The Steadying Effect of an Independence-Accountability Balance: A Hypothesis

Cotter, John

Abstract

This chapter, the first in Part II, presents a hypothesis (analysed in Chapters 7-10), which suggests the balance between independence and accountability at the CJEU contributes to steadying its rulings. The chapter commences with a description of Llewellyn's eleventh steadying factor: judicial security and honesty. A hypothesis, derived from this steadying factor, is then presented, which suggests that the placing of the Court in a sphere between independence and accountability promotes greater certainty by reinforcing the pressures of legal doctrine and accepted interpretative techniques. The chapter then moves on to describe the legal rules which purport to protect the institutional independence of the Court and the security of its Judges, as well as the legal rules which confer on its countervailing powers mechanisms to hold it accountable. Finally, the meaning of countervailing power in the CJEU context is identified, before the analysis to be undertaken in Chapters 7-10 is described.

Citation

Cotter, J. (2022). The Steadying Effect of an Independence-Accountability Balance: A Hypothesis. . Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788979559.00013

• Acceptance Date: May 6, 2022
• Publication Date: May 6, 2022
• Deposit Date: Jun 2, 2023
• Pages: 84-98
• ISBN: 9781788979559; 9781788979542; 9781788979559
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788979559.00013
• Public URL: https://keele-repository.worktribe.com/output/435233