Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind

D'Oro

Abstract

This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. Second, that as an attempt to graft conceptual mind-body dualism onto a monistic metaphysics, the idealist alternative bears some similarities to anomalous monism, but that it is superior to it because it is not vulnerable to the charge of epiphenomenalism. I conclude that this idealist alternative should be given serious consideration by those who remain unconvinced that a successful defence of the non-reducibility of the mental is compatible with the pursuit of a naturalistic agenda.

Citation

D'Oro. (2005). Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind. Inquiry, 395 - 412. https://doi.org/10.1080/00201740500241847

• Acceptance Date: Aug 21, 2005
• Publication Date: Oct 1, 2005
• Journal: Inquiry
• Print ISSN: 0020-174X
• Electronic ISSN: 1502-3923
• Publisher: Routledge
• Pages: 395 - 412
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00201740500241847
• Keywords: philosophy, philosophy of mind
• Public URL: https://keele-repository.worktribe.com/output/403363
• Publisher URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00201740500241847