Why epistemic pluralism does not entail relativism

D'Oro

Abstract

There is a widespread view according to which the denial that the conditions of knowledge are truth-evaluable inevitably leads to a form of epistemic pluralism that is both quietist and internally incoherent. It is quietist because it undermines the possibility of genuine epistemic disagreement. It is internally incoherent because it simultaneously denies the existence of universal knowledge claims and makes the universal claim that there is no such knowledge. The goal of this paper is to show that denying that the conditions of knowledge are truth-evaluable does not necessarily entail a commitment to a form of epistemic relativism that is both quietist and internally incoherent. To undermine the view that the denial that the conditions of knowledge have truth-values leads down the blind alley of epistemic relativism I mobilize a version of “hinge epistemology” which distinguishes between epistemic pluralism and epistemic relativism. This form of hinge epistemology is to be found in Collingwood’s account of absolute presuppositions (Collingwood 1940). By teasing apart epistemic pluralism from epistemic relativism, the paper exposes the view that the denial that the conditions of knowledge have truth-values inevitably leads to a malignant form of epistemic relativism as a form of philosophical scaremongering.

Citation

D'Oro. (2018). Why epistemic pluralism does not entail relativism. In Collingwood on Philosophical Methodology

• Acceptance Date: Oct 1, 2018
• Publication Date: Nov 25, 2018
• Book Title: Collingwood on Philosophical Methodology
• ISBN: 978-3-030-02431-4
• Keywords: philosophical methodology
• Publisher URL: https://www.palgrave.com/de/book/9783030024314