Aspects of Practical Bindingness in Kant: Introduction

Gläser, Micha; Baiasu, Sorin

Abstract

One of the few points of consensus in the Kantian literature is that Kant's Moral Law is binding universally and unconditionally. Hence, the Moral Law is binding for all human agents (universally) irrespective of the agents' particular interests (unconditionally). Whether or not we intend to act on the Moral Law, this is the law we ought to follow. Beyond this point of consensus, however, even the most important details are matters of controversy. What exactly does the Moral Law require of us? What, if anything, grounds its bindingness? In particular, does Kant argue that the Moral Law is binding because it is 'self-legislated'? What is the relation between the Moral Law (supreme principle of morality) and substantive moral laws such as the law that we ought to promote the happiness of others? What does Kant mean by his claim that the will has autonomy? In the four articles discussed in this special issue, Kleingeld proposes novel answers to these questions. This introduction presents the articles and brings to the fore the larger theme tying them all together.

Citation

Gläser, M., & Baiasu, S. (2023). Aspects of Practical Bindingness in Kant: Introduction. Philosophia, 51(2), 457-461. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00646-9

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Mar 17, 2023
• Online Publication Date: Apr 5, 2023
• Publication Date: Apr 1, 2023
• Publicly Available Date: May 30, 2023
• Journal: Philosophia
• Print ISSN: 0048-3893
• Electronic ISSN: 1574-9274
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Volume: 51
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 457-461
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00646-9
• Keywords: Rawls, Autonomy, Contradiction, Moral Law, Possible or Actual, Consent, Kleingeld
• Publisher URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-023-00646-9