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Powers and the Hard Problem of Consciousness: Conceivability, Possibility and Powers

Allen

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Abstract

Do conceivability arguments work against physicalism if properties are causal powers? By considering three different ways of understanding causal powers and the modality associated with them, I will argue that most, if not all, physicalist powers theorists should not be concerned about the Conceivability Argument because its conclusion that physicalism is false does not hold in their favoured ontology. I also defend specific powers theories against some recent objections to this strategy, arguing that the conception of properties as powerful blocks Conceivability Arguments unless a rather implausible form of emergence is true.

Acceptance Date Feb 8, 2022
Publication Date Mar 30, 2022
Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science
Print ISSN 1879-4912
Publisher Springer Verlag
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-022-00451-3
Keywords Conceivability argument; Consciousness; Powers; Dispositions; Powerful qualities; Modality; Actualism; Physicalism
Publisher URL https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13194-022-00451-3

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