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Presuppositional analysis and the goal of metaphysical inquiry (2024)
Book Chapter
D'Oro, G. (2024). Presuppositional analysis and the goal of metaphysical inquiry. In Interpreting R.G Collingwood: Critical Essays (143-160). Cambridge University Press (CUP)

Metaphysics is often understood as an inquiry into the fundamental structures of reality. Collingwood, by contrast, defends a view of metaphysics on which its role is not to advance knowledge of fundamental reality but to deepen our understanding of... Read More about Presuppositional analysis and the goal of metaphysical inquiry.

To reply or not to reply, that is the question: descriptive metaphysics and the sceptical challenge (2023)
Book Chapter
D'Oro. (2023). To reply or not to reply, that is the question: descriptive metaphysics and the sceptical challenge. In P.F. Strawson and His Legacy. In Audun Bengtson, Benjamin De Mesel and Sybren Heyndels (eds.) (192-211). Oxford University Press (OUP). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192858474.003.0010

How should one respond to scepticism? Should one seek to refute it? Or should scepticism be ignored? This chapter explores four responses to scepticism: that of ambitious, truth-directed transcendental arguments; that of modest transcendental argumen... Read More about To reply or not to reply, that is the question: descriptive metaphysics and the sceptical challenge.

Beyond narrativism: the historical past and why it can be known (2021)
Journal Article
D'Oro. (2021). Beyond narrativism: the historical past and why it can be known

This paper examines narrativism’s claim that the historical past cannot be known once and for all because it must be continuously re-described from the standpoint of the present. We argue that this claim is based on a non sequitur. We take narrativis... Read More about Beyond narrativism: the historical past and why it can be known.

How to (and not to) defend the manifest image (2019)
Book Chapter
D'Oro. (2019). How to (and not to) defend the manifest image. In Responses to Naturalism: Critical Perspectives from Idealism and Pragmatism. (1). Taylor & Francis (Routledge). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315180854-7

Claims such as ‘there are no tables and chairs’ have become increasingly common in the philosophical context, and eliminativism is a fairly well-established position in contemporary debates in analytic metaphysics. Locating manifest properties requir... Read More about How to (and not to) defend the manifest image.

Non-Redcuctivism and the Metaphilosophy of Mind (2019)
Journal Article
D'Oro. (2019). Non-Redcuctivism and the Metaphilosophy of Mind. Inquiry, 477-503. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2018.1484001

This paper discusses the metaphilosophical assumptions that have dominated analytic philosophy of mind, and how they gave rise to the central question that the best-known forms of non-reductivism available have sought to answer, namely: how can mind... Read More about Non-Redcuctivism and the Metaphilosophy of Mind.

British Idealism (2019)
Book Chapter
D'Oro. (in press). British Idealism. In A Companion to 19th Century Philosophy (365-388). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119210054.ch14

This chapter identifies some themes in British idealism, especially those which resonate in contemporary debates, through an examination of T.H. Green, F.H. Bradley and J.M.E. McTaggart. It focuses primarily on metaphysics and epistemology, supplemen... Read More about British Idealism.

Collingwood on Philosophical Methodology (2019)
Book
Dharamsi, K., D'Oro, G., & Leach, S. (Eds.). (2019). Collingwood on Philosophical Methodology. Springer: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02432-1

Explores an under-served area: investigates Collingwood's main treatises in specific relation to the field of philosophical methodology

Offers currency: shows the relationship between Collingwood and contemporary philosophical pragmatism, and so d... Read More about Collingwood on Philosophical Methodology.

Why epistemic pluralism does not entail relativism (2018)
Book Chapter
D'Oro. (2018). Why epistemic pluralism does not entail relativism. In Collingwood on Philosophical Methodology

There is a widespread view according to which the denial that the conditions of knowledge are truth-evaluable inevitably leads to a form of epistemic pluralism that is both quietist and internally incoherent. It is quietist because it undermines the... Read More about Why epistemic pluralism does not entail relativism.