Harm To Future Persons: Non-Identity Problems and Counterpart Solutions

Wrigley

Abstract

Non-Identity arguments have a pervasive but sometimes counter-intuitive grip on certain key areas in ethics. As a result, there has been limited success in supporting the alternative view that our choices concerning future generations can be considered harmful on any sort of person-affecting principle. However, as the Non-Identity Problem relies overtly on certain metaphysical assumptions, plausible alternatives to these foundations can substantially undermine the Non-Identity argument itself. In this paper, I show how the pervasive force and nature of Non-Identity arguments rely upon a specific adoption of a theory of modality and identity and how adopting an alternative account of modality can be used to reject many conclusions formed through Non-Identity type arguments. By using Lewis’s counterpart-theoretic account to understand ways we might have been, I outline the basis of a modal account of harm that incorporates a person-affecting aspect. This, in turn, has significant implications for ethical decision-making in areas such as reproductive choice and the welfare of future generations.

Citation

Wrigley. (2012). Harm To Future Persons: Non-Identity Problems and Counterpart Solutions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 15, 175 -190. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9280-0

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Apr 14, 2011
• Publication Date: Apr 1, 2012
• Journal: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
• Print ISSN: 1386-2820
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 15
• Pages: 175 -190
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9280-0
• Keywords: Harm, Non-identity problem, Counterparts, Genetic selection
• Public URL: https://keele-repository.worktribe.com/output/408297
• Publisher URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9280-0