by His Excellency the Military Governor of Benue-Plateau State, Mr Joseph Gomwalk, ACP, at a meeting with Representatives of various ethnic groups in the State at Government Lodge, Jos, Saturday May 3rd, 1969 p1.
- 8b Ibid May 1969 p2.
9. Ibid May 1969 p2-3.
10. Bola Ige, "I knew Joseph Tarka" in Simon Shango (Ed.), Tributes to a Great Leader, Enugu, 1982 p92-94.
11. M. J. Dent, "Senator J. S. Tarka: Introduction to Memorial Volume - A Personal View" in Simon Shango (Ed.), Tributes to a Great Leader: J. S. Tarka, Enugu, 1982 p28.
12. Ibid 1982 p28.
13. Ibid 1982 p28-29.
14. Ibid 1982 p28-29.
15. Ibid 1982 p29.
16. Ibid 1982 p30.
17. Unity and Peace in Diversity, Broadcast Speech by His Excellency, the Military Governor, to People of Benue-Plateau State, Jos, 17th September 1974 p6.
18. For examples, see sundry copies of the New Nigerian for the period between January 1970 and September 1974.
19. Yahaya 1979 p204-222.
20. Anonymous Letter From an Alleged Plateau Man Quoted in an Address by Joseph Targema Orka, to the Commission on the Creation of more States in the Nigerian Federation, October 1975.
21. For examples, see Unity and Peace in Diversity, Speech by His Excellency, the Military Governor, to People of Benue-Plateau State, Jos, 17th September 1974 p1-8.
22. Ali D. Yahaya, "The Creation of States" in Keith Panter-Brick (Ed.), Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria, London, 1978 p204.
23. Ibid 1978 p204.
24. Ibid 1978 p209.
25. Ibid 1978 p209.
26. An Address Delievered by His Highness the Chief of Jos, Mr. Fom Bot on behalf of the Traditional Rulers and the entire people of the former Plateau Provinces on the issue of creating more states, Jos, October 1975 p1-2.
27. Ibid 1975 p1-2.
28. For examples, see The New Nigerian, advertisement "The Stand of the

- Tiv People", December 3rd, 1974; Address by Joseph Targema Orka, to the Commission on the creation of more states in the Nigerian Federation, October 1975.
29. Ibid October 1975 sundry pages.
 30. Yahaya 1978 p219.
 31. Ahmadu Kurfi, The Nigerian General Elections: 1959 and 1979 and the Aftermath, Lagos, 1983 p51.
 32. Ibid 1983 p52.
 33. Oyediran 1979 p243.
 34. Dent 1978 p125.
 35. Ibid 1978 p136.
 36. Ibid 1978 p136.
 37. Ibid 1978 p136; See also The New Nigerian, Kaduna, November 13th, 1974, "Lafia and Nassarawa Divisions want BP State to remain"; The New Nigerian, Kaduna, December 2nd, 1974, "Creation of More States and the Stand of Nassarawa Emirate"; The New Nigerian, Kaduna, December 16th 1974, "The Stand of the People of Wukari".
 38. Dent 1978 p136.
 39. Interview Discussions with George Hoomkwap, January 1981.
 40. E. Alex Gboyega, "The making of the Nigerian Constitution" in Oyeleye Oyediran (Ed), Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule: 1966-1979, London, 1979 p243.
 41. Ibid 1979 p246.
 42. Ibid 1979 p244.
 43. Ibid 1979 p246.
 44. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Constituent Assembly Debates, Lagos, 1979 piv - pxi.
 45. Interview Discussions with George Hoomkwap, January 1981.
 46. Ibid 1979 piv - pxi.
 47. Ibid 1979 piv.
 48. Gboyega 1979 p252.
 49. Ibid 1979 p252.
 50. Interview Discussions with George Hoomkwap, January 1981.
 51. Gboyega 1979 p252 - p253.
 52. Ibid 1979 p253.
 53. Ibid 1979 p253.
 54. Ibid 1979 p253.
 55. Ibid 1979 p253.
 56. Interview Discussions with George Hoomkwap, January 1981; Hoomkwap, further suggests that many Southern Nigerian Christians in the CA expressed surprise when they were seen going to church on Sundays. It was also alleged that their religiosity was meant to deceive the South while a monolithic Islamic North remained!
 57. Interview Discussions with George Hoomkwap, January 1981.
 58. New Nigerian, Kaduna, 11th April 1978.
 59. Gboyega 1979 p254.
 60. Ibid 1979 p254.
 61. Yahaya 1979 p272.
 62. Interview Discussions with George Hoomkwap and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
 63. M.J. Dent, "Senator J. S. Tarka: Introduction to Memorial Volume - A Personal View", in Simon Shango (Ed), Tributes to A Great Leader: J.S. Tarka, Enugu, 1982 p27.
 64. Ibid 1982 p34; Yahaya 1979 p270.
 65. Yahaya 1979 p270.
 66. Dent 1982 p34.
 67. Ibid 1982 p31; Oyediran 1981 Appendix 5.
 68. Oyediran 1981 Appendix 4 and 5. who conducted the enquiry on the coup makers and recommended specific sentences of execution by firing squads and to General Obasanjo, who hurried the approved sentences,

- particularly that of Iliya Bissala.
70. "We Want Our Own State "Middle-Belt State": for Freedom, Progress and Justice", Movement for the creation of a Middle Belt State, Jos, 10th January 1981 p1; The suggested areas for the "middle belt state" were to comprise: Akwanga, Awe, Doma, Keffi, Lafia, Nassarawa, Akun, Obi, Toto and Uke - with a total population of about 1 323 642 (1973 census projections); the movement also wished to see Nigeria organized along the old lines of the proposed 1905 Provinces of Lugard, with a minimum of 25 federal units; Infact the so called "middle belt state" was the former Nassarawa Province, a proposal which harks back to 1919 when it was dismembered and perhaps merely confirms the strength of historical links forged by a common administrative experience.

