Rorty's Philosophy of Consciousness

Tartaglia, James

Abstract

This chapter begins by asking why Rorty would endorse a physicalist agenda which, on the face of it, ran counter to his aims in philosophy; and concludes both that his motivation was confused, and that he failed to detach physicalism from metaphysics and scienticism. I begin by showing the importance of metaphilosophy to Rorty's position on consciousness, and the centrality of consciousness to his overall project. I then summarize Rorty's position, which was essentially derived from Ryle, but uniquely driven by metaphilosophy. My assessment begins by disputing Rorty's thesis about the historical origins of the concept of consciousness, before following him into his favorite argumentative territory by talking about the social utility of first-person reflection on consciousness, and his own motivations for wanting to undermine such reflection. I conclude that because of his obsession with religion, Rorty became entangled in a scientistic agenda he should have opposed.

Citation

Tartaglia, J. Rorty's Philosophy of Consciousness. In A companion to Rorty (43-58). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118972199.ch3

• Online Publication Date: Feb 14, 2020
• Publicly Available Date: May 26, 2023
• Publisher: Wiley
• Pages: 43-58
• Book Title: A companion to Rorty
• Chapter Number: 3
• ISBN: 9781118972168
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118972199.ch3
• Publisher URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118972199.ch3
• Related Public URLs: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781118972199