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Transcendental Unity of Apperception and Non-reflective Consciousness of Self

Baiasu, Sorin

Authors



Abstract

In this chapter, I would like to defend the claim of a deep similarity between Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception and Sartre’s non-reflective consciousness of self.2 The claim is not simply of historical interest, although this by itself I think would be sufficient to justify its importance; I take this claim to have also considerable systematic significance. Thus, my motivation for the development of a detailed discussion of Kant’s and Sartre’s philosophical views is given by the prospect of formulating the outline of a critical ethics which would combine the attractive elements of Kant’s and Sartre’s theories. I take the deep similarities between Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception and Sartre’s non-reflective consciousness of self to be important, since they provide the necessary and sufficient condition for an important aspect of accountability.

Citation

Baiasu, S. (2015). Transcendental Unity of Apperception and Non-reflective Consciousness of Self. In Comparing Kant and Sartre (21-44). (1). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137454539_2

Online Publication Date Apr 29, 2016
Publication Date Dec 20, 2015
Deposit Date Jun 7, 2023
Publisher Palgrave Macmillan
Pages 21-44
Edition 1
Book Title Comparing Kant and Sartre
Chapter Number 1
ISBN 978-1-137-45452-2
DOI https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137454539_2
Keywords Ontological Condition; Empirical Reality; Numerical Identity; Critical Ethic; Epistemological Condition