APPENDIX IDefining Key Terms and Categories used in The Research

Ethnic Groups:

For the purpose of this study we use the term ethnic group to refer to groups characterized by a sense of identity and by the cultural features which they may have. This may be a common language that shapes their communicative world views on socio-economic and political problems and also the cultural values that shape similarities in their life style. The group may be concentrated in a specific geographical space and make claims that they are natural to the area. The basic feature of an ethnic group therefore is the existence of a wide and advanced level of cultural and physical intercourse between individuals in the groups of which it is composed within the geographical space. It ought to be borne in mind however that each society in the modern world contains subsections or subsystems more or less distinct from the rest of the population even within an ethnic group.

On account of the potential for variations within categorized population R.A. Shermerhorn therefore defines an ethnic group as: "a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their people".¹

1. R.A. Shermerhorn, A framework for Theory and Research: Comparative Ethnic Relations, New York 1970 p.12

Examples of such symbolic elements associated with an ethnic group are: kinship patterns, physical contiguity as localism or sectionalism or the underlying notions in the conceptions of 'son of the soil', religious affiliations, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliations, nationality, phenotypical features or any combinations of these; but a necessary if not paramount accompaniment is some consciousness of kind among members of the group.

Socio-Cultural Identity:

For the purpose of this study, we use the term socio-cultural identity to refer to the way the culture of a specific society shapes the personality of individuals that belong to it. Socio-cultural **identity** is thus taken to mean the way of a group of people that affects individuals in specific ways who may be an ethnic group: the configuration of all the more or less stereotyped patterns of learned behaviour which are handed down from one generation to the next through the means of language and imitation account for all particular socio-cultural identities.¹

Personality in this context is taken to mean a more or less enduring organization of forces within the individual associated with a complex of fairly consistent attitudes, values and modes of perception which account in part for the individual's consistency of behaviour from his socio-cultural environment that is crucial in determining a socio-cultural identity.² Essentially however, a socio-cultural identity is a reconciliation of private and public identities that come together into a stable relationship with a community of relation-

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1. Perspectives of this definition derive from W.J.M Mackenzie Political Identity, Middlesex, England 1978 p.42
 2. Mackenzie 1978 p.43

ships within a collectivity for the collective identity to be usable as a political identity.¹ A socio-cultural identity is therefore tied to the ethnic cultures of societies.

Implicit in this definition is that the existence of an ethnic group becomes a sufficient indicator of a socio-cultural identity. The crucial difference between a socio-cultural identity and an ethnic identity however, is that the former may expand and contract to enclose and incorporate other groups by proximity of residence while ethnic identities are essentially static identities. This means new socio-cultural identities may be learnt and assume saliency when they become built up by socially and culturally meaningful influences and religion that cut across ethnic boundaries and patterns of identity as was the case with the M-Belt groups ^{and Societies} upon impact with the Christian religion and Western modernization and educational influences which created new values, and new languages like Hausa and English.

Outsiders:

For the purpose of this study, the term 'outsiders' is used to refer to conceptions of the central problems in socio-cultural, ethnic and political identity: 'I' and 'we', 'us' and 'them', as they affect the specific 'culture context' of an ethnic group identity or an identity that becomes mobilized for political purposes.² Conceptions of 'insiders' and 'outsiders' however tend to revolve or the fear of domination of 'insiders' by those that may be branded as 'outsiders'.

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1. Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernization in The Middle East, London 1958 p.408
 2. For more elaborate discussions of these categories see Mackenzie 1978 p.40-48

The fear of domination is the atavistic force that binds people together, since it is about things unfamiliar, unknown or simply different brought in by new entrants from other places. The creation of such a category, by let us say, politicians, religious priests etc. seems to be what holds people together as a unit. This may provide the cement for people who may not necessarily be considered distinct or having a persistent cultural system in terms of sharing a common language, a religious faith, a cultural heritage with roots in history and way of life.¹

It ought to be borne in mind, however, that all distinct categories of people cling together, united by a specific identity which serves as a psychological fortress when there is intrusion from outside, by people considered as strangers, in the context of perceived differences in the ways of doing things or in life styles and values. In a situation like that new ideas and life styles, that are perceived as threats to the integrity of their distinct identities, tend to increase fears which assume greater intensity in times of socio-economic and political conflict. All through the history of man, the 'outsider', has been the scape-goat in the recriminations of the 'insiders'.

It has, however, always been a matter for politically motivated agitation to arouse the fear over strangers, who may be menacing

1. For discussions and examples, see article by Edward H. Spicer, 'Persistent cultural systems: A comparative study of Identity systems that can adapt to contrasting environments', Science, Oct-Dec 1971, Vol.174 p.795-800

the very sanctity of the insiders' homes and identity. This conception of 'outsiders' as against 'insiders' also becomes directed at political recalcitrants in which case they are branded as collaborators, and a collaborator with outsiders is an 'inside outsider'. In a situation like that, shared interests and shared space become the criteria of cooperation between practical men to brand all others as 'outsiders'. People who share an interest share an identity. The interests of each require the collaboration of all within the presumed identity.¹

Conceptions of 'outsiders' are powerful factors that reinforce political and social identities since their social space conditions interact in communicative networks and those who share a network share an identity. Those excluded from that network of communications - interaction, in context of the specific shared interests and identity are the 'outsiders'.

Political Identity:

For the purpose of this study, we use the term, political identity, to mean identification and political loyalty of an individual, or a socio-cultural community, to an organization, to resolve questions that are concerned with power and authority, with other contestants, to secure them and with their exercise within a recognized framework of government.² To define political identity, therefore, means defining politics.

