When the liberal state decides whether to accommodate conscientious objections, it can apply one of two approaches: a content-neutral approach or a content-based approach. Choosing one of these approaches is necessary in order to define the limits of tolerance towards conscientious objections. We offer a distinction between conscientious objections that rely on unjustly intolerant, morally repugnant and illegitimate values, and objections that rely on misguided yet legitimate values. It is argued that, all other things being equal, the state has strong reasons not to tolerate the former and weaker reasons not to tolerate the latter. We use the case of conscientious objection to equality laws as an example of conscientious objection that relies on illegitimate values and the cases of wearing religious dress in the workplace and conscientious objection to performing abortions as examples of conscientious objections that rely on misguided yet legitimate values.