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Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat

Baiasu

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Abstract

Constitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the perspective from which the nature of the constitutivist justification is usually discussed. In this paper, I focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will not be whether the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have some elements, which are not constructed, but real, given independently from us; instead, my concern will be more narrowly epistemic – whether those claims can be derived from premises, which are normatively less substantial than the normative conclusions themselves. I focus on Korsgaard’s transcendental articulation of the constitutivist argument. I conclude that more work would need to be done, in order for this argument to function as intended.

Citation

Baiasu. (2016). Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat. Philosophia, 44, 1185-1208. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9746-3

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jul 26, 2016
Publication Date Sep 16, 2016
Journal Philosophia
Print ISSN 0048-3893
Electronic ISSN 1574-9274
Publisher Springer Verlag
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 44
Pages 1185-1208
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9746-3
Keywords Immanuel Kant, Christine Korsgaard, Michael Smith, Constitutivism, Constructivism, Transcendental argument, Anaytic/synthetic, Metaphysics
Publisher URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9746-3

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