The ordinary usage of the word 'politics', is primarily concerned with such things as parliaments, congresses, presidents, parties,

1. Mackenzie 1978 p.124
2. Ibid p.107

public officials, cities and city bosses, enforcement of law, civil liberties, dictatorships: "It is concerned with "them", the big boys, the fixers, the "high-Heidyins", not in general, but as a special trend or sector of our grumbles, about the human situation... That is where 'politics' bites first and most deeply."¹

More fundamental however, the meaning of politics reflects the issues that concern society as public servants, beneficiaries or victims of government. A definition, often employed by political scientists, describes politics as, the articulation, choice and reconciliation of conflicting demands for government action.² Politics in any society, is about calling issues to public attention, whether through testimony before committees or testimony in the streets by a demonstration. It may even be testimony and communications with government through planting a bomb, hijacking a plane or kidnapping a dignitary, causing the death of a charismatic political leader and overthrowing a government by any means. Politics is also about reconciling competing demands for governments to act or to ignore an issue in dispute. In the instance of politics some issues are "organized-in" while others are "organized-out".³ In the circumstances politics is conflict-prone. Conflicts in politics concern what governments ought to do about specific issues, such as the creation of a M-Belt region, armed robbery, crime in the cities or rural housing,

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1. Mackenzie 1978 p.107
 2. For extended discussions of definitions of politics, see Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, 3rd Ed. New Jersey 1976, Chapter 1
 3. Rose 1978 p.10

provision of electricity, pipe borne water or tarred roads. It also concerns disputes about which individuals or institutions should make decisions about political actions to be taken in the name of the people in society. In that respect, politics also concerns, how institutions are used by politicians to achieve their objectives in the governing process.

The governing process involves officials in many different institutions, as much as it involves those outside governments who press demands for government to act and those who receive the goods and ills produced by the process.¹ Politics also involves governing. Governing is about a place, a territory, as much as it is about people in the territory.² Where electoral patterns exist the mechanism that organized politics to produce governing is the political party.

Essentially as used in this study therefore, a political identity is party identity which is generated toward achieving specific objectives of society when it takes control of political power and may have public interest at heart as much as it fulfils the private interests of individuals.³

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1. Rose 1978 p.9
 2. Ibid
 3. See more elaborate discussions in Mackenzie 1978 p.106-132; Philip E. Jacob et al (Eds), The Integration of Political Communities, New York, 1965 p.270-283; Michael Laver, The Politics of Private Desires: The Guide to the Politics of Rational Choice, London 1981 p.106

Majority(ies)/Minority(ies):

For the purpose of this study, the term majority is used to mean an ethnic group that has greater numerical size than other groups and societies in a wider plural society, like a Region or a State in Nigeria or in context of the whole Nigerian Federation relative to other Nigerian groups and societies. This suggests that there are no numerical majority ethnic groups, unless there also exists a numerical minority ethnic group. This distinction is analytically crucial, because a numerical minority can dominate a numerical majority like in Burundi.

In this study however the problem was Islamic majorities which dominated non-Islamic minorities. This distinction also highlights the point that the existence of minorities and majorities in a plural society, suggests that there are various types of relationships which occur between them. The nature of the type of relationships is politically crucial since groups relate to each other in terms of differential prestige of social status and control of political power. A minority may therefore be either a dominant group or a subordinate group. Such relationships imply definitions of this category in terms that suggest that groups cannot relate to each other as minority and majority unless the members of those groups establish ways of recognizing one another in terms of political advantage.¹

In using the term majority ethnic groups we recognize the meaning of its political dimension in electoral numerical sizes, in

1. B. Eugene Griessman, Minorities: A text with Readings in Inter-Relations, Alabama, USA, 1974 p.viii

context of political identities and access to political power as characteristic of the groups within the larger society as well as their joint political behaviour patterns. Similarly by combining the characteristics of groups in terms of size, power and ethnicity we use the term minority ethnic group to signify a group(s) that has less than half the population of a given society and is in an appreciable subsystem with limited access to roles and activities central to the economic and political institution of the society.¹ Furthermore, a minority group may be taken as a group of people who are discriminated against and who regard themselves as objects of discrimination. This may be an ethnic group that is distinct because of culturally identifiable patterns, a racial group that has distinct physical characteristics or a restricted membership religious group.

The thesis takes account of all these dimensions in the usage of these categories but is emphatic in using the term 'minority', restricted to groups that are small in numerical size by their cultural patterns and lacking access to political power in the wider society.

The term 'majority' group is used to refer to numerically large groups that are also dominant groups in society.² The problem however remains, whether one can really generalize that all claims in the demands for a separate state into a new political unit of a federation

1. Schermerhorn 1968 p.14

2. See more elaborate discussions of these conceptual categories and their definitions by Donald E. Gelfand, "Ethnic Relations and Social Research: A Re-evaluation", in Donald E. Gelfand and Russell D. Lee, Ethnic Conflict and Power: A Cross-National Perspective, London 1973 p.9-10

originates from conceptions of "minorities". In the instance of the Nigerian experience of a federation, minority groups and societies established the political precedence rather than the "majorities" where political recalcitrants conditioned separation into a new political unit within the majorities. For example while the M-Belt political, social and cultural minorities demanded the creation of a M-Belt Region as early as 1950 it was not until in the 1960s that a Kano and Borno Region became political issues.

The Nature of socio-economic and political relationships:

For the purposes of this study, the terms nature of socio-economic and political relationships, between groups in society are used in reference to the distribution of political power, authority and political decision-making on socio-economic matters that make some groups dominate others, with the dominated in subordinate positions ^{decision making} in/roles played in society. The focus therefore is on levels of distribution of ethnic groups to socio-economic and political roles, who may get politically manipulated and why, as much as which group is patron and which is a client and the dictatorial forms of power and authority that is involved and their institutionalization by the politically advantaged group(s). In the situation, exploitation discrimination and prejudice become characteristics of the nature of socio-political and economic relationships.

