Free will: An impossible reality or an incoherent concept?

Leach, Stephen

Abstract

The problem that Tallis attempts to address in Freedom: An Impossible Reality (2021) is that science appears to describe the entire world deterministically and that this seems to leave no room for free will. In the face of this threat, Tallis defends the existence of free will by arguing that science does not explain our intentional awareness of the world; and it is our intentional awareness that makes both science and free will possible. Against Tallis, it is here argued that his argument is vulnerable to two criticisms. Firstly, his characterisation of science as apparently deterministic is inaccurate. Secondly, he has not solved the problem he has set himself but rather recast it, so that his conclusion leaves us having to account for free will, not in a deterministic universe, but either as a product of chance or as a miracle. It is here suggested that when we set aside the illusory threat of scientific determinism, we also set aside the temptation of free will (as its spurious answer). That done, we may better focus upon agent’s freedom of action – as discussed by philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke and Hume – the rational capability of an agent to act upon their wishes, given the constraints under which they find themselves.

Citation

Leach, S. (2022). Free will: An impossible reality or an incoherent concept?. Human Affairs, 32(4), 413-419. https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0035

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Oct 26, 2022
• Online Publication Date: Nov 2, 2022
• Publication Date: Oct 26, 2022
• Deposit Date: May 15, 2024
• Journal: Human Affairs
• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 32
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 413-419
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0035
• Public URL: https://keele-repository.worktribe.com/output/826626
• Publisher URL: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/humaff-2022-0035/html