All Outputs (11)

Powers, persistence, and the problem of temporary intrinsics (2024)
Journal Article
Allen, S. R. (in press). Powers, persistence, and the problem of temporary intrinsics. Philosophical Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02157-z

David Lewis uses the problem of temporary intrinsics to motivate a perdurantist account of persistence in which four-dimensional individuals consist of temporal parts. Other philosophers use his argument to conclude that apparently persisting individ... Read More about Powers, persistence, and the problem of temporary intrinsics.

Powers, persistence, and the problem of temporary intrinsics (2024)
Journal Article
Allen, S. (2024). Powers, persistence, and the problem of temporary intrinsics. Philosophical Studies, Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Persistence and (De Re) Modality, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02157-z

David Lewis uses the problem of temporary intrinsics to motivate a perdurantist account of persistence in which four-dimensional individuals consist of temporal parts. Other philosophers use his argument to conclude that apparently persisting indivi... Read More about Powers, persistence, and the problem of temporary intrinsics.

What There Is and What There Could Be: Mereology, Causality and Possibility in an Ontology of Powers (2023)
Book Chapter
Allen, S. (in press). What There Is and What There Could Be: Mereology, Causality and Possibility in an Ontology of Powers. In Powers, Parts and Wholes Essays on the Mereology of Powers. Routledge

The Necessity of Conceivability (2022)
Journal Article
Allen, S., & Cumpa, J. (2022). The Necessity of Conceivability. Synthese, 200(2), 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03534-z

In his conceivability argument, Chalmers assumes that all properties have their causal powers contingently and causal laws are also contingent. We argue this claim conflicts with how conceivability itself must work for the conceivability argument to... Read More about The Necessity of Conceivability.

Powers and the Hard Problem of Consciousness: Conceivability, Possibility and Powers (2022)
Journal Article
Allen. (2022). Powers and the Hard Problem of Consciousness: Conceivability, Possibility and Powers. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-022-00451-3

Do conceivability arguments work against physicalism if properties are causal powers? By considering three different ways of understanding causal powers and the modality associated with them, I will argue that most, if not all, physicalist powers the... Read More about Powers and the Hard Problem of Consciousness: Conceivability, Possibility and Powers.

Intrinsicality, Independence and Grounding (2020)
Journal Article
Allen. (2020). Intrinsicality, Independence and Grounding. Metaphysica, 71-97. https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-2018

This paper investigates the plausibility of Witmer, Butchard and Trogdon’s (2005) proposal to distinguish intrinsic properties from extrinsic ones in terms of independence from accompaniment and grounding. I argue that the proposed criterion is not a... Read More about Intrinsicality, Independence and Grounding.

Can metaphysical structuralism solve the plurality problem? (2018)
Journal Article
Allen. (2018). Can metaphysical structuralism solve the plurality problem?. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 722-746. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2018.1544732

Metaphysics has a problem with plurality: in many areas of discourse, there are too many good theories, rather than just one. This embarrassment of riches is a particular problem for metaphysical realists who want metaphysics to tell us the way the w... Read More about Can metaphysical structuralism solve the plurality problem?.

Kind Behaving Badly: Intentional Action and Interactive Kinds (2018)
Journal Article
Allen. (2018). Kind Behaving Badly: Intentional Action and Interactive Kinds. Synthese, 2927-2956. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1870-0

This paper investigates interactive kinds, a class of kinds suggested by Ian Hacking for which classification generates a feedback loop between the classifiers and what is classified, and argues that human interactive kinds should be distinguished fr... Read More about Kind Behaving Badly: Intentional Action and Interactive Kinds.

From Possibility to Properties? Or from Properties to Possibility? (2016)
Journal Article
Allen. (2016). From Possibility to Properties? Or from Properties to Possibility?. Philosophy, 21-49. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819116000577

This paper contrasts two metaphysical accounts of modality and properties: Modal Realism which treats possible entities as primitive; and Strong Dispositionalism in which metaphysical possibility and necessity are determined by actually existing disp... Read More about From Possibility to Properties? Or from Properties to Possibility?.

A Critical Introduction to Properties (2016)
Book
Allen, S. (2016). A Critical Introduction to Properties. Bloomsbury Publishing. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781474276979

What do blue things have in common? Or electrons? Or planets? Distinct things appear to share properties; but what are properties and what is the best philosophical account of them? A Critical Introduction to Properties introduces different ontologic... Read More about A Critical Introduction to Properties.

Curiosity kills the categories: A dilemma about categories and modality (2015)
Journal Article
Allen. (2015). Curiosity kills the categories: A dilemma about categories and modality. Metaphysica, 211 - 229. https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0015