Prejudice, which is almost a form of racism, based on stereotype attitudes, is the underlying cause of exploitation and discrimination. A popular usage of prejudice refers to hostility between ethnic or racial groups within society. This definition does not however specify whether the hostile relationship is one solely of unfavourable

attitudes or of both unfavourable attitudes and actions. A narrower definition restricts the term to an attitude which is not justified by reality. In the situation, the prejudiced group may just lack or may distort information with the result that its attitudes do not fit the actual situation, or the actual attributes of the group which is the object of the prejudice. A more precise definition limits prejudice specifically to an unfavourable or favourable attitude towards a group, which may or may not lead to overt hostile or friendly action. We use prejudice here as an attitude that predisposes a person in authority to think, perceive, feel and act in favourable and unfavourable socio-political ways towards a group or its individual members.¹

As a measure in this reserach, it is reported attitudes and statements on specific groups, by other groups that are used as indicators of prejudice to determine both positive and negative attitudes and their accompanying "mental-blocks" on other groups and societies. This mainly concerns analysis of British political attitudes in the period between 1900 and 1960 toward the Islamic society and the M-Belt groups and societies in The North and the socio-political attitudes of political leadership in the Islamic society in the period between 1804 and the present, toward the M-Belt groups and societies and also toward Southern Nigerian groups.

1. See more elaborate discussions of prejudice in G. Duncan Mitchell (ed) A New Dictionary of Sociology, London 1979 p.146

Prejudice, to subordinate groups and societies may result from differences in magico-religions, cultures, language, lifestyles, food, dress styles and traditional levels of social, political and economic development which may be seen as inferior by the prejudiced group. The political advantages enjoyed by groups in positions of authority may become compounded by the prejudices that exist in society which usually result in discriminatory practices and the exploitation of the subordinate groups. Discriminatory practices may be on economic, occupational and social roles in the institutions of society based on language and socio-cultural identities as much as it can result in segregated residence. Exploitation is not narrowed to the purely Marxian notions of labor and raw materials since in certain instances groups may be exploited in terms of their social status and prestige: ^{for example} subordinate groups may be seen to be fit only for specified functional roles in the institutions of society and pegged down into the positions with little chance of upward mobility within the system of institutions, whether these be economic, political social, occupational roles as in the administrative services to do with political decision-making.¹ Typical reaction to the resulting patterns of conflict in a situation like that is that there is cultural alignments of both dominant and dominated populations in order to improve their positions.

Region/State:

For the purpose of this study, the term Region and State is used synonymously to refer to a particular geo-political, administrative

territory and economic space. This is in particular reference to the political Units whose boundaries were contained in the Nigerian Federation more concretely from 1946, consolidated in 1954, restructured in 1967 and which became further subdivided in 1976. Within the geo-political unit claims always exist that their cultural and political ties make their spaces distinct from the rest. It must be noted however that international, national, regional or even local government boundaries are artificial and do not respect or correspond exactly to socio-cultural and political reality. This is a universal phenomenon. No-one has as yet produced an absolute classification that produces uncontested boundaries since it is not possible to take into account every conceivable criterion that might be relevant to produce boundaries that correspond to exact socio-cultural and political reality.¹ To some extent however political boundaries, whether they are international or within the political units of a nation state like in a federal system, have a characteristic of consolidating political identities, particularly so when an administrative system has held the enclosed citizens for a long period of time. For example the Northern and provincial identities in The North of Nigeria were largely built up on an administrative system over a longish period of time until they were politically altered in 1967 by the Nigerian Military Government under General Gowon

1. See more elaborate discussions of this definition in J.F. MacDonald "The lack of Political Identity in English Regions: Evidences from Mps", Studies in Public Policy, No.33, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow 1979 p.2-4

and subsequently under General Mohammed with the identities still existing. This suggests that a common administrative system is also crucially important in the definition of a Region/State and the political unity conceived of by its citizens.

Government Policy:

For the purpose of this study, the term government policy is used to refer to what governments do with policy. In other words we use the term to describe governing in policy terms.

The word policy itself is used in at least three different ways by political scientists.¹ In its most general use, it is synonymous with issues or problems that point to an area of life on earth that governments can do something about. We use the term however to emphasize the intentions of politicians who find themselves governing rather than the intentions of the programmes politicians ideally wish to achieve. Doing this concentrates attention upon the purposes of governing.² In this way the choice of means to achieve a given purpose is undoubtedly important but then, desirable purposes are usually abandoned if the means prescribed are politically unacceptable and the choice of ends itself is even more important for it reflects what governing is about.³

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1. For more detailed discussions on the use of the term 'policy' see Rose 1978 p.13-14.
 2. Rose 1978 p.13-14
 3. Rose 1978 p.14; see also David Apter, Choice and The Politics of Allocation: A Developmental Theory, London 1971 Chapter 5

Distribution of Socio-Economic, Political and Welfare Amenities and Benefits:

For the purpose of this study, the term Distribution of Socio-Economic, Political and Welfare Amenities and Benefits is used in reference to the production and distribution of an infrastructure for more welfare in society, since welfare of society is the central purpose of government and governing. The founding fathers of the social sciences viewed welfare as of central importance to government and governing. For example, in the days before economics, sociology and political science were separate academic subjects, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) used the word "happiness" in place of "welfare", writing: "The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation."¹

The use of the term welfare in this research is however not directly concerned with the greatest good to the greatest number of people in society since this can create enormous problems in a plural society like Nigeria where majority ethnic groups control governments. Instead the focus is with the promotion of particular infrastructural programmes that enhance the welfare of society. In the instance all pluralities whether they are majorities in government or minorities outside government benefit. Another problem is that the difficulties of measuring welfare are so great that, giving it practical meaning in legislation as well as in academic circles is itself a subject of political controversy. Unlike economics, governing is about providing

1. Cited in Rose 1978 p.47

particular benefits rather than benefits in the abstract. To assume that there exists or ought to exist a consensus about what constitutes welfare is to try to take politics out of government.¹

Psychologists and sociologists suggest there are three important measures of welfare or well-being of society: what an individual has (resources), what an individual is (social status) and what the person loves (affection and social solidarity).² In this research we also take account of conceptions of what individuals or groups think they ought to have or government and governing ought to produce for them in order to achieve the three important measures of welfare in society.

