In our own image: materialism’s impoverished image of humanity and what this means for our technological future

Brayford, Kieran Martin

Abstract

In this thesis, I seek to temper the commonly held faith in our technological endeavours. Recently this has taken the form of seeking to create humanlike technologies. In part one, I argue that progress in this is derailed by the image of humanity advanced by metaphysical materialism and its methodological commitments. I begin by arguing that materialism gains common assent by way of its proximity to the Promethean attitude intrinsic to capitalist and communist dogma—the idea that the totality of the natural world can be utilised to improve our quality of life. I then argue that materialism’s image of humanity is impoverished as it cannot do justice to several features of human subjectivity—namely, consciousness, free will and selfhood. I then draw upon the difficulties in formulating a reasonable understanding of materialism to further demonstrate that there are no reasonable grounds for endorsing the metaphysic. This culminates in the argument that strong-AI—i.e., that replete with a mind—is impossible in the materialist paradigm. In part two, I explore and evaluate the impact that the Promethean attitude and its weakly-humanlike technological products may have on several fields—healthcare, finance, warfare, work and government—to ascertain the social utility of the attitude. I conclude by warning that such technologies will likely make us wealthier and healthier, but at detrimental cost elsewhere—most prominently, with regard to our agency—and thus, should we not take due care with these technologies, they are capable of creating a future at-odds with the best interests of humankind.

Citation

Brayford, K. M. (2022). In our own image: materialism’s impoverished image of humanity and what this means for our technological future. (Thesis). Keele University

• Thesis Type: Thesis
• Publicly Available Date: May 30, 2023
• Keywords: Humanity, Technology, Materialism, Artificial Intelligence, Subjectivity
• Award Date: 2022-03