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The gap is semantic, not epistemological


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This paper explores an alternative to the metaphysical challenge to physicalism posed by Jackson and Kripke and to the epistemological one exemplified by the positions of Nagel, Levine and McGinn. On this alternative the mind-body gap is neither ontological nor epistemological, but semantic. I claim that it is because the gap is semantic that the mind-body problem is a quintessentially philosophical problem that is not likely to wither away as our natural scientific knowledge advances.


D'Oro. (2007). The gap is semantic, not epistemological. Ratio, 168 -178.

Acceptance Date May 2, 2007
Publication Date May 2, 2007
Journal Ratio
Print ISSN 0034-0006
Publisher Wiley
Pages 168 -178
Keywords philosophy
Publisher URL


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