In the narrow sense, welfare may refer to payment of cash to people by governments as it happens to social security benefits in most Western European societies. In the broader sense of the term however, welfare benefits accrue to virtually all tax-payers in society because far larger sums than cash payments are spent on education, health, pensions and other programmes that indirectly affect welfare benefiting a cross-section of society in creating welfare infrastructural facilities in all societies. Of interest to this study infrastructural facilities³ would include means of transport and communications (roads, railways, bridges, sea ports, airports, post and telecommunication services), electricity and water supply, education, curative medicines and housing.⁴ Such services are

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1. Rose 1978 p.49
 2. Ibid p.18
 3. Commonly understood to mean services or capital assets helping to provide them that are basic to economic activity in its modern or industrial forms.
 4. Douglas Rimmer, 'The Economy since 1970', in Anthony Kirk Greene and Douglas Rimmer, Nigeria since 1970: A political and Economic Outline, London 1981 p.109

provided not only as intermediate products for industrial use; they also serve human wants directly. Thus for example, the demand for electricity is partly industrial and partly household, education and health care can be regarded as a means of raising labour productivity or as a source of personal gratification; mail and telephones facilitate both economic activity and social intercourse.¹ Uneven distribution of these would mean some groups benefit and have such infrastructural facilities disproportionate to others. The nature of politics compounds acceptable formulae for the 'even distribution' of infrastructural facilities. For example, an ethnic group outside the control of government may interpret the distribution of government socio-economic and welfare infrastructure as unevenly distributed. Where there is a pattern that suggests that there was government policy tied to patron-client relationship this affects 'even distribution' since it is the case that not everybody can be a patron or a client in society.

Control of Government:

For the purposes of this study, the term Control of Government is used in reference to mean a particular breed of politicians have their "hands on" the institutions of government and governing. Usually this is achieved through an election, political manipulation or through a military coup. The political advantages in the situation of control

1. Rimmer 1981 p.109

of government are obvious: a government is usually associated with rewards for the political community and individuals in it. Because it has political power it controls policy and political decision-making at the highest level. This has ramification on the distribution of socio-economic, political and welfare amenities and benefits. The result is uneven distribution reflecting a hodgepodge of welfare programmes depending largely on the political bargaining strength than social needs of groups in society.

Bureaucratic Jobs:

For the purpose of this study we use the term bureaucratic jobs to refer to bureaucratic, that is civil servants appointed for life on the grounds of expertise and skills. Usually, they are by far the most numerous group of office holders in any governed society, assumed secure in their position, whatever the political colouring of the political group in control of government. They have their "hands-on" power, so to speak, for they are the persons who carry out laws enacted for society by elected political leadership to benefit interested groups in society. The most successful of the bureaucrats can realize the literal meaning of the term bureaucracy: rule by bureau chiefs.¹ Most of the work of government and governing is therefore undertaken by civil servants of all categories who are the unobtrusive politicians rather than the campaigners for public office. The term is therefore used to specifically refer to government

1. Richard Rose, What is Governing: Purpose and Policy in Washington, London 1978 p.11

employees from where in the study it is analyzed to see whether such are recruited from the dominant or subordinate groups in a plural society to determine which group dominates government posts and jobs.

Domination of Government Posts:

For the purpose of this study, we use the term domination of top government posts to refer to politicians in government and in high ranking bureaucratic jobs.¹ Collectively, elected officeholders and high ranking bureaucrats are the politicians that run government in society. The term politician cannot however be restricted solely to elected officials, since Presidents, Governors, Prime Ministers, Premiers of Regions in a Federal system, make their own appointees who may belong to the same party or individuals that share certain political sympathies with the governing party.²

Political Power:

For the purpose of this study, political power is used to refer to the political capacity to mobilize resources of society for the accomplishment of intended effects with recourse to some type of sanction(s) to encourage compliance.³ Donald Gelfand identifies five power bases in society that may be directly or indirectly related to political power: Attraction power, Expert power, Reward power, Coercive power and Legitimate power.⁴

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1. Rose 1978 p.11
 2. Ibid
 3. This definition derives from John Walton's definition of power: Walton 1968 p.449, cited in Gelfand et al (eds) 1973 p.12
 4. Gelfand 1973 p.13

Attraction power or reference group power, which is power based on a group's liking for another group - for example, the destruction of traditional African culture made Europeans able to exert power over some Africans because their appearance and life style appeared more rewarding and valuable. In the instance of The North, the style of political leadership in the Islamic society made British administration shape M-Belt political leadership along such lines giving rise to a Northern Identity. Expert power, is the ability of one group to provide specialized knowledge and information for another. For example, in traditional African societies, priests were in a position to provide this assistance. In modern societies specialists in such occupational roles as psychiatry, law, medicine, assume this function. Conflict in society may result when dominant groups seek to maintain this power by controlling admissions into these occupations. In the instance of The North it may here be pointed out that most of the technical and professional jobs in the civil service were an exclusive list for the recruitment of the M-Belt groups and societies into the bureaucracy in The North. Only a few M-Belt people were recruited into political decision-making jobs like in the administrative services. Reward power, refers to a group's ability to provide another group with gains either of a material or spiritual nature. Coercive power refers to the ability of a group to mediate punishment for another group. Legitimate power is based on the acceptance of a group's right to prescribe opinions and behaviour.

These forms of power are however not mutually exclusive. For example control over different components of the social structure may provide groups with access to more than one base of power. This is

particularly so for the control over solidary groups in a community. These solidary groups may be able to induce individuals and groups to move into a community or prevent unwanted ethnic groups from doing so. Furthermore groups and individuals who possess one structural base of power may eventually attempt to extend the scope of their power.

