The Necessity of Conceivability (2022)
Journal Article
Allen, S., & Cumpa, J. (2022). The Necessity of Conceivability. Synthese, 200(2), 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03534-z

In his conceivability argument, Chalmers assumes that all properties have their causal powers contingently and causal laws are also contingent. We argue this claim conflicts with how conceivability itself must work for the conceivability argument to... Read More about The Necessity of Conceivability.

Powers and the Hard Problem of Consciousness: Conceivability, Possibility and Powers (2022)
Journal Article
Allen. (2022). Powers and the Hard Problem of Consciousness: Conceivability, Possibility and Powers. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-022-00451-3

Do conceivability arguments work against physicalism if properties are causal powers? By considering three different ways of understanding causal powers and the modality associated with them, I will argue that most, if not all, physicalist powers the... Read More about Powers and the Hard Problem of Consciousness: Conceivability, Possibility and Powers.

Can metaphysical structuralism solve the plurality problem? (2018)
Journal Article
Allen. (2018). Can metaphysical structuralism solve the plurality problem?. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 722-746. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2018.1544732

Metaphysics has a problem with plurality: in many areas of discourse, there are too many good theories, rather than just one. This embarrassment of riches is a particular problem for metaphysical realists who want metaphysics to tell us the way the w... Read More about Can metaphysical structuralism solve the plurality problem?.