The Ontology of Freedom

Tartaglia

Abstract

I begin by clarifying Tallis’s revisionary terminology, showing how he redraws the lines of the traditional debate about free will by classifying himself as a compatibilist, when in standard terms he is an incompatibilist. I then examine what I take to be the two main lines of argument in Freedom, which I call the Mysterian Argument and the Intentionality Argument. I argue that neither can do the required work on its own, so I ask how they are supposed to combine. I then argue that a commitment to the ontological priority of everydayness, of the kind suggested in chapters 5 and 6 of Freedom, might combine the arguments in such a way as to secure Tallis’s conclusion. I conclude that the argument of Freedom requires positive metaphysical commitment of a kind Tallis has yet to provide.

Citation

Tartaglia. (2022). The Ontology of Freedom. Human Affairs, 32(4), 461-473. https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0040

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jul 27, 2022
• Online Publication Date: Nov 2, 2022
• Publication Date: Oct 26, 2022
• Journal: Human Affairs
• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 32
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 461-473
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0040
• Keywords: free will; determinism; compatibilism; libertarianism; metaphysics; F.H. Bradley
• Public URL: https://keele-repository.worktribe.com/output/423731
• Publisher URL: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/humaff-2022-0040/html