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A Corpus Study of “Know”: On The Verification of Philosophers’ Frequency Claims about Language

Hansen, Nat; Porter, J.D.; Francis, Kathryn

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Authors

Nat Hansen

J.D. Porter



Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>We investigate claims about the frequency of “know” made by philosophers. Our investigation has several overlapping aims. First, we aim to show what is required to confirm or disconfirm philosophers’ claims about the comparative frequency of different uses of philosophically interesting expressions. Second, we aim to show how using linguistic corpora as tools for investigating meaning is a productive methodology, in the sense that it yields discoveries about the use of language that philosophers would have overlooked if they remained in their “armchairs of an afternoon”, to use J.L. Austin's phrase. Third, we discuss facts about the meaning of “know” that so far have been ignored in philosophy, with the aim of reorienting discussions of the relevance of ordinary language for philosophical theorizing.</jats:p>

Citation

Hansen, N., Porter, J., & Francis, K. (2019). A Corpus Study of “Know”: On The Verification of Philosophers’ Frequency Claims about Language. Episteme, 18, 242-268. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2019.15

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Apr 4, 2019
Online Publication Date Jul 2, 2019
Publication Date Jul 2, 2019
Journal Episteme
Print ISSN 1742-3600
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 18
Pages 242-268
DOI https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2019.15
Keywords discourse markers; frequency; J.L.Austin; know; knowledge; linguistic corpora; meaning; ordinary language philosophy
Publisher URL https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/corpus-study-of-know-on-the-verification-of-philosophers-frequency-claims-about-language/E8B80F40D5269E99326C69F471AE2D25

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