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How Far Do We Self-legislate?

Baiasu, Sorin

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Abstract

: In his early writings, Kant regarded the autonomy of the will as the supreme principle of morality, as well as the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them. Nevertheless, this impressively sounding principle gradually disappeared from the later Kant’s texts, and there is not much in the literature to explain why. Pauline Kleingeld’s purpose, in the two articles I consider here, is to address this lacuna and to show that there are good philosophical reasons for this principle’s gradual disappearance from the Kantian framework. One of my aims, in this paper, is to formulate and argue for several reservations about Kleingeld’s argument; however, even if these reservations turn out to be apposite, my claim is not that Kant did not actually abandon the Principle of Autonomy; instead, I argue that, even if Kleingeld were right and Kant had abandoned the Principle of Autonomy, he would still not have needed to.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jan 9, 2023
Online Publication Date Feb 2, 2023
Publication Date Apr 1, 2023
Journal Philosophia
Print ISSN 0048-3893
Publisher Springer Verlag
Volume 51
Issue 2
Pages 525-544
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00613-4
Keywords Autonomy, Political legislation, Ethical community, Pauline Kleingeld, Kant, Motivation, Analogy
Publisher URL https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-023-00613-4

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