This means that there are obvious differences in the power resources of various ethnic groups in a plural society. These differences are politically crucial in determining which of these various bases of power can be most effectively utilized by a particular group. The primary resources that enhance the bases of power for groups giving them political advantages include money, property, prestige, authority, control of resources, access to supernatural powers, physical strength, voting strength in voting rights and various rights achieved by formal education, apprenticeships or membership of certain organizations.¹ Possession of any of these resources may be countered by the resources that others possess and may result into intense political conflict.

Intensity of Political Conflict:

For the purpose of this study, the term intensity of political conflict, is used to refer to the amount of energy, resources and time invested in the conflict to resolve issues or problems by the contesting groups or individuals. It may be measured by such indicators as time and number of meetings, travel distances and extensiveness and financial contributions. Intensity of political conflict therefore refers to the amount of energy a group may invest on a conflict situation. The intensity of conflict and violence is usually characteristic and higher when engaged in by subordinate groups.²

1. Gelfand 1973 p.13
2. Ibid

Political Hostilities:

For the purposes of this study, the term political hostilities is used to refer to violence (although this may not be in all instances), and the weapons utilized as a means of resolution. Violence refers to the weapons chosen for a particular conflict. Conflict refers to disagreements in society over issues or problems. Generally, conflicts vary within society with an extreme point occurring when a group attempts to overthrow another group's political position by force of arms.¹

At less extreme levels, violence is commonly practised on individuals in organizations by exerting authority or by verbal assaults.² Contemporary social theory suggests and contends that manipulation has replaced coercion in organizations although there are times in all organizations when coercion by threats of jobs or pay and mild forms of violence are used.³ The intensity of conflict and violence is characteristically higher when engaged in by subordinated groups than by superordinate groups. This is because the avoidance of physical violence allows dominant groups who may be in control of government to exert power while maintaining the facade of an open democratic egalitarian society.⁴ On the other hand subordinated groups often than not resort to physical violence to a degree not required by groups with greater resources of power.⁵

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1. An example of this in Nigeria is the Ibo led attempt in January 1966 to overthrow the dominant position of The North in Nigerian Politics.
 2. Gelfand 1973 p.13
 3. Ibid
 4. Ibid p.14
 5. Ibid

Dominant Group:

For the purposes of this study the term dominant group is used to refer to that collectivity within society which has pre-eminent authority to function both as guardians and sustainers of the controlling values of the system and as prime allocators of rewards in the society.¹ A dominant group may be a group of greater or lesser intensity. For example, a restricted elite, incumbents of a government apparatus, an ethnic group who is a majority controlling government, a temporary or permanent coalition of interest groups or a pure numerical majority from a particular ethnic group. The emphasis on a dominant group in this study signifies numerical size, access and control of government by a socio-religious and cultural group. This means that an overwhelming preponderance of ethnic groups are subordinate rather than in dominant positions particularly so in context of The North where ethnic group numbers vary from 100 people to as many as 7 million people.

Subordinate Group:

For the purpose of this study, a subordinate group means a group that has little access to political power to influence socio-economic decision-making in the cause of the development of the wider society including its own territorial spaces. It is therefore dependent on a dominant group's political leadership. It may also be due to superior cohesion from language and culture, self-confidence rooted in the traditions of command in the ruling group and traditions of dependence of the other groups. This is the premise from which a minority as much as a majority group dominates. In a large measure

1. Schermerhorn 1968 p.12-13

however, subordination is conditioned by members and hence a minority in numerical size. Strictly speaking, "majority-minority" usage in this study is restricted to ethnic group numbers while "dominant-subordinate" usage is in reference to access to political power and the political process which in certain instances is compounded by "majority-minority" conceptions of numbers in electoral processes. This is crucially important in electoral democratic regimes given that the command vote is still salient in shaping electoral outcomes in Nigeria.

Historical Recollections:

For the purpose of this study, the term historical recollection is used to mean any remembrance of ideas and events from the past as affected individuals in a particular society. Ideas and events of the past are however only important when they become socially and politically meaningful to individuals in their present context and as it affects their relationships with other individuals or groups. Knowledge of such ideas and events and the way they become transmitted by ancestors affects and shapes socio-political relationships in society.

Appendix II

A definition of the M-Belt areas in the nature of socio-economic and political problems of incorporation in the North.

Distinction is made in this study between the conception of a geographical M-Belt in the territories of the Nigerian Federation and the sociological and political M-Belt in the North in Nigerian politics. The geographical definitions of the M-Belt have always been anti-the M-Belt political identity and created some confusion in the conceptual understanding of the political M-Belt where there were socio-economic and political problems of politics in the plural society of the North. It is therefore crucial to the understanding and explanation of the M-Belt movement in the North and Nigerian politics to produce a sociological and political definition of the M-Belt in more than just determinate geographical terms.

More than in any other part of Nigeria that contained separatist political movements for the subdivision of the Federation into more units, the M-Belt areas have been subjected to a stereotype political definition that derived from the submissions of the Northern Regional government to the Willink Commission of enquiry on the fears of minorities and the means of allaying them in 1957. The Commission had defined the area to comprise:

"the whole of Ilorin, Kabba, Benue and Plateau Provinces, the Southern parts of Bauchi and Zaria Provinces, the whole of Niger Province except for the area north of Kontagora town and the whole of the Numan Division of Adamawa Province together with the Districts of Muri and Wurkun in the Muri Division of the same province"¹.

Following from this definition James Coleman in 1958 in his academic classic on the development of Nigerian nationalism defined and described the M-Belt areas as: "the lower half of the (Northern) Region"². This

definition is more geographical than political and touts the political line of the Northern Regional government which produced a definition that went beyond the scope of the sentiments of the M-Belt movement. The areas of the "lower half" of the North contain more Muslims than Christians and with powerful Emirs as those of Ilorin, Bida, Minna, Kontagoro, Bauchi and Zaria, whose allegiance was strongly focussed on Sokoto as the centre of politics and religion. In 1963 Post, with some slight variation to the definitions of Coleman and that, produced by the Northern government in 1957, suggested that the M-Belt areas consisted of the Provinces of: "Ilorin, Niger, Kabba, Benue, Plateau and Adamawa"³. This definition leaves out substantial tribal minorities that exist in Southern Zaria and Southern Bauchi, whose political support the M-Belt movement enjoyed and who shared the social and political identity of the movement, them being Christians and non-Muslim.

