Kant's Right as Normatively Independent: One Strategy Considered and Rejected

Baiasu, Sorin

Abstract

The question of how politics and ethics are supposed to connect, if at all, in our societies is an important one, especially in the context of today’s socio-economic and geo-political challenges. Not surprisingly, commentators have tried to find an answer in Kant’s texts: the relation between the Categorical Imperative (CI), as the fundamental principle of ethics, and the Universal Principle of Right (UPR), as the fundamental principle of politico-legal norms, has been variously regarded as one of simple dependence, simple independence or complex dependence. Recent interpretations increasingly converge on the view that Kant was not a simple independentist. Yet, questions remain about the philosophical significance of Kant’s account, more precisely, about the extent to which certain aspects of Kant’s thought do not in fact inconsistently commit him to simple independentism. One aim of this chapter is to illustrate this critical strategy starting from a specific interpretation of the UPR. I argue that, although robust, this interpretation is not the most accurate. While this strategy opens up new avenues for further objections to Kant, the chapter concludes that the complex dependentist reading is philosophically the most convincing to date.

Citation

Baiasu, S. (2025). Kant's Right as Normatively Independent: One Strategy Considered and Rejected. In Law and Morality in Kant (1-15). Cambridge University Press

• Publication Date: 2025-12
• Deposit Date: Sep 5, 2024
• Pages: 1-15
• Book Title: Law and Morality in Kant
• Public URL: https://keele-repository.worktribe.com/output/891389
• Publisher URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/law-and-morality-in-kant/8F5A4BA7E06726B660DC50C34B0361D2#fndtn-information
• Additional Information: Book editors: Martin Brecher and Philipp-Alexander Hirsch
• Contract Date: Mar 31, 2024