Defending the Integrity Principle: Necessity, Remorse and Moral Consistency in the Protest Trial

Cammiss, Steven; Hayes, Graeme; Doherty, Brian

Abstract

The protest trial has distinctive features and should be governed by what we term the ‘integrity principle’: it should respect the moral consistency of the defendant; justifications, not excuses, should be privileged; and the ‘remorse principle’ should not apply. As such, the trial should enable effective communication where the defendant is held to account in meaningful terms. We apply this argument to three high-profile protest trials: the Frack Free Three; the Stansted 15; and the Colston 4. Using observation data, we argue the first two trials and subsequent appellant court rulings failed to respect the integrity principle. The third case provides a contrast: the defendants maintained moral consistency, and gave an authentic and contextualised account. This was, however, at some cost of political divestment. Nevertheless, the Colston 4 trial is exceptional in a process that typically pays little operational respect to the integrity principle.

Citation

Cammiss, S., Hayes, G., & Doherty, B. (in press). Defending the Integrity Principle: Necessity, Remorse and Moral Consistency in the Protest Trial. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Article gqaf003. https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaf003

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Mar 14, 2025
• Online Publication Date: Mar 14, 2025
• Deposit Date: Apr 30, 2025
• Journal: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
• Print ISSN: 0143-6503
• Electronic ISSN: 1464-3820
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Article Number: gqaf003
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaf003
• Public URL: https://keele-repository.worktribe.com/output/1202692
• Publisher URL: https://academic.oup.com/ojls/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ojls/gqaf003/8078322