Protagonists of the M-Belt movement and the creation of a M-Belt Region, also never clearly defined the M-Belt areas. Article three of the UMBC constitution and Bye-Laws of 1956 gave the definition of the M-Belt areas as Ilorin, Kabba, Niger, Benue, Plateau, Adamawa, Southern Zaria and Southern Bauchi Provinces⁴. This definition later received the endorsement of the UMBC Lafia conference on 15th-17th January 1957⁵. Slightly different definitions were given by Bitrus Rwang Pam and Ibrahim Imam which excluded Ilorin Province and the Ibgirra in Kabba Province but included the Igalla and other smaller groups in the area, and still included the "Lower North syndrome" definition by Coleman⁶. Subsequently scholarly research tended to use one variant or the other of those definitions which essentially remained within the domain of the geographical conception of the M-Belt in the North⁷.

One of the major political problems of the M-Belt movement in its efforts to mobilization Christians and non-Muslims for support of the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region was its ambivalence on the

areas for the region. While it concentrated its political leadership and activities in Adamawa, S.Bauchi, Plateau, S.Zaria and Benue, it all along claimed Ilorin and Kabba areas, mainly from its alliance with the AG and the financial assistance it enjoyed. Some divisions in Ilorin and Kabba had strong pan-Yoruba irredentist feelings which the AG encouraged, in the hope of the merger with Western Region of Nigeria. There is no doubt that there is a geographically descriptive M-Belt of Nigeria. However a socio-political M-Belt also exists in the specific context of religious and political problems in Nigeria, particularly problems in the North. It is in the latter case that constituted the foundations and origins in the growth and development of the M-Belt movement in Nigerian politics, which this study undertakes. Although a descriptive definition was brought to bear on a political concept, the geographical M-Belt areas did not correlate with the socio-political and economic problems of the political M-Belt that led to the organization of the M-Belt movement in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the North as a unit of the Nigerian Federation. The unclear definition of the M-Belt areas has arisen from the failure to disentangle the geographical M-Belt of Nigeria from the political M-Belt, from which the name derived, a failure that was due to official attitudes and political pressures on the M-Belt movement from both the government of the North and AG strategy to achieve the merger of the Yoruba divisions in the North with the West. One of the ways the government of the North created pressures on the concept of the M-Belt was to discourage in official circles any references to the Southern areas of the North as "Middle-Belt" and in its place the areas were referred to as "the riverain areas"⁸. The riverain concept was still very much a geographical definition. The logic of the geographical definition of the M-Belt might be something like this: the territories of the Nigerian political state are found roughly between latitudes 4 degrees and 14 degrees North and between 2 degrees 50' and 15 degrees East; the M-Belt areas, using a purely

geographical definition would therefore be the areas from West to East between latitudes 7 degrees 10' and 10 degrees 42'N⁹. The geographical M-Belt of Nigeria by this logic of definition, cuts off the southwardly parts of the Jukun, Tiv, Idoma and Igalla land and people and includes the Yoruba of Western parts of Nigeria as deep down as to Ondo and Oyo. Northwardly, the geographical M-Belt of Nigeria enclosed all of Kwara state (former Ilorin Province), some parts of Southern Sokoto, all of Niger state, and Southern half of Kaduna State, including Kaduna town, the Southern half of Bauchi including the towns of Bauchi and Gombe and a Southern bit of Borno and all of Adamawa. Using the geographical definition of the M-Belt movement without a precise distinction is therefore political meaningless. The geographical conception of the M-Belt does not reflect the socio-economic and political problems of minorities in the North, which is what the M-Belt movement was all about.

The correlation of the sources of political tensions between the Islamic society and the non-Islamic groups in the North and the subsequent political support the M-Belt movement enjoyed from specific areas, with the socio-political characteristics of certain non-Islamic groups can produce a more precise definition of the sociological and political M-Belt areas, in the North and Nigeria, which is more useful in the analysis of the problem. The M-Belt areas in the North were characterized by unique geographical features that made them stand out as distinct and different from the rest of the North. This varied from the hilly and rocky geographical features of the Plateau, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria, interspersed by the plains and hilly terrain of the Adamawa areas and the Manbilla Plateau, to the forested land areas with tall grassy plains in the Niger-Benue Valley. This natural setting of the M-Belt areas created sharp contrasts with the flat and plain woodland of the rest of the North, which stretched to the edges of the desert. There was no desert in the political and sociological M-Belt areas of the North in Nigeria. In the earlier years of the 20th century,

the non-Islamic groups in the North were differentiated from the rest of the Islamic Society by such descriptive labels as "the cannibal-belt" (Lady Lugard 1905; Tremearne 1912), "the pagan-belt" where Christianity might be established to wedge the southward expansion of Islam in the 'Sudan' (Kumm 1904) and laterly in the 1950s and 1960s as the "Bible-belt" in the North¹⁰. The government of British administration in the North also described the M-Belt areas as "pagan areas" and as an animistic area, where there was little and in some instances, a total absence of Islamic influences and civilization. Furthermore, the people of the M-Belt areas in the North were non-Hausa speaking non-Fulani, non-Kanuri and non-Nupe, the dominant Islamic groups in the North and they were also non-Muslims¹¹. The M-Belt groups who spoke the Hausa language were apt to be Christians or animist as were the Birom of Jos Division; the mixed religious tribes in the M-Belt areas spoke their own tribal languages as were the Pyem in Gindiri on the Plateau. Many of the other M-Belt tribes are neither Muslim, nor Hausa speaking like the Tiv in Benue¹². The conception of the M-Belt areas also has a cultural and historical significance in the experiences of the non-Islamic groups in the North who by and large were not part of one of the Hausa-Fulani emirates established in the days of dan Fodion and Sultan Bello and reinforced by British rule¹³. However, besides the above characteristics, there was simply no way of identifying or distinguishing the M-Belt people from the people of the Islamic society. Racial characteristics and the physical structure of the human beings were not as pronounced as they were between the North and the South in the Republic of the Sudan. In the Sudan, the negroid population in the South contrasted sharply with the Arabs of the North, who controlled political power in almost the same circumstances of Northern Nigeria, where religious identities reinforced political differences. In the North however the Fulani and the Kanuri, tended to be slightly different from the M-Belt people being fairer in skin pigmentation and taller with slimmer

body-build.

