Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat

Baiasu

Abstract

Constitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the perspective from which the nature of the constitutivist justification is usually discussed. In this paper, I focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will not be whether the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have some elements, which are not constructed, but real, given independently from us; instead, my concern will be more narrowly epistemic – whether those claims can be derived from premises, which are normatively less substantial than the normative conclusions themselves. I focus on Korsgaard’s transcendental articulation of the constitutivist argument. I conclude that more work would need to be done, in order for this argument to function as intended.

Citation

Baiasu. (2016). Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat. Philosophia, 44, 1185-1208. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9746-3

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jul 26, 2016
• Publication Date: Sep 16, 2016
• Journal: Philosophia
• Print ISSN: 0048-3893
• Electronic ISSN: 1574-9274
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 44
• Pages: 1185-1208
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9746-3
• Keywords: Immanuel Kant, Christine Korsgaard, Michael Smith, Constitutivism, Constructivism, Transcendental argument, Anaytic/synthetic, Metaphysics
• Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9746-3