Is Attoe’s Neutral Nihilism Neutral Enough?

Tartaglia, James

Abstract

In this paper I analyse and critique Aribiah David Attoe’s position in The Question of Life’s Meaning: An African Perspective (2023). While highly sympathetic to his project, since I also defend an evaluatively neutral form of nihilism, I argue that the role of death and indifference within his theory is incompatible with thinking of nihilism in a neutral manner, and that his position wavers between the traditional view of Negative Nihilism and the Neutral Nihilism I recommend. In reconstructing his position, I begin by arguing, on historicist grounds, that the meaning-realism Attoe has adopted from Thaddeus Metz and others is implausible, and that Attoe’s account of meaning in life appears in a much more favourable light when construed as a project of conceptual engineering. After explaining why Attoe thinks that death establishes nihilism and undermines the significance of meaning in life, I argue that the only real connection between nihilism and death is a historical one. I conclude that Attoe’s neutrality about nihilism should not lead him to indifference about life, since it is only nihilism that he should be neutral about.

Citation

Tartaglia, J. (2024). Is Attoe’s Neutral Nihilism Neutral Enough?. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions,

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Oct 25, 2024
• Online Publication Date: Dec 17, 2024
• Publication Date: Dec 17, 2024
• Deposit Date: Oct 25, 2024
• Publicly Available Date: Nov 8, 2024
• Journal: Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions
• Print ISSN: 2276-8386
• Electronic ISSN: 2408-5987
• Publisher: African Journals Online (AJOL)
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Public URL: https://keele-repository.worktribe.com/output/955225
• Publisher URL: https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ft