The M-Belt areas also have the highest concentration of minorities tribal groups in the North and Nigeria in terms of culture, population, religious beliefs, members who speak the same language, territorial area of claims to rights of ownership of land. It was from these conceptions that the "minorities" political identity of the M-Belt movement developed in relation to the dominance of Islamic groups in the control of politics and society in the North. However, a perfect correlation does not exist between the geographical boundaries of the M-Belt and the boundaries of politics of the M-Belt areas and the Islamic Society. This is so because there were areas with population that held strong allegiance to the Islamic Society which were in the middle of the M-Belt areas; for example, Keffi, Lafia, Kanam and Wase.

The definition of the M-Belt areas for the purposes of this research is focussed on the centres of gravity of the M-Belt Movement, the areas it directed its social and political appeal and also the areas that stood to be affected in benefits of the objectives of the dreamed M-Belt Region from the goals of the parent organization the NML to the all embracing political organization, the UMBC party under the leadership of Joseph Tarka. This therefore includes the whole societies whose boundaries differentiated and create conceptions of minorities in relation to the Islamic society in the North in socio-political and cultural terms.

However, to get into the innerness of the definition of the M-Belt areas, a periodization of the political experiences that characterized the non-Islamic groups in relation to the Islamic society in the North, is important. Three periods are critical to the definition. Firstly, there is the period that witnessed the establishment and functioning of an Islamic society in the North: the period before 1804 and between 1804 right through to 1900. In that period the M-Belt groups and people were essentially non-Islamic, although some were under varying degrees of control by the

Islamic society ie. those in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, some parts of the Plateau (Keffi, Nassarawa, Lafia, Kanam, Wase) and Southern Zaria; while others were beyond the boundaries of the Islamic society ie. the Tiv. In the same period, the M-Belt groups were also seen as peripheries to be exploited by the Islamic societies of the Hausa and Borno Kingdoms and eventually by the more elaborately centralized Islamic Society under the authority of Sokoto, established and expanded by the Fulani Jihad. As a result of the expansion of the Islamic Society, the M-Belt groups were raided for slaves that served the functional social and economic purposes of both the Islamic centres of Borno and Sokoto. The non-Islamic groups that were the socio-economic and political victims of the expanding Islamic Society in the North, were therefore the M-Belt groups and these later became the political focus of the M-Belt movement to gain support for the creation of a M-Belt Region. Secondly, there was the period of the establishment of the North and Nigeria by the British, in which the M-Belt areas were characterized by a non-Emirate structure of authority under British Residents and District Officers. The M-Belt groups in this period therefore were the non-centralized entities in authority patterns and this created difficulties for the British in their application of the indirect rule system. Also characteristic of the M-Belt areas in this period were the revolutionary activities of European Christian Missionary Bodies in the North, who were deliberately restricted to the non-Islamic parts of the North by the government of British administration. The M-Belt areas were, therefore, those areas of the North, where there was a concentration of European Christian Missionaries with social and welfare institutions which produced a Christian religious identity. Christianity, Christians and non-Christians as well as non-Muslims were therefore to be found in higher proportions in the M-Belt areas when compared with other parts of the North. A further significant trend which was begun in the 1940s was that more non-Muslims and non-Christians in the M-Belt areas were becoming

committed Christians rather than Muslims in the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, in the period approaching Self-Government and Independence for the North and Nigeria in the 1950s and also in the period after 1960, the M-Belt areas were characterized by anti-NPC sentiments with the increased religious and political consciousness when it was perceived that the NPC government was predominantly Islamic apparently clear in the political and religious expressions of the Sardauna. The M-Belt areas were therefore areas that contained political opposition to the NPC government, an opposition that was reinforced by anti-Islamic sentiments developed from the Christian religious identity.

The M-Belt areas in the North therefore were to be found in the South-Eastern parts of the Sokoto ruled Islamic Society and the Southern parts of the Borno Centred Islamic Society. These areas comprised Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau, S. Zaria and Benue. In terms of the contemporary Nigerian political scene, the areas comprise of Gongola, Plateau and Benue states as well as the Southern parts of Kaduna and Bauchi states.

Notes to Appendix 2

1. Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, December 1957 p46-p47.
2. James Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, London 1958 p18-p24.
3. K.W.J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: Politics and Administration in A Developing Political System, Oxford 1963 p77n.3.
4. Dudley 1968 p112n.80.
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6. Ibid 1968 p112n.80.
7. J.T. Tseayo, Conflict and Incorporation in Nigeria: The Integration of the Tiv, Zaria, 1975 passim; Magid 1971 p360n.4; Sklar 1963 p344.
8. Discussions with M.J. Dent 1980-1984; Interview Discussions with A. Kirk-Greene May 1982; Sklar 1963 p77n.3, p344; see also Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, December 1957 p20.
9. Plotted from, Nigeria Cartactual Map No. 62, Belfast 1976; I am grateful to Mr Mason of the Department of Geography, University of Keele, for assistance and advice on precise use of latitudes to determine the geographical M-Belt of Nigeria and for provision of maps.
10. This conception was explained to me by Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot, Patrick Dokotri, Barnabas Dusu and Elizabeth Ivase, January 1981.
11. Sklar 1963 p345.
12. Ibid 1963 p345.
13. Post 1963 p77.

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