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Toleration and pragmatism: themes from the work of John Horton

Baiasu

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Abstract

John Horton’s work has been particularly influential in debates on specific topics related to toleration, political obligation, modus vivendi and political realism. More recently, he has synthesised these views in the form of a distinctive position in political philosophy, a position that has the potential to question much of the received wisdom in the field. The papers of this special issue engage with some of the most fundamental issues of Horton’s account, more exactly, the related issues of toleration and modus vivendi, Horton’s account of associative obligations, with a focus on the methodological assumptions which underpin his position more generally, and the metaphysical presuppositions of his account, in particular, the presupposition of contingency. I offer brief presentations of the papers in the special issue and of the ways they link with each other. In the discussion of the papers by Forst, Newey, Jones, Weale and Mendus, the emphasis will be on those arguments which question Horton’s position. Horton’s paper will then be presented with a focus on possible responses to these challenges. I will conclude with several remarks on an unexpected continuity between Horton’s realist view and a view realists usually criticise as idealising, namely, John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness.

Citation

Baiasu. (2016). Toleration and pragmatism: themes from the work of John Horton. Philosophia, 397-413. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9767-y

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Sep 12, 2016
Publication Date Nov 5, 2016
Journal Philosophia
Print ISSN 0048-3893
Publisher Springer Verlag
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Issue 45
Pages 397-413
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9767-y
Keywords toleration, modus vivendi, pragmatism, realism, contigency, political obligation
Publisher URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9767-y

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