Gabriel Dupre
Correspondence and Construction: The Representational Theory of Mind and Internally Driven Classificatory Schemes
Dupre, Gabriel
Authors
Abstract
There is a tension at the heart of much contemporary work in philosophy of psychology—specifically, within representational theories of mind. On the one hand, the central insight of this tradition is that mental and behavioral processes are understood by appeal to mental representations: mental tokens which function as internal proxies for some aspect of the environment, on which behavioral interaction with the environment can depend. On the other, it has long been noted that many purported representations seriously distort, or even simply fabricate, those aspects of the environment they are alleged to represent. I will focus on the examples of color vision and speech perception. At a minimum, this puts pressure on the explanatory goals of representationalism. Many representational theories explain behavior with reference to accurate representation, but if we can seemingly function perfectly well with wildly inaccurate representations, the centrality of this strategy is threatened. At worst, this undermines the representationalist project itself, posing insuperable worries for any account that seeks to ground mental content in relations to the environment.
Citation
Dupre, G. (2023). Correspondence and Construction: The Representational Theory of Mind and Internally Driven Classificatory Schemes. In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, vol. 3 (57–86). (3). Oxford University Press (OUP). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198879466.003.0003
Acceptance Date | Mar 12, 2022 |
---|---|
Online Publication Date | Jul 7, 2023 |
Publication Date | Jul 7, 2023 |
Publicly Available Date | Jul 8, 2025 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) |
Pages | 57–86 |
Edition | 3 |
Book Title | Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, vol. 3 |
Chapter Number | 3 |
ISBN | 9780198879466 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198879466.003.0003 |
Keywords | Representational theory of mind, mental representation, color vision, speech perception, psychological explanation, misrepresentation |
Public URL | https://keele-repository.worktribe.com/output/422649 |
Files
This file is under embargo until Jul 8, 2025 due to copyright restrictions.
You might also like
(What) Can Deep Learning Contribute to Theoretical Linguistics? (vol 31, pg 617, 2021)
(2022)
Journal Article
Linguistic intuitions: Evidence and method
(2021)
Journal Article
Empiricism, syntax, and ontogeny
(2021)
Journal Article
Reference and morphology*
(2022)
Journal Article
Public language, private language, and subsymbolic theories of mind
(2022)
Journal Article
Downloadable Citations
About Keele Repository
Administrator e-mail: research.openaccess@keele.ac.uk
This application uses the following open-source libraries:
SheetJS Community Edition
Apache License Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/)
PDF.js
Apache License Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/)
Font Awesome
SIL OFL 1.1 (http://scripts.sil.org/OFL)
MIT License (http://opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.html)
CC BY 3.0 ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
Powered by Worktribe © 2024
Advanced Search