Realism and Anti-Realism about Mental Illness

Wrigley, Anthony

Abstract

In this paper I provide an account of the metaphysical foundations of mental illness in terms of a realism debate. I motivate the importance of such metaphysical analysis as a means of avoiding some intractable problems that beset discussion of the concept of mental illness. I apply aspects of the framework developed by Crispin Wright for realism debates in order to examine the ontological commitments to mental illness as a property that humans may exhibit and to examine the various arguments that realists and anti-realists can use to defend their position on mental illness. I pay particular attention to characterising Szasz's account of mental illness as that of an anti-realist error-theory and present ways in which a realist may counter such a position. Ultimately I argue that in order to hold a realist position on mental illness one would have to adopt some form of realism towards values, such as moral realism.

Citation

Wrigley, A. (2007). Realism and Anti-Realism about Mental Illness. Philosophical Papers, 36(3), 371-397. https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2007.11733499

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: May 6, 2016
• Publication Date: 2007-11
• Deposit Date: May 30, 2024
• Journal: Philosophical Papers
• Print ISSN: 0556-8641
• Electronic ISSN: 1996-8523
• Publisher: Routledge
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 36
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 371-397
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2007.11733499
• Public URL: https://keele-repository.worktribe.com/output/834564
• Publisher URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/05568641.2007.11733499