Caird on Kant’s Idealism: Revolutionary or Traditionalist?

Baiasu

Abstract

The traditionalist interpretation of Kant's idealism reads his Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism, à la Berkeley. By contrast, a revolutionary account of Kant will assert the threefold distinction between states of mind, external objects of the world and things in themselves, and will reject the attempt to reduce external objects to states of mind. In this paper, I argue that, while Caird's interpretation is clearly not traditionalist, nor is it obviously revolutionary: he is critical of Kant's threefold distinction, although he fully acknowledges Kant's attempt to uphold this distinction. While arguing for this claim, the paper will examine several classical objections to Kant's Critical philosophy, including the view that things in themselves should be rejected and that Kant's system lacks the unity necessary to account for the variety of distinctions he introduces, including the distinction between phenomena and noumena.

Citation

Baiasu. (2013). Caird on Kant’s Idealism: Revolutionary or Traditionalist?. Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, 19(1), 19 - 45

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Dec 1, 2012
• Publication Date: Jan 1, 2013
• Journal: Collingwood and British Idealism Studies: incorporating Bradley Studies
• Print ISSN: 1744-9413
• Publisher: Imprint Academic
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 19
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 19 - 45
• Publisher URL: https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/imp/col/2013/00000019/00000001/art00002